No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Chinese Construction Companies in Angola: A Local Linkages Perspective
Abstract
China tends to spearhead its economic overtures to African countries through high-level bilateral negotiations. These are frequently in the form of China Exim Bank loans for large-scale infrastructure projects, repaid by resource exports to China. While much is made of China's resource-based activities in Africa, less focus is placed on the converse of this relationship—the infrastructure provision that African resources buy from China. This article takes the positions that local linkages development is one of the clearest ways that African countries can benefit from Chinese construction companies' market engagement. The prevailing view is that Chinese companies contracted to undertake the construction projects financed in this way do not use local labour, materials or any other inputs in the undertaking of their contracts. Focusing on the strategic orientation of large Chinese companies state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in Angola's construction sector, this article seeks to uncover the determinants of their sourcing behaviour, and the manner in which this is reflected in their use of local inputs.
... Chinese companies integration into African market is growing over years. Since 2005, China won 32% of their total international revenue from African countries [1]. ...
... where d s (1) :effective depth to compression rebar, d s (2) :effective depth to tension rebar,ƹ cu3 :strain of concrete ↋ sd (1) :strain of compression rebar, and ↋ sd (2) :strain of tension rebar. Non-prestressing reinforcement are provided in top of the section to not only improve the strength in compression zone, but also increase the curvature at failure and improve ductility. ...
... where d s (1) :effective depth to compression rebar, d s (2) :effective depth to tension rebar,ƹ cu3 :strain of concrete ↋ sd (1) :strain of compression rebar, and ↋ sd (2) :strain of tension rebar. Non-prestressing reinforcement are provided in top of the section to not only improve the strength in compression zone, but also increase the curvature at failure and improve ductility. ...
Precast composite structures are new trend in construction technology in China due to their high sustainability and structural performance. As Chinese construction companies enter Africa continuously, the Chinese developed technologies are increasingly applied in Africa. A novel precast prestressing composite structure, developed in China, is believed to have a good prospect in Africa. In this study, a design method of the novel precast structure based on the African design system was developed to promote the application in Africa. The structural design systems in Africa and China were compared to help designers know the difference between the two design systems and develop a better design method for the new precast prestressed composite frame in Africa. It can be found that the basic theory of the two design systems is similar, but the technical design parameters and equations are different. The structural design method of the novel precast structure was built with African design system. The basic structural design steps based on the limit state method according to Eurocodes were established, and the seismic design process for the novel precast structure was also developed based on equivalent lateral seismic force method. Some important structural details of the novel frame for earthquakes based on African manner were presented. The developed detailed design method of the novel structure was applied by designing a four storey novel building structure expected in Huye City at Southern Province of Rwanda. The design results were validated by comparison with results of the novel four storey building structure constructed in Suzhou, China. It is shown that both design systems provide safe design since all the results are within allowable limit, and the Chinese design method is more economical but the African design method is more conservative.
... As state-owned companies, they are prone to be controlled by the government for both international and domestic agenda (Victor et al., 2012). Such Many of China's state-owned and private corporations in Angola intend to gain access to national development assistance projects-directed for their own personal interests-through contacts with local politicians and other political elites in Angola (Corkin, 2012). This leads to foreign intervention in Angola's internal politics as verified by an MFL official and a former Angolan diplomat (Corkin, 2012). ...
... Such Many of China's state-owned and private corporations in Angola intend to gain access to national development assistance projects-directed for their own personal interests-through contacts with local politicians and other political elites in Angola (Corkin, 2012). This leads to foreign intervention in Angola's internal politics as verified by an MFL official and a former Angolan diplomat (Corkin, 2012). Hence, China has been penetrating its influence within Angola's domestic affairs, which is now growing significantly. ...
... This situation is due to the nature of ownership, not only from the infrastructure financing mechanism, but also from the Chinese contractors themselves (Corkin, 2012). Corkin It is evident that Chinese companies or contractors, both state-owned and privateowned, are unlikely to increase local participation (Corkin, 2012). ...
China is experiencing a fast and dynamic phase of economic development driven by its fast pace of industrialisation. The vast energy demand has pushed China to import energy from other countries with plentiful natural resources. To this aim, China conducts economic diplomacy worldwide, including Angola, a country with plentiful natural resources in Africa. The main concern of this research is China's economic diplomacy which is considered as a form of neocolonialism in this globalisation era. Therefore, the research question of this research is why China's economic diplomacy towards Angola constitutes neocolonialisation. To this aim, this study utilises the Neocolonialism theory in dissecting China's Economic Diplomacy against Angola. This study uses qualitative method with a case study approach using secondary data. Thus, the basis for this research is the author's interpretation. This research concludes that China's economic diplomacy towards Angola constitutes neocolonialisation since the economic means that China exerts on Angola enables China to indirectly control Angola's politics, economy and natural resources, which in turn leads to Angola's dependence on China.
... Deng et al. (2014) find that an appropriate emergency framework is an effective guarantee to ensure the operation efficiency of the project and can address the vulnerability of political risks [3]. In addition, Corkin (2012) believes that increased interaction with the government will promote the operation efficiency of the project [4]. Wu et al. (2015) believe that Chinese enterprises should pay more attention to labor protection, enviro nmental protection and anti-corruption in order to fundamentally solve other problems [5]. ...
... Deng et al. (2014) find that an appropriate emergency framework is an effective guarantee to ensure the operation efficiency of the project and can address the vulnerability of political risks [3]. In addition, Corkin (2012) believes that increased interaction with the government will promote the operation efficiency of the project [4]. Wu et al. (2015) believe that Chinese enterprises should pay more attention to labor protection, enviro nmental protection and anti-corruption in order to fundamentally solve other problems [5]. ...
The strategy of “One Belt One Road” can not only promote common development and prosperity among countries, but also enhance mutual understanding and trust, strengthening all-round exchanges between countries. Based on the current situation that Chinese engineering enterprises lack experience in countries along the route, this paper mainly provides inspiration and conclusions for enterprises through the study and analysis of two cases.
... Many commentators have raised concerns about China's expanding economic presence in Africa. They have warned about a lack of transparency, the hiring of Chinese instead of local workers, the creation of unsustainable debt, the promotion of China's commercial interests ahead of the borrowing country's needs, and a lack of good governance [36][37][38][39][40]. As discussed in this paper and elsewhere [120][121][122], it is likely that there is little truth and much myth-making and fearmongering in these allegations. ...
... Twinoburyo [92] argued that, despite apparently low interest rates, Chinese project loans are actually expensive, doubleedged relationships. Most construction materials must be imported from China even when they can be procured locally at a cheaper price [37,130]. Brautigam and Gallagher [72] advocated that African countries should insist on greater levels of local procurement. ...
Increasingly common methods for financing public infrastructure in developing economies are Resources-for-Infrastructure (R4I) and Resource-Financed Infrastructure (RFI), usually involving Chinese financial institutions and Chinese construction companies. Although there are advantages to the borrowing country from these project financing arrangements, there are also various issues and governance challenges. In Uganda, expectations around future revenue from oil extraction have led to many infrastructure projects being commissioned, mostly funded by RFI arrangements. To consider the appropriateness of these arrangements and to reflect on whether they are likely to contribute to positive development outcomes or be examples of the resource curse, we examined four public infrastructure projects: Kampala–Entebbe Expressway; Karuma Hydroelectric Dam; Isimba Hydroelectric Dam; and the Malaba to Kampala section of the East Africa Standard Gauge Railway. Although R4I/RFI arrangements are viewed positively by some commentators, others (especially local companies) consider they lack transparency, create unsustainable debt, promote China’s interests over the borrowing country, increase unemployment, unfairly compete with local business, deal in corruption, have poor working conditions, and result in substandard construction. Nevertheless, we conclude that Uganda and other developing countries have generally benefited from Chinese-funded infrastructure, and there is more myth trap than debt trap. However, to ensure positive development outcomes, governments and construction companies should ensure compliance with international standards, especially relating to: environmental and social impact assessment; human rights; benefit-sharing arrangements; livelihood restoration; and project-induced displacement and resettlement.
... It is understandable since more and more conflicts result from the inappropriate behavior of Chinese employees and construction enterprises. For example, Corkin [65] pointed out that Chinese companies in Africa have a reputation for being reluctant to hire local labor, preferring to bring labor from China, which causes discontent among jobseeking Angolans. In 2016, about 200 local youths expressed their discontent over not being able to share employment opportunities and injured 14 Chinese workers on a Chinesefunded railroad project in West Narok County, Kenya (case 10). ...
... The huge cultural difference between China and Africa has exacerbated the conflicts and tensions between Chinese employees and the locals. Corkin [65] has found that many Chinese and Angolan interviewees showed their contempt for each other. Except for the lack of local labor, the locals believe that Chinese employees are taking away their wealth. ...
