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LXXVIII Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
The Cost of a Revolution
Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar1
Senior Economist, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Washington, D.C
Introduction
In this study, I have attempted to quantify the economic opportunity benets/costs
of the 1979 Iranian revolution and the subsequent policies and actions of the Islam-
ic Republic for the average Iranian citizen. This question has often been raised in
various contexts, but has not received a rigorous treatment yet. I have addressed this
issue by focusing the study on the difference between the actual performance of the
Iranian economy in 1979-2010 period against a set of scenario-generated counter-
factual outcomes, to obtain a measure of economic opportunity cost. Some of these
ISSN 0892-4147-print/ISSN 2159-421X online/2016/30.4/LXXVIII-CI.
Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar, “e Cost of a Revolution,” Iran Nameh, 30:4 (Winter
2016), LXXVIII-CI.
Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar is a senior economist at the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System in Washington, D.C. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2007. His research is focused on the interaction between
nancial and nonnancial sectors in the economy and predictability in nancial markets.
Mohammad Jahan-Parvar <Mohammad.Jahan-Parvar@frb.gov>
1Economist, Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
20th St. and Constitution Ave. NW, Washington,
DC 20551. E-mail: mohammad.jahan-parvar@
frb.gov. I thank Mohammad Tavakoli-Targhi (the
Editor), an anonymous referee, Richard Ericson,
Abbas Milani, Hassan Mohammadi, Borghan
Nezami-Narajabad and seminar participants at
the 2012 “Politics, Society, and Economy in
a Changing Iran” workshop hosted by Iranian
Studies Program and the Hoover Institution,
Stanford University. The views expressed in this
article are my own and do not reect the posi-
tions, opinions, or recommendations of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or
the research staff. All remaining errors are mine.
LXXIX
e Cost of a Revolution
scenarios are based on the economic performance of the Iran in the pre-revolution
years, and some are constructed from the performance of Iran’s neighbors in the
period ending in 2010. The goal of this study is to start a dialog, not to provide the
denitive answer to this often asked question.
Based on the methodologies used in this study, the opportunity costs of the Irani-
an revolution range between US$ 59,559.57 to 732,704.80 for the average Iranian
citizen in the 1979-2010 period. In other words, the average Iranian citizen experi-
enced a loss of income ranging between US$ 59,559.57 to 732,704.80 in constant
2005 prices and adjusted for purchasing power parity in this period. While the range
presented here is large, our ndings indicate a consensus loss of income (based on
purchasing power parity) of approximately US$ 80,000.00 between 1979 and 2010,
or on average US$ 2,580 per year, per person. Thus, a family of four lost (or did not
earn) over US$ 10,000.00 per year. Given that by 2010, Iranian citizens earned less
than US$ 10,000.00 per year in real terms, the computed “cost” in this study trans-
lates into over 25% loss of income in purchasing power terms per year, per person.
Since per capita income was signicantly lower than US$ 10,000 for the period
ending in 2010, this cost is much higher than 25% loss of purchasing power. For ex-
ample, the computed loss amounts to over 50% of per capita income in 1989. Given
that the Iranian economy has been in a severe recession since 2012, such costs have
undoubtedly risen. Data scarcity, unfortunately, prevents us from quantifying these
costs for post-2010 period.
While my ndings are based on counterfactual scenarios, they are generally rooted
in plausible assumptions and rigorous economic analysis. Where they are not based
on reasonable foundations, I have clearly communicated such shortcomings. Thus,
these results are useful for impartial assessment of economic stewardship of the
Islamic Republic of Iran in comparison with both its neighbors in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) region and with Iran’s performance in the two decades
prior to the revolution in 1978.
Counterfactual analysis is a common tool in economic analysis. Examples include
Givens and Kubler and Schmedders, among many others.2
Choosing the concept of opportunity cost– the cost that we pay for making one
decision instead of another – as the basis of this study is not incidental. This
2G.E. Givens, “Estimating Central Bank Preferences
under Commitment and Discretion,” Journal of Mon-
ey, Credit and Banking, 44:6 (2012), 1033-1061. See
also F. Kubler and K. Schmedders, “Non-parametric
counterfactual analysis in dynamic general equi-
librium,” Economic Theory, 45:1 (2010), 181-200.
LXXX Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
concept is at the heart of economic analysis. Policies implemented at the national
level naturally entail opportunity costs and often have long lasting effects. As the
science of choice, economics is intended to help individuals, entrepreneurs, and
public and private decision makers make better decisions. Evaluation of success
or failure of policies requires knowledge of their opportunity costs, to enable us
make cost-benet analysis.
The target audience of this study is the educated reader, though not necessarily the
professional economist. Thus, I have avoided presenting mathematical and statistical
details underpinning this study as much as possible. Furthermore, I have intentionally
narrowed the focus of this study. I have not tried to match the breadth of surveys of
the Iranian economic performance or history such as those by Salehi-Esfahani and
Pesaran or Issawi3. A narrow focus is necessary. The fact is that between 1979 and
2010, the MENA region faced signicant endogenous and exogenous shocks such as
the breakup of the Soviet empire, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, several signi-
cant wars and uprisings: the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, terrorist attacks on the US in
1993 and 2001; the second Persian Gulf war and the war in Afghanistan; and the Arab
Spring in 2010-2012. Adding to this list of mitigating factors would be the Global
Financial Crisis, and oil shocks of 1980 and 1986. Disentangling the impact of these
events and detecting the causal relationship between these events and the economic
performance of Iran is a daunting task that requires sophisticated econometric analy-
sis. Such a study, by nature, is both inaccessible to most readers and highly contingent
on the methodology used.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present some back-
ground information that I consider informative about the attitudes of Iran’s key
decision makers regarding economic growth and development and the welfare of
Iranian citizens. In Section 3, I describe the data used in my analysis and discuss
some observed facts about Iran’s per capita GDP as well as comparisons with other
countries. Section 4 contains the description of methodologies used and discussion
of their results. I present my conclusions in Section 5.
