Algebra of conscience: Vladimir A. Lefebvre, Boston, Mass.: Reidel, 1982

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JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY
27,461-471 (1983)
Book Review
VLADIMIR
A.
LEFEBVRE,
Algebra of Conscience.
Boston, Mass.: Reidel, 1982.
Reviewed by
JAMES
T.
TOWNSEND
The author is a Research Psychologist at the School of Social Sciences, University of
California, Irvine. He obtained his Ph.D. in Psychology in 1971 from Moscow State
University. Prior to coming to the United States, he was a research Scientist at the Central
Mathematical Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences, Moscow. His major research
interests are formal models of human thought and ethical cognition.
The reviewer is a Professor of Psychology at Purdue University. His research interests
center on questions of model equivalence, diversity, and testability, particularly in the areas of
information processing, pattern recognition, and memory search. He has
just
published, with
F. Gregory Ashby,
Stochastic modeling of elementary psychological processes
[Cambridge
Univ. Press, New York, 19831.
Lefebvre begins with the idea of two distinct ethical systems. The first is based on
the principle, to be made precise below, that
compromise of good and evil is evil.
Equivalently in the theory,
confrontation of good and evil is good.
We will call this
System
IV; it founds the ethical structure of the Western World (the “first system” in
Lefebvre’s terminology). The second ethical system follows the converse principle
that
compromise of good and evil is good,
that is,
confrontation of good and evil is
evil.
This we will call
System
S; it is the base of the Soviet ethical structure (the
second system of Lefebvre).
There are two overriding themes developed in the book. One is simply the working
out of theorems emanating from the definitions, axioms, and either of the above prin-
ciples. The other is the attempt to persuade the reader that not only do the above
principles, and by extension the various themes, describe real, if ideal people, but that
System W really does represent the ethical norm of the present Western Society
whereas System S represents that of the Soviet Union.
Lefebvre intends far more than an amusing logical game here. Not only does he
feel that two types of systems pretty much exhaust those found in the world today, he
comes close to claiming outright that the set of the two may be virtual cultural
imperatives. That is, a society may come to have one or the other, but not both and
not something else. It is made clear from the outset that these do stand for the ideal
and that a country or an individual may possess each in some degree in real life, but
one or the other principle dominates.
My plan is to offer the reader a tour of the central underpinnings of the structure
461
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All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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as well as certain of the discoveries, bypassing by necessity the axiomatic details.
Occasional questions and problems in addition to exceptional or captivating results
will arise along the way. Although the itinerary is short, I believe it will aid the
person wishing to read the book in addition to proffering a fairly decent idea of what
the book is about to those with less time. Nevertheless, the reader looking for a quick
overall evaluation may skip to the Discussion. It should also be mentioned that there
is certain thought provoking material in the book that simply cannot be covered in a
review of this type. An example is the analogy, developed in an appendix, between the
present theory and some principles of quantum mechanics.
SOME BEGINNING ELEMENTS
Let us begin by developing a little of the logic behind Lefebvre’s rather ingenious
and novel calculus. Consider the formula uw where “a” is a variable with a = 1 or 0,
and
W
is a formula involving “a” and possibly another variable “b”, the partner of
“a”. The “a” term here represents the environmental input to the individual or alter-
natively what he really is and is called the root and
W
is the
inner world,
which itself
may be multileveled in exponents. The inner world possesses various levels of self-
reflection in “a” (himself) and his partner “b”. When 0 or 1 is substituted for each of
the variables (which may be “a” and/or “F) in
W,
then
W
will equal 0 or 1 also.
The simplest 24evel structure is ua.
Now, uw is given an interpretation by the author in ordinary predicate calculus as
W-+
a; that is,
W
implies a. We may then rewrite this in terms of Boolean algebra
using an overbar as negation and + as nonexclusive “or”, uw = q + a.
W
will be a
further formula, perhaps a single term as “a” or “b”.
Already we have a small result. If we interpret a = 1 as “good” and a = 0 as “evil”
then letting a = 0, we find that u’ = G + a = 1 + 0 = 1. Lefebvre sees this as meaning
that evil aware of evil becomes good.
Next we note that if “a” in the
W
part of Us equals the root “a”, then the
individual is said to have a correct image of himself. (This will be made a bit more
specific below.)
