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Intuitive Cooperation and the Social Heuristics Hypothesis: Evidence from 15 Time Constraint Studies
Abstract
Cooperation is central to human societies. Yet relatively little is known about the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative decision-making. Does cooperation require deliberate self-restraint? Or is spontaneous prosociality reined in by calculating self-interest? Here we present a theory of why (and for whom) intuition favors cooperation: cooperation is typically advantageous in everyday life, leading to the formation of generalized cooperative intuitions. Deliberation, by contrast, adjusts behavior towards the optimum for a given situation. Thus, in one-shot anonymous interactions where selfishness is optimal, intuitive responses tend to be more cooperative than deliberative responses. We test this “Social Heuristics Hypothesis” by aggregating across every cooperation experiment using time pressure we conducted over a two-year period (15 studies and 6,910 decisions), as well as performing a novel time pressure experiment. Doing so demonstrates a positive average effect of time pressure on cooperation. We also find substantial variation in this effect, and show that this variation is partly explained by previous experience with one-shot lab experiments.
... Observability particularly increases cooperation when the prosocial nature of the cooperative choice is made salient (55,61). Moreover, experimental evidence indicates that indirect reciprocity is deeply entrenched in human psychology: subtle cues of observability have large effects on cooperation levels (62)(63)(64)(65), and our initial impulse to cooperate in one-shot anonymous settings (66)(67)(68)(69) is likely the result of adaptation in a world dominated by reputational concerns (66,68). ...
... Observability particularly increases cooperation when the prosocial nature of the cooperative choice is made salient (55,61). Moreover, experimental evidence indicates that indirect reciprocity is deeply entrenched in human psychology: subtle cues of observability have large effects on cooperation levels (62)(63)(64)(65), and our initial impulse to cooperate in one-shot anonymous settings (66)(67)(68)(69) is likely the result of adaptation in a world dominated by reputational concerns (66,68). ...
... In a world with repeated interactions, it is usually worthwhile to cooperate, and therefore, individuals may adopt heuristics, such as always cooperate or always cooperate in nonbusiness settings. These same individuals, when serving as laboratory subjects, may apply these heuristics and cooperate even when it is not worthwhile to do so (25,32,33). ...
... Cooperation in these situations is puzzling from the standpoint of models of the evolution of cooperation based on reciprocity, because in that framework, cooperation can only improve one's reputation if actions are observed, and reputations are only valuable if others have an opportunity to reciprocate. Some have suggested that cooperation in these settings results from intuitive cooperation (25,32), that it can emerge if there is uncertainty over the probability of future cooperation opportunities (38), or that it is a consequence of the evolution of altruism caused by group selection (37). We offer another potential explanation by considering a variation of our model, in which the likelihood of continuation varies and player 1 learns this likelihood when she looks (details in SI Appendix). ...
Significance
Why do we trust people more when they do good without considering in detail the cost to themselves? People who avoid “looking” at the costs of good acts can be trusted to cooperate in important situations, whereas those who look cannot. We find that evolutionary dynamics can lead to cooperation without looking at costs. Our results illuminate why we attend closely to people’s motivations for doing good, as prescribed by deontological ethicists such as Kant, and, also, why we admire principled people, adhere to taboos, and fall in love.
... 6 These findings relate to work on the cognitive basis of cooperation in social dilemmas. Our work is consistent with recent evidence that automatic, intuitive responses tend to favour cooperation: time pressure or priming of intuition increases cooperation in public goods games (Rand et al., 2012;Rand and Kraft-Todd, 2013;Rand et al., 2013b), cognitive load increases giving in zero-sum allocation games (Cornelissen et al., 2011;Roch et al., 2000;Schulz et al., in press), and impairing the function of the right lateral prefrontal cortex, a brain region associated with deliberation and control, increases giving in a unilateral money transfer, while amplifying this region decreases giving (Ruff et al., 2013). 7 To explain this predisposition towards cooperation, the Social Heuristics Hypothesis has been proposed (Rand et al., 2013b): strategies that are advantageous in daily life become internalized as defaults, and tend to get overgeneralized into less representative situations (such as one-shot anonymous laboratory games). ...
... Our work is consistent with recent evidence that automatic, intuitive responses tend to favour cooperation: time pressure or priming of intuition increases cooperation in public goods games (Rand et al., 2012;Rand and Kraft-Todd, 2013;Rand et al., 2013b), cognitive load increases giving in zero-sum allocation games (Cornelissen et al., 2011;Roch et al., 2000;Schulz et al., in press), and impairing the function of the right lateral prefrontal cortex, a brain region associated with deliberation and control, increases giving in a unilateral money transfer, while amplifying this region decreases giving (Ruff et al., 2013). 7 To explain this predisposition towards cooperation, the Social Heuristics Hypothesis has been proposed (Rand et al., 2013b): strategies that are advantageous in daily life become internalized as defaults, and tend to get overgeneralized into less representative situations (such as one-shot anonymous laboratory games). ...