Iranian Decision Makers and Economic Growth
The opportunity costs computed in this study are outcomes of decades of policymaking
by successive Islamic Republic administrations and decision makers. The Iranian decision
3H. Salehi-Esfahani and M.H. Pesaran, “Iranian
Economy in the Twentieth Century,” Iranian
Studies, 42:2 (2009), 177-211; see also C. Is-
sawi, An Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
LXXXI
e Cost of a Revolution
makers, politicians, and pundits often brush off the costs that their decisions impose on the
average citizen as the necessary price to pay for opposing hostile and meddlesome foreign
powers. In addition, it is important to bear in mind that the Islamic Republic is not particu-
larly concerned with economic development or elevating the living standards of its citizens.
The founder of the Islamic Republic and its rst supreme leader, Ruhollah Khomeini,
memorably claimed that “economics is for donkeys”.4 Ali Khamenei, the current supreme
leader and Iran’s most inuential decision maker, is a harsh critic of modern economic
growth and development, which he considers a ploy to maintain the Western hegemony.
In the fall 2010, when he gave a speech on what he calls “the Islamic-Iranian Model of
Progress,” he stated that “. . . We intentionally do not use the word ‘development’, since
‘development’ has its own value system. We may not necessarily agree with or adopt that
value system. We do not want to use a well-known international concept that conveys
known perceptions, and injects its values into our system. We want to offer an alternative
concept that conveys our values.”5 He then proceeds to spell out what he means by “prog-
ress”. In his words, progress needs to happen, in order of importance, in realms of spiritu-
ality, Quranic thought, knowledge, and at the very last, in livelihood (a catch-all concept
for a variety of issues from security to governance). Pointedly, he does not include eco-
nomic development and improvement in living standards in his hierarchy of progress. He
discusses economic concepts only in terms of distributive justice and he makes the claim
that one should regard economics and wealth creation with a “non-materialistic” view.
Since 2012, his focus has been a concept which he calls “resistance economics,”
which echoes ideas from war-time economic management. The Rouhani adminis-
tration formally adopted “resistance economics” as the blueprint and guideline for
economic policymaking in the summer of 2014.6
This attitude is not limited to supreme leaders. Many Islamist ideologues, promi-
nent among them Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi and the late Morteza Avini, have
objected to economic growth and development as goals worthy of pursuit. In the
summer of 2014, Mesbah Yazdi went as far as saying that “if the main objective was
the economy, we would be better off without the (1979) revolution”.7
4V, Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conicts within
Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2006), 134.
5Mr. Khamenei’s website: http://farsi.khamenei.
ir/speech-content?id=10664/.
6Michel Makinsky, “Iran Special: Real Story Be-
hind Supreme Leader’s ‘Resistance Economy’,
EA World View, 5 March 2014, at http://eawor-
ldview.com/2014/03/iran-full-story-behind-su-
preme-leaders-resistance-economy/.
7Refer to http://www.radiofarda.mobi/a/f9-mes-
bahyazdi-critics-rouhani-religion-alamolho-
da/25426317.html/.
LXXXII Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of such statements. The ideologues and deci-
sion makers in the highest echelons of power do not consider economic growth, and
by extension, the welfare of Iranian citizens to be important. Thus, it is not entirely
surprising that Iran lags behind more successful neighbors. This divergence will be-
come more pronounced over time and impoverish the country, since even small differ-
ences in the long-term growth rate of economies lead to dramatic disparities over time.
Ignoring fundamental differences between the Islamic Republic’s core economic
objectives and the globally dominant paradigm of desirability of rising living stan-
dards for the average citizen may lead to miscalculations and policy failure. Emer-
gence of a large, prosperous and politically assertive middle class may not be a de-
sirable outcome for the Islamic Republic. In fact, several studies including, but not
limited to Alfoneh, Thaler, et al., and Alamdari point to the increasingly clientelist
nature of the Iranian state and economy under Khamenei’s leadership.8 In such an
environment, economic growth does not necessarily lead to gradual liberalization
or democratization of the political system. In addition, the decision makers in a cli-
entelist system can implement policies with impunity that are too politically costly
to be palatable in a liberal democracy. In the Iranian context, continuation of the
Iraq-Iran war after 1982 and the nuclear program since mid-1990s come to mind.
Description of the Data and Preliminary Comparisons
The main vehicle in my analysis is purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted real
per capita GDP in US Dollars, and based on 2005 xed prices. I use this measure
to overcome the following in-built problems of comparisons across countries: a)
differences in tax regimes, government transfers, and subsidies; b) differences in
ination and exchange rate regimes; c) differences in the size and growth rates of
population. I use the data from Penn World Tables data bank, maintained by the
University of Pennsylvania, to extract per capita real GDP series for Iran and a select
number of countries in the MENA region.9
Cross-country comparisons based on PPP-adjusted per capita income are common in
economic development literature. Realistically, we do not have a better measure of
8A. Alfoneh, “All Ahmadinejad’s Men,” The
Middle East Quarterly (2011), 79-84; D.E.
Thaler et al, “Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads,”
An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynam-
ics, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation
Monograph Series, 2010); K. Alamdari, “The
Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran:
Transition from Populism to Clientelism, and
the Militarization of Government,” Third World
Quarterly, 26:8 (2005), 1285-1301.
9I use Penn World Tables version 7.1. This data
bank contains data ending in 2010. The latest
version (V8.1) extends the data to 2011.
LXXXIII
e Cost of a Revolution
welfare at the individual level. Alternative measures are built on GDP foundations,
with cosmetic alterations. For example, the widely discussed human development
index (HDI) published by United Nations Development Program is 1/3 PPP-ad-
justed per capita GDP, and 2/3 life expectancy and educational attainment. Since
life expectancy and educational attainment changes are relatively slower than GDP
growth, and since both measures are highly correlated with GDP, economic growth
is the main driver of changes in HDI. In general, the higher the value of per capita
GDP, the better off a country is. According to studies by Barro and Rueschemeyer,
et al., per capita GDP is highly correlated with health, wealth, longevity, and de-
mocracy.10
A brief overview of the trajectory of the Iranian per capita income in the period
under investigation is useful to better understand the subsequent discussions. Penn
World Tables record data on Iran’s real per capita GDP starting in 1955. In that year,
with an income of US$ 2,328.12, Iran had a per capita GDP less than 80% of Tur-
key (US$ 2,933.80), and less than 45% of Spain (US$ 5,164.829) and Israel (US$
5,621.36).
