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t h e plu r a l is t Volume 6, Number 2 Summer 2011 : pp. 1–17 1
©2011 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Varieties of Twentieth Century
American Naturalism
john shook
University at Buffalo
natur alism dominated twentieth century American philosophy.
1
Naturalism is a philosophical worldview that relies upon experience, reason,
and especially science for developing an understanding of reality. Natural-
ism demands that these three modes of understanding together shall control
our notion of reality. Varieties of naturalism emerge because the many es-
sential factors of experience, reason, and science can be coherently related
in numerous ways. All naturalisms demand that experience, reason, and sci-
ence be taken most seriously so that no fourth mode of understanding can
be permitted to override them. This triadic unity moderates the excesses of
phenomenalism and idealism, and filters out spiritualism and supernatural-
ism for their introduction of radical and mysterious discontinuities into
knowledge and reality.
Scientific method and knowledge play a crucial role in all naturalisms.
Varieties of naturalism may be distinguished along three dimensions: the
degree of ontological confidence given to science; the breadth of explana-
tory discretion given to science; and the number of scientific fields permitted
to describe reality. From the logically possible combinations resulting from
these dimensions, seven viable varieties of naturalism are distinguished and
contrasted. Each of these varieties of naturalism has had champions in the
course of twentieth century American philosophy, such as Dewey, Whitehead,
Santayana, and Quine to Sellars, Davidson, Churchland, Putnam, and Searle.
The conclusion discusses the three major competitors during the twenti-
eth century for the title of the “genuine” naturalism: Reductive Physicalism,
Non-Reductive Physicalism, and Perspectival Pluralism. The struggles among
these great naturalisms and the other viable varieties of naturalism have been
bequeathed to the twenty-first century, and their outcomes may decide the
ultimate fate of naturalism itself.
2 th e plu r al ist 6 : 2 2011
I.
Stage One: Science, Knowledge, and Reality. There are six primary options when
considering whether science yields knowledge about reality:
(1) Reality cannot be known at all—radical skepticism.
(2) Reality only consists of what science cannot know about—only
other non-sciences know reality.
(3) Science rarely gives reliable knowledge about reality—other non-
sciences know reality far better.
(4) Science is able to give increasingly reliable knowledge about reality.
(5) Science is the only source of knowledge about reality.
(6) Reality only consists of what science knows about.
Each of these six options present pathways to many different worldviews.
Because naturalism at minimum presupposes that the knowledge about reality
provided by science can seriously rival any other alleged source of knowledge,
options 1, 2, and 3 are rejected by naturalists. Options 4, 5, and 6 can lead to
varieties of naturalism.
(4) Science is able to give increasingly reliable knowledge about real-
ity. There may be other ways besides science for knowing reality, but those
ways are not better than science. Science needs assistance from other ways
of knowledge to fully understand reality. This option searches for a compre-
hensive worldview formed by blending together ways of knowledge. Two
interesting varieties:
(4)A. Ontological Dualism: there are two (or more) kinds of reality, know-
able through two or more ways. For example, perhaps introspection is a non-
scientific way of knowing reality because we are consciously aware of mental
realities that science can never explain—leading to Mind-Body Dualism.
(4)B. Synoptic Monism: there is only one kind of ultimate reality, but
it is knowable through two or more ways. We consciously know of realities
(perhaps mental in nature) that science cannot fully explain. Varieties include
Dual Aspect Monism and also Panpsychism, which holds that the natural
world explored by science is ultimately composed of entities that have a
mental/spiritual aspect. Unlike option (4)A, synoptic monism can be used
to develop kinds of naturalism.
(5) Science is the only source of knowledge about reality. The only type
of knowledge is scientific knowledge. However, some of reality consists of en-
tities that cannot be known by science, simply because science is not designed
to provide knowledge about these entities. Two interesting varieties:
(5)A. Perspectival Realism: we are acquainted with the entities unknow-
able through science because we experience these entities in some other way.
For example, much of experience that provides the data for science is not
itself also known by science. Specific types include Emergent Naturalism
(mental entities emerge from, but are not reducible to, physical entities) and
Pragmatic Naturalism, which both offer attempts to coordinate experience
with science. However, unless the perspectives of ordinary experience on
reality are carefully reconciled with scientific knowledge, excessive concern
for ordinary experience can lead toward option (4).
(5)B. Transcendent Realism: there must be entities unknowable by sci-
ence, since science’s own limitations suggest that some of reality is beyond
scientific knowledge.