... Here we reanalyse the data from these experiments as suggested by Tinghög et al. 1 , and demonstrate that our reported positive effect of time pressure on cooperation is not an artefact. Furthermore, an aggregate analysis based on fifteen studies and 6,910 decisions also replicates this effect 3 . ...
... This study's null result is disappointing. However, it fits within the pattern of results observed in an aggregate analysis examining every experiment our group has ever run applying time pressure to social dilemmas (thus eliminating potential ''file drawer'' effects) 3 . ...
replying to G. Tinghog et al. Nature 498, http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature12194 (2013)
Tinghog et al.1 take issue with two of the ten experiments in our paper2 (studies 6 and 7). Here we reanalyse the data from these experiments as suggested by Tinghog et al.1, and demonstrate that our reported positive effect of time pressure on cooperation is not an artefact. Furthermore, an aggregate analysis based on fifteen studies and 6,910 decisions also replicates this effect3.
... Here we reanalyse the data from these experiments as suggested by Tinghög et al. 1 , and demonstrate that our reported positive effect of time pressure on cooperation is not an artefact. Furthermore, an aggregate analysis based on fifteen studies and 6,910 decisions also replicates this effect 3 . ...
... This study's null result is disappointing. However, it fits within the pattern of results observed in an aggregate analysis examining every experiment our group has ever run applying time pressure to social dilemmas (thus eliminating potential ''file drawer'' effects) 3 . ...
Rand et al. reported increased cooperation in social dilemmas after forcing individuals to decide quickly. Time pressure was used to induce intuitive decisions, and they concluded that intuition promotes cooperation. We test the robustness of this finding in a series of five experiments involving about 2,500 subjects in three countries. None of the experiments confirms the Rand et al. finding, indicating that their result was an artefact of excluding the about 50% of subjects who failed to respond on time.
... While Mechanical Turk makes it easy to collect arbitrarily large samples, it is not clear whether this is always a responsible approach. Recent research has suggested that the median MTurk participant has completed over 300 studies (Rand, Peysakhovich, Kraft-Todd, et al., 2013), suggesting that participant reuse throughout the field is likely a serious problem (i.e., the Mechanical Turk subject pool is highly experienced with social science experimental paradigms, potentially impacting their behavior during such experiments). Avoiding over-sampling throughout cognitive science disciplines may help to mitigate this issue. ...
One of the principle tenets of modern behavioral ethics is that human morality is dynamic and malleable. Recent work in technology ethics has highlighted the role technologies can play in this process. As such, it is the responsibility of technology designers to actively identify and address possible negative consequences of such technological mediation. In this work, we examine dialogue systems employed by current robotic agents, arguing that they can have deleterious effects on both the human moral ecosystem and human perception of the robots, regardless of the robots' actual ethical competence. We present a preliminary Bayesian analysis of empirical data suggesting that the architectural status quo of clarification request generation systems may (1) cause robots to unintentionally miscommunicate their ethical intentions (our two tests for this yielded Bayes factors of 1319 and 1099) and (2) weaken humans' contextual application of moral norms (Bayes factor of 1069).
... While Mechanical Turk makes it easy to collect arbitrarily large samples, it is not clear whether this is always a responsible approach. Recent research has suggested that the median MTurk participant has completed over 300 studies [26], suggesting that participant reuse throughout the field is likely a serious problem. Avoiding over-sampling may help to mitigate this issue. ...
Recent work on natural language generation algorithms for human-robot interaction has not considered the ethical implications of such algorithms. In this work, we provide preliminary results suggesting that simply by asking for clarification, a robot may unintentionally communicate that it would be willing to perform an unethical action, even if it has ethical programming that would prevent it from doing so. In doing so, the robot may not only miscommunicate its own ethical programming, but negatively influence the morality of its human teammates.
... These evidence has been acquired using modeled environments with constrained behaviors of humans, or agents, to analyze their social behavior explicitly. However, it is important that this evidence be generalized to a less restrictive environment to understand human society [21], because humans act motivated by various reasons including non-rational thinking [22], [23]. Interactive online games are particularly powerful tools for the quantitative study of human society [24]- [30]. ...