In recent years, more and more construction enterprises are expanding into overseas markets, especially in underdeveloped regions such as Africa. Compared to domestic construction projects, international construction projects have been faced with more uncertainties and increased levels of safety risks to the employees in the context of political turmoil, racism, and religious conflict in the host country. This study aims to answer what risk factors contribute to the threat to the safety of overseas employees and how safety risk factors interact, using employees from Chinese international construction companies (CICCs) in Africa as an example. A total of 39 safety risk factors were selected by literature review and case study based on Heinrich’s Domino Theory of Accident Causation. To identify the critical safety risk sources and significant risk paths, a questionnaire survey was conducted among 208 professionals who have participated in construction projects in Africa. Using structural equation modeling (SEM), a total of twelve critical risk paths and five controllable risk sources were identified. The improper behaviors of the CICCs and their employees were shown to have the largest impact on the safety of Chinese employees, through the mediating effect of the criminal offense. This study provides some insights into safety risk management in international construction projects. Meanwhile, the quantitative approach proposed can also be used by other international companies or governments in identifying the safety risk paths of their overseas workers involved in international construction projects.
... The high interest rates of these loans and concerns about the quality/transparency of these projects also cast doubts of the cost-effectiveness of the loans. China's in-road footprint in Africa has been identified to include a strategy of loans and infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan African countries (Corkin, 2012). While substantial similarities, such as a focus on extraction of natural resources, trade partnerships, diplomacy and construction of infrastructural projects, can be observed in the activities of colonial Britain and current China foreign policy in Africa, studies and trends have indicated that the approach employed by China is quite different and unique, with engagements with beneficiary nations strategically shaped to promote China's economic interests and global positioning, rather than political influence or territorial considerations (Kaplinsky et al, 2010). ...
The economic renaissance of China has transformed the Sub-Saharan Africa from economic stagnation to an emerging economy. This transition was mainly spurred by Chinese investments, loans, aids and reliefs in different aspects of economy. However, there is binary bipolar debate regarding the motives and methods of Chinese engagement in Africa and the outcomes that followed it. While one group sees this engagement as purely economical and mutually beneficial, the other group frowns upon this engagement and sees it as a mirage of development and progress. Agreeing with this concept of mirage, a substantial segment of this group sees this engagement as a new form of colonialism. They draw parallels between the motives and methods of former colonizers in this region with that of China. They devise arguments from the economic, political, cultural realities of Chinese engagement in Africa. However, as they don't fixate the focus neither on one colonial model nor on any specific geographic region, these studies fall short in focus, clarity and precision, undermining its depth and breadth. To fill this knowledge gap, the present study has fixated the geographical focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and colonial focus on former British colonizers to provide a more focused and nuanced understanding of the complexities surrounding China's engagement in Africa and its implications for regional dynamics. This is achieved by critically exploring the economic footprints of China and former British colonizers in Sub-Saharan Africa and drawing similarities and differences among these two in terms of their motives, methods and outcomes. As such, this research not only provides a focused perspective that is lost in broader studies, but also provides a nuanced understanding that is important for policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders in making informed decisions.
Keyword: China in Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, British Colonialism, Colonialism, Neo-colonialism, Financial Inflow, China, Britain, economic renaissance, Chinese investments, Sino optimism, Sino pessimism
Reference
Okafor, C., Fatema, B. and Okafor, T., 2024. Is China the new Britain in Sub-Saharan Africa? Exploring the purpose of financial inflow to Sub-Saharan African countries from a neo-colonial lens. BAM2024 Conference, Nottingham Trent University. ISBN 978-9-9956413-7-2.
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4950698 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4950698
... Fourthly, studies have shown that Chinese construction companies, for example, have weak linkages with local economies (Corkin, 2012). In other words, Chinese firms mainly import their workforce, materials, and equipment. ...
Infrastructure acts as a catalyst for human and economic development and is critical to the general functioning of a society. It defines a country’s international competitiveness and creates jobs (Chen, 2018). However, in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), it is well documented that, in terms of the most common measures of infrastructure development, the region typically lags behind most developing regions (Calderon et al., 2018). Although the region is abundantly rich in natural resources, with discoveries being continuously made, the lack of infrastructure remains one of the significant obstacles to sustaining economic development in the region. Given the constraints on traditional sources of infrastructure finance, resources-for-infrastructure (R4I) deals present one of the most promising financing techniques for bridging the infrastructure gaps in SSA (Halland et al., 2014). Its potential use, however, begs the question of whether R4I deals guarantee remunerative returns by ensuring the mutuality of benefits between host nations and foreign developers. In answering this question, we used a theoretical or doctrinal approach. Although certain aspects of R4I deals as a financing mechanism are flawed, this mechanism can be leveraged to address the huge infrastructure deficit in the region. This paper thus informs policymakers on the aspects of R4I deals that need reform.
... From the long list of those who entered, the trio Duarte, Santos and Tjonneland (2014) mention the following companies: Jiangsu Company, China State Construction Engineering Corporation, Guangxi International Construction, and China Road and Bridge Corporation. These Chinese companies now have operations in all levels of construction, from building housing units in Luanda and 17 other provinces to repairing roads, constructing schools, hospitals, stadiums and condominiums, and also repairing railways and airports (Corkin 2012a). Most of these Chinese companies are competitive in the construction sector partially because their construction business practices keep prices of construction low, accompanied by long workdays. ...
Background: China’s international relations with Africa have recently received much attention from the community of international relations scholars and practitioners. Even though such a scholarly conversation has become a hot topic, little attention has been paid to the Chinese multinational corporations’ (MNCs) adherence to and practice of corporate social responsibilities in African countries like Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Aim: This study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of China’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements in both Angola and DRC.
Setting: Based on historical sensibility, this research article uses Zambia’s political and economic fertile grounds to revisit what drives the Chinese engagement in Zambia within a historical context.
Methods: Methodologically, this research article has deployed the use of document review to assemble the data used.
Results: This article has discovered that China has not been adhering to the international norms and expectations of CSR in both countries.
Conclusion: China’s international relations with Africa, Angola and the DRC in context do not at all serve the interests of Africans but those of China.
Contribution: This article has contributed in terms of bringing an awareness among Africans about the conduct of China and her multinational corporations in the continent. This will then deepen the current scholarly conversation on an urgent need for policy transformation in Angola and the DRC when it comes to matters of CSR.
... China's EXIM bank's export buyer's credits, for example, permit sourcing of 50% of inputs necessary for a project from non-Chinese contractors. Even in the case of the Chinese loan contracts financed by EXIM, Angola negotiated an agreement under which up to 30% of the contracts' value would be subcontracted to Angolan firms (Corkin, 2012). Still, many factors inherent in the beneficiary country's policy framework (such as a lack of local productive capacities, trade policies that facilitate the import of foreign products, and a lack of trained employees) have been identified as reducing the effect of local content policies. ...
In asking whether China’s growing economic power and international economic engagement increases or reduces the highly constrained industrial policy space associated with the contemporary neoliberal mode of regulation of international economic relations, it is argued that Chinese finance enlarges the
development policy space as it significantly helps fill infrastructure gaps, while focusing on big clusters of projects in the energy, transport and industry sectors. In addition, it provides finance free of the neoliberal conditionalities attached to Western-centred multilateral and private finance. Regarding trade and investment relations, Chinese agreements are shallow and grant national states the upper hand in relation to behind-border industrial policy measures in striking contrast to core countries’ neoliberal trade and investment agreements. Considerable emphasis is placed on the responsibility of the Global South to adopt measures enabling itself to seize the development opportunities derived from China’s internationalisation approach.
... The motivations and effects of international aid, trade, and investment have primarily been addressed in existing research on Chinese engagement with African nations through the prism of political economy (Corkin, 2012;Lu et al., 2017). The factors influencing Chinese aid to African nations vary by sector. ...
The emerging literature on China–Africa cooperation has provided some insight into human resource management (HRM) and organisation studies. More research is therefore needed, and this necessitates a deeper comprehension of how Chinese MNCs’ development and their increasingly apparent strategic interest/intent and capabilities could be conceptualised with implications for HRM. Therefore, this chapter explores international HRM practices in Africa and the implications of Chinese firms operating on the continent. The chapter reviewed the extant literature that has examined Chinese operations in Africa and the emerging implications of these operations for HRM research and practice. Specifically, we found that while resource-seeking remains the primary motive for Chinese internalisation in Africa, these internalisational strategies tend to vary in different industries and may also be determined by MNCs’ ownership structure. Moreover, given the similar cultural attributes (Chinese Confucianism and African Ubuntu) and differences in labour participation, there appears to be a crossvergence of HRM practices in Chinese MNCs operating in Africa, as well as the different adaptive measures implemented by Chinese MNCs to maintain their internationalisation intent.KeywordsChinaAfricaInternational HRMInternationalisation
... Local content policy supports the use of materials and products made in a country as opposed to those that are imported. There is an increasing interest in this concept as it is seen as an effective and easy way to support local economies and provide jobs (Belderbos & Sleuwaegen, 1997;Qiu & Tao, 2001;Corkin, 2012;Warner, 2011;Stephenson, 2013). ...
This study provides a brief overview of the state of play of the circular built environment in
Africa in 2020. It sets out the characteristics of the sector and explores how these could be
enhanced through circular economy approaches.
It shows that significant challenges face the African built environment and construction sector.
