The Iron Cage Revisted: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields

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The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields
Author(s): Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell
Source:
American Sociological Review,
Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 147-160
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095101
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THE
IRON
CAGE REVISITED:
INSTITUTIONAL
ISOMORPHISM
AND COLLECTIVE
RATIONALITY
IN
ORGANIZATIONAL
FIELDS*
PAUL J.
DIMAGGIO
WALTER
W. POWELL
Yale University
What makes
organizations so similar?
We contend that the engine of
rationalization
and
bureaucratization
has moved
from
the
competitive
marketplace
to the state and
the
professions.
Once a set
of organizations
emerges
as a
field,
a
paradox
arises:
rational actors
make their
organizations
increasingly
similar
as
they try
to
change
them. We describe
three
isomorphic processes-coercive,
mimetic,
and
normative-leading
to
this
outcome. We
then
specify
hypotheses
about the impact of
resource
centralization
and dependency, goal ambiguity
and
technical
uncertainty,
and
professionalization
and structuration
on
isomorphic change.
Finally,
we
suggest
implications
for theories of organizations
and social
change.
In The
Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit
of
Capitalism,
Max Weber
warned that the
ra-
tionalist spirit
ushered in by
asceticism
had
achieved a
momentum of
its
own and
that,
under capitalism,
the rationalist
order had
be-
come an
iron
cage
in
which
humanity was,
save
for
the
possibility
of
prophetic
revival,
impris-
oned "perhaps
until the last
ton of fossilized
coal
is burnt"
(Weber,
1952:181-82).
In
his
essay
on
bureaucracy, Weber
returned to
this
theme, contending
that
bureaucracy, the
ra-
tional spirit's
organizational
manifestation,
was
so efficient
and powerful a
means of controlling
men and
women that, once
established,
the
momentum
of bureaucratization
was irreversi-
ble (Weber,
1968).
The imagery
of the iron
cage has haunted
students
of society as the
tempo
of bureau-
cratization
has
quickened.
But while bureau-
cracy
has
spread
continuously
in the
eighty
years
since
Weber
wrote,
we
suggest
that the
engine
of
organizational
rationalization
has
shifted.
For
Weber,
bureaucratization
resulted
from three
related
causes: competition
among
capitalist
firms
in the marketplace;
competition
among
states, increasing
rulers'
need to
control
their staff
and
citizenry;
and bourgeois
de-
mands
for equal
protection
under the
law. Of
these three,
the
most important
was
the com-
petitive
marketplace.
"Today,"
Weber
(1968:974)
wrote:
it is
primarily the
capitalist
market
economy
which demands that
the official business
of
administration
be discharged precisely,
un-
ambiguously,
continuously,
and
with
as
much
speed as
possible.
Normally,
the very
large,
modern
capitalist
enterprises
are
themselves
unequalled
models
of strict bu-
reaucratic
organization.
We
argue
that
the causes
of bureaucratiza-
tion and
rationalization
have
changed.
The
bu-
reaucratization
of the
corporation
and the state
have been
achieved.
Organizations
are
still be-
coming
more
homogeneous,
and
bureaucracy
remains
the
common
organizational
form.
Today,
however,
structural
change
in
organi-
zations
seems less and
less driven
by
competi-
tion or
by
the
need for
efficiency.
Instead,
we
will contend,
bureaucratization
and
other
forms of
organizational
change
occur as
the
result
of processes
that
make organizations
more similar
without necessarily
making
them
more
efficient.
Bureaucratization
and
other
forms of
homogenization
emerge,
we
argue,
out
of the structuration
(Giddens,
1979)
of or-
ganizational
fields.
This
process,
in
turn,
is
effected
largely
by
the state and the
profes-
sions,
which have
become the
great
ration-
alizers
of the second half
of the twentieth cen-
tury.
For reasons that
we will
explain,
highly
structured
organizational
fields
provide
a
con-
text
in
which individual efforts
to
deal
ration-
ally
with
uncertainty
and
constraint often
lead,
in-the
aggregate,
to homogeneity
in structure,
culture,
and
output.
*Direct
all
correspondence to: Paul
J.
DiMaggio
and
Walter
W.
Powell,
School
of
Organization and
Management,
Yale
University,
Box
IA, New
Haven,
CT 06520.
A
preliminary
version of
this
paper was
presented
by
Powell at the
American
Sociological Association
meetings
in
Toronto, August
1981.
We have
bene-
fited
considerably
from
careful
readings
of
earlier
drafts by
Dan
Chambliss,
Randall
Collins,
Lewis
Coser,
Rebecca
Friedkin,
Connie
Gersick,
Albert
Hunter,
Rosabeth Moss
Kanter,
Charles
E.
Lindblom, John
Meyer,
David
Morgan,
Susan
Olzak,
Charles
Perrow, Richard A.
Peterson, Arthur
Stinchcombe, Blair
Wheaton, and
two
anonymous
ASR
reviewers.
The
authors'
names are
listed in
alphabetical
order
for
convenience.
This was
a fully
collaborative
effort.
American
Sociological Review 1983, Vol. 48
(April: 147-160)
147

148
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
ORGANIZATIONAL
THEORY
AND
ORGANIZATIONAL
DIVERSITY
Much of
modern organizational
theory
posits a
diverse
and differentiated
world
of organi-
zations
and seeks to explain variation
among
organizations
in structure and behavior
(e.g.,
Woodward,
1965;
Child and Kieser,
1981).
Hannan
and Freeman
begin a major
theoretical
paper (1977)
with
the
question,
"Why are there
so many
kinds of organizations?"
Even our in-
vestigatory
technologies
(for example,
those
based
on
least-squares
techniques)
are geared
towards
explaining
variation rather
than
its
ab-
sence.
We ask,
instead,
why there is
such startling
homogeneity
of organizational
forms
and prac-
tices;
and we
seek to
explain
homogeneity,
not
variation.
In the initial
stages of their
life cycle,
organizational
fields
display
considerable
di-
versity
in approach and
form. Once
a field be-
comes
well
established, however,
there
is
an
inexorable
push
towards homogenization.
Coser,
Kadushin,
and
Powell
(1982)
describe
the evolution of
American
college textbook
publishing
from
a period
of
initial
diversity
to
the
current
hegemony
of
only
two
models,
the
large
bureaucratic
generalist
and the small
spe-
cialist.
Rothman
(1980)
describes the
winnow-
ing
of several
competing
models
of
legal
edu-
cation
into two dominant
approaches.
Starr
(1980) provides
evidence
of
mimicry
in the de-
velopment
of the
hospital field;
Tyack (1974)
and
Katz
(1975)
show a
similar process
in
pub-
lic
schools;
Barnouw
(1966-68)
describes
the
development
of dominant
forms in
the
radio
industry;
and DiMaggio
(1981)
depicts
the
emergence
of dominant
organizational
models
for
the
provision
of
high
culture
in the late
nineteenth
century.
What we see
in
each
of
these
cases
is the
emergence
and
structuration
of
an
organi-
zational
field as a
result
of
the activities
of
a
diverse set of
organizations;
and,
second,
the
homogenization
of these
organizations,
and
of
new entrants
as
well,
once
the field
is estab-
lished.
By
organizational
field,-we
mean those
orga-
nizations
that,
in
the
aggregate,
constitute
a
recognized
area of
institutional life: key
suppliers,
resource
and
product
consumers,
regulatory
agencies,
and
other
organizations
that
produce
similar
services or
products.
The
virtue
of this
unit of analysis
is that it
directs
our attention not
simply
to
competing
firms,
as
does
the
population
approach
of
Hannan and
Freeman
(1977),
or to networks of
organi-
zations that
actually
interact,
as does the
inter-
organizational
network
approach
of
Laumann
et
al.
