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From the Colour Revolutions to the Arab
Awakening:
EU Approaches to Democracy Promotion and
the Rising Influence of CEE States
By: Benedetta Berti and Olga Ouch
In: Berti, B., Mikulova, K. & Popescu, . N. (eds.). London: Routledge/UACES
Contemporary European Studies, p. 61-88
https://www.routledge.com/Democratization-in-EU-Foreign-Policy-New-
member-states-as-drivers-of-democracy/Berti-Mikulova-
Popescu/p/book/9781138309890
In this chapter we provide an analysis of European Union (EU) narratives and
policies with respect to mass mobilisations in Eastern Europe (EE) and in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Specifically, the focus here is on
the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ and the recent ‘EuroMaidan’ in Ukraine; as well as
on the 2011 ‘J25’ Egyptian revolution and the later summer 2013 cycle of protests
and violence following the ousting of President Mohammad Morsi. European
Union and ‘EU3’ (French, German, British) perspectives and policies are compared
to those of ‘new’ EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, identifying
and accounting for patterns of convergence and divergence.
2
The bulk of the policy and scholarly analysis on EU democracy promotion has
been focused on the impact and role of Western European countries. Yet ‘new’
member states, specifically new CEE member states, have been among the most
active agents in discussing and shaping European democracy assistance strategies,
both at the normative and at the policy level. Our analysis shows that EU member
states from CEE have also played an important role as intermediaries between the
EU and democratising states (or democratic actors) in both EE and the Middle East
and North Africa region. Thus, this chapter seeks to further investigate the specific
role and impact of these states as norms protagonists in the context of their pro-
democracy and human rights foreign policy, in a comparative and cross-regional
perspective. In examining their efforts in the context of EU foreign policy, the
chapter further probes the distinctive features behind CEE EU member states
‘brand’ of democracy promotion as well as the normative and strategic factors
behind it.
Although the EU3 are understood to be ‘power players’ within the EU structures,
it is clear that over the years ‘new’ member states and their politicians, such as the
Prime Minister of Poland, then European Council President Donald Tusk and the
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, have become important voices in the
public debate on EU foreign policy. They are also very well positioned to engage
in meaningful communication with the EU ‘neighbours,’ be it in MENA or Eastern
Europe. Thus, it is crucial to investigate their role in and contribution to the recent
waves of social mobilisation in the two regions.
3
While several important studies
1
have focused on the part external actors can play
in the promotion of specific normative agendas; few have evaluated how EU-
based actors act as norms protagonists, influencing social mobilisation processes
and assisting post-revolutionary transitions.
2
Even fewer have done so in a
comparative perspective. The chapter focuses on exploring CEE member states’
role as norms protagonists in EU-democracy assistance policies at the backdrop of
mobilisation process in eastern and southern neighbourhood countries. For each
cycle of protest we examine EU and CEE reactions at both the discursive and
policy level. The chapter also assesses the impact, or lack thereof, in the MENA
region and Eastern Europe, pitting CEE member states against other EU players.
The chapter thus provides a nuanced explanation of the key actors’ involvement
in the protest waves analysed, and furthermore, accounts for CEE contribution to
promoting democracy in both Eastern Europe and MENA at the EU level.
CEE Foreign Policy and the Role of Democracy Promotion: Convergence or
Divergence with the EU?
In investigating CEE new member states’ distinct contribution to democracy
promotion at the EU level, it is important to understand what differentiates their
approach, if anything, from the mainstream one implemented by EU institutions.
Unsurprisingly, a cursory comparison of the EU as a unitary foreign policy actor
and CEE member states’ foreign policies reflects a shared emphasis on core values.
The normative basis of European foreign policy is grounded in peace, liberty,
democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights.
3
These values inform both
4
the EU’s foreign policy agenda and conceptions of the legitimate uses of force.
4
What is more, European foreign policy is defined by its emphasis on ‘normative
power,’ its ability to influence external actors, thereby projecting power and
influence, through shaping ‘conceptions of the normal in international relations.’
5
The focus on norms is not only a reflection of existing power constraints,
6
but a
product of an (assumed to be) common ‘civic’ culture centred on the principles of
multilateralism, liberalism and inclusiveness and seeking to foster ‘interstate
community building’ through non-coercive means.
7
Accordingly, the EU’s policy
toolkit has relied heavily on public diplomacy, international development, and
democracy promotion.
8
In this sense, democracy promotion has been a defining
feature of European foreign policy.
Since CEE states became EU members, many have been pushed into or sought out
a role as protagonists of EU norms to neighbours further east, placing themselves
at the forefront of the EU ‘eastern’ democracy promotion mission. Be it in
formulating the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership or
establishing the European Endowment of Democracy, Czech, Slovak, Polish,
Estonian and Lithuanian (among other CEE countries’) politicians have made
consistent public declarations about supporting democracy in the EU’s
neighbourhood, focusing specifically on the case of Ukraine. For instance, in 2011,
Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski proclaimed in a speech at the Atlantic
Council that:
Poland is leading the European Union in supporting the people of
Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia….Our policy is that we will help
5
Ukraine every time she asks for it and every time she does something
for herself. And we hope that they will stay on course for greater and
greater association with the EU.
9
On the same occasion, Sikorski also clearly highlighted that Poland, as well as
other ‘new’ member states, see themselves as most capable, among EU member
states, to usher countries like Ukraine onto the path of democratisation.
At the normative level, the EU’s general commitment to democracy and
democratic values echoes CEE states’ view of democracy promotion as both an
external responsibility and an internal tool to ascertain identity and values. At the
same time, new democracies may be rightfully thought of as especially sensitive
to both objectives, keen on locking democracy in within the own country and
externalising their newly established democratic commitment. The central idea is
that CEE-EU states perceive themselves as the ‘successful’ cases of post-
communist democratisation that countries like Ukraine can learn from. More
importantly, it may be in their interest to have pro-EU democratic states as their
immediate neighbours as a buffer from Russia. If this is the case, the expectation
would be for CEE foreign policy to be more heavily focused on democracy
assistance than the broader EU external action, with new CEE member states
standing up for democratic values more vocally and explicitly, and remaining less
willing to compromise them in the name of stability.