Rapid growth and limited capacity have meant that infrastructure and service backlogs are
increasing and significant proportions of urban populations have to turn to the informal sector
for their livelihoods and accommodation. Out-of-date and fragmented policy and regulatory
frameworks, as well as limited implementation and enforcement capacity, have resulted in
unregulated and sometimes dangerous and unhealthy living and working environments.
At the same time, there is a diverse and resilient tradition of indigenous construction in
Africa that creates comfortable, affordable buildings from local materials using local labour
without generating waste. The informal sector has found untapped economic trade and waste
opportunities which have resulted in increased access to affordable food, significant reductions
in waste and provided many with incomes.
A review of the strengths of and challenges facing existing and emerging practices can be
used to identify significant opportunities to integrate circular economy approaches within the
built environment and construction sectors in Africa. These opportunities include enhancing
standards of construction and maintenance; avoiding early obsolescence and ensuring the right
to repair; increasing upcycling and recycling of building materials and components; creating
simpler, locally sourced buildings; enhancing informal economy processes; developing waste
micro-grids; and supporting local organic waste recycling and soil fertility.
... This massive housing project of 20,000 apartments, situated 30 kilometers outside Luanda, the capital city of Angola, is one of several concrete products that have emerged from the selling of Angolan oil to China in exchange for housing and infrastructure over the last two decades. Such Sino-Angolan bilateral agreements, which see oil flow in one direction and machines, workers, and cement in the other (Cardoso, 2016;Schubert, 2017), have often been sealed, captured, and framed by the handshakes of politicians in suits, turning "high-level negotiations" (Corkin, 2012) into concrete and masculine visions of the architectures for the "New Angola." Without a doubt, since the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002, these buildings, as elsewhere, are representational; they convey the particular "political, social and cultural values of dominant classes and elite social groupings" (Rendell et al., 2000, p. 10), engendering a "distinct new consciousness" (Mercer, 2014, p. 17) in both space and society. ...
Kilamba, the first of the new centralities in Angola, is increasingly visible in recent urban scholarship about Luanda, further establishing it as the symbol of both this “new” post-war city and the “New Angola.” Within local discourses of progress, its emergence from within “petro-urbanism,” and its size and modern aesthetics are emphasized, while little attention has been directed towards understanding the actual contributions of its workers, particularly the women who spend a significant part of their day cleaning Kilamba’s apartments. In this paper, we combine a social reproduction framework with infrastructure studies to trace the labor of Kilamba’s female domestic workers, in order to demonstrate how their everyday practices uphold the status and materiality of this centrality, even as their work is invisibilized. In doing so, we understand their commentaries about this space, often refracted through descriptions of their homes, as critiques of the infrastructural priorities of the “New Angola.”
... Cette perspective résolument micro veut s'inscrire en complémentarité avec la littérature existant sur les entreprises chinoises en Afrique. En effet, s'il existe depuis quelques années des recherches de terrain approfondies rendant compte du fonctionnement des entreprises chinoises en Afrique (Lee 2009(Lee , 2017Corkin 2012 ;Kernen & Lam 2014 ;Lam 2017), ces travaux n'abordent qu'à la marge le quotidien et le ressenti des employés africains sur les chantiers chinois. ...
Au Cameroun, les « grands chantiers de l’émergence » servent à consolider le régime du président Paul Biya, mais représentent également de nouvelles opportunités d’emplois salariés sous contrat dans un pays marqué par leur rareté. En s’appuyant sur les récits d’ouvriers camerounais du barrage de Lom Pangar, cet article rend compte de la tension entre les avantages d’un emploi salarié et stable et la réalité du travail dans cette enclave chinoise caractérisée par des conditions de travail difficiles, des salaires bas et le maintien d’une grande précarité de l’emploi. Cette tension est renforcée par une organisation « raciale » du travail. Ainsi, quelle que soit la fonction des employés camerounais (manœuvres, conducteurs de machine, techniciens ou encore ingénieurs), ils sont toujours en position d’infériorité face aux employés chinois. Comme, dans les chantiers des entreprises chinoises au Cameroun, le nombre de travailleurs expatriés est beaucoup plus important qu’au sein des entreprises étrangères opérant dans le même secteur, chaque employé camerounais ou presque est sous les ordres directs d’un chef chinois. Dès lors, si les grèves dénoncent les conditions de vie et de travail sur le site, les récits que nous avons récoltés reviennent souvent sur les conflits, les bagarres et les frustrations engendrés par cette organisation raciale du travail.
... (Dogan et al., 2017, Yunus, 2021. Moreover, the industrial sector has often been influenced by Chinese infrastructure projects and contract sourcing behaviour (Abd Rahman, 2019;Corkin, 2012). ...
This study has utilised the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimator method to explore the spillover effects of "technology" and "knowledge" from foreign direct investment (FDI) on Malaysian labour productivity. The study focus was on Malaysian medium-low technology and low-technology industries from 2000 to 2018. The findings showed that the presence of FDI spillovers as diffusion channels that increased labour productivity were greater through "technology effects" compared to "learning effects" for both types of industries. A cross-comparison of the results on technological spillovers between investor countries revealed that Singaporean and Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) contributed the most significant technological effects in increasing Malaysian labour productivity, with the effects being most noticeable was in low-technology industries. These findings seem to suggest that the spillover effects of FDI are still concentrated in sectors with low-capacity technologies that commensurate with the required level of workforce capability. The negative relationship between "knowledge" spillovers and productivity found in this study seems to illustrate that the absorptive capacity of local workers to absorb high-skill-based technology from MNCs is still at a low level in both types of industries. This study has recommended that strategies and mechanisms should be devised accordingly to assist MNCs in their effort to improve knowledge and technology transfers, while simultaneously acknowledging the constraints of human factors, absorptive capacity, competition for resources or ethical dilemmas and cultural barriers.
... The Chinese construction firm follows the policy of no outsourcing and utilizing human resources, raw materials, and other resources of china only which motivates locals against Chinese workers/employees. It is the leading cause of xenophobia against Chinese workers in a setting of mega construction international projects (Corkin, 2012). ...
Leader opening and closing behaviors are assumed to foster high levels of employee exploration and exploitation behaviors, enhancing Project Success (PS) parameters by reducing the impact of Xenophobia (XP). Besides, previous studies relating to ambidextrous leadership (AL), and xenophobia, among CPEC projects in Pakistan and its implication for project success are inadequate. Hence, this study examines the mediating role of Xenophobia on the relationship between ambidextrous leadership and project success. The Study framework is established on ambidextrous theory. Data was collected from persons holding various key positions in the construction projects under CPEC – China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Total questionnaires of 570 were distributed, and 424 were returned. A convenient sampling technique was used. Hypotheses tests were performed via Smart PLS 3.0. Results show that the closing behavior of a leader positively affects the construction project’s success. In contrast, the opening behavior of the leader fails to establish with construction project’s success. Besides, Opening and closing leadership behavior have a negative relationship with Xenophobia. While Xenophobia has a negative effect on the construction project's success. Xenophobia mediated the relationship between Opening & closing leadership and a construction project’s success. Findings provide essential insights to owner-managers, policy-makers, and researchers for further understanding this research.
... One way to increase productivity in a sector is by increasing the technical, organisational and managerial skills of workers, making them more efficient and raising labour productivity (Lall, 1996). Many scholars find that Chinese companies operating in Africa provide some form of training or capacity building to their employees (Agbebi, 2019;Bashir, 2015;Chen et al., 2016;Corkin, 2012;Ellis et al., 2021;Lam, 2014;Li, 2016;Omoruyi, 2021;Oya & Schaefer, 2019;Rounds & Huang, 2017;Shen, 2015;Tang, 2016Tang, , 2019aTugendhat, 2021;Xia, 2019aXia, , 2021. Chinese firms are found to spend much time and energy in training their labour force in various ways. ...
African countries face an economic transformation gap. Given the large and growing Chinese presence on the African continent, a fundamental question is whether Chinese firms contribute to, or hinder, economic transformation in Africa. This article conducts a scoping review of over one hundred sources, examining the pathways through which Chinese firms can affect economic transformation. On balance, the literature points to a positive role of Chinese firms. Africa–China trade leads to mixed results, while Chinese investment and infrastructure construction are found to contribute positively to transformation. Chinese firms are also found to support capacity building, spillovers and innovation in African countries.
... Unlike traditional donors that focus on concessional aid flows (i.e., grants) that typically come with strings attached, the vast majority of Chinese aid is more commercial in nature (for example, see figure 1), made up of loans at or just below market interest rates and export credits, often with specific stipulations regarding repayment and the involvement of Chinese firms, particularly state-owned enterprises (SOEs; Bräutigam 2011;Dreher et al. 2021). Many high-profile projects, particularly in infrastructure, are funded through these less-concessional, and thus more-commercial, forms of Chinese aid flows, which frequently require the use of Chinese contractors and workers (Corkin 2012;Gransow 2015). Examples include the Bui Hydropower Station in Ghana Note: Excluding regional and territorial disbursements and cancelled, suspended, or pledged projects. ...
