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Resilience: Theory and Application

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There is strong agreement among policymakers, practitioners, and academic researchers that the concept of resilience must play a major role in assessing the extent to which various entities - critical infrastructure owners and operators, communities, regions, and the Nation - are prepared to respond to and recover from the full range of threats they face. Despite this agreement, consensus regarding important issues, such as how resilience should be defined, assessed, and measured, is lacking. The analysis presented here is part of a broader research effort to develop and implement assessments of resilience at the asset/facility and community/regional levels. The literature contains various definitions of resilience. Some studies have defined resilience as the ability of an entity to recover, or 'bounce back,' from the adverse effects of a natural or manmade threat. Such a definition assumes that actions taken prior to the occurrence of an adverse event - actions typically associated with resistance and anticipation - are not properly included as determinants of resilience. Other analyses, in contrast, include one or more of these actions in their definitions. To accommodate these different definitions, we recognize a subset of resistance- and anticipation-related actions that are taken based on the assumption that an adverse event is going to occur. Such actions are in the domain of resilience because they reduce both the immediate and longer-term adverse consequences that result from an adverse event. Recognizing resistance- and anticipation-related actions that take the adverse event as a given accommodates the set of resilience-related actions in a clear-cut manner. With these considerations in mind, resilience can be defined as: 'the ability of an entity - e.g., asset, organization, community, region - to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance.' Because critical infrastructure resilience is important both in its own right and because of its implications for community/regional resilience, it is especially important to develop a sound methodology for assessing resilience at the asset/facility level. This objective will be accomplished by collecting data on four broadly defined groups of resilience-enhancing measures: preparedness, mitigation measures, response capabilities, and recovery mechanisms. Table ES-1 illustrates how the six components that define resilience are connected to the actions that enhance the capacity of an entity to be resilient. The relationships illustrated in Table ES-1 provide the framework for developing a survey instrument that will be used to elicit the information required to assess resilience at the asset/facility level. The resilience of a community/region is a function of the resilience of its subsystems, including its critical infrastructures, economy, civil society, governance (including emergency services), and supply chains/dependencies. The number and complexity of these subsystems will make the measurement of resilience more challenging as we move from individual assets/facilities to the community/regional level (where critical infrastructure resilience is only one component). Specific challenges include uncertainty about relationships (e.g., the composition of specific supply chains), data gaps, and time and budget constraints that prevent collection of all of the information needed to construct a comprehensive assessment of the resilience of a specific community or region. These challenges can be addressed, at least partially, by adopting a 'systems approach' to the assessment of resilience. In a systems approach, the extent to which the analysis addresses the resilience of the individual subsystems can vary. Specifically, high-level systems analysis can be used to identify the most important lower-level systems. In turn, within the most important lower-level systems, site assessment data should be collected only on the most critical asset-level components about which the least is known. Implementation of the strategies outlined here to assess resilience will facilitate the following four objectives: (1) Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the asset/facility level, (2) Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the critical infrastructure sector level, (3) Provide resilience-related information to critical infrastructure owners/operators to facilitate risk-based resource decision making, and (4) Provide resilience-related information to State and local mission partners to support their risk-based resource decision making.
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Resilience: Theory and Applications
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Contents
Contents ......................................................................................................................................... iii
Figures............................................................................................................................................ iv
Tables ............................................................................................................................................. iv
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... v
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... vii
1 Overview ................................................................................................................................... 9
2 Definition and Properties of Resilience .................................................................................. 11
2.1 Defining Resilience ........................................................................................................ 11
2.1.1 General Definitions ............................................................................................ 12
2.1.2 Definitions of Infrastructure Resilience ............................................................. 13
2.1.3 Definitions of Community Resilience ............................................................... 14
2.2 Synthesis of Different Definitions ................................................................................. 15
2.3 Our Definition ................................................................................................................ 17
3 Measurement and Evaluation of Resilience ............................................................................ 19
3.1 Systems Approach to the Assessment/Measurement of Resilience ............................... 20
3.2 Critical Infrastructure Resilience ................................................................................... 20
3.3 Community/Regional Resilience ................................................................................... 22
3.3.1 Definition and Measurement of Components of Community/Regional
Resilience ........................................................................................................... 25
4 Making the Case for Participation in the Assessment of, and Investment in, Resilience ....... 31
4.1 Infrastructure Resilience ................................................................................................ 31
4.2 Community/Regional Resilience ................................................................................... 34
5 The Path Forward .................................................................................................................... 39
5.1 Develop a Methodology and Supporting Products to Assess Resilience at the Facility
Level .............................................................................................................................. 39
5.2 Develop a Methodology and Supporting Products to Assess Resilience at the Sector
Level .............................................................................................................................. 40
5.3 Provide Resilience-Related Information to Critical Infrastructure Owners/Operators to
Facilitate Risk-Based Resource Decision Making ......................................................... 40
5.4 Provide Resilience-Related Information to State and Local Mission Partners That Will
Support Their Risk-Based, Resource Decision-Making Process ................................... 42
5.5 Summary ........................................................................................................................ 42
6 References ............................................................................................................................... 43
Appendix A: Energy Assurance Plan Steps A, B, and C......................................................... 47
Resilience: Theory and Applications
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Appendix B: Building Resilient Regions Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) Indicators .......... 49
Appendix C: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Coastal Resiliency
Index Sample Questions .................................................................................................... 51
Appendix D: Federal and State Funding Opportunities to Help Finance Improvements in
Community and Regional Resilience...................................................................................... 53
Appendix E: List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................... 59
Figures
1 Components of Resilience and the Timing of an Adverse Event ........................................... 18
2 Community/Regional Resilience Framework ......................................................................... 23
3 Site Assessment Contribution to Community Resilience Analysis ........................................ 24
4 Representative Dashboard Presentation .................................................................................. 41
Tables
ES-1 Relationship between Components of Resilience
and Resilience-Enhancing Measures ................................................................................ vii
1 Distinguishing among Resistance- and Anticipation-Related Actions ................................... 17
2 Relationship between Components of Resilience and Resilience-Enhancing Measures ........ 22
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Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge the role of U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Protective Security members of the Resilience Assessment Methodology Working Group Mike
Norman, David Bradfield, John Walsh, Sean McAraw, Carlos Bishop, and Paul Meyers in
motivating the development of and contributing constructive views for this paper.
We also acknowledge the contributions of several Argonne colleagues. Jean-Michel Guldmann,
Jim Peerenboom, Ron Fisher, and David Dickinson who reviewed the report and made several
sound suggestions that greatly improved its quality and breadth. Andrea Manning carefully
edited the report, and Linda Conlin prepared it for publication.
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Executive Summary
There is strong agreement among policymakers, practitioners, and academic researchers that the
concept of resilience must play a major role in assessing the extent to which various entities
critical infrastructure owners and operators, communities, regions, and the Nation are
prepared to respond to and recover from the full range of threats they face. Despite this
agreement, consensus regarding important issues, such as how resilience should be defined,
assessed, and measured, is lacking. The analysis presented here is part of a broader research
effort to develop and implement assessments of resilience at the asset/facility and
community/regional levels.
The literature contains various definitions of resilience. Some studies have defined resilience as
the ability of an entity to recover, or “bounce back,” from the adverse effects of a natural or
manmade threat. Such a definition assumes that actions taken prior to the occurrence of an
adverse event actions typically associated with resistance and anticipation are not properly
included as determinants of resilience. Other analyses, in contrast, include one or more of these
actions in their definitions. To accommodate these different definitions, we recognize a subset of
resistance- and anticipation-related actions that are taken based on the assumption that an
adverse event is going to occur. Such actions are in the domain of resilience because they reduce
both the immediate and longer-term adverse consequences that result from an adverse event.
Recognizing resistance- and anticipation-related actions that take the adverse event as a given
accommodates the set of resilience-related actions in a clear-cut manner. With these
considerations in mind, resilience can be defined as: the ability of an entity e.g., asset,
organization, community, region to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and
recover from a disturbance.
Because critical infrastructure resilience is important both in its own right and because of its
implications for community/regional resilience, it is especially important to develop a sound
methodology for assessing resilience at the asset/facility level. This objective will be
accomplished by collecting data on four broadly defined groups of resilience-enhancing
measures: preparedness, mitigation measures, response capabilities, and recovery mechanisms.
Table ES-1 illustrates how the six components that define resilience are connected to the actions
that enhance the capacity of an entity to be resilient. The relationships illustrated in Table ES-1
provide the framework for developing a survey instrument that will be used to elicit the
information required to assess resilience at the asset/facility level.
Table ES-1: Relationship between Components of Resilience and Resilience-Enhancing Measures
Resilience: Theory and Applications
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The resilience of a community/region is a function of the resilience of its subsystems, including
its critical infrastructures, economy, civil society, governance (including emergency services),
and supply chains/dependencies. The number and complexity of these subsystems will make the
measurement of resilience more challenging as we move from individual assets/facilities to the
community/regional level (where critical infrastructure resilience is only one component).
Specific challenges include uncertainty about relationships (e.g., the composition of specific
supply chains), data gaps, and time and budget constraints that prevent collection of all of the
information needed to construct a comprehensive assessment of the resilience of a specific
community or region. These challenges can be addressed, at least partially, by adopting a
“systems approach” to the assessment of resilience. In a systems approach, the extent to which
the analysis addresses the resilience of the individual subsystems can vary. Specifically, high-
level systems analysis can be used to identify the most important lower-level systems. In turn,
within the most important lower-level systems, site assessment data should be collected only on
the most critical asset-level components about which the least is known.
Implementation of the strategies outlined here to assess resilience will facilitate the following
four objectives:
1. Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the asset/facility
level,
2. Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the critical
infrastructure sector level,
3. Provide resilience-related information to critical infrastructure owners/operators to
facilitate risk-based resource decision making, and
4. Provide resilience-related information to State and local mission partners to support their
risk-based resource decision making.
The first objective will be accomplished by modifying the current version of the Infrastructure
Survey Tool (IST) developed by Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne). Modification of the
IST will result in an enhanced version of Argonne’s Resilience Index (RI). The second objective
will be accomplished by analyzing data collected with the new versions of the IST and the RI to
better understand the primary resilience-related characteristics of each critical infrastructure
sector and to identify each sector’s resilience-related strengths and weaknesses. The third
objective will be accomplished by identifying and developing the types of resilience-related
information critical infrastructure owners and operators need to make informed resource
allocation decisions and developing an effective means of providing them with that information.
Finally, the fourth objective will identify the types of resilience-related information that State
and local mission partners currently lack, as well as the most effective methods for displaying
and sharing this information with them.
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1 Overview
Over the past several years, publications ranging from government-produced policy documents
to analyses in scholarly outlets have provided varying perspectives on the role of resilience in
policies and programs that are designed to address natural and man-made threats.
1
A review of
those documents and reports reveals that there is strong agreement among policymakers (The
White House 2011; DHS 2010, 2009; NIAC 2009), practitioners (Opstal 2007), and academic
researchers (Kahan et al. 2009; Norris et al. 2008; Fiksel 2006) that the concept of resilience
must play a major role in assessing the extent to which various entities critical infrastructure,
networks (e.g., electricity generation, transmission and distribution), communities, regions, and
the Nation are prepared to deal with the full range of threats they face. Agreement regarding
the importance of resilience notwithstanding, there is a lack of consensus regarding important
issues associated with the concept, including how resilience should be defined and how
resilience on various scales should be assessed and measured.