(6) Reality only consists of what science knows about. Only what can
be known by science really exists. Two interesting varieties:
(6)A. Current Scientific Exclusivism: reality only consists of what cur-
rent science knows now. This option is not widely favored because science
frequently revises its understanding of reality. However, on this option there
is no other rational way to understand reality, so current science’s worldview
is the only reasonable choice.
(6)B. Scientific Exclusivism: reality only consists of what perfected sci-
ence would know. This thesis is sometimes called Eliminative Materialism or
Physicalism. This option cannot yet depict reality accurately since we cannot
know which parts of science have been perfected already, and hence this op-
tion cannot be useful for developing a concrete worldview.
Only three of the six primary worldviews described above can lead to
kinds of naturalism: Synoptic Monism, Perspectival Realism, and Scientific
Exclusivism. Transcendent realism may be ignored here because any transcen-
dent natural reality, if it exists, cannot be an important part of the contest
between naturalism and non-naturalism. Current scientific exclusivism may
also be ignored here because the scientific exclusivist, when challenged over
something that current science cannot yet explain, will eventually resort to
the claim that future science will probably explain it.
shook : Varieties of American Naturalism 3
4 th e plu r a l ist 6 : 2 2011
II.
Stage Two: Explaining Experiences Using Science’s Theories. Let us further con-
sider ways of distinguishing kinds of naturalism. Consider these three kinds
of naturalism:
Narrow Naturalism: If some X is among those things (or among the
properties of those things) that are described by science’s best theories, then
the existence of X is accepted; otherwise, its existence must be denied.
Fitting Naturalism: All the entities accepted by narrow naturalism exist,
plus additional things as follows: If some X is successfully hypothesized as
really being a Y that is among those things (or among the properties of those
things) that are described by science’s best theories, then the existence of X
may be accepted.
Broad Naturalism: All the entities accepted by fitting naturalism exist,
plus additional things as follows: If some X is successfully explained by a hy-
pothesis about why X exists that references only those things (or properties of
those things) that are described by science’s best theories, then the existence
of X may be accepted.
So far we have distinguished six kinds of naturalism, along two dimen-
sions: (1) the degree of ontological confidence given to science, from synoptic
monism to perspectival realism to scientific exclusivism; and (2) the breadth
of explanatory discretion given to science, from narrow to fitting to broad
naturalism.
III.
Stage Three: How Many Sciences Describe Reality? There is one more dimension
that further distinguishes kinds of naturalism: (3) the number of scientific
fields permitted to describe reality. Some naturalists are happy with letting
many sciences know reality, while other naturalists want only one scientific
field to know reality.
The latter type of naturalists have typically accepted a methodological
principle that may be called “reductionist universalism”—only the smallest
parts of reality really exist, and the natural laws about those parts are uni-
versally valid (they hold in all regions of the universe), exclusively valid (no
other laws have independent validity), and exhaustively valid (all events are
dictated by these laws). As physics is the scientific field that knows the small-
est parts of reality, reductionist universalism amounts to the claim that all
of reality ultimately consists solely of subatomic particles and that all events
in the natural universe are ultimately dictated by the laws those subatomic
particles obey. The naturalist who follows reductionist universalism will be
the sort of materialist who puts physics first—this naturalism can be called
“physicalism.”
Other kinds of naturalism do not agree with reductionist universalism
and feel comfortable with permitting other scientific fields to describe reality
with just as much legitimacy as physics. Because the biological and social
sciences have traditionally used some methodological principles and modes
of causality that depart from the physical sciences, many naturalists want
to draw a line between trustworthy physical sciences (physics, chemistry,
geosciences, astronomy, cosmology) and suspicious biological and social
sciences.
The naturalists who would permit just the physical sciences to describe
reality (“scientism”) form a separate camp from those naturalists who are
comfortable with all of the physical, biological, and social sciences describing
reality (“pluralism”).
IV.
Stage Four: How Many Naturalisms? The varieties of naturalism may be dis-
tinguished along three dimensions: (1) the degree of ontological confidence
given to science, from synoptic monism to perspectival realism to scientific
exclusivism; (2) the breadth of explanatory discretion given to science, from
narrow to fitting to broad naturalism; and (3) the number of scientific fields
permitted to describe reality, from just physics to the physical sciences to all
sciences.
If all combinations of these nine kinds of naturalism were created, twenty-
seven varieties of naturalism would result. Let us first combine breadth of
explanation with the number of scientific fields (see Table 1).
shook : Varieties of American Naturalism 5
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Now combine these nine kinds of naturalism with the three kinds of
naturalism that express the degree of ontological confidence given to science,
from synoptic monism to perspectival realism to eliminative materialism.
These combinations generate twenty-seven potential varieties of naturalism.
