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Devolution in the United States: Theory and Practice
Abstract
The paper by Tannenwald examines the recent debate on devolution of fiscal responsibilities from the U.S. federal government to the States. Over the last 70 years, the share of federal spending out of total government outlays doubled, reaching 61 per cent. This trend appears inconsistent with the important role that the Constitution assigns to States. Since the 1990s, a rebalancing of responsibilities has been widely discussed. A “devolution revolution” has been considered. Several economists have highlighted the efficiency benefits of devolution and suggested several policy changes, such as the reduction in federal aid to state and local government, the substitution of block grants for matching entitlements and greater flexibility for states in making use of federal grants. Tannenwald notes that the political support for devolution has not actually been very strong and that the federal government has mostly retained its dominant role. He illustrates this point by analysing the policies concerning health care for children, health care for low-income households (the Medicaid program), and federal assistance for primary and secondary education. He shows that matching requirements and constraints on the use of federal funds still have an important role.
... Nevertheless, the functions of the state have been declining in respect to those of the federal government over the last two decades. The devolution debates have been majorly centred on medical program and both primary and secondary education welfare (Tannenwald, 2012). Devolution in china resulted from a decision of the central government to www.ijcab.org ...
Devolution in Kenya is about decentralising political, financial and administrative powers to forty seven counties. Kenya had practised devolution through the one year Majimbo government which lasted in 1964, before the highly centralised provincial administration was established. The provincial administration was centralised and gained control over all decentralized ministerial functions in the country; as an extension of the executive office of the president in the field. The Constitution stipulates that the provincial administration be restructured to align with the devolved administrative structure. Little research has been done on the structural frictions that arise from the fact that central governments are keen to retain or recapture the same authority that have been devolved to the lower level governments. Therefore, on this basis this study sought to establish the effects of implementing devolution on the operations of the Provincial Administration. The study was anchored on the objectives of establishing how devolution had shaped the structure of the Provincial Administration in Kenya; examine the extent to which functions of both County and National Government Administrators are interlinked and to identify the challenges faced in the implementation of Schedule Four of the Constitution. Both primary and secondary data were used. The study was guided by the Structural Functionalism theory of Emile Durkheim, which compare the society to an organism comprising of structures that influence each other for its own existence. A case study design was used with Nairobi City County as the study area. A simple random sampling technique was used to select the sample size for the questionnaires from the sample frame. Further the study used purposive sampling technique to select key informants for the interview guide. SSP version 21 and Content analysis were used to analyse the descriptive data. Data was presented in tables, charts and prose form. The study found out that the provincial administration had restructured through change of tittles and administrative units but not functions, there were points of roles interlinkages some of which are not procedurally and devolution was facing challenges such as: - revenue allocation, administrative and bureaucratic culture, organisational capacity and stakeholder mistrusts. The study concluded that duplication of functions by both levels of government still exists and that the aligning of the provincial administration with the schedule four was yet to be fully attained. Devolution advance national unity by recognising diversity and that it promotes participatory and transparent exercise of authority. The study recommends the enactment of legislation on functions to regulate the constitutional functions of the two levels of government and that commission on Revenue allocation to focus on Wards as the point of reverence in budgeting as they happen to be the service delivery vocal point. It further recommends the need for concerted efforts in creation of awareness on matters devolution through a structured civic education program. The fourth schedule needs to be implemented in tandem with the county government act 2012, for separation of functions between the National and County governments. There is need further research on devolution in future and to widen the study by including a bigger samples size, widening its scope and other variables not covered by this study.