(1978),
but to
the
totality
of relevant
actors.
In
doing
this,
the field idea
com-
prehends the
importance of both
connected-
ness (see
Laumann et al., 1978) and
structural
equivalence (White
et al., 1976).1
The structure
of an organizational
field can-
not be determined
a priori but
must be defined
on the basis of
empirical investigation.
Fields
only exist to
the extent that they
are institu-
tionally
defined.
The
process
of
institutional
definition,
or
"structuration,"
consists of four
parts: an increase
in
the extent
of interaction
among organizations
in the field; the
emergence
of
sharply
defined
interorgani-
zational
structures of domination and
patterns
of
coalition;
an increase
in
the
information load
with which
organizations
in
a
field
must con-
tend;
and
the
development
of a mutual aware-
ness among participants
in a set of
organi-
zations
that
they
are involved
in
a common
enterprise (DiMaggio,
1982).
Once
disparate
organizations
in
the same
line of business
are structured
into
an
actual
field
(as
we shall
argue, by competition,
the
state,
or
the
professions), powerful
forces
emerge
that
lead them to
become more similar
to one another.
Organizations
may change
their
goals
or
develop
new
practices,
and new
organizations
enter the field.
But,
in
the long
run, organizational
actors making
rational de-
cisions construct
around themselves
an
envi-
ronment
that constrains their
ability
to change
further
in later
years.
Early adopters
of
organi-
zational
innovations are
commonly
driven by a
desire to
improve
performance.
But
new prac-
tices can become,
in
Selznick's words
(1957:17),
"infused with
value
beyond
the tech-
nical
requirements
of
the task
at
hand."
As
an
innovation spreads,
a threshold
is reached be-
yond
which
adoption provides
legitimacy
rather than
improves
performance (Meyer
and
Rowan, 1977).
Strategies
that are rational for
individual
organizations may
not
be rational
if
adopted by large
numbers. Yet the
very
fact
that
they
are
normatively
sanctioned increases
the likelihood
of their
adoption.
Thus
organi-
zations
may try
to
change constantly;
but,
after
I
By
connectedness
we mean
the existence
of
transactions
tying
organizations
to one another:
such
transactions
might
include formal
contractual re-
lationships, participation
of
personnel
in
common
enterprises
such as
professional
associations,
labor
unions,
or
boards of
directors,
or informal
organizational-level
ties
like
personnel
flows.
A
set
of
organizations
that are
strongly
connected
to
one
another and
only
weakly
connected
to other
organi-
zations constitutes
a
clique. By
structural
equiva-
lence we
refer to
similarity
of
position
in
a network
structure:
for
example,
two
organizations
are
structurally equivalent
if
they
have
ties of the same
kind to the
same set
of
other
organizations,
even
if
they
themselves
are
not connected:
here the
key
structure
is the role
or
block.

INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 149
a certain
point
in the structuration
of an
orga-
nizational
field,
the
aggregate
effect
of individ-
ual
change
is to lessen
the
extent
of diversity
within the field.2
Organizations
in a
structured
field, to paraphrase
Schelling
(1978:14),
re-
spond
to an
environment
that
consists
of other
organizations
responding
to
their environment,
which consists
of organizations
responding
to
an
environment
of
organizations'
responses.
Zucker and
Tolbert's (1981)
work on the
adoption
of
civil-service
reform
in the
United
States
illustrates
this
process.
Early adoption
of civil-service
reforms was
related to
internal
governmental
needs,
and
strongly predicted
by
such
city
characteristics
as
the size
of
immi-
grant
population,
political
reform
movements,
socioeconomic
composition,
and
city
size.
Later
adoption,
however,
is
not
predicted
by
city
characteristics,
but is
related to
institu-
tional
definitions
of the
legitimate
structural
form for
municipal
administration.
Marshall
Meyer's
(1981)
study
of the
bureaucratization
of urban
fiscal
agencies
has
yielded
similar
findings:
strong
relationships
between city
characteristics
and
organizational
attributes
at
the
turn of
the
century,
null
relationships
in
recent
years.
Carroll and
Delacroix's
(1982)
findings
on
the birth and
death rates
of news-
papers
support
the view
that
selection acts
with
great
force
only
in the
early
years
of an
industry's
existence.4 Freeman
(1982:14)
sug-
gests
that
older,
larger
organizations
reach
a
point
where
they
can
dominate
their
envi-
ronments
rather
than adjust
to
them.
The concept
that best
captures
the process
of homogenization
is
isomorphism.
In Haw-
ley's
(1968)
description,
isomorphism
is
a con-
straining
process
that
forces
one
unit
in a
population
to resemble
other
units
that
face
the
same
set
of environmental
conditions.
At the
population
level,
such
an approach
suggests
that
organizational
characteristics
are
modified
in
the direction
of increasing
comparability
with
environmental
characteristics;
the
number
of
organizations
in a
population
is
a
function
of environmental
carrying
capacity;
and
the
diversity
of
organizational
forms
is
isomorphic
to environmental
diversity.
Han-
nan
and
Freeman
(1977)
have
significantly
ex-
tended
Hawley's
ideas.
They argue
that
isomorphism
can
result
because
nonoptimal
forms are selected
out of
a
population
of
orga-
nizations
or because
organizational
decision
makers
learn
appropriate
responses
and adjust
their behavior
accordingly.
Hannan and
Freeman's
focus
is almost
solely
on
the
first
process:
selection.5
Following
Meyer (1979)
and
Fennell
(1980),
we maintain
that
there are
two
types
of
isomorphism:
competitive
and
institutional.
Hannan
and
Freeman's
classic
paper
(1977),
and
much of
their
recent
work,
deals
with
competitive
isomorphism,
assuming
a
system
2
By organizational
change,
we
refer
to
change
in
formal
structure, organizational
culture,
and
goals,
program,
or
mission. Organizational
change
varies
in
its
responsiveness
to technical
conditions.
In this
paper
we are
most interested
in
processes
that
affect
organizations
in
a
given
field:
in
most
cases
these
organizations
employ
similar
technical bases;
thus
we do
not
attempt
to
partial
out
the relative
im-
portance
of
technically
functional
versus
other
forms
of organizational
change.
While
we shall
cite
many
examples
of
organizational
change
as
we
go
along,
our purpose
here
is to identify
a
widespread
class
of
organizational
processes
relevant
to a
broad
range
of
substantive
problems,
rather
than
to identify
deter-
ministically
the.
causes
of specific
organizational
ar-
rangements.
3
Knoke
(1982),
in
a careful
event-history
analysis
of the spread
of
municipal
reform,
refutes
the
con-
ventional
explanations
of
culture
clash
or
hierarchal
diffusion
and
finds but
modest
support
for
modern-
ization
theory.
His
major
finding
is
that
regional
dif-
ferences
in municipal
reform adoption
arise
not
from
social compositional
differences,
"but
from
some
type
of
imitation
or contagion
effects
as
represented
by
the
level
of neighboring
regional
cities
previously
adopting
reform
government"
(p.
1337).
4
A
wide
range
of
factors-interorganizational
commitments,
elite sponsorship,
and government
support
in
form
of
open-ended
contracts,
subsidy,
tariff
barriers
and
import
quotas,
or favorable
tax
laws-reduce
selection
pressures
even
in competi-
tive organizational
fields.
An
expanding
or
a
stable,
protected
market
can
also
mitigate
the
forces
of
selection.
5In contrast
to
Hannan
and Freeman,
we
empha-
size
adaptation,
but
we are
not suggesting
that
man-
agers'
actions
are
necessarily
strategic
in
a
long-
range
sense.
