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2. Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts on quality
of life, influence and political rights
2.1. Introduction
Interest in responsive and inclusive governance has been central to the
international development debate in the last two decades. On the one hand the
international development policy agenda since the 1990 Washington
Consensus focused on (good) governance, privatisation and responsive service
delivery through decentralisation.1 On the other hand, (inter)national civil
society and citizenship and deepening democracy literature (as well as social
movements and livelihoods literature) focused on the ‘rights based approach’
for development and participation as primary citizenship right for civic
engagement to claim other human rights. With the mixed record of results of
the good governance and decentralisation agenda and the gradual refocus at
(inter)national level on rule of law and state building rather than
democratisation for development, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness and 2008 Accra High Level Forum (AHLF) on Aid Effectiveness
promoted an increased emphasis on endogenous development and ownership
and intensification of the agenda through capacity development. Parts of the
international development policy world called for investigation of alternative
and mutually complementary informal channels. Examples are the Drivers of
Change approach of DFID/SIDA, the OECD institutional programme and the
recent Africa Politics and Power Programme. There has also been a shift
towards understanding the role of power and multi-level institutional and
structural constraints in action and research after a history of mixed results
from the good governance agenda and the increased effects of globalisation on
poverty. A coherent framework has yet to be formulated in order to analyse the
conditions under which spaces of power (underpinned by multi-level formal
and informal institutions) impact quality of life, influence and political rights
of the poor.
This chapter starts with a general literature review of the debate on voice,
responsiveness and (local) governance (2.2). It proceeds by discussing spaces
through which citizens can potentially express their voice and make their
claims for influence and political rights (2.3). After introducing the concept of
spaces, the relevant theoretical notions with regard to individually
claimed/created spaces, collectively claimed/created spaces, and invited spaces
are reviewed. For each of these spaces the relevant theoretical
conceptualisations are reviewed and the transition from an actor-oriented
agency perspective, towards a balanced structural constraints perspective is
discussed. Finally, the literature on impacts on poverty and influence though
Chapter 2
8
these spaces is reviewed (2.4) in terms of impacts on quality of life and impacts
on influence and political rights.
2.2. Voice, responsiveness, governance and citizen influence
Towards the end of the 1990s international development literature stressed the
insufficient responsiveness of governance institutions and the additional need
for channels of accountability and expression of citizen voice. The
Consultations with the Poor report for the WDR 2001 (drawing from the
Voices of the Poor reports of Narayan (2000/1)), indicated that many poor
people in developing countries perceive institutions as distant, unaccountable
and corrupt; furthermore the report states that poverty needs to be increasingly
understood from the perspective of the poor. A study by the Commonwealth
Foundation (1999, quoted from Goetz & Gaventa 2001) found growing
disillusionment of citizens with their governments, based on concerns about
corruption, lack of responsiveness to the needs of the poor, and the absence of
connection to or participation by ordinary citizens. The lack of responsiveness
concerned especially delivery of public services.
Decentralisation, in the context of the 1990 Washington Consensus, was
generally considered as a major way to enhance efficient and responsive
delivery of service (Zanetta 2005, based on Oates 1972, Tiebaut 1956 and
Musgrave 1963; Smoke 2003; Jütting 2004/5). Guided by the principle of
subsidiary, responsibility for service provision should be allocated at the
closest appropriate level consistent with efficient and cost-effective delivery of
services. Due to their close proximity, local government officials are
considered to be in a better position than state officials to assess the needs and
preferences of their citizens; moreover they are in a better place to make
decisions over the distribution and allocation of resources and public services.
In addition, management of public services can improve in terms of
accountability and performance in the hands of sub-national officials, rather
than with far removed national bureaucracies and elected officials (Ostrom et
al. 1993). Figure 2.1 shows an overview of the basic accountability
relationships within a devolved system of local service provision. In addition,
if successfully implemented, decentralisation can potentially reduce red tape
and bureaucracy, improve credibility and legitimacy of the government, foster
innovation while minimising the risks in case of failure (Rondinelli 1983) and
promote local democracy among other things through greater representation of
diversity by greater public input in pluralistic political environments (Pauly
1973, quoted from Zanetta 2005; Crook & Sverrisson 2003; Blomkvist 2003).
