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Abusive Constitutionalism
Abstract
This paper identifies and grapples with an increasingly important phenomenon: the use of mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order. A rash of recent incidents in countries as diverse as Egypt, Venezuela, and Hungary has shown that the tools of constitutional amendment and replacement can be used by would-be autocrats to create quasi-authoritarian regimes with ease. Rather than using military coups to create authoritarianism, actors rework the constitutional order with often subtle changes in order to make themselves difficult to dislodge and to disable or pack courts and other accountability institutions. This piece makes three contributions to the literatures on constitutional theory and international and comparative constitutional design. First, I draw on interdisciplinary research from law and political science, as well as examples from around the world, to describe these abusive constitutional techniques and to argue that they represent the major current and future threat to democracies worldwide. Second, I show that the major democracy-protecting mechanisms in international law and comparative constitutional law are obsolete – most of these tools are still aimed at older threats like coups and totalitarian movements, and are unable to effectively detect and deal with modern instances of abusive constitutionalism. Third, I bring together recent scholarship and case-law to suggest an agenda that is more effective against this new threat. This work pushes towards making constitutional change selectively rigid, allowing many alterations to occur rather easily while identifying certain kinds of change that are especially harmful to the constitutional order and holding them to higher standards. A consideration of the problem of abusive constitutionalism helps to improve these developing practices and offers important and controversial insights, such as the need for a doctrine of substantively unconstitutional constitutional amendments and for restrictions on the process by which an existing constitution may be replaced. The goal is to reframe the conversation about how the fields of comparative constitutional law and international law might best be leveraged to protect new democracies.
... Many scholars have argued that the rise in human rights violations in Guinea has turned the nation from partially free to non-free (Gyimah-Boadi, 2021; Hartmann and Thiery, 2022; Repucci and Slipowitz, 2022). A growing number of individuals are participating in what David Landau terms "abusive constitutionalism," an effort to undermine democracy via constitutional change, namely through modification and replacement (Landau, 2013). It is possible that totalitarian control has become less harsh and noticeable in different parts of the world. ...
... It has been usual practice for purportedly democratic governments to include authoritarian measures into their institutions in order to create hybrid regimes that are either electoral autocracy or competitive authoritarianism (Landau, 2013). In order to legitimise the government and provide the illusion of democracy, some African countries' constitutions were amended in a way that is anti-democratic. ...
... Military Coup The enduring threat of military coups must be considered in any global effort to advance democracy. During the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the military ruled all Latin American nations with the exception of two (Landau, 2013). The democratic progress that had been made in West Africa in 2021 was promptly reversed. ...
The objective of this research is to examine the 21st Century of Democratic Practice in Africa: Challenges and Solutions. The paper addressed three basic concerns: the 21st century of democratic practice in Africa, the challenges of democratic practice in Africa, and the solutions to the challenges of democratic practice in Africa. The researcher adopted the secondary method of data collection via books, journals, articles, and newspapers in order to understand the 21 century of democratic practice in Africa and the challenges and solutions. The study findings on the challenges of 21st century democratic practice in Africa, including digital authoritarianism, third-termism, electoral violence, corruption, and power abuse. To address these issues, African leaders should adopt exemplary practices, uphold the rule of law, hold free, fair elections, and enhance state institutions. They should focus on removing cronyism and following the constitutional term limit culture. Instead of limiting competition, encourage diverse opinions and tolerance, allowing residents to actively engage in decision-making. Free online and offline speech is essential for this. Digital resource recognition and protection are crucial for civic engagement and capacity development. Leaders should be held accountable and eliminate corruption and power abuse. The African Union must condemn military coups and establish institutions to extend democracy and prosperity across the continent. Democracy will prosper in Africa if Africans learn to reject politicians who think voters can be deceived into giving up their rights and votes.
... No entanto, a prática demonstra que tais compromissos não são sempre aceitos e, quando em posição de força, os atores políticos podem tentar subordinar ou enfraquecer a independência judicial. Exemplos de erosão da autonomia das cortes podem ser observados em países como Hungria, Venezuela e Polônia, onde governantes poderosos atacaram a independência do Judiciário (Landau, 2013;Kovács & Scheppele, 2018). ...
... É difícil imaginar que uma corte possa se manter independente e em confronto com forças políticas hegemônicas que controlam o Executivo e o Legislativo por um período prolongado, a menos que haja uma divisão profunda entre os órgãos políticos, impedindo um ataque coordenado ao poder judicial (Gillman, 2008). Exemplos contemporâneos de ataques à independência judicial, como na Hungria, Venezuela e Polônia, ilustram essa dinâmica, onde governos com maioria parlamentar ampla enfraqueceram a autonomia das cortes (Landau, 2013;Kovács & Scheppele, 2018). ...
Introduction: This article explores the relationship between the behavior of the Supreme Court and the presence of strong political coalitions in a presidential system. We examine how Brazil's Supreme Federal Court (STF) made decisions in relation to party coalitions during Bolsonaro's administration, focusing on constitutional review cases brought by political parties between 2019 and 2022. Our analysis looks at whether the STF was more active and assertive in using its counter-majoritarian powers during the period when the president lacked majority coalition support (2019-2021), and whether it became more restrained after the formation of a coalition in 2021.
Materials and methods: We applied a logistic regression model to a dataset of 89 concentrated constitutional review cases, using the STF's counter-majoritarian behavior as the dependent variable and the strength (size and cohesion) of Bolsonaro's governing coalition as the independent variable. We also factored in control variables, such as government popularity, the stance of the Attorney General's Office, and the prominence of the Covid-19 pandemic as a potential influence on the Court's decisions.
Results: The STF was less deferential to federal legislation when Bolsonaro's administration lacked a structured majority coalition in Congress but became more deferential after the coalition was formed. Specifically, the likelihood of the Brazilian Supreme Court issuing a counter-majoritarian decision dropped by 86% following Bolsonaro's alliance with the Centrão in 2021.
Discussion: Despite robust institutional guarantees that provide significant independence, the STF's behavior appears influenced by the political dynamics inherent in coalition-based presidentialism. This article not only addresses unexplored areas in the literature concerning the STF's political behavior within the context of Brazilian coalition presidentialism but also empirically supports the hypothesis that judicial courts tend to exercise greater independence in more fragmented and pluralistic political systems.