6
With respect to strategic factors—again—one may find convergence between CEE
and EU in the adherence of both to democratic peace theory and to the notion of
democratisation as a tool for increasing stability. Divergence stem from policy
prioritisation, as it is possible to see how CEE’s strategic considerations may lead
to attributing increased importance to democracy. CEE countries can see the
diffusion of democracy as an especially crucial tool of foreign policy bringing
additional stability to their own immediate neighbourhood, and deflecting the
influence of Russia, as well as lowering chances of democratic regression by
strengthening democracy and the rule of law in their extended neighbourhood.
Finally, the combination of scarcer resources and deep subject-matter expertise can
also contribute to greater divergence in policy prioritisation and implementation
of democracy promotion between the EU and its CEE members, with the latter
countries keen on focusing on the subject to highlight their value added, enhance
their reputation and rely on unique expertise to both forge and strengthen
alliances and partnerships.
Overall, it seems that the CEE states’ distinctive role as norm protagonists in their
own right as well as within the European Union could be explained by a fortunate
interaction between normative, strategic and structural considerations. The rest of
the chapter seeks to support this case by empirical evidence, exploring the patterns
of convergence and divergence between the EU’s and CEE’s discursive and policy
responses to distinct waves of popular mobilisation occurring, respectively, in
Ukraine and Egypt. The aim is to conceptualise the CEE contribution to both.
7
From Euromaidan to Tahrir Square: Framing the Revolutions
Ukraine in 2004-2014: From Revolution to War
Ukraine experienced two significant recent waves of mass protest in 2004 and
2013-2014. Considering Ukraine’s geo-strategic position–positioned directly on
the border of EU and acting as a buffer between Russia and the EU— it is hardly
surprising that any political change in Ukraine is strategically significant for the
EU, and specifically for the ‘new’ member states.
10
The case of Ukraine, since it stretches across an entire decade, allows us to map-
out the shifting role of CEE states from standing on the side-lines to becoming
protagonists of democracy promotion in the ‘east.’ In 2004, CEE states were brand
new members of the EU club. Hence, as pointed out by Poland’s former US
Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, they did not yet have the power of the EU
flag behind them.
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This explains why, in 2004, the EU3 played a dominant role in
bringing Ukraine to the top of the European agenda. On the other hand, by 2013,
Poland, Lithuania and other new CEE member states had established themselves
as foreign policy players in the EU, having proven their ability to be equal partners
during several crises. Therefore, this time around, they led EU efforts to mediate
during the mass protests.
8
In 2004, Ukraine experienced its first moment of true mass mobilisation following
an attempt by the regime of President Leonid Kuchma to install a chosen
successor, Viktor Yanukovych, by electoral fraud,
12
Following the rigged election,
hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians filtered into the city streets, peacefully
protesting against the broil and demanding that the opposition candidate Viktor
Yushchenko be declared the real victor.
13
The 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ as it was
called–after the pervasive orange colour present on Yushchenko’s campaign
paraphernalia–was understood by most scholars specialising in the region to be a
part of a series of protest events, often referred to as the ‘colour revolutions’ in
Eastern Europe, which began with Slovak and Serbian attempts to expose electoral
fraud more than a decade prior, in 1998 and 2000.
14
From the very beginning the EU as an institution played a central role in the 2004
crisis: for example, the European Commission was among the first global
stakeholders to urge the Kuchma regime refrain from formally announcing the
contested election results prior to allowing national and international election
monitors to adequately review the charges of electoral manipulation and, if
necessary, recount the vote. The Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot—with his
country holding the EU presidency at the time–immediately expressed concern.
Javier Solana, then EU High Representative for foreign policy, described the vote
as “fraudulent and stressed that the EU’s ‘good’ relations with Ukraine were
highly “dependent” on a “democratic resolution”.
15
Yet Solana, one of the most
important power brokers within the EU,
16
had to be more guarded and less clearly
favouring the opposition in light of the EU member states’ divergent relationships
with Russia. Solana could not offer the opposition the prospect of EU membership
9
for concessions and he could not impose any true sanctions or make any threats
again the party in power should it decide to override the negation route and use
repression against the protesters.
17
CEE member states did not face those constraints: it soon became clear that the
member state that would make the greatest contribution to resolving the crisis
would be Poland.
18
Polish presence in Kyiv was tangible evidence of a sustained
strategy to be at the centre of EU democracy promotion in the ‘east.’ A large
delegation arrived in the Maidan Square during the first week of protests.
Meanwhile, most other new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe—with
the notable exception of the pro-Russian Czech president Václav Klaus
19
—who
spoke out in support of the protesters. While politicians from Germany or the
Netherlands also took the lead in making statements to underline Europe’s
commitment to democratic values, it was the ‘new’ member states that ended up
in a unique position to speak out, representing both ‘successful cases’ of
democratic transition and Europeanisation whilst maintaining close working
relationships with both the opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko and then
President Leonid Kuchma. In this vein, President Kuchma asked then Polish
President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus to
mediate in the crisis. Hence, CEE politicians could act as protagonists because they
were seen as legitimate and respected players in Ukraine by both the
establishment and the opposition. They brought something to the negotiation table
that no other actor could deliver: they were true insiders. As a result, the EU, with
the help of CEE mediators, could facilitate and de-escalate the crisis.
10
CEE mediations efforts were followed by a political agreement and by the re-run
of the elections, a move quickly praised by the EU. Following Yushchenko’s
victory, Solana and European Commission member Benita Ferrero-Waldner
released a statement that Ukraine had made a “strategic choice (…) in favour of
democracy and reform” and expressing the EU’s desire to offer support.
20
The
message was positive but vague and made it clear that it would be procedurally
difficult for the EU to make a real offer of accession to Ukraine. This position
primarily reflected preferences of ‘old’ member states’ and specifically the EU3’s
divergent interests in the region as well as varying levels of ‘friendship’ with
Russia.