Between 1955 and 1978, Iran enjoyed one of the highest rates of real economic
growth, per capita, in the world. At 6.57% per year, this growth outpaced that of
countries mentioned above, such that by 1976, at US$ 13,329.78, Iran’s per capita
GDP was 2.5 times larger than that of Turkey, 88% of Israel’s, and 87% of Spain’s.
In other words, in 1976 Iran was posed to break into the ranks of the rich countries’
club. This picture, however, quickly changed with the revolution in 1978. By 1986,
Iran’s per capita GDP was less than Turkey’s and equal to US$ 5,866.89, a drop of
almost 66% in comparison with the 1976 level. Since 1986, Iran has remained poor-
er than Turkey. In comparison with Spain and Israel, in 2010 Iran per capita GDP
was about one third of per capita GDP in either country. These patterns are easily
detected in
In Table 1, I report the breakdown of real GDP levels by sampling period. Figure 2 provides
a visual demonstration for Iranian real per capita GDP. Between 1955 and 2010, Iran’s per
capita GDP grew at 2.94% per year – a modest rate by developing countries’ standard.
The fastest growth happened in 1975-76, when growth topped 17.72%. Similarly, the
largest contraction happened in 1979-1980, when per capita income shrank by -17.31%.
10R. Barro, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section
of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
106:2 (1991), 407-444; D. Rueschemeyer, E,
Huber-Stephens and J.D. Stephens, Capitalist
Development and Democracy (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1992).
LXXXIV Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
Figure 1: Per Capita Real GDP, comparison with Israel, Spain, and Turkey
I report summary statistics for growth by decade, and also important sampling pe-
riods. The fastest growth took place between 1955 and 1978. Per capita income
grew six-fold in this period and, as mentioned above, Iran enjoyed one of the fastest
growth rates in the world. This period is not of immediate interest to us, however, a
detailed discussion on the sources of this rapid growth is available.11
In the post-revolution period, the average real growth is an anemic 0.20% per year.
As is clear from Figure 2 and Table 1, the onset of the Revolution of 1978-79 and the
war with Iraq between 1980 and 1988, had a profound impact on the Iranian econo-
my. Real per capita declined from US$ 9,644 in 1978, to US$ 5,898.04 in 1981 and
further fell to US$ 5,156.06 by 1989.
The rst stage of this loss is explained by the economic policies pursued by the revo-
lutionary government, which included conscation and nationalization of industries
and businesses, conscation of the property of entrepreneurs, and persecution of
those deemed close to the recently toppled Monarchy. These policies led to signif-
icant ight of capital and brain drain, and were naturally followed by a signicant
output drop.
PC GDP stands for per capita GDP in the corresponding period, and ∆GDP rep-
resents logarithmic growth rate (year-to-year) of per capita GDP for the corre-
sponding period. “Average” refers to sample mean for the period, while “Min”
11Selahi-Esfahani and Pesaran, 2009.
LXXXV
e Cost of a Revolution
and “Max” refer to the lowest and highest values and the year they were were
attained, respectively.
Table 1: Level and Growth Rates of PPP-Adjusted Per Capita Real GDP of Iran
(2005 USD Constant Prices)
Average Min Max
Years PC GDP ∆GDP PC GDP Year ∆GDP Year PC GDP Year ∆GDP Year
1955-2010 7085.82 2.94 2328.12 1955 -17.31 1980 13329.78 1976 17.72 1976
1955-1978 7125.80 6.57 2328.12 1955 -15.84 1978 13329.78 1976 17.72 1976
1979-2010 7205.76 0.20 5156.06 1989 -17.31 1980 9645.97 2007 12.67 1990
1960-1969 5319.36 7.38 4091.94 1961 -0.01 1961 7327.97 1969 15.25 1965
1970-1979 10546.83 4.29 8480.23 1970 -15.84 1978 13329.78 1976 17.72 1976
1980-1989 6203.54 -4.56 5156.06 1989 -17.31 1980 7114.11 1980 10.29 1983
1990-1999 6539.44 3.36 5809.50 1990 -5.82 1995 7092.79 1999 12.67 1990
2000-2010 8511.93 2.92 7300.56 2001 -1.62 2008 9645.97 2007 6.65 2003
Between September 1980 and August 1988, Iran and Iraq were at war. In the context
of this study, the cost of mobilization for war and the 1986 oil price crash dealt dev-
astating blows to the Iranian production abilities and hence, adversely affected the
per capita GDP. In June 1982, Iran’s then supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, re-
jected a ceasere offer, leading to Iran’s international isolation. This decision almost
certainly led to increased supply of crude oil by Saudi Arabia. This crude oil glut,
Figure 2: PPP Adjusted Per Capita Real GDP of Iran in 2005 constant price USD
LXXXVI Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
coupled with technological innovations leading to lower oil-intensive production in
industrialized countries, resulted in the oil market crash of 1986. Between 1986 and
the ceasere in August 1988, Iranian economy fared very poorly.
Another detrimental factor affecting income growth in this period was a popula-
tion boom that started in late 1960s, averaged 3.75% between 1976 and 1990, and
reached the maximum of 4.29% per year in 1981. A stagnant or contracting econ-
omy along with rapidly rising population naturally led to further decline in income
per person. The row labeled 1980-1989 on Table 2 shows that between 1980 and
1989, Iranian per capita GDP contracted by 4.56% per year.
As (Mojaver, 2009) documents, early 1990s were characterized by massive invest-
ments in physical and human capital.12 Furthermore, between 2003 and 2012, Iran
enjoyed an unprecedented oil revenue windfall, primarily fueled by emergence of
China and India as important global economic powers. The size of this windfall is
conservatively estimated to be over half a trillion US Dollars. Yet, oil revenues and
the contribution of early 1990s investments, coupled with the astonishing successful
population control policy that saw population growth slowdown from over 4% a
year in late 1980s to about 1.26% a year for 1990-2010, did not result in signicant
income growth.13 The rows labeled 1990-1999 and 2000-2010 in Table 1 show that
the average growth rate during these periods were 3.36% and 2.92% per year, re-
spectively. Typically, an investment boom leads to periods of rapid income growth.
However, Egypt (3.30%), Turkey (2.54%), or Lebanon (5.46%) which did not expe-
rience a reconstruction boom or an oil windfall, post similar or better growth results
in the same time span.
