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Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (review)

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Acemoglu and Robinson undertake a thorough and detailed enquiry of the existing puzzle of economic, social and political inequality in the current world scenario. The authors make an attempt to address the fundamental problem of glaring income gaps and variation in the standards of living in various parts of the world, "why [some] nations fail" while others succeed. The answer to the puzzle is embedded in the "institutions" which shape up the overall governance in terms economic, social and political policies of a specific country. The authors present a strong case by delving in-depth in a "historically path dependent" analysis of how some nations have followed an institutional path which resulted in effective institutions that are able to render policies beneficial for the citizens. This has been further elaborated by providing stories of "success and failure" and juxtaposing "dissimilar-similar" examples, dissimilar in terms of socio-economic indicators and similar regionally and geographically, for example, Nogales, Arizona (United States) and Nogales, Sonara (Mexico) in Chapter 1, North and South Korea in Chapter 3. Linking history and the contemporary conditions authors opine that historical revolutionary turning points of a nation matter only when they succeed in altering the social structures fundamentally as happened in the case of England in 1688 and French revolution in 1789. The authors cite the example of recent revolution in Egypt (overthrowing Hosni Mubarak) where earlier revolutions (the Ottoman Empire and the end of British rule in 1952) failed to establish a new order leading to much familiar to absolutism (Mubarak's rule). Following from the previous patterns, the authors cast a shadow of doubt whether the recent revolution would result in any fundamental change in the existing socio-economic and political structures in Egypt. A historical institutional exploration of success and failure stories according to the authors is instructive in providing answers and solutions to the existing dilemma of variation in prosperity and poverty. The book initially presents a contrasting case of the two Nogales, one which is situated in the United States in the north and the other in Mexico in the south. Despite similar geography and climate, the two have glaring differences in income and standards of living. The authors argue that these differences are embedded in the types of institutions which took shape historically in the two countries. Institutions providing incentives to the citizens for overall growth is the key for the success and failure. However, economic institutions alone cannot provide the necessary structure for development; politics and political institutions also dictate the shaping of economic institutions as is the case of United States since 1619. It is pertinent to examine the interactions between political and economic institutions. The kind of institutions which take shape is path dependent on the past forces; "different patterns of institutions today are deeply rooted in the past because once society gets organized in a particular way, this tends to persist" (p. 44). Acemoglu and Robinson, while presenting a strong case for institutional analysis, negate some popular hypotheses which attempt to provide reasons for the world inequality in terms of geography, culture, and ignorance of the rulers, resulting in poor policy choices. Some prominent examples like Asian and African economies of Malaysia, Singapore, Botswana, and China are cited to support their argument. Why some nations fail while others succeed is highly dependent on the types of institutions which take root historically. The authors further classify and distinguish them as "inclusive and extractive" institutions. Inclusive economic institutions provide incentives to the citizens resulting in technological innovations (Thomas Edison in the United States) and increase in education. Extractive institutions, on the other hand, only concentrate on maximizing benefits to the ruling elites, providing no incentive to the citizens to participate in any economic activity or encourage technological innovations. The authors cite differences in North and South Korea, the United States, and Latin America as examples of inclusive and extractive institutions. Economic institutions are inextricably linked to the politics and inclusive political institutions which are pluralistic and highly centralized at the same time, pointing towards striking a delicate balance of political power. This balance is a prerequisite to forge a meaningful synergy between political and economic institutions. The question of...
Review
Reviewed Work(s): Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty by
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson
Review by: HIMANSHU JHA
Source:
ASEAN Economic Bulletin,
Vol. 29, No. 2 (August 2012), pp. 168-170
Published by: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43184876
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DOI: 10.1355/ae29-2j
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power ,
Prosperity and Poverty. By Daron Acemoglu and
James A. Robinson. New York: Crown Business,
2012. Pp. 544.
Acemoglu and Robinson undertake a thorough and
detailed enquiry of the existing puzzle of economic,
social and political inequality in the current world
scenario. The authors make an attempt to address
the fundamental problem of glaring income gaps
and variation in the standards of living in various
parts of the world, "why [some] nations fail"
while others succeed. The answer to the puzzle
is embedded in the "institutions" which shape up
the overall governance in terms economic, social
and political policies of a specific country. The
authors present a strong case by delving in-depth
in a "historically path dependent" analysis of how
some nations have followed an institutional path
which resulted in effective institutions that are
able to render policies beneficial for the citizens.