2
The analysis presented here is part of a broader research effort to develop and implement a set of
instruments to assess resilience at the asset/facility and community/regional levels. This paper
examines the theoretical and applied literature on resilience, focusing on the definition,
characteristics/determinants, and assessment of resilience at the asset/facility (including
organizations such as hospitals) and community/regional levels. Sources include scholarly
publications; trade organization publications (e.g., the Council on Competitiveness; National
Institute of Building Sciences [NIBS]); and research reports produced by governmental and
educational organizations, such as the Community and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI) at
Oak Ridge National Laboratory and The Center for Resilience at The Ohio State University,
among others. This paper also addresses practical issues, including the availability of data
needed to measure resilience at different levels, and the willingness or motivation for private
entities, as well as local and regional governments, to assist in data collection efforts and invest
in increased resilience.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a brief overview of the emergence of
resilience as an integral component of a comprehensive risk management strategy and consider
definitions of resilience that have been proposed or applied in various documents. We also
provide a rationale for the definition of resilience that is employed in the remainder of this paper
and that will underlie the subsequent development and implementation of a set of instruments to
measure resilience at different levels. In section 3, we consider a range of issues related to the
measurement of resilience at the infrastructure and community/regional levels, and present the
basic framework we employ. Section 4 addresses the issue of how to motivate private
enterprises, communities, and regions to participate in the assessment of resilience and invest in
increased resilience. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of how the results of sections 2
through 4 of the paper will facilitate the achievement of specific objectives associated with the
assessment of resilience at the asset and community/regional levels.
1
The terms “threat,“hazard, and “event” are often used interchangeably in discussions concerning homeland
security issues. That will be the case in this paper as well.
2
As the National Research Council has noted, [t]he meaning of resilience, however, is far from clear.
Numerous definitions of resilience exist, and the term is often used loosely and inconsistently”
(NRC 2011, p. 27).
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2 Definition and Properties of Resilience
Although the concept of resilience has been applied in a variety of settings (e.g., psychology,
psychiatry, ecology, social science, economy, and engineering) for several decades
(Renschler et al. 2010, Rose 2009), it has received an increasing amount of attention in the area
of risk management over the past several years. In the case of natural and man-made threats,
analyses of resilience have focused on critical infrastructures, communities, and regions and on
the resilience of various subsystems (e.g., a community’s or region’s economy, governmental
units, emergency services sector, the civilian population). As we discuss in Section 2.1, the
assessment of resilience varies according to the object of analysis. In addition, certain measures
of resilience, such as critical infrastructure resilience and economic resilience, are important both
in their own right and in their roles as determinants of resilience measured at a broader level,
such as community or regional resilience.
Ultimately, the goal of efforts to assess such properties as protection (vulnerability), resilience,
criticality, and so forth is to enable decision makers to make informed choices that will result in
cost-effective reductions in the risks associated with the range of natural and man-made threats
we face. Viewed from this perspective, we find that where we draw the line between such
indicators as vulnerability and resilience is less important than being able to develop a process
for measuring those indicators that will produce results that are consistent, reproducible, and
useful to decision makers. Having a clear and consistent process for distinguishing and
measuring resilience is a necessary element of a comprehensive approach to risk management.
The initial step in developing that process is to establish a working definition of resilience.
2.1 Defining Resilience
As the review of the literature presented here clearly demonstrates, there is considerable
variation in how different authors have defined resilience. For example, definitions vary
depending on the object of analysis (e.g., asset, facility, system, community/region, system of
systems). Even when attention is focused on a specific object of analysis (e.g., community),
definitions vary in substantive ways. The definition of resilience, however, should be
independent of the object of analysis and, in the interest of facilitating the formulation of
compatible policy goals in both the public and private sectors by a range of actors private
decision makers (e.g., business owners and managers) and local, State, and national government
decision makers the same definition should be used in all decision-making processes.
Establishing a uniform definition is critically important. Our definition of resilience will affect
how we distinguish between resilience and other measures specifically, protection and
vulnerability of our ability to withstand the adverse effects of natural and man-made threats.
3
3
The importance of distinguishing between vulnerability and resilience notwithstanding, as a practical matter
there are certain aspects of protection and resilience that overlap. For example, the use of blast curtains has the
potential to reduce the probability of a terrorist attack which implies an increased level of protection
because the anticipated benefits to the terrorist in the form of damage to the facility, deaths, injuries, etc., are
considered to be too small to warrant the expenditure of resources on an attack. In addition, in the event an attack
occurs, the blast curtains might protect certain features of the asset (e.g., telecommunications equipment) that,
in turn, enhances the rapidity of recovery of the asset’s full functioning subsequent to the attack which
implies increased resilience.
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Equally important, the definition of resilience has important implications for how resilience is
measured or assessed. To appreciate the differences in how resilience has been defined in the
literature, we have divided the definitions into three broad categories: general definitions,
definitions of infrastructure resilience, and definitions of community resilience.
2.1.1 General Definitions
Several documents discuss the concept of resilience in very broad terms and without reference to
a specific object of analysis (e.g., a critical asset/facility, community, or region). As the set of
definitions included here demonstrates, there is a clear break in opinion regarding how resilience
should be defined. To be specific, in describing the components or determinants of resilience,
several of the definitions considered here focus on what happens after the adverse event (i.e.,
an adverse natural or man-made event), whereas others include one or more before the adverse
event components, including resistance, protection, anticipation, and preparedness.
4
2.1.1.1 Resilience Definitions That Include Only “After-Event” Components
[Resilience is] “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, undergo change, and
retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks”
(Longstaff et al. 2010, p. 2).
We define resilience as: a process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive
trajectory of functioning and adaptation after [emphasis added] a disturbance…. resilience
emerges from a set of adaptive capacities” (Norris et al. 2008; p. 130, 135).
“The capacity of a system to survive, adapt and grow in the face of change and
uncertainty” (Fiksel 2006, p. 21).
“Resiliency is defined as the capability of a system to maintain its functions and structure
in the face of internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it must”
(Allenby and Fink 2005, p. 1034).
[Resilience is] [t]he ability of systems to absorb changes... and still persist”
(Holling 1973, p. 3).
2.1.1.2 Resilience Definitions Containing Both “Before” And “After Event
Components
“The term ‘resilience refers to the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand
and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies” (The White House 2011, p. 6).
[Extended definition of resilience as the] “[a]bility of systems, infrastructures,
government, business, communities, and individuals to resist, tolerate, absorb, recover
4
This difference is readily apparent when we consider competing definitions of both infrastructure resilience and
community resilience.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
13
from, prepare for, or adapt to an adverse occurrence that causes harm, destruction, or
loss” (DHS 2010, p. 26).
Resilience is defined as the ability to minimize the costs of a disaster, to return to a state
as good as or better than the status quo ante, and to do so in the shortest feasible time…
Resistance is used to mean the ability to withstand a hazard without suffering much harm.
Resilience in this paper will include resistance but will also include the ability to recover
after suffering harm from a hazard” (Gilbert 2010, p. 11).
“We see resilience as the aggregate result of achieving specific objectives in regard to
critical systems and their key functions, following a set of principles that can guide the
application of practical ways and means across the full spectrum of homeland security
missions… The objectives (or end states) of resilience that underpin our approach are
resistance, absorption, and restoration” (Kahan et al. 2009, p. 9).
[Resilience is] [t]he capacity of a system, community, or society potentially exposed to
hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing, in order to reach and maintain an acceptable
level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social
system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past
disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures”
(SDR 2005, p. 17).
“The term ‘resilience,”… implies both the ability to adjust to normal or anticipated
stresses and strains and to adapt to sudden shocks and extraordinary demands. In the
context of hazards, the concept spans both pre-event measures that seek to prevent
disaster-related damage and post-event strategies designed to cope with and minimize
disaster impacts” (Tierney 2003, p. 3).
2.1.2 Definitions of Infrastructure Resilience
Infrastructure resilience (or what in some circles is referred to as organizational resilience
(Stephenson 2010)) is important both in its own right and because it contributes to the resilience
of other objects of analysis, such as communities and regions. As Stephenson (2010) has argued:
To be resilient, communities rely on services and employment provided by
organisations, to enable them to plan for, respond to, and recover from emergencies and
crises. However, organisational and community resilience are two sides of the same coin;
if organisations are not prepared to respond to emergencies and crises, communities too
are not prepared (p. iii).
Stephenson’s position reflects the commonly held view that the resilience of a community’s
infrastructure is a key determinant of the community’s overall resilience. As such, if the
infrastructure in a particular community is not resilient, the community’s overall resilience will
be undermined, all else remaining constant.
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“The QHSR [Quadrennial Homeland Security Review] offers the homeland security
enterprise a strategic framework for understanding protection and resilience. The QHSR
describes protection efforts as being focused on stopping an attack or disruption from
occurring, while resilience efforts are centered on minimizing the consequences of a
disaster. As such, it implies that protection and resilience are distinct, complementary,
and necessary elements of a comprehensive risk management strategy for the critical
infrastructure mission” (SLTTGCC 2011, p. 3).
Resilience is defined as the ability to minimize the costs of a disaster, to return to a state
as good as or better than the status quo ante, and to do so in the shortest feasible time…
In order to effectively measure and improve resilience, we need to define what bad thing
it is we are trying to avoid. That is, we need to know what it is we are trying to protect.
Protecting physical infrastructure means limiting damage to buildings and structures,
including most lifeline infrastructure (Gilbert 2010, pp. 1112).
“Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude, impact, or duration of a
disruption. Resilience is the ability to absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a
potentially disruptive event” (NIAC 2009, p. 12).
2.1.3 Definitions of Community Resilience
Risk management at the community level requires consideration of both the risks faced by
critical infrastructure and the community’s ability to recover from a disruptive event. The latter
can be captured by measuring the community’s resilience. As was the case when considering
both general definitions and definitions of infrastructure resilience, the definitions of community
resilience considered here reveal disagreement over whether one or more pre-event actions
(e.g., resistance, protection, anticipation, preparedness) should be included in the definition and,
consequently, measurement of community resilience as well.
Disaster Resilience for regions and communities, refers to the capability to prepare for,
prevent, protect against, respond to or mitigate any anticipated or unexpected significant
threat or event, including terrorist attacks, to adapt to changing conditions and rapidly
recover to normal or a “new normal,” and reconstitute critical assets, operations, and
services with minimum damage and disruption to public health and safety, the economy,
environment, and national security. (TISP 2011, p. 7).
The sub-factors of resilience defined in the DHS Risk Lexicon resist, absorb, and
recover or adapt can be … used to describe subordinate objectives (outcomes) against
which preparedness capabilities (outputs) could be measured. Thus, capabilities
developed to prevent, protect, and mitigate strengthen our ability to resist hazards;
response capabilities enable us to absorb impacts; and recovery capabilities support a
return to normalcy or adaptation to a new norm which may mitigate future impacts
The objective is to strengthen the capacity to ‘resist,’ through strategies to thwart
intentional attacks or other man-made disasters; through protective measures that reduce
the probability of failure, like access controls or protective barriers; and by taking steps to
reduce the consequences of failure, through measures such as provision of back-up power
Resilience: Theory and Applications
15
or ensuring that critical facilities are not located in areas known to be vulnerable to
adverse events” (HSAC 2011, pp. 1011).