We present a new computational framework for modeling moral decision-making in artificial agents based on the notion of ‘Machine Morality as Cooperation’. This framework integrates recent advances from cross-disciplinary moral decision-making literature into a single architecture. We build upon previous work outlining cognitive elements that an artificial agent would need for exhibiting latent morality, and we extend it by providing a computational realization of the cognitive architecture of such an agent. Our work has implications for cognitive and social robotics. Recent studies in human neuroimaging have pointed to three different decision-making processes, Pavlovian, model-free and model-based, that are defined by distinct neural substrates in the brain. Here, we describe how computational models of these three cognitive processes can be implemented in a single cognitive architecture by using the distributed and hierarchical organization proposed by the DAC theoretical framework. Moreover, we propose that a pro-social drive to cooperate exists at the Pavlovian level that can also bias the rest of the decision system, thus extending current state-of-the-art descriptive models based on harm-aversion.
This chapter considers four general types of declining effect sizes, include false positive decline effects, inflated decline effects, under-specified decline effects, and genuinely decreasing decline effects, each of which relates to the hypothetical true effect size of the finding in question at the time it was originally reported. Publication practices can create a decline effect through multiple routes. Arguably the most insidious artifactual source of decline effects is selective reporting. Replication studies need to be devised that systematically investigate specific hypotheses regarding the factors that may contribute to decline effects. To discover if a decline effect represents a genuine diminishment in the effect due to non-conventional mechanisms such as observation, researchers must make multiple observations over time that: fully replicate the procedure; maintain the same sample sizes; sample from the same populations; and use the same analytical methods.
Cooperative behaviors are common in humans, and they are the fundamental basis of our society. Theoretical and experimental studies have modeled environments where the behaviors of humans, or agents, have been restricted to analyze their social behavior. However, it is important that such studies can be generalized to a less restrictive environment in order to understand human society. Social network games (SNGs) provide a powerful tool for the quantitative study of human behavior using a less restrictive environment than in previous studies. We focused on multilevel selection, one of the theoretical frameworks used to study the evolution of cooperation. The evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection requires that the continual assortment between cooperators and noncooperators is generated; thus, humans may have acquired mechanisms that ensure assortment (e.g., migration between groups). This study aims to investigate this mechanism in a less restrictive environment. For this purpose, we researched the effect of migration based on data analysis in an SNG where the players could behave more freely than was possible in the environments used in the previous studies. We showed that players maintained assortment between cooperators and defectors in this SNG, where it appears that environmentally driven migration generated the assortment.
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online labor market created by Amazon, has recently become popular among social scientists as a source of survey and experimental data. The workers who populate this market have been assessed on dimensions that are universally relevant to understanding whether, why, and when they should be recruited as research participants. We discuss the characteristics of MTurk as a participant pool for psychology and other social sciences, highlighting the traits of the MTurk samples, why people become MTurk workers and research participants, and how data quality on MTurk compares to that from other pools and depends on controllable and uncontrollable factors.
Evolutionary accounts have difficulty explaining why people cooperate with anonymous strangers they will never meet. Recently models, focusing on emotional processing, have been proposed as a potential explanation, with attention focusing on a dual systems approach based on system 1 (fast, intuitive, automatic, effortless, and emotional) and system 2 (slow, reflective, effortful, proactive and unemotional). Evidence shows that when cooperation is salient, people are fast (system 1) to cooperate, but with longer delays (system 2) they show greed. This is interpreted within the framework of the social heuristic hypothesis (SHH), whereby people overgeneralize potentially advantageous intuitively learnt and internalization social norms to 'atypical' situations. We extend this to explore intuitive reactions to unfairness by integrating the SHH with the 'fast to forgive, slow to anger' (FFSA) heuristic. This suggests that it is advantageous to be prosocial when facing uncertainty. We propose that whether or not someone intuitively shows prosociality (cooperation) or retaliation is moderated by the degree (certainty) of unfairness. People should intuitively cooperate when facing mild levels of unfairness (fast to forgive) but when given longer to decide about another's mild level of unfairness should retaliate (slow to anger). However, when facing severe levels of unfairness, the intuitive response is always retaliation. We test this using a series of one-shot ultimatum games and manipulate level of offer unfairness (50:50 60:40, 70:30, 80:20, 90:10) and enforced time delays prior to responding (1s, 2s, 8s, 15s). We also measure decision times to make responses after the time delays. The results show that when facing mildly unfair offers (60:40) people are fast (intuitive) to cooperate but with longer delays reject these mildly unfair offers: 'fast to forgive, and slow to retaliate'. However, for severely unfair offers (90:10) the intuitive and fast response is to always reject.