Salehi-Esfahani and Pesaran discuss the causes of short-lived impact of the “recon-
struction” policies undertaken by president Hashemi Rafsanjani’s administration.14
In short, balance of payment problems and difculties in management of partially
liberalized markets following the decline in oil prices after 1993 led to interventions
in foreign exchange markets in particular, and international trade in general, leading
to a sharp slowdown in growth. This trend is clearly visible in Figure 3.
As recently as 2009, Mojaver detected evidence in favor of signicant decrease in
total factor productivity (TFP, or simply “productivity”) after the revolution.15 He
12Mojaver, 2009.
13Data on Iranian population growth rates are
from Penn World Tables.
14Pesaran, 2000; Salehi-Esfahani and Pesaran,
2009.
15Mojaver, 2009.
LXXXVII
e Cost of a Revolution
concludes that Iranian productivity in manufacturing did not recover to pre-rev-
olution levels. If this observation also holds true for other sectors, especially ser-
vices - the largest in the Iranian economy – then along with other factors such as
government policies, we may have a culprit for the slow rate of income growth in
post 1990s period. While it requires further research, one can speculate that the legal
system, uncertainty at domestic and international levels, as well as massive govern-
ment-induced distortions in the market may be responsible for this slowdown.
Moreover, Salehi-Esfahani and colleagues, in their study of oil exports, show that
ination has a signicant negative effect on long-run real output.16 Since ination
has been stubbornly in double digits for almost the entire post-revolutionary period,
its negative impact has neutralized some of the positive factors such as the oil wind-
fall of the period 2003-2008.17
Finally, a discussion of the Iranian economy in early 21st century must include the
impact of the country’s nuclear program. This program has been extremely costly,
controversial, nancially wasteful, and shrouded in secrecy. It has led to diplomatic
tension, economic sanctions, and uncertainty at least since 2002. In terms of economic
costs, estimates range between 100 billion USD (Vaez & Sajjadpour, 2013) to 500 bil-
lion USD (Rosen, 2015). Costing roughly 11 billion USD, the Bushehr nuclear plant is
the most expensive facility in the world, both in absolute and per unit of output terms.
Even Mehdi Araghchi, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator in P5+1 negotiations leading
to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement in July 2015, admits
that “measured in economic terms alone, our nuclear program is a catastrophic loss .
. . . But we are willing to bear such costs to maintain our dignity, independence, and
progress. We (pay these costs) in order to resist others’ belligerence.”18
Accurate estimates of economic damages sustained by Iran during the Iraq-Iran war
are not available. (Hiro, 1991) reports a conservative estimate of 627 billion USD.
16H. Saleh-Esfahani, K. Mohaddes, and M.H.
Pesaran, “Oil Exports and the Iranian Econo-
my,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Fi-
nance, 53:3 (2013), 221-237.
17Among many others, I have shown elsewhere
that persistent double-digit ination and poor
macroeconomic stewardship are among the
main problems facing the Iranian economy.
Briey, both problems stem from failed attempts
of the government to inuence the real cost of
capital, leading to massive arbitrage opportuni-
ties and corruption. This crucial issue is unfor-
tunately beyond the scope of the current study.
See M. Jahan-Parvar, The Practice of Central
Banking in the I. R. of Iran: Is There Room for
Reform? (London: Legatum Institute, 2013). for
a discussion of the topic.
18See https://goo.gl/Djdwcl. His speech was rst
reported by Fars news agency. This report was
later removed following Araghchi’s objection to
publication of his off-the-record remarks.
LXXXVIII Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
Based on (Rosen, 2015) reported value of roughly 500 billion USD, the cost of
Iran’s nuclear program is close to the damages sustained during the war with Iraq. In
other words, the Islamic Republic policy makers have imposed the equivalent two
wars on a middle-income country in thirty years.
Figure 3: Growth Rates of PPP Adjusted Per Capita Real GDP of Iran in 2005 constant price USD
Empirical economic growth studies establish a signicant positive relationship be-
tween accumulation of capital and the growth rate of investment in an economy and
its future growth potential. In general, investment, after paying for depreciation of
the existing capital stock, turns into new capital and adds to the capital endowment
of an economy. Developing economies devote a larger percentage of their income to
investment than rich countries. In part, this is due to high marginal rate of return on
capital in developing economies (which are typically abundant in labor, but not in
capital).19 We observe in Figure 4 that this empirical regularity does not hold for Iran.
Since 1992, the share of investment as a percentage of per capita real GDP has fallen
and stayed low, while especially since 2000, share of consumption in per capita GDP
has increased. This observation implies low future growth in output. Identifying the
factors that cause this observation is an interesting topic for future research.
Finally, I discuss data from other MENA countries used in this study. The sample in-
cludes countries that during the 1978-2010 period had cordial relations with the West,
19See R.J. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin, “Conver-
gence,” Journal of Political Economy, 100:2
(2003), 223-251 for further information.
LXXXIX
e Cost of a Revolution
did not engage in wars of aggression or state-sponsored terrorism, and had taken steps
to liberalize their economies. I also limit my sample to countries in the Middle East.
Thus, I do not include Cyprus, a European Union member, North African countries
(except Egypt which has strong economic and cultural ties to the Middle East), and
non-sovereign territories such as Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza.
The sample includes Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qa-
tar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. To be clear, I do
not claim that other countries in the MENA region are examples of good economic
stewardship. Many of them face signicant policy challenges, such as high youth
unemployment, low productivity growth, low levels of innovation, and anemic en-
trepreneurial activity (with the exception of Israel and Turkey). But my results show,
and they are corroborated by ndings of other studies, that Iran has an unattering
record even in comparison with its neighbors.20
As I explain in Section 4, I use per capita GDP growth data from the sample coun-
tries to construct counterfactual paths for Iran’s economy. This strategy is meaning-
ful if there is reasonable correlation between income levels among the countries rep-
resented in the sample, and between income levels of the sample countries and Iran.
Table 2 shows that there is high positive correlation between income levels in the
plurality of the countries in this sample, and between Iran and income levels in sam-
Figure 4: Shares of investment and consumption outlays as a percentage of PPP adj. real per capita
GDP, in 2005 constant price, US$.
20Salah-Esfahani et al., 2013.
XC Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
ple countries. Panel B of this table shows that in addition to correlation in levels,
growth rates of income are also non-trivially correlated. I interpret these results to
be encouraging for the approach adopted in the next Section.