A disaster-resilient nation is one in which its communities, through mitigation and pre-
disaster preparation, develop the adaptive capacity to maintain important community
functions and recover quickly when major disasters occur” (NRC 2011, p. 29).
[Community resilience is] [t]he capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, undergo
change, and retain the same essential functions, structure, identity, and feedbacks…
Resilience in a community setting is the ability of a community to absorb a disturbance
while retaining its essential functions” (Longstaff et al. 2010, pp. 3,4).
We define resilience as: a process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive
trajectory of functioning and adaptation after [emphasis added] a disturbance….
community resilience [emerges] from a set of networked adaptive capacities”
(Norris et al. 2008, p. 130, 135).
Efforts should therefore be focused on the promotion of [societal] resilience,
i.e., the ability to ‘bounce back’ after suffering a damaging blow” (Boin and
McConnell 2007, p. 54).
[Community resilience is] [t]he capacity of a community, its members and the systems
that facilitate its normal activities to adapt in ways that maintain functional relationships
in the presence of significant disturbances” (Paton 2007, p. 7).
2.2 Synthesis of Different Definitions
As the range of definitions of resilience listed above demonstrates, the most significant
difference concerns the timing of specific actions, that is, actions that are taken prior to the
occurrence of the adverse event versus those actions that are taken after the event has occurred.
The majority of the documents we reviewed define resilience as the ability of an entity to
recover, or “bounce back,” from the adverse effects of a natural or man-made event.
5
In addition,
those same documents take the position, either explicitly or implicitly, that actions taken prior to
an adverse event’s occurrence (i.e., actions that are typically associated with resistance,
protection, anticipation, or preparedness) are not part of resilience. Rather, resistance, protection,
anticipation, preparedness-related measures, and resilience-related actions are distinct elements
of an overall strategy to address various threats. This view is advocated by Rose (2009), who
argues that “[m]y view is that vulnerability is primarily a pre-disaster condition, but that
resilience is the outcome of a post-disaster response. Resilience is one of several ways to reduce
vulnerability, the others being adaptation and the entirely separate strategy of mitigation” (p. 3).
The preceding observation notwithstanding, several of the documents we reviewed (NRC 2011;
HSAC 2011; TISP 2011; DHS 2010; Tierney 2003) include one or more of the concepts of
5
A review of the literature by Norris et al. (2008) yielded results similar to our own; they found that 16 of the
21 studies they examined define resilience as capacities/actions that occur after some type of disturbance, stress,
or adversity has occurred.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
16
resistance, protection, anticipation, and preparation in their definitions of resilience. This
approach is that taken by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2010) and the
Homeland Security Advisory Council’s (HSAC’s) Community Resilience Task Force
(HSAC 2011). Kahan et al. (2009) also include resistance in their definition of resilience,
observing that,
Most definitions of resilience do not address the issue of resistance, which we see as
integral to a holistic perspective. Of the several definitions we have found in our research,
the only one that specifically links resistance-related activities to resilience is that
proposed by DHS in its Risk Lexicon document (p. 10).
In fact, Bruneau et al. (2003) also include resistance in their definition of resilience, asserting
that:
Resilience can be understood as the ability of the system to reduce the chances of a
shock, to absorb a shock if it occurs (abrupt reduction of performance) and to recover
quickly after a shock (re-establish normal performance). More specifically, a resilient
system is one that shows the following:
Reduced failure probabilities
Reduced consequences from failures, in terms of lives lost, damage, and negative
economic and social consequences
Reduced time to recovery (restoration of a specific system or set of systems to their
normal level of performance) (p. 736).
Clearly, actions that contribute to reducing the chances of a shock or reducing failure
probabilities would be viewed as protection-related or resistance-related actions.
Bruneau et al. (2003) also identify a set of properties that further define resilience. One of those
properties is robustness, which they define as “strength, or the ability of elements, systems, and
other units of analysis to withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering
degradation or loss of function” (p. 737). Considering the context in which Bruneau et al. (2003)
are writing (i.e., seismic resilience), their definition of robustness implies resistance-related
activities. This interpretation is supported by Tierney (2009): “robustness refers to the ability to
resist disruption and failure and continue functioning effectively…” (p. 6).
6
The question, then, is whether resistance, anticipation/preparation, or protection should be
included as components of resilience. To answer this question, it is instructive to consider the
relationships among resistance, anticipation,
7
and protection. First, we assume that resistance,
anticipation, and protection involve actions that are taken prior to the occurrence of an adverse
event. Second, we assume that certain resistance- and anticipation-related actions are properly
viewed as a subset of a broader set of protective measures. This subset of resistance- and
anticipation-related actions consists of those actions that are predicated on the assumption that an
6
It is worth pointing out that Tierney is one of the co-authors of the study by Bruneau et al. (2003).
7
From this point on, we treat anticipation and preparedness as synonymous.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
17
adverse event is going to occur. Such actions are designed to reduce the adverse consequences,
both immediate and longer term, that result when an adverse event does occur. For example,
building a flood wall to absorb the impacts of anticipated record flood levels would be an action
within this subset. Other resistance- and anticipation-related actions that are intended solely to
prevent an adverse event from occurring for example, installing gates at a facility with the
goal of preventing a terrorist act are not part of this subset of resistance- and anticipation-
related actions.
8
Table 1 lists additional examples of actions predicated on the assumption that an
adverse event is going to occur and of actions that are intended solely to prevent an adverse
event from occurring.
Distinguishing resistance- and anticipation-related actions from the broader set of protective
measures on the basis of whether they take the occurrence of an adverse event as a given
provides a straightforward means for distinguishing among the broader set of such actions.
Moreover, this distinction reduces the degree of difference among the definitions considered
here. Obviously, all of the definitions in which resilience is a function of what happens after an
adverse event occurs take the adverse event as a given. Adding in resistance and anticipation-
related actions that take the adverse event as a given simply expands the set of resilience-related
actions in a clear-cut manner.
Table 1: Distinguishing among Resistance- and Anticipation-Related Actions
Examples of Actions that Assume an Adverse
Event is Going to Occur
Examples of Actions Intended to Prevent an Adverse
Event from Occurring
Install and monitor closed circuit television
(CCTV)
Develop a response/emergency action plan
Install bollards to increase standoff distance
Maintain stockpiles of inputs to production (raw
materials)
Develop an evacuation plan
Establish an emergency operations center
Employ entry controls (e.g., guards), perform visitor
screening
Install a fence around a facility
Establish procedures for dealing with suspicious
packages
Conduct employee background checks
Add razor wire or barbed wire to perimeter fencing
2.3 Our Definition
On the basis of the literature review and the preceding argument, we define resilience as: “the
ability of an entity asset, organization, community, region to anticipate, resist, absorb,
respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance.” This definition underlies our analysis and
proposed approach to the measurement and evaluation of resilience at the facility/asset and
community/regional levels. The relationship between the different components of resilience and
the occurrence of an adverse event are illustrated in Figure 1. As shown, anticipation-,
resistance-, and absorption-related actions are undertaken prior to the occurrence of an adverse
event, whereas response, adaptation, and recovery occur afterward. The heavy line in the figure
8
In the remainder of this paper, the terms resist, resistance, anticipation, and preparation refer specifically to the
subset of actions that are taken prior to an adverse events occurrence on the assumption that an adverse event is
going to occur.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
18
represents the level of activity (e.g., production in the case of a manufacturing plant) or of the
well-being (e.g., a population’s psychological health in the case of a community or region) of the
object of analysis. Subsequent to the occurrence of an adverse event, activity/well-being
declines. The resilience of the object of analysis determines both the amount by which the
activity/well-being declines and the amount of time required to return to the pre-event
equilibrium (or some other new equilibrium).
Figure 1: Components of Resilience and the Timing of an Adverse Event
Resilience: Theory and Applications
19
3 Measurement and Evaluation of Resilience
The measurement of resilience at all levels for example, critical infrastructure, community,
region entails considerable challenges. Moreover, measuring resilience becomes more
challenging as we move from critical infrastructure resilience, which focuses on individual assets
and facilities, to higher-level aggregates, for example, community or regional resilience (of
which critical infrastructure resilience is only one component). This pattern follows from the fact
that as we move to the community or regional level of analysis, the determinants of resilience
(e.g., supply chain resilience, governance resilience, civil society resilience) become increasingly
difficult to quantify. This is a result of such factors as uncertainty about specific relationships
(e.g., the composition of specific supply chains [because firms may not be willing to divulge
information about specific suppliers]), and data gaps (e.g., measurement of sociological and
psychological factors that influence civil society resilience). In addition, time and budget
constraints may simply make it impossible to collect all of the information that would be needed
to construct a comprehensive assessment of the resilience of a specific community or region.
Thus, it is quite likely that as the scope of the object of analysis increases from critical
infrastructure to community/region so will the gap between theory and practice.
In this section, we address three topics: (1) the systems approach to the assessment of resilience,
(2) an improved framework for the measurement and evaluation of resilience at the asset/facility
level, and (3) a model for the assessment of resilience at the community/regional level. We begin
by briefly describing how a systems approach can be used to effectively prioritize resilience
assessment efforts. Next, we discuss how the current version of the Infrastructure Survey Tool
(IST) that has been developed by Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) will be modified to
assess the resilience of individual critical infrastructures more accurately. We then present a
framework for the assessment of resilience at the community/regional level, which is based in
part on the Department of Homeland Security’s Regional Resilience Assessment Program
(RRAP). The RRAP which was developed and piloted by DHS in FY2009 and emphasizes
infrastructure “clusters,” regions, and systems — is designed to identify critical infrastructure
dependencies, interdependencies, cascading effects, resiliency characteristics, regional
capabilities, and security gaps.
9
In our model, community/regional resilience is a function of the
resilience of five subsystems: the local economy, critical infrastructure,
governmental/institutional units, civilian population, and relevant supply chains. In addition to
providing justification for the inclusion of each of these subsystems, we identify possible data
sources that can be used to measure the resilience of each subsystem.
9
The RRAP process also includes information from tools that are used to measure both the protective measures and
resilience measures in place at individual facilities. Reducing the risks associated with natural and man-made
events faced by a facility includes both protection against an event happening and resilience once the event has
happened. Thus protective measures and resilience measures are all determinants of a facility’s ability to reduce
risk.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
20
3.1 Systems Approach to the Assessment/Measurement of
Resilience
Recognizing budget realities and the need for a process that effectively prioritizes resilience
assessment efforts, personnel at DHS have proposed a “systems approach” to the assessment of
resilience. Briefly stated, the approach is based on the assumption that a critical asset or facility
can be viewed as a system (DHS 2011a).
10
Higher-level constructs (e.g., a community or a
region) are composed of several different systems. As such, a community or a region is a
“system of systems.” Viewed within this framework, “high-level systems analysis informs the
identification of the most important lower level systems, within which site assessment data on
only the most critical asset-level components about which the least is known should be
collected.” (DHS 2011a, p. 3) An underlying assumption of the discussion that follows is that a
“system of systems” approach should be employed in identifying the appropriate scope of a
resilience assessment, as well as the specific assets and/or subsystems for which resilience-
related information should be collected. In the parlance of systems engineering, this means that
we must focus on the “states of the system.”