The same complex interaction between strategic interest and normative values
would also be impact the EU’s response to the second wave of protests in Ukraine;
which erupted in November 2013, after President Yanukovych declared that
Ukraine would not be signing the Association Agreement with the EU, which
contained free trade area provisions. Diplomatic tensions between the EU and
Ukraine reached new highs. Since Yanukovich’s election in 2010, the EU timidly
reacted to a series of constitutional amendments and political prosecutions, such
as the jailing of his biggest opposition contender Yulia Tymoshenko. But criticism
and attempts to coerce the Ukrainian administration to make headway in
protection of human rights and democracy by threatening to take the Association
Agreement off the table did not reverse the democratic backsliding. When the
Association Agreement finally fell through, it was evident that Russia had put
pressure on Yanukovych to not sign the agreement. The population of Kyiv and
11
several large cities across Ukraine came together in mass protests against the
regime. They spread to all regions of the country and in Kyiv, they attracted up to
300,000 participants.
21
In response, European Council President Herman Van
Rompuy and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso criticised
Russia for attempts to influence the situation in Ukraine and stated that, “it is up
to Ukraine to freely decide what kind of engagement they seek with the European
Union… [the EU] will not force Ukraine, or any other partner, to choose between
the European Union or any other regional entity … we therefore strongly
disapprove of the Russian position and actions.”
22
Hence, rather than making a
strong declaration in support of Ukrainian democracy, the EU’s two top diplomats
insisted that Ukraine’s closer ties with the EU would in no way undermine the
country’s relationship with Russia. The initial message from the EU was hence
mixed. After the Vilnus summit on November 29th 2013, Barroso proclaimed that,
“the times of limited sovereignty are over in Europe.”
23
; implying that Russia’s
interference was not simply anti-democratic but also infringing on Ukraine’s
sovereignty, and those of other eastern neighbours like Georgia and Moldova.
Shortly after brutal repression of the growing protests by the government, a
delegation of members of the European Parliament arrived in the Ukrainian
capital. They met with several opposition leaders and in a show of support
addressed the protesters from a stage. As the demonstrations grew more and more
violent, the EU maintained its tone of ‘disapproval.’ However, the Yanukovych
regime was not interested or willing to make a deal; no amount of rhetoric would
force Yanukovych to the negotiation table. Unlike Kuchma in 2004, Yanukovych
lacked connections among CEE leaders, and it was difficult to identify anyone that
12
would have the same success as a mediator as Kwasniewski in 2004. Interestingly,
the EU still opted for Poles and Lithuanians as envoys, but in 2014, these
representatives were really only accepted by the opposition, which was also not
as united and coherent as the coalition led by Yushchenko in 2004.
In early February 2014, EU foreign ministers offered economic assistance to
Ukraine if the government agreed to hold elections and put forth a unity
government. But they stopped short of any immediate threat of sanctions.
24
The
EU also repeatedly called for a new government to be formed and for new
constitutional reforms to make “free and fair presidential elections” possible.
25
Following further suppression of protests, the EU's 28 foreign ministers met to
discuss the deteriorating situation in the country. The council put out an
announcement detailing that the EU was “deeply concerned” and “alarmed by the
human rights situation” in Ukraine. Their statement called for “an inclusive
dialogue, a democratic solution that would meet the aspirations of the Ukrainian
people.”
26
The crisis ended when the German, French and Polish foreign ministers, acting on
behalf of the entire EU, but without EU representatives, brokered a deal between
Yanukovich and Ukraine’s opposition leaders, which crucially included early
presidential elections towards the end of 2014. However, the protesters did not
accept the deal, and on the evening of February 21, Yanukovich fled Kiev and then
Ukraine. Around the same time, Russia sent its military into Crimea and then
annexed the region, while the Ukrainian region of Donbas descended into a war.
13
With a drastically deteriorating situation in Ukraine, security and economic
concerns took the centre stage, and pushed the issue of democracy into the
background. Overall, CEE involvement in the EuroMaidan movement lacked the
same level of commitment to democracy promotion as in 2004, but this was not
due to an ideological shift but rather to a combination of context and capability.
In 2013-2014, regional economic and security concerns, together with the EU’s
desire not to ‘stir the pot’ with Russia, informed CEE leaders’ approaches to
Ukraine. This explains, for example, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski’s
advice to the Ukrainian opposition to make concessions to Yanukovych and to
consider Putin’s demands. Moreover, in 2014, CEE countries could not rely on a
well-liked ‘maverick’ like Kwasniewski to represent them in the negotiations.
Thus, both the broader strategic context and the lack of skilful diplomacy made
the EU and its CEE representatives less successful.
Egypt in 2011-2013: from the ‘Arab Awakening’ to the Stalled Transition
There is an astounding parallel and thus a comparable case of repeated attempts
by the society at ousting undemocratic leadership in Egypt. The beginning of the
so-called ‘Arab Awakening’ in late 2010 deeply shook the status quo in the MENA
region, leading to a massive wave of social protests and mass mobilisation that left
virtually no country unaffected. Riding on the momentum provided by the
successful removal of authoritarian leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia,
Egyptians also took the streets in January 2011 to demand political and social
change. The J25–January 25–revolution rapidly grew into a massive and
14
heterogeneous political protest movement, eventually forcing Hosni Mubarak,
President of Egypt since 1981, to resign. Following the 18-day revolution, a
tentative process of transition began, with the Army, led by General Mohamed
Hussein Tantawi, temporarily assuming control of the country with the stated
purpose of facilitating political change and organising free elections. Eventually,
in June 2012, a newly elected President, Mohammed Morsi, came to power. Yet,
Egypt’s troubled transition was far from over: a widespread perception that the
President and the Muslim Brotherhood movement he represented were seeking to
centralise control and power led to the rise of another protest movement.
Eventually, the Egyptian Army stepped in and, in July 2013—a little over a year
after the presidential elections that had brought Morsi to power in the first place—
declared an end to both the Constitution and the Morsi Presidency, taking interim
control of the country. Heavy internal clashes as well as violent repression of
Morsi’s supporters and Muslim Brotherhood members in general ensued, further
revealing the deep troubles behind the Egyptian transition.