Table 2: Correlations between Levels and Growth Rates of PPP-based
Per Capita GDP among MENA Economies
Panel A: Levels of Income
Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Oman Turkey UAE Kuwait Qatar Saudi Iran
Bahrain -0.17 -0.09 0.33 -0.06 -0.15 -0.03 0.56 0.79 0.83 0.88 0.96
Egypt 0.99 0.27 0.77 0.95 0.96 0.52 0.72 0.89 0.83 0.97
Israel 0.28 0.76 0.93 0.97 0.54 0.76 0.85 0.84 0.94
Jordan 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.44 0.61 0.83 0.64 0.83
Lebanon 0.82 0.78 0.37 0.60 0.79 0.67 0.81
Oman 0.94 0.50 0.71 0.93 0.83 0.95
Turkey 0.65 0.77 0.89 0.88 0.97
UAE 0.39 0.49 0.56 0.63
Kuwait 0.53 0.80 0.76
Qatar 0.77 0.88
Saudi 0.88
Panel B: Growth Rates of Income
Bahrain 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.23 0.13 -0.08 0.33 0.31 0.45 0.11
Egypt 0.10 -0.33 0.16 -0.07 0.03 -0.20 0.07 -0.11 -0.07 -0.12
Israel 0.13 0.29 0.00 0.31 0.27 -0.01 0.04 0.25 0.03
Jordan 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.17 -0.06 0.14 0.10 0.31
Lebanon 0.08 0.17 0.02 -0.18 -0.16 0.13 0.2
Oman 0.10 0.04 0.17 0.53 0.50 0.19
Turkey 0.37 0.04 0.22 0.28 0.05
UAE -0.28 0.12 -0.01 -0.03
Kuwait -0.22 0.22 -0.09
Qatar 0.15 0.51
Saudi 0.07
Methodology and Numerical Results
In this section, I present a comprehensive discussion of the underlying computa-
tions that generate the numerical results. They are readily divided in two categories:
XCI
e Cost of a Revolution
“naïve or own country” and “regional” scenarios. “Naïve or own country” scenar-
ios use Iranian growth data from 1950s to 1978 to construct counterfactual experi-
ments and results. “Regional” scenarios are based on contemporaneous data (1978
to 2010) from the MENA region sample discussed in Section 3.
The following equation is the measure used to make comparisons. I call it “cumula-
tive cost” if this value is negative or “cumulative benet” if it is positive:
where YtSce is the real per capita GDP in 2005 US dollars generated by one of the scenarios
discussed below, Yt is the actual realization of Iranian per capita real GDP in year t. We
compute the difference between scenario based and actual real per capita GDP for each
year in sample, t, and then sum up these differences for the entire sample or a sub-sample.
If the resulting value for our measure, denoted as CCBt→T, is less than zero, then the
value of per capita income based on that particular scenario for the duration of (sub-)
sample is greater than what was actually achieved by the Iranian economy. We view
such an outcome as a cost imposed on the average Iranian citizen, and as a proxy for
opportunity costs. It simply says that if the Iranian economy had followed the path
assumed by a particular scenario instead of what it actually did follow, the average
Iranian citizen would be better off by the number of dollars that appear in CCBt→T.
Alternatively, if CCBt→T is greater than zero, we interpret this outcome as Irani-
an economy outperforming what could be achieved under that particular scenario.
Hence, we call CCBt→T < 0 “cumulative cost” and CCBt→T > 0 as “cumulative
benet”.
Naïve Scenarios
As discussed earlier, Iran enjoyed high growth in real per capita personal income
between 1955 and 1978. The average growth rate in this period was 5.75% per an-
num. The scenarios discussed in this section are all related to that growth trajectory
or levels of per capita income for 1955 to 1978.
Also known as “projections,” these scenarios are familiar staple of the popular me-
dia. The most well-known of such projections was the assertion that Soviet Union’s
Gross National Product (GNP) would surpass that of the United States in 1984.21
21This is based on the projections printed on the
inside jacket of the 1961 edition of Paul Samu-
elson’s widely read textbook, Economics: An In-
troductory Analysis (New York, McGraw-Hill).
XCII Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
Another example was the widely held belief in 1980s that Japan would surpass the
United States in early 1990s as the largest (and the dominant) economy in the world.
Projections are fraught with problems, as the US-USSR and US-Japan examples
amply demonstrate.
Table 3: Computed CCBt→T Values for All Scenarios
“Scenario” refers to different projections and counterfactual experiments detailed in Section 4.
CCBt→T refers to cumulative cost or benet introduced in Equation (1). If this number is less than
zero, it implies a cumulative cost to the average citizen for studied period, and if it is greater than zero,
it signies gains. “SPC GDP 2010” stands for scenario-generated real per capita income in 2010, as
opposed to what is actually realized in the data. “Min” and “Max” refer to the smallest and largest
values of real per capita GDP generated by each scenario.
Scenario CCBt→T SPC GDP 2010 Min Max
Panel A: Naïve Scenarios (Projections)
Frozen in ‘78 -78,031.70 9,644.25 9,644.25 9,644.25
High growth -732,704.80 65,710.62 10,240.26 65,710.62
Middle income trap -207,454.23 14,714.77 10,240.26 14,714.77
Panel B: Regional Scenarios (1979-2010)
Regional: Average -83,608.05 9,918.66 8,852.31 10,425.17
Regional: High -107,569.18 10,048.64 9,822.70 11,838.67
Regional: Low -59,559.57 9,413.69 6,593.20 9,781.22
Panel C: Regional Scenarios (1989-2010)
Regional: Average -20,353.25 9,918.66 8,995.51 10,425.17
Regional: High -34,758.80 10,048.64 9,988.75 11,838.67
Regional: Low 10,758.50 9,413.69 6,793.10 9,781.22
Panel D: Monte Carlo Simulation-Based Scenarios
Monte Carlo Simulation -79,613.78 5,523.02 19,223.10
1989-2010 sub-sample -14,713.64 5,156.60 10,742.93
I refer to the rst scenario studied as “Frozen in ‘78”. This scenario computes the
value of CCBt→T, had we kept Iranian per capita real GDP constant at its 1978 level
(US$ 9,699.28 per person in 2005 prices) for 30 years.