More generally, when an interaction with another person is brought into play, the
general formula can be expressed as uA *’ by setting
W
= A * B. “A” is the higher
order reflective world of “a” himself whereas “B” is “a”‘~ internal picture of his
partner “b” as well as the way that “a” believes that the “b” internal reflective world
is. The “*” denotes the interaction of “a” and “b” as “a” sees it; we return to it
shortly. The complete situation including the objective interaction as well as “b” and
“b”‘s internal world, is expressed as uAl*B1 * bA>*B2. However, much emphasis is on
the internal world of an individual as in a,4 *‘. The sign of interaction, “*“, is either
“+” denoting disjunction as seen above or “.“, logical conjunction (or equivalently
Boolean multiplication).
We now arrive at the foundational axiom of the entire theory: “+” is interpreted as
confrontation
in System W (the Western Christian Society) but as
compromise
in

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System S (Soviet society). Just the reverse is true for “a”, which means compromise
in System W and confrontation in System S. All societal effects of good and evil
within Lefebvre’s theory emanate from this axiom.
Now let us examine a + b and a . b. In System W, confrontation of good and evil
is good and compromise of good and evil is evil so we set + = confrontation and
. = compromise for then, if say, a = 1 and
b
= 0, 1 + 0 = 1 (i.e., confrontation of
good and evil is good) but 1 .O = 0 (compromise of good and evil is evil). In System
S exactly the converse assignment is made: + = compromise and . = confrontation.
Consequently System S yields exactly the opposite result: compomise of good and
evil is good (1 + 0 = 1) and confrontation of good and evil is evil (1 . 0 = 0). It is
rather fascinating to watch how this axiom ultimately winds into the seemingly
paradoxical prediction that ethical status is high in System S (the Soviet) when one
sees oneself in
confrontation
with an adversary whereas the contrary holds in
System W (the Western).
Note that the earlier statement we analyzed,
“evil aware of evil becomes good,” is
true for either system because exponentiation and implication have the same meaning
in both systems. The same is true for certain other primitive Boolean expressions in
their ethical interpretation. Another example is 0 + 0 = 0 which signifies that evil in
confrontation with evil is evil in System W and evil in compromise with evil is evil in
System S.
Now let us run through what appear to me to be some of the most significant
results. Along the way, assumptions and other facets that appear a little hard to
swallow will be mentioned. The order of treatment below corresponds roughly to the
order of topics in the book starting at about Chapter 5 but it is not entirely so.
FORMULATION OF ETHICAL STATUS
As prefaced above, when the “a” and
“b”
are replaced in the formula by values of
1 or 0, the resultant value is always a 1, representing “good,” or 0, representing
“evil.” Thus, if aw = 1 the individual overall, based on his internal world in league
with the value of “a”, is good and vice versa if the overall value is 0. The same is
obviously true when values are substituted for “a” and
“b”
in b W. Furthermore, an
overall interactional situation may be evaluated because awl * bWz will also be 0 or 1
when specific values for “a” and “b” are implemented in the formula.
A frequent strategy in the calculus is to assume some proportion of times that, say
“a”, takes on the value 1 and the remainder of the times it assumes the value 0 and
then to average the ethical status of the individual cases to arrive at an overall status:
this is easily extended to combinations of values of “a” and “b”. An early result is
that a two-tier individual with a correct image of himself always has a higher status
than an individual with an incorrect image of himself, as in the simplest instance,
a’
is higher in status than a’.
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DOUBTS,GUILT,CONDEMNATION, AND ETHICAL STATUS
Not only individuals and situations can be evaluated but also internal reflective
worlds. We therefore concentrate on aA *’ and in particular A ;k B. To investigate
doubts, we require a third level. Assume we observe a person in System W. We find
that in,
say
aA *B = aaz+bb ~6 7)
a sees himself as being in conflict with “b” (recall that
“+” means confrontation in System W), he sees himself correctly, but doubts his self-
image as given by the “E” on the third level. Incidentally, note that he imagines that
“b” has a true image of himself (i.e., b). Doubt is always signified by a difference in
the self-image in the second and third levels. As an example, observe
aA *B.
If A *
B =
a
“’ . b, we learn that “a” does not doubt his own good or evil but he doubts his
image of b as well as whether he is correct in his image of the interaction (i.e., as
being confrontational or compromising).
We next are told that if the overall status of A, obtained by substituting O’s and l’s
consistently for “a” and “b”, is A = 0 then “a” feels guilty, which is the same as
saying that guilt is equivalent to seeing evil in ‘oneself. When
B = 0
in aA “, “a” is
said to condemn his partner. If A *
B
= 0, “a” views the situation as being bad or
evil, or feels suffering. One finding of interest is that for an arbitrary formula with a
third level, doubts always lead to increased guilt; that is, the frequency of times that
A = 0 increases on the average.