Contrasting discursive and policy responses on the part of the EU–and more
narrowly, its CEE members–to the J25 revolution and the later ousting of the newly
elected President from power can serve as an interesting case to test interactions
between normative commitments to democracy and strategic interests, such as
stability in the MENA region and a good external relationship with Egypt and its
army. When the Egyptian revolution first began, both EU as well as EU-3 leaders’
response was swift and vocal, unlike the more cautious approach adopted at the
incipit of the Arab Spring in Tunisia a few weeks earlier. Both in Brussels as well
as in the other European capitals the immediate reaction involved condemning the
15
violence, calling to the Egyptian government to refrain from violent repression
and urging it to both uphold the protesters’ rights and listening to their demands.
27
European leaders were keen to highlight the link between the European Union
and its member countries’ constitutive values and their respect for the growing
anti-Mubarak grassroots movement in Egypt. German Chancellor Angela Merkel
clearly stated that on the commitment to “human rights, the respect of the dignity
of the human being” there should be “no compromises.”
28
EU High Representative
Catherine Ashton echoed this notion by clarifying that “the European Union has,
at its heart, democracy, the rule of law, human rights–these are our values and we
believe these must be respected by the Egyptian authorities.”
29
The commitment to democracy was not only framed as a normative core value,
but also as an important geo-strategic interest. British PM David Cameron
argued:
30
Now there are those who argue these North African countries are not the
poorest in the world, and that we should concentrate on our own affairs.
(…) Be in no doubt. Get this wrong, fail to support these countries and we
risk giving oxygen to the extremists (…). We would see more terrorism,
more immigration, more instability coming from Europe’s southern border.
(…) But get this right (…) their security will mean greater security for us
(…) and their prosperity, a more prosperous world for us all.
Yet EU member states by and large did not directly demand Mubarak’s
resignation: rather, a more general ‘orderly transition’). Still the sentiment of
16
‘rejoicing’ expressed by German Chancellor after his departure was undoubtedly
shared by many of her colleagues across the EU.
31
After the revolution European leaders expressed hope for a democratic transition
and urged the new government to suspend emergency rulings and secure timely
elections. EU actors also offered technical assistance in areas ranging from
constitutional to electoral reform and civil-society building, while also voicing
their support for an expanded and strengthened neighbourhood policy.
32
Speaking after visiting Egypt in February 2011, EU High Representative Catherine
Ashton stated that, “The EU stands ready to accompany the peaceful and orderly
transition to a civilian and democratic government and to support Egyptian efforts
to improve their economic situation and increase social cohesion.”
33
CEE member states’ statements on the J25 revolution were in this sense entirely
convergent with the broader EU discourse, first expressing concerns about the
violence against the protesters and demanding “extensive economic and
democratic reform.”
34
After the revolution, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław
Sikorski echoed the broader EU discursive framework for the Arab Awakening: “I
have always enthusiastically supported democratisation in the [Middle East]
region. I am among those who believe that democracies never go to war against
each other. And so when millions of people seek the right to be responsible for
managing their own lives the way they should in a democracy, it is reason for
17
hope.”
35
Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg in addition to expressing
hope for a democratic transition also stressed the importance of assistance (which
his country immediately offered)
36
and stated that, "I am convinced that the
European Union should, if the country establishes itself in a democratic regime,
greatly help Egypt. Not only beautiful words, but real help."
37
Similarly strong discursive convergence between the EU and CEE member states
was in place two years after the revolution, as President Morsi was being removed
from power. Here European leaders—from Western to Eastern European member
states—voiced concern over the ousting of Morsi while framing it as a ‘failure,’ a
‘set-back,’ a ‘regression’ of the democratic transition, while directly condemning
the violence.
38
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared: “Recalling our
democratic transformation, accomplished without bloodshed, we appeal to the
sides of the conflict in Egypt to continue the process of the country’s
democratisation through negotiations and without resorting to acts of violence
and military intervention.”
39
While overall avoiding the use of the word ‘coup,’ European leaders found
different formulas to express their concern over the situation in Egypt . British PM
Cameron declared: "We never support intervention by the military. What now
needs to happen in Egypt is for democracy to flourish and for a genuine
democratic transition to take place and all parties need to be involved in that.”
40
In
a July 2013 statement from the EU foreign affairs council meeting, the EU said:
18
“Egypt has to move rapidly to an inclusive democratic transformation process,
including by the holding of democratic elections in the shortest possible time.”
41
As violent repression escalated in the country, statements about Egypt became
stronger and with more direct words of condemnation. UK Foreign Secretary
William Hague, while stressing the need for dialogue with Egyptian authorities,
also alluded to his countries’ suspension of security cooperation while asking the
EU to collectively reflect on the future of external assistance to Egypt.
42
In terms of substance, no major gaps emerge between the EU and CEE in the
framing of both the J25 revolution and the 2013 ‘upheaval,’ with convergence
apparent in highlighting the importance of democracy and democratic values,
while condemning violence and offering assistance. The same discursive
convergence and normative alignment between EU official statements, EU3 and
EU members for Central and Eastern Europe can be identified when comparing
reactions to both crises in Egypt and Ukraine. Yet, in terms of tone, the directness
of the language and prioritisation of the crisis largely varies: CEE statements about
the Egyptian revolution and its aftermath are, with the partial exception of Poland
and, to a lesser extent the Czech Republic and Slovakia, far fewer when compared
to EU-3 states and EU institutions. On the other hand, on the ‘eastern’ front, new
CEE members of the EU indisputably played a key role in discussing the Ukrainian
cycle of protests and in supporting pro-democratic forces. This disparity in policy
priorities can be understood by emphasising how, despite a common normative
understanding of the role and importance of democracy, Egypt and the southern
neighbourhood are of lesser strategic importance to CEE countries.
19
From Words to Deeds: Policy Responses
Did the calls to uphold democracy and support human rights, ever-present themes
in both EU institutions’ and CEE EU member states’ official statements with
respect to both Egypt and Ukraine, translate into convergence in democracy
support policy toward both countries at the EU level? And what, if anything,
distinguished the actions and projects implemented by Central and Eastern
European countries?
Relationships between the EU and both countries can be analysed through the lens
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the primary tool for EU
engagement in the neighbourhood. With the EU growing wearier of enlargement,
the ENP framework and its complementary initiatives, such as the Eastern
Partnership and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), aimed at
placing bilateral relations between the EU and its southern and eastern neighbours
within a broader framework, anchored in the “values of democracy, rule of law
and respect of human rights.”