However, many of these varieties are not viable because of coherence prob-
lems, and some are not practical because their principles would conflict (see
Table 2).
After eliminating sixteen varieties of naturalism because they are either
incoherent or impractical, and leaving aside the four “poor fits” asking for un-
stable combinations, there are seven viable varieties of naturalism remaining.
V.
Stage Five: The Seven Viable Varieties of Naturalism. The seven varieties are
listed in order from the very restrictive to the very open assertions about
what reality is like.
1. Eliminative Physicalism: reality only is what physics says. This variety
is the most austere and rigid naturalism, restricting reality most sharply. Ac-
cording to Eliminative Physicalism, the only realities are those that number
among those things (or among their properties) that are described by physics’s
best theories. This eliminativism typically accepts the principle of “reduction-
ist universalism.” Once eliminativism rejects the existence of some X, then
any belief or judgment or knowledge claim about X is strictly false or quite
meaningless. Trouble soon erupts, because the other physical sciences, such as
chemistry, do not regard their respective claims about nature as meaningless
and may not agree that reductionism will ever work. Sometimes eliminative
physicalists relent from this harsh treatment of eliminable entities, saying that
discourse about many condemned Xs can still be partially and temporarily
meaningful (at least until replaced with physicalist discourse), and “second-
class” practical language and knowledge about these Xs may be needed. For
example, naturalistic philosophy of mind can treat folk psychology as not
Table 1. Nine Kinds of Naturalism
Best Science
Naturalism Physics The Physical Sciences All Natural, Biological,
and Social Sciences
Narrow Naturalism Eliminative Physicalism Eliminative Scientism Eliminative Pluralism
Fitting Naturalism Reductive Physicalism Reductive Scientism Reductive Pluralism
Broad Naturalism Liberal Physicalism Liberal Scientism Liberal Pluralism
entirely false since its talk of perceptions and other mental things may at
least point to real phenomena that require better description rather than
no description. For example, Paul Churchland’s endorsement of eliminative
materialism treats the ontology of perceptions and beliefs as “illusion,” yet
his own cognitive science admits the existence of the “qualitative character of
Table 2. Twenty-Seven Varieties of Naturalism?
Ontological Confidence
Synoptic Perspectival Scientific
Explanatory Function Monism Realism Exclusivism
Eliminative Physicalism not coherent: not coherent: good fit: reality only is
eliminativism eliminativism what physics says—
conflicts with conflicts with Eliminative Physicalism
synopticism perspectivism
Eliminative Scientism not coherent: not coherent: poor fit: can reality be
eliminativism eliminativism only what the physical
conflicts with conflicts with sciences say?—
synopticism perspectivism Eliminative Scientism
Eliminative Pluralism not coherent: not coherent: not practical: the many
eliminativism eliminativism sciences yield diverse
conflicts with conflicts with views on reality
synopticism perspectivism
Reductive Physicalism not coherent: why not practical: good fit: reality must be
reduce when reality why reduce what is reducible to physics—
has multiple modes? only experienced? Reductive Physicalism
Reductive Scientism not coherent: why not practical: why poor fit: is reality
reduce when reality reduce what is reducible to the
has multiple modes? only experienced? physical sciences?—
Reductive Scientism
Reductive Pluralism not coherent: why not practical: why not practical: many
reduce when reality reduce what is only sciences yield contrary
has multiple modes? experienced? views on reality
Liberal Physicalism not practical: using not practical: good fit: physics alone
only physics physics alone supplies explanations of
diminishes diverse cannot explain all reality—Exclusivist
views on reality diversity of experience Liberal Physicalism
Liberal Scientism poor fit: why demand poor fit: can the good fit: the physical
explanations when physical sciences sciences supply
reality has multiple fully explain diverse explanations of all
modes?—Synoptic experience?— reality—Exclusivist
Scientism Perspectival Scientism Liberal Scientism
Liberal Pluralism good fit: the many good fit: the many good fit: the sciences
sciences indicate sciences indicate supply explanations of
plural modes of plural perspectives all reality—Exclusivist
reality—Synoptic on reality— Liberal Pluralism
Pluralism Perspectival Pluralism
shook : Varieties of American Naturalism 7
8 t he plur a l is t 6 : 2 2011
a sensation” in the course of explaining it.
2
Successful explanations, even of
the most austere reductive sort, tend to confirm the reality of the things ex-
plained (failed explanations arouse doubt). Genes are not unreal because they
are composed of nucleotide molecules. The Eliminative Physicalist who is too
generous with “second-class” language and knowledge, especially regarding
mental affairs, risks sliding over to Exclusivist Liberal Pluralism, and is under
great pressure to at least admit the superiority of Reductive Physicalism.