Keywords Brazilian Supreme Federal Court; counter-majoritarian behavior; governing coalition; coalition cohesion; Bolsonaro administration
... While we do not engage in a systematic or empirical study here, we do think that a robust argument exists that core techniques of court-hoarding have been employed in Hungary, Zimbabwe,Kenya,and Mexico. 17 Regarding Hungary, the literature has extensively documented what has been variously called democratic backsliding, illiberal democracy or abusive constitutionalism (Bakke & Sitter, 2022;B ankuti et al., 2012;Bogaards, 2018;Kov acs & Scheppele, 2018;Landau, 2013;Pap, 2018;Uitz, 2015). Our purpose is not to rehash that extensively documented subject. ...
... 9 There are plenty of examples in U.S. history of Supreme Court justices who were mentally or physically impaired (see Atkinson, 1999). 10 Compare with the understanding of abusive constitutionalism in Landau (2013). 11 While insurance theories primarily involve discussions of why political branches would accept the constraints of an independent judiciary, court-hoarding as a technique affects judicial independence by virtue of its abusive nature and targeting of loyal judges. ...
While a slew of recent scholarship has examined the phenomenon of executive overstay, there is little talk about the more complex and equally vexing phenomena of judicial overstay. This article begins to examine the many layers and complexities of judicial overstay by exploring whether the political branches ever seek to prolong abusively the time in office of loyal judges, and if so, by what mechanisms. Illustrating this is not merely a theoretical practice, we label such a phenomenon court‐hoarding, and consider it a subset of the broader category of judicial overstay. Our contribution is two‐fold. First, we argue that while court‐hoarding is a somewhat risky and less‐known governance tactic that is likely to occur only when certain conditions are fulfilled, the potential benefits of court‐hoarding for power consolidation and institutional monopoly power are profound. Second, we contribute to the emerging literature on judicial tenure. More specifically, we add conceptual utility to thinking about judicial tenure—and its abuse—by describing a three‐layer model of court‐hoarding, consisting of a core, a mid‐layer, and a periphery, which correspond to three broad categories of influencing judicial tenure across time and space.
... In recent years, however, courts have increasingly become an instrument in the toolkit of aspiring populist autocrats to undermine democratic institutions, expand their executive power, and target opposition groups. Instead of destroying democracies overnight, these leaders relied on their parliamentary majorities to tilt the playing field in their favor and gain control over state institutions and the judiciary through constitutional amendments and legislative changes Landau, 2013;Landau & Dixon, 2019;Scheppele, 2018). Accordingly, the populist capture of power was accompanied by a constitutional project that sought to restructure the state apparatus and introduce an executive-centered regime. ...
... Accordingly, the populist capture of power was accompanied by a constitutional project that sought to restructure the state apparatus and introduce an executive-centered regime. In what Landau (2013) defines as "abusive constitutionalism," populist governments have enacted constitutional amendments and legislation to amass significant power and influence over the political arena. For instance, Hugo Chavez used his parliamentary majority in Venezuela to enact laws that expanded his presidential powers, abused them through selective and partisan implementation, and misused their functions to favor his supporters (Corrales, 2022). ...
What accounts for the variation in the judiciary’s ability to serve as a democratic guardrail under populist rule? This article contends that populist governments
use judicial activism against their political agenda to portray courts as institutions that curtail popular sovereignty and subsequently adopt a democratizing discourse to conceal their assault on the judiciary. Based on the Turkish case under the rule of the AKP (Justice and Development Party), it explores how the judiciary’s democratic deficits provided a legitimation strategy for the ruling party’s gradual capture of the courts. During its initial term, the right-wing populist AKP government faced staunch opposition from high courts aligned with the secular establishment. In response, it strategically used the Turkish Constitutional Court’s counter-majoritarian decisions to legitimize its actions, paving the way for court-packing and other forms of judicial manipulation through a series of constitutional amendments. These changes set a dangerous precedent for future clashes with the judiciary, hastening the erosion of Turkish democracy and the subsequent shift toward a competitive authoritarian regime.
... Este proceso es conducido de manera sigilosa (Przeworski, 2019) y conforme a procedimientos democráticos: una reforma legal, una revisión constitucional favorable a un cambio político democráticamente cuestionable o la judicialización de procesos de co- Eslovenia rrupción política contra la oposición. El así llamado "constitucionalismo abusivo" (Landau, 2013) es un ejemplo de ello. De acuerdo con Landau, el constitucionalismo abusivo hace uso de "mecanismos de cambio constitucional -reforma y reemplazo constitucional-para socavar democracia" (Landau, 2013, 191). ...
... Una vez más, utilizando su mayoría en el Congreso, y una retórica basada en lo excluyentes que resultan las instituciones actuales, los populistas buscan impulsar la promulgación de una nueva constitución en la que se aumentan los poderes del ejecutivo, mientras desaparecen los contrapesos. Ejemplos de esto son los casos de Hugo Chávez en Venezuela, Rafael Correa en Ecuador y Evo Morales en Bolivia (Landau, 2013). ...
Existen innumerables libros y artículos en revistas especializadas que abordan el fenómeno del populismo. Ante esta abundancia, ¿para qué un libro más?, se pregunta el editor. En México hemos llegado tarde a esta discusión. Nuestra tardía transición a la democracia produjo también un desgaste de la democracia elitista muy posterior a la sufrida en la mayor parte de América Latina. En casi todos los países de la región emergieron distintos proyectos populistas desde principios del siglo XXI, unas dos décadas después de las transiciones a la democracia desde regímenes dictatoriales. Mientras los mexicanos experimentábamos una modesta primavera democrática, los países del Cono Sur ya estaban avanzando, en su mayoría, hacia la fase del neopopulismo. Desde la llegada a la presidencia de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, el interés en la cuestión del populismo creció de manera extraordinaria al volverse un asunto vital e inmediato. El carácter tardío de nuestra entrada al debate contemporáneo sobre el populismo explica parcialmente que tengamos una relativa escasez de estudios empíricos sobre el tema y una discusión teórica menos intensa. Por ello es pertinente y necesario, en este contexto, revisar el debate contemporáneo sobre el populismo y ponderar su potencial contribución a la caracterización del actual gobierno y del futuro de la democracia mexicana.
... Some of the various conclusions include a systematic disregard and relativisation of the rule of law, 16 democratic principles and human rights by these illiberal and populist governments (Drinóczi and Cormacain 2021, 271). 17 Constitutional courts become one of the first targets when populist regimes take control of the political branches of power (see the literature on "abusive constitutionalism": (Aydin-Cakir 2023; Cheesman and Badó 2023;Granat 2023;Kovács and Scheppele 2018;Landau 2013;Skąpska 2019)). ...
