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This is a revised personal version of the article published in Planning Theory. Please cite as: De Vries, J.R., Beunen, R., Aarts, N.,
Lokhorst, A.M., Van Ark, R. (2013) The pivot points in planning: How the use of contracts influences trust dynamics. Planning Theory
(online first, DOI: 10.1177/1473095213501506). http://plt.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/09/11/1473095213501506
The pivot points in planning: How the use of contracts influences trust
dynamics
Jasper de Vriesa, Raoul Beunena, Noelle Aartsa, Anne-Marike Lokhorsta and Ronald van Arkb
a Strategic Communication Group , Wageningen University, PO Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen , The Netherlands
b Royal Haskoning DHV, The Ne therlands
ABSTRACT
To organize new governance arrangements and to restore trust in spatial planning, contracts are often
seen as vital policy instruments. The relations between contracts and trust are regularly studied from
various perspectives. In this paper, we add to the existing knowledge by exploring the use of contracts
over time and the influence thereof on trust dynamics. We conclude that, longitudinally, the use of
contracts can plays a pivotal role in trust dynamics by influencing the construction of, and actors’
perspective on, the common history of the parties involved and their future expectations in close relation
to the changing context. This perspective might help planners to deal with the inevitable dynamics of
planning processes and trust.
Keywords: Contracts, policy instruments, trust dynamics, spatial planning, communication.
INTRODUCTION
Because of changes in social, economic, cultural and
political contexts, traditional planning models have
been increasingly criticized (Van Woerkum et al.,
2011). These critiques focus on traditional planning
approaches which have often failed to deliver
required and requested services (Hajer, 2003; Van
Dijk et al., 2011). This inability has resulted in a
decreasing feeling of trust towards planning
institutions amongst citizens and organizations
(Swain and Tait, 2007; Tait, 2011). In response to this
decrease in trust, new planning approaches have been
developed and explored (Allmendinger, 2002;
Albrechts, 2005). Examples of these approaches can
be found in communicative planning (Healey, 1997)
and consensus building (Innes, 2004), and in
approaches such as public–private partnerships
(PPPs). At their core, these approaches search for new
ways to deal with the growing complexity of planning
processes (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007; Van
Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). This complexity
results from the growing number of participants
involved in planning processes, and the
unpredictability and uncertainty that are inherent in
the future-oriented character of spatial planning. To
deal with this new situation, the approaches share a
search for new arrangements to facilitate
collaboration between different parties. To organize
or consolidate these new forms of collaboration,
contracts are often seen as vital instruments
(Albrechts, 2004).
Contracts have long been used in many ways and have
played an important role in the organization of
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today’s complex European society (Greif, 2007). In the
last decades, contracts have attracted renewed
attention in various fields and are often seen as
instruments to coordinate negotiations between
actors in complex situations (Djanibekov et al., 2013;
Das and Teng, 1998; Salet and Woltjer, 2009). An
essential concept – with relevance for the use of
contracts – in these negotiations is mutual trust
between the actors involved (Van Ark and Edelenbos,
2005). In both planning practice and scientific
debates, the introduction of contracts is explained as a
way to build or restore the dwindling trust in
planning institutions (Lorenz, 1999; O’Neill, 2002).
These ideas are partly based upon normative theories
supporting the use of contracts to create transparency
and trust (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007). However, not
all planning processes in which contracts are used are
considered successful or transparent.
Trust and contracts are strongly related to each other
(Talvitie, 2011; Van der Veen and Korthals Altes,
2009; Möllering, 2005). One might expect a rather
simple linear relation: when trust is low, contracts are
used extensively; and when trust is high, there is no
need to use contracts. However, a rich line of studies
in this area has resulted in various perspectives on
the trust–contract relation. These perspectives focus
mainly on the form and content of the contract and
the influence of these aspects on trust. However, by
doing so, they fail to take into account the actual use
of contracts over time and the influence thereof on
trust (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Consequently,
they omit the dynamics that characterize the
interaction in planning processes. In order to gain a
deeper understanding of the relation between trust
and contracts, we therefore explore the longitudinal
relation between the use of contracts and trust
dynamics in planning practices. In doing so, we
triangulate a historical, a contextual and a
comparative perspective, taking into account how
things have become, what happened simultaneously
and what patterns emerge from case comparisons
(Blok, 1978).
The outline of the paper is as follows: we first give a
theoretical overview of contracts and trust dynamics.