A defining aspect of human cooperation is the use of sophisticated indirect reciprocity. We observe others, talk about others, and act accordingly. We help those who help others, and we cooperate expecting that others will cooperate in return. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation, which spreads by communication. A crucial aspect of indirect reciprocity is observability: reputation effects can support cooperation as long as peoples' actions can be observed by others. In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, natural selection favors cooperation when observability is sufficiently high. Complimenting this theoretical work are experiments where observability promotes cooperation among small groups playing games in the laboratory. Until now, however, there has been little evidence of observability's power to promote large-scale cooperation in real world settings. Here we provide such evidence using a field study involving 2413 subjects. We collaborated with a utility company to study participation in a program designed to prevent blackouts. We show that observability triples participation in this public goods game. The effect is over four times larger than offering a $25 monetary incentive, the company's previous policy. Furthermore, as predicted by indirect reciprocity, we provide evidence that reputational concerns are driving our observability effect. In sum, we show how indirect reciprocity can be harnessed to increase cooperation in a relevant, real-world public goods game.
Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following Herbert Simon's notion of satisficing, this chapter proposes a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast-and-frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: It neither looks up nor integrates all information. By computer simulation, a competition was held between the satisficing "take-the-best" algorithm and various "rational" inference procedures (e.g., multiple regression). The take-the-best algorithm matched or outperformed all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result is an existence proof that cognitive mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical norms of rational inference.
Much research in the last 2 decades has demonstrated that humans deviate from normative models of decision making and rational judgment. In 4 studies involving 954 participants, the authors explored the extent to which measures of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature including the selection task, belief bias in the syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, base-rate use, covariation detection, hypothesis testing, outcome bias, if-only thinking, knowledge calibration, hindsight bias, and on false consensus paradigm. Significant relationships involving cognitive ability were interpreted as indicating algorithmic level limitations on the computation of the normative response. Relationships with thinking dispositions were interpreted as indicating that styles of epistemic regulation can predict individual differences in performance of these tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Conform to the Norm
Human societies have always enforced compliance with norms of acceptable behavior among their members by threatening punishment. It has been proposed that the human brain may have developed neural processes that support norm enforcement behavior and generate appropriate behavioral responses to social punishment threats. However, evidence for the neural circuitry underlying sanction-induced norm compliance in humans is limited. Using noninvasive brain stimulation, Ruff et al. (p. 482 , published online 10 October) observed that alteration of the activity and excitability of the right lateral prefrontal cortex affected norm compliance, without affecting awareness of the content of the respective norms, or the expected sanctions. These alterations were much larger in a social, as compared to a nonsocial, context.
SOCIAL DILEMMAS ARE SITUATIONS IN WHICH COLLECTIVE INTERESTS ARE AT ODDS WITH PRIVATE INTERESTS: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup conflicts, are at their core social dilemmas. Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have been studied by economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. These studies typically explain tendency to cooperation by dividing people in proself and prosocial types, or appealing to forms of external control or, in iterated social dilemmas, to long-term strategies. But recent experiments have shown that cooperation is possible even in one-shot social dilemmas without forms of external control and the rate of cooperation typically depends on the payoffs. This makes impossible a predictive division between proself and prosocial people and proves that people have attitude to cooperation by nature. The key innovation of this article is in fact to postulate that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and consequently they do not act a priori as single agents, as assumed by standard economic models, but they forecast how a social dilemma would evolve if they formed coalitions and then they act according to their most optimistic forecast. Formalizing this idea we propose the first predictive model of human cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not explained by the standard model. We show also that the model makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social dilemmas.
Moral dilemmas engender conflicts between two traditions: consequentialism, which evaluates actions based on their outcomes, and deontology, which evaluates actions themselves. These strikingly resemble two distinct decision-making architectures: a model-based system that selects actions based on inferences about their consequences; and a model-free system that selects actions based on their reinforcement history. Here, I consider how these systems, along with a Pavlovian system that responds reflexively to rewards and punishments, can illuminate puzzles in moral psychology.
Although previous theories and research have suggested that human behavior is automatically driven by selfish impulses (e.g., vengeance rather than forgiveness), the present research tested the hypothesis that in close relationships, people's impulsive inclination is to be prosocial and to sacrifice for their partner-to pursue the interests of the partner or of the relationship at some costs for the self. Results from four studies demonstrated that people with low self-control, relative to those with high self-control, reported greater willingness to sacrifice for their close others. Furthermore, Study 4 demonstrated that communal orientation was more strongly associated with sacrifice among participants with low self-control than participants with high self-control. This moderational pattern supports the hypothesis that communal orientation functions as a default approach to sacrifice in the context of close relationships. Taken together, these findings suggest that under certain crucial conditions in close relationships, gut-level impulses are more likely than deliberative considerations to promote prorelationship behavior.
Rand et al. reported increased cooperation in social dilemmas after forcing individuals to decide quickly. Time pressure was used to induce intuitive decisions, and they concluded that intuition promotes cooperation. We test the robustness of this finding in a series of five experiments involving about 2,500 subjects in three countries. None of the experiments confirms the Rand et al. finding, indicating that their result was an artefact of excluding the about 50% of subjects who failed to respond on time.
Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In con-
trast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with un-
limited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the
authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-
reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical
rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the authors
held a competition between the satisficing "Take The Best" algorithm and various "rational" infer-
ence procedures (e.g., multiple regression). The Take The Best algorithm matched or outperformed
all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result is an existence proof that cognitive
mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical
norms of rational inference.
When people are the victims of greed or recipients of generosity, their first impulse is often to pay back that behavior in kind. What happens when people cannot reciprocate, but instead have the chance to be cruel or kind to someone entirely different-to pay it forward? In 5 experiments, participants received greedy, equal, or generous divisions of money or labor from an anonymous person and then divided additional resources with a new anonymous person. While equal treatment was paid forward in kind, greed was paid forward more than generosity. This asymmetry was driven by negative affect, such that a positive affect intervention disrupted the tendency to pay greed forward. Implications for models of generalized reciprocity are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
Investigated dominant simplifying strategies people use in adapting to different information processing environments. It was hypothesized that judges operating under either time pressure or distraction would systematically place greater weight on negative evidence than would their counterparts under less strainful conditions. 6 groups of male undergraduates (N = 210) were presented 5 pieces of information to assimilate in evaluating cars as purchase options. 3 groups operated under varying time pressure conditions, while 3 groups operated under varying levels of distraction. Data usage models assuming disproportionately heavy weighting of negative evidence provided best fits to a signficantly higher number of Ss in the high time pressure and moderate distraction conditions. Ss attended to fewer data dimensions in these conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The latest interdisciplinary research on the evolutionary models of cooperation.
Current thinking in evolutionary biology holds that competition among individuals is the key to understanding natural selection. When competition exists, it is obvious that conflict arises; the emergence of cooperation, however, is less straightforward and calls for in-depth analysis. Much research is now focused on defining and expanding the evolutionary models of cooperation. Understanding the mechanisms of cooperation has relevance for fields other than biology. Anthropology, economics, mathematics, political science, primatology, and psychology are adopting the evolutionary approach and developing analogies based on it. Similarly, biologists use elements of economic game theory and analyze cooperation in "evolutionary games." Despite this, exchanges between researchers in these different disciplines have been limited. Seeking to fill this gap, the 90th Dahlem Workshop was convened. This book, which grew out of that meeting, addresses such topics as emotions in human cooperation, reciprocity, biological markets, cooperation and conflict in multicellularity, genomic and intercellular cooperation, the origins of human cooperation, and the cultural evolution of cooperation; the emphasis is on open questions and future research areas. The book makes a significant contribution to a growing process of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization on this issue.
Two studies were conducted to test a two-stage model of the psychological mechanisms underlying the overconsumption of scarce resources in small groups. The model proposes that members of groups sharing resources first anchor their consumption choices on an “equal-division” heuristic and then, given sufficient cognitive capacity, adjust their choices in a self-serving direction. The results from both studies support the model. The first study found that when faced with a common resource pool almost all group members expressed thoughts regarding equality; however, individuals with sufficient cognitive capacity requested more from the pool and expressed more task-relevant thoughts than individuals lacking the necessary cognitive resources. The second study provided additional support for the two-stage model by demonstrating that group members' cognitions occur in the order predicted by the model and by demonstrating that an individual difference, social value orientation, affects thought processes only when individuals are not experiencing high cognitive loads. Implications are discussed.
Online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) offer an unprecedented opportunity to run economic game experiments quickly and inexpensively. Using Mturk, we recruited 756 subjects and examined their behavior in four canonical economic games, with two payoff conditions each: a stakes condition, in which subjects' earnings were based on the outcome of the game (maximum earnings of $1); and a no-stakes condition, in which subjects' earnings are unaffected by the outcome of the game. Our results demonstrate that economic game experiments run on MTurk are comparable to those run in laboratory settings, even when using very low stakes.
Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries.
This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions
and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings
and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its
computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal
contiguity. The other is "rule based" because it operates on symbolic
structures that have logical content and variables and because its
computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules.
The systems serve complementary functions and can simultaneously
generate different solutions to a reasoning problem. The rule-based
system can suppress the associative system but not completely inhibit
it. The article reviews evidence in favor of the distinction and
its characterization.
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining
situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet,
when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly
for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns
out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.