2. Reductive Physicalism: reality must be reducible to physics. This vari-
ety is almost as austere as eliminative physicalism. According to Reductive
Physicalism, the only realities are those of physics’s best theories, plus those
additional things that can be theoretically and ontologically reduced to them.
Reductive Physicalism accepts reductionist universalism but resists collapsing
into eliminative physicalism by permitting the existence of things that can
have their own properties, behaviors, and laws that physics itself does not
investigate. Most eliminativists gain their confidence in the non-existence
of X after reductivists have done their work, and most physicalists are elimi-
nativists about some things (the paranormal, the mythical) and reductivists
about other things (the biological, the social). Reductive Physicalism must
demand complete submission to the principle of reductionist universalism
from all other sciences, or else it must admit the superiority of Exclusivist
Liberal Pluralism. The practical difference between a reductivist and an elimi-
nativist is that an eliminativist about some X would not seek any reductive
explanation of X, since it is irrational to attempt to explain the non-existent.
However, most eliminativists gain their confidence in the non-existence of
X after reductivists have done their work, and most physicalists are elimi-
nativists about some things (the paranormal, the mythical) and reductivists
about other things (the biological, the social). Challenges to reductionism
can arise from the natural sciences, such as biology or geology—the reduc-
tive physicalist demands that these sciences’ entities and laws be reducible in
principle to those of physics, but no one knows how to even attempt such a
reduction. In light of such troubles among the physical sciences, the social
scientist, not surprisingly, is tempted to rebel against this imperial demand
of physics. Resistance to reductive universalism among social scientists is not
necessarily matched by enthusiasm for theoretical pluralism in their own
fields, however; a separate defense of theoretical pluralism is needed.
3
Psy-
chology in particular must deal with the first-person situated and subjective
perspective of consciousness, and many philosophers also want to preserve
legitimate discourse and inquiry into such experience. Churchland may be
better located here with Reductive Physicalism, along with Jaegwon Kim, who
admits that some mental features may not be entirely eliminable as unreal by
proven reductions.
4
3. Exclusivist Liberal Physicalism: physics alone supplies explanations of all
reality. This variety is attractive to naturalists who are skeptical about reductive
explanations of all realities to physical realities. Exclusivist Liberal Physicalism
holds that reality consists of what can be explained by physics. This variety
of naturalism does not adhere to the principle of reductionist universalism,
keeping it distinct from its eliminativist and reductivist cousins. Exclusivist
Liberal Physicalism does maintain an analogue of reductionist universalism,
which can be called “explanatory universalism,” which instead declares that
only the things and laws theorized by physics may be referenced when fully
explaining reality, so that explanations of things are best given solely in terms
of the things recognized by physics alone, if only by some future final physics.
This prioritization of physical explanation is frequently signaled by hostility
toward consciousness, free will, social forces, or anything that could challenge
strict determinism. Ernest Nagel’s naturalism might be best classified here; his
hostility toward life and social science explanations using suspicious teleolo-
gies was matched by his confidence in his “bridge-laws” for reducing such
“explanations” to those of physics.
5
These “bridges” are multiply realizable
and must endlessly proliferate, however. The primary difficulty that confronts
Exclusivist Liberal Physicalism is causality: physically explainable but irreduc-
ible things can appear to have their own causally lawful relationships, and
so one event might be described as having two sufficient causes, or the very
notion of “cause” can fracture into distinct senses. The work of Wilfrid Sel-
lars and Daniel Dennett make strenuous efforts to reconcile the normative,
manifest, and folk ways of living and speaking with physicalism’s underlying
truth. By denying complete reductionism in practice, Sellars and Dennett
can sound like pluralists or even perspectivalists, but their firm commitment
to the exclusive ontological reality of the strictly physical ultimately belies
their generosity toward normative, intentional, and psychological modes
of language. Unless the descriptive and causal overdetermination issues are
eventually resolved, however, Exclusivist Liberal Physicalism is under great
pressure to either collapse into Reductive Physicalism or else to go in the
opposite direction and mutate toward Perspectival Pluralism.
4. Exclusivist Liberal Scientism: the physical sciences supply explanations
of all reality. For reasons given below, this position is better labeled as Non-
Reductive Physicalism. Like any middle position that tries to compromise
all things, this variety is highly unstable, under intense pressure to resign
the field in favor of its exclusivist cousins. According to this position, reality
shook : Varieties of American Naturalism 9
10 th e plu r a l ist 6 : 2 2011
consists only of those things that are explainable by the physical sciences.