Then, we analyse their interrelation and present our
analytical focus. Using this focus, we analyse three
examples of Dutch spatial planning. We conclude by
discussing the core aspects of the interrelation
between trust and the use of contracts over time.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
CONTRACTS
In the last decades, the use of contracts has especially
been advocated and discussed in economics
(transaction cost economics, TCE, Williamson, 1985)
and in relation to new arrangements for the
implementation of public services, such as PPPs
(Edelenbos and Teisman, 2008) and New Public
Management (NPM) (Lane, 1998). Within spatial
planning, contracts are used in the coordination of
practices and policies affecting spatial organization or
to increase the efficiency of planning institutions (Van
Assche and Verschraegen, 2008; Van Ark, 2005).
Contracts are used for numerous reasons, varying
from arranging simple financial transactions to
organizing new and complex intergovernmental
forms of cooperation. However, an important reason
for the use of contracts in general is the formalization
of existing informal rules (Ellickson, 1991). Both
informal and formal rules play an important
organizing and regulating role in society (Van Assche
and Djanibekov, 2011). Formal institutions such as
laws influence informal networks, just as informal
rules influence formal institutions (North, 2005; Van
Assche and Djanibekov, 2011). Through the use of
contracts, informal norms can be consolidated and
therefore become formal rules within a certain
institutional context (North, 2005; Buitelaar and
Sorel, 2010). In this situation, contracts can be seen as
a specific set of rules that two or more parties have
negotiated in order to establish variations or
specializations for further cooperation within a wider
web of rules (Ellickson, 1991).
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To support various ways of cooperating, contracts
exist in different forms. The majority of the literature
focuses on the content and level of detail of contracts.
NPM scholars, for instance, argue that contracts
should be complete or as specific as possible in order
to enforce them in court (Lane, 2000). In the NPM
view, complete contracts are seen as a vital
mechanism for high performance and efficient
management (Bevir et al., 2003; Noordegraaf, 2000).
Others, focusing on the transaction costs that come
with the design, use and enforcement of contracts,
argue that contracts are by definition incomplete.
Consequently, contracts should be more general and
take into account uncertainty and other social
mechanisms in order to be truly useful (Williamson,
2000). This perspective is further developed by
scholars of relational contracting and governance.
This group argues for more general forms of contracts
taking into account trust relations (MacNeil, 1985;
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). However far from
complete, this overview shows that contracts can vary
from a set of strategic agreements consolidating
common ideas about future development (Van Ark
and Edelenbos, 2005) to complex and detailed
agreements arranging the implementation of policies
(Lane, 2000).
TRUST AND TRUST DYNAMICS
The focus on trust originates from organization
studies and adjacent fields in the 1970s (Tyler and
Kramer, 1996). Since then, trust has been
conceptualized in different ways. Broadly, there are
two dominant conceptualizations. The first is the
behavioural tradition focusing on the relation
between trust and choices or actions in cooperative
settings. These studies focus for example on trust as
the basis for choosing to cooperate (e.g. Hardin,
1993). The second tradition is more cognitive,
focusing on interpersonal characteristics associated
with trust such as expectations, intentions and
uncertainties (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al.,
1998). The distinction between the two is highly
analytic, and the two are interrelated. However, in
trust studies the behavioural tradition is often
explained as ‘thin trust’ (Williams, 1988) or
generalized trust (Uslaner and Conley, 2003; Uslaner,
2004). In which, generalized trust is explained as the
willingness to trust strangers for cooperation based
on assumed common values (Uslander and Conley,
2003). On the other hand, the cognitive tradition is
often explained as ‘thick trust’ (Williams, 1988) or
particularized trust (Uslaner and Conley, 2004).
Particularized trust is then explained as trust between
people based on common characteristics and
identities (Uslaner and Conley, 2004).
Although these conceptualizations give interesting
insights into the nature of trust, most of these studies
take a static perspective on trust, paying limited
attention to the evolution of trust through interaction
(Lewicki et al., 2006; Idrissou, 2011, 2012).
Consequently, these studies fail to include the
dynamics that come with interaction in planning
practices. In order to gain a better understanding of
trust in planning practices, we wish to adopt a
dynamic perspective on trust in this paper. Therefore
we follow Lewicki and Bunker (1996) and Lewicki et
al. (2006) who move away from these two traditions
and define trust as a dynamic concept that develops in
interaction. From their work, we distinguish two main
aspects of trust.
The first aspect concerns trust as individuals’
expectations about the others’ thoughts, behaviour
and decisions (Lewicki and Buncker, 1996; Idrissou,
2012). These expectations are often based on what we
know of the other through patterns of cooperation
(Lewicki et al., 2006; O’Brien, 2001). This knowledge
is based on a set of accumulating events and the
interpretation of these events. Under the influence of
new events, cooperation and interaction, this
interpretation is constantly constructed and
reconstructed over time. This common history forms
a dynamic basis for expectations and trust. In
addition, on the basis of the interpretation of common
history and present day events, individuals
experience uncertainty, risks, control and
vulnerability. These experiences influence the
construction of expectations over time as well.