Indeed,
two
of
the
three
forms
of
isomorphism
described
below-mimetic
and
normative-involve
managerial
behaviors
at
the
level
of
taken-for-granted
assumptions
rather
than
consciously
strategic
choices.
In general,
we
ques-
tion
the
utility
of arguments
about
the
motivations
of
actors
that suggest
a
polarity
between
the
rational
and
the
nonrational.
Goal-oriented
behavior may
be
reflexive
or
prerational
in the
sense
that
it
reflects
deeply
embedded
predispositions,
scripts,
schema,
or classifications;
and
behavior
oriented
to
a goal
may
be
reinforced
without
contributing
to
the
ac-
complishment
of
that
goal.
While
isomorphic
change
may
often
be
mediated
by
the
desires
of
managers
to
increase
the
effectiveness
of
their
organizations,
we
are
more
concerned
with the
menu
of possible
op-
tions
that
managers
consider
than
with
their
motives
for choosing
particular
alternatives.
In
other
words,
we
freely
concede
that
actors'
understandings
of
their
own
behaviors
are
interpretable
in
rational
terms.
The
theory
of isomorphism
addresses
not
the
psychological
states
of actors
but
the
structural
de-
terminants
of
the
range
of choices
that actors
per-
ceive
as
rational
or
prudent.

150
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
rationality
that
emphasizes market
competi-
tion,
niche change,
and fitness
measures.
Such
a view,
we suggest,
is most
relevant
for those
fields
in
which
free
and open
competition
exists.
It
explains
parts
of the process
of bu-
reaucratization
that Weber
observed,
and may
apply
to early
adoption
of innovation,
but
it
does
not present
a fully adequate
picture
of the
modern
world
of organizations.
For
this pur-
pose
it
must
be supplemented
by
an institu-
tional
view of
isomorphism
of the
sort intro-
duced
by Kanter
(1972:152-54)
in
her discus-
sion of
the forces
pressing
communes
toward
accommodation
with the
outside world.
As Al-
drich
(1979:265)
has argued,
"the major
factors
that
organizations
must take
into
account are
other
organizations."
Organizations
compete
not just
for resources
and
customers,
but for
political
power
and institutional
legitimacy,
for
social
as well as
economic
fitness.6
The con-
cept
of institutional
isomorphism
is a useful
tool for understanding the
politics
and cere-
mony
that
pervade
much modern
organi-
zational
life.
Three
Mechanisms
of
Institutional
Isomorphic
Change
We
identify
three mechanisms
through
which
institutional
isomorphic
change
occurs, each
with
its own
antecedents:
1)
coercive
isomorphism
that
stems
from political
influ-
ence
and the
problem
of
legitimacy;
2)
mimetic
isomorphism
resulting
from
standard
re-
sponses
to
uncertainty;
and
3)
normative
isomorphism,
associated
with
professionaliza-
tion.
This
typology
is an
analytic
one: the
types
are
not
always
empirically
distinct.
For exam-
ple,
external
actors
may
induce an
organization
to conform
to its
peers
by requiring
it to
per-
form a
particular
task
and
specifying
the
pro-
fession
responsible
for its
performance.
Or
mimetic
change
may
reflect environmentally
constructed
uncertainties.7
Yet,
while
the
three
types
intermingle
in
empirical
setting,
they
tend
to derive
from different conditions
and
may
lead
to different outcomes.
Coercive
isomorphism.
Coercive
iso-
morphism
results
from both
formal and
in-
formal
pressures
exerted
on
organizations
by
other
organizations
upon
which
they
are
de-
pendent
and
by
cultural
expectations
in
the
society
within which
organizations
function.
Such
pressures
may
be felt as
force,
as
persua-
sion,
or as
invitations
to
join
in
collusion.
In
some
circumstances,
organizational
change
is a
direct
response
to
government
mandate:
man-
ufacturers
adopt
new
pollution
control
technologies
to
conform
to
environmental
reg-
ulations;
nonprofits
maintain
accounts,
and
hire
accountants,
in
order
to
meet
tax
law
re-
quirements;
and
organizations
employ
affirmative-action
officers
to
fend
off
allega-
tions of
discrimination.
Schools
mainstream
special
students
and
hire
special
education
teachers,
cultivate
PIAs
and
administrators
who
get
along
with
them,
and
promulgate
cur-
ricula
that
conform
with
state
standards
(Meyer
et
al.,
1981).
The
fact
that
these
changes
may
be
largely
ceremonial
does
not
mean
that
they
are
inconsequential.
As
Ritti
and Goldner
(1979)
have
argued,
staff
become
involved
in
advocacy
for
their
functions
that
can alter
power
relations
within
organizations
over
the
long
run.
The existence
of a
common legal
environ-
ment
affects
many
aspects
of an
organization's
behavior
and
structure.
Weber
pointed
out the
profound
impact
of
a complex,
rationalized
system
of contract
law that
requires
the
neces-
sary
organizational
controls
to honor
legal
commitments.
Other
legal
and
technical
re-
quirements
of
the
state-the
vicissitudes
of
the
budget
cycle,
the
ubiquity
of certain
fiscal
years,
annual
reports,
and
financial
reporting
requirements
that
ensure
eligibility
for
the re-
ceipt
of
federal
contracts
or funds-also
shape
organizations
in similar
ways.
Pfeffer
and
Salancik (1978:188-224)
have
discussed
how
organizations
faced
with
unmanageable
inter-
dependence
seek
to use the
greater
power
of
the larger
social
system
and its
government
to
eliminate
difficulties
or
provide
for
needs.
They
observe
that politically
constructed
envi-
ronments
have
two
characteristic
features:
political
decisionmakers
often
do not
experi-
ence directly
the
consequences
of
their ac-
tions; and
political
decisions
are
applied
across
the board
to entire
classes
of
organizations,
thus
making
such decisions
less
adaptive
and
less
flexible.
Meyer
and Rowan
(1977)
have
argued
per-
suasively
that as
rationalized
states
and
other
large
rational
organizations
expand
their
domi-
nance over
more
arenas
of
social
life,
organi-
zational
structures
increasingly
come
to reflect
rules institutionalized
and
legitimated
by
and
within
the
state (also
see
Meyer
and Hannan,
1979).
As a
result,
organizations
are
increas-
ingly
homogeneous
within
given
domains
and
increasingly
organized
around
rituals
of
con-
formity
to
wider institutions.
At the
same
time,
organizations
are
decreasingly
structurally
determined
by
the
constraints
posed
by
techni-
cal
activities,
and
decreasingly
held
together
6
Carroll and
Delacroix
(1982)
clearly
recognize
this and include
political
and
institutional
legitimacy
as
a major
resource.
Aldrich
(1979)
has argued
that
the
population
perspective
must
attend
to
historical
trends and
changes
in
legal and
political
institutions.
7
This
point
was suggested
by John
Meyer.

INSTITUTIONAL
ISOMORPHISM
151
by output
controls.
Under
such
circumstances,
organizations
employ
ritualized
controls
of
credentials
and group
solidarity.
Direct
imposition
of standard
operating pro-
cedures
and legitimated
rules
and
structures
also occurs
outside
the governmental
arena.
Michael
Sedlak (1981)
has documented
the
ways that
United Charities
in the 1930s
altered
and homogenized the
structures,
methods,
and
philosophies
of the social
service
agencies that
depended
upon them
for support.
As conglom-
erate corporations
increase
in size and scope,
standard
performance
criteria
are
not
neces-
sarily
imposed on
subsidiaries,
but it is com-
mon for subsidiaries
to be subject
to stan-
dardized
reporting
mechanisms
(Coser et
al.,
1982).
Subsidiaries
must adopt
accounting
practices,
performance
evaluations,
and bud-
getary
plans
that are
compatible
with the
policies
of the parent
corporation.
