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The Big Picture – trends, drivers, wild cards, discontinuities and weak signals

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Following work done in the UK, Canada and now starting across Europe,1 there appears to be renewed interest in charting the boundaries of what to expect between 2010 and 2025 as the character of the 21st century begins to become firmly established. What are the shaping forces, or sources of change and what might be their impacts, particularly where these may create entirely new challenges and opportunities?Futures experts (attendees of the FTA 2008 Conference) were invited to state their opinions on these questions by considering the trends, drivers, wilds cards, discontinuities and weak signals likely to shape the future through the Big Picture Survey. The survey was launched 6 months prior to the Conference. More than 250 responses were submitted by the Conference date. The results collected were synthesised and presented back to the attendees in a plenary presentation by the authors.The current paper aims to clarify the concepts first by suggesting definitions and discussing the distinctions between them. The paper then presents the rationales of conducting the Big Picture Survey (BPS), presents its methodology and discusses the results of the survey in a greater extent.
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The Big Picture trends, drivers, wild cards, discontinuities and
weak signals
Ozcan Saritas
a,
*, Jack E. Smith
b
a
Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL Manchester, UK
b
Federal Foresight & Innovation Strategy, Defence R&D Canada, 305 Rideau St., 8th Floor, CJ02 Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0K2
1. Introduction
One of the recurring items of feedback from previous FTA Symposia and Conferences was the concern expressed by some
attendees that an opportunity was being missed to use the assembly of strategic Foresight experts to gain more insights into
the state of Foresight content regarding critical issues and trends, drivers of change and prospective discontinuities that
might be expected within 5–10 or 15 years.
The rationale for this concern tended to be expressed in these terms: ‘‘At these meetings you have assembled many of the
global experts in designing, managing and interpreting the outcomes of Foresight exercises that involve leaders from a
diverse range of governments, universities and business enterprises would it not be a useful addition to benefit from this
expertise by developing a focused strategic discussion based around their experiences i.e. what they are seeing as emerging
critical forces causing change and what they are hearing or learning about the types of major changes or discontinuities that
may be expected in the short, medium and long term.’’
This Big Picture Survey (BPS) was designed primarily to address this concern. It has been structured to allow the
Conference attendees, mainly the organizers and practitioners of Foresight, an opportunity to contribute to a value-adding
Futures 43 (2011) 292–312
ARTICLE INFO
Article history:
Available online 19 November 2010
ABSTRACT
Following work done in the UK, Canada and now starting across Europe,
1
there appears to
be renewed interest in charting the boundaries of what to expect between 2010 and 2025
as the character of the 21st century begins to become firmly established. What are the
shaping forces, or sources of change and what might be their impacts, particularly where
these may create entirely new challenges and opportunities?
Futures experts (attendees of the FTA 2008 Conference) were invited to state their
opinions on these questions by considering the trends, drivers, wilds cards, discontinuities
and weak signals likely to shape the future through the Big Picture Survey. The survey was
launched 6 months prior to the Conference. More than 250 responses were submitted by
the Conference date. The results collected were synthesised and presented back to the
attendees in a plenary presentation by the authors.
The current paper aims to clarify the concepts first by suggesting definitions and
discussing the distinctions between them. The paper then presents the rationales of
conducting the Big Picture Survey (BPS), presents its methodology and discusses the
results of the survey in a greater extent.
ß2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ozcan.saritas@manchester.ac.uk (O. Saritas), jack.smith@drdc-rddc.gc.ca (J.E. Smith).
1
UK Ministry of Defence, UK Foresight Office Horizon Scan; Global Futures Forum Vancouver April 2008, Europe @ 2025 European Commission.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Futures
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures
0016-3287/$ see front matter ß2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.futures.2010.11.007
Author's personal copy
Foresight knowledge base regarding the directions and catalysts that are prompting our global future and its various
contingencies and uncertainties. The originators of this survey used the responses to lead a plenary discussion at the 2008
FTA Conference, by providing some basic profile information without any attribution of responses to individuals. The BPS
methodology was straightforward: an open-ended survey with compilation, grouping responses, and a general analysis of
the five areas. We were more interested in the distribution of responses than individual response patterns. For this purpose,
looking at the survey results we suggested a STEEP (Social-Cultural, Science & Technology, Energy, Ecology and Economy,
and Geo-Politics) framework to map the five areas consistently. This allowed us to see the general patterns of preferences
while still capturing the respondents’ narratives.
The second section of the paper first clarifies the definitions of the concepts used including trends, drivers of change, wild
cards/shocks, discontinuities, and weak signals. The review of the literature indicated that these concepts are not considered
and compared in one single source. The current paper brings all these concepts together, suggests definitions for them and
discusses the distinctions between them. Moreover, examples are provided to make the concepts clearer and to encourage
reader to think about similar other Future-oriented examples from their own perspectives. Then, in the third section, the
survey methodology and method of analysis are described. The fourth section presents the respondents’ profile summary
with a set of descriptive statistics including (i) the country of residence, (ii) Foresight experience, and (iii) principle
affiliation/role. The results are analysed in greater detail in the fifth section. Subsequently, Section 4discusses the
implications of the findings on policy and strategy. Finally, Section 4draws the overall conclusions and rounds off the paper.
2. Definitions of terminology
Trends, drivers of change, wild cards/shocks, discontinuities, and weak signals can be considered as the critical elements
and essential outputs of Horizon Scanning.
2
The UK and the Netherlands have conducted their national horizon scans. In its
Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004–2014, the UK Government committed to establishing a Centre of
Excellence in Horizon Scanning, to be based in the Foresight directorate of the Government Office for Science (see
www.foresight.gov.uk). As another example, the Netherlands developed a joint horizon scanning procedure focused on
security to identify their common strategic choices and questions for policy [1]. Work conducted within the scope of the
European Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN) included a strong element of scanning in the form of detecting and
analysing emerging S&T issues [2].
Although a wide variety of definitions exist, the paper seeks to narrow the range of what is considered most applicable
and thereby focuses on a single definition in each case after exploring several perspectives. This approach was selected
because it was considered that a clear definition of the terms supported with examples would help the participants in
completing the survey, particularly those with less Foresight experience, and also because it would distinguish the concepts
from each other. Subsequently in conducting the survey it was nevertheless still evident that at least perceptually on the
part of many respondents overlap exists, so it is deemed even more important to work toward a more commonly accepted
set of definitions for purposes of future work in this area.
2.1. Trends
The starting point for scanning definitions is usually to identify the key trends which are presently evident in the broad
sense of being both discernible and (usually are) somewhat gradual forces, factors and patterns that are pervasively causing
change in society generally. The speed of change may be deemed comparatively slow or fast depending upon one’s vantage
point, but the important aspect of a trend is its pervasiveness.
These are representative of the broad forces and complex factors involving diverse actors that lead and cause societal
change. What is often apparent is that most stakeholders are relatively powerless alone to affect the direction or intensity-
impact of a trend so trends tend to display some dynamic ecological characteristics, at least insofar as they usually endure
as influential shapers for at least 4–5 years until succeeded by others. Some analysts have attempted to distinguish trends by
their degree of influence [3].