Consequently, these experiences influence trust. In
this process, new interactions result in new
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experiences, a reconstruction of the past, adjusted
expectations and a rebalancing of trust.
The second dimension of trust is the context in which
it is performed (Mayer et al., 1995; Kadefors, 2004).
Trust is always expressed in a specific situation of
interaction. In such interaction, people give meaning
to the context through interpretation and consequent
actions. Thus, these interpretations result in new and
terminating opportunities to trust or not. However,
the interpretation can also result in feelings like risk,
(un)certainty, vulnerability or flexibility. Experiencing
such feelings influences trust dynamics as well.
When considered in these two dimensions, trust
reveals itself as a concept that is constantly balanced
in interaction. Figure 1 illustrates trust constantly
balanced over time around the question of whether to
trust or not, built upon the image of history and future
expectations (horizontal lines) and influenced by
feelings of uncertainty, vulnerability and risk (little
arrows). It also shows the context (vertical line)
creating new opportunities and terminating existing
ones.
Figure 1: Longitudinal trust dynamics in context
TRUST AND CONTRACTS
The literature about the relation between trust and
contracts is extensive, especially in economics
(Möllering, 2006). However, studies reveal diverging
views (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). A first group of
scholars argues that contracts and trust are opposite
to each other (Rousseau et al., 1998). They contend
that contracts reduce effective exchange in
relationships as a result of too much structure and
control. According to them, detailed contracts rule out
the flexibility that is needed to deal with trust and
even reduce the development of positive expectations.
Moreover, they argue that the level of control is seen
as a sign of distrust. A second group argues that trust
is a stronger and more preferred control mechanism.
Trust makes contracts and control unnecessary
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The last group sees
contracts and trust as complementary to each other,
arguing that a contract does not imply a lack of trust
(Van Ark and Edelenbos, 2005). They argue that
contracts and trust are two different approaches
which can be used alongside each other (Das and
Teng, 1998; Mellewigt et al., 2007; Eshuis, 2006), or
are a duality which refer and create each other
(Möllering, 2005). In this perspective, contracts are
the basis for trust and limit the chances and incentives
for opportunism.
Closer examination of these different perspectives
reveals that they all share a focus on the level of detail
of contracts in relation to trust. We therefore conclude
that the interplay between trust and contracts can
thus have various forms, showing that the relation
between trust and contracts is far from static (Das and
Teng, 2001; Edelenbos and Eshuis, 2012). However,
how trust and contracts relate over time has hardly
been studied (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Taking
this dynamic relation as a starting point, in the
current paper we focus on the use of contracts over
time and the influence thereof on trust dynamics. In
doing so, we concentrate on the moments in a
planning when contracts are discussed or used in
interaction. We chose this focus because the meaning
of policy instruments such as contracts is constructed
in interaction, through interpretation and the actors’
subsequent actions (Rap, 2006; Van Herzele and
Aarts, 2013). We assume that contracts influence trust
dynamics every time they are discussed, altered or
broken. In order to understand how this occurs, we
analyse the use of contracts over time in three Dutch
cases of spatial planning practice.
For each case, we identified and analysed a series of
events to explore longitudinally the dynamic
perspective on trust and contracts. During these
events, contracts were discussed, altered or adjusted.
Following these instances, we analysed the planning
process by looking at:
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a) The course of the process
b) The relationships among the parties involved.
For our exploration we draw upon three earlier
studies on planning practice, namely, the Maurik
Dijkzone case , the Teylingen Pact case (Van Ark,
2005), and the Investment Fund for Rural Areas case
(De Vries et al., forthcoming). The secondary analysis
aimed to explore the use of contracts and the
influence thereof on trust dynamics. The data from
the three case studies were suited to that purpose
because the initial studies aimed to study trust in
planning practice in which contracts played an
important role (the Maurik Dijkzone case and the
Investment Fund for Rural Areas case) and the use of
contracts in planning practice in which trust played
an important role (the Teylingen Pact case). The data
for these studies were collected through semi-
structured interviews in order to explore the various
events in the processes and the perspectives on these
events. For the Maurik Dijkzone case, eight
landowners were interviewed. In the study of the
Teylingen Pact case, data were collected through nine
interviews with politicians, civil servants, NGOs and
interest groups. For the Investment Fund for Rural
Areas case, 25 interviews were conducted with civil
servants from the national government and the
provinces. All interviews where audiotaped and
transcribed. In addition, all studies contain a
document study in which policy documents relating to
the planning processes were collected.
Our secondary analysis concentrates on the use of
contracts over time and the influence thereof on trust
dynamics in interactions. In doing so we take a
interpretative analyses perspective as this enables us
to focus on the interaction and the ‘.. different ways of
seeing, understanding, and doing, based on different
prior experiences.’ (Yanow, 200, pp. 8). For this
analyses we draw upon the transcribed interview
data and earlier publications of the three cases.