Crook and Manor (1998) were very critical about the expectations of
decentralisation, in the context of earlier experiences in the world. ‘The
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
9
outcomes of a decentralisation policy were supposed not to depend just on the
relative weights of devolution and deconcentration in the institutional and
fiscal structures, but also on their combination with the two other important
elements: the kind of legitimation and accountability adopted (e.g.
participatory, electoral, religious, monarchical) and the principles according to
which the area (and hence size and character) of a decentralised authority are
determined’(Crook & Manor 1998: 2).2
Source: Tidemand, Steffensen and Olsen (2007), adapted from World Bank
(2004).
Decentralisation can be defined as the transfer of responsibilities for public
functions and services from central government to lower levels of government.
It can take on different functions and intensity in different countries.
Decentralisation can consist of three functions: fiscal, institutional or
administrative, and political (Smoke 2003). Fiscal decentralisation refers to the
resource allocation to sub-national levels of government, such as the
assignment of responsibilities of own-source revenues. Institutional or
administrative decentralisation aims at transferring decision-making authority,
Figure 2.1: Basic accountability relationships
National Policy Makers
(Central Government)
Local Policy Makers
(Local Government)
(Poor )
Peo
p
le Providers
Chapter 2
10
resources and responsibilities for the delivery of public services from the
central government to sub-levels of government. It concerns administrative
bodies, systems and mechanisms which help to manage and support
decentralisation. It is also comprised of procedures which link formal
government bodies to other key local actors such as NGOs and the private
sector. Political decentralisation refers to the transfer of political power and
authority to sub-national levels of government. Decentralisation may also
differ in intensity or degree. Rondinelli (1999) distinguishes between the
modes of deconcentration, delegation and devolution.3 Deconcentration is
considered the weakest form of decentralisation, with a geographical
dispersion of state responsibilities rather than the actual transfer of authority to
sub-national governments. Delegation implies a transfer of decision-making
authority and administrative functions to the sub-national level, in which sub-
national authorities are not controlled by the state but are accountable to it.
Devolution concerns the strongest form of decentralisation, with transfer of
competencies, especially in service delivery, to local authorities that elect their
own mayors and councils, gain financial autonomy, and have independent
decision-making authority in the allocation of investments. Devolution is
therefore an inherent political process and has also been termed ‘democratic
decentralisation’ (Litvack et al. 1998). Decentralisation can be implemented as
a gradual process or as a big bang operation. Whatever the function and mode
of decentralisation, interrelations between various levels and parts of
government remain crucial elements in the functioning of the public sector.
Decentralisation is often, but not necessarily, accompanied by a shift from
hierarchy to markets for provision of pubic goods and services and the related
shift from government to (local) governance (see also Baud, Post, De Haan &
Dietz 2001). Governance takes on the form of multi-actor arrangements and
has been described as ‘a notoriously slippery term that vaguely refers to non-
hierarchical attempts at coordinating public and private interests, actions and
resources’ (Pierre & Peters 2000: 7). It concerns forms of cooperation between
the state and the private – including both civil society as well as the private for
profit sector (Pierre 1998).
The main commonality in definitions of governance is the notion of institutions
as ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990), while especially differing in terms of
specificity and normativity (Grindle 2005/7).4 Institutions are generally defined
as ‘regularised patterns of behaviour between individuals and groups’ (Leach
1999: 226), or ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape interaction’ (North
1990: 3) or ‘social practices that are regularly and continuously repeated,
sanctioned and maintained by social norms and have a major significance in
the social structure’ (Abercombie et al. 1984). Institutions can be formal (rules
and conventions, including constitutions, laws, regulations, property rights,
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
11
markets and enforcement characteristics like sanctions) and informal (codes of
behaviour like traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs and all other
norms of behaviour that passed the test of time) (North 1990; see also Ellis
2000; Jütting 2003).