The underlying principle of the system of systems approach is that, to make effective decisions,
one must understand the various states of the system in order to influence system outcomes, for
example, resilience. According to Haimes (2011):
The behavior of the states of the system, as a function of time, decision, exogenous and
random variables, and inputs, enables modelers to describe, under certain conditions, its
future behavior for any given inputs (random or deterministic). For example, to determine
the safety of drinking water from a reservoir (as a system), one must determine the states
of the water in the reservoir: its acidity, turbidity, dissolved oxygen, bacteria, and other
pathogens. To determine the functionality and reliability of a bus, one must know the
states of the bus’s fuel, oil, tire pressure, and other mechanical and electrical components.
To treat a patient, a physician first must know the temperature, blood pressure, and other
states of the patient’s physical health (p. 6).
Using this approach, analysis would consider the high-level context (e.g., a geographic region or
an industry sector) and the associated states of these systems, ultimately represented by the most
critical assets to inform the scope and focus of a resilience assessment including the most
critical assets from which to collect resilience data.
3.2 Critical Infrastructure Resilience
Because critical infrastructure resilience is a component of community and regional resilience(as
are the resilience of social, economic, and other subsystems), it is appropriate to focus first on
10
A system can be defined as “[a]n organized, purposeful structure regarded as a whole and consisting of
interrelated and interdependent elements (components, entities, factors, members, parts, etc.). These elements
continually influence one another (directly or indirectly) to maintain their activity and the existence of the
system, in order to achieve the goal of the system. http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/system.html,
accessed on December 6, 2011.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
21
the development of a sound approach to its measurement that can stand alone and also serve as
an input to the calculation of those other measures. In 2010, Argonne National Laboratory, in
collaboration with the DHS Protective Security Coordination Division, developed a measure of
the resilience of critical infrastructure. (Argonne 2010) The Resilience Index (RI) was based on
the approach recommended by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, which argued for
analyzing the resilience of an organization or system by considering three major components:
robustness, resourcefulness, and rapid recovery. Briefly stated, the RI was constructed from data
collected via the IST, which was modified to address various determinants of robustness,
resourcefulness, and rapid recovery. The data were weighted and summed to produce an index
number that ranges between 0 and 100.
This new task will build on the current RI to construct an improved measure of critical
infrastructure resilience by revising the current question set in the IST to conform to our
definition of resilience (the ability of an entity asset, organization, community, region to
anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance). This effort will
consist of deleting, reworking, or adding new questions to the existing question set to produce a
more comprehensive infrastructure resilience index, the Resilience Measurement Index (RMI),
that will assist in feeding into the broader community/regional resilience assessment discussed in
Section 3.3 of this paper.
On the basis of the questions concerning resilience in the current IST, we have categorized four
general groupings of measures that together provide a measure of the resilience of a facility (i.e.,
its ability to withstand and rebound from an event). The proposed major components of the RMI,
and the characteristic(s) of resilience to which they correspond, include the following:
Preparedness (anticipate),
Mitigation measures (resist, absorb),
Response capabilities (respond, adapt), and
Recovery mechanisms (recover).
These major components align closely with the four strategic elements of resilience identified in
the DHS (2010) Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: enhanced preparedness, hazard
mitigation, effective emergency response, and rapid recovery.
Table 2 illustrates how the six components found in the definition of resilience are connected to
the actions that describe the capacity of an entity to be resilient to a man-made or natural event.
The relationships illustrated in Table 2 provide the framework for developing a survey
instrument that will be used to elicit the information required to assess resilience at the
asset/facility level. In the discussion that follows, we consider each of the major components
designed to capture facility resilience, the sub-components that contribute to each major
component, and the characteristic(s) of resilience that each sub-component is meant to capture.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
22
Table 2: Relationship between Components of Resilience and Resilience-Enhancing Measures
The proposed major components present a more intuitive view of the resilience of a facility. The
expanded focus on the components that contribute to the resilience of a facility will provide a
more complete calculation of RI and provide better insight on the resilience of some of the
Nation’s most critical infrastructure. Strengthened understanding of a facility’s resilience will
enable greater understanding of the items that must be considered when looking beyond the
individual asset level that is, when considering the resilience of the collective to the
community, region, and/or the Nation.
3.3 Community/Regional Resilience
On the basis of our review of the literature (see, e.g., Norris et al. 2008; Stewart et al. 2009;
Longstaff et al. 2010; and Cutter et al. 2010), we find that community/regional resilience is a
function of the resilience of several subsystems, including but not necessarily limited to, the
community/region’s economy, civil society, critical infrastructure, supply chains/dependencies,
and governance (including emergency services). Figure 2, which depicts the process employed in
the Department of Homeland Security’s RRAP,
11
illustrates a framework that facilitates
consistent assessment of community/regional resilience while allowing the specifics of the
assessment process to be driven by the scope of the individual assessment. In particular, the
figure illustrates steps in the process of identifying the specific scope of a community/regional
resilience assessment project. Certain pieces (e.g., site assessments, facilitated
discussion/community outreach events) should be part of all community/regional resilience
assessments; however, depending on the scope of the analysis in question, the specific facilitated
discussion/ community outreach mechanism would change; thus, how the analysis addresses the
resilience of the five community subsystems would also change. For example, in certain
analyses, analysts might choose to place a heavy emphasis on critical infrastructure, civil society,
and governance and thus choose to use multiple analysis tools within those subsystem categories.
In other cases, we might expect to see an in-depth analysis of the supply chain/dependencies
subsystem so that we could not only determine the resilience of the supply chain but also
evaluate how the supply chain contributes to overall community/regional resilience. The basic
premise is that, in each analysis, all of the subsystems should be considered as they all contribute
11
This approach is similar to, and is based in part on, Sandia National Laboratories’ Complex Adaptive System of
Systems Process, http://www.sandia.gov/CasosEngineering/, accessed on December 1, 2011. For more
information on the DHS RRAP, see http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1265397888256.shtm.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
23
to community/regional resilience; however, there should be flexibility regarding the depth of
analysis and the tools that are used.
Figure 2: Community/Regional Resilience Framework
a
a
CAPTA = Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies; CI = criticality index;
COOP/COG = continuity of operations/continuity of government plans; CRR = Cyber Resiliency Review;
DI = Dependencies Index; ESSCI = Emergency Services Sector Capabilities Index ; PPI = Public Preparedness
Index; PMI = Protective Measures Index; RI = Resilience Index; SEDIT = Special Events and Domestic
Incidents Tracker.
Figure 3 illustrates the relative contribution that the proposed approach can potentially provide to
our overall understanding and analysis of the five subsystems of community/regional resilience
identified in Figure 2. For example, a site assessment of a critical infrastructure (e.g., a water
treatment plant) can provide a significant amount of data to inform resilience given that the
community/region has a strong dependency on the water plant. However, a site assessment of a
water treatment plant would provide less information about civil society resilience.
12
Information
on civil society resilience can be more appropriately obtained through indices such as the Public
Preparedness Index (PPI) (Petit et al. 2011) and open source data (e.g., American Community
12
It is important to note that we did find direct ties between existing and/or potential new site assessment questions
and each of the five subsystems of community resilience (e.g., we can go into a water treatment plant and ask at
least a few questions that would inform the civil society subsystem analysis).
Resilience: Theory and Applications
24
Survey
13
). The relative size of the blue bubbles shows that, for example, if we wanted to assess
the civil society subsystem of a community at the same level as the critical infrastructure
subsystem analysis, we would need to make use of additional data collection methods and tools
outside of the site assessments. Examples of these additional tools are identified in the bottom
row of Figure 2.
Figure 3: Site Assessment Contribution to Community
Resilience Analysis
13
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/, accessed December 1, 2011.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
25
3.3.1 Definition and Measurement of Components of Community/Regional
Resilience
As we have stated, in our model, community/regional resilience is a function of the resilience of
the following five subsystems: the community’s economy, the civilian population, critical
infrastructure, supply chains, and governmental and institutional units. Definitions and
approaches to the measurement of each of these components are presented below.
3.3.1.1 Economic Subsystem
Economic resilience is defined variously as (1) a function of the fairness of risk and vulnerability
to hazards, the level and diversity of economic resources, and the equity of resource distribution
(Norris et al. 2008); (2) the ability of a system to recover from a severe shock and includes both
inherent and adaptive resilience (Stewart et al. 2009); (3) being composed of people, firms, and
institutions that interact to accomplish the production, distribution, and consumption of goods
and services (Longstaff et al. 2010); and (4) a measure of the economic vitality of communities
based on housing capital, equitable incomes, employment, business size, and physician access
(Cutter et al. 2010). Considering these definitions, economic resilience clearly has important
implications for all five of the properties of resilience (anticipate, resist, absorb, respond/adapt
to, and recover).
Potential tools/approaches/variables that might be used to measure economic resilience at the
community/regional level include the following:
Building Resilient Regions Resilience Capacity Index (RCI)
14
: Specific RCI indicators
that could be apportioned to Economic Resilience are listed in Appendix B.
Shannon Diversity Index (which can also be used to measure the level of diversification
of the local economy).
Input-output modeling of critical infrastructure interdependencies.
360-degree review of CI sectors and cascading risks (Macaulay 2009).
3.3.1.2 Civil Society Subsystem
It should be clear that the public’s inability to adapt to, respond to, and recover from a
disturbance will seriously limit the ability of a community or region to bounce back, regardless
of the resilience of the other subsystems considered here. Longstaff et al. (2010) define civil
society as the formal and informal modes of social organization and collective action outside of
governmental authority (i.e., nongovernmental and philanthropic organizations, health and
human service organizations, faith-based organizations, unions, associations). Cutter et al.
(2010) define community capital resilience as the relationships that exist between individuals and
their larger neighborhoods and communities. Norris et al. (2008) define social capital as a
14
http://brr.berkeley.edu/rci/, accessed on November 6, 2011.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
26
function of received (enacted) and perceived (expected) social support; social embeddedness
(informal ties); organizational linkages and cooperation; citizen participation, leadership, and
roles (formal ties); a sense of community; and attachment to place. Stewart et al. (2009) define
social resilience as social systems within which communities build relationships among people
and businesses, as well as communication channels for gathering and disseminating information.
Potential tools/approaches/variables that might be used to measure civil society resilience at the
community/regional level include the following:
Argonne’s PPI (Petit et al. 2011).
Building Resilient Regions RCI: Specific RCI indicators that could be apportioned to
civil society resilience are listed in Appendix B.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Planning for First
Responders and their Families (FEMA 2011).
FEMA Personal Preparedness in America: Findings from the 2009 Citizen Corps
National Survey
15
(FEMA 2009).
3.3.1.3 Critical Infrastructure Subsystem
As we have discussed earlier in this report, critical infrastructure resilience is a critical
determinant of community/regional resilience. Stewart et al. (2009) define critical infrastructure
resilience to include the actual infrastructure and the owner/operator capabilities needed to create
a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance has occurred.
Longstaff et al. (2010) define physical infrastructure subsystems as:
the substructure or underlying foundation or network used for providing goods and
services; especially the basic installations and facilities on which the continuance and
growth of a community depend, including roads, water systems, communications
facilities, sewers, sidewalks, cable, wiring, schools, power plants, and transportation and
communication systems. (p. 12)
Cutter et al. (2010) define infrastructure resilience as “mainly an appraisal of community
response and recovery capacity (e.g. sheltering, vacant rental housing units, and healthcare
facilities) (p. 9).