This article examines the concept of tailor-made laws and their empirical implications in the process of legislative backsliding. We define tailor-made laws as legislation that codifies an individual case under the guise of a general rule. These laws are designed directly or indirectly to affect only certain individuals or institutions, thereby potentially disadvantaging or favouring their target at the expense of the broader public interest. We argue that the normative assessment of these laws is partly dependent on the availability of judicial remedy for restoring the generality of the legal norm in question. By developing case studies from Central–Eastern Europe, we utilised this concept to better understand the characteristics of law-making in the shift from liberal to illiberal democracy. We show that the proliferation of tailor-made laws is a prime candidate for the empirical markers of legislative backsliding: besides public procurement, they may serve as key instruments for implementing discretionary reward and punishment policies.
... While the Court did advocate a 'democracy of citizens rather than of political parties' (PL. ÚS 18/99, 13), its general approach raises doubts about whether it would have been able to withstand more sophisticated attacks of 'abusive constitutionalists' (Landau 2013) than of the somewhat amateurish authoritarianism of PM Mečiar. Moreover, the symbolic equation of the democracy principle with majoritarianism is one that subsequent majorities were to actively overcome it if they intended to read into democracy the rule of law as well. ...
Disputes pertaining to elections and referenda are most visibly associated with the power of the sovereign People, whereas constitutional courts are typically seen as countermajoritarian institutions. Abuse of elections and referenda by illiberal actors, who present themselves as embodiment of the “will of the People”, accelerates rule of law backsliding. Via engaging with the extent to which constitutional courts help prevent such abuse and thereby reduce pressure on the rule of law, this article shows how constitutional courts might—even inadvertently—strengthen illiberalism if they do not embrace more robust, constitutional conceptions of democracy in which democracy and the rule of law are inherently intertwined. The article differentiates between minimalist, middle-ranged and maximalist conceptions of democracy and emphasizes the rule of law beyond minimalism. Via an explorative contextual study of the Slovak Constitutional Court (SCC), which has dealt with elections and direct democracy on several occasions since its establishment including during de-democratization in 1994–1998, the article shows the extent to which the SCC, in these cases, framed democracy in tension with the rule of law. The Court managed to link elections as a key democratic institution to the rule of law, but failed to establish this link with referenda. The results demonstrate the judges’ indecisiveness over a conception of democracy that has limited the SCC’s potential to prevent rule of law backsliding via illiberal abuse of the “will of the People”. Furthermore, they indicate the importance of constitutional courts’ thinking explicitly about the rule of law as a democratic principle.
... The concept of abusive constitutionalism became widespread in legal scholarship after David Landau's famous publication. The author defines abusive constitutionalism as the use of constitutional amendment mechanisms to make a state significantly less democratic than it was before [1] . He refers to actions that make a particular regime significantly less democratic [2] . ...
The concept of abusive constitutionalism became widespread in legal scholarship after David Landau's famous publication. The author defines abusive constitutionalism as "the use of constitutional amendment mechanisms to make a state significantly less democratic than it was before" . He refers to actions that make a particular regime "significantly less democratic" . The result, he points out, is to move away from democracy . He pointed to 2013 as examples of this trend - Honduras, Venezuela or Hungary. "De-democratisation" of constitutional mechanisms is also, in my view, relevant from the perspective of the Polish experience, though viewed differently than usually presented in the political debates. It turns out that democratic mechanisms and their implementation are undermined by those judiciary representatives who, simultaneuosly, accuse the authorities introducing solutions in line with democratic principles of violating the rule of law.
... O autor identifica um fenômeno cada vez mais presente no cenário mundial, o qual denomina constitucionalismo abusivo (abusive constitutionalism). Esse fenômeno envolve o uso de mecanismos de mudança da constituição (emenda e substituição constitucional) para enfraquecer a democracia e guiar um sistema político a um regime aquém do democrático (LANDAU, 2013). ...
Após a Guerra Fria, verificou-se na política internacional uma proliferação de regimes híbridos. Nesses sistemas, a grosso modo, há uma combinação de regras democráticas e de práticas autoritárias, de modo a se situarem num meio-termo entre democracias plenas e ditaduras. Nesse contexto, David Landau identifica um fenômeno cada vez mais presente, o qual denomina constitucionalismo abusivo (abusive constitutionalism). Esse fenômeno envolve o uso de mecanismos de mudança da constituição (emenda e substituição constitucional) para enfraquecer a democracia e guiar um sistema político a um regime aquém do democrático. No ambiente jurídico, é comum que conceitos, teorias e modelos legais produzidos num determinado país sejam “copiados” por outros. Cuida-se do processo chamado de transplante jurídico. A recepção de modelos legais estrangeiros de maneira irrefletida pela doutrina é demasiadamente arriscada e assume o centro das preocupações neste estudo. A partir daí, impõe-se o problema de pesquisa: a produção acadêmica brasileira assimilou apropriadamente a teoria do constitucionalismo abusivo de David Landau? A metodologia utilizada para resolver a problemática se apoia prevalentemente no levantamento bibliográfico de livros e artigos especializados e se perfaz pela confrontação das visões dos autores nacionais com o paradigma lançado por Landau. Ao final, conclui-se que a doutrina brasileira recepcionou inadequadamente o constitucionalismo abusivo.
... Moreover, processes of democratic subversion are incremental. They proceed in small steps, each of which, viewed in isolation, may seem innocuous (Landau, 2013), while their cumulative, interlocking effects are hard to trace. On top of that, most autocratizing governments dismantle democracy under the pretense of improving or even saving it (Gandhi, 2019). ...
Dalam setiap sistem pemerintahan, konstitusi memainkan peran yang sangat penting sebagai sumber hukum tertinggi yang mengatur struktur, fungsi, dan batasan kekuasaan, sehingga menjadi fondasi bagi stabilitas dan legitimasi pemerintahan. Konstitusi tidak hanya mendefinisikan bagaimana suatu negara dijalankan, tetapi juga menetapkan prinsip-prinsip dasar yang melindungi hak-hak individu, menjamin keadilan sosial, dan menciptakan ruang bagi partisipasi warga dalam proses pengambilan keputusan. Dengan demikian, pemahaman tentang hubungan antara konstitusi dan kekuasaan menjadi sangat krusial dalam konteks politik dan hukum, karena konstitusi berfungsi sebagai pengatur dan pengontrol perilaku lembaga-lembaga negara serta pemangku kepentingan. Dalam praktik pemerintahan sehari-hari, interaksi antara konstitusi dan kekuasaan dapat terlihat melalui implementasi kebijakan publik, penegakan hukum, dan perlindungan hak asasi manusia, yang semuanya mencerminkan komitmen negara untuk menjalankan pemerintahan yang demokratis dan bertanggung jawab. Oleh karena itu, menjelajahi hubungan ini memberikan wawasan yang mendalam tentang bagaimana nilai-nilai konstitusi diterapkan dalam kehidupan masyarakat dan bagaimana kekuasaan negara dapat dipertanggungjawabkan.