3
It is also possible to further analyse trends according to their duration, scale, evolutionary
pathways and structure (see the box below). However these degrees of differentiation, while clearly valid, were deemed too
complicated for purposes of the survey.
Mega-trends
Trends come in different sizes. A mega-trend extends over many generations, and in cases of climate, mega-trends can
cover periods prior to human existence. They describe complex interactions between many factors. The increase in
population from the Palaeolithic period to the present provides an example.
2
The UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) defines Horizon Scanning as ‘‘the systematic examination of potential threats,
opportunities and likely future developments which are at the margins of current thinking and planning. Horizon Scanning may explore novel and unexpected
issues, as well as persistent problems or trends’’ (http://horizonscanning.defra.gov.uk last visited on March 14, 2009).
3
Strategic Trends ‘‘seek to identify and interpret the likely pattern of change’’ in the future ([3] p. xiii).
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Potential trends
Possible new trends grow from innovations, projects, beliefs or actions that have the potential to grow and eventually go
mainstream in the future (for example: just a few years ago, alternative medicine remained an outcast from modern
medicine. Now it has links with big business and has achieved a degree of respectability in some circles and even in the
marketplace). See Damrongchai et al. [4] for an example of potential trends, being used in a technology roadmap.
Branching trends
Very often, trends relate to one another the same way in which a tree-trunk relate to branches and twigs. For example, a
well-documented movement toward equality between men and women might represent a branch trend. The trend
toward minimizing differences in the relationship between the salaries of men and women in the Western world could
form a twig on that branch [5].
As a result of the analysis, the current paper suggests the following definition of trends:
Trends are those change factors that arise from broadly generalizable change and innovation. They are experienced by everyone
and often in more or less the same contexts insofar as they create broad parameters for shifts in attitudes, policies and business focus
over periods of several years that usually have global reach. What is interesting about trends is that normally most players,
organizations or even nations cannot do much to change them they are larger than the power of individual organizations and
often nation states as well.
The box below lists some examples of trends:
Trend examples
Aging population;
Decline in state sovereignty;
Islam-West cultural gaps;
More nuclear equipped nations;
Gradually increased concerns for the environment in terms of sustainability, human and animal health, and global
warming;
Increasing push for greater efficiency and decarbonisation of the energy system because of the environmental and energy
security concerns;
Shift to digital technology;
Trend toward ever smaller, more mobile and more powerful computation-communications devices, and integration and
convergence of functions and systems;
Proliferation of nation states and groupings of peoples seeking self determination status.
2.2. Drivers of change
The second key definition concerns those forces, factors and uncertainties that are accessible by stakeholders and create
or drive change within one’s business or institutional environment. These tend to be more immediate and relevant and
distinct to different types of stakeholders and also they can be both adapted by and/or strongly impact stakeholders,
sometimes rapidly.
Driver of change examples
Climate policies and resource practices;
Major S&T developments and their societal impacts;
Policy or regulatory changes that lead to changes in government priorities, company actions and investments;
Demand for certain products or services changes and thereby shifts the marketplace, often in response to other drivers or
trend impacts that finally become measurable in price terms, such as carbon credits, taxes and footprint accounting;
Environmental policies and practices that are enacted to change behaviours and shift societal actions more toward
integral or internalized measures such as recycling requirements.
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As one can see there are subtle differences from trends. Instead of being mid-longer term and quite pervasive, these
concern areas, involve factors and forces that change from year to year and may be amenable to stakeholder actions and
strategic choices by way of one’s investments, new alignments, infrastructure, R&D, innovations and business-institutional
strategies [6].
A critical concept associated with being a driver is the level of uncertainty. Drivers have real leverage on one’s future
flexibility and outcomes i.e. if a driver goes one way or the opposite way the real divergence occurs and change patterns
evolve differently. It has been said (by some practiced Foresight facilitators) that drivers are those critical choices, forks in the
road and deep uncertainties that keep executives awake at night.
In this context, the definition for drivers of change was decided to focus on things that are accessible and directly
impacting one’s influence environment. Thus, drivers of change are those factors, forces or events developments which may be
amenable to changes according to one’s strategic choices, investments, R&D activities or foresight knowledge and strategies. They
are both presently accessible and future relevant.
The concept of uncertainty enters again into the Foresight process when for purposes of scenario planning there is an
attempt to define the key drivers or those having both great uncertainty and potentially high impact. These are then
structured into a matrix of 4 cells (2 drivers with high and low situations for each) or 8 cells (3 drivers) to create diverging
scenario parameters, while trends are used to ask how each different scenario plays out against each trend and the other (less
critical but still relevant) change drivers.
2.3. Wild cards or shocks
Because most people have experienced surprise situations and unforeseen developments that have in some way altered
at least their expectations if not the direction of their existence, the concept of a wild card or shock is not that unfamiliar. In
Foresight processes it becomes important to include some of these possibilities because they often do reshape the
trajectories of events and situations. The real issue is how they should be contexted, and when and with what intensity they
can or should be introduced. This is a key element of the art of crafting Foresight to respond well to plausible uncertainties
and conceivable surprises, so for this survey it will not be possible to rigorously provide a single definition that fits all
situations so the following examples are useful to guide those seeking to imagine what could shock the systems of
incremental change.
Wild card/shock examples
Gulf Stream shift;
Nuclear bomb;
Fusion power;
Cyber collapse;
Human aging breakthrough;
Solar flare, asteroid impacts, discovery of an alien;
Autonomous computers;
The attacks of September 11, 2001, which created significant shocks to the global security, airport screening and
intelligence systems and practices;
A major pandemic or outbreak of a human focused communicable disease that has not been prepared for such as SARS,
Bird flu and Swine flu;
Another internationally relevant disruption of energy systems on the scale of a Chernobyl nuclear accident.
These examples suggest that wild cards involve relatively high impact but somewhat low probability events and
situations that carry a lot of conditionality. They really are unlikely but if there is even a remote possibility, then that
contingency needs to be accounted for.
The following description provides perhaps the most relevant definition for purposes of the current paper:
Wild cards and shocks are those surprise events and situations which can happen but usually have a low probability of doing so
but if they do their impact is very high. These situations tend to alter the fundamentals, and create new trajectories which can then
create a new basis for additional challenges and opportunities that most stakeholders may not have previously considered or
prepared for.
Arguably the best known work in wild cards comes from Petersen [7] author of ‘‘Out of The Blue How to Anticipate Big
Future Surprises’’. Petersen’s book articulates a series of events that due to their likelihood to surprise and potential for
impact might be considered ‘Wildcards’. He defines wild cards as ‘Low Probability, High Impact events that, were they to
occur, would severely impact the human condition’. Steinmueller [8] also has an excellent overview of wild cards in the 2008
RAHS Booklet on Foresight: Thinking about the Future.