15
The survey script found in Appendix B of this document might also be adapted to fit infrastructure
owner/operators. Currently, the questions are designed for use in collecting data from individual households.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
27
Potential tools/approaches/variables that might be used to measure critical infrastructure
resilience at the community/regional level include the following:
Argonne’s infrastructure RI (Argonne 2010).
Electric System Reliability Indices, for example, the System Average Interruption
Duration Index (SAIDI) and the Customer Average Interruption Duration Index
(CAIDI).
16
The U.S. Department of Energy Local Government Energy Assurance model/questions
and plan development steps
17
(see Energy Assurance Plan Steps A, B, and C in
Appendix A).
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agencys Community-Based Water Resiliency
(CBWR) Initiative and assessment tool.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology Contingency Planning Guide for
Information Systems.
18
National Communications Systems (NCS) Route Diversity Project/Tools.
NCS questions/data used to form Regional Characterization reports.
National Cooperative Highway Research Program Costing Asset Protection: An All-
Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) (NCHRP 2009).
Population commute times, travel patterns, and traffic congestion from the U.S. Census.
Various Metropolitan Planning Organization travel demand models.
3.3.1.4 Supply Chain/Dependencies Subsystem
The study by Stewart et al. (2009) is the only one that explicitly includes supply chain resilience,
which they define as:
[t]he capability of supply chain operators to manage the consequences, which impact
their ability to exchange value with supply chain partners located within and outside the
impact area. Supply chains exist in both private and public sectors and often involve
collaboration across sectors.
16
Electric System Reliability Indices available at http://l2eng.com/Reliability_Indices_for_Utilities.pdf, accessed
on November 28, 2011.
17
http://www.pti.org/docs-sust/LocalGovernmentEnergyAssuranceGuidelines.pdf, accessed on November 28,
2011.
18
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-34-rev1/sp800-34-rev1_errata-Nov11-2010.pdf, accessed on
November 28, 2011.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
28
This definition is included in their list of the determinants of community resilience.
Stewart et al. (2009) suggest measures of supply chain resilience, including redundancy
(establishment of reserves or back-up options that can be deployed in times of disruption),
flexibility (sensing capabilities that enable enterprises to identify potential threats and respond
accordingly), density (number and geographical spacing of supply chain nodes), complexity
(number of supply chain nodes and interconnectedness of the nodes), node criticality (ability to
prioritize post-disaster action around nodes that are important to the recovery of the chain), and
public-private partnerships (legal bonds, operational linkages, information exchange
mechanisms, cooperative norms, and relational contracts). Supply chain resilience should also
consider the physical, geographical, cyber, and logical dependencies/interdependencies existing
between critical nodes and links.
Potential tools/approaches/variables that might be used to measure supply chain resilience at the
community or regional level include the following:
Various Argonne models:
Dependencies Index.
EPFast (model for simulating uncontrolled electric grid islanding and for performing
load flow analysis)
NGFast (model for natural gas pipeline breaks and downstream impacts).
POLFast (model for estimating impacts on U.S. petroleum industry).
Restore
©
(model of the complex set of steps required to accomplish a goal, such as
repair of a ruptured natural gas pipeline).
Sandia’s Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems Applications (Glass and Ames 2008):
Petrochemical supply chains.
Food Defense: Detailed Topological Mapping of Food Supply Chains.
Strategic Recovery Model.
3.3.1.5 Governance/Institutional Subsystem
Longstaff et al. (2010) define governance resilience as a function of the public organizations
(political, administrative, legislative, and judicial institutions) that contribute to the
administration of government functions of the community and the processes through which
government institutions, or any group of people with a mandate or with a common purpose,
make decisions. Cutter et al. (2010) define institutional resilience as a function of the capacity of
communities to reduce risk, to engage local residents in mitigation, to create organizational
linkages, and to enhance and protect the social systems within a community. The two studies cite
the connectedness of the various units of government in times of disruption; the cost and quality
of services delivered in relation to the resources collected from the citizens; the strength of the
government’s mandate to act on the citizens’ behalf, government’s capacity to institutionalize
and adapt lessons learned, and the extent of discretionary authority granted to government
officials during a crisis (Longstaff et al. 2010); and political fragmentation and the percent of
municipal expenditures for fire, police, and emergency medical services (Cutter et al. 2010) as
possible determinants of governance/institutional resilience. Emergency services will also have a
Resilience: Theory and Applications
29
large impact on the community’s ability to absorb, respond to, and recover from a disturbance
and captures information and communication resilience as called for by Norris et al. (2008).
Potential tools/approaches/variables that might be used to measure governance/institutional
resilience at the community/regional level include the following:
Argonne’s Emergency Services Sector Capabilities Index (Shoemaker et al. 2011).
FEMA Emergency Planning for First Responders and their Families (FEMA 2011).
Variables cited in the American Planning Association’s Policy Guide on Security.
19
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Coastal Resiliency
Index. Questions can be gathered from portions of that index, as detailed below. Specific
examples are listed in Appendix C.
Community Plans and Agreements
20
Mitigation Measures
21
19
http://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/security.htm, accessed on November 6, 2011.
20
http://www.seagrant.noaa.gov/focus/documents/HRCC/resiliency_index_7-15-08.pdf, accessed on November 6,
2011.
21
Ibid.
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4 Making the Case for Participation in the Assessment of,
and Investment in, Resilience
A strong case can be made for enhancing resilience at various levels asset, community,
regional, national in terms of the social benefits that would accrue from such actions. Social
benefits notwithstanding, investment in enhanced resilience can be costly in terms of both time
and resources. Recognizing that more than 85%
22
of critical infrastructure is privately owned and
operated, it is important to be able to convince owners and operators that investment in both the
assessment and, where necessary, the enhancement of resilience is in their interest. At the
community and regional levels, we must also acknowledge the fact that government budgets are
severely strained in the current economic environment. Thus, local and regional governments
must also be convinced that investment in assessment and enhancement of regional resilience
will benefit their constituents, as well.
4.1 Infrastructure Resilience
Although owners/operators of privately owned critical infrastructure are ultimately concerned
with the “bottom line,” there is nevertheless growing awareness in the business community that
enhanced resilience is part of a well-designed strategy to enhance a business’s ability to
withstand various shocks for example, natural and man-made disasters, supplier outages,
industrial accidents, or economic shocks and thus enhance the business’s competitive
position. A variety of organizations and private sector firms, including Business Resilience
Certification Consortium International (BRCCI), Business Continuity Institute (BCI),
Stephenson Resilience, and IBM, have been offering assessments of business resilience services
to prospective clients for several years. The partnership between Dow Chemical Company and
Ohio State University’s Resilience Center to develop the Supply Chain Resilience Assessment
and Management tool
23
is another example of the move to enhance business resilience. This
increased focus on resilience reflects a growing appreciation in the private sector of the
importance of effectively managing risks that can range from natural and man-made disasters to
market and regulatory shocks. As a recent report by IBM noted,
Organizations are adapting to an increasingly complex global environment with more
holistic approaches to business resilience planning. Traditional business continuity plans
typically with a strong IT focus are still critical, but they are becoming part of a
bigger picture, as senior executives strengthen their oversight of enterprise-wide risk
management. To ensure business resilience, companies are moving toward a risk
management process that both addresses the myriad types of risk that functions across the
organization face, and encompasses all facets of risk management, from its identification
through to mitigation (IBM 2011, p. 2).
22
http://www.dhs.gov/files/partnerships/editorial_0206.shtm, accessed December 1, 2011.
23
Dow Chemical Joins Resilience Program, http://resilience.osu.edu/CFR-site/pdf/Dow_Resilience.pdf, accessed
December 5, 2011.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
32
IBM defines business resilience as
the ability of enterprises to adapt to a continuously changing business environment.
Resilient organizations are able to maintain continuous operations and protect their
market share in the face of disruptions such as natural or man-made disasters. Business
resilience planning is distinguished from enterprise risk management (ERM) in that it is
more likely to build capacity to seize opportunities created by unexpected events.
Another difference is that while ERM can be implemented as a management capability,
an integrated business resilience strategy requires the engagement of everyone in the
organization, and often means a change in corporate culture to instill awareness of risk
(IBM 2011, p. 3).
This definition is very similar to the definition of community resilience as it relates to the
involvement of everyone who could potentially be affected by an unexpected event.
Consistent with IBM’s position that, while they are similar, business resilience planning and
ERM are not the same thing, the BRCCI has taken the following position:
An effective business resilience program requires a concerted effort to achieve resilience
objectives from different areas of expertise within an organization. The following three areas are
essential for establishing a business resilience program:
Business continuity planning (BCP),
Business resilience strategy planning (BRSP), and
Enterprise risk management (ERM).
24
To secure the cooperation of private owners/operators of critical infrastructure, infrastructure
analysts need to be able to present a convincing argument to the owner/operator that he/she will
receive tangible benefits by allowing analysts to conduct a resilience assessment. To be
persuasive, infrastructure analysts need to be able to:
Explain how enhanced resilience can benefit the owner/operator;
Explain how the completion of the resilience assessment will provide information that the
owner/operator needs to improve the facility/asset’s resilience in a cost-effective manner;
and
Demonstrate an understanding of the factors that must be considered in assessing the
business resilience of individual facilities or assets, that is, factors that guide the
development of an effective business resilience program.
24
http://www.brcci.org/business+resilience+model.htm, accessed November 3, 2011.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
33
Regarding the third bullet, a partial list of such factors includes the following:
Characteristics of the business continuity management process.
Risk management measures that businesses should consider, including:
Investment in new information technology solutions related to risk management,
including:
Data and application security,
Data protection,
Infrastructure security,
Compliance management,
Security governance and risk management, and
Identity and access management. (IBM 2011, p. 3)
Creation of a business continuity plan.
Development of a communications or training program to enhance its business
continuity or resilience strategies.
Establishment of a company-wide risk management team.
Development of an integrated business resilience strategy.
Discussion of business resilience issues with supply chain partners.
Response to the recent increase in natural disasters by re-thinking business continuity
strategies.
Assignment of overall responsibility for risk management across the organization to a
single executive.
Engagement of an external risk management advisor (IBM 2011, p. 6).
Additional factors that have been cited include:
Emergency response planning,
Risk and vulnerability assessments, and
Supply chain resilience planning.
25
25
http://www.stephensonresilience.co.uk/ourservices, accessed November 6, 2011.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
34
4.2 Community/Regional Resilience
As we noted in the introduction to this section, governmental units at all levels are facing
increasingly strained budgets in the current economic environment. Therefore, suggestions that
local governments should expend scarce resources on assessing and enhancing resilience are
likely to be met with varying amounts of resistance. Thus, it is important to be able to
demonstrate the benefits that increased resilience can be expected to yield.
As we discussed in Section 3.3.1.5, public organizations (e.g., emergency services, floodplain
management) will have a large impact on the ability of a community or region to absorb, respond
to, and recover from a disturbance (i.e., community/regional resilience). The Emergency
Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) assesses a region’s emergency management
capabilities. EMAP has identified several benefits of achieving accredited status, including the
following:
Provides benchmarks for program management and operations,
Focuses on comprehensive emergency management,
Encourages the collaboration of state- and community-wide programs rather than
focusing on individual agencies,
Enhances operational continuity and resiliency,
Validates professional capabilities,
Demonstrates effective use of public resources and provides justification for resources,
and
Encourages intra- and interagency communication and team building through the
assessment and accreditation process (EMAP 2006, p. 4).