The outcome of this scenario is reported in the rst row of Panel A of Table 3. This
scenario implies that real per capita GDP is invariant between 1979 and 2010, lead-
ing to a cumulative cost equal to US$ 78,031.70 per person. As we will see later,
XCIII
e Cost of a Revolution
this estimate is indeed close to what we nd using more sophisticated techniques.22
This value for opportunity costs in terms of lost income translates into a cost equal
to approximately US$ 2,517.12 per person, per year.
The second scenario is called the “high growth scenario”. It is the most implausible
scenario in this study, and assumes that the real output growth rate of 5.75% could
be sustained for the next three decades. Almost no economy, developed or devel-
oping, has been able to sustain such high growth rate in per capita real GDP for
half a century. It implies that all factors of production (labor, capital, and technol-
ogy as well as exploitation of natural resources) enjoyed gains in productivity and
growth at a rate faster than that of all industrialized countries, which typically have
productivity growth rates between 1.5 to 3% during economic expansion periods.23
Even fast-growing Asian economies such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China and
Malaysia sustained above 5% growth in per capita real income and in the case of the
latter, for 27 years.24
Given that per capita real GDP in post-revolutionary Iran did not reach 1978 level
until 2006, this scenario presents a massive opportunity cost for the average Iranian
citizen. However, this number should be treated cautiously as it is based on dif-
cult-to-justify assumptions. The results of running the projection are available on
the second row of Panel B in Table 3. This scenario implies a cumulative cost for the
average person equal to US$ 732,704.80, or US$ 23,635.64 per year. Notice that this
scenario also implies a real per capita GDP equal to US$ 65,710.62 for 2010, which
is over two times higher than real per capita GDP in Spain (US$ 27,331) or Israel
(US$ 26,034). One should view this projection’s outcomes skeptically.
In the last two decades development economists have devoted considerable energy
to the study of “middle income trap” phenomenon. In short, this problem means
that many developing economies cannot sustain uninterrupted growth in per cap-
ita real GDP that allows them to transition from middle income or low-middle
22This is not surprising. Per capita real GDP ex-
ceeds US$ 9,644 only once in 1979-2010 period,
in 2007. Thus, the computed cumulative cost in
this scenario is similar to those in computations
that yield end-of-period simulated per capita in-
comes around US$ 10,000.
23For example, the U.S. economy enjoyed ap-
proximately 1% multifactor productivity growth
between 1987 and 2011. Notice that this time
period includes the high productivity dotcom
boom of 1990s. Economic theory implies that in
the long run, per capita output can only grow as
fast as gains in productivity, which enables an
economy to produce more efciently, and net ac-
cumulation of resources of production (labor and
capital). Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
24J. Felipe, A. Abdon and U. Kumar, Tracking
the Middle Income Trap: What is it, Who is in
it, and Why? (s.1.: Levy Economics Institute,
2012).
XCIV Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
income to high-income status.25 Thus, after an initial period of fast growth due to
exploitation of previously untapped natural resources or copying new production
technologies, output growth in many developing economies stagnates.26
According to this literature, if not matched by gains in innovation and productivity,
rising labor costs and the subsequent loss of international competitiveness leads to
declining per capita output growth. Only 13 countries considered low or low-middle
income in 1960 could join high-middle or high-income economies by late 2000s. A
number of such countries are Iran’s neighbors: Israel, United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
and Kuwait. However, Oman, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey are currently in or have
been in the middle-income trap for extended periods.
To explore what could have been the impact of the middle-income trap on Iran’s
economy, I impose a scenario that implies a declining growth rate after reaching the
middle-income level. In particular, I allow growth rate of per capita GDP to decline
from 5.75% to about 1.00 % in 15 years, and then decline to about 0.45% per year
for the rest of the sample. The projection results from running this scenario are
available on the third row of Panel B in Table 4. This scenario points to a cumulative
cost equal to US$ 207,454.23 per person for 1979 to 2010, or US$ 6,692.07 per per-
son, per year. It also delivers a per capita real GDP for 2010 equal to US$ 14,714.77.
For a more rigorous study of opportunity costs, we have to appeal to economic
methodology. This is what I demonstrate in the next two sections.
Regional Scenarios
As pointed out earlier, the MENA region has encountered signicant economic and
political volatility in the last three decades. Such volatility would denitely impact
the growth trajectory of the region’s economies. The naïve scenarios studied in the
previous section ignore such exogenous inuences, which is why I consider them to
be naïve. For example, it is implausible to assume that the oil price bust of 1986 or
the nancial crisis of 2007-2009 could not affect Iran’s real income growth. But this
is precisely what the “high growth scenario” in the previous section assumes. In this
section, I address this important shortcoming.
25Ofcial cut-off points for income levels in
1999 constant US dollars of per capita real GDP,
based on Felipe et al., 2012, are: 1) low income:
less than US$ 2,000, 2) lower middle income:
more than US$ 2,000 but less than US$ 7,250,
3) upper middle income: more than US$ 7,250
but less than US$ 11,750, and nally 4) high in-
come: more than US$ 11,750.
26Felipe et al., 2012.
XCV
e Cost of a Revolution
The scenarios investigated in this section are based on a simple observation: Iran’s
economy and its neighbors, by and large, follow the same business cycle uctua-
tions. The channels of transmission are obvious enough. Two of Iran’s major trading
partners are United Arab Emirates and Turkey.27 Hydrocarbon export revenues ac-
count for over 80% of Iran’s exports and are its main source of hard currency. Sim-
ilarly, revenues from oil and gas trade are the main driving force for Persian Gulf
oil and gas exporting economies. In addition, output growth is correlated in these
economies – see Table 2. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that barring nonmarket
events such as war or political problems, Iran should follow a growth path similar
to its neighbors.
However, pinning down what this growth path would have been with certainty is
impossible. Yet, there is a simple solution. Assuming that absent non-economic im-
pediments, Iran should have the same business cycle as its neighbors, then its GDP
growth rate would have been similar to its neighbors in each year in our sample.
This means that such a growth rate would be a stochastic variable and subject to a
distribution law.