Processing these data, we coded the parts about trust,
distrust, contracts, agreements and trust-related
concepts, namely, uncertainty, control and risk. These
coded elements were then used to construct the use of
contracts and the influence thereof on trust dynamics
over time. These findings were then combined in
three timelines.
THREE EXAMPLES FROM DUTCH SPATIAL PLANNING
THE MAURIK DIJKZONE CASE
Our first example is from the municipality of Buren.
The municipality signed a contract with a group of
landowners in order to build several houses on their
private land (for the timeline of this project, see
Figure 2). This project was initiated when a group of
five landowners in Maurik village (4000 inhabitants)
had the idea of jointly building new houses on their
land. They presented their ideas to the local
municipality, who invited the landowners to come up
with a concrete development plan. Together, the
landowners negotiated over several months, and
eventually signed a contract. This contract stated that
they would hire a spatial consultant to draw up the
plan, that they would develop the houses together and
share the basic costs of plan development. In this
contract, the municipality was not yet involved. The
development plan – the product of the contract – was,
however, rejected by the municipality as it did not fit
into the municipality’s recently presented spatial
strategy. The contract between the landowners
became therefore out of use. A few years later, the
municipality took the spatial strategy further and
developed the land allocation plan for the village. In
this process, the municipality invited the five
landowners to draw up a new plan, called Dijkzone,
together with their neighbours as part of the
allocation plan. The project was now directed by the
municipality and the total area included 11
landowners and 7.5 ha of land.
As project leader, the municipality presented a time
planning, with the various phases of the process such
as initiation phase and design phase. On their
initiative the landowners and the municipality came
together to discuss the wishes and demands of the
landowners. Afterwards, the new group (of 11) and
the municipality signed a contract which included
clauses about cost sharing, required studies and
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research, preconditions for development, legal
requirements and detailed agreements about the
process. If the process did not lead to the expected
housing plan with the landowners’ consent, the
process would be terminated until further notice.
Some of the landowners had the intention of selling
their land, whereas others intended to build houses in
the Dijkzone. For the municipality, the main reason
for joining the process was that this project would
lead to relatively cost-efficient small-scale housing
suited to the local situation. Under the direction of the
municipality the contract was designed. Because the
various landowners had different reasons for signing
it, the contract became very detailed. After signing the
contract, the municipality delegated the two external
planning professional as project managers. The
contact between municipality and the landowners
was mainly through public meetings and the project
managers. During the process the contract was used
by the municipality for keeping to the time schedule
and controlling the various steps in the planning
procedure.
After some time, the municipality changed the
proposed financial clauses in the contract as they
feared exposure to significant financial risk. The
landowners were surprised about these changes.
Subsequently, other actions taken by the municipality
were not greatly appreciated either. For instance,
some landowners raised the issues of the constant
change of project leaders and of a confidential memo
accidentally send to all participants. Moreover, the
changes resulted in higher financial risk for the
landowners. This risk was perceived as stronger in
the context of the on-going economic decline.
Consequently, expectations regarding profit were
sharply reduced. Discussing these issues with the
municipality did not help, according to the
landowners. In their view the municipality kept deaf
for their questions. These lowered expectations
resulted in landowners starting to lose trust in the
municipality, thus making cooperation more difficult.
The perception of risk increased as well, because it
was felt that the contract limited the landowners’
personal ability to deal with future developments; for
instance, their ability to deal with the consequences of
economic decline. However, as the municipality was
not open for discussions, the contract was not
discussed either. In other words, in the perspective of
the landowners, the municipality did what they
wanted after signing the contract while the risk was
mostly felt by the landowners. Consequently, the
contract was perceived more and more as restrictive
and a risk factor. These perceived limitations resulted
in decreasing trust in the municipality and the project
on the part of the landowners. In addition,
landowners started to search for more information
and research. These studies delayed the process.
Especially in the group of five, the changes by the
municipality were viewed negatively. However, as the
municipality delegated the project management to the
external planners, the ministry was not involved
directly. Consequently, the landowners, started to
develop depersonalized trust based on discussions
with each other has there was hardly any personal
contact with the municipality (Kramer, 1999).
Although the participants started to lose their trust in
the municipality, the general feeling was that the
contract was signed and therefore most of them were
still cooperating. In other words, they had trust in the
working of the contact.
In the process of declining trust in the municipality,
the first contract – between the landowners - started
to play a role again. This first contract had become
void because the municipality rejected the first
development plan. At that juncture, it did not seem to
play a very important role, but in the process of
declining trust this ‘historical event’ was reframed as
an argument to underpin the feeling of distrust and
uncertainty in relation to the municipality. This
process of resemiotization, shows that it is not only
the way contracts are used in interaction that plays a
role, but that in this interaction mutual history can be
reframed over time (Iedema, 2003). As such they form
the basis for the argument of trust or distrust.