A variety
of
service
infrastructures,
often
provided by
monopolistic
firms-for
example,
telecom-
munications
and transportation-exert
com-
mon pressures
over
the
organizations
that use
them. Thus,
the expansion
of
the
central state,
the centralization
of capital,
and
the
coordina-
tion
of
philanthropy
all
support
the
homogeni-
zation of
organizational
models
through
direct
authority
relationships.
We have
so
far
referred only
to the direct
and
explicit
imposition
of
organizational
mod-
els
on
dependent
organizations.
Coercive
isomorphism,
however,
may be
more
subtle
and
less explicit
than
these examples suggest.
Milofsky
(1981)
has
described the
ways
in
which
neighborhood
organizatioins
in
urban
communities, many
of which are committed
to
participatory
democracy,
are
driven
to
devel-
oping
organizational
hierarchies
in
order
to
gain support
from more hierarchically orga-
nized donor organizations.
Similarly, Swidler
(1979)
describes
the
tensions
created
in the
free
schools
she studied
by
the need
to have a
"principal"
to
negotiate
with
the
district
sup-
erintendent
and
to
represent
the school
to out-
side
agencies.
In
general,
the
need to
lodge
responsibility
and
managerial
authority
at least
ceremonially
in a
formally
defined
role in
order
to interact
with
hierarchical organizations
is a
constant
obstacle
to the maintenance
of
egalitarian
or collectivist
organizational
forms
(Kanter,
1972;
Rothschild-Whitt,
1979).
Mimetic
processes.
Not all institutional
isomorphism,
however,
derives from coercive
authority.
Uncertainty
is also a
powerful
force
that
encourages
imitation. When
organi-
zational
technologies
are
poorly
understood
(March
and
Olsen,
1976),
when
goals
are
am-
biguous,
or
when the environment
creates
symbolic
uncertainty, organizations
may
model themselves
on
other
organizations.
The
advantages of mimetic
behavior in the econ-
omy
of
human action are
considerable; when
an
organization faces a
problem with ambigu-
ous
causes or unclear
solutions, problemistic
search may yield a viable
solution with little
expense (Cyert and
March, 1963).
Modeling,
as we use the
term,
is a
response
to
uncertainty.
The modeled
organization may
be unaware
of
the
modeling
or
may have
no
desire to be
copied;
it
merely
serves as a con-
venient source of
practices that the borrowing
organization may
use.
Models
may
be
diffused
unintentionally, indirectly
through employee
transfer
or
turnover,
or
explicitly by organi-
zations
such as
consulting
firms or
industry
trade associations.
Even innovation
can
be
ac-
counted
for
by organizational
modeling.
As
Alchian (1950)
has observed:
While there
certainly
are those
who
con-
sciously innovate,
there
are
those
who,
in
their imperfect attempts
to
imitate
others,
unconsciously innovate
by unwittingly ac-
quiring some unexpected
or
unsought unique
attributes which under
the prevailing
cir-
cumstances
prove
partly responsible
for the
success. Others,
in
turn,
will
attempt
to
copy
the uniqueness, and
the innovation-imitation
process
continues.
One
of
the most dramatic
instances
of mod-
eling
was the
effort
of
Japan's
modernizers
in
the late nineteenth
century
to model
new
gov-
ernmental initiatives
on
apparently
successful
western -prototypes.
Thus, the imperial gov-
ernment sent
its officers
to
study
the
courts,
Army,
and
police
in
France,
the
Navy
and
postal system
in
Great
Britain,
and
banking
and art
education
in
the United
States
(see
Westney, forthcoming).
American
corpo-
rations
are
now
returning
the
compliment by
implementing (their
perceptions of) Japanese
models
to
cope
with
thorny productivity
and
personnel problems
in
their
own
firms. The
rapid proliferation
of
quality
circles
and
quality-of-work-life
issues
in
American
firms
is,
at least
in
part,
an
attempt
to
model
Japanese
and
European
successes. These de-
velopments
also have a ritual
aspect; com-
panies adopt
these "innovations"
to
enhance
their
legitimacy,
to
demonstrate
they
are
at
least
trying
to
improve
working conditions.
More
generally,
the wider the
population
of
personnel employed by,
or customers served
by,
an
organization,
the
stronger
the
pressure
felt
by
the
organization
to
provide
the
pro-
grams
and
services offered
by
other
organi-
zations.
Thus,
either
a
skilled
labor
force or
a
broad customer base
may
encourage
mimetic
isomorphism.
Much
homogeneity
in organizational
structures
stems from the
fact that despite con-

152
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
siderable
search for
diversity there is
relatively
little variation
to be
selected from.
New orga-
nizations are
modeled
upon old ones
through-
out
the
economy, and
managers
actively seek
models upon
which to
build
(Kimberly, 1980).
Thus, in the
arts one can
find textbooks
on how
to
organize a
community
arts council or
how to
start a
symphony
women's guild.
Large orga-
nizations
choose from a
relatively
small set of
major
consulting firms,
which, like
Johnny
Appleseeds,
spread a few
organizational mod-
els
throughout
the
land.
Such
models are
pow-
erful
because structural
changes are observa-
ble, whereas
changes
in
policy and
strategy are
less easily
noticed. With
the advice of
a major
consulting
firm,
a
large
metropolitan
public
television
station
switched
from
a
functional
design
to a multidivisional
structure.
The
sta-
tions'
executives were
skeptical that
the
new
structure was
more
efficient;
in
fact,
some ser-
vices were
now
duplicated across
divisions.
But they
were convinced
that the new
design
would carry
a powerful
message to
the for-
profit
firms
with whom the
station
regularly
dealt.
These
firms, whether
in
the
role
of cor-
porate underwriters or
as
potential
partners
in
joint
ventures,
would
view the
reorganization
as a
sign
that "the
sleepy
nonprofit station
was
becoming
more
business-minded"
(Powell,
forthcoming).
The
history
of
management
re-
form in
American
government
agencies,
which
are
noted
for
their
goal
ambiguity,
is
almost a
textbook case of
isomorphic model-
ing, from the
PPPB
of the
McNamara
era to the
zero-based
budgeting
of the
Carter administra-
tion.
Organizations
tend
to model
themselves
after similar
organizations
in
their field that
they perceive
to be more
legitimate
or suc-
cessful.
The
ubiquity of certain
kinds
of
structural
arrangements
can
more
likely
be
credited
to
the
universality
of
mimetic
pro-
cesses than to
any
concrete
evidence that the
adopted
models enhance
efficiency.
John
Meyer (1981)
contends
that
it is
easy
to
predict
the
organization
of a
newly emerging
nation's
administration without
knowing
anything
about the
nation
itself,
since
"peripheral
na-
tions
are
far
more
isomorphic-in
administra-
tive
form and economic
pattern-than
any
theory
of the world
system
of
economic di-
vision
of
labor would lead one
to
expect."
Normative
pressures.
A
third
source
of
isomorphic
organizational
change
is
normative
and
stems
primarily
from
professionalization.
Following
Larson
(1977) and Collins
(1979),
we
interpret professionalization
as the
collective
struggle of
members of an
occupation
to
define
the
conditions and methods of
their
work,
to
control "the
production
of
producers"
(Lar-
son,
1977:49-52),
and
to establish
a
cognitive
base
and
legitimation
for
their
occupational
autonomy.
As
Larson
points
out,
the
profes-
sional
project
is
rarely
achieved
with
complete
success.
Professionals
must
compromise
with
nonprofessional
clients,
bosses, or
regulators.
The
major
recent
growth in
the
professions
has
been
among
organizational
professionals,
par-
ticularly
managers
and
specialized
staff
of
large
organizations.