43
EU, CEE and Ukraine: Half-hearted Follow-up
20
Whilst the EU was on the frontline in 2003-2004 Ukraine, employing its diplomacy
to encourage a resolution of the crisis, in the years following Yushchenko’s victory,
the employment of strong conditionality to support Ukraine’s ‘strategic choice’
toward Europe was virtually absent. Although ‘new’ member states like Poland
and Lithuania were eager to put full membership on the table for Ukraine in 2005,
it was clear that—despite the rhetoric—the EU3 were in no way ready to move
forward with such an offer.
44
Indeed the EU-Ukraine Action Plan,
45
drafted and
endorsed by the European Council on February 21, 2005, made no promise of
membership; vaguely offering Ukraine "a new kind of [EU-Ukraine]
relationship."
46
This resolution became the basis for a series of Association
Agreement attempts and the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy,
aligning Ukraine’s relationship with the EU with that of countries like Morocco or
Israel. Through the development of the European Neighbourhood and Eastern
Partnership policies, the EU effectively took membership prospects off the table,
whilst avoiding any policies that might encroach on Russian foreign policy
interests.
The limits of the EU’s ‘lite’ approach to democracy support in Ukraine were again
evident in 2013-2014. Indeed, the EU as an institution was almost entirely
ineffective in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis, with CEE member states unable to
go beyond statements in support of Ukrainian democracy. The real weakness of
the EU, including member states from CEE as norms protagonists in Ukraine, was
the inability to halt the escalation of violence against what first were peaceful
protesters as well as to prevent the later annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by
21
Russia in March 2014 along with the outbreak of the conflict in two eastern
provinces of Ukraine, Luhansk and Donetsk.
As the political crisis deteriorated and repression intensified in 2014, the EU was
vocal in its condemnation of violence yet did little in real policy terms to stop it. In
a February 2014 statement, President Barroso clarified that: “we have also made it
clear that the EU will respond to any deterioration on the ground. We therefore
expect that targeted measures against those responsible for violence and use of
excessive force can be agreed by our Member States as a matter of urgency, as
proposed by the High Representative/Vice President".
47
In reality, however,
sanctions were not employed until later in the crisis. The EU’s had a similarly
toothless reaction to the annexation of Crimea on March 21, 2014. Brussels was
extremely slow to reply to the events, eventually coordinating with the US in
instituting sanctions against Russia, Russian nationals and Ukrainian former
regime officials. With each negotiation over sanctions the EU is divided, but such
fractions are no longer along ‘old’ versus ‘new’ member lines.
CEE policy responses cannot easily be compared to that of the EU or EU3 as there
is no unified bloc: when it comes to Ukraine, the countries are no longer on the
same page. While Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have firmly pressed their
counterparts in relevant EU institutions to augment the pressure on Russia and
support Ukraine’s democratisation efforts; the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovakia have emerged as outspoken critics of sanctions and some of them have
even supported Russia’s right to interfere in the Ukrainian crisis. Comparing their
22
stances to the EU3, their rhetoric has remained supportive of Ukrainian democracy
and territorial integrity, yet the language has been kept vague enough as to not
‘upset’ Russia.
EU, CEE and Egypt:
Even though it would be inaccurate to overstate the impact of EU diplomacy on
Mubarak’s departure, it is undeniable that European actors did their utmost to
leverage their diplomatic weight to call for reforms in Egypt. Similarly, in the
immediate aftermath of the revolution, European leaders and EU representatives
alike were keen on stressing the importance of democracy and human rights, using
statements as a diplomatic tool to advance democratic transitions in the MENA
region.
A few months after the beginning of the Arab Awakening, in December 2011, the
European Parliament and Council issued a joint document aptly titled ‘Human
Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action–Towards a More
Effective Approach.’
48
The aim, in the words of EU High Representative Catherine
Ashton, was ‘to have human rights running as a silver thread through a truly
integrated range of external policies.’
49
The document was followed, in the
summer of 2012, by both the publication of the ‘EU Strategic Framework and
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’ and by the appointment of the first
Special Representative for Human Rights.
50
In this sense, there is little doubt that
23
the initial, peaceful, stages of the Arab Spring did help elevate the democracy and
human rights agenda in the general EU foreign policy debate. Even more
interestingly, the post-Arab Spring period saw a revival of the ‘normative agenda’
in the Middle East, at least at the discursive level. Among CEE member states, the
Arab Spring similarly led to heightened attention towards democracy assistance
in the MENA, a region that had prior been rather neglected.
Accordingly, increased attention and formal declaratory commitments to
democracy and democratic values and expression of ‘concern’ when those seemed
violated became a core part of the message conveyed by EU countries, including
CEE member states, to post-revolutionary Egypt. Even so, the failure to directly
demand the resignation of Mubarak in 2011 and, in 2013, the lack of stronger
criticism of the role of the Egyptian Army in ousting President Morsi earned the
EU some chastising for compromising on its own declaratory commitments.
51
Diplomatic calls to uphold democracy were also matched by an increased focus
on offering technical and financial assistance to MENA countries in transition. In
February 2011 the European Council expressed the will to “lend its full support to
the transition processes” and stressed its commitment “to a new partnership
involving more effective support in the future to those countries which are
pursuing political and economic reforms including through the European
Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean.”
52
A few months
later, the frameworks set in “A partnership for democracy shared prosperity with
the southern Mediterranean” and in "A new response to a changing
24
Neighbourhood" confirmed the heightened emphasis on “deep democracy” in the
region and the backing for “democratic transformation and institution-building,
with a particular focus on fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform
of the judiciary and the fight against corruption.”
53
The new-emphasis on
democracy assistance and civil society support in MENA came through the
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) as well as through
a number of different instruments, including the European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR),
54
the newly established Civil Society
Facility, the Anna Lindh Foundation and, after its creation, the European
Endowment for Democracy. Within Egypt, several Western European member
states organised bilateral capacity building and training projects, ranging from
transitional justice, to coalition-building or multi-party training.