But why just the physical sciences? The Exclusivist Liberal Physicalist will
complain that purely physical explanations must in principle prevail across
all the physical sciences anyway. The Exclusivist Liberal Pluralist will com-
plain that admitting the explanatory power of the physical sciences should
be extended to all the sciences. Even worse than competition from its cous-
ins, this variety suffers from both of the severe difficulties confronting its
cousins. Like Exclusivist Liberal Physicalism, this variety must resolve the
issue of causal overdetermination, lest it admit the superiority of Reductive
Physicalism. Like its other cousin, Exclusivist Liberal Pluralism, this variety
must also resolve the issue of incoherence between the physical sciences, which
can be handled more easily by Reductive Physicalism on the one hand or by
Perspectival Pluralism on the other. During the twentieth century, the two
most popular forms of Exclusivist Liberal Scientism were Non-Reductive
Physicalism and the closely related position of Emergent Supervenient Natu-
ralism. For Non-Reductive Physicalism, the only realities are those of physics’s
best theories, plus those additional things of the other physical sciences that
can be theoretically reduced to them, plus those non-reducible experiential/
mental/social properties or powers that are ontologically dependent on physi-
cal things. This position is widely labeled as “Non-Reductive Naturalism,”
but that label is too broad, obscuring the remaining varieties of naturalism
(varieties 5, 6, and 7, below) and omitting its distinctive prioritization of
physics. For this position, the most urgent priority in the defense of natu-
ralism is ontological: mental properties are distinguishable from, but still
entirely dependent on, physical things. Dynamic and causal supervenience
holds globally. Non-reductive physicalists sometimes express this position
in terms of Emergent Naturalism: reality includes many entities that are
emergent (neither explanatorily nor ontologically reducible to physics) even
though these entities entirely supervene on (cannot exist without) realities
known by perfected physics. Emergent Naturalism has enthusiasm for the
supervenience strategy and would not obstruct the search for correlation,
dynamic, and causal superveniences. Dubious whether the supervenience
strategy will ever culminate in satisfactory reductions of all phenomenal/
mental entities, the option of emergence can seem attractive. There are no
non-physical things, yet there are non-physical “mental” properties that can
be experienced, even though they must really be properties of physical things.
Even if other sciences besides physics experimentally confirm theories about
“mental” things as having somewhat independent existences and/or causal
powers from physical things, such knowledge is inferior to physics, and any
suggested quasi-independence of the mental from the physical is only illusory.
To summarize, this Non-Reductive Physicalism is the compromise position
taken by a philosopher who admires the reductivist program and endorses
physicalism yet also believes that some experiential/biological/social prop-
erties will likely forever resist theoretical reduction. W. V. Quine’s holistic
scientism is probably best categorized here, and his philosophy spawned a
wide variety of non-reductive naturalisms projecting at least a “token-token”
identity if not “type-type” identity of mind and matter. Although Quine was
notoriously hostile toward mental states, he was not a straightforward reduc-
tive physicalist, by endorsing the knowledge of the several natural sciences
while demanding strict supervenience over micro-physical matters. Donald
Davidson’s Anomalous Monism is in this non-reductive tradition, along with
many similar formulations. Non-Reductive Physicalism is inherently unstable,
because any devout endorsement of physicalism is embarrassingly compro-
mised by the admission that some phenomenal/mental entities will never be
reduced: not by any semantic, epistemic, explanatory, scientific, functional,
or ontological means. Non-reductive physicalists are torn by this position’s
conflicting pressures. A genuine physicalist should instead bravely vow that
future science will supply all necessary reductions, while a stubborn non-
reductivist should instead slide over to Emergent Supervenient Naturalism
(which in turn is under pressure to mutate toward Perspectival Pluralism)
or Exclusivist Liberal Pluralism (which is similarly under pressure to mutate
into Perspectival Pluralism).