Amazon's Mechanical Turk is an online labor market where requesters post jobs and workers choose which jobs to do for pay. The central purpose of this article is to demonstrate how to use this Web site for conducting behavioral research and to lower the barrier to entry for researchers who could benefit from this platform. We describe general techniques that apply to a variety of types of research and experiments across disciplines. We begin by discussing some of the advantages of doing experiments on Mechanical Turk, such as easy access to a large, stable, and diverse subject pool, the low cost of doing experiments, and faster iteration between developing theory and executing experiments. While other methods of conducting behavioral research may be comparable to or even better than Mechanical Turk on one or more of the axes outlined above, we will show that when taken as a whole Mechanical Turk can be a useful tool for many researchers. We will discuss how the behavior of workers compares with that of experts and laboratory subjects. Then we will illustrate the mechanics of putting a task on Mechanical Turk, including recruiting subjects, executing the task, and reviewing the work that was submitted. We also provide solutions to common problems that a researcher might face when executing their research on this platform, including techniques for conducting synchronous experiments, methods for ensuring high-quality work, how to keep data private, and how to maintain code security.
Drawing on the social intuitionist model, the authors studied the hypothesis that social value orientations are expressed automatically in behavior. They compared spontaneous and more deliberated decisions in the dictator game and confirmed that social values determine behavior when responses are based on the automatic system. By means of both mediation and experimental analyses, the authors further demonstrate that the automatic expression of social value orientations is mediated by perceptions of interpersonal closeness. A reasoning process can subsequently override these automatic responses and disconnect decisions from perceptions of interpersonal closeness. This results in lower levels of other-regarding behavior, at least for prosocials.
Although Mechanical Turk has recently become popular among social scientists as a source of experimental data, doubts may linger about the quality of data provided by subjects recruited from online labor markets. We address these potential concerns by presenting new demographic data about the Mechanical Turk subject population, reviewing the strengths of Mechanical Turk relative to other online and offline methods of recruiting subjects, and comparing the magnitude of effects obtained using Mechanical Turk and traditional subject pools. We further discuss some additional benefits such as the possibility of longitudinal, cross cultural and prescreening designs, and offer some advice on how to best manage a common subject pool.
We study the impact of cognitive load in dictator games to test two conflicting views of moral behavior. Are social preferences skindeep in the sense that they are the result of humans’ cognitive reasoning while the natural instinct is selfish, or is rather the natural instinct to share fairly while our cognitive capacities are able to adjust moral principles in a selfserving manner? Some previous studies in more complex settings give conflicting answers, and to disentangle different possible mechanisms we use simple games. We study both charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load, where high cognitive load is assumed to reduce the impact of cognitive processes on behavior. In the dictator game we use both a give frame, where the dictator is given an amount and may share some or all of it to a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may take from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results from four different studies indicate that the effect of cognitive load is small if at all existing.
Current methods for the detection of contagious outbreaks give contemporaneous information about the course of an epidemic at best. It is known that individuals near the center of a social network are likely to be infected sooner during the course of an outbreak, on average, than those at the periphery. Unfortunately, mapping a whole network to identify central individuals who might be monitored for infection is typically very difficult. We propose an alternative strategy that does not require ascertainment of global network structure, namely, simply monitoring the friends of randomly selected individuals. Such individuals are known to be more central. To evaluate whether such a friend group could indeed provide early detection, we studied a flu outbreak at Harvard College in late 2009. We followed 744 students who were either members of a group of randomly chosen individuals or a group of their friends. Based on clinical diagnoses, the progression of the epidemic in the friend group occurred 13.9 days (95% C.I. 9.9-16.6) in advance of the randomly chosen group (i.e., the population as a whole). The friend group also showed a significant lead time (p<0.05) on day 16 of the epidemic, a full 46 days before the peak in daily incidence in the population as a whole. This sensor method could provide significant additional time to react to epidemics in small or large populations under surveillance. The amount of lead time will depend on features of the outbreak and the network at hand. The method could in principle be generalized to other biological, psychological, informational, or behavioral contagions that spread in networks.
Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper, we provide an answer by analysing the data of Herrmann et al. (2008a), who studied cooperation and punishment in 16 subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (2000)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities.
What explains variability in norms of cooperation across organizations and cultures? One answer comes from the internalization of norms prescribing behavior that is typically successful under the institutions that govern one’s daily life. These norms are then carried over into atypical situations beyond the reach of institutions. Here we experimentally demonstrate such spillovers. First, we immerse subjects in environments that do or do not support cooperation using repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas. Afterwards, we measure their intrinsic prosociality in one-shot games. Subjects from environments that support cooperation are more prosocial, more likely to punish selfishness, and more generally trusting. Furthermore, these effects are most pronounced among subjects who use heuristics, suggesting that intuitive processes play a key role in the spillovers we observe. Our findings help to explain variation in one-shot anonymous cooperation, linking this intrinsically motivated prosociality to the externally imposed institutional rules experienced in other settings.
