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Implementation and Comparison of a Rules-Based Approach and a Statistical Approach Intrusion Detection Systems



This paper presents an analysis of a rules-based approach and a statistical anomaly approach to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Two IDS systems are implemented. Analysis and comparisons of the systems are presented, as well as conclusions regarding the two approaches.
Abstract-- This paper presents an analysis of a rules-based
approach and a statistical anomaly approach to Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS). Two IDS systems are implemented.
Analysis and comparisons of the systems are presented, as well as
conclusions regarding the two approaches.
Index Terms—Communications systems security, Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS), Rule-based approaches, Statistical
approaches, Ping of Death.
I. I
NCREASES in the interconnectivity of computers and
computer networks as well as the rising level of
sophistication and automation of intrusive attacks make IDS a
tool of great importance to the network administrator.
However, a poor choice in IDS systems can do more harm
than good by providing a false sense of security. Research in
IDS systems has flourished in the last decade and has attracted
extensive efforts in the recent years [1-10].
IDS systems attempt to provide a safety net to other
network security systems. An effective IDS implementation
makes no assumptions about the effectiveness of other
network security services. All activity is suspect and
monitored to assess the perceived threat of the actions.
Threatening behavior is responded to via logging, reporting or
some action on the part of the IDS or related systems.
The value of an IDS system lies in its ability to accurately
determine if an action is a result of an intrusion or normal
Intrusion detection systems fall into two broad categories.
The first approach is Statistical Anomaly Detection. The
underlying premise of this approach is that an intruder’s
activity will differ from that of a legitimate user. Legitimate
user behavior is derived by analyzing past activity.
Aberrations that are outside expected deviations are reported
as the act of an intruder. The strength of statistical approaches
Khaled M. Elleithy is with the Computer Science and Engineering
Department, University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, CT 06601,
Shawn Bell, Brenda Plaag, and Darren Stone are with Computer Science
and Information Technology, Sacred Heart University, Fairfield, CT 06825
is that attacks are defined as any non-normal activity, so it can
theoretically guard against any type of attack.
The second approach is Rules-Based Detection. A rules-
based detection system defines specific activity as being an
intrusion. The system looks for known attacks or defined
behaviors and reports when these are observed.
This paper presents an examination of both approaches to
IDS. We have developed and implemented a rules-based and a
statistical anomaly IDS system. Both IDS systems monitored a
Web-based wire transfer application of similar architecture.
Analysis of the two systems reveals their respective strengths
and weaknesses.
We have developed two IDS implementations. One was a
rules-based approach, the other a statistical anomaly approach.
The rules-based system evaluates actions on the rule-set alone
and the statistical approach evaluated actions only against
statistical models of historical data.
As mentioned, both systems monitored a Web-based wire
transfer system. Users interact with the database via a Web
front-end. All activity is monitored surreptitiously by a second
IDS database. The respective IDS algorithms are implemented
within the interaction between the two databases, easily
hidden to the front-end user.
The system administrator can interact with the IDS
database via a separate Web site or an isolated section of the
production Web site. There the administrator can view
logging and report data, or in the case of the rules-based
implementation, they can define and modify the rule set.
Both systems use Microsoft IIS Server to host the Web
front-end applications (user and administrator components).
ASP code using VBScript was used to program the
applications and both rely on Microsoft databases as a back-
end. The rules-based system uses MS Access, while the
statistical anomaly approach uses MS SQL Server. Figure 1
shows the system architecture and Figure 2 shows the used
system tools in development.
Implementation and Comparison of a Rules-
Based Approach and a Statistical Approach
Intrusion Detection Systems
Khaled M. Elleithy, Shawn Bell, Brenda Plaag, and Darren Stone
IDS Database
Fig. 1. System Architecture
Fig. 2. System Tools.
The front-end comprises a variety of different screens, each
performing functions that are checked by the IDS system. The
login screen provides a security service by authenticating
users. Additionally, it also determines the user’s level of
access based on the type of user (administrator versus
standard user).
Once an administrator logs in successfully the application
points to the administration screen where intrusion attempts
are reported. These reports indicate log-in failures as well as
any other unauthorized activity that falls within the scope of
the rule set. This reporting module allows the administrator
quick access to data regarding possible intrusions.
Also, within this section of the site, the administrator can
change elements of the rule set thus allowing for a degree of
customization in the application. Rules can be changed
periodically to reflect changing activity within the system,
resulting in few false positive reports of intrusion.