Sejak awal kemerdekaan, Indonesia telah mengadopsi beberapa konstitusi, dimulai dengan Undang-Undang Dasar (UUD) 1945 yang merupakan hasil dari konsensus para pendiri bangsa dan mencerminkan cita-cita luhur bangsa untuk mencapai kemerdekaan yang berdaulat. UUD 1945 tidak hanya mengatur struktur kekuasaan pemerintahan, tetapi juga menegaskan bahwa kedaulatan berada di tangan rakyat, sehingga menjadi landasan penting bagi pelaksanaan demokrasi dan representasi dalam sistem politik Indonesia. Dalam konteks ini, penulisan ini akan membahas evolusi konstitusi Indonesia, yang mencakup perubahan dan amandemen yang telah dilakukan seiring berjalannya waktu, serta tantangan yang dihadapi dalam implementasi nilai-nilai konstitusi dalam praktik kekuasaan. Berbagai isu, seperti konsolidasi demokrasi, penegakan hukum, dan perlindungan hak asasi manusia, menjadi fokus utama yang perlu dianalisis untuk memahami sejauh mana nilai-nilai konstitusi diterapkan dan diinternalisasi dalam kehidupan politik dan sosial masyarakat. Selain itu, penulisan ini juga akan menggali bagaimana dinamika politik domestik dan global mempengaruhi perjalanan konstitusi Indonesia, serta peran masyarakat sipil dalam mendorong akuntabilitas dan transparansi pemerintahan.
Dalam konteks kekuasaan, konstitusi juga berfungsi sebagai alat untuk membatasi kekuasaan pemerintah dan mencegah penyalahgunaan wewenang. Melalui berbagai ketentuan, konstitusi memastikan bahwa tidak ada satu pun lembaga atau individu yang dapat menguasai kekuasaan secara mutlak, sehingga tercipta sistem checks and balances yang esensial bagi demokrasi. Pembagian kekuasaan antara eksekutif, legislatif, dan yudikatif merupakan salah satu aspek penting yang diatur dalam konstitusi, di mana setiap lembaga memiliki fungsi dan wewenang yang saling mengawasi dan mengimbangi. Penulisan ini akan menganalisis bagaimana pembagian kekuasaan ini diimplementasikan dalam praktik pemerintahan di Indonesia, termasuk peran masing-masing lembaga dalam pengambilan keputusan, pengawasan, dan akuntabilitas. Selain itu, tantangan yang muncul dalam menjaga keseimbangan kekuasaan, seperti intervensi politik, dominasi satu lembaga atas yang lain, serta dampak dari dinamika sosial dan politik, juga akan menjadi fokus pembahasan. Dengan memahami aspek-aspek ini, diharapkan dapat ditemukan solusi untuk memperkuat mekanisme demokrasi dan menjaga integritas konstitusi sebagai pengatur utama dalam pengelolaan kekuasaan di Indonesia.
Di sisi lain, konstitusi juga mencerminkan nilai-nilai dan norma-norma sosial yang berlaku di masyarakat, berfungsi sebagai cerminan dari aspirasi dan harapan rakyat. Perubahan dalam konstitusi sering kali terjadi sebagai respons terhadap dinamika sosial dan politik yang menginginkan perbaikan dan penyesuaian terhadap kebutuhan zaman. Misalnya, amandemen UUD 1945 pasca-reformasi tidak hanya bertujuan untuk memperkuat hak asasi manusia, tetapi juga meningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam proses pemerintahan, sehingga menciptakan ruang yang lebih inklusif bagi semua lapisan masyarakat. Penulisan ini akan mengidentifikasi berbagai faktor yang mempengaruhi perubahan konstitusi, seperti tekanan dari masyarakat sipil, perkembangan global, dan tuntutan untuk keadilan sosial, serta bagaimana hal tersebut mencerminkan aspirasi masyarakat yang semakin beragam dan kompleks. Dengan memahami proses perubahan ini, kita dapat melihat sejauh mana konstitusi mampu beradaptasi dengan perkembangan sosial, serta perannya dalam mendorong kemajuan dan keadilan dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara. Selain itu, analisis ini juga akan mempertimbangkan tantangan yang dihadapi dalam menjaga keselarasan antara nilai-nilai konstitusi dan realitas sosial yang ada, serta pentingnya keterlibatan masyarakat dalam menjaga dan memperjuangkan nilai-nilai tersebut.
Selanjutnya, penting untuk mempertimbangkan tantangan yang dihadapi dalam implementasi konstitusi di Indonesia, meskipun konstitusi telah diatur dengan baik dan mencakup berbagai prinsip yang mendukung keadilan dan demokrasi. Praktik kekuasaan sering kali tidak sesuai dengan nilai-nilai konstitusi, menciptakan jurang antara idealitas dan realitas. Masalah seperti korupsi, penyalahgunaan kekuasaan, dan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia masih sering terjadi, mengancam kepercayaan publik terhadap institusi pemerintahan dan merusak integritas sistem hukum. Penulisan ini akan mengeksplorasi berbagai tantangan tersebut, termasuk faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi pelanggaran konstitusi, seperti lemahnya penegakan hukum, kurangnya transparansi, dan budaya impunitas yang telah mengakar. Selain itu, analisis ini juga akan membahas upaya-upaya yang telah dilakukan untuk memperbaiki implementasi konstitusi dalam praktik pemerintahan, seperti reformasi hukum, penguatan lembaga antikorupsi, serta peningkatan kesadaran dan pendidikan hukum bagi masyarakat. Dengan demikian, diharapkan pembahasan ini dapat memberikan pemahaman yang lebih mendalam tentang dinamika antara konstitusi dan praktik kekuasaan di Indonesia, serta pentingnya upaya kolaboratif untuk menciptakan pemerintahan yang lebih bersih, akuntabel, dan responsif terhadap kebutuhan masyarakat.