We examine the impact of China's commercially oriented forms of state financing, the dominant type of Chinese aid, on voting alignment between recipient countries and China in the United Nations General Assembly. Previous research has shown these types of aid flows to follow economic interests, suggesting they have no political ramifications. Given the principles, motives and process of China's foreign aid program, and the associated economic and political benefits to capital hungry recipient countries, we believe this to be a premature conclusion. We argue that recipients will respond to Chinese commercially oriented aid flows by aligning more closely their foreign policy with China's. We further argue that regime type will condition this relationship in that democracies will more strongly align with China than autocracies. Leveraging the global coverage of AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance dataset for the period 2000–2014, we find that Chinese commercial aid flows lead to recipients’ foreign policy alignment with China and that democracies strongly align with China in response to such flows while autocracies do not respond so. These results suggest that China's foreign aid yields political influence but in a way that has not yet been uncovered and that differs from other donors, old and new alike.
Examinamos el impacto de las formas de financiación estatal con fines comerciales de China, el tipo dominante de ayuda china, en la alineación de votos entre los países receptores y China en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Investigaciones anteriores han demostrado que este tipo de flujos de ayuda obedece a intereses económicos, lo que sugiere que no tiene ramificaciones políticas. Dados los principios, los motivos y el proceso del programa de ayuda exterior de China, y los beneficios económicos y políticos asociados a los países receptores hambrientos de capital, creemos que esta es una conclusión prematura. Sostenemos que los receptores responderán a los flujos de ayuda china orientados al comercio alineando más estrechamente su política exterior con la de China. Además, creemos que el tipo de régimen condicionará esta relación, ya que las democracias se alinearán de modo más sólido con China que las autocracias. Gracias a la cobertura global del conjunto de datos Global Chinese Official Finance de AidData para el periodo 2000–2014, descubrimos que los flujos de ayuda comercial china conducen a la alineación de la política exterior de los receptores con China, y que las democracias se alinean fuertemente con China en respuesta a dichos flujos, mientras que las autocracias no responden así. Estos resultados sugieren que la ayuda exterior de China produce influencia política, pero de una manera que aún no se ha descubierto y que difiere de la de otros donantes, tanto antiguos como nuevos.
Nous examinons l'impact des formes de financement commercialement orientées de l’État chinois, le type dominant de l'aide chinoise, sur l'alignement des votes entre les pays bénéficiaires et la Chine à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. De précédentes recherches ont montré que ces types de flux d'aide suivaient des intérêts économiques, en suggérant qu'ils n'avaient pas de ramifications politiques. Compte tenu des principes, des motivations et du processus du programme d'aide internationale de la Chine, ainsi que des avantages économiques et politiques associés pour les pays bénéficiaires avides de capitaux, nous pensons que cette conclusion est prématurée. Nous soutenons que les pays bénéficiaires réagissent aux flux d'aide commercialement orientés de la Chine en alignant plus étroitement leur politique étrangère sur celle de la Chine. Nous affirmons en outre que le type de régime conditionne cette relation dans la mesure où les démocraties s'alignent plus étroitement sur la Chine que les autocraties. Nous avons tiré profit de la couverture mondiale du jeu de données Global Chinese Official Finance (financement officiel chinois à l'internationale) d'AidData pour la période 2000–2014 et nous avons constaté que les flux d'aide commerciaux chinois amenaient les pays destinataires à aligner leur politique étrangère sur celle de la Chine et que les démocraties s'alignaient étroitement sur la Chine en réponse à ces flux alors que les autocraties ne réagissaient pas de cette manière. Ces résultats suggèrent que l'aide internationale de la Chine exerce une influence politique, mais d'une manière qui n'avait pas encore été découverte et qui diffère de celle des autres donateurs, anciens et nouveaux.
... Many other leaders, officials, and notable figures from across the continent have expressed similar views (Shangwe, 2017;The Economist, 2010). One persistent criticism of Chinese engagement in Africa has been that many projects built on the continent overwhelmingly rely on Chinese labor or resources, and fail to encourage local linkages (Alden, 2007;Cabestan, 2012;Corkin, 2012;Rocha, 2007). The reality, however, is more complicated, with much empirical work demonstrating that Chinese engagement can contribute to job creation, skills development, and technology and knowledge transfer (Brautigam, 2015;Brautigam et al., 2017;Calabrese and Tang, 2020;Chen et al., 2016;Sun et al., 2017;Tang, 2016). ...
Over the past several decades, the People’s Republic of China’s engagement with African countries has grown tremendously. China has emerged as Africa’s largest trading partner, while Chinese investment in and lending to African countries has grown rapidly. In Eritrea, a young, developing country located in the Horn of Africa, Chinese involvement has also considerably increased in recent years. However, although there has been extensive study of China’s partnerships across the continent, very little work has been dedicated to examining its ties with Eritrea. What are the history and current scale of involvement? What has been the impact of this engagement on Eritrean society? What are locals’ overall perceptions about the relationship or about China more generally? Utilizing a mix of qualitative research methods, including surveys, the current paper explores China’s engagement with Eritrea, adding to the voluminous, ever-growing body of literature and helping to diversify and deepen understanding of this important topic. Additionally, although various narratives about the China-Africa relationship have arisen, often led and framed by non-Africans, the present study broadens the discussion by offering local, African perspectives on China-Africa links. Engagement and cooperation between China and Eritrea are longstanding and extend to numerous areas, driven by a range of interests, while local perceptions are quite nuanced and largely consistent with many cross-national studies.
... Some of these include communication and cultural differences, bribery and corruption, conflict of interest, and lack of trust and transparency [86,87]. These risks affect negotiation and cause lengthy decision making and eventually the development and management of conditions of contract [88]. Poor contractual management has resulted in the failure of projects in meeting cost, time, and quality preferences. ...
Africa’s growth in public infrastructure provision has been fueled by the collective effort of the government authority and foreign private investors. China, through state-owned corporations, has become one of the leading infrastructure financier springing up numerous projects in transport, energy, oil and gas, water, and sewage sectors in Africa. Infrastructure procurement in developing countries comes with complexities and uncertainties. While Sino-Africa transnational public–private partnerships (TPPP) are becoming an increasingly popular route for public infrastructure procurement, their specific project risks and dynamics are not yet fully understood due to the typical assessment of risk autonomously. This paper identifies pertinent project risks in Sino-Africa TPPPs and applies system thinking in evaluating their behaviour and dynamics. An extensive review of literature and expert opinion employing semi-structured interviews was adopted in the identification and assessment of risk factors. Additionally, the study applied causal loop and interpretive structural modelling as an integrated approach in the assessment of risk behaviour from a systems perspective. Results indicate that risk factors associated with Sino-Africa TPPPs are interactive and portray curious systemic behaviour. Risk factors like force majeure and others associated with the governance structure and stability of the host African country are most influential, and their occurrence could inhibit project success. The study recommends that in conjunction with the conventional risk assessment by impact, systems thinking can be adopted to evaluate and comprehend the dynamics and interactions amongst the risk factors. This will improve risk assessment efficiency and fair allocation and treatment of risks as a conduit for project success and promote a win–win partnership for project actors.
... Nevertheless, a limited numbers of firms can accomplish the EPC mission, depending solely on their capabilities due to increased riskiness of EPC projects in the international construction market [14]. The majority of EPC contractors are building and construction firms; for example, Chinese EPC contractors' capacity is mainly in construction [12,15]. Because of the complexities and dynamic processes in the international EPC, many of the essential threats that crop up in EPC projects are outside the reach of the ability of the contractors to handle-for example, HSR infrastructure projects [16,17]. ...
Since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been put in practice by the Chinese government, several High-Speed Railways (HSR) have been built by Chinese Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) firms. However, many delays have created severe detrimental consequences on the progress of most HSR projects. This study sought to explore the essence of the recurring triggers of delays in international EPC HSR projects under the BRI, and a structured questionnaire survey approach was applied to compile the first-hand dataset from Chinese EPC firms working for BRI infrastructure projects. The data were evaluated, and the Relative Importance Index (RII) was adopted to assess the magnitude of the important delay triggers. The findings suggest that HSR projects are still susceptible to unavoidable delays in global construction infrastructure projects. In the engineering phase, improper management of the design, unsustainable land acquisition, and insufficient use of EPC joint venture are the salient trigger of delays. In the procurement phase, the leading causes of unsuitable procurement, undervalued procurement cost, inefficient logistics in labor and materials, improper planning, unqualified site supervisors, inefficient technical standard management, and inefficient constant payment terms are likely to trigger delays in the construction phase HSR projects. Five critical groups of delay factors are identified by this study, which has an essential primary contribution to the body of knowledge and is helpful to EPC contractors working for HSR projects under BRI.
... The SWOT analysis identified an EPC contract's essential issues in the West Asian construction markets, including low management ability and high information communication cost (Corkin 2012). In terms of contracting, the cost-profit is crucial to achieving a competitive edge at international competitiveness. ...
... 10). In Angola, for example, Corkin (2012) finds an interesting situation. The study reports that the acutely inadequate supply of skilled local labour has resulted in a situation where the scant skilled labour has become 'artificially' expensive. ...