In addition, the National Flood Insurance Programs (NFIP) Community Rating System (CRS) is
a voluntary incentive program that recognizes and encourages community floodplain
management activities. As a result, flood insurance premium rates are discounted to reflect the
reduced flood risk resulting from a community’s actions. For communities participating in the
NFIP’s CRS, flood insurance premium rates are discounted on the basis of 18 creditable
activities, which are organized under four categories:
Public Information,
Mapping and Regulations,
Flood Damage Reduction, and
Flood Preparedness (NFIP 2006).
Although the EMAP program is focused specifically on emergency planning and the NFIP’s
CRS is focused on floodplain management, the benefits listed above apply more generally to the
Resilience: Theory and Applications
35
assessment and enhancement of community/regional resilience, as well. Additional benefits that
communities and regions with higher levels of resilience should experience include smaller
adverse impacts on such variables as employment, income, consumer and business spending, tax
receipts, interruption of essential services, and higher levels of societal cohesion and well-being
than communities and regions with lower resilience would have, all else equal.
We have observed over three years of conducting the DHS Regional Resilience Assessment
Program in communities throughout the country that there is a need for, and opportunity to,
institutionalize resilience considerations in the infrastructure development process (DHS 2011b).
This objective can be accomplished through recognition of resilience factors “built in” to official
foundational documents, such as local comprehensive plans, land use plans, zoning standards,
building codes, transportation plans, and urban design guidelines. With direct guidance in local
plans, it would be easier to interject resilience considerations into a project in such a way that
these measures become part of the established scope of work and budget and receive appropriate
agency representation in project stakeholder groups. Often, resilience measures can be designed
into a project at minimal or even no cost if they are considered from the project’s inception. As
recently reported, however, by the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating
Council (SLTTGCC), which was convened to facilitate a wider conversation among national
critical infrastructure mission partners regarding infrastructure resilience, there is a significant
amount of work that needs to be done to bring the planning/design community together with the
emergency response/law enforcement community to facilitate successful development of
resilient infrastructure. This gap is illustrated in the SLTTGCC’s response to the
2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report’s recommendation that “design of new
infrastructure and infrastructure improvements anticipate change in the risk environment,
incorporate lessons from past events and exercises, and consider and build in security and
resilience from the start” (DHS 2010, p. 42). The SLTTGCC stated that opportunities to “design-
in” resilience do not fall under its area of responsibility. However, recognizing the importance of
resilient infrastructure design, Council members did recommend that the DHS Office of
Infrastructure Protection consider convening forums with State, local, tribal, and territorial
officials to explore design standards as an element of risk reduction (SLTTGCC 2011).
The emerging national resilience imperative is underscored by Presidential Policy Directive-8
(The White House 2011) and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review’s (DHS 2010)
recognition of resilience as a foundational element essential to a comprehensive approach to
homeland security. Both the June 2011 Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Community
Resilience Task Force Recommendations (HSAC 2011) and the November 2010 Designing for a
Resilient America: A Stakeholder Summit on High Performance Resilient Buildings and Related
Infrastructure (NIBS 2010) provide more explicit direction for carrying out this charge through
collaboration with the planning/design community. Relevant portions of these two reports are
summarized below.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
36
The HSAC Community Resilience Task Force provides the following recommendations to build
resilient communities.
Leverage existing Federal assets. DHS, in conjunction with the General Services
Administration and local officials, should develop a Resilient Community Initiative that
leverages Federal assets and programs to enable community resilience.
Align Federal grant programs to promote and enable resilience initiatives. DHS should
review and align all grant programs related to infrastructure or capacity building and
should support development of synchronized strategic master plans for improvement of
operational resilience throughout the Nation.
Enable community-based resilient infrastructure initiatives. DHS should transform its
critical infrastructure planning approach to more effectively enable and facilitate
communities in their efforts to build and sustain resilient critical infrastructures.
Enable community-based resilience assessment. DHS should coordinate development of
a community-based, all-hazards American Resilience Assessment methodology and
toolkit (HSAC 2011, pp.45).
The Designing for a Resilient America Stakeholder Summit on High Performance Resilient
Buildings and Related Infrastructure, was held on November 30December 1, 2010, at the
American Institute of Architects Headquarters in Washington, D.C. It was attended by 82 experts
from the building industry, Federal agencies, State and local governments, universities, and
professional and trade organizations (NIBS 2010). The goals of the summit were to bring the
gathering’s collective recommendations to the President, members of Congress, and senior
representatives from Federal government departments and agencies and to issue a call for action
by government and industry to address the critical requirements of resilience. Eighteen specific
recommendations resulted from the Summit, including the following four recommendations most
relevant to community resilience:
DHS should support State and local planning and regulatory entities to advance the
application and enforcement of resilient design for buildings and infrastructure in
communities (NIBS 2011, p. 11).
Urban and community planning and zoning organizations should develop strategies to
build in resilience to all hazards for maintaining the functionality of infrastructure
(NIBS 2011, p. 11).
The Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
26
should be updated to
include provisions for community resiliency planning and evaluation in an all-hazards
approach as a prerequisite to receiving Federal grant monies, including establishing a
national infrastructure bank to be used to finance resilience projects (NIBS 2011, p. 7).
26
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, signed into law November 23, 1988,
constitutes the statutory authority for most Federal disaster response activities, especially as they pertain to
FEMA and its programs.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
37
An interagency MOU should be implemented among all Federal agencies involved in
urban planning, design, construction, and operations related to buildings and
infrastructure. The MOU should establish an Interagency Resilience Working Group to
identify and share tools and best practices and to coordinate the implementation of
resilient design activities for Federal buildings (NIBS 2011, p. 11).
Because of the necessity of dealing with significant disasters ranging from terrorist attacks to
catastrophic drought, certain areas of the country have already developed valuable resilience
partnerships. Primary examples of communities/regions that have undertaken resilience
initiatives include the following:
With the 2002 National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan, the National Capital
Planning Commission (NCPC)
27
led the Nation in finding innovative urban design
solutions to meet heightened perimeter security requirements. Most recently, an NCPC-
sponsored design competition is being used to inform the development of security
alternatives for President’s Park South that will be undertaken by the National Park
Service and the United States Secret Service.
28
These alternatives will be examined
through a Federal and local review and approval process, including a National
Environmental Protection Act Environmental Assessment.
Possibly because of its having experienced a series of severe droughts over the past
decade, the City of Raleigh recognized water as a key planning issue in its 2030
Comprehensive Plan. The Plan made policy recommendations to establish the ability to
provide interconnects with other water utility systems for use in times of drought or other
emergency situations; it also promoted a series of water conservation measures even
during periods of adequate supply. Water conservation saves energy and normalizes
practices, which will help the City cope with the ups and downs of rainfall patterns.
29
The Hillsborough County, Florida, Metropolitan Planning Organization’s (MPO) 2025
Long-Range Transportation Plan (LRTP) addresses security of the region’s transportation
system to meet Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) funding and authorization requirements.
30
SAFETEA-
LU requires consideration of the security of a region’s transportation system as a stand-
alone planning factor. As part of the Hillsborough MPO’s LRTP development,
transportation planners actively engaged with emergency management and first responder
agencies to ensure that considerations, such as hurricane evacuation and emergency
access, were represented in the transportation project prioritization process.
27
http://www.ncpc.gov/ncpc/Main(T2)/Planning(Tr2)/PlanningStudies(Tr3)/Security.html, accessed July 17, 2011.
28
President’s Park South Design Competition, http://www.ncpc.gov/ppdc/index.html, accessed July 17, 2011.
29
City of Raleigh 2030 Comprehensive Plan, http://www.raleighnc.gov/business/content/PlanLongRange/Articles/
2030ComprehensivePlan.html, accessed July 18, 2011.
30
Hillsborough County MPO 2025 Long Range Transportation Plan, http://www.hillsboroughmpo.org/pubmaps/
pubmaps_folders/folderlrtp/lrtp_document/lrtp_document_files/LRTP_Ch_4%20Intermodal%20Trans_06-
07.pdf, accessed July 17, 2011.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
38
A strong case can be made for the benefits of increased resilience; however, the cost side of the
equation must be addressed, as well. An important factor to consider in this regard, and one that
community and regional leaders must be made aware of, is the variety of funding opportunities
available at the Federal and State levels. Several such opportunities are listed and described in
Appendix D.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
39
5 The Path Forward
Implementation of the strategies described in Sections 2 through 4 specifically, the adoption
of a consistent definition of resilience, modification of the current IST to produce additional
resilience-focused information/data at the facility level, and the development of a strong case for
enhancing resilience at various levels (asset, community, region) will facilitate realization of
the following four objectives, namely, to:
(1) Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the facility level,
(2) Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the sector level,
(3) Provide resilience-related information to critical infrastructure owners/operators to
facilitate risk-based resource decision making, and
(4) Provide resilience-related information to State and local mission partners that will
support their risk-based, resource decision-making process.
As the discussion that follows demonstrates, the four objectives considered here are
interdependent and sequential.
5.1 Develop a Methodology and Supporting Products to Assess
Resilience at the Facility Level
This objective will be accomplished by modifying Version 3 of the IST to produce a new,
enhanced version of the current RI. As was described in Section 3.2, Version 2 of the RI will
include four major components:
Preparedness,
Mitigation Measures,
Response Capabilities, and
Recovery Mechanisms.
Questions in the current version of the IST will be assigned to each of these four components,
and new questions will be added to ensure collection of the information required to compute the
new RI.
Achieving this objective will yield two deliverables:
Version 4 of the IST; and
Version 2 of the RI.
These new tools will be used first in the Regional Resilience Assessment Program and then in
other DHS programs (e.g., Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection and Site Assessment
Visits). Version 2 of the RI will be developed and operational by January 2013. Accomplishing
Resilience: Theory and Applications
40
this first objective will support objectives 24 and will constitute the basis for regional resilience
assessments.
5.2 Develop a Methodology and Supporting Products to Assess
Resilience at the Sector Level
The second objective is to develop a process for characterizing the resilience of each of the
18 critical infrastructure sectors. This process, which will employ the data collected with
Version 4 of the IST and Version 2 of the RI, will support the analysis of critical infrastructure
resilience within each sector.
Achieving this objective will yield two deliverables:
An improved understanding of the primary resilience-related characteristics of each
critical infrastructure sector, and
Identification of sector strengths and weaknesses in term of resilience.
This objective may also support the development of resilience reports for each critical
infrastructure sector for inclusion in the Infrastructure Protection Report Series. Because the
development of the sector-level resilience assessments will require that the needed data be
collected with Version 2 of the RI, there will be a delay between the implementation of
Version 2 and the development of sector-level resilience assessments.
5.3 Provide Resilience-Related Information to Critical Infrastructure
Owners/Operators to Facilitate Risk-Based Resource
Decision Making
The third objective is to provide information that critical infrastructure owners and operators can
use when deciding whether to enhance their facility’s resilience. This objective will guide the
selection of the format(s) in which the information that is collected and assessed will be
presented to critical infrastructure owners/operators with the tools developed in the two first
objectives. The formats for making information available to owners/operators will be adapted to
their specific needs. Possible formats include interactive presentations (e.g., dashboards that
allow the consideration of different options for increasing resilience) and more formal documents
(e.g., reports, concept drawings
31
, graphs). An illustrative dashboard screen is shown in Figure 4.