Standard users successfully logging in will be directed to
the Banking screen. This screen allows the user to transfer
money from one account to another. Users can also add new
accounts, and log out of the application.
The Banking screen consists of two drop-down menus
determining the account source and destination of the transfer.
A text box is provided for entering monetary values.
The system’s back-end consists of two separate databases.
The first database is called Rules.mdb and is the production
database, designed to store the information captured from the
The second database is called IDS.mdb. IDS.mdb
implements the IDS system. This database collects
information that has been stored in Rules.mdb and then checks
for intrusions based on the rules stored in IDS.mdb. The
IDS.mdb will encrypt the data that comes in if time permits,
however the assumption is made that security precautions
have been made to secure the web server.
The actual rules are stored within tables in IDS.mdb. This
facilitates rule changes, as the administrator merely needs to
change the values stored in these tables. The following are
examples of rules implemented by this system:
Rules 1 through 5 evaluate log in information.
Rule1: Checks for a valid user.
Rule2: Confirms the password, 3 false logins is defined as
an intrusion
Rule3: Checks for user being allowed to login at that time
Rule4: Amount of logins in a day
Rule5: Checks to see if user was already logged in and tries
to login simultaneously
Rules 6 onwards evaluate the actions of the user after log
Rule6: Checks the amount the user is transferring
Rule7: Checks the accounts that the user can transfer to or
Rule8: Checks to see if user has permission to set up new
Rule9: Number of transactions per user in a day
The application monitored by this system is very similar to
that of the rules-based system. Users log in and are
authenticated from the log in screen and can then process
transactions. Log in attempts and all transactions are stored in
a production database.
This production database is tied to an IDS database that
evaluates the transactions and assigns them an alert level
depending on the evaluated level of suspicion. This evaluation
occurs as the transaction takes place and could be
programmed to send alerts to the administrator in real-time.
The administrator logs in to a separate site that access the
IDS database. There the administrator can view reports on the
activity in the production database. Reports can be filtered by
alert level to ignore innocuous transactions.
Data in the IDS database is encrypted to thwart attackers
who gain access to the IDS database. While the encryption
Technology Rules-based Statistical
Web Server MS IIS Server MS IIS Server
Application ASP w/
ASP w/
Database MS Access MS SQL
employed in this system is very modest (values are converted
to ASCII values, shifted two positions and written back in
reverse), it is implemented as a separate ‘black-box’ function
that can easily be swapped out for a more secure encryption
The anomaly detection engine is implemented as SQL
Server stored procedures. These procedures can be encrypted
by SQL Server to provide additional security. However, once
encrypted they cannot be decrypted even by the developer. To
facilitate development the stored procedures were not
encrypted in this implementation.
The stored procedure that assesses the alert level does so
by performing analysis on the historical data in the system. To
do this the data is decrypted and stored in a staging table so
that analysis can be performed. Once an alert level has been
determined it is encrypted and stored in the transaction table
with the corresponding transaction. The decrypted data in the
staging table is immediately purged once the alert level is
Alert levels are determined by measuring current activity
against previous activity. This is achieved by constructing
profiles of normal activity. Actions are decomposed into their
component parts and evaluated against the corresponding
property of the ‘normal’ profile.
Profiles model entities in the database such as the user and
the bank accounts. The profile consists of a property, the
properties average value and a standard deviation for the
range of values associated with that property. An example
would be the following:
A new transaction amount is tested to determine if it falls
with the standard deviation for the average value, which
would be expected. Values outside the standard deviation
increment the alert value. The further the new values vary
from the standard deviation, the higher the alert value is
Each property associated with the transaction is measured
in a like fashion and a final alert value is determined. This
value is then stored in the IDS database with its transaction.
As mentioned previously reporting on this data is provided
via a Web page that can be filtered by alert level.
V. A
The strength of statistical approach is the fact that
intrusions are defined as any non-normal activity. Rules do
not have to be defined to cover all possible intrusions. Any
activity that does not relate closely to previous activity is
regarded as an intrusion. However, this implementation is far
more processor intensive. With each transaction the system
must create a profile of all the entities involved in the
transaction and measure the profile properties against the
corresponding component of the new transaction.
The current implementation is small enough to run without
problem. However even given the scope of this approach,
each transaction has at least four components (users, account
source, account destination and amount). Therefore, each
incremental increase of activity in the production database
could result in a fourfold increase in activity in the IDS
Creating models and storing them in the database could
address this issue. The system could then simply retrieve the
constructed model and perform its evaluations. However the
model would still need to be refreshed periodically, and this
refresh would be processor intensive.