This assumption allows us to consider three counterfactual scenarios. In the rst
scenario, which I call “average growth rate scenario,” per capita GDP growth in Iran
follows the average per capita GDP growth rate among the MENA countries in the
sample. The second scenario, which I call “high growth rate scenario,” implies that
Iranian per capita real GDP follows the average growth rate of the best performers
in the sample. The third scenario assumes that Iran’s per capita GDP grows at a rate
comparable to the slower performers in the sample. Thus, I refer to this scenario as
the “low growth rate scenario”.
I assume that growth rates are normally distributed for the cross-section of econo-
mies in the sample for any given year. This assumption means that growth rates have
a familiar bell-shaped distribution, a common assumption in the economic growth
literature.28
27CIA Fact Book, 2012. UAE is Iran’s number
one source of imports and accounts for 30.6% of
Iran’s total imports. Turkey accounts for 8.7% of
Iran’s exports (the 4th export market) and 4.2%
of imports (also the fourth imports partner).
28Examples include R. Barro, “Determinants
of Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy,
107:6 (1999), 158-183; R. Barro et al., “ Con-
vergence Across States and Regions,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1991); Barro &
Sala-i-Martin, 1992; D. Canning et al., “Scaling
the volatility of GDP growth rates,” Economics
Letters, 60 (1998); Barro & Sala-i-Martin, Eco-
nomic Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2003).
XCVI Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
In the rst scenario, I compute the average growth rate and the variation of growth
rates for the countries in our sample in each year. Iranian data is naturally excluded
to avoid contaminating the computations. We also compute upper and lower bounds
on growth rates that encompass about 70% of possible values for real per capita
GDP growth.
These three measures, average, upper bound, and lower bound growth rates for real
per capita GDP growth for the region, allow me to study what would have happened
if Iranian policy makers had followed liberalization policies (as the UAE, Israel,
and Turkey did in 1990s and 2000s); or had implemented more competent monetary
policies to avoid the perennial double-digit ination; or had followed a less confron-
tational foreign policy.
Computing cumulative opportunity costs based on the average regional growth rate
scenario yields results reported in the rst row of Panel B in Table 3. The cumulative
opportunity cost for this scenario is equal to US$ 83,608.05, or US$2,697.03 per per-
son, per year. Based on this scenario, per capita real GDP in 2010 should have been US$
9,918.66, instead of US$ 9,432.06, and high and low values of per capita GDP would be
US$ 8,852.31 and US$ 10,425.17 instead of US$ 5,156.06 and US$ 9,645.97 respectively.
High regional growth rate scenario implies growth rates for the real per capita Ira-
nian GDP that are one standard deviation larger than the average growth rate for the
ten MENA economies in the sample. These results are reported in the second row of
Panel B, Table 3. This scenario implies that the value of opportunity costs amounts
to US$ 107,569.18, or US$ 3,469.97 per person, per year. This scenario implies that
2010 per capita real GDP equal to 10,048.64, an upper limit equal to US$ 11,838.67,
and a lower limit equal to US$ 9,822.70.
Low regional growth rate scenario puts the CCB cost value at US$ 59,559.57. It also
sets the 2010 per capita income at US$ 9,413.69. The upper and lower income limits
are US$ 9,781.22 and US$ 6,593.20, respectively.
Figure 5 shows that the counterfactual scenarios generate real income paths that are
above what the Iranian economy actual attainment in 1979-2010 period, even under
the low growth assumption. In summary, this exercise shows that the cost of eco-
nomic mismanagement and political decisions made since 1979 have contributed
to signicant loss of income and purchasing power. Following what even the slow
performers in the region achieved could still put Iran in a better position in terms of
the welfare of its citizens.
XCVII
e Cost of a Revolution
Figure 5: Regional Scenarios
This gure plots the results for running the three scenarios based on the growth rates of per capita real
GDP of 11 MENA countries in sample. The rst scenario, ‘Average Growth’, assume that the Iranian
per capita GDP grows at the average rate of its MENA neighbors for each year in sample. The second
scenario, ‘High Growth’, assumes that the Iranian per capita GDP grows at a rate one standard devi-
ation above the average growth of Iran’s neighbors for each year in sample. The last scenario, ‘Low
Growth’, assumes that Iranian real per capita GDP grows one standard error lower than the average
of its neighbors for any given year.
Monte Carlo Simulation-Based Growth Rate Scenario
While the scenarios discussed in the previous section address many shortcom-
ings inherent in projection methods, they still suffer from an important statisti-
cal shortcoming. Statistical inference methodology yields accurate results when
applied to sufciently large samples of the population under investigation. Us-
ing a sample of only ten observations per year is decidedly not large enough.
There is a solution available though. We appeal to a concept called the central
limit theorem, which in practice enables us to design repeated samplings from a
(potentially) unknown distribution.29 This is tantamount of generating numerous
samples, and then averaging the results. Implementation of simple Monte Carlo
simulations of the form I describe here are widespread in engineering, physics,
nance, and economics.30
29The central limit theorem implies that under
mild requirements, most empirical distributions
converge to a limiting Normal distribution.
30D. Creal, “A Survey of Sequential Monte Carlo
Methods for Economics and Finance,” Econo-
metric Reviews, 31:3 (2012), 245-296 for a
comprehensive review of these methods.
XCVIII Volume 30, Number 4, 2016
I proceed to implement this method as follows: First, I assume that for each year in
the sample, growth rates are distributed with mean equal to the average growth rate
of the cross-section of economies in my sample and variance equal to the sample
variance of the same cross-section. Second, I form a path where initial income of
1978 grows following a random drawing of the distributions specied in the pre-
vious step for years 1979 to 2010. This forms one growth path for the Iranian per
capita real GDP. Third, I subtract the actual data for 1979-2010 period, element by
element, from the scenario-based real per capita GDP generated in step 2. Fourth,
I sum the resulting differences to generate one realization of CCBt→T. I repeat this
exercise 100,000 times, save the generated CCBt→T in each run. Finally, I compute
the average value of CCBt→T for the whole Monte Carlo simulation. This number
is the Monte Carlo generated CCBt→T, which does not suffer from small sample
shortcomings, since it is based on a large number of resamplings.
The outcomes from executing this scenario are available in the rst row in Panel
D of Table 4. Based on Monte Carlo simulations, the value of opportunity cost in
1979-2010 period is equal to US$ 79,613.78 in 2005 constant prices, per person.