In any case, the resulting structure is then used to study how and with what
frequency an evil intention, as given by the root “a” in aA *’ being equal to 0, can be
transformed into good by various combinations of values of “a”, “b”, and * in the
general formula aA *B, It is assumed for this purpose that “a” always has a correct
image of himself. As an aside, there seem to be several places in the book where a
simplification of this type is made without informing the reader whether it makes any
difference in the conclusions.
As another parenthetical remark, it is interesting to observe that even guilt can
depend on whether
“b”
is seen as evil or good, even if “a” doubts his own view of
“b”! Thus, consider the formula aaO+btb where “a” doubts only whether “b” is good
or evil and a = 0. If, in fact
b
= 0 then it follows that “a” feels guilty, A = 0, but if
b
= 1 then “a” feels no guilt. Of course, in studying average frequencies that A = 0
with or without doubt, the value of
“b”
in A averages out.
To proceed along the main track, the author deduces the following important
consequences: (1) Feeling guilty is more characteristic of an individual in System W
than in
System
S. (2) The simultaneous appearance of feeling guilty and condem-
nation is a necessary condition for transforming evil into good in W, but in S, either
is sufficient. (3) Absence of doubts prevents transformation of evil into good in
System W but not in S. (4) In System W, if “a” doubts his own self-image and has a
bad intention (the root a = 0) he always feels guilty; not so in the Soviet system. (5)
Individuals with no doubts never feel guilty in System S but sometimes do in the
Western system.
I must say that I do not feel completely comfortable with certain aspects of the
guilt analysis. For instance, it seems, intuitively, that if an individual has evil intent,

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sees himself as being bad, and has no doubts about it, he should be more prone to
guilt; but this is false in the present theory.
A further intriguing result presented in Chapter 8 is that in System W, when in
conflict, doubts about the correctness of one’s image of one’s adversary enhance one’s
status, but in the Soviet system, that diminishes a person’s status.
APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY TO SOVIET AND WESTERN LITERATURE
There are two primary ways in which the author has so far sought to test his
concepts. One is by experimental means where people of Soviet birth or western
culture are asked to fill out questionnaires designed to pit predictions of System S
against System W. This approach will be dealt with further below. The other has been
to analyze certain literature, in the main fiction, legends, or propaganda. The
legendary material has largely been used to suggest origins of the two ethical systems,
which we see again further along. In the present work, the author analyzes and
compares Shakespeare’s “Hamlet” with prototypical post-communist revolutionary
propaganda novels.
In the analysis, Hamlet is portrayed as possessing doubts concerning himself and
his adversary, Claudius. The doubts about himself are presumably expressed in the
renowned “to be or not to be” soliloquy, despite the actual authenticity of Hamlet’s
suspicions. Claudius, on the other hand, is viewed by Lefebvre as having incorrect
images of himself and of Hamlet and of doubting the correctness of those images.
Within the frame of System W, Hamlet possesses the higher status but they are equal
in the confines of System S. Similar points are made in the Soviet literature com-
parison
These conclusions are adduced as positive evidence for the theory. I have some
grave reservations about attempting to map the filigree of subtleties of Shakespeare’s
greatest tragedy into the binary platform of the present theory. Moreover, even the
particular binary dimensions of the theory are not necessarily those of which
Shakespeare conceived or indeed perforce make contact with the theoretical structure.
In perusing a number of critical commentaries on “Hamlet,” some did indeed
emphasize the lack of action on Hamlet’s part. However, the presumed reasons for
his lethargy are disputed and it is not at all certain that it may be projected into a
doubt about his images of himself and of Claudius. Thus, although Hamlet may have
doubted his images, those doubts may have little or nothing to do with the
philosophical content of the play. It is further not clear that Hamlet doubts his own
ethical goodness.
The picture of Claudius is in some ways even more murky. I would have thought
before reading the present book that Claudius correctly perceived Hamlet, maybe
correctly evaluated himself, but was rueful about his lack of morality and distrustful
of Hamlet. For instance, a little more than halfway through the play, Claudius
embarks on a monologue wherein he castigates himself for his evilness (“Oh, my
offense is rank, it smells to heaven; it hath the primal eldest curse upon?, a brother’s

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murder...“) and even attempts to pray for salvation. However, his thoughts apparently
are dissonant with his words so that the effort fails. This seems to contradict
Lefebvre’s conclusion that Claudius has an incorrect image of himself or even that he
doubts it.