In 1996 the United States revamped its welfare system by eliminating the entitlement to cash benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and replacing it by Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Federal financing was converted from open-ended matching grants to fixed block grants. This paper reviews the evidence on the likely impact of block grants for the needy on average benefit levels, total redistributional outlays, and on differentials across states. The econometric evidence on state responses to federal incentives for spending on the needy varies enormously. An evaluation of this evidence, together with an examination of state responses to the federalization of aid to the elderly, blind, and disabled through the Supplementary Security Income program, suggests that in the long run the federal changes will substantially decrease the amount of direct cash redistribution in the United States. A reasonable guess is that average benefits to the needy will be 15 to 30 percent smaller than under current law, while total spending on cash grants could decline by as much as 35 percent. While interstate competition will act to reduce benefit differentials across states, this tendency will be offset by differential matching rate effects. An extreme ‘race to the bottom,’ with a total withering of the transfer state, is unlikely to occur. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
There has been much talk in recent years of devolving powers and functions from the federal government to the states. Some observers even proclaim a “devolution revolution”, the result of which will be a more efficient and effective federal government and more robust and responsive states. The generally recognized objectives of devolution include (1) more efficient provision and production of public services; (2) better alignment of the costs and benefits of government for a diverse citizenry; (3) better fits between public goods and their spatial characteristics; (4) increased competition, experimentation, and innovation in the public sector; (5) greater responsiveness to citizen preferences; and (6) more transparent accountability in policymaking.> Paper: John Kincaid Panelists: David R. Beam, David T. Ellwood, William F. Fox, and William B. Modahl Moderator: George Latimer
In a period when many policymakers in Washington are attempting to push an unprecedented number of programs and functions back to state and local jurisdictions, immigration stands out as a policy area that is universally regarded as the exclusive domain of the federal government. This article challenges this pervasive understanding of policies toward legal as well as illegal immigrants. It does so by examining the historical evolution of state-federal responsibilities in this area and then by scrutinizing contemporary evidence of state and local efforts to influence immigration flows. Finally, the unique political dynamics of immigration will be explored to explain why—in the face of so much evidence to the contrary—this one-sided view of state-federal responsibilities persists in this increasingly volatile policy domain.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant (TANF). TANF substitutes a block grant for the open-ended matching grants that helped finance state welfare programs, reduces federal administrative authority, ends the entitlement of individuals to welfare, limits assistance to a family to sixty months, and gives states more discretion to design their welfare programs. Instead of detailed federal prescriptions regarding the process and structure of state programs, TANF sets a few goals and mandates for the states and guides their actions with financial incentives and penalties. States have new powers to restrict access to welfare, although they also have opportunities to deflect some of the law's restrictive provisions.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant (TANF). TANF substitutes a block grant for the open-ended matching grants that helped finance state welfare programs, reduces federal administrative authority, ends the entitlement of individuals to welfare, limits assistance to a family to sixty months, and gives states more discretion to design their welfare programs. Instead of detailed federal prescriptions regarding the process and structure of state programs, TANF sets a few goals and mandates for the states and guides their actions with financial incentives and penalties. Stales have new powers to restrict access to welfare, although they also have opportunities to deflect some of the law's restrictive provisions.
Deficit reduction was an important impetus for the devolution initiatives thai moved through the 104th Congress, but it was not the only cause. Other objectives, notably building an alliance with Republican governors and transforming the American welfare state, also helped to drive devolution. Although the Republican deficit and devolution agendas appeared mutually reinforcing at first, arguments over the terms of devolution (e.g., entitlement status, program mandates, and funding formulas) helped to slow down and build opposition to those agendas. The use of omnibus legislation helped to gel Republican proposals through the Congress in 1995, but packaging together popular and highly unpopular provisions in a single bill ultimately provided President Bill Clinton with political cover to veto the legislation. The unpopularity of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Clinton's pledge to “end welfare as we know it” propelled a more limited devolution agenda focused on AFDC in the lead-up to the 1996 presidential election. Devolution ofMedicaid was dropped, however, while Food Stamps and child nutrition programs experienced budget cuts but little devolution.
Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) and related programs, such as provider-specific taxes or intergovernmental transfers (IGTs), help support uncompensated care and effectively reduce State Medicaid expenditures by increasing Federal matching funds. We analyze the uses of these funds, based on a survey completed by 39 States and case studies of 6 States. We find that only a small share of these funds were available to cover the costs of uncompensated care. One method to ensure that funds are used for health care would be to reprogram funds into health insurance subsidies. An alternative to improve equity of funding across the Nation would be to create a substitute Federal grant program to directly support uncompensated care.
The 'Devolution Revolution': An Overview
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Immigrant Vote Swings Democratic As Issues Move Front and Center
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Concern for Uninsured Children Has Not Led to Agreement
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Plan Would Cut a Variety of Taxes and Modestly Curb Entitlements
- A Rubin
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Fiscal Effects of Block Grants for the Needy: A Review of the Evidence
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Immigrant--SSI Status Remains Major Issue To Be Resolved
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No Child Left Behind
- The White House
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Overview of Medicaid 'DSH' Provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
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Measuring the Gap between Medicare and Private Payment Rates
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GOP Gains Sense of Victory by Avoiding Big Missteps
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Debate on Education Policy Crystallizes Campaign Themes
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Clinton and the GOP Congress: A Rough Road to Agreement
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Finance Panel Approves Bill to Trim Medicaid Spending
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Questions for States As They Turn to Medicaid Managed Care
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The Deficit and the Politics of Domestic Reform
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