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Building on Petersen’s work, Barber [9] developed an additional wild cards tool called a ‘‘Reference Impact Grid’’ (RIG)
which helps strategists and risk managers define vulnerabilities within a given system and to then consider what type of
event might de-stabilise that system. Challenging Petersen’s hypothesis, his additional thoughts on ‘Cascading Discontinuity
Sets’ broke away from the idea of wild cards to introduce other types of interrelated events. A Cascading Discontinuity Set
can achieve a similar outcome to a one off Wildcard event but does so via a series of smaller, unplanned events that
eventually overwhelm the system’s ability to cope. The idea is similar to the Black Swan theory described by Taleb [10] in his
book ‘‘The Black Swan’’. van Notten et al. [11] and Mendonc¸a et al. [12] provide further discussion and examples on wild cards
and shocks. Taleb [10] has also derived a series of principles for organizations governments to try to avoid he kinds of
disruptions that Black Swan events tend to cause.
Wild cards may also be introduced into anticipatory decision-making activity in order to increase the ability of social
groups to adapt to surprises arising in turbulent business or social environments. Such sudden and unique incidents might
constitute turning points in the evolution of a certain business social trend or system.
A further clarification, thanks to the collective thinking of Wikipedia [5] is that wild cards may or may not be announced
by weak signals, which are incomplete and fragmented data from which relevant Foresight information might be inferred.
Sometimes, mistakenly, wild cards and weak signals are considered as synonyms, which they are not. There have also been
attempts to link wild cards/shocks to trends (see the box below).
Trends Wild cards
Globalization of markets: finance, goods & services, labor Crash of global financial markets
Globalization ‘‘with human face’’
Clash of civilizations
Demography: aging and shrinking of populations A new baby boom
‘‘Breakdown of the sperm count’’
Clash of generations
European Union: enlargement and institution building Europe orients to the East
‘‘Fraglargement’’
Fortress Europe
Life styles: erosion of traditional family Return of family
Spiritual revolution
Technology: rapid progress of ICT and biotech End of Moore’s Law
100 years life expectancy
Environment: global warming, resources depletion Collapse of the Gulf Stream
Cold fusion energy
Source: Steinmueller [13].
2.4. Discontinuities
Discontinuities refer to rapid and significant shifts in trajectories without the aspect of being mostly unanticipated or
deeply surprising. They can take many forms such as ‘technological discontinuities’. According to at least one analyst [14],
technological discontinuity is represented in a new technology or in the re-packaging of a set of existing technologies that
result in quickly obsoleting a product or service. An example from the 1960s is the introduction of the electronic calculator.
In a very short time, slide rules and mechanical calculators disappeared and, in some cases, the companies that made these
products disappeared when they could not adapt to or find ways to use the new technology. Another more recent example is
that of using the Internet and the tcp/ip protocol to transport voice calls. This application of the Internet represents a
technological discontinuity for traditional telephone companies and provides an opportunity for small entrepreneurs to
enter the telephone business with relatively little investment.
In general, the Internet and the Web represent technological discontinuities for many sectors and thus both create new
opportunities and expose potential threats for those attached to old or inflexible technologies.
As just one example, as we train our reference librarians to do Internet reference using search engines, portals, and Web
research guides we are finding less use of the Library of Congress classification system, a system which most students find
obscure and confusing.
Another series of examples have recently emerged in the excellent work by Social Technologies, based in the USA. The
following definition indicates how discontinuities are being positioned by them for Foresight purposes: ‘‘Discontinuities,
which are those sudden, sharp breaks that can strike consumers, business sectors, nations, or the world with disruptive force.
Exactly when, where, or how such events will occur is inherently hard to foresee’’ ([15], p. 2).
Discontinuity examples
Google and Wiki, VOIP, Facebook and You Tube and similar innovations create powerful forces that change the business
and social environments and personal information practices;
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Recent reports about accelerated arctic ice shelf melting and greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere may create
discontinuities in national and international policy approaches toward climate treaties design and promulgation;
Advances in nanotechnology, genomics and quantum computing, if realised within the next decade, could fundamentally
alter our ways of making materials, practicing medicine and computation-making calculations, with pervasive societal
impacts.
The definition suggested by the authors of the current paper is as follows:
Discontinuities are those situations impacts where over time and extending beyond single events, change is rapid and
fundamentally alters the previous pathways or expected direction of policies, events and planning regimes. While this is normal in
most market places where the processes of creative destruction and products and services innovation are familiar, when
discontinuities occur in society and government, the changes tend to be more significant because they can alter so many other
domains.
2.5. Weak signals
The final key term is ‘‘weak signals’’. Weak signals are the first important indications of a change. These may be
understood as advanced, somewhat noisy and generally socially situated indicators of change in trends and systems that
constitute raw informational material for enabling anticipatory action. The benefits of weak signals can be seen when
assessing their significance in an organization or a field concerned and analysing how the phenomena reflected by the weak
signals should be reacted on.
4
There remains some confusion about the definition of weak signal by various researchers and consultants. Sometimes it is
referred as future oriented information, sometimes more like emerging issues. Hiltunen [16] has tried to clarify the confusion
about the weak signal definitions, by combining signal, issue and interpretation in the concept of the ‘‘future sign’’, which
more holistically describes how these signals relate to change. Citing from Igor Ansoff, Hiltunen [16] provides a definition of
weak signals as: ‘‘warnings (external or internal), events and developments that are still too incomplete to permit an accurate
estimation of their impact and/or to determine their complete responses’’.
Weak signals are meaningful as long as they are evaluated in the context of both their emergence and their evolution as a
part of a pattern along with other weak signals. They do not exist in isolation.
Nevertheless weak signals do portend significance, even if the probability cannot be estimated easily, so for example,
James Hanson’s presentation to the US Congress in 1988 about possible global warming on the horizon, or in technology
terms, the speed of take up of ‘‘Mosaic’’ (precursor to Netscape) as the first Internet browser in 1993, were hard to estimate at
the time, but can now clearly be seen as being indicative of things to come.
There are some tools for utilizing weak signals in organizational environments. One tool is called Strategy Signals, which
aims to collect weak signals inside of an organization. The tool is developed by the Finnish company Fountain Park.
5
Another
tool for using weak signals in organizations is called the Futures Windows [5], in which images of weak signals are shown in
organization facilities. All the employees in the organization can send their images about weak signals to this tool. The
purpose of that tool is to disseminate weak signals in organizations easily and increase futures thinking and innovating in the
organization.
In general, weak signals are messages and signs usually associated with early developments in technologies, societal
innovations, conflicts, origins of conflicts, etc. that while not easily verifiable from a present day perspective.
In conclusion regarding definitions, weak signals refer to the early signs of possible but not confirmed changes that may later
become more significant indicators of critical forces for development, threats, business and technical innovation. They represent the
first signs of paradigm shifts, or future trends, drivers or discontinuities.
Weak signal examples
In the 1980s the first mention was made of global warming and climate change;
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and subsequently the Soviet Union was weakly discernible in the mid 1980s through
assessments of military capacities and responses to the ‘‘Star Wars’’ initiatives;
The growing importance of nanotechnology was first apparent as early as 1986 when Eric Drexler issued his first book on
the subject.
4
http://www.metsafoorumi.fi/dokumentit/newsletter3_05.pdf.
5
http://hosting.fountainpark.com/strategysignals/.