Although I have not read the particular Soviet inspired literature to which the
author refers, I have read similar such work. Lefebvre’s claims seem much more
cogent here. However, in contrast to most of Shakespeare’s plots and charac-
terizations, this type of Soviet example appears almost comic strip in nature. It seems
likely that simple binary moral dispositions may be much more obvious there than in
exceedingly deep dramas. Possibly there exist books or plays in Western society that
are more patent in their representation of normative ethical status, and which might
better serve the author’s goal.
An exposition relating to Dostoevski’s “Crime and Punishment” is pursued later in
the book. It is more cogent than the “Hamlet” sojourn but still a little strained.
EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF THE THEORY
A series of experiments was run to test predictions of the theory. I felt much more
comfortable here. A subject was given a questionnaire about two individuals in
conflict with one another; the pair are well known political figures. Either the relation
of ethical priority is given in the statement or the subject has to give his estimate of
the ethical priority of one of the two interactants. After the subject has given an
overall judgment about the ethical priority, he is asked a series of questions in order
to determine a unique structure which intends to represent the situation as viewed by
the subject.
The theory predicts that the overall judgment will be consistent with the ethical
status computed from the theory if the correct variant, of the two systems, is
employed to interpret the subject’s answers. A sample question pair is the following:
(1) Did Mr. Kennedy have any doubt about the correctness of his evaluation of
himself? (2) Did Mr. Nixon have any doubt about the correctness of his evaluation
of himself?
As can be seen, the subject’s responses can be used to either assign the same value
in how, say, Nixon, sees himself and how he believes he sees himself or the opposite
value. The first response indicates no doubt whereas the latter does indicate doubt.
The results were statistically in favor of the W system describing Americans and
comparable experiments run on Soviet emigres strongly supported the hypothesis that
their ethical predisposition agreed with System S; a pleasing outcome.
MAXIMIZING ONE'S ETHICAL SELF-IMAGE IN THE COUNTERPOSED SYSTEMS
Lefebvre proposes that a person may be able to choose the interaction sign in the
third level and that by doing so he attempts to maximize the ethical status of his self-

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image. It follows from the theory that an individual will maximize his ethical status
by letting “yc” = “.“. Because “.”
means compromise in System W but confrontation
in System S, the implication is that a Westerner will maximize his self-image by
choosing compromise but a Soviet will do so by opting for confrontation.
Let us depict how this seemingly counterintuitive result comes about. Consider the
term aarb in the formula u@‘*~*~ and first let “*” = “+” be confrontation in
System W but compromise in System S. The various combinations of values of “a”
and
“6”
or LZ’+~ yield 1 ito = 1, O”+’ = 1, liti = 1, Oofl = 0. Now because each of
these cases is presumed to occur with equal frequency, the average status for
“*” = “+” is 3/4. Similar computations show that ua’b = 1.
Therefore, the overall status is higher if one utilizes “a” rather than “+” in one’s
third level, which seems to be the level of conscious choice in Lefebvre’s scheme.
A possible nit to pick here is that one might wonder why an “ideal” individual in a
society might not always see himself as a = 1 and his adversary as
b
= 0. In this case
we have
U
0th =
1
1+0=
1
and ua,b= l’.oz 1:
that is, confrontation and compromise then confer equal status on the typical self-
righteous nationalist.
There follows in the book some discussion of events at the fourth level (i.e.,
exponent) but I find it difficult to take this degree of supposed abstraction on the part
of an individual very seriously. It might be of more interest in the theory of automata.
FEELINGS AND SACRIFICES
A subsequent investigation explores the consequences of assuming that the
individual might be able to maximize his ethical status as compared with minimizing
his suffering, or his feelings of guilt. It turns out that guilt and ethical status (in the
person’s image) are complementary to one another but that suffering is monotonically
related to ethical status. For example, a W system person will on the average, by
choosing a mode of compromise in his image instead of confrontation, increase his
ethical status, decrease his feelings of guilt, and increase his suffering. The opposite
occurs for a person of the S system. Another neat result here is the proof that a
perfect individual cannot consider himself perfect. A perfect person is one with
maximum ethical status. Considering oneself perfect is equivalent to considering one’s
image of oneself as attaining maximal ethical status. Because he is viewed as being
able to manipulate certain signs that relate to this image, if he does so in a way that
gives himself minimal guilt, he will not reach the true highest ethical status.