In this paper, we explore the logics, persistence, and evolving perspectives on Chinese labour regime in Africa. We find that Chinese firms’ labour practices engender abuse via casualisation of labour, low remuneration, and a general lack of adherence to occupational safety. Contrarian studies however demonstrate variations among Chinese firms’ labour practices as mediated by the labour dynamics of host countries, labour specificities and industrial capitalism dynamics. We end by questioning the ‘talent gap’ dynamics in Africa in relation to Chinese firms’ managerial hiring practices and call for an engaged scholarship on how Chinese investment in Africa’s human resource base is altering the ‘talent gap’ phenomenon.
... The SWOT analysis identified an EPC contract's essential issues in the West Asian construction markets, including low management ability and high information communication cost (Corkin 2012). In terms of contracting, the cost-profit is crucial to achieving a competitive edge at international competitiveness. ...
Engineering procurement and construction (EPC) is a normative practice globally approved since China has been engaging in international cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure development. EPC has been adopted in the delivery of BRI infrastructure projects in other countries. Compared to the domestic method of contract, EPC remains at a low level in management practice, such as a lack of coordinating diverse project stakeholders, high cost of information communication, and risk in complex environments in West Asia (WA). However, no research has conducted a strategic analysis of the current situation of EPC for BRI infrastructure projects in West Asian countries. This study aims to understand the current status quo of EPC for BRI projects in WA by performing a strength, weakness, opportunity, and threats (SWOT) analysis and with the support of data collected from the literature review and semi-structured interviews with EPC stakeholders. The study brings awareness along which internally and externally circumstances of the EPC for BRI infrastructure projects can be perceived by major stakeholders participating. The four critical strategies presented based on the SWOTs identified could help EPC firms develop and promote EPC to implement BRI infrastructure projects in WA at the strategic level.
... Capability to offer a lower price for construction services (Cheah, Kang and Chew, 2007) Long-term partnerships with low-cost equipment and material suppliers (Chen et al., 2007) Capability to trade debt for local resources, such as wood, land and minerals (Corkin, 2011) Capability to offer all types of technical, construction associated services and funding options to their clients (Low and Jiang, 2003) Capability to offer and deliver all types of contract agreements to their clients, such as build/design and build/engineering, procurement and construction/build, operate and transfer (Low and Jiang, 2003) Shortlisted Organisational Strategies ...
Chinese enterprises are presently dominating various sectors of businesses abroad, offering a wide range of low to high-end quality products and services. The construction sector in Africa is now being dominated by Chinese multinational contractor companies, who find in Africa their next preferable market to grow. The available literature on the field has serious gaps in explaining which organisational strategies increase the competitive advantage and the market dominance of Chinese multinational contractors, especially in the Southern African region. This research aims to uncover the organisational strategies, implemented by Chinese multinational contractors operating in the Southern African region, who have paved the way and consolidated their success in the region. Through a mixed methods process, qualitative and quantitative data are obtained. The construction markets of the Southern African region are analysed (environmental analysis) and the main multinational Chinese contractors are identified, through a literature review and organisational analysis. Several organisational strategies are shortlisted and, finally, through an online questionnaire, the opinions of the participants to rank the organisational strategies previously identified in terms of contribution to the actual success, copying capability, etc., are carried out. The findings revealed that the capability to offer a lower price for construction services, the easy access to loans and funds from the organisation's home government and the capability to trade debt for local resources, such as wood, land and minerals are the organisational strategies that mostly contributed to the recent Chinese contractor dominance in the Southern African construction market.
This paper discusses and conceptualises the notion of Chineseness as related to infrastructure projects in Ghana and Africa more generally. Based on fieldwork in Ghana and secondary literature, our study combines two aspects. On the one hand, we undertake a nationality and origin-based analysis of all the elements (ownership, financing, design, consulting, construction standards, materials and equipment, labour practices) making up Chinese infrastructure projects in Ghana. On the other hand, we include perceptions of such projects as Chinese. Our analysis identifies different degrees of Chineseness in Ghana’s infrastructure projects, what we also describe as “diluted Chineseness.” We find that even projects perceived as “fully Chinese” are populated by other international and local actors. Our study further reveals how portrayals of such infrastructure projects as “fully Chinese” are used by different actors to push different agendas – at times expressing opposite views about the Chinese presence in Africa.
As one of 16 landlocked countries in Africa, Zambia, with its copper-dependent economy, is particularly reliant on transport infrastructure that links its economic heartlands, the capital Lusaka as well as the Copper Belt, with ports in neighbouring countries. This chapter discusses the rise of the Zambian infrastructure state under the Patriotic Front (PF) which, after coming to power in 2011, embarked on an ambitious “development-through-infrastructure” agenda. Driven by the imaginary of a “land-linked” Zambia, the PF-led government relied heavily on Chinese loans and export credits to finance road development. The chapter reveals how Lusaka’s infrastructure developmentalism colluded with the peculiarities of Chinese supply-/supplier-driven loan financing, resulting in the Sino-Zambian “road bonanza” that contributed to rapid sovereign debt accumulation. It is shown how Zambia’s deteriorating financial situation expedited the commodification of Zambian roads through tolling and fostered the renaissance of public–private partnerships.
This chapter provides a necessary state-theoretical complement to David Harvey’s spatio-temporal fix. It fist engages the existing literature on African state agency in Sino-African relations. While political elites play a central role in co-determining Sino-African encounters, African state agency must not be reduced to elite agency. The chapter also assesses the value of the neopatrimonialism literature. Instead of pathologising “the” neopatrimonial African state, the chapter suggests that the coexistence and interpenetration of legal-bureaucratic and patrimonial types of domination must be analysed in conjunction with (global) capital accumulation. Lastly, the chapter introduces the strategic-relational approach and its social relational state ontology. Understanding the state as a strategic-relational domain allows us to analyse the strategies of specific state actors within the strategically selective structural context they find themselves in. The conclusion provides the “theoretical synthesis” of the main concepts introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 which allows for a strategic-relational analysis of the Chinese infrastructural fix in Africa.
Chinese investments in African infrastructure markets are crucially co-determined by political and institutional context factors in host countries. This chapter problematises neopatrimonial strategic selectivities of the Zambian infrastructure state and the practice of “not so public” procurement which has expedited the Chinese infrastructural fix in Zambia’s road sector through highly personalised exchanges among Chinese and Zambian elites and opaque procurement processes for road projects. Looking at the case of the “20 per cent subcontracting policy”, the chapter illustrates how Zambian state actors have strategically employed a combination of both formal and informal modes of governance to “zambianise” the country’s booming road construction sector. The chapter then examines the case of the Lusaka-Ndola dual carriageway. This analysis, at a more concrete level, illustrates the strategic shift towards project finance, discussed in Chapter 6, and the interweaving of formal and informal practices in the appraisal and procurement of Chinese-funded road projects.
Chinese FDI and their impact have been studied by many scholars but findings remain inconclusive. Many articles are descriptive, sometimes offering cautious conclusions along the lines of Chinese FDI in Africa ‘has produced both positive and negative effects’. Others claim that on balance Chinese engagement has been positive. To use Deborah Bräutigam’s words, this is where ‘the academic literature on Chinese investment in Africa is thin’. The goal of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of the scholarly analysis thus far and to examine where the existing work needs methodological refinement or more empirical findings, which otherwise may offer only a partial picture. Several, critical issues are addressed, such as blending of concepts of spillovers, linkages and knowledge transfer, unwarranted generalizations based on sectoral studies or neglecting the structural problems underpinning African industries and economies. Lastly, it lays out a non-exhaustive list of reasons explaining the relative lack of linkages or spillover effects from Chinese companies to local African firms. It argues that expectations of substantial linkage or spillover effects from Chinese manufacturing investments in Africa may be in fact misplaced, which fits with a more general pattern of extractivist Sino–African economic relations.
This chapter offers a comprehensive and up-to-date evaluation of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa, with a specific focus on the motives, profiles and strategies of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Drawing on fieldwork and extensive interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders and 50 Chinese companies in Zambia and Angola in 2019, the chapter sheds light on the considerable heterogeneity that exists amongst firms operating in Africa. The chapter goes beyond a surface-level examination by exploring the diverse motivations, including both push and pull factors that drive Chinese investment in these two Southern African countries. By challenging prevailing misconceptions and offering nuanced insights, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Moreover, it argues that African agency should be also viewed through the lens of policy implementation and the ability to drive fundamental structural change.
The Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect Eurasia, African and Asian countries in several ways. To achieve this objective, huge investments in the construction sector funded by China in various participating countries are underway. Some megaprojects had achieved great success. However, dissenting voices were expressed in some participating countries. As such, there is a need to study the real benefits of BRI by the receiving countries. This study therefore aims to examine the impact of the BRI on Malaysia's construction sector by identifying the long-run relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows from China to Malaysia and the development of Malaysia's construction sector during the period 1991-2018 using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach. The empirical results signify positive impact of FDI inflows from China on the development of Malaysia's construction sector. This finding suggests that Malaysia should continue to implement an open-door policy for the influx of FDI from China and collaborate with China in planning and executing construction projects in order to stimulate the development of construction sector and to sustain the long-run economic growth. It is highly likely that the FDI inflow from China, in particular the FDI involving high-technology, enable the local labours to gain from the benefits of technology transfer and subsequently enjoy the upliftment of skill-set. In order to ensure the success of BRI-linked projects in stimulating the development of Malaysian construction sector, a competent team should be formed in Malaysia to monitor the progress of each BRI-linked project to avoid falling into any debt trap situation, any loss of national sovereignty, as well as to ensure adherence to the spirit of the agreements signed between the donor and recipient of BRI projects. RESUMEN La Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta pretende conectar Eurasia, los países africanos y asiáticos de varias maneras. Para lograr este objetivo, se están realizando enormes inversiones en el sector de la construcción financiadas por China en varios países participantes. Algunos megaproyectos han logrado un gran éxito. Sin embargo, en algunos países participantes se han expresado voces discordantes. Por ello, es necesario estudiar los beneficios reales de la BRI por parte de los países receptores. Por lo tanto, este estudio tiene como objetivo examinar el impacto de la BRI en el sector de la construcción de Malasia mediante la identificación de la relación a largo plazo entre las entradas de inversión extranjera directa (IED) de China a Malasia y el desarrollo del sector de la construcción de Malasia durante el período 1991-2018 utilizando el enfoque de retardo distribuido autorregresivo (ARDL). Los resultados empíricos indican un impacto positivo de las entradas de IED de China en el desarrollo del sector de la construcción de Malasia. Esta conclusión sugiere que Malasia debería seguir aplicando una política de puertas abiertas para la entrada de IED procedente de China y colaborar con este país en la planificación y ejecución de proyectos de construcción para estimular el desarrollo del sector de la construcción y mantener el crecimiento económico a largo plazo. Es muy probable que la afluencia de IED de China, en particular la que implica alta tecnología, permita a los trabajadores locales beneficiarse de las ventajas de la transferencia de tecnología y, por consiguiente, disfrutar de la mejora del conjunto de competencias. Para garantizar el éxito de los proyectos vinculados a la BRI a la hora de estimular el desarrollo del sector de la construcción malasio, debería formarse un equipo competente en Malasia para supervisar el progreso de cada uno de los proyectos vinculados a la BRI para evitar caer en cualquier situación de trampa de la deuda, cualquier pérdida de soberanía nacional, así como para garantizar la adhesión al espíritu de los acuerdos firmados entre el donante y el receptor de los proyectos de la BRI. Palabras clave: Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta; sector de la construcción; China; crecimiento económico; Malasia; enfoque ARDL Clasificación JEL: H54; O11; F10 Recibido: 23 de Octubre de 2021 Aceptado: 21 de Mayo de 2022
This article focuses on the launch by the Chinese company Huawei of ICT academies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Kenya especially. Existing literature shows contrasting findings concerning the impact of such formation and recruitment centres. Through high-level thematic and sentiment analyses, this article examines various Huawei accounts on social networking sites (SNSs) – that is, Facebook and Twitter – in order to better assess: (1) the kind of online corporate communication unfolded by the company with particular regard to these centres; and (2) how the advertising of such centres is perceived by users. The results suggest that Huawei’s online corporate requires better fine-tuning with local SNSs’ users.
The past two decades have witnessed increasing scholarly analysis of China’s growing presence in Africa. How does African agency operate within the asymmetric power relations between China and African states? How do African actors use foreign-sponsored projects to achieve domestic objectives? Some analyses take a China-centered perspective, with divergent views about how Chinese economic engagement promotes or inhibits African development. Scholarly work increasingly recognizes the agency of African actors. I advance upon the African agency argument by proposing a concept of presidential extraversion. I argue that Chinese-sponsored projects in Africa have coincided with the host ruler’s strategies for political survival. Internationally, African rulers have strategized among their available options to ensure that the state received foreign finance and services on the most favorable terms. Domestically, they have instrumentalized Chinese-sponsored projects and loans to demonstrate their performance legitimacy and sustain patronage networks. I process-trace the Kenyan Standard Gauge Railway and Angolan Kilamba Kiaxi housing project, primarily relying on evidence collected in Kenya, Angola, and China from 2017 to 2019. The findings challenge the neo-dependency argument and show that despite Sino-African power asymmetry, African leaders have had the agency to shape this relationship to their advantage. The presidential extraversion argument advances upon African extraversion theory by locating the agency within the African political leaders rather than elites broadly.
Based on a 5 year European Research Council advanced grant project, this edited collection explores the genealogy of the corridor concept, the financing of road, rail and port projects, and the different configuration of corridors across the continent
Chinese state firms are expected not only to profit but also to serve state interests. But the Chinese state is fragmented: border provinces are taking on an expanded role in China's global expansion and a broad range of firm activities could be defined as patriotic contributions. Through the case of Yunnan State Farms (YSF), a province-level state-owned enterprise, this article explores how state firms interpret and navigate multiple state interests while also pursuing profit. The firm's ability to profit depends on balancing the demands and support of different Chinese state actors while depicting itself as a development partner to the Lao state and a contributor to Sino-Lao diplomatic relations and border region stability. This case thus shows that, instead of YSF's behaviour being directed by the state, the firm exercises considerable latitude in defining its contributions to state interests through the expansion of rubber production as a driver of development.
Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) in Africa are often criticized for hiring Chinese expatriates at the expense of native workers. This raises the possibility that Chinese MNCs, unlike most non-Chinese MNCs, fail to contribute to local employment or the skill improvement of native workers. In reality, the extent to which Chinese firms increase the number of expatriate workers varies widely across host countries. When does Chinese FDI increase the number of Chinese expatriate workers in a host country? Do Chinese MNCs rely more heavily on expatriate workers than do MNCs from other countries? To answer these questions, I conduct a cross-national analysis of a panel dataset of Chinese workers in 49 African host countries from 2000 to 2018. This study finds that Chinese FDI only increases the number of Chinese workers in host countries with weaker collective labor rights. In host countries featuring stronger collective labor rights, Chinese FDI does not increase the number of Chinese expatriate workers. The firm-level analysis of the African Investor Survey of 2010 also shows that Chinese MNCs hire more non-native workers than do non-Chinese MNCs only when investing in countries with weaker collective labor rights. These findings highlight the role of host countries’ institutions in conditioning the impact of FDI.
Chinese expatriate workers in Africa remain an under-researched and poorly understood group despite their large numbers. Based on data collected through interviews and participant observations during 2013 and 2014 among Chinese expatriate construction workers employed by a large-scale Chinese state-owned construction enterprise in Zambia, this article offers an analysis of their migration experience as it relates to the context of China’s growing economic involvement with Africa. This paper further argues that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Africa function as transnational social organizations to promote Chinese expatriate workers’ migration to Africa and provide them social support and care when they experienced difficulties during their sojourn. In this way, the patron–client relationship was formed between Chinese SOEs and Chinese expatriate workers, paralleling the existing employment relationship.
Huawei has built several training centres across Africa. This study establishes the purpose of these centres in Kenya and Nigeria and presents original data on their success based on their objectives. Fieldwork was conducted in 2018 and follow-up interviews continued by phone until 2021. I find that Huawe’s investments offer no significant opportunities for knowledge transfers that could foster technological or industrial upgrading in Kenya or Nigeria’s telecommunications sectors. In part, this is due to domestic obstacles in the host countries. But, like other international equipment vendors operating in the region, knowledge transfers are also hindered by the limited scope of Huawei’s investments and the boundaries on the knowledge it is willing to share with domestic employees. I conclude that Kenya and Nigeria’s governments may underestimate the leverage they have over international equipment vendors to induce more meaningful opportunities for knowledge transfer.
International staffing policies and practices of Chinese enterprises in Africa have given rise to a number of observations, critical comments, empirical support and rebuttals. One of the areas of research and critique has been the implications of the staffing policies and practices for knowledge and skills transfer to their African hosts. The availability of local skills and talent as constraints to change employment practices by Chinese enterprises has also received attention of researchers. We argue that the dominant international staffing models and theories are inadequate for a comprehensive understanding and critiquing of staffing practices of Chinese MNEs in Africa. Therefore, this paper adopted Zoogah, D. B., Peng, M. W., and Woldu, H. (2015a. Institutions, Resources, and Organizational Effectiveness in Africa. Academy of Management Perspectives, 29(1), 7–31) dynamic African business environment context to interrogate the utility of the dominant international staffing models and theories in order to understand and explain Chinese staffing policies and practices in Africa. The paper also used Chinese Multinational Construction Enterprises (CCMNEs) as a lens through which to examine the relevance of the African context. The paper advances a series of questions to guide future research. We argue that if pursued, the questions can help further our understanding of why the staffing policies and practices of multinational companies from emerging economies in Africa might focus on recruiting PCNs and the casualization of African workers.