Derived from the 2001 Santa Fe Institute Conference, “The Economy as an Evolving Complex System III,” represents scholarship from the figures in the area of economics and complexity. The subject, a perennial centerpiece of the SFI program of studies, has gained a wide range of followers for its methods of employing empirical evidence in the development of analytical economic theories. Accordingly, the chapters in this volume address a wide variety of issues in the field of economics and complexity, accessing eclectic techniques from many disciplines, provided that they shed light on the economic problem. Dedicated to Kenneth Arrow on his 80th birthday, this volume honors his many contributions to the Institute. SFI-style economics is regarded as having had an important impact in introducing a new approach to economic analysis.
Prosocial behavior is a central feature of human life and a major focus of research across the natural and social sciences. Most theoretical models of prosociality share a common assumption: Humans are instinctively selfish, and prosocial behavior requires exerting reflective control over these basic instincts. However, findings from several scientific disciplines have recently contradicted this view. Rather than requiring control over instinctive selfishness, prosocial behavior appears to stem from processes that are intuitive, reflexive, and even automatic. These observations suggest that our understanding of prosociality should be revised to include the possibility that, in many cases, prosocial behavior-instead of requiring active control over our impulsesre-presents an impulse of its own.
How does cooperation emerge among selfish individuals? When do people share resources, punish those they consider unfair, and engage in joint enterprises? These questions fascinate philosophers, biologists, and economists alike, for the "invisible hand" that should turn selfish efforts into public benefit is not always at work.The Calculus of Selfishnesslooks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Karl Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation.Focusing on some of the best-known social and economic experiments, including games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust, Ultimatum, Snowdrift, and Public Good, Sigmund explores the conditions leading to cooperative strategies. His approach is based on evolutionary game dynamics, applied to deterministic and probabilistic models of economic interactions.Exploring basic strategic interactions among individuals guided by self-interest and caught in social traps,The Calculus of Selfishnessanalyzes to what extent one key facet of human nature--selfishness--can lead to cooperation.
We experimentally compare the nature of cooperation among Romanian students to that of U.S. students in various repeated games. We find stark differences in the students’ ability to productively link behavior in a public goods game with bilateral interactions of either reward or punishment. On the other hand, we find no difference in cooperation rates in a control public goods game, where coordination on desirable outcomes is hard to achieve, or a bilateral Prisoners’ dilemma, where coordination is relatively easily attained. Rather than being fundamentally more cooperative, U.S. groups perform significantly better in the linked games because cooperative behavior is preferentially rewarded in the U.S., and cooperators are rarely punished. Romanian subjects, on the other hand, are unwilling to risk their productive personal relationships to achieve more public cooperation, and also engage in spiteful punishment. Our findings corroborate and complement existing sociological explanations for cross-cultural productivity differences.
Dual-system approaches to psychology explain the fundamental properties of human judgment, decision making, and behavior across diverse domains. Yet, the appropriate characterization of each system is a source of debate. For instance, a large body of research on moral psychology makes use of the contrast between "emotional" and "rational/cognitive" processes, yet even the chief proponents of this division recognize its shortcomings. Largely independently, research in the computational neurosciences has identified a broad division between two algorithms for learning and choice derived from formal models of reinforcement learning. One assigns value to actions intrinsically based on past experience, while another derives representations of value from an internally represented causal model of the world. This division between action- and outcome-based value representation provides an ideal framework for a dual-system theory in the moral domain.
In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, compete with slower analytic processes that can lead to correct logical decisions. Requiring rapid responding thus differentially inhibits the operation of analytic reasoning processes, leading to the results observed.
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
Cooperation is central to human social behaviour. However, choosing to cooperate requires individuals to incur a personal cost to benefit others. Here we explore the cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making in humans using a dual-process framework. We ask whether people are predisposed towards selfishness, behaving cooperatively only through active self-control; or whether they are intuitively cooperative, with reflection and prospective reasoning favouring 'rational' self-interest. To investigate this issue, we perform ten studies using economic games. We find that across a range of experimental designs, subjects who reach their decisions more quickly are more cooperative. Furthermore, forcing subjects to decide quickly increases contributions, whereas instructing them to reflect and forcing them to decide slowly decreases contributions. Finally, an induction that primes subjects to trust their intuitions increases contributions compared with an induction that promotes greater reflection. To explain these results, we propose that cooperation is intuitive because cooperative heuristics are developed in daily life where cooperation is typically advantageous. We then validate predictions generated by this proposed mechanism. Our results provide convergent evidence that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemmas, and that reflection can undermine these cooperative impulses.
Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. With a few exceptions, these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In three large experiments, we investigate whether social framing effects are also present in Dictator games. Since only one of the subjects makes a decision, the frame can affect behavior merely through preferences. In all the experiments, we find that behavior is insensitive to social framing. We discuss how to reconcile the absence of social framing effects in Dictator games with the presence of social framing effects in Ultimatum games.
Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a relatively new website that contains the major elements required to conduct research: an integrated participant compensation system; a large participant pool; and a streamlined process of study design, participant recruitment, and data collection. In this article, we describe and evaluate the potential contributions of MTurk to psychology and other social sciences. Findings indicate that (a) MTurk participants are slightly more demographically diverse than are standard Internet samples and are significantly more diverse than typical American college samples; (b) participation is affected by compensation rate and task length, but participants can still be recruited rapidly and inexpensively; (c) realistic compensation rates do not affect data quality; and (d) the data obtained are at least as reliable as those obtained via traditional methods. Overall, MTurk can be used to obtain high-quality data inexpensively and rapidly.
© The Author(s) 2011.
Lecture audiences and students were asked to respond to virtual decision and game situations at gametheory.tau.ac.il. Several thousand observations were collected and the response time for each answer was recorded. There were significant differences in response time across responses. It is suggested that choices made instinctively, that is, on the basis of an emotional response, require less response time than choices that require the use of cognitive reasoning. © 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation
Online labor markets have great potential as platforms for conducting experiments, as they provide immediate access to a large and diverse subject pool and allow researchers to conduct randomized controlled trials. We argue that online experiments can be just as valid – both internally and externally – as laboratory and field experiments, while requiring far less money and time to design and to conduct. In this paper, we first describe the benefits of conducting experiments in online labor markets; we then use one such market to replicate three classic experiments and confirm their results. We confirm that subjects (1) reverse decisions in response to how a decision-problem is framed, (2) have pro-social preferences (value payoffs to others positively), and (3) respond to priming by altering their choices. We also conduct a labor supply field experiment in which we confirm that workers have upward sloping labor supply curves. In addition to reporting these results, we discuss the unique threats to validity in an online setting and propose methods for coping with these threats. We also discuss the external validity of results from online domains and explain why online results can have external validity equal to or even better than that of traditional methods, depending on the research question. We conclude with our views on the potential role that online experiments can play within the social sciences, and then recommend software development priorities and best practices.
People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.
Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.
Classical economic models make behavioral predictions based on the assumption that people are fully rational and care only about maximizing their own payoffs. Although this approach successfully explains human behavior in many situations, there is a wealth of experimental evidence demonstrating conditions where people deviate from the predictions of these models. One setting that has received particular attention is fixed length repeated games. Iterating a social dilemma can promote cooperation through direct reciprocity, even if it is common knowledge that all players are rational and self-interested. However, this is not the case if the length of the game is known to the players. In the final round, a rational player will defect, because there is no future to be concerned with. But if you know the other player will defect in the last round, then you should defect in the second to last round, and so on. This logic of backwards induction leads to immediate defection as the only rational (sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium) strategy. When people actually play such games, however, immediate defection is rare. Here we use evolutionary dynamics in finite populations to study the centipede game, which is designed to explore this issue of backwards induction. We make the following observation: since full cooperation can risk-dominate immediate defection in the centipede game, stochastic evolutionary dynamics can favor both delayed defection and even full cooperation. Furthermore, our evolutionary model can quantitatively reproduce human behavior from two experiments by fitting a single free parameter, which is the product of population size and selection intensity. Thus we provide evidence that people's cooperative behavior in fixed length games, which is often called 'irrational', may in fact be the favored outcome of natural selection.
Diverse lines of theoretical and empirical research are converging on the notion that human evolution has been substantially influenced by the interaction of our cultural and genetic inheritance systems. The application of this culture-gene coevolutionary approach to understanding human social psychology has generated novel insights into the cognitive and affective foundations of large-scale cooperation, social norms and ethnicity. This approach hypothesizes a norm-psychology: a suite of psychological adaptations for inferring, encoding in memory, adhering to, enforcing and redressing violations of the shared behavioral standards of one's community. After reviewing the substantial body of formal theory underpinning these predictions, we outline how this account organizes diverse empirical findings in the cognitive sciences and related disciplines. Norm-psychology offers explanatory traction on the evolved psychological mechanisms that underlie cultural evolution, cross-cultural differences and the emergence of norms.
Do moral judgments hinge on the time available to render them? According to a recent dual-process model of moral judgment, moral dilemmas that engage emotional processes are likely to result in fast deontological gut reactions. In contrast, consequentialist responses that tot up lives saved and lost in response to such dilemmas would require cognitive control to override the initial response. Cognitive control, however, takes time. In two experiments, we manipulated the time available to arrive at moral judgments in two ways: by allotting a fixed short or large amount of time, and by nudging people to answer swiftly or to deliberate thoroughly. We found that faster responses indeed lead to more deontological responses among those moral dilemmas in which the killing of one to save many necessitates manhandling an innocent person and in which this action is depicted as a means to an end. Thus, our results are the first demonstration that inhibiting cognitive control through manipulations of time alters moral judgments.
One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. (D12, D 83, H41, Z13)