From a critical perspective, Swyngedouw (2005: 1991) suggests that hybrid
and ambiguous ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ not only rearticulates the state-
civil society relationship, but also erodes the democratic character of the
political sphere by the encroaching neo-liberal imposition of market forces that
set the rules of the game, empowering new actors and disempowering others.
Swyngedouw indicates that ‘considerable risks may be involved in the
proliferation of ‘unauthorised’ actors: a vast terrain of contestation, potential
conflict, capacity to exercise entitlements and institutional power without
official restraints may emerge from it. Systems may become non-transparent,
ad-hoc and context dependent and questions remain with regard to inclusion,
legitimacy, representation, scale of operation and internal/external
accountability. Whereas in formal ‘democracy’ the rules are clear and all have
the opportunity to participate – if only to vote –, in multi-actor governance
arrangements participation itself becomes contested and governance becomes
limited ‘in terms of who can, is, or will be allowed to participate which in turn
is related to power and status’.
Early citizenship literature and ‘deepening democracy’ literature was much
more positive about the possibilities of inclusive governance. This literature
emphasised that for promotion of development with poverty reduction through
local governance, it is necessary to rebuild the relationships between citizens
and their local governments by working on ‘both sides of the equation’ and on
their intersections (Gaventa 2001; Cornwall & Gaventa 2001b). Focusing on
just one of these perspectives was considered to hold the risk of leading to
either ‘voice without influence’, when participation is not linked to power and
politics, or to reinforcing the status quo when reform of political institutions
does not include consultation and participation (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001).5
Citizenship and deepening democracy literature moved beyond voice as
consultation and presence, and included influence on decision-making and
holding accountable those who make policies in participatory processes
regarding service delivery (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001; Goetz & Gaventa
2001).6 Citizenship literature emphasises the rights of citizens to participate
and exert influence ‘as makers and shapers’ rather than ‘users and choosers’ of
interventions and services designed by others (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001;
Goetz & Gaventa 2001). The reconceptualisation of participation as a right of
citizenship – aligning with concepts of rights-based approaches to development
- , indicates that it represents an expression of human agency in the political
Chapter 2
12
arena: citizenship is a right that enables people to act as agents (Lister 1998,
quoted from Cornwall & Gaventa 2001b). In addition, it was suggested that if
rights and citizenship are attained through agency - not only bestowed by the
state – the right to participate is a prior right necessary for making other rights
real. While social rights were seen as freedoms helping people to realise their
political and civil rights, participation as a right was considered as a positive
freedom enabling citizens to realise their social rights (Ferguson 1999; DFID
2000; Lister 1997, quoted from Gaventa 2004). In this study participation is
interpreted as a right of citizenship that enables access to other rights. Direct
participation is however not viewed as the only channel through which other
rights can be accomplished.
2.3. Spaces
The concept of spaces
The notion of spaces was first introduced to the development literature by
Grindle and Thomas (1991), who conceptualised policy arenas as spaces. The
notion of spaces for participation was more widely introduced to the
development literature towards the end of 1990s in the context of growing
attention for (local) governance and accountability, viewing inclusive
governance as a right for all citizens as opposed to earlier need based
conceptions of participation (Gaventa & Valderama 1999; Brock 2000; Brock,
Cornwall & Gaventa 2001; Cornwall 2002).
The concept of spaces originates from 20th century German (Habermas,
Arendt) and French (Lefebvre, Foucault, Bourdieu) social theorists (Cornwall
2002). Spaces for participation were defined ‘in abstract terms as the ways in
which opportunities for engagement might be conceived or perceived, and in
concrete terms of the actual sites that are entered and animated by citizens’
(Lefebvre 1991, quoted from Cornwall 2001/2/4a).