Considering Chinese FDI in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the paper attempts to verify if the long-existing ‘flying geese’ paradigm (FGP) might be used to clarify the headway of Chinese migrating geese transmission of skills and job generation in SSA. Notably, since factory workers’ wages have increased in China, small but important migrating geese could, perhaps, be perceived as the vanguard of the flying geese – migrating to SSA to capitalize on those SSA nations with lower costs bases. As a result, the scientific task of this paper rests on answering three questions: Why do we have growing Chinese manufacturing activities in SSA? Are these new Chinese migrating geese bridging the unemployment gap and skills shortage? Also, since the Chinese migrating geese are moving to an environment where operations are cheaper, a third question is to specifically find out if the Chinese migrating geese are in Nigeria, and if they perceive local skills development and job creation to be a salient matter? Against this backdrop, the author argues that these Chinese migrating geese seem to contribute partly in transferring skills and job creation by standing-in as a worthwhile catalyst to upgrade the follower’s economy in the process of catching up a leader.
This paper investigates the technological impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) among developing markets on the host economy, as the distinctive features of FDI from developing countries may induce stronger technology-enhancing effect on the host developing nations than that of FDI from developed economies. Adopting the context of Chinese FDI in a set of 24 African nations during 2006–2017, we first separate structural change from total factor productivity (TFP) to obtain the technological progress series. We then account for spatial dependence in technological progress across countries by employing various spatial models; of these, the Spatial Durbin Model is found to best describe our data. We find that, first, both structural change and technological progress have contributed positively to TFP in Africa. Thus, the latter captures the pure technological change more accurately than TFP does. Second, Chinese FDI in Africa has had a positive and significant effect on the region's technological progress, whilst non-Chinese FDI (mainly from developed countries) has not, substantiating our expectation of stronger technological benefit for developing economies when FDI is from other developing nations. Finally, there had been negative spatial technological dependence across countries, implying a competitive rather than cooperative relationship among African nations.
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of China’s political and economic engagements with Africa, on its growth and development with specific focus on Angola and Rwanda as case studies. I examine the historical background of the relationship between China, Angola and Rwanda and the growing trade and investment between the three parties. The chapter explores Angola and Rwanda as specific cases studies and justifies their selection for investigating the impact of China on local development in Africa. I explore China’s trade and investment in these two countries, and further seeks to answer whether this trade and investment contributes to the overall economic development in these two African states. This is done by examining the aggregate economic growth and development in these two countries by analysing the gross domestic product (GDP) and the gross national income (GNI) indicators prior to 2002, when China was not yet a major trading partner in either of these countries.
This study examines the issues of linkage development pertaining to the Bui Hydropower Dam. ¹ 1 Hereafter called Bui Dam. Completed in 2013, the 400-megawatt hydropower facility was touted by the government to catalyse Ghana’s socio-economic transformation. However, while the Chinese contractor delivered the physical edifice to the Ghanaian government, the dam’s material benefits have yet to materialize. The inability to instigate economic linkages from the project has sparked debate in research and policy circles in Ghana. While some scholars reference local factors, others cite external elements, including the demands of Chinese actors and financiers as the cause of the limited economic linkages the dam created in the Ghanaian economy. This paper explores these counterpropositions. Drawing from exploratory mixed-method research, the paper asserts that although linkage creation is mediated by internal and external factors, the former is more salient when it comes to engagement with China.
We explore why resource-financed infrastructure—whereby developing countries pledge future resource revenues to repay infrastructure loans—mitigates credit rationing in poorly governed countries. Using a novel project-level database, we find that the loan sizes for resource-financed infrastructure are much larger than those determined by the traditional government infrastructure purchasing model especially in poorly governed countries. We use the credit rationing model to explain these empirical patterns. The traditional government infrastructure purchasing model suffers from two limitations: the borrowing government may steal infrastructure funds, or fail to make a credible commitment to using taxation to repay its sovereign infrastructure loans. The new financing model solves such problems by allocating loans directly from the lender to the contractor minimizing government corruption, and channeling resource revenues into an independent escrow account to repay infrastructure loans. Our findings highlight that this new infrastructure financing model can alleviate credit rationing in poorly governed, resource-rich countries.
Based on original empirical data collected through an interview and questionnaire survey, this paper analyzes the intentions, strategies, and risk management perspectives of Chinese construction firms (CCFs) active in Africa. It summarizes the qualitative evidence from the survey and the main trends that emerge from analyzing the data as a whole. The study offers a unique look into the mindset and philosophy of the biggest players in the Chinese construction industry, at a time when they are expanding aggressively beyond their traditional home market into Africa and beyond.
It has long been recognised that the actors involved in crafting and implementing China’s foreign policy are not always in agreement. This paper argues that the prioritisation of commercial outreach over purely political objectives in Africa has led to a shift in influence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). To that end, the paper examines the rising prominence of China Exim Bank’s concessional loans as a foreign policy instrument in Africa along with the process through which they are negotiated and implemented. Using the case of Angola, this paper shows how despite formal institutional equality, the MOFCOM is playing a far more influential role than the MFA is in defining the direction of China’s foreign policy toward Africa.
This article is to analyze the impact of Chinese enterprises on the local employment practices in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Based on surveys of over 100 Chinese and local companies and extensive interviews with managers and policy-makers in both countries made from July to December 2007, the study aims not only to depict the current employment practices of Chinese companies in Africa, but also to analyze the factors which affect the localization of employment. Two major patterns, bulldozer-type and locomotive-type, are identified and their implications for the local communities are discussed.
Rafael Marques de Morais describes how the short life span of public works undertaken by Chinese companies in Angola as part of the low-key economic and cultural offensive China is waging on the African continent. The Chinese intervention is centralized in the office of the president, who runs the country as an extensive fabric of patronage networks. Under bilateral agreements between the two countries, China's Exim Bank has loaned some 10 billion loan for the next two years. The China International Fund (CIF) has taken charge of the most ambitious projects, such as the construction of 215,500 low-income social houses, an industrial area in Luanda with seventy factories, an international airport, 2,680 kilometers of national railway tracks and 133 depots, and 1,500 kilometers of inter-provincial roads, with more on the drawing boards.
1. The rise and decline of development economics Part I. Around National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade: 2. Beyond asymmetry Part II. Around The Strategy of Economic Development: 3. The changing tolerance for income inequality in the course of economic development 4. A generalised linkage approach to development with special reference to staples 5. The turn to authoritarianism in Latin America and the search for its economic determinants Part III. Around Journeys Toward Progress: 6. Policy-making and policy analysis in Latin America 7. On Hegel, imperialism and structural stagnation 8. The social and political matrix of inflation Part IV. Around Exit, Voice and Loyalty: 9. Exit, voice and loyalty 10. Exit and voice 11. Exit, voice and the state 12. Three uses of political economy in analysing European integration Part V. Around The Passions and the Interests: 13. An alternative explanation of contemporary harriedness 14. Morality and the social sciences Index of authors cited.
By conventional accounts, following the so-called ‘Angola Model’, the Chinese government is heavily involved in the national reconstruction programme through various financial institutions as a means to ensure closer relations with Angola and thus access to oil. China's strategy is thus ostensibly to accumulate political capital through the provision of infrastructure, financed by oil-backed concessional loans extended by Chinese state-owned banks. This study briefly traces the history of China's relations with Angola before examining the various parallel structures involved in the two country's co-operation over infrastructure, loans and oil. It examines the so-called ‘Angola Model’ by looking at three key assumptions surrounding risk, access to oil and China's political access in Angola. The study also evaluates the nature of the so-called ‘strategic partnership’ for both Angola and China. Political posturing indicates that both China and Angola see each other as necessary strategic allies for the foreseeable future, but this may mask an uneasy marriage of convenience.
Although China's Africa strategy has yielded an impressive slate of successes recently, a closer inspection suggests a fundamental underlying problem: it depends on an increasing number of bureaucratic principals and corporate agents whose contradictions are likely to increase.
China's remarkable business expansion abroad since the mid-1980s cannot be explained simply by applying existing theories, which focus on conventional international businesses from capitalist systems. Many puzzling phenomena in Chinese investments abroad become intelligible only when we introduce a key variable–illicit privatization through internationalization. So far only advantageously-placed nomenklatura members and their kin have had access to crossborder ownership, but many of them are accumulating sizeable private wealth at the cost of nationalized property. Contrary to an impression held by many in the West, the Chinese economy under Communist rule experiences spontaneous privatization parallel to what has happened in European postcommunist nations–though with a few Chinese characteristics. An examination of informal privatization in China's multinationals adds a new dimension to our understanding of the shift from state socialism to market capitalism.
This article examines one of the pre-eminent logics of global capital flow – the pursuit of flexible labour regimes – as a window to explore the interaction between Chinese investments and African communities. It analyses the respective “politics of casualization” in the Chambishi mine on the Zambian Copperbelt and the Tanzania–China Friendship Mill in the port city of Dar es Salaam. Both Zambian and Tanzanian workers have witnessed and resisted precipitous “informalization” of employment since the Chinese assumed full or majority ownership in the late 1990s. Wildcat strikes were staged by workers in both cases. Nevertheless, Zambian copper miners, but not Tanzanian textile workers, seem to have successfully halted this tendency of casualization. After several years of struggle, in 2007 they signed new collective agreements with the Chinese management, who agreed gradually to convert all casual and contract jobs into “permanent” pensionable ones. By explaining the divergent outcomes of these two cases of labour resistance, I hope to identify the major factors shaping the encounter between Chinese managers and African workers.