The
increased
professionaliza-
tion of
workers
whose
futures
are
inextricably
bound
up
with
the
fortunes
of
the
organizations
that
employ them has
rendered
obsolescent
(if
not
obsolete)
the
dichotomy
between
organi-
zational
commitment
and
professional
alle-
giance
that
characterized
traditional
profes-
sionals in
earlier
organizations
(Hall,
1968).
Professions
are
subject to
the
same
coercive
and
mimetic
pressures as
are
organizations.
Moreover,
while
various
kinds
of
professionals
within
an
organization
may
differ
from
one
an-
other,
they
exhibit
much
similarity
to
their
professional
counterparts
in
other
organi-
zations.
In
addition,
in
many
cases,
profes-
sional
power
is
as
much
assigned
by the
state
as it
is
created
by the
activities
of the
profes-
sions.
Two
aspects
of
professionalization are im-
portant
sources
of
isomorphism.
One is the
resting of formal
education and of
legitimation
in a
cognitive
base
produced
by
university
spe-
cialists;
the
second is
the
growth and
elabora-
tion
of
professional
networks
that
span
organi-
zations
and
across which new
models diffuse
rapidly.
Universities and
professional
training
institutions
are
important centers
for the
de-
velopment of
organizational
norms
among
professional
managers
and their
staff.
Profes-
sional and trace
associations are
another
vehi-
cle
for
the
definition and
promulgation
of nor-
mative
rules about
organizational
and
profes-
sional behavior.
Such
mechanisms
create
a
pool
of
almost
interchangeable
individuals
who
occupy
similar
positions
across a
range
of
or-
ganizations
and
possess
a
similarity
of
orienta-
tion and
disposition
that
may
override
varia-
tions
in
tradition and
control that
might
other-
wise
shape
organizational behavior
(Perrow,
1974).
One
important
mechanism
for
encouraging
normative
isomorphism
is
the
filtering
of
per-
sonnel. Within
many
organizational
fields fil-
tering
occurs
through
the
hiring
of
individuals
from firms within
the
same
industry;
through
the recruitment
of fast-track staff
from
a
nar-
row
range
of
training
institutions;
through
common
promotion
practices,
such as
always
hiring
top
executives from
financial
or
legal
departments;
and
from
skill-level
requirements
for
particular
jobs.
Many
professional
career
tracks
are so
closely
guarded,
both
at the
entry
level and
throughout
the career
progression,

INSTITUTIONAL
ISOMORPHISM
153
that individuals
who
make
it to
the
top are
virtually
indistinguishable.
March
and
March
(1977)
found
that
individuals
who
attained
the
position
of
school superintendent
in
Wisconsin
were so
alike
in background
and orientation
as
to make
further career
advancement
random
and unpredictable.
Hirsch
and
Whisler
(1982)
find a similar
absence
of
variation
among
For-
tune 500 board
members.
In
addition,
individu-
als
in an
organizational
field
undergo
antici-
patory
socialization
to common
expectations
about their
personal
behavior,
appropriate
style
of dress,
organizational
vocabularies
(Cicourel,
1970;
Williamson,
1975)
and
stan-
dard methods
of speaking,
joking,
or
address-
ing
others
(Ouchi,
1980).
Particularly
in
indus-
tries
with a service
or financial
orientation
(Collins,
1979,
argues
that the importance
of
credentials is
strongest
in
these
areas),
the
fil-
tering
of
personnel
approaches
what
Kanter
(1977)
refers to
as
the "homosexual
reproduc-
tion of management."
To
the extent
managers
and
key
staff are drawn
from the
same
univer-
sities
and
filtered
on a common
set of
attri-
butes,
they
will tend
to view
problems
in a
simi-
lar fashion,
see
the
same
policies,
procedures
and structures as
normatively
sanctioned and
legitimated,
and
approach
decisions
in much
the same
way.
Entrants
to professional
career
tracks
who
somehow escape
the filtering
process-for
example,
Jewish
naval
officers,
woman
stockbrokers,
or Black
insurance
executives-are
likely
to be
subjected
to
per-
vasive
on-the-job
socialization.
To
the extent
that
organizations
in
a
field
differ and
primary
socialization
occurs
on
the job,
socialization
could
reinforce,
not
erode,
differences
among
organizations.
But
when
organizations
in
a
field are
similar and occupational
socialization
is
carried
out
in
trade
association
workshops,
in-service
educational programs,
consultant
ar-
rangements,
employer--professional
school
networks,
and
in the
pages
of trade
magazines,
socialization
acts as an isomorphic
force.
The professionalization
of
management
tends
to
proceed
in
tandem
with the structura-
tion
of
organizational
fields.
The
exchange
of
information
among
professionals
helps
con-
tribute to
a
commonly
recognized
hierarchy
of
status,
of
center and
periphery,
that becomes
a
matrix for
information
flows
and
personnel
movement
across
organizations.
This status
ordering
occurs
through
both
formal
and
in-
formal
means.
The
designation
of a few
large
firms
in an
industry
as
key
bargaining
agents
in
union-management
negotiations
may
make
these
central
firms
pivotal
in other
respects
as
well. Government recognition
of
key
firms
or
organizations
through
the
grant
or contract
process
may
give
these
organizations
legiti-
macy and visibility and lead competing
firms
to
copy aspects of their structure
or
operating
procedures
in
hope
of
obtaining
similar
re-
wards. Professional and trade associations
provide other
arenas in which center
organiza-
tions
are
recognized
and their
personnel given
positions of substantive
or
ceremonial
influ-
ence. Managers
in
highly visible organizations
may in turn have
their stature
reinforced
by
representation on the boards
of
other organi-
zations, participation
in
industry-wide
or
inter-industry councils,
and consultation
by
agencies
of
government (Useem, 1979).
In
the
nonprofit sector, where legal barriers
to
collu-
sion
do
not exist,
structuration
may proceed
even
more rapidly.
Thus
executive
producers
or
artistic directors
of
leading
theatres head
trade or professional
association
committees,
sit on government
and foundation
grant-award
panels,
or consult
as
government-
or
foundation-financed management
advisors to
smaller theatres, or
sit
on smaller organi-
zations'
boards,
even as
their stature
is
rein-
forced
and
enlarged by
the
grants
their theatres
receive from government, corporate,
and
foundation funding
sources
(DiMaggio, 1982).
Such
central organizations
serve
as both
active
and
passive models;
their
policies
and
structures will be copied throughout
their
fields.
Their
centrality
is
reinforced
as
up-
wardly mobile managers
and
staff seek
to
se-
cure positions
in
these
central
organizations
in
order
to further their
own
careers.
Aspiring
managers may undergo anticipatory
socializa-
tion into the
norms and mores
of
the
organi-
zations
they hope
to
join.
Career
paths may
also
involve
movement
from
entry positions
in
the center organizations
to
middle-
management positions
in
peripheral organi-
zations.
Personnel flows
within
an
orgarni-
zational field
are further
encouraged by
structural homogenization,
for
example
the
existence of
common career titles and
paths
(such
as
assistant, associate,
and
full
profes-
sor)
with
meanings
that
are
commonly
under-
stood.
It is important to note that each of the in-
stitutional
isomorphic processes can be ex-
pected
to
proceed
in
the absence
of evidence
that
they increase
internal
organizational effi-
ciency.
To
the
extent
that
organizational effec-
tiveness
is
enhanced,
the reason will
often be
that
organizations are rewarded for being
similar
to
other organizations
in
their fields.
This
similarity can make it easier for organi-
zations to
transact
with
other
organizations, to
attract
career-minded staff, to be acknowl-
edged
as
legitimate
and
reputable, and to fit
into administrative categories that define eligi-
bility
for
public
and
private grants and con-
tracts.