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3. Big Picture Survey
3.1. Motivation and approach
Up until the Future-oriented Technology Analysis (FTA) 2008 Conference, previous FTA meetings tended to focus on
methodology, policy linkages and success factors for Foresight design & delivery. The Scientific Committee of the FTA 2008
Conference heard that some attendees felt that an opportunity had been missed to discuss future Foresight determinants
i.e. content for Foresight structuring with so many experienced experts. As a result, the Big Picture Survey was designed
and implemented with the following key premises:
1.
The FTA community is one of the most capable assemblies of strategic Foresight expertise, and would it not be useful to
poll this group for Foresight insights?
2.
Building on a survey of FTA Conference attendees-experts about critical trends, drivers, shocks-wildcards, discontinuities
and weak signals, new insights can be gained about the state of Foresight and future uncertainties, which should be useful
to the community.
3.1.1. The structure of the survey
The survey consisted of two main parts. In the first part, the respondents were asked to provide descriptive information
around three sorting variables:
1.
Years of Foresight experience;
2.
Country of residence;
3.
Affiliation-type of organization represented.
Then, the in the second part, the respondents were asked to identify a list of trends, drivers of change, wild cards/shocks, weak
signals and discontinuities. The respondents were also asked to assess their entries by considering their:
1.
Impact: rating of the trends, drivers, discontinuities as low, medium or high;
2.
Likelihood: rating of the trends, drivers, discontinuities as low, medium or high;
3.
Estimated time horizon: 2008–2015; 2016–2025; beyond 2025.
3.1.2. Data set
Total surveys submitted: 293; substantive completion: 106 (about 50% of FTA Conference attendees);
Respondent Distribution Charts by: years of experience, country of residence and affiliation; (3)
15 STEEP Categories for each domain of interest: i.e. trends, drivers, shocks, discontinuities and weak signals = 75 cells of
content (Table 1);
Qualitative review of Foresight (content) insights and patterns;
3.1.3. Further analysis
Analysis of each of the Domains of Interest according to % distribution by years of experience, country of residence,
affiliation;
Analysis of assessed impact, likelihood, controversy, time horizon patterns;
Comparison of FTA community insights-domains content with others sources of Foresight trends, drivers, etc.
Table 1
STEEP map for the Domains of Interest.
Sub-categories (A–B–C) to classify Domains of Interest
1. Society & Culture Social Norms, Education,
Information & Knowledge Society
Demographics, Urbanization,
Population Health & Migration
Equity, Ethical, Moral & Legal Issues
2. Science & Technology Science Culture & Discoveries Technology Progress Innovative, Transformative
Applications & Products
3. Energy Current Energy Use,
Peak Oil, Efficiency & Security
New and Renewable Sources Non Renewable Energy
Alternatives (e.g. H2, nukes)
4. Ecology-Economy State of Global Finance, Trade,
Debt and Related
Globalization Issues
BRIC Rapid Development
Economies
Climate Change, Global
Warming = sustainable
ecology, new economy
5. Geo-Politics &
Security
East-West, North-South Issues,
Governance, Health of
Democracy, Failed States
Global, Cyber Terrorism &
Nuclear & Bio WMD
Water, Food and Resource
Shortages, Disasters
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e.g. do those with more years of experience tend to use greater differentiation in their scoring?
e.g. do academics or government respondents see the prospective developments in longer or shorter time horizons than the
business respondents?
Results can serve as baseline for a more quantitative-reactive survey next year likely generating a higher return rate
requiring less time to formulate original ideas.
3.2. Analysis of the results
3.2.1. Descriptive statistics
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the participants.
3.2.1.1. Respondents’ profile summary. Fig. 1 illustrates that the majority of the respondents were from the EU member states,
with a considerable portion of respondents from Asia-Australia and North America.
The majority of respondents engaged in Foresight activity 5–10 years as expected a quite experienced group of
professionals (Fig. 2).
The survey respondents were mainly from Academia and Governmental bodies (Fig. 3).
3.2.2. Analysis of trends, drivers of change, wild cards/shocks, discontinuities and weak signals
3.2.2.1. Trends. The trends obtained from the survey were mapped on the STEEP map for the Domains of Interest. Then the
number of trends in each cell of the matrix was calculated. This gave the main orientations of the trends were represented
with a radar diagram (Fig. 4).
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Country of residence.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Foresight experience.
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The diagram illustrates that:
Contributors were inspired 382 trends in total identified;
STEEP format enabled three subcategories for each-for a total of 18 trend and driver categories: the analysis of trends
indicated that the coverage was broad and quite deep as well;
Balance was well distributed with economy-ecology leading but S&T, geo-politics, security and culture close behind;
Many of these trends suggest substantial dislocations coming, involving disruptions and shifts to new premises for societal
management, e.g. energy alternatives, resource shortages, bio-neural evolution, rising new economic leaders and
directions, reduced personal privacy;
These are described both in terms of challenges and potential opportunities for civilization.
Fig. 5 illustrates the frequency distribution of trends and the most widely cited ones.
Some of the most thought provoking trends are given in Table 2.
When both the frequency distribution (Fig. 5) and the highlights table (Table 2) are examined, it is rather clear that trends
involving technology change and uncertainties about environmental, climatic and energy systems change are on the top of
respondents minds. The general area of health system developments and changes is also prominent. Perhaps the most
provocative ones are the trends describing broad new domains of human evolution (e.g. genetic manipulation, trans-
humanism, ‘‘biologisation’’, disruptive surveillance, etc.) which suggest new and quite different types of relationships within
the human community and with the natural world. While clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it may be revealing to
pursue some scenarios development that focus on tracking many of these possible provocative trends forward to try to
estimate how disruptive they might conceivably be by 2025.
3.2.2.2. Joint assessment of Foresight experience and trends. The respondents with more than 15 years of experience
constituted the largest single group, comprising more than a quarter of the total of all respondents clear evidence of the
substantial experience present at the FTA Conference. There was also a balanced representation from 1–3, 3–5 and 5–10
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. Affiliation of respondents.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 4. Orientations of trends.
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Table 2
Examples of trends.
Examples of trends by category
ABC
Society &
Culture 66
Growth of knowledge/access
and need for management
Aging/labor force ratio
creating tensions
Negative prospects from genetic
manipulation
‘‘Privacy loss’’ as 21st century
externality
Pandemic risks increase Genetically designed children
will be possible
Dematerialisation the
West/materialisation in the East
Personalised medicine and
home-based healthcare increase
Science &
Tech. 77
More multi-disciplinary and e-science GM disease resistant plants
and microbes for energy
Automatisation and robotics growth
changes our understanding of
what it is to be human
Shortage of science in the
West, growth of science in the East
Neural network functional drugs Virtualisation, Internetisation of life,
intelligent Web content
Growth of bio-sciences ‘‘biologisation’’ New human species ‘‘Transhumanist
evolution’’ synthetic DNA, new
drugs, prosthetic organs, etc.