Another consequence of the declining trust was that
some of the landowners signed a new contract,
without terminating the other. This contract was a
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contract among a small group of actors. In the new
contract, they formulated agreements for the future
development of the project in order to consolidate the
feeling of trust among themselves, in the face of
distrust towards the municipality. The contract
consisted of agreements consolidating the trust
relation between the landowners, and agreements
about the way they would team up in future
negotiations with the municipality. They felt this was
necessary since so much had changed and happened
in their mutual relation. Thus, the new context
resulted in a new contract. This contract functioned
as the specification of the context to foster further
cooperation (Ellickson, 1991).
The Maurik Dijkzone case shows how the use of
contracts influences expectations, although it was not
regularly discussed amongst the various parties
involved. The main contract between the municipality
and the landowners was designed to specify and
clarify the relation for future cooperation within the
existing context. However, as the context changed
over time, the contract became oppressive for the
landowners. This resulted in two developments. First,
over time various negative events relating to the
contract occurred and became part of the parties’
common history. Second, landowners started to
reframe the rejection of the first plan and expressed
this as an argument for distrust. On the basis of these
various and accumulating events and on the
agreements in the contract, landowners developed
negative expectations and distrust towards the course
of the project and the municipality. The last can
mainly be characterized as depersonalized trust. In
addition, a group of landowners signed a new contract
to specify their mutual relation in order to consolidate
their trust in the new context and in the face of
unknown future developments. In a way this can be
viewed as the consolidation of a ‘gentlemen’s
agreement’, and the consolidation of trust and
goodwill.
THE TEYLINGEN PACT CASE
The second example deals with the use of a contract
agreed upon by a large number of public and private
parties about spatial developments in the Bulb district
(Province of Zuid-Holland, the Netherlands) (for the
timeline of this project, see Figure 3). This agreement,
called the Teylingen Pact, is the more or less
spontaneous outcome of a joint effort by local
governmental and non-governmental organizations to
prevent further urbanization of the area (Van Assche
et al., 2012). Prior to the cooperation in the pact, the
different parties clashed with one another for a long
time over various issues in different projects and
contexts. Consequently, large gaps existed in the
relations between people, and great distrust was
experienced amongst representatives.
Although plans for further urbanization of the district
were launched before, the actual start of the pact
followed the province’s presentation of the plan for
‘Bulb city.’ The local governments, non-governmental
organizations and other actors came together in
common resistance against this plan. The contract
was initiated because of a strong feeling of distrust
towards a common enemy, emanating from
discussions in which opinions were shared. As a
result, people started to understand one another’s
perspectives, and mutual distrust started to decrease.
The discussions resulted in an agreement on a set of
strategic actions to keep the Bulb district open, the
Teylingen Pact. This agreement was rather informal
and not part of any formal policy. The contract
contained agreements about spatial development but
also about strategic decision making. On the basis of
these discussions, a feeling of trust developed
between the actors. Möllering (2006) describes as the
reflexivity of trust, a process in which actors and their
interaction influences trust development and trust
influences interaction between the actors. Although
the reflexivity of trust is by no means a key to success,
in this case it resulted in growing trust. At the
moment the contract was signed, the contract
functioned as a consolidation of trust. This trust was
based on the renegotiation of actors’ common history
and the consolidation of future interdependencies.
From the time the Teylingen Pact came into being
(1996), the agreements were incorporated in
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different spatial plans. This was seen as a sign of
success and strengthened the trust in the agreements.
Although the agreements were seen as very positive
and as a sign of trust, they did not lead to blind trust.
Representatives remained critical of one another and
the agreements. For instance, when discussions about
spatial developments or mutual cooperation became
deadlocked, the representatives often referred back to
the agreements. However, discussing the contract and
using it successfully made the contract stronger over
time. Also, the agreements were seen as a framework
giving the flexibility to develop relations and spatial
plans within the context of the agreements. In
addition, to a certain extent the agreements
themselves could be questioned during pre-set
evaluation periods. This then resulted in discussions
in which spatial challenges, ambitions and ideas were
balanced. Based on these discussions, new
agreements would be made fitting the new context.
Because trust was the basis of the agreements,
breaking the agreements could only happen at great
personal expense, especially as the representatives
committed to the agreements would meet and need
one another in various future projects. This feeling
grew as the contract was successful and became
stronger every time it was used. It gradually became
difficult to deviate from the contract because it
became functional as a dominant tool in the network
of organizations dealing with spatial development in
the area (Ter Haar et al., 2010).