Penulisan ini bertujuan untuk memberikan wawasan tentang pentingnya hubungan antara konstitusi dan kekuasaan dalam konteks Indonesia. Dengan memahami dinamika ini, diharapkan masyarakat, akademisi, dan pembuat kebijakan dapat berkontribusi dalam memperkuat nilai-nilai konstitusi dan menciptakan pemerintahan yang lebih transparan, akuntabel, dan demokratis. Melalui analisis yang komprehensif, penulisan ini akan menjadi kontribusi penting dalam diskursus mengenai konstitusi dan kekuasaan di Indonesia.
El Derecho Administrativo transnacional alude el efecto extraterritorial de las normas y decisiones del Derecho Administrativo, incluyendo los casos en los que los tribunales extranjeros deben interpretar y aplicar el marco constitucional y legal de la Administración Pública. Un ejemplo interesante es el contrato público de la deuda externa, típicamente ejecutado por los tribunales de Nueva York. Los efectos transnacionales en el marco de litigios de deuda pública se han utilizado a través de la doctrina del acto de Estado y el principio de cortesía, que rigen a las decisiones de gobiernos extranjeros en los Estados Unidos. Otro mecanismo ha sido la doctrina de la deuda odiosa, que es más un argumento moral que jurídico. Recientemente, el máximo tribunal de Nueva York adoptó una interpretación novedosa según la cual, en los contratos de deuda pública regidos por la Ley de Nueva York, la validez se rige, no obstante, por el Derecho Público del emisor. Por lo tanto, las Cortes de Nueva York pueden aplicar las disposiciones constitucionales y estatutarias que determinan la validez de la deuda, lo que resulta en una aplicación transnacional del Derecho Administrativo.
The decision of the Constitutional Court in case 90/PUU-XXI/2023, which gave rise to allegations of political scandal and "Court Capture," also shows the possibility of using judicial institutions for certain political interests, thereby causing the decline of democracy. The purpose of this writing is to describe the dysplasia of Constitutional Court decision number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 and the destructive power of this decision. This paper will adopt a descriptive-analytical research method to investigate the relationship between dysplasia (structural errors or abnormalities) and the destructive power of Constitutional Court decisions in the context of law and democracy in Indonesia. This article shows: first, dysplasia in Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 can be seen from the collapse of the principle of open legal policy, rapid changes in judges' stances that raise doubts about the consistency and integrity of Constitutional Court Judges, dissenting opinions that reflect anger/agriness , and alleged political influence (the so-called invisible hand). Second, the destructive power of this decision is manifested in its serious impact on the destruction of the constitutional democratic order, damaging public trust in the judiciary, causing internal rifts in the Constitutional Court, and the consistency of jurisprudence. Apart from that, this decision also damages the court's traditional overruling activities and reduces the independence of the judiciary.
This chapter reflects upon findings of this book, from the perspective of two central distinguishing themes. First, it endorses and explores the implications of understanding the rule of law in terms of a central aspiration or goal – reduction of the possibilities of arbitrary exercise of power – rather than any purported checklist of legal instruments said to embody it. Second, it discusses the distinctive implications of examining the rule of law in a transnational, not merely national, context. Part III examines the geopolitical sources of transnational enthusiasms for the rule of law, and the implications of geopolitical changes that might lead to the exhaustion or extinction of such enthusiasms. Finally, the chapter suggests that optimists might curb their constructivist enthusiasms, and pessimists acknowledge that speed bumps are not necessarily the end of the road, if both reflect on how long securing the rule of law might be expected to take.
Humanity's efforts to build a society in which prosperity and happiness prevail and in which people live in peace and security are due to a civilizational background that has historical roots. By referring to the "Greek" political thought in general and the political thought of (Plato and Aristotle) in particular and extending to modern philosophy, it is clear that the issue of the virtuous city or the ideal political system is one of the most important topics that attract significant attention among thinkers and specialists in philosophical field and political science.
Constitutionalism and constitutional governance as a modern movement in constitutional thought is an important step towards building a system of government that adopts constitutional rules and principles. Given this importance, this form of government is considered one of the greatest achievements of modern civilization through which a measure of freedom, prosperity and coexistence among human beings has been achieved. However, it is noted that despite the existence of written constitutions in some countries, the legitimacy of the ruling regimes is still a matter of serious question. Where the issue of democracy, the protection of human rights and dignity, the sovereignty of the people, periodic elections, the peaceful transfer of power, respect for the rights of minorities, the right to self-determination, and resistance to tyranny are exposed to multiple problems and challenges.
From this angle and in order to establish a constitutional state and a real constitutional governance, jurists of contemporary constitutional law are studying the idea of an international constitutional court. These jurists also seek to answer several questions and examine that necessity and search for a group of main issues that are represented in discussing the role that this court can play in implementing the constitution and protecting individuals and societies from unjust rule and the opportunity to live in accordance with international values, away from the means of violence and chaos, contribute to progress and development. Accordingly, this study is considered an in-depth scientific attempt to study and analyze the idea of establishing the International Constitutional Court, presenting the substantive and procedural terms of reference for this court and indicating its future challenges and prospects.
Keywords: International Court for Constitutional Law, Constitutional Governance, Rights and Democracy, Authority and Legitimacy, State and International Community.
Hükümet sistemleri meselesi karmaşık kimi kavram ve kurumlar üzerinden ilerlemektedir. Bu kavram ve kurumlar dizisinden en önemlileri erkler ayrılığı ve demokratiklik değerdir. Erkler ayrılığı ve demokratiklik değer bakımından parlamenter hükümet sisteminin daha etkin olduğu kanaatindeyiz. Bu çalışmada, başkanlık sistemi ve parlamenter sistemin kavramsal ve kurumsal özellikleri ortaya konulduktan sonra demokratiklik değer bakımından delegasyon özellikleri tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda öncelikle erkler ayrılığı ve hükümet sistemine etkilerini incelemeye çalıştık. İkinci olarak başkanlık, hiper-başkanlık sistemi kavramsal ve kurumsal dizilerini kısaca ortaya koyduktan sonra Türkiye’deki cari hükümet sistemiyle ilişkisini irdeledik. Esasen burada Türkiye’deki mevcut hükümet sisteminin özelliklerini detaylı incelemekten ziyade kavramsal bir ilişkilendirme yapmakla yetindik. Son olarak ise erkler ayrılığı ve demokratiklik değer bakımından parlamenter sistemin daha cazip olduğunu, ülkemizin de sistem dışı (off-path) bir çözüm olarak bu sisteme dönmesinin gerekliliğini vurgulamaya çalıştık.