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ON SAINTS, HEROES, PHILISTINES, AND DISSEMBLERS
The tract becomes even more exciting and potentially controversial at this point.
The metastructure @t4.P is analyzed where the underbars mean that the letter is a
variable, i.e., (I = a or a and so on. By substituting 0 or 1 in all possible combinations
for a = a or 5, etc., where it is assumed that these values occur with equal frequency,
we
may
calculate
the ethical status of individuals characterized as special prototypes.
Thus a saint is said to be characterized by the form _a_aotb’_b. Notice that in the W
system, this type of individual seeks compromise but thinks he should seek confron-
tation. The reasoning here becomes a little strained at times, but it might go
something like this: The person actually decides to seek compromise which tends to
increase suffering in system W, presumably because in our system, it is natural and
ideal to want confrontation of good and evil (of course, it appears somewhat foggy
here because _b could in general be either 0 (evil) or 1 (good)) and yet he chooses to
compromise. Alternatively, as Lefebvre treats this topic here, there is an emphasis on
when maximal suffering, guilt, etc., occur, rather than a stress on the values of the
variables “a” and “b”. Further observe that the saint also is destined to cringe under
the burden of guilt because of the doubt expressed in the different symbols on the
second and third levels. Possibly he views himself (or his image of himself?) as being
in conflict with the other person.
One bothersome point is that it is unexplained as to why the sacrificial behavior is
always in the same direction as the moral code of the society and vice versa. One of
the most frequent aspects of a saint, almost to the point of being part of the common
definition, is that of sacrificing against the standard code of a society.
In any event, the saint, hero, philistine, and dissembler are analyzed and it is
learned among other things that a saint has the highest status and also the highest
suffering and guilt and so forth. This and other results are important in what follows.
WHEN SAINTS AND SINNERS GET TOGETHER...
The structures leading to the four prototypical ethical characters mentioned in the
preceding section are now brought into dynamic interactions. There are two major
cases:
(1) An individual establishes his relationships with his partner by himself.
(2) An individual’s partner establishes the relationships.
The first case is termed active, the second passive. The mean ethical status can be
computed assuming that with probability p he is active and 1 - p he is passive with
respect to his partner and thus weighting the two pertinent ethical statuses. An
implicit assumption is that an individual always imposes on his partner the structure
he chooses for himself. Why this should necessarily be true is not adequately
defended.

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Recall that a saint labors under maximal guilt as well as suffering. A philistine is
one who tends to decrease suffering but can have high guilt; the small degree of
suffering implies a low ethical status. A hero minimizes his feelings of guilt but not
his feelings of suffering. Finally, a dissembler minimizes feelings of both suffering and
guilt. It works out that a society made up of only dissemblers has a mean situational
status of .81 while one of heroes has status .61. Contrarily, the mean ethical
individual status of people in a hero society is, of course, higher than one of
dissemblers. This untoward finding may suggest that dissemblers can make a society
work more smoothly (although that is probably not an actual logical result of the
theory); or perhaps situations are really more ethical somehow on the average.
IDEOLOGY, MORALITY, AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
Several propositions are now advanced relating to how the W vs the S system may
have arisen in a sociopolitical’fashion from certain moral and religious precepts. One
pivotal idea is that the Christian ideal is based on prohibition of evil but Soviet
ideology is based on declaration of good. For example, Lefebvre claims there is a
great deal of difference between “do not lie” and “be truthful.” This, I believe, cannot
be substantiated at the level of two-valued logic. However, it may be that this and
other conclusions drawn in this chapter might have some psychological validity, in
that perhaps how people interpret the above two commands or exhortations may
indeed differ.
The author conjectures that the New Testament forms a normative theory of
personality whereas the Old Testament contains the fundamental postulates of moral
human behavior (e.g., the Ten Commandments). It is postulated that the Old
Testament leads to a negative evaluation of a compromise between good and evil and
the New Testament to compromise between people. That is, this is hopefully the foun-
dation of System W. In contrast, the “Moral Code of a Builder of Communism” in
Soviet ideology emphasizes what a person should do rather than what he should not
do as in System W. Also, it clearly stresses confrontation with adversaries of com-
munism.