Cet article évalue la part croissante du secteur privé chinois en Afrique. Actuellement l’attention se porte sur les entreprises publiques chinoises qui investissent dans le secteur minier et peu d’intérêt est accordé aux entreprises du secteur privé. Cette étude comble ce manque en évaluant les caractéristiques et les motivations des entreprises privées chinoises et leurs impacts sur le développement. Les principaux résultats montrent que les entreprises privées chinoises suivent leur propre voie et les facteurs déterminant l’investissement privé sont les opportunités offertes par les marchés africains, la concurrence intra-chinoise et un fort esprit d’entreprise. Il manque un mécanisme efficace qui pourrait relier la politique africaine de la Chine et sa mise en oeuvre par l’intermédiaire de l’engagement du secteur privé chinois. Afin de maximiser les gains en termes de développement, une approche des relations chinoises publiques-privées qui soit « top-down » et « bottom-up » et fondée sur la réciprocité est nécessaire. Il s’agit d’un processus d’apprentissage mutuel pour les relations publiques-privées chinoises ainsi que pour les relations Chine-Afrique. Ce sont des relations fluides qui se forment et s’adaptent l’une à l’autre.European Journal of Development Research (2009) 21, 570–587. doi:10.1057/ejdr.2009.21
To verify whether human colon carcinoma cells can express Toll-like receptor 4 (TLR4) and investigate the biological function of TLR4 on human colon carcinoma cells.
Human colon carcinoma cells SW480 was cultured with RPMI 1640 medium. The expression of TLR4 was analyzed by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction and quantified by flow cytometry. Cell proliferation was evaluated by 3-[4, 5-dimethylthiazol-2-yl]-2, 5-diphenyltetrazolium bromide assay. The production of transforming growth factor-beta, vascular endothelial growth factor, and interleukin-8 induced by lipopolysaccharide (LPS)-the TLR4 ligand was tested by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. Whether mitogen-associated protein kinases and nuclear factor-kappaB (NF-kappaB) proteins were activated was analyzed by Western blot. Apoptosis was analyzed by Annenxin V/PI staining.
TLR4 is expressed on SW480 cells. LPS could not affect TLR4 expression and the proliferation of SW480 cells. LPS increased the phosphorylation of ERK1/2 and P38 and activated NF-kappaB. LPS promoted the production of vascular endothelial growth factor, transforming growth factor-beta, and interleukin-8. In addition, LPS induced resistance of SW480 cells to tumor necrosis factor-related apoptosis-inducing ligand-induced apoptosis. Furthermore, NF-kappaB activation was necessary for apoptosis resistance of SW480 cells induced by LPS.
TLR4 is expressed on human colon carcinoma cells and functionally active. It may play important roles in promoting immune escape of human colon carcinoma cells by inducing immunosuppressive factors and apoptosis resistance.
The increasingly multi-faceted engagement of China in Africa is part of China's growing global reach. Chinese diplomats strive to promote an image of a peacefully rising power, whereas Chinese businessmen seek natural resources and export markets. As a result, those responsible for Chinese foreign policy strategic thinking struggle to accommodate the needs of this diverse group of actors in Africa, well aware that as a major power, Beijing is expected to address international crisis. In Washington and Brussels, China is criticized for its support of despotic African regimes and its aid programs ‘with no strings attached’. In Sudan, in particular, China's credibility as a responsible nation is questioned. This article provides a concise overview of China's evolving diplomacy toward Africa, highlighting the Sino-Sudan relationship, with the aim of shedding light on the drivers and constraints on Beijing's motives and actions on the African continent. The article assesses some of the implications of Beijing's policy choices in Africa for its international relations.
A central concern of industrial policy is how to configure the relationship with the global economy. The manifold choices and pressures make this a difficult task for policy-makers. This article suggests a way of framing discussions between policy-makers, advisers and researchers, to help reduce complexity and find common ground. It demonstrates how different constellations of low/high challenge and support bring out the essence of different policy regimes, and how different constellations of narrow/wide technology and marketing gaps help identify the most plausible way forward. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Chinese construction companies in Angola: a local linkages perspective. Discussion paper no. 2; making the most of commodities pro-gramme
- L Corkin
Corkin, L., 2011b. Chinese construction companies in Angola: a local linkages perspective. Discussion paper no. 2; making the most of commodities pro-gramme, MMCP, March, pp. 1–80 /http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/publications/inci dental-paper/2011/750S, ISBN: 978-1-77011-233-9.
China lends Angola $15 bn, but few jobs are created Mail and Guardianchina-lends-an gola-15bn-but-few-jobs-are-createdS
- De Comarmond
De Comarmond, C., 2011. China lends Angola $15 bn, but few jobs are created Mail and Guardian, 6 March: /http://mg.co.za/article/2011-03-06-china-lends-an gola-15bn-but-few-jobs-are-createdS (accessed 23 03 11).
Hostility toward workers cools Angola–China relationship
- B Faucon
- S Su
Faucon, B., Su S., 2010. Hostility toward workers cools Angola–China relationship', Wall Street Journal, 10 August: /http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 4052748704388504575418990791137242.html?mod=WSJASIA_hpp_MIDDLE TopStoriesS. (accessed 24 04 11).
Linha de Cré dito com o Eximbank da China: Relató rio das actividades desenvolvidas II trimestre de
- Apoio Gabinet
- ( Té
- Gat
Gabinet de Apoio Té cnico (GAT) 2007a Linha de Cré dito com o Eximbank da China: Relató rio das actividades desenvolvidas II trimestre de 2007 June: /http:// www.minfin.gv.ao/fsys/Relatorio_de_Actividades_do_II_trimestre_2007_3. pdfS. (accessed 18 04 11).
Chinese contractors in Africa: insights from a survey
- Goldstein
- Andrea
Goldstein, Andrea 2007. Chinese contractors in Africa: insights from a survey. Presentation at the African Development Bank Annual Meetings, Shanghai, 16 May.
China's diplomacy towards Africa: drivers and constraints. International Relations of the Asia Pacific
- L Jakobsen
Jakobsen, L., 2009. China's diplomacy towards Africa: drivers and constraints. International Relations of the Asia Pacific 403–433.
Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and its Limitations Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China
- K Lieberthal
Lieberthal, K., 1992. Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and its Limitations. In: Kenneth Lieberthal, Lampton, David (Eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China. University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 1–32.
Which enterprises are privates [sic] in China? Presentation at the Rock–Paper–Scissors: Dynamics of the Modernity in China
- Y Lin
Lin, Y., 2009. Which enterprises are privates [sic] in China? Presentation at the Rock–Paper–Scissors: Dynamics of the Modernity in China, In: Proceedings of the 4th International Sinology Forum, Oporto, Portugal, 14 February.
The Dragon looks West International Construction Review
- J Liu
- J Wu
Liu, J., Wu J., 2008. The Dragon looks West International Construction Review, 1st Quarter, pp. 24–25.
Angola seeking to diversify co-operation with China, 3 Febru
- Macauhub
Macauhub, 2010a, Angola seeking to diversify co-operation with China, 3 Febru-ary: /http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/news.php?ID=8871S. (accessed 22 12 10).
Angola Shifts Control of Economic Policy to Presidency, Eurasia Group Says. Bloomberg, 7 October2010-10-07/angola-shifts-control-of-economic-policy-to-pre sidency-eurasia-group-says.htmlS (accussed 11
- C Mcclellend
- C Mendes
McClellend, C., Mendes, C., 2010. Angola Shifts Control of Economic Policy to Presidency, Eurasia Group Says. Bloomberg, 7 October. /http://www.bloom berg.com/news/2010-10-07/angola-shifts-control-of-economic-policy-to-pre sidency-eurasia-group-says.htmlS (accussed 11.12.10).
Going Global: Chinese Oil and Mining Companies and the Governance of Resource Wealth. Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars SOE reform can drive State back and leave the people in charge, Global Times
- J Shankleman
Shankleman, J., 2009. Going Global: Chinese Oil and Mining Companies and the Governance of Resource Wealth. Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington. Sheng, H., 2010. SOE reform can drive State back and leave the people in charge, Global Times, 21 September: /http://china-wire.org/?p=6021S. (accessed 19 11 10).
African labor abuse denied Global Times
- S Song
Song, S., 2010. African labor abuse denied Global Times, 19 November: /http:// china-wire.org/?p=7271S (accessed 20 11 10).
Backward linkages in the manufacturing sector in the oil and gas value chain in Angola. Discussion paper no. 11; making the most of commod-ities programme
- Z Teka
Teka, Z. 2011. Backward linkages in the manufacturing sector in the oil and gas value chain in Angola. Discussion paper no. 11; making the most of commod-ities programme, MMCP, March, pp. 1–60.
Drivers of change: an overview. Chatham House Chinese official refutes allegation subsidies given to SOEs for outbound investment
- A Vines
- N Shaxson
Vines, A., Shaxson N., Rimley L., Heymans C., 2005. Drivers of change: an overview. Chatham House, April. Xinhua, 2010. Chinese official refutes allegation subsidies given to SOEs for outbound investment, 1 November: /http://china-wire.org/?p=6668S (accessed 16 11 10).