Alternatively, this cost is equal to US$ 2,568.19 per person, per year. Monte Carlo
simulations generate an upper bound for Iran’s per capita real GDP equal to US$
19,223.10 and a lower bound equal to US$ 5,523.02.
Figure 6: Monte Carlo Simulation-Based Scenario
This gure plots 100 paths of Monte Carlo simulations for Iranian PPP-adjusted real per capita
GDP. The solid red line on the bottom reects the actual data for the period1979-2010.
XCIX
e Cost of a Revolution
Figure 6 provides a visual representation of this method based on 100 simulated paths
plotted along with the actual data. As it is clear from this gure, my Monte Carlo
simulation results reconrm what was found in the previous section: avoiding the
actions taken by the Islamic Republic, both economic and political, and just following
what Iran’s neighbors did for the last three decades, would allow the average Iranian
citizen to enjoy a signicantly higher living standards. As it is clear from this gure
and the results reported on Table 3, Monte Carlo simulated paths are strictly above the
actual data. Notice that if Iranian policy makers could implement winning pro-growth
policies along the lines of Israel, South Korea, Chile, or Taiwan, the end result for the
average Iranian citizen could be even higher living standards. But few countries have
replicated the stunning success of Taiwan or South Korea, so one can only hope that
Iranian policy makers reverse course and follow their more successful neighbors.
Economic Performance since Iraq-Iran War:
The impact of direct military conict on any economy is not negligible, and Iran is
not an exception. A good part of cumulative opportunity cost discussed in the previ-
ous sections can be attributed to uncertainty and policies following the victory of the
revolution in 1979 and the impact of war in 1980-1988. Table 1 presents results for
1990-1990 and 2000-2010 periods. Both periods witnessed modest growth, howev-
er Iran has not been able to return to pre-revolution growth rates. How successful
was the system to recover from both revolution and war? In other words, is the
system viable enough to generate high enough growth; at least comparable to other
countries in the MENA region?
To answer this question, we look at Panel C and the second line on Panel D of Table 4.
The values reported on Panel C, reect the cumulative loss or gain for 1989-2010 pe-
riod based on regional scenarios. These values are all signicantly smaller than what
is reported on Panel B of the same table, validating the assertion that the bulk of lost
income is due to the revolution, the war with Iraq, and population policies of 1980s.
However, we observe a small cumulative “gain” only in case of the low growth sce-
nario. The same conclusion is true for the second line on Panel D of Table 4. Once
I limit Monte Carlo results to 1989-2010 period, the size of cumulative opportunity
cost drops, but it does not turn positive. We recall that 1990s were a period for
increased investment. Population growth slowed down signicantly between 1990
and 2010. In addition, between 2003 and 2012, Iran earned a unique and unprece-
dented oil revenue windfall totaling over half a trillion dollars.
CVolume 30, Number 4, 2016
In other words, Iran’s economic performance is at best better than the lagging econ-
omies in our sample. This result indicates that the system is not capable of gener-
ating a pro-growth environment. In case of an escalation of confrontation with the
international community, this characteristic of the Islamic republic bodes ill for the
ability of Iran to recover from losses due to a military engagement and/or extended
and comprehensive economic sanctions in a reasonable time period.
Conclusion
The decisions of Islamic Republic’s leaders and policy makers in their four decades
in power have generally escaped rigorous scrutiny. Many people within and outside
the system have questioned the rationale for some of the decisions made. In general,
these criticisms are not rigorous, and have not focused on the potential opportunity
costs. In this study, I have provided a preliminary measurement of the costs that the
average Iranian pays for the policies of his/her government. I have intentionally set
a low bar for my results: matching the behavior of other countries in the MENA
region. With even such a low bar, Iran’s performance is unattering.
The opportunity costs for the average Iranian citizen are quite high. For a middle in-
come country with per capita real GDP of less than US$ 10,000 for the sample peri-
od, an annual opportunity cost equal to US$ 2,500 is high. To better understand this
issue, think about roads not built, research and development not carried out, health
care improvements not realized, houses not built, and pension and retirement sav-
ings not funded. In other words, the average Iranian is signicantly poorer than his/
her neighbors or in comparison with what (s)he could have earned due to policies
and actions taken by the Iranian state. Notice that massive investments in physical
and human capital were undertaken, particularly after the Iran-Iraq war, and the oil
revenues since 2003 are signicantly larger than what Iran earned prior to the revo-
lution. Thus, this underachievement cannot be attributed to lack of investment or oil
income shortfalls. Continuation of such policies impoverishes future generations.
A cornerstone of the Islamic Republic’s propaganda regarding U.S., Western, and
international sanctions has been the claim that “sanctions and isolation have had
absolutely no impact on our nation and economy” or “isolation and economic sanc-
tions have led us down the path of self-sufciency and progress”. These claims
turned out to be false, as both the outcome of 2013 presidential election and the
July 2015 JCPOA agreement amply demonstrated. The severity of the 2012-2014
recession, a direct result of the imposition of sharp international sanctions, focused
the public’s interest on many fragilities of Iran’s economy. However, the majority
CI
e Cost of a Revolution
of debates and commentaries are focused on recent economic performance of Iran,
and the impact imposing or lifting of sanctions. The costs imposed by international
sanctions are undeniably real. However, they are only an addition to opportunity
costs borne by Iranian citizens – as the price paid for their country’s policies, both
domestic and international – since 1979.
Given the expressed indifference of key Iranian decision makers to the welfare or
living standards of ordinary citizens, the opportunity costs computed in this study
may be completely justied. If key Iranian policy makers operate under a different
set of rules, arguing that Iranian citizens deserve better may not change their views.
They pursue goals that may be incompatible with welfare maximization, and have
different measures for success. However, many Iranian economic decision makers
at least nominally express interest in growth and prosperity for their country. In this
study, I highlight the discrepancies between the stated objectives of these ofcials
and the outcomes of the implemented policies.
Iranian politicians often try to wrap the debate about their policies and actions in a
nationalistic garb, accusing their critics of not having Iranian citizens’ best interest
in mind. The goal of this study is to recast the debate about the merit of policies
pursued in the last four decades in concrete, economic terms. Once the costs of
decisions are measured in terms of numbers rather than (nationalistic or religious)
sentiments, informed dialog becomes more attainable and fruitful.