This has been further elaborated by providing
stories of "success and failure" and juxtaposing
"dissimilar-similar" examples, dissimilar in terms
of socio-economic indicators and similar regionally
and geographically, for example, Nogales, Arizona
(United States) and Nogales, Sonara (Mexico) in
Chapter 1, North and South Korea in Chapter 3.
Linking history and the contemporary conditions
authors opine that historical revolutionary turning
points of a nation matter only when they succeed
in altering the social structures fundamentally as
happened in the case of England in 1688 and French
revolution in 1789. The authors cite the example
of recent revolution in Egypt (overthrowing Hosni
Mubarak) where earlier revolutions (the Ottoman
Empire and the end of British rule in 1952) failed
to establish a new order leading to much familiar
to absolutism (Mubarak's rule). Following from
the previous patterns, the authors cast a shadow
of doubt whether the recent revolution would
result in any fundamental change in the existing
socio-economic and political structures in Egypt.
A historical institutional exploration of success
and failure stories according to the authors is
instructive in providing answers and solutions to
the existing dilemma of variation in prosperity
and poverty.
The book initially presents a contrasting case
of the two Nogales, one which is situated in
the United States in the north and the other in
Mexico in the south. Despite similar geography
and climate, the two have glaring differences in
income and standards of living. The authors argue
that these differences are embedded in the types
of institutions which took shape historically in the
two countries. Institutions providing incentives to
the citizens for overall growth is the key for the
success and failure. However, economic institutions
alone cannot provide the necessary structure for
development; politics and political institutions also
dictate the shaping of economic institutions as is
the case of United States since 1619. It is pertinent
to examine the interactions between political and
economic institutions. The kind of institutions
which take shape is path dependent on the past
forces; "different patterns of institutions today
are deeply rooted in the past because once society
gets organized in a particular way, this tends to
persist" (p. 44). Acemoglu and Robinson, while
presenting a strong case for institutional analysis,
negate some popular hypotheses which attempt to
provide reasons for the world inequality in terms
of geography, culture, and ignorance of the rulers,
resulting in poor policy choices. Some prominent
examples like Asian and African economies of
Malaysia, Singapore, Botswana, and China are
cited to support their argument.
Why some nations fail while others succeed
is highly dependent on the types of institutions
which take root historically. The authors further
classify and distinguish them as "inclusive and
extractive" institutions. Inclusive economic
institutions provide incentives to the citizens
resulting in technological innovations (Thomas
Edison in the United States) and increase in
education. Extractive institutions, on the other
hand, only concentrate on maximizing benefits
to the ruling elites, providing no incentive to
the citizens to participate in any economic
activity or encourage technological innovations.
The authors cite differences in North and South
ASEAN Economic Bulletin 168 Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2012
This content downloaded from 147.142.218.127 on Tue, 16 Apr 2019 10:50:01 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Korea, the United States, and Latin America as
examples of inclusive and extractive institutions.
Economic institutions are inextricably linked to
the politics and inclusive political institutions
which are pluralistic and highly centralized
at the same time, pointing towards striking a
delicate balance of political power. This balance
is a prerequisite to forge a meaningful synergy
between political and economic institutions.
The question of centralized power is again
explored in cases of the Caribbean between the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, development
of Soviet Union till the 1970s, South Korea and
more recently China where extractive political
institutions with highly centralized power were
consequential in shaping up inclusive economic
institutions. Political centralization is the key for
such a growth. However, in the absence of any
inclusive political institutions, it may not result
in sustained economic growth. Additionally, there
is danger that economic institutions might turn
extractive working in favour of the power elite.