Increased surveillance smart
security, disruptive surveillance
technology big business
Energy 42 Peak oil Growth of renewable energy:
solar, wind, thermal, bio, ocean
Progress in nuclear and solar
energy is not constraining
development
Decentralised power generation Changing energy source and
supply reconfiguring world
power division
Diversification and fragmentation
of energy sources (hydrogen,
fuel cells and nuclear)
Shift in travel patterns due
to energy prices and ICT alternatives
Solar energy meets grid parity
Ecology
Economy 82
Increased frequency of economic crises Increased tensions for
R&D ownership
Solid waste limits industrial activities
and life in urban centres
Capital shift from ‘‘W to E’’ to ‘‘E to W’’ Continued rise of Asia as
economic, political and military region
Different environmental abuses
Reversal of globalization and
growth of anti-globalization
India and China create increased
demand for petrol and minerals
Increased widespread diseases clue
to global warming
Geo-Politics &
Security 66
Unsettled global governance
in dealing with critical issues
Escalation of terrorism and
political instability
Increased global unrest related to
resource shortage and affordability
Nationalist and nativist backlash
prevents the world from
realising globalization and migration
Strategic cyber intrusions
attacks shut downs
Water is the oil in the 21st century
Disintegration of states, and
reintegration in a different format
Water desalinisation
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 5. Frequency distribution of top 10 trends.
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years experienced groups. We believe that this strong contribution from the more experienced contributors supports the
basic assumption behind the survey that such a gathering of experts would constitute a uniquely defined relevant cohort
worthy of sampling and that they would be motivated by the opportunity to add content ideas additional to their evident
Foresight process expertise.
Impact assessment. Overall, the respondents considered the impacts of the trends they identified high. Over 70% of the
trends identified by the participants have high impact on Society and Culture; Science and Technology; Energy; Ecology and
Economy; and Geo-Politics and Security (STEEP). Furthermore, high impact assessment is more prevalent among the more
highly experienced respondents (>10 years).
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. The majority of the trends were considered to be medium to high probability of
occurrence. The respondents stated that over 65% of the trends are likely to occur. The time of occurrence for most of the
trends was considered to be from 2016 to 2025. Respondents believe that around 30% of the trends will occur in the short
term (before 2015).
Controversy assessment. According to the survey respondents the majority of trends identified contain medium to high
level possibility of controversy. Assessed together with the time horizon, the survey respondents generally expect that the
highest controversies are likely to emerge from 2016 to 2025.
3.2.2.3. Joint assessmentof country of residence and trends. A majority of the respondents (over 55%) that assessed and contributed
trends were from the EU-27 countries. There was a balanced distribution between the respondents from the EU-candidate
countries and Australasian countries, which amounted approximately 28% of the respondents, who contributed trends.
Impact assessment. The majority of the respondents around the globe considered that more than 75% the trends will have
high impact on the STEEP systems. Within the respondents from Australasia and EU Candidate countries the percentage
went up to 90%.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. Almost all respondents from all regions considered that there is a medium to high
level of occurrence of the trends identified. 75% of the North American respondents considered that the likelihood of
occurrence was high, whereas the respondents from Australasia and EU Candidate countries mostly stated a medium
likelihood of occurrence for the majority of the trends. The majority of the respondents from Australasia (60%) stated that the
trends will occur in the short term (before 2015). More than half of the respondents from North America and the EU countries
suggested a medium time horizon (between 2016 and 2025) for the occurrence of the trends identified.
Controversy assessment. A majority of the Australasian respondents expect low controversy for the trends identified. The
assessment of the respondents from EU Candidate and Associate countries seemed to be the opposite with high controversy
expectations. North American and EU respondents considered the level of controversy medium. This distribution and
differentiation could be a result of how recent technology challenges such as genetically modified organisms have attracted
more intense controversy in Europe than in other regions, and how the EU countries in contrast to the EC Candidate countries
have now had the experience and essentially weathered it.
3.2.2.4. Joint assessment of Foresight affiliation and trends. A majority of the respondents assessing trends were from
Academia (approx. 36%). There was also a significant contribution from the Governmental respondents (over 31%). Low
number of respondents from NGOs (0.95%) in trend assessment was noteworthy.
Impact assessment. Almost all respondents from different Foresight affiliations stated that over 70% of the trends identified
will have high impact on the STEEP systems. No significant differences were observed among different affiliation categories.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. Similarly no significant differences were encountered between the different
affiliation category groups. More than 60% of all respondents considered that the likelihood of occurrence of the trends
identified will be high. Whereas, the majority of respondents from Academia and NGOs (51% and 58% respectively)
considered that the trends will occur between 2016 and 2025, whereas the majority of the respondents from business
envisaged shorter time horizon for the emergence of trends (between 2008 and 2015). The responses from the respondents
from governments were more balanced between long, medium and short time horizons.
Controversy assessment. 52% of the respondents from NGOs expect medium controversy resulting from the trends. The
respondents from Academia expect high controversy, whereas the figure is exactly the opposite for the Business
respondents, who expect low level of controversy.
3.2.3. Drivers of change
The main orientations of the drivers are represented with the following radar diagram.
Analysing the data, the following observations were made (Fig. 6):
Strong emphasis again on ecology-environment and economy with Society and Culture and S&T close behind;
Clear belief that health-medicine, climate and the environment will be central to our futures and offer possibilities for
improvements, sometimes through dramatic changes;
Technology improvements are seen to be accelerating and pervasive;
Infrastructure stress and threats to stability are likely to continue or intensify;
Personalised, genetic and molecular medicine are likely to drive many changes in health economics, and possible
migration of energy sourcing to more efficient and sustainable modes may be available sooner than thought.
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Fig. 7 shows the frequency distribution of drivers of change and the most widely cited ones.
Table 3 presents some of the critical drivers of change suggested by the respondents.
In contrast to the trends, the drivers are more grounded in current areas of expected leverage such as society-cultural
change factors, including R&D and energy choices we may be able to affect through our society or nation. Many of the most
articulately described drivers were those associated with the management uncertainties of change in the environmental,
governance and globalization response systems. It is probably fair to observe that the drivers lists indicate more optimism
and less fatalism than the trends lists, which is consistent with the way that the trends and drivers were defined and
differentiated.
3.2.3.1. Joint assessment of Foresight experience and drivers of change. A balanced distribution is observed among the
respondents with 1–3, 5–10 and over 15 years experience.
Impact assessment. Almost all the survey respondents considered that the drivers will have medium to high impact on the
STEEP systems with the large majority of the experienced respondents (73%) considered high impact.
Likelihood assessment. Similarly, a large number of respondents considered the likelihood of occurrence high for the
drivers identified, except the respondents with 10–15 years experience, who considered that about one third of drivers have
low probability of occurrence.
Time horizon. All respondents from less than 1 year experience to more than 15 years considered that the majority of the
drivers will occur between 2016 and 2025.
3.2.3.2. Joint assessment of country of residence and drivers of change. Approximately 60% of the drivers were assessed by the
EU-27 respondents. Again, a balanced distribution was observed between the EU-candidate countries and Australasian
countries.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 6. Orientations of drivers of change.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 7. Frequency distribution of top 10 drivers.
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Impact assessment. There was a general consensus among all respondents around the globe that around 65% of the drivers
will have high impact and the remaining 35% will have medium impact on the STEEP systems. The figures were 75% high and
25% for medium for the Australasian respondents.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. The respondents from North America and the EU countries suggested similar
assessments for the likelihood of occurrence of the drivers identified. About half of the drivers identified have high likelihood
of occurrence with the rest being medium likelihood of occurrence. The percentages were 63% and 29% respectively for the
Australasian respondents. The majority of respondents from the EU member and associate countries and North America
considered that around half of the drivers will occur between 2016 and 2025. A considerable percentage of respondents from
Australasia suggested that the drivers will emerge in the short run, whereas the majority of the respondents from the EU
Candidate countries assessed the time horizon for the occurrence of drivers after 2025.