The Teylingen Pact case shows how a common image
of history is reconstructed between various parties.
This image was the basis for mutual trust. This trust
was consolidated in a contract in which parties agreed
upon future interdependencies for the development of
the Bulb district. The ‘successful’ use of the contract
over time added to the positive perspective on the
common history amongst the parties involved.
Möllering (2006) refers to such a development as the
reflexivity of trust, a process in which actors and their
interaction influences trust development and trust
concurrently influences interaction between the
actors. Although the reflexivity of trust is by no means
a key to success, in this case it resulted in growing
trust. Over time the parties developed more positive
expectations about future development and mutual
trust. In this process, the successes resulted in a form
of group-think in which the success of the group, e.g.
the contract, influenced individual decisions (Haslam,
2004). This is exemplified by the idea that the
contract itself was seen as a sign of trust by the group,
from which people could only deviate with great
damage to their reputation.
INVESTMENT FUND FOR RURAL AREAS
The third example is the Investment Fund for Rural
Areas (ILG), a series of contracts used by the Ministry
of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality to make
agreements with provincial authorities (for the
timeline of this project see Figure 4).
To respond to the growing multi-functionality of the
Dutch countryside, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature
and Food Quality initiated this investment fund in
2004. The aim of the ILG was to enable regional and
local authorities to effectively realize national
objectives for the development of rural areas, as it
was believed that the provinces were better informed
about local and regional demands and wishes.
Therefore, the national government and provinces
signed contracts in which they agreed which part of
national policy would be implemented by the
provinces. The contract did not explicitly contain
agreements on how these objectives should be
reached. Consequently, cooperation between the
governments was based on trust (as stated in one of
the first policy documents), and the focus in the
contracts was to be on national objectives. The
philosophy behind this approach was that both
governmental tiers would work together in a
horizontal manner. In this structure, the central
government would function as principal, and the
provinces as directors of the implementation.
In the process of designing the contracts, discussions
were held about the budgets, autonomy of the
provinces, control by central government and
monitoring. As a result, the design process took a very
long time and, although not intended at the start of
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the ILG, it resulted in very detailed performance
contracts. These contracts were completely focused
on output in order to ensure accountability to the
national government and to make it easy to execute
yearly monitoring rounds. In the first years of the ILG,
it became clear that the national government
perceived the contracts as a detailed way of
consolidating cooperation. Consequently, the national
government used the contract as a way to control the
provinces in the various discussions about the
progress of the ILG, in and outside national
parliament. The provinces on their turn, perceived the
contracts as control mechanisms.
Until the mid-term review (MTR), many discussions
were held between the different governments. The
discussions focused mainly on the correctness of the
numbers reported and the accountability of the
various provinces in relation to the agreements in the
contracts. Although not agreed upon, the first annual
reports were discussed in parliament. In these
discussions, the content and form of the contracts
were often mentioned. These discussions kept on
going as both parties needed each other and due to
the horizontal organisation structure of the ILG there
was not one leading actor who could make the
decisions. As a result of these discussions, the
provinces saw the contracts as control mechanisms,
limiting their flexibility to deal with future
developments. However, the discussions themselves
were also seen by the provinces as a sign of distrust.
These feelings of control, lack of flexibility and
distrust built upon one another. Consequently, these
experiences became part of the common history of the
cooperating governmental tiers. In addition, under the
influence of these experiences the provinces also
reframed their mutual history (Iedema, 2003). This
resulted in a growing negative feeling over time.
Because of this perspective, combined with the
detailed contracts, the provinces developed low
expectations about the future of the ILG, and lost trust
in the central government and the ILG. Under these
circumstances, both the provinces and the central
government argued that the long duration of
discussions in the process towards signing the
contracts was already a sign of distrust.
As the MTR came nearer, it could be observed that the
discussions focused even more on numbers agreed
upon in the contracts. Under the influence of these
discussions, the control aspects of the contracts was
more strongly felt, and trust between the parties
declined further. The declining trust went hand in
hand with debates about the future of the provinces.
The future of the provinces was an important topic in
the national elections, taking place at the time of
writing the MTR. In election debates, many politicians
wanted to cut back on the provincial budgets and the
ILG. In heated debates, provinces felt that they were
fighting for their future existence. Here, the provinces
saw the ILG as an instrument to show their
importance in the web of governments and
governmental tasks. After the elections, a new
government took office with new ideas about the
rural areas. In its very first months, the national
government started new negotiations because they
wanted new agreements with the provinces and to
stop most of the funds for the ILG projects.
Consequently, the provinces judged the ministry as an
unreliable partner in long-term policies.
The ILG case shows how the contracts were perceived
differently over time. Under the influence of
discussions about the contracts, and in relation to
accountability, the provinces started to perceive the
contracts more and more as a control mechanism.