31
That is, early-stage architectural or engineering drawings, which are generally referred to as “conceptual.”
Resilience: Theory and Applications
41
Figure 4: Representative Dashboard Presentation
Referring to Figure 4, different tabs at the top of the dashboard screen allow the user to select
one of the four major Resiliency Index components: Preparedness, Mitigation Measures,
Response Capabilities, and Recovery Mechanisms. When one of these components is selected,
the corresponding subcomponents appear in the middle of the screen, which enables the user to
choose the different characteristics that apply to his/her facility. At the bottom of the screen, the
user can see in real time the repercussions of modifying each of these components in the
different RI values that result. Three representations are used to support this functionality
(moving clockwise from the bottom left of the screen):
A gauge shows the value of the RI for the selected level 1 component (i.e., preparedness),
A counter shows the value of the overall RI, and
Bar charts show the values of indices for the lower-level components and compare them
to the subsector averages.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
42
The ability to change the parameters, the speed with which users can see the results, and the
possibility for assessing different scenarios all serve to make the dashboard a very powerful tool
and particularly relevant for helping to manage risk-related decisions about critical
infrastructures.
Achieving this objective will yield one deliverable:
Identification of effective means to provide resilience-related information to critical
infrastructure owners/operators.
5.4 Provide Resilience-Related Information to State and Local
Mission Partners That Will Support Their Risk-Based, Resource
Decision-Making Process
The fourth objective is to assist State and local officials in the development of restoration and
risk management programs. This objective will be accomplished by identifying the types of
resilience-related information that State and local mission partners currently lack but that is
critical to a well-informed decision-making process.
Achieving this objective will yield two deliverables:
Determination of information needed by State and local officials to support their
restoration and risk management programs; and
Methods for displaying and sharing this information.
5.5 Summary
Two factors the emergence of resilience as a critical component of a comprehensive risk
management strategy and the acknowledgement that critical infrastructure is an important
component of regional resilience have necessitated the development of a sound methodology
to assess the resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. On the basis of a review of the
literature covering the basic concept, as well as the application of the concept of resilience at the
critical infrastructure and community/regional levels, we developed a working definition for the
measurement of resilience. A basic framework for measuring resilience at the infrastructure level
with a single survey tool was then presented. As we move to the community/regional level, the
assessment of the resilience becomes a much more complex task that involves investigation of
the resilience of numerous aspects of the community or region, including the local economy,
critical infrastructure, civil society, governance (including emergency services), and supply
chains. The methodology required to capture resilience at the community/regional level is very
complex and will involve not only surveys of individual assets but discussions with stakeholders,
identification of critical community and regional capabilities, and identification of
interdependencies among these entities.
Resilience: Theory and Applications
43
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Appendix A: Energy Assurance Plan Steps A, B, and C
Checklist A: Facility Analysis
1. Inventory facilities
2. Identify facility ownership/management
3. Determine facility criticality
4. Prioritize facilities based on their functions/impacts
5. Identify required operations for critical and essential facilities
6. Identify energy sources for required operations
7. Calculate energy demand for required operations
8. Identify low-cost/no-cost back-up alternatives
9. Estimate energy demand contribution for alternatives
10. Identify current back-up systems, locations, and energy output
11. Calculate energy shortfall for each facility
12. Calculate reduced energy demand from alternatives and options
13. Identify and evaluate opportunities for meeting shortfall
14. Develop a strategic investment plan to harden facilities
Checklist B: Fuel Supply
1. Onsite generators are routinely exercised, fueled, and in stand-by mode.
2. Fuel storage capacity (diesel and gasoline) exists for multiple days for required operations.
3. Fuel supplies at numerous storage facilities located strategically around the city are
regularly consumed and refreshed.
4. Capability exists to deliver fuel citywide via numerous tanker vehicles.
5. Refueling routes are in place and current.
6. Personnel (primary and alternate) to operate the refueling equipment and trucks are
identified.
7. Inventory of roll-up generators with fuel are routinely exercised.
8. Fuel reserve sensors are in place to automatically alert suppliers and city personnel of
impending needs.
9. Facilities with mission-required operations have uninterruptable power supply (UPS).
10. Decisions regarding fuel for required operations are in place.
11. Diverse portfolio of back-up energy technology is in place (renewables, etc.).
12. Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff is aware of these alternate work sites.
13. Communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place.
14. Emergency purchase authorizations are in place for fuel acquisition.
15. Contracts with fuel suppliers address that the city gets top priority, tankers can be located
onsite, and fuel for a minimum of 72 hours of operation is mandatory.
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Checklist C: Personnel
1. Onsite generators are routinely exercised including fueling, start-up, checking for
functionality of stand-by mode, etc.
2. Plans are in place and practiced to deliver fuel on a citywide basis (i.e., there are numerous
tanker vehicles, adequate number of trained personnel, etc.).
3. Refueling routes are in place, current, known, and practiced, if necessary.
4. Primary and alternate personnel have been identified to operate equipment (refueling,
trucks, etc.).
5. Personnel routinely exercise inventory of roll-up generators, if applicable.
6. Personnel are aware of what fuel reserve sensors are and how they function.
7. Personnel are aware of how priority decisions regarding fuel for required operations are
made.
8. Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff is aware of these alternate work sites.
9. Communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place and personnel
regularly review and exercise these plans.
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Appendix B: Building Resilient Regions Resilience Capacity
Index (RCI) Indicators
Specific RCI Indicators that could be apportioned to Economic Resilience include the following:
Income Equality. Income equality in the RCI is based on the metropolitan area Gini
coefficient for income inequality calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau for metropolitan
areas in 2009. So that high values signify high equality and high resilience, the RCI
indicator is calculated as the inverse of the Gini coefficient for income inequality. Data
are from the 2009 American Community Survey one-year estimates, Table B19083 (Gini
coefficient for income inequality).
Economic Diversification. Data for the RCI indicator are from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), 2009. For metropolitan
areas without 2009 QCEW data, the RCI indicator uses comparable data for a previous
year. Data substitutions occurred for three metropolitan areas: Amarillo, Texas (data for
2008), Hartford, Connecticut (data for 2001) and Parkersburg, West Virginia (data for
2001).
Regional Affordability. The RCI assesses regional affordability using the metropolitan
area as the unit of analysis. It measures the percentage of households in the metropolitan
area spending less than 35% percent of their income on housing, accounting for both
owners (mortgage costs) and renters (monthly rent costs). Data come from the
2009 American Community Survey one-year estimates, tables B25070 (gross rent as a
percentage of income) and B25091 (monthly owner costs as a percentage of income).
Business Environment. As formulated and measured by the Indiana Business Center
(2010) for its Innovation Index, an economically dynamic region is one with a
proportionately high level of small businesses, high levels of business churn (starts and
stops), residential high-speed Internet connections, change in the number of broadband
holding companies, and ample venture capital (Indiana Business Center,
http://www.statsamerica.org/innovation/). The RCI Business Environment indicator is the
“Economic Dynamics” subcomponent of the Indiana Business Center’s Innovation Index.
Formulated as an index, it is a single number capturing the range of business conditions
at the metropolitan region scale.
Specific RCI Indicators that could be apportioned to Civil Society Resilience include the
following:
Educational Attainment. Data come from the 2009 American Community Survey one-
year estimates, table B15003 (educational attainment). Because of the unavailability of
data, the RCI uses 2008 figures for the Hinesville-Fort Stewart, Georgia, metropolitan
area.
Without Disability. So that high scores translate to higher resilience, the RCI measures
the inverse of disability, that is, the population that is without disability. It is calculated as
Resilience: Theory and Applications
50
the percentage of a metropolitan area’s civilian non-institutionalized population that
report no sensory, mobility, self-care, or cognitive disabilities. Data come from the
2009 American Community Survey one-year estimates, table B18101 (disability status).
Out of Poverty. So that high scores translate to higher resilience, the RCI measures the
inverse of poverty, that is, the population that is out of poverty. Measured at the
metropolitan-area scale, the indicator captures the percentage of the population with
income in the past 12 months above the federally defined poverty line. Data come from
the 2009 American Community Survey one-year estimates, table B17001 (poverty status
in the past 12 months), from which the inverse measure is calculated.
Health Insured. The RCI measures health-insured persons as the percentage of the
metropolitan area’s civilian non-institutionalized population that report having health
insurance coverage, including both public and private insurers. Data come from the
2009 American Community Survey one-year estimates, table B27001 (health insurance
coverage status).
Civic Infrastructure. The RCI uses the number of civic organizations per 10,000 people
in a metropolitan area to capture the concept of civic infrastructure. Organizational
counts come from the 2008 County Business Patterns, 3-digit North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) code 813 (“religious, grant-making, civic, professional,
and similar organizations”), from which the indicator includes voluntary health
organizations, social advocacy organizations, social organizations, business associations
and professional organizations, labor unions, and political groups. It excludes religious
organizations (NAICS code 8131) and grant-making organizations (NAICS code 8132).
Metropolitan Stability. The RCI indicator for Metropolitan Stability is the annual
average percentage over a five-year period of a metropolitan-area population that lived
within the same metropolitan area a year prior. It is calculated as the sum of persons who
lived in the same house a year ago and those who lived in a different house in the same
metropolitan area a year ago, divided by the population aged one year and older. Data
come from the 20052009 American Community Survey five-year estimates,
table C07201 (geographical mobility in the past year).
Home Ownership. The RCI indicator for home ownership is the number of owner-
occupied housing units as a percentage of total occupied housing units in a metropolitan
area. Data come from the 2009 American Community Survey one-year estimates,
table B25003 (tenure).
Voter Participation. The RCI uses voter turnout data from the 2008 general election to
gauge voter participation. The measure is the number of voters participating in the 2008
general election as a percentage of population age 18 and over in the metropolitan area.
Voting data come from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections at
http://www.uselectionatlas.org/.
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Appendix C: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) Coastal Resiliency
Index Sample Questions
In its Coastal Resiliency Index (Emmer et al. undated), the NOAA has developed a list of
questions to gauge Community Plans and Agreements (available at
http://www.seagrant.noaa.gov/focus/documents/HRCC/resiliency_index_7-15-08.pdf). For
example, does your community:
Have a certified floodplain manager?
Participate in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Community Rating
System?
Use an early flood warning system?
Have a certified floodplain manager?
Have planning commissioners with formal training in planning?
Have a planning staff with credentials from the American Institute of Certified Planners
(AICP)?
Have a mitigation plan that is approved by FEMA and the State emergency management
system (EMS)?
If you have an approved mitigation plan, has it been revised in the past two years?
Have Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) or Memorandums of Agreement
(MOAs) with neighboring communities in place to help each other during times of
disaster?
Have a comprehensive plan or strategic plan that addresses natural disasters?
Have a floodplain manager or planner who participates in the following organizations:
Association of State Floodplain Managers or State Floodplain Management
Association?
American Planning Association (APA) or state APA chapter?
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) or State or local section of ASCE?
American Public Works Association?
Have first-hand experience with disaster recovery within the last 10 years?
Have a communication system to use before, during, and after a disaster?
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The NOAA’s Coastal Resiliency Index (Emmer et al. undated) also includes questions to gauge
use of mitigation measures (available at http://www.seagrant.noaa.gov/focus/documents/HRCC/
resiliency_index_7-15-08.pdf). For example, has your community implemented the following
mitigation measures?