5. Exclusivist Liberal Pluralism: the many sciences supply explanations of
all reality. This variety is attractive to naturalists who are skeptical about reduc-
ing all realities to physical realities on the one hand, and also skeptical about
any naturalistic ontology that permits experience to yield genuine perspectives
on reality that can never be fully explained by the sciences. Exclusivist Liberal
Pluralism holds that reality consists of what can be explained by the many
sciences, including the life sciences and social sciences. Its pluralism encour-
ages all of the sciences to draw their own conclusions about reality. But this
liberality also encourages such a diversity of conclusions about reality, and
such a multiplicity of entities for theorizing, that incoherence among them
will inevitably result. The only way to manage this diversity is to assign each
science its own task of exploring a “level” or “aspect” of reality, so that clash-
ing scientific theories are kept apart. For example, chemistry studies the laws
peculiar to interacting molecules, while subatomic physics studies the quite
different laws peculiar to subatomic particles—without worrying how these
entities and laws specifically relate to each other. The naturalistic pluralist
shook : Varieties of American Naturalism 11
12 th e plu r a l ist 6 : 2 2011
must accept the “disunity of science” and defend each science’s theoretical
autonomy for deciding how to best satisfy the methodological standards of
empirical inquiry. Exclusivist Liberal Pluralism is also burdened with show-
ing how all of experience and the mental life is in principle explainable by
the many sciences. The first-person situated and subjective perspective of
consciousness must be ultimately explainable in terms of the third-person
objective knowledge of the sciences. Taking up the eliminativist challenge
to empirically justify talk of intentions, beliefs, and the like, a philosopher
of mind cannot merely praise the utility of the “intentional stance,” but
can also thereby justify it over reductionist accounts as well.
6
This liberal
pluralism can proclaim its advantages over all pretenses to physicalist re-
ductionism, but its dealings with experience remain extremely hazardous.
Any experiences not satisfactorily explained by the sciences will pressure this
naturalism to mutate into Perspectival Pluralism. Barry Stroud, recognizing
the position of Exclusivist Liberal Pluralism and labeling it as “open-minded
or expansive naturalism,” prefers it over all reductionisms. However, Stroud
warns that excessive expansiveness, a willingness to undertake explanations
for almost everything we encounter, may remove substantive meaning from
the term “naturalism.”
7
John Searle’s “biological naturalism” is caught up in
this problem, too, when he simultaneously insists that the life sciences can
deal with subjective consciousness in a way that mere physicalism or machine
functionalism will never succeed.
8
However, Searle’s strong insistence on the
separate ontological category of subjectivity makes one wonder if even the
life sciences or psychological/social sciences could ever handle such subjectiv-
ity, making his stance sound much more like Perspectival Pluralism or even
Synoptic Pluralism.
6. Perspectival Pluralism: the many sciences along with experience indicate
plural perspectives on reality. This variety offers a middle path between Ex-
clusivist Liberal Pluralism’s reliance on science alone and Synoptic Pluralism’s
hypostatizations of ways of experiencing and knowing reality. Perspectival
Pluralism concludes that the sciences are unable to fully explain experience
and the mind, yet it also respects how the sciences can cohere with, and fre-
quently illuminate, much of experience and the mind. Perspectival Pluralism
finds that experience and scientific knowledge present multiple perspectives
upon the same reality. The first-person situated and subjective perspective of
consciousness is neither inexplicable nor incongruent with the third-person
objective knowledge of the sciences, since all experience and knowledge is
embedded in situated contexts. Our mental lives are correlated to some de-
gree with nervous processes, scientific knowledge grows from our careful
observations of the world, and our experiences of the world can be usefully
coordinated with scientific knowledge. Appreciation for the many vital and
practical relationships and interpenetrations among experiences and scientific
knowledge inspires the Perspectival Pluralist to postulate one natural world
that experience and science both reveal. Pleas for perspectivalism and plural-
ism resound throughout the works of pragmatists, including John Dewey, a
paradigmatic example of a perspectival pluralist. Nicholas Rescher applies the
label of “perspectival pluralism” for his metaphilosophical stance in addition
to “pragmatic idealism.”
9
Ronald Giere also calls his position “perspectival
pluralism,” and in recent writings he has acknowledged his connection with
pragmatism.
10
Pragmatic pluralists understandably express high confidence
in science’s ability to find explanations for all phenomena, since they oppose
the positivisms, constructivisms, and anti-realisms that lead away from natu-
ralism. Such confidence is actually the defining characteristic of Exclusivist
Liberal Pluralism, which means by “explanation” something stronger than
the weak coordination between science and experience sought by Perspectival
Pluralism. For example, an Exclusivist Liberal Pluralist will anticipate that
neurophysiology may someday “explain” human emotions in a near-reduc-
tionist manner (romantic love is “caused” by certain neurotransmitters, for
example). The Perspectival Pluralist resists such narrow causality, preferring
to emphasize how science can help understand the plurality of interrelation-
ships between social conduct, personal feelings, and brain modifications. The
Perspectival Pluralist must tread carefully when explaining science’s “explana-
tions” of experience and the mental life. To justify confidence in one natu-
ral reality, the Perspectival Pluralist develops an ontological system to show
how all experience and all scientific knowledge can be coordinated together.