The work discusses a significant event that occurred on May 1, 2021, when the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador removed the Justices of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice before their term expiration, violating legal procedures. This action was facilitated by a combination of populist rhetoric from the President and abuse of power by the Legislative Assembly. Referred to as Constitutional Authoritarian-Populism, this trend undermines the rule of law. The text outlines the Salvadoran constitutional framework and discusses concepts like judicial independence, populism, abusive constitutionalism, and authoritarianism in the Latin American context. It then examines instances of Constitutional Authoritarian-Populism in El Salvador from 2019 to 2023, demonstrating that the removal of the Justices wasn’t spontaneous. Finally, it analyzes the process of removal, the response from the removed Justices, and the subsequent decision by newly appointed Justices to authorize presidential re-election in El Salvador.
The advent of autocratic legalism prompts the presentation of the role of judges in societies of new democracies. The recommended proposal modifies the vision of judges as guardians of the law with an educational-democratic component, in which judges also become interpreters of the law. This article offers a presentation of this proposal. It will commence in two stages. The first is a reconstructive and interpretative process. Its aim is to present autocratic legalism and then, in its light, the problem of the abusive judicial review. The second one is of a normative nature, i.e. a presentation of the social role of judges. In this proposal, judges can be assigned three moral obligations: a) to protect the democratic system, b) to improve legal standards and public institutions when they are dysfunctional, and c) to educate the citizenry, with a particular emphasis on human rights. A primary argument in favour of such a role for judges is the strengthening of civil society as an important safeguard against autocratic rule. The context for the findings presented in this paper is the current constitutional crisis in the Polish legal order. However, empirical documentation does not determine the research methodology in the presented article. In it, I pursue an approach that can be described as “doing philosophy historically.”
Tóth Gábor Attila: Nemdemokrácia – Az alkotmányjogi patológia és terápia alapjai, Budapest, Oriold és Társai, 2024.
This volume of essays brings together a group of leading political scientists, legal scholars, and political theorists to describe and analyze the body of constitutional law and practice within and upon democratic institutions, in particular examining how constitutional law shapes electoral democracy. Constitutional law and practice on this question are complex and varied. This volume therefore takes a thematic and regional approach: it selects a range of key theoretical questions related to democratic constitutional design and offers a series of chapters featuring a diverse range of voices, as well as a blend of theory, qualitative studies, and quantitative methods. Readers will gain a multifaceted understanding of a phenomenon of growing importance. The volume will also be useful to students of comparative constitutionalism, who will gain a rich array of empirical evidence to stimulate further work. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This volume of essays brings together a group of leading political scientists, legal scholars, and political theorists to describe and analyze the body of constitutional law and practice within and upon democratic institutions, in particular examining how constitutional law shapes electoral democracy. Constitutional law and practice on this question are complex and varied. This volume therefore takes a thematic and regional approach: it selects a range of key theoretical questions related to democratic constitutional design and offers a series of chapters featuring a diverse range of voices, as well as a blend of theory, qualitative studies, and quantitative methods. Readers will gain a multifaceted understanding of a phenomenon of growing importance. The volume will also be useful to students of comparative constitutionalism, who will gain a rich array of empirical evidence to stimulate further work. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
In this article the thirty years of Armenian independence shall be analyzed from the point of view of constitutional cycles. Similarities and differences shall be outlined, as well as a general information about what constitutional cycles are shall be provided. The paper will further focus on the current constitutional cycle and outline possible solutions of how to avoid making the mistakes that have been omnipresent in the previous cycles.
Keywords: Armenian constitution, Constitutional cycles, abusive constitution- alism, rule of the majority, illiberal democracy, rule of the majority.
Este trabajo tiene el propósito de esclarecer y valorar críticamente la argumentación jurisprudencial del Tribunal Constitucional respecto de la doctrina de las «reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales». Desde una perspectiva principalmente constitucional, aunque complementariamente filosófico-jurídica, se defenderá la tesis de que el alto Tribunal mantiene básicamente una concepción sustancialista o valorativa de la Constitución —donde las reformas constitucionales están sujetas no solo a límites institucionales, sino también a límites materiales—, evidenciándose además que dicha concepción implícita, no obstante su plausibilidad, adolece de desequilibrios importantes que resulta necesario corregir.
This chapter discusses the interrupted process of democratic consolidation and the transformation of constitutional law in North Macedonia, focusing on the characteristics of the rule of the previous Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski. The country, under his rule, has gone through a process of gradual dismantlement of the system of checks and balances resulting in the domination of executive power, the curtailment of the independence of the judiciary and many violations of human rights. Other characteristics of the rule of Gruevski during 2008–2017 were clientelism and patrimonialism, state-controlled corruption, and an electoral process favorable to the dominant political party, which led to the decay of competitive elections. The chapter points to the transformative effects of populism on the constitutional system of North Macedonia and the difficulty of ‘undoing’ these transformations after the end of the populist government of Nikola Gruevski.
The introduction chapter provides an overview of the Hungarian constitutional system from 2010 until today. This system is best characterized by populist constitutionalism. We argue that the resilience of the Hungarian legal system suffered hardly irreplaceable damages from 2010, mostly due to the cumulative effect of external impacts (Coronavirus crisis, financial crises, migration crises, war in Ukraine etc.) coupled with decesive internal factors such as the populist term and its new constitutional order. In our chapter, we mainly focus on the role of emergency powers in the new constitutional order.
We have three central points. First, the entitlement to impose emergency powers has been overused and, by and large, misused in Hungary. Even today, the integrity of the legal system is attacked by subsequently prolonged state of emergency regulations relying on a permanent state of emergency eroding democratic processes.
Second, we argue that populist constitutionalism during the Coronavirus crisis resulted in the lack of legal certainty: the rapidly increasing number of legislations had a counter effect of maintaining the rule of law standards. Thirdly, in this introductory chapter, we argue that rapid, effective, and (often uncensored) lawmaking is not an unheard reaction to international crises. However, when they appear to be only a façade that enables populist constitutionalism to eliminate checks and balances, the rule of law and democracy are at high risk.