Initially spaces for participation of citizens were mainly defined in relation to
the state and differentiated into invited and claimed or created spaces. In
invited spaces citizens are acting in and with the state. In claimed or created
spaces citizens are acting without the state, both outside and in the absence of
or in relative autonomy from and on the state.7 Later the notion of spaces was
also increasingly used for non-state spaces, referred to as ‘new democratic
spaces’ or ‘spaces of change’(Gaventa 2007a: xv). These spaces exist in a
dynamic relationship in that whatever happens in the one influences the other.
Similarly, power, experiences and capacities gained in one space, can be used
to enter and affect other spaces (Cornwall 2004b).
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
13
More recently the notion of spaces for participation was adapted in the context
of the growing recognition of the importance of power relations and
globalisation (Gaventa 2004/6b). In the so called ‘power cube’ the dimension
of power is explicitly added to the dimensions of spaces and places, while
redefining them as levels, spaces and forms of power (Figure 2.2). Levels
consist of global, national and local places. Spaces are divided into closed,
invited and created/claimed spaces. Forms of power, based on Lukes’s
conceptualisations (1974/2005) and VeneKlasen and Miller (2002), are divided
into visible, hidden and invisible power (Gaventa 2004/6b/7a/7b). Visible
power (observable decision-making) includes the visible and definable aspects
of political power – the formal rules, structures, authorities, institutions and
procedures of decision-making. ‘Hidden power (setting the political agenda)
concerns the maintenance of influence of certain powerful people and
institutions by controlling who gets to do the decision making and what gets on
the agenda. Invisible power (shaping meaning and what is acceptable) shapes
the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation. Significant
problems and issues are not only kept from the decision-making table, but also
from the minds and consciousness of the different players involved, even those
directly affected by the problem. By influencing how individuals think about
their place in the world, this level of power shapes people’s beliefs, sense of
self, and acceptance of the status quo – even their own superiority or
inferiority. Processes of socialisation, culture and ideology perpetuate
exclusion and inequality by defining what is normal, acceptable and safe’
(Gaventa 2004/6b, based on VeneKlasen and Miller 2002). The power cube
framework is meant to facilitate the assessment of possibilities for
transformative action in various political spaces. Spaces are then viewed as
‘opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially
affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and
interests’ (Gaventa 2006b). Each of the continuums involves contestation over
the boundaries of spaces and places for participation, and the dynamics of
power which influences which actors, voices and identities may enter or are
excluded from them (Gaventa 2004).
Gaventa (2006b) indicates that other relevant terminologies have been added
to the continuum of spaces, such as ‘conquered’, ‘instigated’ or ‘initiated
spaces’. Recently the term ‘negotiated spaces’ was proposed to refer to
processes of expanding spaces and claiming spaces (Baud & Nainan 2008).
Chapter 2
14
Figure 2.2: The ‘power cube’: the levels, spaces and forms of power
Source: Gaventa (2006b).
This study discusses spaces at the local level and their intersections with spaces
at the national level.8 The study still applies the original core differentiation
between claimed/created and invited spaces. Claimed/created spaces are
differentiated into individually and collectively claimed/created spaces. The
added forms of power in the ‘power cube’ are captured more dynamically in
the research through the analysis of processes and the accommodating and
constraining metropolitan, national and international institutional contexts.