Any irreconcilable contradiction between some aspect of experience “E” and
some part of scientific knowledge “K”—a contradiction so severe that it is
impossible to see how E and K could both be about the same natural real-
ity—dooms Perspectival Pluralism. Making this task easier is the view held
by Perspectival Pluralism (but not Synoptic Pluralism) that experience is not
itself a kind of knowledge that could challenge scientific knowledge. Synoptic
Pluralism is designed to handle conflicts between experiential knowledge and
scientific knowledge by assigning what each knows to sharply dichotomized
modes of reality. The Perspectival Pluralist worries that such an accommo-
dating synopticism is tantamount to a resignation to ontological dualism.
The disagreements between Dewey’s perspectival pluralism and the systems
of his contemporaries George Santayana and Alfred North Whitehead (both
Synoptic Pluralists) prefigure much of the contemporary debate between
shook : Varieties of American Naturalism 13
14 th e plu r a l ist 6 : 2 2011
naturalisms. This disagreement has more recently erupted over Dual Aspect
Monism. Can Dual Aspect Monism make any proper claim to naturalism?
David Chalmers suggests that ample psychophysical laws ensure a funda-
mental ontological connection between mind and matter, holding out hope
for naturalism’s victory over ontological dualism in a manner suggestive of
Perspectival Pluralism.
11
Psychophysical laws only raise the problem of causal
overdetermination once again. Pragmatic pluralists such as Hilary Putnam
and John Dupré find that multiple modes of explanation generate multiple
modes of causality.
12
Can a vision of multiple modes of one reality be ad-
equately distinguished from a straightforward ontological pluralism of many
worlds? Nelson Goodman notoriously raises doubts about halting short of
ontological pluralism.
13
7. Synoptic Pluralism: the many sciences, reason, and experience indi-
cate plural yet related modes of reality. This variety is the most open and
flexible naturalism, defining reality most generously. According to Synoptic
Pluralism, reality has a variety of aspects or modes as known by the many
sciences, and also has aspects or modes known by experience and perhaps
pure reason as well that the sciences are incompetent to describe or explain.
The simplest forms of Synoptic Pluralism include Dual Aspect Monism (the
sciences deal only with reality’s physical aspect while the introspective mind
deals only with reality’s mental aspect) and Panpsychism (the sciences ac-
curately but only partially describe all realities, because the sciences cannot
capture the sentient or feeling aspect of these realities). Dual Aspect Monism
has the heavy burden of confidence that science will figure out the deep-
est ontological relations between mind and matter despite the irreducible
subjective/objective dichotomy; Thomas Nagel is a recent illustration. Epi-
phenomenalism is another intriguing form of Synoptic Pluralism (although
the epiphenomenalist who denies that irreducible qualities of experience are
themselves objects of knowledge would instead be a Perspectival Pluralist).
Synoptic Pluralism requires some sort of naturalistic ontology—an account
of reality that constructs a coherent understanding of one single natural
reality with multiple aspects, experienced/known in multiple ways. Synopti-
cism can more easily segregate incompatible aspects into distinct modes of
reality that need not fully overlap or intersect. Charles Peirce and William
James prefigure much of twentieth century Synoptic Pluralism in America.
Santayana’s four Realms of Being and Whitehead’s panexperiential Process
Philosophy emphasize their capacious accommodation of diverse modes
of experiencing/describing/knowing. Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses,
Paul Weiss’s Modes of Being, Nelson Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking, and
Richard Rorty’s Linguistic Turn have similar merits.
14
A synoptic natural-
ist ontology is not testable by ordinary experimental methods, because it
is designed to be maximally compatible and coherent with all knowledge
and experience from all sources. Since experience increases and knowledge
evolves, a naturalistic ontology must adapt to keep pace, and this adapt-
ability serves as its test of adequacy. Synoptic Pluralism distinguishes itself
from Perspectival Pluralism by concretizing and hypostatizing experienced
and known entities for their classification into sharply distinct ontological
categories, to forbid the merging of these entities into coordinated perspec-
tives upon reality. On the other hand, unless Synoptic Pluralism can de-
velop its own compelling naturalistic ontology, its enthusiasm for multiple
modes of reality can easily amount to ontological dualisms and pluralisms
that entirely depart from naturalism.
VI.
Stage Six: The Great Naturalisms. Each of the seven major varieties of natural-
ism suffers from unresolved problems requiring further intense philosophical
work. Lacking satisfactory resolutions to their problems so far, each is under
great pressure to mutate into some other variety of naturalism. The next
table diagrams the seven major naturalisms, their most urgent issues, and
the direction of pressure for mutation (see Table 3).