3.2.3.3. Joint assessment of Foresight affiliation and drivers. Respondents from Academia and Government took the lead in
drivers assessment with 32% and 25% respectively. More balanced distribution was observed among Business respondents
and Students.
Impact assessment. Similar to the patterns observed regarding trends, no significant differences were encountered
regarding the impact assessment based on Foresight affiliation. The majority of respondents (around 68%) consider that the
drivers will have high impact on the STEEP systems, whereas the rest expect medium level of impact.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. The majority of respondents from Academia and NGOs expected a medium level of
likelihood of occurrence for the drivers identified. On the contrary, the respondents from Government, Business, and other
Table 3
Examples of drivers.
Examples of critical drivers by category
ABC
Society & Culture 46 Increased citizen participation with
the help of collaborative Web tools
International mobility of educated
workforce improves cultural
competences
Ensuring equity in the development
of new technologies
Self-proficiency and hoarding alters
social patterns
Decline of motivation in the youth
cohort of industrialised and aging
societies
Ethics in capitalism under scrutiny
Growing tribalism around national,
religious and team sport identities
Changes in health risk perception Ethical investment in development
projects to promote sustainability
Science & Tech. 46 Maturation of S, T and Humanities
relationship
Increased research in medical
science, gene therapy, life
prolongation
Technological innovation to create
inexpensive self-diagnostic devices
Development of a global e-science
community
The new human: cultural, physical
and biological improvements
New investments in the Internet
capacity improvement
Progress in genetic therapy, stem
cells and molecular medicine
pharmacology
Sunburst of change in vehicle
technology
Energy 17 Rising cost and crises in oil
production
Bio-fuel generation Spread of nuclear energy production
toward developing countries
Lack of energy sources Innovation for new energy sources
which does not effect food chain
Increased emphasis on energy
conservation
Peak oil and climate change lead to
descent scenarios
Ecology Economy 50 Global financial imbalances create
national commercial rivalries
China’s role in international affairs:
perceptions of Chinese elites, and
response of the US toward China’s
growth
Kyoto protocol full implementation
Political resistance to economic
globalization and deregulation
Rising economies demand for
energy, electricity drives
modernisation and puts extreme
stress on infrastructure
Economic measures to meet
international environmental
commitments
Growing localisation in response to
supply chain vulnerability
Foreign affairs fail to be harmonised
to cope with global issues
Patterns of disease radically
changed by climate change
Geo-Politics &
Security 35
Cooperative and concerted policies
among nations
Nuclear proliferation-incidence
from terrorism in Middle East
Renewed awareness of the limits to
growth
Uni-bio-multi-polar world Cyber crime and network
vulnerabilities from failure of
human systems
Increased barriers to access to
natural resources
Growing organizational and
governance incapacity
Water recognised as a valuable
resource and priced accordingly
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affiliations expect high likelihood of occurrence. The majority of the all respondents (around 50%) consider that the drivers
will emerge from 2016 to 2025. None of the student respondents expect that the drivers will occur after 2025.
3.2.4. Wild cards/shocks
The radar diagram, Fig. 8 below shows the orientations of the 217 wild cards/shocks identified.
The following observations were made from the analysis of wild cards/shocks:
High number of imaginative and creative responses 217 in total;
Clear dominance of geo-politics and security not a surprise but followed by Society and Culture some interesting
possibilities;
Many shocks for some were treated as drivers or trends by others i.e. displaying quite a wide range of attitudes and
beliefs, confidence levels in the ability of existing systems to adapt;
Usual suspects (natural disaster, nuclear accidents, etc.) supplemented by several provocative shifts in human psyche,
social cohesion factors, ethics, etc.;
Global order–disorder and natural health and shocks affecting the resilience of Planet Earth are recurring themes treated in
many different ways;
Suggest the possibility of probing deeper in subsequent surveys to extract a more complete picture of the provocative edge.
Fig. 9 illustrates the frequency of wild cards/shocks identified and the most widely cited ones.
Table 4 shows the examples of wild cards/shocks by category.
Natural and global sourced major disasters and events originating in the geo-political arena of conflict, wars, terrorism
and competition for scarce resources dominate as expected here. Some of the more interesting prospective wild cards
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 8. Orientations of drivers of wild cards/shocks.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 9. Frequency distribution of top 10 wild cards/shocks.
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include those identified in Table 4 that would have unknown implications because of they were to appear, could
fundamentally change the ways some familiar and long surviving societal systems. Again, to be able to embody there types of
wild cards into some scenarios could be a provocative and rewarding exercise to test some of the leverage points that may
impact change if any of these eventually emerge.
3.2.4.1. Further assessment of wild cards/shocks by time horizon, affiliation and country of residence. Experience time horizon.
As the years of experience increased, the time horizon for the occurrence of wild cards tended to remain between 2016 and
2025. Respondents with no experience expected that the wild cards would occur after 2025, whereas the respondents with
maximum 3 years of experience had a shorter time horizon (2008–2015).
Affiliation time horizon. Regarding the affiliation of participants, the time of occurrence for wild cards indicates
parallelism between the respondents from Academia, Business and Other affiliations, who have a medium term time
horizon. While the time horizon for students and NGO respondents is longer, it is the opposite for the participants from the
Government, where the majority (40%) has a shorter time horizon for the occurrence of wild cards.
Country of residence time horizon. Respondents from the EU Candidate countries have a longer time horizon, compared
to the respondents from the rest of Europe. The respondents from North America have a more balanced distribution of time
horizons among short, medium and long terms.
Table 4
Examples of wild cards/shocks.
Examples of wild cards–shocks by category
ABC
Society & Culture 42 Rise of dogma, e.g. creativism/
creationism, social resistance to
technological change
New diseases from pharmaceutical
and space research
Intolerance of science to renew
moral outrage over genetic
modification, trans-humanist
research, etc.