Historical critical junctures play a role in shaping
up institutions that take root, whether inclusive or
extractive, contributing towards little differences in
the initial phase of institutional building. The small
differences are consequential and get amplified
further to facilitate the emergence of institutions
which are critical for a nation's success or failure
and "diffusion of prosperity". It is also pointed
out that institutions are rooted in the prevailing
socio-cultural ethos of a particular nation. The
patterns and dynamics of interaction between the
critical historical junctures and institutions play
a significant role and had varied effect on the
institutional paths which took shape in various
parts of the world. The "critical juncture" argument
provides an explanation as to why industrial
revolution took root in England and was diffused to
some parts of the world such as the United States,
France, and Japan, while some others like Spain,
Austria-Hungary, Russia, and China could not take
advantage of the industrial revolution.
Imperialist and colonial expansions are
additional factors which hindered and stagnated
growth in most parts of Asia and Africa, creating
extractive institutions. The cases of Sierra Leone
and most of sub-Saharan Africa are examples of
this colonization which led to the formation of
"vicious circle" of extractive institutions in both
pre- and post-colonial scenario. The key, the
authors point out, is the transformation of the
extractive institutions to inclusive ones with the
right policy choices and appropriate politics as
with what happened in the case of southern United
States, Botswana, and China - what is termed
as creation of "virtuous cycle". Interestingly,
according to the authors, luck plays a role as well
as "history unfolds in a contingent fashion".
The authors present a compelling institutional
theory operating at two levels of institutional
interpretation of history in terms of extractive and
inclusive institutions and the history resulting in
new inclusive institutional pathways. They also
highlight the crucial link and synergy between the
economic and political institutions - one creating
conducive economic environment and the other
facilitating ideal distribution of power which is
both sufficiently pluralistic and centralized. There
is no ready-made recipe for creating institutions
which pull the nations out of the poverty cycle
and allow them to prosper; the process is gradual,
dependent on a number of socio-political and
historical factors. Hints of such factors are cited
in the case of Botswana, which had a degree of
centralized power and existing traditional pluralistic
political institutions and Brazil, which experienced
the building of civil society institutions and related
party organizations from the grassroots. Media is
also seen playing a transformative role.
Needless to mention some of the gaps which one
is compelled to point out indicate the robustness and
relevance of the institutional theory rather than the
lack of it. The model of sustained economic growth
in some parts of the world which the authors have
traced historically and used as success cases have
recently come under severe scrutiny in the light
of the ongoing global economic crisis in Europe,
North America, Japan, etc. Simultaneously, a new
group of nations are emerging as key players in
the world affairs, for example, BRIC countries. Is
this then a critical juncture or a historical moment
where existing institutional framework is replaced
by a new set of institutions? Perhaps, it could
ASEAN Economic Bulletin 169 Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2012
This content downloaded from 147.142.218.127 on Tue, 16 Apr 2019 10:50:01 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
have been prudent for the authors to deal with this
question of emerging world order going beyond
the historical account, thereby making it more
contemporary. While agreeing with the authors'
argument on striking a balance between political
centralization and pluralism, it must be pointed
out that the existing diversity at the grassroots
necessitates a decentralized governance structure
and hence a decentralized institutional framework
as can be seen in case of India and Brazil and to a
large extent in most of the large federally arranged
nations. This aspect of institutional framework
has not been dealt with in detail by the authors,
which is immensely significant for the delivery of
policies to the grassroots.
Finally, this volume comprehensively provides
an insightful and instructive historical explanation
of the "inequality" dilemma faced by the policy-
makers and analysts alike. The institutional
approach provides an alternate theoretical
framework as institutions are often the vehicles
through which the governance agenda of the
country is carried forward. The volume presents
a valid case of a historically path-dependent
"institutional theory" in explaining "prominent
patterns of world inequality".
HIMANSHU JHA
Doctoral candidate at the
National University of Singapore
ASEAN Economic Bulletin 170 Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2012
This content downloaded from 147.142.218.127 on Tue, 16 Apr 2019 10:50:01 UTC
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... Inclusiveness is an objective as well as a mean to achieve other ends. Different inequality-growth models describe that inequality can be harmful for economic growth through its political economy effects (Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; Perotti, 1996; Rodrik, 1999; Fajnzylber et al. 2000) and inclusive economic and political institutions may be viewed as important determinant of the nation's success or failure (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Tolerance for inequality in a society may vanish if it persists for a longer period of time and this problem may be even more severe in heterogeneous societies (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973). ...
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