This chapter examines the resilience of the 2011 Fundamental Law through a functional analysis. For this purpose, it first presents the basic functions of modern constitutions. Among these, it deals with a regulatory function, whereby the constitution contains the main rules for the exercise of public power as well as fundamental rights. However, the paper examines constitutional functions not only in a formal sense, but within the framework of modern European constitutionalism. For this reason, it also defines the requirements for constitutional regulation, such as its stability, coherence, effectiveness, and, above all, the limitation of public power and state intervention. It also identifies the representation of national identity as a further function, i.e. the social integrative function of the constitution. The Fundamental Law is a full-fledged, modern written constitution, but has fallen far short of what was expected of it: it is ‘the most flexible constitution in the world’, which is burdened with many internal contradictions, and many of its provisions have remained only on paper, i.e. have not been put into practice. The authoritarian transition since 2010 and the usurpation of power by the governing parties show that it has been completely unable to limit public power, which is perhaps the most important constitutional requirement of all.
Son yıllarda anayasanın üstünlüğünü benimseyen bazı ülkelerin yargı organları tarafından ortaya konan “temel yapı doktrini”, anayasa hukuku gündeminde önemli bir yer bulmuştur. Bu doktrini kullanan mahkemeler, anayasa değişikliklerinin içeriğine bakarak denetim yapma konusunda kendilerine olağanüstü bir yetki tanımaktadırlar. Bangladeş Yüksek Mahkemesi “temel yapı doktrini”ni ilk kez, 1989 yılında karara bağlanan Anwar Hossain Chowdhurdy davasında benimsemiştir. Bu tarihten sonra uzun bir zaman boyunca temel yapı doktrini, Bangladeş’te anayasa değişikliklerinin yargısal denetiminde tek ölçü olarak kullanılmıştır. Bangladeş Anayasasında 2011 yılındayapılan On Beşinci Anayasa Değişikliği ile getirilen geniş kapsamlı 7B maddesi, Anayasanın önemli sayıda hükmünün değiştirilemeyeceğini açıkça ortaya koymuştur. Bu çalışmada, 7B hükmünün getirilmesiyle birlikte temel yapı doktrininin, Bangladeş Anayasasında gelecekte yapılacak olan anayasa değişikliklerinin yargısal denetiminde en önemli ölçü olma özelliğini yitireceği ifade edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Yük- sek Mahkeme yargıçlarının görevden alınmasına ilişkin parlamento mekanizmasının Anayasanın 7B maddesine dayanılarak anayasaya aykırı bulunduğu Asaduzzaman Siddiqui davası ise bu iddiayı kanıtlar niteliktedir.
In many African countries with hegemonic-party or de facto one-party systems, political leaders have historically exploited ostensibly proper constitutional amendments to undermine constitutionalism, a practice raising questions about the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of such amendments. This article argues that amendment legitimacy is contingent on achieving ‘broad consensus’, a concept endorsed by the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance . Traditional amendment procedures, such as supermajorities and referendums, while crucial, have proven to be imperfect proxies for ensuring such broad consensus. To more effectively safeguard the core constitutional rules of democratic governance, this article contends that political parties must be recognised as key sites of power division and checks and balances. Accordingly, constitutional amendment procedures should require some level of cross-party approval for key amendments, thus preventing individual political groups, regardless of their dominance, from unilaterally altering fundamental rules of the game. This approach would not only enhance the legitimacy of amendments but also serve as a safeguard against contemporary forms of democratic backsliding, where incumbents exploit formal processes to undermine democratic competition. While this process might make constitutional changes more difficult, it would apply only to a narrow set of fundamental aspects of constitutional democracy. Moreover, it does not necessarily conflict with popular self-governance (and its majoritarian expression), but instead calls for an inclusive re-imagining of majoritarianism.
There has long been debate about the capacity of the US Supreme Court to achieve “progressive” social change. Recent decisions of the court also point to a new worry for American progressives: the court may not only have a limited capacity to drive such change. In some cases, it may actively stand in the way of such change or help reverse it. This invites us to rethink when, or under what conditions, courts are likely to be effective in driving change—whether in a positive, dynamic, or else more obstructionist or regressive direction.
This article revisits the scholarly debates on the AKP’s constitutional amendment package that was put to vote in the 2010 Constitutional Referendum. It takes the democratic theorist Andrew Arato and constitutional scholar Aslı Bali as major representatives of the two opposing views on the political implications of the reform proposal. It compares and contrasts their arguments particularly in light of their different assessments of the amendments which concern the restructuring of the judiciary, especially the Turkish Constitutional Court. It argues that their fundamental controversy with regard to the democratic or authoritarian nature of these amendments is rooted in the contrast between Bali’s predominantly contextual and Arato’s predominantly global approach. While Bali affirms the reform proposal as a democratic step forward in transcending the persistent legacy of the Kemalist authoritarian “tutelary” regime represented by the Constitutional Court, Arato interprets it as a manifestation of the global populist-authoritarian retreat that is expresses itself most visibly through assaults against the independent judiciary. After a critical reading of these two approaches, this paper finalizes by way of introducing a new framework that would counterbalance the contextual with the global and vice versa that would arguably provide a new perspective through which one could unveil the particular characteristics of the AKP’s populist constitutional politics at the time of the Referendum.
This study examines the regulation of Emergency and Urgency Decrees (DNU) in various international constitutions to identify common patterns and differences among them. The research aims to conduct a comparative analysis of DNU regulations in various international constitutions, identifying common patterns, similarities, and differences. The primary focus is to understand how different countries regulate the use of DNUs, including approval procedures, material limitations, and legislative oversight mechanisms. This study employs normative juridical research with a statutory and comparative approach. The countries compared in this study include the United Kingdom, the United States, Paraguay, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina. The data used are secondary data comprising primary legal materials, including the constitutions of the respective countries and their statutory regulations. Secondary legal materials consist of research articles and journals, while tertiary legal materials include dictionaries. The results indicate that although many constitutions do not explicitly regulate DNUs, parliamentary systems are more likely to have DNU-related regulations compared to presidential systems. All constitutions that regulate DNUs require immediate approval by the legislature and set specific time limits for this process. Some countries impose strict limitations on the material that can be regulated through DNUs, ensuring that fundamental rights and government structures are not affected. The study concludes that stringent legislative oversight is necessary to prevent the misuse of executive power in the use of DNUs, and balancing the need for swift action with the protection of human rights is crucial for the effectiveness and accountability of DNUs.