Compared the elevation of residential, nonresidential buildings, or infrastructure to
National Flood Insurance Program standards for your community?
Relocated buildings and infrastructure from flood-prone areas?
Performed flood-proofing of nonresidential structures?
Conducted education programs about mitigation options for your community?
Acquired repetitive loss structures or infrastructure?
Supported/funded incentives-based mitigation measures?
Adopted the most recent International Building Codes?
Hired certified building inspectors?
Supported/funded staffing of an adequate number of people to enforce building codes?
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Appendix D: Federal and State Funding Opportunities to
Help Finance Improvements in Community and
Regional Resilience
D.1 Federal Funding Opportunities
The Federal government awards grants to support the homeland security efforts of States, local
governments, and public/private partnerships. Funding for projects in disaster mitigation,
preparedness, planning, exercising, and other homeland security activities may support resilience
initiatives. In addition, funding for other activities such as transportation projects or
community development also may support resilience goals.
The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) provides a full listing of all Federal
programs available to State and local governments (including the District of Columbia); federally
recognized Indian tribal governments; Territories (and possessions) of the United States;
domestic public, quasi- public, and private profit and not-for-profit organizations and
institutions; specialized groups; and individuals. There are more than 2,000 programs listed from
64 different agencies. The CFDA is available online at http://www.cfda.gov and provides
application deadlines, current eligibility requirements, and information on the application process
for each program.
Of the many programs in the CFDA, the ones listed below are some of the most closely aligned
to potential resilience enhancement projects. Note that the funding landscape changes every year.
The programs and initiatives described below may or may not be available in the future and are
not presented as a comprehensive list of possible funding sources.
D.1.1 Homeland Security Grant Programs
The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) umbrella includes several programs detailed
below. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issues information and application
guidance for the HSGP on an annual basis. The current guidance (Fiscal Year 2011 Homeland
Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit, May 2011) includes funding guidelines
and information on eligibility, the application process, and application review criteria. In
addition to this general guide, DHS has numerous “supplemental resources” for particular types
of programs, including cyber security, law enforcement information sharing, public-private
collaboration, caring for children in disasters, and other topics. The HSPG office Web page,
http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hsgp/, includes these guides and other information on
the HSPG application process. HSGP programs include the following:
The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) supports the implementation of State
Homeland Security Strategies to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from
acts of terrorism and other catastrophic events. In addition, SHSP supports
implementation of the National Preparedness Guidelines, the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), the National Response Framework (NRF), the National
Strategy for Information Sharing, and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The
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SHSP awards block grants to States, as administered by the designated State
Administrative Agency. Subgrants are coordinated through the designated State or
regional representative. Those considering applying should attend meetings and get on
mailing lists to learn of and request consideration for available funds. New requests are
generally considered in the Fall. Amounts vary and no match is required but matching
may be encouraged.
The Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program funds address the unique planning,
organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban
areas and assists them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
Operation Stonegarden (OPSG) funds are intended to enhance cooperation and
coordination among local, Tribal, territorial, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies
in a joint mission to secure the United States’ borders along routes of ingress from
international borders to include travel corridors in States bordering Mexico and Canada,
as well as States and territories with international water borders.
The Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) program supports the integration
of emergency management, health, and medical systems into a coordinated response to
mass casualty incidents caused by any hazard. MMRS grantees reduce the consequences
of a mass casualty incident during the initial period of a response by augmenting its
existing, local operational response systems before an incident occurs.
The Citizen Corps Program’s (CCP) mission is to bring community and government
leaders together to coordinate the involvement of community members and organizations
in emergency preparedness, planning, mitigation, response, and recovery.
D.1.2 Hazard Mitigation Assistance
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has several programs aimed at “breaking
the cycle” of disaster response (e.g., for communities that repeatedly suffer flooding) through
disaster resilience. The FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance Web page
(http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hma/index.shtm) has extensive information. These
programs include the following:
The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) assists in implementing long-term hazard
mitigation measures following Presidential disaster declarations. HMGP funding is
available to implement projects in accordance with State, Tribal, and local priorities.
The Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program provides funds on an annual basis for
hazard mitigation planning and the implementation of mitigation projects prior to a
disaster. The goal of the PDM program is to reduce overall risk to a grantee jurisdiction’s
population and structures, while at the same time reducing reliance on Federal funding
from actual disaster declarations, as well.
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The Repetitive Flood Claims (RFCs) program provides funds on an annual basis to
reduce the risk of flood damage to individual properties insured under the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) that have had one or more claim payments for flood damages.
RFC provides up to 100% Federal funding for projects in communities that meet the
reduced capacity requirements.
The Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) program provides funds on an annual basis to reduce
the risk of flood damage to residential structures insured under the NFIP that are qualified
as severe repetitive loss structures. SRL provides up to 90% Federal funding for eligible
projects.
D.1.3 Other Federal Programs
A number of other programs administered by FEMA, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), and other agencies are potential sources for funding resilience enhancement initiatives.
The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) provides funding for transportation
infrastructure security activities to implement Area Maritime Transportation Security
Plans and facility security plans among port authorities, facility operators, and State and
local government agencies required to provide port security services. PSGP’s purpose is
to support increased port-wide risk management; enhance domain awareness; conduct
training and exercises; oversee expansion of port recovery and resiliency capabilities; and
develop further capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from attacks
involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other nonconventional weapons.
Information may be found at http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/psgp/.
The Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) Program makes grants to
States to assist State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments in preparing for all
hazards, as authorized by Title VI of the Stafford Act. The Federal government, through
the EMPG Program, provides necessary direction, coordination, guidance, and assistance
as authorized in this title so that a comprehensive emergency preparedness system exists
for all hazards. Information may be found at http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/
empg/.
Through the Transportation Security Grant Program, DHS provides security grants to
mass transit and passenger rail systems, intercity bus companies, freight railroad carriers,
ferries, and the trucking industry to help protect the public and the Nation’s critical
transportation infrastructure against acts of terrorism and other large-scale events. The
grants support high-impact security projects that have a high efficacy in reducing the
most risk to our Nation’s transportation systems. Information is available on the TSA
Web site at http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/grants/index.shtm.
FEMA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have partnered on the
Smart Growth Program to promote disaster resilience through smart growth. Smart
growth strategies, such as creating flexible land use policies, targeting public investment
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to catalyze private investment, and engaging the entire community in making decisions
about the future, can help communities to recover from a disaster in a more resilient way,
rebuild according to a shared community vision, and be prepared for the next natural
disaster. Information may be obtained at http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/
fema_moa.htm.
The Homeland Defense Equipment Reuse (HDER) Program is implemented through a
DHS and U.S. Department of Energy partnership. HDER’s mission is to provide
emergency responder agencies with access to items that are no longer needed by the
Federal government. Items are refurbished and provided at no cost to the recipient. It
provides surplus radiological, chemical, and biological detection and response
equipment; detection instrumentation; and personal protective equipment, as well as
training and technical support, to enhance homeland security preparedness capabilities.
Information is available at http://hder.oro.doe.gov/.
The long-term goal of the Disaster Resilience for Rural Communities Program is to
advance basic research in engineering and in the social, behavioral, and economic
sciences on enhancing disaster resilience in rural communities. As stated by the USDA,
“There is much research on vulnerability and resilience in urban communities, but much
less about how rural communities and their residents are responding to natural and man-
made hazards.” Information is available at http://nifa.usda.gov/funding/rfas/disaster.html.
The Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program is the primary provider of Federal criminal
justice funding to State and local jurisdictions. JAG provides States and units of local
governments with funding to support law enforcement; prosecution and court programs;
prevention and education programs; corrections and community corrections; drug
treatment and enforcement; crime victim and witness initiatives; and planning,
evaluation, and technology improvement programs. Information about this U.S.
Department of Justice program is available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/
jag.html.
D.2 State Funding Opportunities
A number of examples of innovative State programs are profiled in the 2008 report, Innovative
Programs in Funding State Homeland Security Needs, by the Southern Legislative Conference
(SLC). The three themes of the programs profiled in the SLC report are interagency
coordination, public/private communication, and adoption of a regional approach. Examples are
described below.
Illinois Private Sector Alliance Project. This project consists of two interdependent
programs: Infrastructure Security Awareness (ISA) and the Mutual Aid Response
Network (MARN). The ISA was designed to facilitate information exchange among
public and private security professionals through the Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN). Participants exchange information about potential threats, training
opportunities, and organized crime through HSIN. MARN is designed to mitigate the
impact of natural disasters and acts of terrorism by leveraging private sector response
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assets. Through this project, Illinois is developing a clearinghouse of information
detailing agreements with the private sector on the use of resources during a critical
incident. Resources covered include facilities, equipment, transportation, medical
supplies, and portable generators.
Indiana public/private initiatives. Indiana is establishing a Special Interest Group on the
InfraGard Web site for enhanced, secure public/private information sharing. Indiana also
is in the beginning stages of a partnership with the Business Executives for National
Security that will enhance public-private interactions and assist in the development of the
State’s critical infrastructure protection program.
Iowa multistate cooperation. Iowa participates in the Multi-State Agriculture Consortium
(MSAC) with Kansas and Nebraska. The MSAC allows representatives from these
States, all with a strong agriculture segment in their economies, to develop quick-
response teams, as well as to share response and recovery plans.
Minnesota regional organization. Minnesota’s 87 counties are organized into six
homeland security and emergency management regions. Starting with the
Minneapolis/St. Paul metro region, joint power agreements have been signed for each
region providing for joint equipment procurement, training standards, exercise
development and execution, and distribution of emergency response equipment within
each region.
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Appendix E: List of Abbreviations
APA American Planning Association
Argonne Argonne National Laboratory
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
BCI Business Continuity Institute
BCP Business Continuity Plan(ning)
BRCCI Business Resilience Certification Consortium International
CAPTA Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies
CARRI Community and Regional Resilience Institute
CFDA Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
CI Criticality Index
COOP/COG Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government plans
CRS Community Rating System
DI Dependencies Index
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
EMAP Emergency Management Accreditation Program
EMPG Emergency Management Performance Grant
EOC Emergency Operations Center
ERM Enterprise Risk Management
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
HDER Homeland Defense Equipment Reuse
HMGP Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HSAC Homeland Security Advisory Council
HSIN Homeland Security Information Network
HSPG Homeland Security Grant Program
ISA Infrastructure Security Awareness
IST Infrastructure Survey Tool
IT information technology
JAG Justice Assistance Grant
LRTP Long-Range Transportation Plan
MARN Mutual Aid Response Network
MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System
MOA Memorandum of Agreement
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
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MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization
MSAC Multi-State Agriculture Consortium
NAIC North American Industry Classification System
NCPC National Capital Planning Commission
NCS National Communications System
NFIP National Flood Insurance Program
NIAC National Infrastructure Advisory Council
NIBS National Institute of Building Sciences
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
PDM Pre-Disaster Mitigation
PMI Protective Measures Index
PPI Public Preparedness Index
QCEW Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
RCI Resilience Capacity Index
RFC Repetitive Flood Claim
RI Resilience Index
SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy
for Users
Sandia Sandia National Laboratories
SEDIT Special Events and Domestic Incidents Tracker
SHSP State Homeland Security Program
SLC Southern Legislative Conference
SLTTGCC State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council
SRL Severe Repetitive Loss
TSA Transportation Security Administration
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
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