None of this, however, insures that

154
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
conformist
organizations do what they do more
efficiently than do
their more deviant peers.
Pressures for
competitive efficiency are also
mitigated
in
many
fields because the number of
organizations
is
limited and there are strong
fiscal and
legal
barriers
to entry and exit. Lee
(1971:51) maintains
this is why hospital ad-
ministrators
are less
concerned with the effi-
cient
use of
resources
and more concerned
with status
competition and parity in prestige.
Fennell (1980) notes
that hospitals are a poor
market system because
patients lack
the
needed knowledge
of
potential exchange
partners
and
prices. She
argues
that
physicians
and
hospital administrators are the actual con-
sumers. Competition
among hospitals
is
based
on
"attracting
physicians, who,
in
turn, bring
their
patients
to the
hospital."
Fennell
(p. 505)
concludes
that:
Hospitals operate
according to a norm of
social
legitimation
that frequently conflicts
with market
considerations of efficiency and
system rationality.
Apparently, hospitals can
increase their
range of services not because
there is an
actual
need for a particular service
or
facility within
the patient population, but
because
they
will
be defined as fit only
if
they can offer
everything other hospitals in
the
area offer.
These
results
suggest
a more
general pattern.
Organizational
fields that include
a
large pro-
fessionally
trained labor force
will
be
driven
primarily by
status
competition. Organi-
zational
prestige
and resources are
key
ele-
ments
in
attracting professionals.
This
process
encourages homogenization
as
organizations
seek to
ensure
that
they
can
provide
the same
benefits and
services
as their
competitors.
PREDICTORS OF ISOMORPHIC
CHANGE
It follows from our discussion of
the mech-
anism
by
which
isomorphic change
occurs that
we
should
be able to
predict empirically
which
organizational
fields will
be
most
homogeneous
in
structure, process, and behavior.
While an
empirical
test of such
predictions
is
beyond
the
scope of
this
paper, the ultimate
value
of our
perspective
will
lie in
its
predictive utility.
The
hypotheses
discussed below are not meant to
exhaust the universe of
predictors,
but
merely
to
suggest
several
hypotheses
that
may
be
pur-
sued
using
data on the characteristics
of
orga-
nizations
in
a
field, either
cross-sectionally or,
preferably,
over time. The
hypotheses
are im-
plicitly governed by
ceteris
paribus
assump-
tions, particularly
with
regard
to
size,
technol-
ogy,
and centralization of external
resources.
A.
Organizational-level
predictors. There
is
variability
in the
extent
to and
rate at
which
organizations
in a field
change
to
become
more
like their
peers.
Some
organizations
respond to
external
pressures
quickly;
others
change
only
after a
long period
of
resistance. The
first two
hypotheses derive from
our
discussion of coer-
cive
isomorphism
and
constraint.
Hypothesis A-1: The
greater
the
dependence
of
an
organization
on another
organization,
the
more
similar it will
become to that
organi-
zation
in
structure,
climate, and
behavioral
focus.
Following
Thompson
(1957)
and
Pfeffer
and Salancik
(1978),
this
proposition
recog-
nizes the
greater
ability
of
organizations
to
re-
sist the demands
of
organizations
on whom
they are not
dependent.
A
position
of
depen-
dence leads to
isomorphic
change.
Coercive
pressures are built into
exchange
relationships.
As Williamson
(1979)
has
shown,
exchanges
are
characterized
by
transaction-specific
in-
vestments
in both
knowledge
and
equipment.
Once an
organization
chooses a
specific
supplier
or distributor
for
particular
parts
or
services,
the
supplier
or distributor
develops
expertise
in
the
performance
of the task as well
as
idiosyncratic
knowledge
about the
exchange
relationship.
The
organization
comes to
rely
on
the
supplier
or
distributor and such
transaction-specific
investments
give
the
supplier
or distributor
considerable
advantages
in
any
subsequent
competition
with
other
suppliers
or distributors.
Hypothesis
A-2:
The
greater
the
centraliza-
tion
of
organization A's
resource
supply, the
greater the
extent
to which
organization
A will
change
isomorphically to
resemble the
organi-
zations
on
which it
depends
for
resources. As
Thompson
(1967)
notes,
organizations
that de-
pend
on the
same
sources for
funding,
person-
nel,
and
legitimacy
will
be more
subject to
the
whims of
resource
suppliers
than will
organi-
zations
that can
play one source of
support off
against
another.
In
cases
where
alternative
sources are
either not
readily
available
or re-
quire effort to
locate, the
stronger
party
to the
transaction can
coerce the
weaker
party to
adopt
its
practices
in
order
to
accommodate
the
stronger
party's
needs
(see
Powell,
1983).
The
third and
fourth
hypotheses derive
from
our
discussion of
mimetic
isomorphism, mod-
eling,
and
uncertainty.
Hypothesis
A-3:
The
more
uncertain
the re-
lationship
between
means and
ends the
greater
the
extent to which an
organization will
model
itself after
organizations it
perceives to be
suc-
cessful.
The
mimetic
thought
process
involved
in
the
search for
models is
characteristic of
change
in
organizations
in
which
key
technologies
are
only
poorly
understood
(March and
Cohen, 1974).
Here our
prediction
diverges
somewhat
from
Meyer
and Rowan

INSTITUTIONAL
ISOMORPHISM
155
(1977) who argue, as
we do, that organizations
which lack well-defined
technologies will
im-
port institutionalized
rules and
practices.
Meyer and Rowan
posit a loose coupling
be-
tween legitimated external
practices and inter-
nal organizational
behavior. From
an
ecologist's point
of
view, loosely coupled
or-
ganizations are
more likely to vary
internally.
In contrast, we expect
substantive internal
changes
in tandem with more ceremonial
prac-
tices, thug greater
homogeneity
and less varia-
tion and change.
Internal consistency of
this
sort is an important
means of interorgani-
zational coordination.
It
also
increases
organi-
zational stability.
Hypothesis
A-4: The more ambiguous
the
goals of
an
organization,
the
greater
the
extent
to which the organization
will model itself after
organizations
that it
perceives
to
be suc-
cessful. There
are two reasons
for this.
First,
organizations
with ambiguous
or
disputed
goals
are
likely
to
be
highly dependent upon
appearances
for
legitimacy.
Such
organizations
may
find
it
to
their
advantage
to
meet the ex-
pectations
of
important
constituencies
about
how they should be
designed
and run.
In
con-
trast to
our
view,
ecologists
would
argue
that
organizations that
copy
other
organizations
usually have no competitive
advantage.
We
contend that,
in most
situations,
reliance
on
established, legitimated
procedures
enhances
organizational legitimacy
and
survival charac-
teristics.
A
second reason
for
modeling
be-
havior
is
found
in situations
where conflict
over
organizational
goals
is
repressed
in
the
interest of harmony;
thus participants find
it
easier to mimic other
organizations
than to
make
decisions on the basis
of
systematic
analyses
of
goals
since such analyses
would
prove painful
or disruptive.
The
fifth and sixth hypotheses are based
on
our discussion of normative
processes
found in
professional organizations.
Hypothesis
A-5: The
greater
the reliance on
academic
credentials
in
choosing managerial
and
staff personnel,
the
greater
the extent to
which
an
organization
will become like
other
organizations
in its
field. Applicants
with aca-
demic credentials
have
already undergone
a
socialization
process
in
university programs,
and are
thus more
likely
than others to have
internalized reigning
norms and dominant
or-
ganizational
models.
Hypothesis
A-5: The
greater
the
participa-
tion of organizational
managers
in
trade and
professional
associations,
the more
likely
the
organization
will
be, or will become, like
other
organizations
in its
field.