Unamendability is often viewed as a ‘lock on the door’ that can keep enemies of constitutional democracy out, at least for a time. Unsurprisingly, it has also been invoked as a potential bulwark democratic backsliding. While it may not entirely thwart authoritarian populist takeovers, unamendability – including in the form of basic structure doctrines or constitutional identity review – is said to at least delay them, buy some time for defenders of constitutional democracy to resist, and clearly signal to the outside world (including supranational institutions such as the European Union) that foul play is afoot. This article questions such easy assumptions about the nature and operation of unamendability, both in general and in an authoritarian populist context in particular. It argues, based on the examples of India and Hungary, that unamendability is a tool either too ineffective to be deployed against authoritarian populists in power, even while courts may not have been fully captured, or one they are just as comfortable wielding as their opponents. For example, the Indian Supreme Court’s hitherto celebrated basic structure doctrine has been useless in the face of the court’s refusal to hear or decide key challenges against the government. Additionally, drawing on the Hungarian case, the article shows the dark side of constitutional identity review includes captured courts defending majoritarianism and exclusion in the name of a national identity perceived as under attack. In other words, doctrines of unamendability may quickly and subversively turn into instruments of entrenching the very authoritarian populist projects proponents of such doctrines abhor.
This article argues that courts in the United States are comparatively less likely to be captured than those of many other countries and more able to resist an authoritarian populist regime, but also somewhat more likely to facilitate democratic backsliding on their own account. In this way, they potentially could—and arguably already do—provide a relatively rare case of “abusive judicial review” by independent courts. The article also briefly considers whether the US experience provides any insights for the relationship of courts and democratic backsliding in other countries, and especially how the ability of courts to resist capture might be bolstered.
Este trabajo reflexiona sobre la relación que existe entre cambio y estabilidad constitucional a partir del caso chileno. El artículo gira en torno a las siguientes preguntas: ¿cómo se relacionan rigidez constitucional y democracia?, ¿cómo se articuló dicha relación en el constitucionalismo chileno reciente? En este artículo argumento que existe un tipo de rigidez contramayoritaria que hace difícil acomodar constitucionalismo y democracia. Sugiero que el modelo chileno se caracterizó por este tipo de rigidez, lo que contribuyó a generar una crisis constitucional que dio paso a dos procesos constitucionales fallidos. A pesar de ello, sostengo que la Constitución vigente ha experimentado un cambio fundamental que se expresa en su flexibilización. Finalmente, reflexiono sobre las posibilidades institucionales del cambio constitucional participativo, ello, a partir de un análisis crítico del modelo de reforma contenido en la propuesta constitucional de 2022.
Populism and the rule of law have been more often than not depicted as necessarily antithetical to each other. Although it has received less attention in the relevant literature than its right counterpart, left populism is also treated with suspicion. The paper problematises the all too common attitude of having populism as the ultimate peril for the rule of law. Such a critical undertaking is pursued in two ways. Firstly, through a definitional discussion on how to best interpret and treat populism and the rule of law. The view adopted here is that the discursive approach to populism and the functional one to the rule of law are the best proxies to understand the two notions at stake, as they seem better equipped than rival theories to pay heed to context and contingency. Secondly, the paper conducts an empirical analysis of two left populist practices–those of Alexis Tsipras in Greece and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. If taken to an extreme, left populism may be problematic in terms of tempering abuses of power. At the same time however, left populism may also spur processes of institutional strengthening that increase state legitimacy, arguably another fundamental component of the rule of law. Yet both aspects should be assessed empirically on a case by case basis rather than by reference to theory, as populism can manifest itself very differently and the rule of law should be understood in terms of use rather than meaning.
The challenge of distinguishing between abusive and non-abusive constitutional practices – Main ways of detecting abuse: analyses of intent and effects – Obstacles to detecting bad faith intent in constitutional law – Structured and focused analysis of the effects of abusive constitutionalism: introducing the foreseeable effects test – Normative benchmark: substantial diminishment of accountability – Step 1: probability of harm, analysing the tested constitutional measure’s foreseeable effects on operability and autonomy of an accountability mechanism – Step 2: seriousness of potential harm, analysing the constitutional measure’s effects in the broader constitutional context (including interaction effects) – Step 3: harm mitigation, analysing the existence and adequacy of harm-mitigating safeguards accompanying the constitutional measure – Strengths and limits of the foreseeable effects test
The fundamental and institutional bases approved by Congress to regulate the new constituent process include a common good clause introduced in the draft approved by the Expert Commission. Based on the historical and comparative method and following the Inter-American Law, the common good clause should interpret to affirm two conclusions: (i) the transformative mandates of the Social state must be interpreted considering the state capability and the progressiveness principle, and (ii) the Social state must be interpreted based on the human dignity centrality. Those conclusions could avoid some excess in the new Latin-American constitutionalism.
This article studies the contestation of liberal-democratic norms from within the liberal international order (LIO), focusing on the case of abortion rights. The US Supreme Court's decisions on abortion, central to both domestic and global debates, provide a compelling case study of how two opposing sides may invoke the same norms, rather than presenting a case of norm collision or co-optation. In contrast to the binary pro-choice versus anti-abortionist framing, this article shows that both sides invoke liberal-democratic norms, but differ in how they relate the norms to each other and how they interrupt established norm relations. Against this background, the article introduces the concept of norm decoupling, highlighting how norm entrepreneurs isolate certain norms from hitherto related norms. This process contributes to a more subtle backsliding of the LIO, particularly by decoupling majority votes from other democratic, substantial norms, and by decoupling liberal-democratic norms from their gen-dered dimensions. Norm decoupling thus explains diverging interpretations of shared norms within the same context. This advances our understanding of norm contestation and interpretation , shedding light on how liberal-democratic norms subtly erode from within the LIO.
This article aims to continue the recent neo-Elyean turn in comparative constitutional scholarship by further exploring the role of the courts in supporting and protecting democracy. In so doing, it refines and develops my previous work on the topic, and applies this fuller version to a highly visible current dispute. The article first examines the underlying conception of democracy that comparative political process theory is designed to protect; namely, constitutional democracy. It asks what this is and what role courts have in supporting it. The article then introduces the idea of ‘semi-substantive review’ as an integral and output-oriented part of a comprehensive comparative political process theory, alongside and in addition to the types of more purely procedural review I primarily emphasized in my previous work. Finally, the article employs the recent, highly controversial judicial reforms in Israel as a case study in applying the criteria for, and limits of, court intervention in my account. It analyses whether, why and how, in the event that the deeply contested bills become law (as so far one did), judges would be justified in acting to support and protect constitutional democracy.
References to the European Convention on Human Rights by Israeli courts – the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights as sources of comparative law – comparative law as technique of legitimation – content analysis of use by domestic courts of European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence – European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence and deference to state
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