55
CEE states’ policies in the MENA region did overall follow a similar course: with
EU members from Central and Eastern Europe overall stepping up in promoting
a democracy and human rights agenda at both the EU and bilateral levels. At the
EU level, Poland used its EU presidency to help create the European Endowment
for Democracy, making a direct link between the lack of EU preparedness for the
Arab Spring and the need to invest in new instruments and approaches.
56
Overall,
in their diplomatic positioning, CEE countries were consistent in expressing
support for infusing the EU Middle Eastern foreign policy with a pro-democracy
agenda; even though they were also focused on making sure the ‘eastern front’
would not be forgotten or neglected as a by-product.
At the bilateral level, CEE countries—and especially Poland, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia – became rapidly involved in implementing technical assistance
25
projects in Egypt, investing in supporting both governmental as well as civil
society actors.
57
In addition, an analysis of the 2011 EU documents highlighted the previously
discussed ‘conditionality lite’ approach to the MENA region by relying of the
‘more for more’ principle: namely offering more ‘money, mobility and market
access’ in exchange for progress in carrying out reforms. As part of the over 4
billion EUR mobilised within the ENPI between 2011 and 2013, roughly 540
million were allocated to the SPRING programme (Support for partnership,
reforms and inclusive growth), established to operate on the ‘more for more’
premise and to offer increased support to countries progressing in their
democratic transitions.
58
Poland and the Czech Republic (along with the Baltic
States, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) played an
important role in pushing for a “reward-based system” in aid allocation.
59
Yet,
overall, the ‘more for more’ approach was selectively applied in the MENA
region.
60
In parallel to limited political conditionality, the EU’s foreign policy towards
Egypt also briefly considered relying on ‘sticks.’ In the weeks leading up to
Mubarak’s resignation, several EU member states such as Germany and France
declared a suspension of arms exports to the Egyptian regime, a policy followed
after the downfall of the regime by EU asset freezes against individuals related to
the Mubarak regime.
61
In 2013, as democratic ‘regression’ and human rights
violations intensified in the weeks following Morsi’s ousting, the EU discussed the
26
issue of aid suspensions and sanctions in more depth,
62
agreeing in the end on a
partial arm export ban.
63
This combination of weak sanctions and relatively
modest rewards has been singled out by critics for creating a ‘well-intentioned but
ineffective’ formula.
64
In recent years, with the deterioration of the security situation across much of the
MENA region, where initially democratic revolutions descended into civil war or
bloody reassertion of authoritarianism, security issues took again centre stage.
Democracy promotion in MENA thus slid down on the EU’s priority list, let alone
on the CEE’s one.
CEE as Norm Protagonists: an Assessment
Analysing CEE EU member states’ narratives and policies with respect to the Arab
Awakening and its aftermath in Egypt as well as the revolutionary upheaval in
Ukraine in 2004 and 2014 allows us to map these countries’ evolving role and
impact on promoting democracy in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhood.
In doing so, it is also possible to examine patterns of convergence and divergence
between these ‘new’ members’ strategy and policy and that of the EU and ‘old’
members. At the most general level, convergence dominates: official CEE and EU
responses to the waves of mobilisation in Egypt and Ukraine demonstrate the
27
shared normative emphasis on supporting anti-authoritarian popular movements
and speaking up against human rights abuses. Similarly, official EU and CEE
narratives on the protest movements in both the MENA region and the eastern
neighbourhood clearly feature a shared pro-democratic ethos. Where CEE and the
EU differ is not in the values and normative commitments evoked in official
rhetoric and discourse, but rather prioritisation in policy-making: the events were
not ranked as equally important in the EU and CEE, which means they warranted
different policy responses.
Indeed, there is little doubt that, when it comes to Ukraine and Eastern Europe in
general, CEE countries like Poland have played an especially prominent role in
supporting pro-democratic forces. Rhetorically, they were more vocal and explicit
in speaking out against the excesses of the authoritarian establishment and in
supporting the opposition movements, especially when compared to the EU’s
‘official’ response to the Ukrainian crises. But when it comes to Egypt, CEE states
simply did not display the same extent of democratic fervour and eagerness to
assume a leadership role in supporting a pro-democracy agenda,. The discourse
analysis shows that the frequency and intensity of CEE official statements on the
Arab Spring simply pale when compared to those concerning Ukraine. The
variation between the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood cases–and the distinct
level of involvement by CEE member states in the former–can be explained by
stronger strategic interests at stake and the limited political capital available to
CEE countries. Overall, while CEE clearly applied the same normative logic to
both Ukraine and Egypt, the logic of interests de facto led them to prioritise their
immediate neighbourhood in democracy support.
28
Yet–be it largely rhetorical–CEE countries’ desire to project their normative
commitment to democracy and its promotion to the Arab world should not be
discounted, as it reflects a strategic interest in branching out in democracy
assistance. The EU’s ‘new’ members’ general eagerness to speak up in support of
the popular revolutions and offer technical support to Arab countries in transition
reflects an effort to boost their foreign policy profile in the EU and to continue to
steer EU foreign policy in a normative direction, as well as to enhance their
visibility in the MENA region. In terms of impact, CEE EU members
understandably seem to place varying emphasis on the eastern and southern
neighbourhoods due to limited resources: this, in turn, can contribute to better
understanding of the more prominent role that they have had in shaping the EU’s
eastern policy. Yet at the same time, when it comes to the Arab world, their
rhetorical power should be explored further as a possible catalyst of policy action
by other EU member states that have the political and financial capital to invest in
the MENA region that CEE states largely lack.
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91; Ron Nixon, “U.S.-Financed Groups Had Supporting Role in Arab Uprisings,” The
New York Times, April 14, 2011 (accessed February 28, 2015)
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html; Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine’s
Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West,” Cambridge Review of International
Affairs 19, 1 (2006): 21–32.