Ultimately, Lefebvre draws the fascinating conclusion that (1) in the society where
ethical System W is realized, the greater the ability for self-organization and unity the
higher the ethical status of its members; and (2) in the society where ethical System S
is realized, the greater the ability for self-organization and unity the lower the ethical
status of its members.
ETHICALLY NONMEASURABLE SITUATIONS
Lefebvre attempts to generalize previous developments to the case of interaction of
an arbitrary number of individuals. It turns out that the situations in general are not
mappable into the Boolean algebra representing the ethical structures of Lefebvre’s

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theory. He refers to such situations as ethically nonmeasurable. Basically, for four or
more individuals it appears that we can measure, in terms of the theory, the ethical
status of individuals but not situations. The author sees this as an analogy to the
decidability problem in logic, in the sense that there may exist correctly formulated
and true propositions which are not provable within a particular logical system. I am
not sure this particular analogy can be pushed too far, but the possible ramifications
of the nonmeasurable development for sociopolitical theory are provocative.
SUBSTANTIATING NONEMPIRICAL AND PRIMITIVE AXIOMS
AND A SHORT EXCURSION INTO MYTHOLOGY
Certain axioms which are not immediately subject to empirical test and which do
not necessarily seem particularly intuitive have untoward consequences if they are
removed or altered. For example, it is shown that interpreting ab as b -+ a i.e., as
logical implication, yields the only algebra which leads to (1) an individual with a
correct image of himself has a higher ethical status than one who does not and (2) an
individual who possesses doubts about the correctness of his (correct) image of
himself has higher ethical status than one who has no such doubts. As another
example, consider the axiom: “The confrontation of good and good as well as the
compromise of good and good is good.” Again, unpleasant consequences erupt if this
axiom is altered.
In a final chapter it is suggested that System S existed in Europe in pi-e-Christian
times by analyzing a plot from an ancient legend of Greenland. We are led to believe
that Christianity nurtured the growth of the W system, but the inception of the Soviet
reign brought with it a recursion into the ancient S ideology.
DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION
This book was beguilingly easy in a way. The more I read and pondered, the more
questions I had, at least up to a point. Although I now believe I have a pretty good
feel for the theory, 1 must confess I do not think I have it quite all in my grasp. In
one sense, the theory is, of course, completely axiomatic; one may churn out theorem
after theorem. What was not always self-evident was the linking of the terms and
operations in the theory to the real-world concepts. There is no doubt in my mind
that the author knows precisely what he is talking about and feels that the correspon-
dence between real-world concepts and the theoretical structure is perfectly defined.
But to the reader, there is occasionally a sense of the slippery and cloudy. Some of
the language seems a little rich for a theory based on binary concepts. Much of the
fog is dispelled by heavy concentration and rethinking but I still am convinced that
further effort on the part of Lefebvre to sharpen the treatment on these dimensions
will be rewarding.
To move. to the overall impact, I believe this theory to be a quite profound

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contribution to the study of phenomenology of internal feeling and reflection
especially with reference to ethical systems. There have certainly been previous
attempts to formulate mathematical descriptions of ethical principles or of human
social interactions embedded in differing political systems. However, I so far have not
been able to find anything quite like the present theory. Lefebvre’s calculus is
ingenious, based on self-reflection and using an extended Boolean algebra and a
clever exponentiation technique. The theorems are deep and highly absorbing in
psychological, philosophical, and sociopolitical senses. Because all springs from a
binary valued foundation, there is often great elegance and parsimony in the theory.
Another admirable facet of the work is the author’s emphasis on empirical tests,
through direct experiment, as well as analysis of literature, legend, and potentially
other varieties of documents. The heavy empirical thrust is still quite rare in this type
of endeavor.
Not to say that all is perfect. Aside from the problems raised in earlier sections.
most trivial, some more substantive, there are certain other difficulties or lacunae.
For instance, it was not always clear how the author made his decisions in
development of the theoretical structure. Some critical assumptions have received
either empirical support or theoretical justification. Other choices, such as associating
the various levels of the exponent with certain psychological functions, are not always
so obvious. In one sense, he is not obligated to provide such explication; if the theory
works then that is that. However, it would be reassuring to know that alternative
paths are impossible, unproductive or the like.
All in all, I would be surprised if this work did not provoke a good deal of
discussion and even controversy, not only at the academic level but within certain
governmental and international sociopolitical circles, for some years to come. I also
envision stimulating extensions of the theory by its author as well as challenging
theoretical conceptions from other scholars.