This
hypothesis
is
parallel
to the institutional
view
that the
more elaborate the relational
networks
among
organizations
and their
members,
the
greater
the
collective
organization of the environment
(Meyer
and
Rowan,
1977).
B.
Field-level
predictors.
The
following
six
hypotheses
describe the
expected effects of
several characteristics
of
organizational
fields
on the
extent
of
isomorphism
in
a
particular
field.
Since
the
effect
of
institutional
isomorphism is
homogenization,
the best
indi-
cator of
isomorphic
change
is
a
decrease
in
variation
and
diversity,
which
could be mea-
sured
by
lower standard deviations of
the
values
of
selected
indicators
in a
set
of
organi-
zations. The
key
indicators would
vary
with
the
nature of the field and the
interests of the
investigator.
In
all
cases,
however,
field-level
measures are
expected
to affect
organizations
in
a field
regardless
of each
organization's
scores on
related
organizational-level
mea-
sures.
Hypothesis
B-1:
The
greater
the
extent
to
which
an
organizational
field is
dependent
upon
a
single
(or
several
similar)
source
of
support
for vital
resources,
the
higher
the
level
of
isomorphism. The
centralization
of re-
sources
within a
field both
directly
causes
homogenization
by
placing
organizations
under
similar
pressures from
resource
suppliers, and
interacts
with
uncertainty
and
goal
ambiguity
to
increase
their
impact.
This
hypothesis
is
congruent
with the
ecologists'
argument
that
the
number
of
organizational
forms is
deter-
mined
by
the
distribution of
resources in
the
environment and
the terms
on
which
resources
are
available.
Hypothesis
B-2: The
greater
the
extent to
which the
organizations in
afield
transact
with
agencies
of
the
state,
the
greater
the
extent
of
isomorphism in
the
field as
a
whole.
This fol-
lows
not
just
from the
previous
hypothesis, but
from
two
elements of
state/private-sector
transactions:
their
rule-boundedness and for-
mal
rationality,
and
the
emphasis of
govern-
ment actors
on
institutional rules.
Moreover,
the
federal
government
routinely
designates
industry standards for
an
entire
field which
require
adoption
by
all
competing
firms.
John
Meyer
(1979)
argues
convincingly that the
as-
pects
of an
organization which
are affected
by
state
transactions
differ to
the
extent
that state
participation
is
unitary
or
fragmented
among
several
public
agencies.
The
third and
fourth
hypotheses
follow
from
our
discussion of
isomorphic
change
resulting
from
uncertainty
and
modeling.
Hypothesis
B-3: The
fewer
the
number
of
visible
alternative
organizational
models in
a
field,
the
faster
the
rate
of
isomorphism in
that
field.
The
predictions of this
hypothesis are
less
specific than those
of
others and
require
further
refinement;
but
our
argument
is
that for
any
relevant
dimension
of
organizational
strat-

156
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
egies
or
structures in an
organizational field
there
will
be a
threshold
level, or a
tipping
point,
beyond
which
adoption
of the
domi-
nant form
will
proceed
with
increasing
speed
(Granovetter,
1978;
Boorman
and
Leavitt,
1979).
Hypothesis
B-4: The
greater
the
extent to
which
technologies are
uncertain or
goals are
ambiguous
within
afield, the
greater
the rate
of
isomorphic
change. Somewhat
counterin-
tuitively,
abrupt
increases
in
uncertainty and
ambiguity
should,
after brief
periods
of
ideologically
motivated
experimentation, lead
to
rapid
isomorphic
change. As
in the
case
of
A-4,
ambiguity
and
uncertainty
may be
a func-
tion of
environmental
definition, and,
in
any
case, interact
both
with
centralization of re-
sources
(A-i,
A-2, B-I,
B-2) and with
profes-
sionalization
and structuration
(A-5,
A-6, B-5,
B-6).
Moreover,
in
fields
characterized by a
high
degree of
uncertainty,
new
entrants,
which
could
serve
as
sources of
innovation and
variation,
will
seek to
overcome
the
liability of
newness
by
imitating
established
practices
within
the
field.
The
two final
hypotheses
in
this
section fol-
low
from
our
discussion
of
professional
filter-
ing,
socialization,
and
structuration.
Hypothesis B-5:
The
greater
the
extent of
professionalization in a
field, the
greater
the
amount
of institutional
isomorphic
change.
Professionalization
may be measured
by
the
universality
of
credential
requirements,
the
robustness of
graduate
training
programs,
or
the
vitality
of
professional
and
trade
associ-
ations.
Hypothesis
B-6:
The
greater
the
extent
of
structuration
of
a
field,
the
greater
the
degree
of
isomorphics.
Fields that have
stable and
broadly
acknowledged
centers,
peripheries,
and
status orders will be
more
homogeneous
both
because
the
diffusion
structure
for
new
models
and
norms is more
routine and
because
the level of
interaction
among
organizations
in
the field is
higher.
While
structuration
may
not
lend
itself
to
easy
measurement, it
might be
tapped
crudely
with
the
use of such
familiar
measures
as
concentration
ratios, reputational
interview
studies,
or
data on
network
charac-
teristics.
This
rather schematic
exposition
of
a dozen
hypotheses
relating the
extent
of
isomorphism
to
selected attributes of
organizations
and
of
organizational
fields does not constitute a
complete
agenda
for
empirical
assessment of
our
perspective.
We have not
discussed the
expected
nonlinearities and
ceiling
effects
in
the
relationships
that we have
posited.
Nor
have
we
addressed the
issue
of the
indicators
that
one must use
to measure
homogeneity.
Organizations
in
a field
may
be
highly
diverse
on
some
dimensions, yet
extremely
homoge-
neous on
others. While
we suspect, in
general,
that the rate
at which the
standard
deviations
of
structural or
behavioral
indicators
approach
zero will
vary with the
nature
of
an
organi-
zational field's
technology and
environment,
we will not
develop these
ideas here.
The point
of
this section
is to
suggest that the
theoretical
discussion is
susceptible
to empirical
test, and
to
lay out a few
testable
propositions
that may
guide future
analyses.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
SOCIAL
THEORY
A
comparison
of
macrosocial theories of
func-
tionalist or
Marxist
orientation
with
theoretical
and empirical work
in
the
study of
organi-
zations
yields
a
paradoxical conclusion.
Societies
(or
elites),
so it
seems,
are
smart,
while
organizations are
dumb.
Societies com-
prise
institutions that mesh
together
comforta-
bly
in the
interests
of
efficiency
(Clark, 1962),
the
dominant value
system
(Parsons,
1951), or,
in
the
Marxist version,
capitalists
(Domhoff,
1967;
Althusser, 1969).
Organizations,
by con-
trast,
are
either anarchies
(Cohen
et
al., 1972),
federations of
loosely
coupled parts
(Weick,
1976),
or
autonomy-seeking agents
(Gouldner,
1954)
laboring
under such
formidable con-
straints
as bounded
rationality (March
and
Simon,
1958),
uncertain or
contested
goals
(Sills, 1957),
and unclear
technologies
(March
and
Cohen,
1974).
Despite
the findings of
organizational re-
search,
the
image
of
society
as
consisting
of
tightly
and
rationally
coupled
institutions
per-
sists
throughout
much
of
modern social
theory.
Rational
administration
pushes
out
non-
bureaucratic
forms,
schools
assume the
structure of
the
workplace, hospital
and
uni-
versity administrations come to
resemble the
management
of
for-profit
firms,
and
the mod-
ernization of
the
world
economy proceeds
un-
abated.
Weberians
point
to
the
continuing
homogenization
of
organizational
structures
as
the formal
rationality
of
bureaucracy
extends
to
the
limits
of
contemporary organizational
life.