Strong classes between cultures,
intensification of conflicts between
cultural classes
Population boom & high
competition in job markets
Decline of knowledge grounded in
local society and history because of
less direct human interaction
Blockage of free trade due to a major
pandemic
Science & Tech. 9 Big disasters in science, creation of
out-of-control species, viruses,
robots
Disruption of technological systems Artificial intelligence passes human
capacity
Shocking scientific discovery
challenges all hitherto received
ideas, e.g., interrestrial visitors,
alliance, eco-collapse, bio-tech
Increased impact of converging
technologies on social life
Natural language codifications
becomes available allowing people
communicate globally
New S&T paradigms for knowledge
society and people well being
Human–animal communication
Energy 12 New transportation based on new
types of flying cars on hydrogen
change all traffic patterns
Nano thin film solar breakthroughs
allow energy production from all
surfaces fading the sun
Successful nuclear fusion shifts
energy to electricity and hydrogen
Regression in the development
because of mismanagement of
energy sources
Hydrogen from LG means pervasive
bio-hydrogen production possible
Peak oil and climate shifts decisively
confirmed meaning to rapid shift to
alternatives
Ecology Economy 32 Global trade conflicts intensify
between developed and developing
countries
Civil war in China Unexpected freeze of northern
hemisphere pushes population to
immigrate south
G8 support equitable redistribution
of wealth to enable the achievement
of millennium development goals
New Islamic superpower Rapid climate change overwhelms
human capacity
Massive failure of capitalism and
liberal democracy
Iran nukes Israel Global warming turns out to be a
false prediction due to
misunderstanding of causes
Geo-Politics & Security 89 Declining world order and
uncontrolled proliferation of
corruption, crime and pollution
Total satellite failure
interconnectivity black out
More frequent natural catastrophies
divert resources from development
Millions of weather related refugees
disrupt global system
Religion-based World War Change of earth rotation causes
climate change
Accidental nuclear spasm leads to
war
Terrorist attacks create police states Global disasters from alignment of
volcanoes, tsunamis, earthquakes,
typhoons, droughts, etc.
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3.2.5. Discontinuities
The orientations of discontinuities are represented with the following radar diagram (Fig. 10).
The discontinuities observations include:
Respondent fatigue and lack of differentiation evident in reduced response total 70;
Distribution toward S&T and energy is different from previous categories;
Good range of trigger events and situations;
Energy, resource and environmental breakthroughs are included which provide a positive outlook as well as more familiar
negative discontinuities;
Some interesting prospective reversals of current conventional opinions.
The frequency distribution of discontinuities and the most widely cited ones are in Fig. 11.
Some of the striking discontinuities are shown in Table 5.
Discontinuities with respect to fairly rapid shifts in energy systems, sources and climate-resources management
represent the most frequently cited domains, with the next area being new governance models. Overall, the lists provide a
fertile field for some real dramatic change scenarios centred on some key discontinuities. While these lists are still innovative
and worthy of more focused analysis by specialists, the strong alignment of these factors with those already cited as drivers
and shocks (or possibly showing a respondent fatigue pattern) suggests that it may be important to analyse the patterns of
individual responses to see how they differentiate among the key factors and whether any of the sorting base descriptions
(i.e. age, affiliation, years of experience and country of origin) demonstrates particular significance with respect to the
differentiation and sophistication of responses.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 10. Orientations of discontinuities.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 11. Frequency distribution of top 10 discontinuities.
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3.2.5.1. Joint assessment of Foresight experience and discontinuities. Over 33% of the discontinuities were defined by the
respondents with over 15 years experience. Respondents with 5–10 years experience also contributed significantly (over
27%).
Impact assessment. The majority of the drivers identified were identified as likely to have high impact on the STEEP
systems with the rest of the drivers (approximately a quarter of them) likely to have medium impact.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. The likelihood of occurrence for about 50% of the discontinuities identified was
considered to be medium. Different from the other groups, respondents with 5–15 years experience considered that more
than 50% of the discontinuities will occur with the realisation time between 2016 and 2025. Inexperienced respondents (<1
year) considered that most of the discontinuities will be observed in the short run (before 2015), whereas the most
experienced respondents expect that the discontinuities will occur in the medium run (2016–2025).
3.2.5.2. Joint assessment of country of residence and discontinuities. Over 60% of the respondents assessed discontinuities were
from the EU-27 countries. The candidate country respondents constituted the second largest group.
Impact assessment. The impacts of the discontinuities identified were considered to be high by most of the respondents
around the globe. The figure went as high as 75% among the North American respondents.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. Strong disagreements were observed regarding the likelihood of occurrence of the
drivers identified. The majority of the respondents from the US (54%) considered low likelihood of occurrence for
discontinuities. The figure was opposite for the EU member countries, where most of the respondents (46%) considered high
likelihood of occurrence for the discontinuities. On the other hand 67% of the respondents from Australasia considered the
likelihood of occurrence medium. 45% of North American respondents expect that the discontinuities will occur after 2025,
whereas most of the EU member country respondents suggest that the discontinuities will emerge between 2016 and 2025.
A strong consensus is observed among the Australasian respondents that the majority of the discontinuities will occur from
Table 5
Examples of discontinuities.
Examples of discontinuities by category
ABC
Society & Culture 10 Back to basics: nature, safety, home Personalised genomic healthcare Rapid reversal of tolerance to
multicultural populations
Human systems adapt to new
culture of physical and biological
requirements
Reduced need for health services ‘‘Enhanced Olympics’’ all
enhancements, all drugs allowed
Human decisions change because of
the Internet advisory capacity
Slow down in the world population
from development
Science & Tech. 13 Scientific community discredited,
isolated and ostracised
Accelerated ICT development in
ubiquitous computation
All communications are mobile,
Web-based and wireless changing
human settlements
E-science, virtual science
discredited for unreliable biased
data
Biochips for human implants Nanotechnology radically changes
production methods and material
world via molecular and self-
assembling entities
Secularism in science overvalues in
religion
End of Moore’s law Business and social environments
revise to accommodate Wiki,
Facebook, You Tube, etc.
Energy 13 Energy availability increases
plentiful oil and other alternatives
Rapid advances in concentrated
solar energy
Technical breakthrough in electric
energy storage
Sudden stop of research into
renewable and alternative energy
sources
New cost-effective sources of
renewable energy identified
Breakthrough in hydrogen
production methods require
infrastructure requirements
Massive failure of airlines because of
oil price increase causes travel
decline
Nano-facilitated energy conversion
alters energy economic mix
Ecology Economy 7 Western world becomes a national/
corporate welfare state
BRICS rapidly overtake western
economy
Runaway global warming
Increase of poverty China leads world in green and
renewable energies
Accelerated arctic ice shelf melting
push international climate treaties
Rising sea levels prompt large
infrastructure restructuring
Geo-Politics & Security 8 Europe becomes the most
competitive economy in the world
WW3 Nanotechnology and ecological
behaviour reverse perception of a
resource scarce world
Discontinuities in national and
international policy approaches
toward climate change
Breakdown of world order Resource scarcity creates new
motivations for space resource
discovery/extraction
Conflicts between treaty promoters
and deniers create discontinuity
Global security issues rise, e.g.
nuclear crisis
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2016 to 2025. These differences suggest some further survey or focus group opportunities to probe the differences in
perception of discontinuities.
3.2.5.3. Joint assessment of Foresight affiliation and discontinuities. Again, Academic respondents took the lead in the
assessment of the discontinuities (39%). A high and balanced participation in discontinuity assessment was observed among
the Governmental and Business respondents.
Impact assessment. Around 70% of all respondents from various Foresight affiliations that assessed discontinuities expect
high impact. The rest of the respondents stated medium impact.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. Regarding the likelihood of occurrence of discontinuities, the responses from
Academia, NGOs and Students were identical, where about 52% of the respondents suggested medium level of likelihood.
50% of the respondents from Government and Business stated high likelihood of occurrence. The figures changed slightly in
the assessment of time horizons. This time Academia and Business suggested that most of the discontinuities would emerge
from 2016 to 2025, whereas students and Governmental respondents expected a longer time horizon (beyond 2025).