As evident from the lines of pressure indicated in Table 3, most natural-
isms gravitate around the three great naturalisms: Reductive Physicalism,
Non-Reductive Physicalism, and Perspectival Pluralism. They stand opposed
across a wide divide that separates the physicalists from the pluralists. The
essential issue for naturalism consists of the fundamental disagreement that
divides Reductive Physicalism apart from Perspectival Pluralism—does any
science’s knowledge, and the reality it knows, have priority (epistemic and
ontological) over all other knowledge and experience?
Table 3. Seven Varieties of Naturalism and Their Issues
Exclusivist Exclusivist
Eliminative Reductive Liberal Non-Reductive Liberal Perspectival Synoptic
Physicalism Physicalism Physicalism Physicalism Pluralism Pluralism Pluralism
What about Must justify What about Why appeal to Why not admit Must justify Goes to
“second class” reductionist causal over- just physical superiority of perspectival ontological
knowledge? universalism determination? sciences? perspectivism? ontology extremes?
pressure→ ←pressure ←pressure→ pressure→ ←pressure
shook : Varieties of American Naturalism 15
16 t h e plu r a l ist 6 : 2 2011
How can we begin to decide this most fundamental issue over reduction-
ism versus perspectivism? What can these great naturalisms do to gain the
advantage over the other? We conclude by suggesting a few recommendations
for pursuing these debates among naturalisms in the twenty-first century.
Reductive Physicalism must (1) display more successful and significant
reductions to physics, to increase confidence that reductions are essential
to science; (2) guarantee that reductive universalism is consistent with sci-
ence’s actual use of theoretical models and natural laws; (3) demonstrate that
avoiding entity duplication and causal overdetermination is essential to sci-
entific progress; (4) explain why its categorization of all sciences but physics
as “second-class” is not just as curious as perspectivism’s categorization of
all sciences as partial and limited; and (5) justify the view that experience is
either eliminable or reducible, at least in principle.
Non-Reductive Physicalism must (1) show how the lack of reductions to
physics is not simultaneously a clinching argument for perspectivalism; (2)
restrict the domain of legitimate scientific reductions so that they are neither
universal nor disposable; (3) argue that entity duplication and causal overde-
termination are tolerably inevitable results of scientific progress; (4) explain
why a compromise view of physics as “first among equals” is still justifiable
in light of the admitted entity duplication and causal overdetermination;
and (5) justify the view that closely interconnecting experience with physical
processes yields confidence in a “token-token” identity of the mental and
the physical.
Perspectival Pluralism must (1) produce more impressive ontological
systematizations across the sciences and experience, to increase confidence
that such systematizations are essential to the progress of knowledge; (2)
show that reductive universalism is inconsistent with science’s actual use of
theoretical models and natural laws; (3) demonstrate that entity duplication
and causal overdetermination are not detrimental to scientific progress; (4)
explain why the standard of scientific method should prevail without any
amendment awarding preference to reductive accounts; and (5) justify the
view that scientific theorizing is continuous with ordinary experience and
should be coordinated with experience in a naturalistic ontology.
notes
1. A judicious sampling is collected in American Philosophic Naturalism in the Twentieth
Century, ed. John Ryder (Amherst: Prometheus, 1994).
2. Paul Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the
Structure of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press), 6, 25.
3. See Helen Longino, “Theoretical Pluralism and the Scientific Study of Behavior,”
Scientific Pluralism, ed. Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino, and C. Kenneth Waters
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P), 102–31.
4. Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton UP,
2007).
5. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961).
6. See, for example, Robert Audi, “Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic,” Men-
tal Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford UP, 1993), 53–74.
7. Barry Stroud, “The Charm of Naturalism,” Naturalism in Question (Cambridge:
Harvard UP, 2004), 32–35.
8. John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: MIT P, 1992).
9. Nicholas Rescher, A System of Pragmatic Idealism, Vol. 3 of Metaphilosophical Inquiries
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994).
10. Ronald Giere, “Perspectival Pluralism,” Scientific Pluralism, ed. Kellert, Longino,
and Waters, 26–41; and Giere, Scientific Perspectivism (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2006).
11. David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New
York: Oxford UP, 1996).
12. Hilary Putnam, “Causation and Explanation,” The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and
World (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), 137–50; and John Dupré, The Disorder of Things:
Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993).
13. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978).
14. Goodman is cited in note 13. See Stephen Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley: U of
California P, 1942); Paul Weiss, Modes of Being (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1958);
and Richard Rorty, “Introduction: Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philoso-
phy,” The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method, ed. Rorty (Chicago: U
of Chicago P, 1967), 1–39.
shook : Varieties of American Naturalism 17