2
Thomas Carothers, “The Continuing Backlash against Democracy Promotion,” New
Challenges to Democratization 15 (2010): 59; Susan Stewart, “Democracy Promotion
before and after the ‘colour Revolutions,’” Democratization 16, 4 (2009): 645–60; Kristi
Raik, “The EU and Mass Protests in the Neighbourhood: Models of Normative (in)
Action,” European Foreign Affairs Review 17, 4 (2012): 553–75; Sandra Lavenex and
Frank Schimmelfennig, “Models of EU Democracy Promotion: Leverage, Linkage, and
45
Governance,” Democratization 18, 4 (2011): 710–32; Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie,
“Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance of EU Democracy
Promotion,” European Foreign Affairs Review 16, 5 (2011): 565–88; Joel Peters, The
European Union and the Arab Spring: Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in the
Middle East (Lexington Books, 2012); Richard Youngs, The European Union and the
Promotion of Democracy (Oxford University Press Oxford, 2001); Jonas Wolff, Hans-
Joachim Spanger and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, The Comparative International Politics of
Democracy Promotion, vol. 23 (Routledge, 2013).
3
Ian Manners, "Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?" Journal of Common
Market Studies 2002, 40, 2, 242.
4
Janne H. Matlary, "When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?"
Security Dialogue 37, 1 (2007).
5
Manners, "Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?" 239.
6
Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review 113 (2002), Hoover Institution.
7
Kalypso Nicolaidis, "The Power of the Powerless," Beyond Paradise and Power:
Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled relationship, ed. Tod Lindberg (London:
Routledge, 2004), 104.
8
Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "EU/NATO Dichotomy: the Beginnings of a
European Strategic Culture," International Affairs 77, 3 (2001).
9
Ibid.
46
10
At the time of writing this chapter the EU was being heavily criticized for its inability
to prevent the crisis and escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Moreover, more so
than ever, the weakness of the EU as an institution, and its inability of presenting a
coherent response to Russian aggression in Ukraine significantly informed the writing of
this chapter.
11
Steven Pifer, Kennan Institute Talk, October 15, 2007.
12
OSCE, Ukrainian Presidential Election. October, 31; November 21; and December 26,
2004, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report (Warsaw: Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE, May 11, 2005).
13
Olga Onuch, “Why Did They Join En Masse? Understanding ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians’
Participation in Mass-Mobilisation in 2004,” New Ukraine/Nowa Ukraina, 11 (2011):
89–113; Olga Onuch, Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary
Moments in Ukraine and Argentina (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).
14
Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in
Postcommunist Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Mark R. Beissinger,
“Mechanisms of Maidan: The Structure of Contingency in the Making of the Orange
Revolution,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 16, 1 (2011): 25–43; Wilson,
“Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West.”
15
“Ukraine MPs Reject Result of Vote,” BBC, November 27, 2004, (accessed February
28, 2015). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4047421.stm.
16
Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.
47
17
Steven Pifer, Kennan Institute Talk.
18
“Ukraine on Brink of ‘Civil War,’” BBC, November 24, 2004, (accessed February 28,
2015). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4040041.stm.
19
Václav Klaus has been known to take an opening pro-Putin and pro-Russian
throughout his time in office. His sentiment has become even more strong and more
public over the past year. See: James Kirchick, “Vaclav Klaus, Libertarian Hero, Has His
Wings Clipped by Cato Institute,” The Daily Beast, December 22, 2014, (accessed March
8, 2015) http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/22/vaclav-klaus-libertarian-hero-
has-his-wings-clipped-by-cato-institute.html; “Ukrainians Rail against Russia-Loving
Klaus,” PRAGUE POST | The Voice of Prague (accessed March 8, 2015)
http://www.praguepost.com/the-big-story/40122-ukrainians-rail-against-russia-loving-
klaus.
20
Javier Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Concrete Proposals for Ways to Strengthen
Cooperation with Ukraine. A Letter from Mr. Javier Solana, High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Mrs. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Member of the
European Commission General Affairs and External Relations Council, (The Council of
the European Union, January 31, 2005), (accessed February 28, 2015)
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%205799%202005%20INIT.
21
Olga Onuch, “‘Who Were the Protesters?’” Journal of Democracy, 2014; Olga Onuch
and Tamara Martsenyuk, EuroMaidan Protest Participant Survey (Nuffield College,
Oxford: Ukrainian Protest Project. Funded by British Academy Newton Fellowship and
48
John Fell Fund., 2013); Olga Onuch, “Social Networks and Social Media in Ukrainian
‘Euromaidan’ Protests,” Washington Post, January 2, 2014, (accessed March 1, 2015)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/02/social-networks-
and-social-media-in-ukrainian-euromaidan-protests-2/.
22
European Commission, Joint Statement by the President of the European Commission
José Manuel Barroso and the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy
on Ukraine (Brussels, November 25, 2013), (accessed February 28, 2015).
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1052_en.htm.
23
“New Ukraine Protests in EU Deal Row,” BBC, November 30, 2013, (accessed
February 28, 2015). http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25162563.
24
“Ukraine Protests Take Center-Stage at EU Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brussels,
News | DW.DE | 10.02.2014,” DW.DE, (accessed February 22, 2015).
http://www.dw.de/ukraine-protests-take-center-stage-at-eu-foreign-ministers-meeting-in-
brussels/a-17422784.
25
“Ukraine Protests Take Center-Stage at EU Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brussels |
News | DW.DE | 10.02.2014.”
26
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Ukraine Foreign Affairs
Meeting (Brussels, February 10, 2014), (accessed February 22, 2015).
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140960.pdf.
27
“Joint UK-France-Germany statement on Egypt.” January 29, 2011, (accessed
February 22, 2015).
49
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-uk-france-germany-statement-on-egypt;
“Statement by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the events in Egypt,”
January 27, 2011, (accessed February 22, 2015).
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/118963.pdf
28
Judy Dempsey, “Looking to Egypt's Future, Merkel Recalls Her Past,” The New York
Times, February 6, 2011, (accessed February 22, 2015).
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/europe/06merkel.html?_r=0;
29
“Remarks by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Egypt
ahead of the Foreign Affairs Council,” January 31, 2011, (accessed February 22, 2015).
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119029.pdf
30
David Cameron, "Closing press conference at the G8 Summit," May 27, 2011,
(accessed February 22, 2015). https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/closing-press-
conference-at-the-g8-summit
31
“Chancellor Merkel on Egypt-"Day of Great Joy",” Africa News, February 14, 2011.