These perceptions influenced their perspective on the
common history. On the basis of this reconstructed
perspective and the different accumulating
discussions, distrust grew between the parties. In
other words, the contracts which were mend as
auditing mechanisms and to create openness, resulted
in growing distrust (O’Neill, 2002). At election time,
the ILG and consequently the contracts were seen as a
last straw to vindicate the provinces’ right to exist.
10
Figure 2. Timeline Maurik Dijkzone case
Figure 3. Timeline Pact van Teylingen
Figure 4. Timeline Investment Fund for Rural Areas
COMPARING THE CASES
Our analysis of the three cases shows how contracts
are used in various spatial planning contexts in the
Netherlands. The cases vary greatly in relation to how
the contracts were used, the context, the relation
between the parties involved, the course of the
projects and trust dynamics. However, comparing the
cases, we found several patterns in how the use of
contracts over time related to trust dynamics.
All three cases showed that, over time the use of
contracts contributes to the common history among
the parties involved, therewith shaping the parties
image of history, of other parties and of mutual
relations. Every time the contract is used, discussed or
altered, it becomes part of the common history as the
planning process continues. In the Teylingen case, for
instance, every time parts of the agreements were
incorporated in spatial plans and policies, this
contributed to the success of the contract. Over time,
these successes accumulated and contributed to a
positive image of the historical interactions and the
contract that was signed. A negative loop is also
possible as the Investment Fund for Rural areas
shows. The repeating emphasis on contracts as a
means for control strengthened the image of a difficult
relation between the parties and therewith distrust
between the parties involved.
The image of history is not a fixed image consisting of
a series of events. Every new event influences the
image of history. Consequently, these images are
constantly constructed and reconstructed and form
therefore a dynamic basis for trust. In the Maurik case
for instance, the changes the municipality’s made to
the contract altered the landowners’ perception of
history. In their view this act shed a new light upon
earlier events, e.g. the rejection of the first spatial
plan. This perception was constructed in relation to
the contract, resulted in lower expectations about the
outcome of the project and the agreements in the
contract and gave raise to distrust. In the ILG case, the
contract negotiations were seen more and more as a
sign of distrust under the influence of the on-going
new discussions about control and accountability. The
reframed distrust and the accountability discussions
in combination with the perceived control function of
the contract resulted in lower expectations and
distrust. In the Teylingen case, the contract was
agreed upon after a renegotiation of the actors’
images of history. In this renegotiation, trust was
established and consolidated through reflexivity
(Möllering, 2006). Subsequently, every time the
contract was used successfully and expectations were
met, the functioning of the contract was confirmed
and so was trust. This strengthened the images of
successful interactions between the parties, resulting
in more positive expectations and a stronger bond of
trust. In this case, the perspective on the contract also
changed. Here, the contract became a sign of trust
from which it was hard to deviate from.
The cases show that the role of the contracts was
perceived differently over time, resulting in different
consequences for trust dynamics. More specifically,
they show how the perceptions about contracts
changed over time under the influence of the use of
the contracts. The Maurik case and the ILG, for
instance, show that, every time the contracts were
discussed or used, they were more and more
perceived as control mechanisms. On the basis of their
11
image of past interactions and influenced by the
perceived role of contracts, actors expected that this
control function would restrict their freedom to deal
with future developments. This increased their
feelings of risk and uncertainty, and consequently
lowered their positive expectation about the outcome
of the project. This lowered expectation negatively
influenced the feeling of trust towards the
municipality (Maurik) and the central government
(ILG).
In addition, perceptions on the role of the contract
were influenced by the changing images about the
context in which parties had to interact and deal with
each other. In the Maurik case, we saw, for instance,
that the landowners perceived economic decline as a
risk factor affecting the amount of profit they would
make from the project. Consequently, their
perspective on the contract changed, and they
perceived the contract as restrictive in dealing with
future developments. In the ILG case, the interplay
between the context and the contract was also
evident. Here, the contracts were more and more
perceived as controlling, thus negatively influencing
the provinces’ perception of the central government
and resulting in distrust, whereas with the upcoming
elections and the debates about the end of the
provinces, the ILG and therewith the contracts were
seen by the provinces as their ticket to future
existence. Although this did not change the provinces’
distrust of the central government, it resulted in a
more positive perspective on the functioning of the
contracts.
Comparing the cases shows that the images of history
are an important dimension for trust dynamics
(Lewicki et al., 2006; O’Brien, 2001). These images are
continuously constructed and reconstructed in
interrelation with the use of a contract and the
specific circumstances in which a party has to deal
with another party. This dynamic images influence
expectations about future developments and trust
dynamics. Here, the use of contracts and the way
different parties perceive the role of the contract play
a key role, as these shape the room, the expectations
and consequent possibilities to deal with future
developments, uncertainties and risks (cf. Domingo
and Beunen, 2013).