3.2.6. Weak signals
The radar diagram below (Fig. 12) shows the orientations of the 171 weak signals identified by the respondents of the Big
Picture Survey.
The following observations were made after the analysis of the Weak signals:
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 12. Orientations of weak signals.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 13. Frequency distribution of top 10 weak signals.
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Good response with 171 weak signals;
Lots of focus on Society and Culture = a well balanced orientation for a FTA audience;
Provocative elements explored: tipping points in culture, science and ecology; familiar bases for economic value,
international conflict and innovations may be shifting resulting in loss of control by the old guard actors;
New ethics, new freedoms, new rights and technologies out of control are cited;
Also worthy of deeper probing in subsequent surveys.
Fig. 13 shows the frequency distribution of weak signals identified by the survey respondents and the most widely cited
ones.
Table 6 gives the examples of weak signals by category.
Compared to the previous elements, the distribution of weak signals appears to be more balanced and nuanced in terms of
socio-cultural variables, but more definitive in terms of technological and ecological signals. In many areas, the weak signals
if and when they become strong will signify real shifts toward new and somewhat uncharted directions for societies
hence they represent a good cross section of global anxieties as well as global aspirations great fodder for an extended
strategic conversation.
3.2.6.1. Further assessment of weak signals by time horizon, affiliation and country of residence. Experience time horizon. The
respondents with a Foresight experience longer than 1 year expect most the majority of the weak signals to emerge in the
medium term future (2016–2025), whereas the inexperienced respondents have a longer time horizon (beyond 2025). This
is likely due to the familiarity that older and more experienced contributors have with how fast changes can really appear
from insight to application.
Affiliation time horizon. The majority of the Business respondents have a longer term time horizon (beyond 2025)
compared to the respondents from Academia and Governments who consider that most of the weak signals will occur in the
mid-term (2016–2025).
Country of residence time horizon. Regardless the country of residence most of the respondents have medium term time
horizon, with a higher emphasis from the EU Associate countries.
Table 6
Examples of weak signals.
Examples of weak signals by category
ABC
Society & Culture 61 Concept of rational behaviour in
modernity losing value and impact
People might be eating plastics due
to photo-degraded plastics in
environments (e.g. eaten by fish)
Different ethical vision science built
Stronger impact of artists Increase of genetic and hereditary
diseases
Acceptance of new culture in arts,
architecture, law and life styles
Dependence on anti-factual
information, failing roots of
knowledge and understanding
Declining male fertility Human cloning
Science & Tech. 33 Ubiquitous connectivity web 2.0,
Facebook, second life. ‘‘Lag of the
real behind the virtual’’
Bio-tech revolution and robotics
change human race
Less usage of human brain
Freedom to do any type of research Breakthrough in plant gene to create
antibiotics for cancer
Nano membranes allow humans
swim under water without air tubes
Researchers become entrepreneurs Exploitation of other planets and
moon
Rights to robots
Energy 9 Russia turns off gas/oil for political
purposes
Solar energy price descants Shift to hydrogen energy
Wrong prediction of oil prices by IEA
Ecology Economy 27 Widening the rift between rich and
poor
More rights of China Induced migration due to
inundation and climate change
Price hikes in energy, materials and
food
Democratisation of China Sunspot theory of climate change
Privatisation criticised more China implodes due to several
political conflicts
Diverse opinions on environmental
issues
Geo-Politics & Security 26 Independent regions in Europe Marginalised proponents of
terrorism
Geopolitical conflict over fisheries
and water resources
Liberal counter-revolution in Iran Increased technological pressure to
redefine confidentiality loss of
privacy
Global food supply shortage
Integration process of Asia and
Africa
Technologies out of control Changes in the gravity of the earth
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4. Conclusions and implications on policy and strategy
The following implications from the outputs of the Big Picture Survey can be mentioned:
The survey responses provide a rich and diverse array of issues that cover most of the provocative policy issues now
engaging public debate and offer a new set of prospective future issues as well;
The range and tone of these policy relevant topics is certainly very wide, reflecting perhaps more what might go wrong
rather than seeing possible developments as opportunities or situations that could become positive in a new context;
For the most part, the drivers in particular suggest an adequate number of critical uncertainties and polarities so that
scenarios development appears to be both possible and desirable;
Overall the many obviously very thoughtful responses and the depth and scope of imaginative thinking inherent
in these responses suggest a robust series of discussions and further research and scenarios development may be
warranted;
Further assessment of survey variables has indicated that there are no dramatic surprises, but there seem to be emerging
several instances of avenues that could benefit from further discussion, focus groups or another survey that invites
respondents to elaborate upon their choices.
The results reveal that the data is both useful and quite insightful and diverse. More data and analysis will be required to
fully develop the potential of this survey but an excellent base now exists, one that could provoke a more consistent and
comprehensive response over time.
The current paper aims to establish a methodological base. The authors acknowledge that it could benefit from additional
content assessment. However, subsequent work will concentrate more on the interpretation of the rich data set that has
been acquired and will be augmented. A first, but a limited attempt at further interpretation of the BPS data has already been
made by using social network analysis in a paper by Nugroho and Saritas [17]. Another paper dedicated to a further
elaboration of the BPS results is planned by the authors in 2009.
Given that this was a first iteration, another limitation became evident regarding the definition of the boundaries
regarding the STEEP categories. This classification was made by the authors to manage the high number and diverse nature of
the responses. Some responses were very precise and some were very general and consequently distribution could be
different depending on the interpretation, i.e. which categories to assign general responses to.
Overall, the authors are very pleased with the response even though time did not permit a full analysis of the data.
Further analysis will include: (1) trends and drivers by experience, country of residence and affiliation and also by
responses on impact, likelihood, controversy and horizon time; (2) discontinuities, wild cards and weak signals by a similar
but smaller range of differentiators. There may be some surprises or patterns or just: so what! So wait for the next iteration
in 2010.
In summary, the authors are excited by how this information might be further dissected and examined for themes and
insights that can be used to guide future Foresight work and additional FTA surveys of this type or building upon this base.
Our primary conclusion is that it will be very useful to repeat the survey with FTA 2010 if possible, and extend it to other
similar groups, in the next year or two, for comparison purposes.
Acknowledgement
We are grateful to our colleague PhD researcher Ms. Graciela Sainz de la Fuente for her valuable contribution to the
analysis of the Big Picture Survey data.
References
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Sandro Mendonça is lecturer at the Department of Economics, ISCTE Lisbon University Institute. He is a researcher at Dinâmia, ERC, CISEP and UECE and is a member of the executive board of Obercom, Portugal's independent communication and the media watch (www.obercom.pt). He was educated in economics at the Technical University of Lisbon and Erasmus University of Rotterdam. He holds a masters degree in Science & Technology Policy from SPRU, University of Sussex, where he is currently completing his doctorate. In his consultancy and advice activities he has interacted with many public and private organisations in areas such as innovation policy, intellectual property and strategic management. His work has appeared in journals like Research Policy, Industrial & Corporate Change, Journal of Economic Issues, Economics of Innovation & New Technology, Technological Forecasting & Social Change. sfm@iscte.pt, s.m.mendonca@sussex.ac.uk
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