This problem is a much smaller factor in the rules-based
approach. Each new transaction is evaluated by a simple
Boolean evaluation of a pre-defined rule. There is no
additional computational overhead in this system.
The rules-based approach suffers from the limitations of its
own finite rule set. Transactions that fall outside of the rule set
are not evaluated and thus undetected.
Both implementations are very modest in scope. As a
result, the statistical implementation was not noticeably
effected by the extra computational activity and the rules-
based approach was not compromised by a lack of rules.
However, there was one significant aspect of the two
systems that we were able to examine and measure. The
statistical implementation reported far greater false-positive
alerts than the rules-based implementation.
Two theoretical users were proposed to research this issue.
One user, Operator A, performed very regular activity in the
database and consistently logged in successfully with one
attempt. The other user, Operator B, executed far more
dynamic transactions within the database and frequently had
multiple failed log-in attempts.
The statistical anomaly approach successfully modeled
Operator A’s activity after three transactions. The three
transactions that incurred an alert value greater than zero were
still low, the highest alert value being three. This transaction
was rated highest due to the fact that it was the first time it
occurred, which systematically generates a level three alert
Bank Account
Property Transaction
Value $100
value. This transaction acts as a seed value for future
The statistical system could not effectively model Operator
B’s dynamic activity. Only one transaction rated zero, while
most transactions had alert levels greater than five. Operators
B’s activity was too dynamic to lend itself to statistical
This issue cannot be resolved in a pure statistical approach.
If the statistical engine is altered it becomes a rules-based
system by the nature of the modification. One could develop
multiple statistical engines and implement them on a user-by-
user case, but once again rules are introduced into the system:
If User A: Use Engine A
The rules-based system could successfully determined that
Operator A’s were normal from the start, there was no
‘seeding’ time as in the statistical implementation as the rules
are pre-defined. It could also successfully evaluate Operator
B’s activity because the rules could be altered as they applied
to B, giving this user more flexibility and eliminating false-
positive reports.
IDS systems can be categorized by their method of
intrusion detection. These methods can be placed into two
broad categories: rules-based and statistical anomaly intrusion
detection. The rules-based system implements a rule set to
detect intrusive behavior, while the statistical anomaly
approach uses mathematically-determined models to detect
Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. The
statistical anomaly system can detect intrusive behavior that
has not been pre-defined, but it is processor intensive. The
rules-based system is far less taxing on the processor, but
activity outside of its rule set is undetected.
We found that the statistical approach has significant
limitations in a very dynamic environment. Such an
environment produces a rash of false-positive intrusion
reports. These dynamic environments do not lend themselves
to statistical modeling and must be approached carefully to
avoid both false-positive reporting as well as false-negative
reporting (rule sets that are too broad could fail to detect
actual intrusions).
A more effective approach to intrusion detection would be
one that combines elements of the two systems.
The ability of a statistical approach to detect unknown
intrusions is far too valuable to be discarded in an IDS system.
However, the ability of rules-based system to limit false-
positive alarms is also critically important to a reliable IDS
system. Developers need to determine which activities are best
suited to rules-based monitoring, and which lend themselves
to a statistical approach.
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Khaled M. Elleithy (M’1988)
received the
B.Sc. degree in computer science and automatic
control from Alexandria University in 1983, the
M.Sc. Degree in computer networks from the same
university in 1986, and the M.Sc. and Ph.D.
degrees in computer science from The Center for
Advanced Computer Studies at the University of
Southwestern Louisiana in 1988 and 1990,
respectively. From 1983 to 1986 he was with the
Computer Science Department, Alexandria
University, Egypt, as a lecturer.
From September 1990 to May 1995 he worked as an assistant professor at the
Department of Computer Engineering, King Fahd University of Petroleum and
Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. From May 1995 to December 2000 he has
worked as an Associate Professor in the same department. In January 2000
Professor Elleithy joined the Department of Computer Science and
Engineering in University of Bridgeport as an associate professor. In May
2003 he was promoted to full professor.
Professor Elleithy published more than sixty research papers in
international journals and conferences. He has research interests in the areas
of network security, mobile / wireless communications, computer arithmetic
and formal approaches for design and verification.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
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Todd Garrison Practical Examination for GCIA. Global Information Assurance Certification
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T. Garrison, Todd Garrison Practical Examination for GCIA. Global Information Assurance Certification, 2003.
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J. Beale et al., Snort 2.0 Intrusion Detection. Rockland: Syngress Publishing, Inc, 2003.