(LexisNexis);
“Joint statement by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, President
of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, and EU High Representative
Catherine Ashton,” (accessed February 22, 2015).
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119267.pdf
32
"Sarkozy: Europe must help Arab Nations,” National Post (Canada), February 28,
2011. (LexisNexis); “PM calls for Egypt reform,” UK Prime Minister's Office, January
50
28, 2011, (accessed February 20, 2015) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-calls-
for-egypt-reform;
33
"Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the end of her visit to
Egypt,” February 22, 2011, (accessed February 20, 2015)
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/remarks-by-eu-high-representative-catherine-
ashton-at-the-end-of-her-visit-to-egypt-116688039.html
34
“Foreign Ministry statement on the situation in Egypt,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Poland. January 30, 2011, (accessed February 20, 2015).
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/aktualnosc_40688
35
Adar Primor “Polish FM to Haaretz: Nazi Germany carried out the Holocaust against
our will,” HaAretz, February 27, 2011, (accessed February 20, 2015).
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/polish-fm-to-haaretz-nazi-germany-
carried-out-the-holocaust-against-our-will-1.345925
36
“Czech Republic May Help with Reforms," Pravo website, February 16, 2011
(LexisNexis).
37
“MFA Press Statement on the situation in Egypt,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech
Republic, February 3, 2011, (accessed February 20, 2015).
http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/udalosti_a_media/prohlaseni_a_stanoviska/x2011_02_03_tisk
ove_prohlaseni_mzv_k_situaci_v_egypte.html
38
"French, Tunisian Leaders Express Dismay Over Morsi Ouster,” Voice of America,
July 4, 2013, (accessed February 20, 2015)
51
http://www.voanews.com/content/french-tunisian-leaders-express-dismay-over-egypt-
morsi-crisis/1695452.html
39
Marcin Bosacki, MFA Press Spokesman, “MFA statement on the situation in Egypt,”
July 3, 2013, (accessed February 20, 2015).
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/news/mfa_statement_on_the_situation_in_egypt
40
Nicholas Cecil, “Let democracy flourish, Cameron tells Egypt's new leaders after
coup,” The Evening Standard (London) July 4, 2013 (LexisNexis).
41
“Council conclusions on Egypt,” Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, July 22, 2013,
(accessed February 20, 2015).
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138282.pd
42
“Foreign Secretary William Hague on the situation in Egypt,” August 19, 2013,
(accessed February 28, 2015).
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-william-hague-on-the-situation-
in-egypt
43
What is the European Neighbourhood Policy? European Union Extern Action,
(accessed March 1, 2015). http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm
44
“Yushchenko Seeks EU Membership,” BBC, January 25, 2005, (accessed February 28,
2015) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4204149.stm.
45
European Council, EU-Ukraine Action Plan, February 2005.
52
46
George Parker, “European Parliament Boosts Ukraine,” Financial Times, January 14,
2005, (accessed February 28, 2015). http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/81157808-65d0-
11d9-8ff0-00000e2511c8.html
47
“Statement by President Barroso on Ukraine,” February 19, 2014, (accessed March 1,
2015) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-13_en.htm
48
“Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Human rights and
democracy at the heart of EU External Action – towards a more effective approach,”
Brussels, December 12 2011 COM (2011) 886 final, (accessed February 28, 2015).
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0886:FIN:EN:PDF
49
“Human Rights: the “silver thread” in Europe’s foreign policy,” December 6, 2012,
(accessed February 28, 2015).
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2012/060112_hr_silverthread_en.htm
50
“Council Decision 2012/440/CFSP of 25 July 2012 appointing the European Union
Special Representative for Human Rights,” Official Journal of the European Union, July
27, 2012, (accessed February 28, 2015).
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:200:0021:0023:EN:PDF
“EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy,” Council
of the European Union, Luxembourg, June, 25 2012, (accessed February 28, 2015).
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf
53
51
David Charter, “Cameron criticises EU over lack of action,” The Guardian, February
5, 2011, (accessed February 28, 2015).
. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article2900225.ece
52
“Declaration on Egypt and the Region,” European Council, February 4, 2011,
(accessed February 28, 2015).
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119143.pdf
53
‘Final joint communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the
council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions.
A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean,’
European Commission, Brussels, March 8, 2011 (accessed February 28, 2015).
http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf;
“A new response to a changing Neighbourhood,” May 25, 2011, (accessed February 28,
2015). http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2011/250511_en.htm
54
“Delivering on the Arab Spring Highlights of the Semester July-December 2011,”
European Commission.
http://www.eidhr.eu/files/dmfile/EIDHR_DeliveringontheArabSpring_Report.pdf
55
See Richard Youngs, Europe in the New Middle East: Opportunity or Exclusion,
(Oxford University Press, 2014), 73-74.
56
“On democracy promotion in Brussels: opening of European Endowment for
Democracy headquarters,” May 27, 2013, (accessed February 28, 2015).
54
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/on_democracy_promotion_in_brussels__opening_of_eur
opean_endowment_for_democracy_headquarters_
57
See Chapter 6 for an in-depth description of the programs implemented.
58
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/eu-neighbourhood-region-and-russia/southern-
neighbourhood/arab-spring_en
59
Richard Youngs, Europe in the New Middle East: Opportunity Or Exclusion, 75.
60
Ibid.
61
Richard Norton-Taylor, “UK refuses to suspend Egypt arms sales,” The Guardian,
February 8, 2011, (accessed February 28, 2015).
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/08/uk-arms-exports-egypt;
http://europeansanctions.com/eu-sanctions-in-force/egypt/
62
Damien McElroy, “EU calls emergency summit over Egypt crisis as European leaders
consider sanctions,” The Telegraph, August 17, 2013, (accessed February 28, 2015).
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10248502/EU-
calls-emergency-summit-over-Egypt-crisis-as-European-leaders-consider-sanctions.html
63
“ EU halts some arms exports to Egypt, aid untouched,” The New Zealand Herald
August 22, 2013.
64
“EU Support for Governance in Egypt – “well-intentioned but ineffective”, say EU
Auditors,” Press Release, ECA/13/18, June 18, 2013, (accessed February 28, 2015).
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ECA-13-18_en.htm