CONCLUSION: PIVOTAL POINTS IN PLANNING
By analysing three cases, we explored our perspective
on trust and contracts further by focusing on how,
over time, the use of contracts influences trust
dynamics. From this analysis, we conclude that the
use of contracts follows from the trust relations
between different parties involves while at the same
time influencing these trust relations. The use of
contracts influences trust dynamics every time
contracts are used, discussed or altered, through
different patterns relating to the continuous
constructions of images of history, the decision-
making context at hand and expectations about the
future. In doing so we took the discussion about trust
and contracts a step further and away from the often
discussed dualism (Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005;
Möllering, 2005).
The use of contracts, their role and the consequent
influence on trust dynamics do not stand alone
(Möllering, 2005). We conclude that contracts are a
specification of the context at a certain juncture.
However, planned and unplanned changes are
inevitable parts of planning processes, resulting in a
continuously changing context (Van Woerkum et al.,
2011). People frame or reframe their perspective on
the role of the contract every time they experience
changes in their context (cf. Djanibekov et al., 2013).
Therefore, new perceptions of the ‘old’ contract result
in the terminating of existing opportunities, the
development of new ones and altered expectations
about the course of the project and mutual
relationships. Thus, these changing perceptions lead
to dynamic trust relations. Moreover, new
perspectives on the role of the contract then also
influence the way the specific circumstances of
interaction and negotiation are perceived.
In addition, we conclude that the use of contracts at
different junctures should be viewed as series of
events. These series become part of the common
history of the parties involved. The common history
12
should not be viewed as a factual reality but as
particular images constructed and reconstructed over
time under the influence of the use of the contract
itself. As such, we conclude that the common history
as basis for trust dynamics, is not only build up in
interaction between actors as often advocated
(O’Brien, 2001; Rousseau et al., 1998). More precisely
the common history is build up and constantly
reframed under the influence of new events,
interactions and the use of policy instruments. This
dynamic perspective results in
certainties/uncertainties, growing or declining risks
and expectations about the course of the project and
mutual relations. In addition, based on a dynamic
image of the past, the perspective on the role of the
contract is thus constantly (re-)constructed as well.
The role then functions as a pivotal point on which
expectations based on the image of the past are
rebalanced in relation to the contract – especially as
expectations about, and trust towards, persons or the
project, based on the image of the past, will always be
rebalanced in the face of the perceived future
possibilities and restrictions of a contract.
Hence, our dynamic perspective on the use of
contracts in relation to trust shows that the use of
contracts over time plays a pivotal role in trust
dynamics and the other way around, reinforcing each
other in positive or negative ways. As pivotal points,
both contracts and trust dynamics are central
mechanisms in the construction and reconstruction of
common histories and in rebalancing specific
expectations in interrelation with dynamic contexts
by creating new and terminating opportunities.
By studying trust and contracts from a dynamic
perspective, we have attempted to provide new input
into the on-going debate about the relation between
these two highly interesting concepts. However, our
exploration is only a first step in studying the use of
contracts and policy instruments in general in relation
to trust dynamics. This leaves us open to more
explorative theories, taking into account the dynamics
of everyday life and planning.
Implications for planners
A dynamic perspective on the interplay between trust
and contracts has different implications. Under the
reform towards governance and neo-liberal ideas,
spatial planning practitioners and authorities
regularly use contracts and other policy instruments
to guide interaction or to (re-)establish trust
(Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007; Lane, 1998; Bevir et al.,
2003; Noordegraaf, 2000). In these settings planners
and others should be aware that the meaning and role
of contracts are constructed based upon their use at
specific junctures. Consequently, contracts are neither
value free nor unambiguous policy instruments and
should therefore not be viewed as the final step in a
planning process. Rather, contracts should be used
with a certain degree of precaution as formalization of
relations may deepen the distrust they seek to
dissolve (O’Neill, 2002). Therefore it is import to
constantly take into account both the images of
history that the different parties have and way the
perceive the specific decision-making context at hand
while using a contract or while trying to understand
its (potential) role..
This precaution may start with the notion that
contracts should include clauses which arrange
junctures or events which give cause to change the
contract in response to the state of the art or expected
situations and ideas. This will enable planners, local
people, governments and other groups to adapt to
changing circumstances and unforeseen changes, as
things will happen differently than planned anyway
(Dörner, 1990). Changing the contract then
constitutes a juncture at which the common history is
discussed and reconstructed, expectations are
managed and trust is influenced. Although this is by
no means a new key to success, it may prevent
situations in which contracts are outdated but still in
place, leading to uncertainties and unrestrained
development of distrust.
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