Functionalists
describe
the
rational
adap-
tation
of
the
structure
of
firms,
schools,
and
states
to
the values and
needs
of
modern soci-
ety
(Chandler, 1977;
Parsons, 1977).
Marxists
attribute
changes
in
such
organizations
as
welfare
agencies
(Pivan
and
Cloward, 1971)
and
schools
(Bowles
and
Gintis,
1976)
to
the
logic
of the accumulation
process.
We find it
difficult to
square
the
extant
lit-
erature on
organizations
with
these macroso-
cial
views. How
can
it be
that the confused
and
contentious bumblers that
populate
the
pages
of
organizational
case studies and
theories
combine
to
construct
the
elaborate and
well-

INSTITUTIONAL
ISOMORPHISM
157
proportioned
social
edifice
that
macrotheorists
describe?
The conventional
answer
to this
paradox
has
been that
some version
of
natural selection
oc-
curs
in
which
selection
mechanisms
operate
to
weed out
those
organizational
forms
that
are
less
fit.
Such
arguments,
as
we have
con-
tended,
are
difficult
to mesh with organi-
zational
realities.
Less efficient
organizational
forms do
persist.
In some contexts
efficiency
or productivity
cannot
even
be
measured.
In
government
agencies
or
in
faltering
corpo-
rations
selection
may
occur
on
political
rather
than economic
grounds.
In
other
contexts,
for
example
the
Metropolitan
Opera
or the
Bohe-
mian Grove,
supporters
are
far
more con-
cerned with
noneconomic
values like
aesthetic
quality
or social
status
than
with
efficiency
per
se.
Even
in the
for-profit
sector,
where
com-
petitive
arguments
would
promise
to
bear the
greatest
fruit,
Nelson
and
Winter's
work
(Winter,
1964,
1975;
Nelson
and
Winter,
1982)
demonstrates
that the
invisible
hand
operates
with, at
best,
a light
touch.
A
second
approach
to
the paradox
that
we
have
identified
comes
from
Marxists
and
theorists who assert
that key
elites guide
and
control
the
social
system
through
their
com-
mand of
crucial
positions
in
major
organi-
zations
(e.g.,
the
financial
institutions
that
dominate
monopoly
capitalism).
In this
view,
while organizational
actors
ordinarily
proceed
undisturbed
through
mazes of
standard
operating
procedures,
at
key
turning points
capitalist
elites
get
their
way by
intervening
in
decisions
that set
the course
of
an
institution
for
years
to come
(Katz,
1975).
While evidence
suggests
that this is,
in
fact,
sometimes
the
case-Barnouw's
account
of
the
early
days
of
broadcasting
or
Weinstein's
(1968)
work
on the
Progressives
are good
examples-other
historians have
been
less
successful
in
their
search
for class-conscious
elites.
In
such
cases as the development
of
the
New Deal
programs
(Hawley,
1966)
or the
ex-
pansion
of the
Vietnamese conflcit (Halperin,
1974),
the capitalist
class
appears
to
have
been
muddled
and
disunited.
Moreover,
without
constant
monitoring,
in-
dividuals
pursuing
parochial
organizational
or
subunit interests
can
quickly
undo
the
work
that
even
the
most
prescient
elites
have ac-
complished.
Perrow
(1976:21)
has noted
that
despite
superior
resources
and
sanctioning
power,
organizational
elites
are often unable
to
maximize
their
preferences
because
"the
com-
plexity
of
modern
organizations
makes
control
difficult."
Moreover,
organizations
have
in-
creasingly
become
the
vehicle for
numerous
"gratifications,
necessities,
and
preferences
so
that
many groups
within
and without
the
orga-
nization
seek
to
use
it for
ends
that
restrict
the
return
to
masters."
We reject
neither
the
natural-selection
nor
the
elite-control
arguments
out
of hand. Elites
do exercise
considerable
influence
over mod-
ern
life and aberrant
or
inefficient organi-
zations
sometimes
do expire.
But
we contend
that neither
of these
processes
is
sufficient
to
explain
the extent
to
which organizations
have
become
structurally
more
similar.
We argue
that a
theory
of
institutional
isomorphism
may
help
explain
the
observations
that organi-
zations
are
becoming
more
homogeneous,
and
that elites
often
get
their
way,
while at the
same
time
enabling
us to
understand
the irra-
tionality,
the frustration
of
power,
and the
lack
of
innovation that
are so commonplace
in or-
ganizational
life.
What
is
more,
our
approach
is
more
consonant
with the
ethnographic
and
theoretical
literature
on
how
organizations
work
than
are
either
functionalist
or elite
theories
of
organizational
change.
A focus
on
institutional
isomorphism
can
also
add a much needed
perspective
on
the
political
struggle
for organizational
power
and
survival that
is missing
from
much
of
popula-
tion
ecology.
The
institutionalization
approach
associated
with John
Meyer
and
his
students
posits
the
importance
of myths
and
ceremony
but
does not
ask
how these
models arise and
whose interests
they
initially
serve.
Explicit
attention
to the
genesis
of
legitimated
models
and
to the definition
and
elaboration
of
organi-
zational
fields
should
answer
this
question.
Examination
of the
diffusion
of
similar
organi-
zational strategies
and
structures
should be a
productive
means
for assessing
the influence
of
elite
interests.
A consideration
of
isomorphic
processes
also leads
us
to
a bifocal
view
of
power
and
its
application
in
modern
politics.
To the
extent
that organizational
change
is
unplanned
and goes
on
largely
behind
the
backs
of
groups
that
wish
to
influence
it,
our
attention
should
be
directed
to two
forms of
power.
The
first,
as
March
and Simon
(1958)
and Simon
(1957)
pointed
out
years
ago,
is
the
power
to set
premises,
to
define
the norms and
standards
which
shape
and channel
behavior.
The
second
is
the point
of critical
intervention
(Domhoff,
1979)
at
which
elites can
define
ap-
propriate
models
of
organizational
structure
and
policy
which
then
go
unquestioned
for
years
to come
(see
Katz,
1975).
Such
a
view
is
consonant
with some
of
the best
recent work
on
power
(see
Lukes,
1974);
research
on
the
structuration of
organizational
fields
and on
isomorphic
processes
may
help give
it
more
empirical
flesh.
Finally,
a more
developed
theory
of
organi-
zational
isomorphism
may
have
important
im-
plications
for
social
policy
in those
fields in

158
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
which the state
works through private
organi-
zations. To the
extent that pluralism is a
guid-
ing value in
public policy deliberations,
we
need to discover
new forms of
intersectoral
coordination that
will
encourage diversification
rather than
hastening homogenization.
An
understanding of
the manner
in
which
fields
become
more
homogeneous would
prevent
policy makers and
analysts from confusing
the
disappearance
of an
organizational form
with
its substantive
failure. Current efforts to en-
courage diversity tend
to be
conducted
in an
organizational vacuum.
Policy
makers con-
cerned with
pluralism
should
consider the
im-
pact of their programs
on
the
structure
of
orga-
nizational fields as a
whole,
and
not
simply
on
the
programs
of individual
organizations.
We believe there is much to be
gained
by
attending
to
similarity
as well
as
to
variation
among organizations
and,
in
particular,
to
change
in
the
degree
of
homogeneity
or varia-
tion
over time. Our
approach seeks to
study
incremental
change
as well as selection. We
take seriously the observations of
organi-
zational
theorists
about the role of
change,
am-
biguity,
and
constraint and
point
to the
impli-
cations of these
organizational
characteristics
for the social structure as a whole. The foci and
motive forces
of
bureaucratization (and, more
broadly, homogenization
in
general) have,
as
we argued,
changed since Weber's time. But
the
importance
of
understanding
the
trends
to
which
he called
attention has never been more
immediate.
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