These institutional contexts - that underpin spaces and accommodate and
constrain processes within spaces - consist of formal rules of the
game/institutions (rules and conventions, including constitutions, laws,
regulations, property rights, markets and enforcement characteristics like
sanctions) and informal rules of the game/ institutions (codes of behaviour like
traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs and all other norms of
behaviour that passed the test of time) (North 1990).9 While the concept of
spaces offers a good framework for the assessment of possibilities for
transformative action in various political spaces and their intersections, it needs
to be complemented by additional theoretical conceptualisations to answer the
research questions of this study.10
Invisible
LEVELS
Visible
SPACES
FORMS
Hidden
Invited
Closed
Global
Claimed/
Created
National
Loca
l
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
15
Individually claimed spaces
Individually claimed spaces are claimed or created by individual households or
their representative members. A wide array of studies has revealed the ways
through which social relations create communal systems of exchange, based on
principles of reciprocity and redistribution, which are embedded in the
dynamics of culture and cultural change (Douglass 1992). These relations can
potentially provide access to assets in different realms of urban life, such as
work and livelihood, personal health and well-being, habitat and environment
(see also Douglass 1998). Social capital can thus be defined as ‘the ability to
secure benefits through memberships in networks and other social structures’
(Portes 1998: 6).
The concept of social capital gained renewed attention during the 1990s in the
context of the increased attention for non-economic factors for well-being and
in the context of the neo-liberal development agenda as the ‘missing link’
between (retreating) states and markets ( see for example Grootaert 1998;
Woolcock 1998). It was based on earlier concepts of strong and weak ties
(Granovetter 1973), vertical ties through associations or networks (Coleman
1988) and bridging and linking capital (Putnam 1993/5).11 The
conceptualisations of various levels and types and ways of measurement of
social capital have been extensively discussed in the literature and are assumed
sufficiently familiar to the reader here (see amongst others Portes 1998;
Bankston & Zhou 2000; Uphoff 1999; Uphoff & Waijayaratna 2000; Gootaert
& Van Bastelaer 2002; Krishna & Uphoff 2002; Woolcock & Narayan 2000;
Onyx & Bullen 2000/1).
The mainstream concept of social capital has been heavily contested in
international development literature over its (normative) belief in the
accommodating nature of institutions - at micro, meso and macro level -
through trust and shared values. Many criticised the lack of proper
consideration of the negative aspects of social life or the structural constraints
on empowerment of the poor like power inequality and the struggle over access
to resources, leading to (reproduction of) social exclusion (Levi 1996; Portes &
Landolt 1996; Silvey & Elmhirst 2003; Cleaver 2005).12 Others emphasised the
potentially ‘victim-blaming’ effect of the (boundedly) rational individual
(Schuurman 2003) and overemphasis on the role of institutions as mechanisms
for uncovering latent shared values, sanctioning anti-social behaviour, and
channelling individual action in collectively desirable directions (World Bank
2000, quoted from Cleaver 2005). Others, severely criticised the grand social
capital agenda of the World Bank over forming an ideological part of the anti-
politics agenda of the post-Washington consensus promoting neo-liberalism
(Schuurman 2003; Harris 2002; Fine 2001; see also Gonzalez de la Rocha
Chapter 2
16
2007). Instead these critical views propose Bourdieu’s critical theory
(Bourdieu 1980) of reproduction through the structures of class relations
(Edwards et al. 2003) or reconceive social capital as embedded social resources
(Beall 2001) or a s social networks and processes (Long 2001) which are
dynamic and negotiated.
Portes and Sennsenbrenner (1993) already pointed out both positive and
negative consequences of social capital in their famous model of social capital
(see Figure 2.3). This model distinguishes between four sources that motivate
people to accept claims (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993). The first two sources,
norms of reciprocity and enforceable trust, are instrumental reasons.
Reciprocity refers to social chits that develop out of previous good deeds and
are backed by the norm of reciprocity. Enforceable trust is the result of
individual members’ disciplined compliance with group expectations that are
based on notions of ‘good standing’ and expected benefits or punishment. In
consummate motivations for social capital moral imperatives are the main
forces for behaviour, either in the form of value introjection or in the form of
bounded solidarity. Value introjection refers to norms and value imperatives
that people learn during socialisation processes and become appropriate
behaviour within groups. Bounded solidarity is similar to this except for the
fact that it emerges from specific, space and time-bound situations. Positive
consequences of social capital are amongst others norm observance, family
support, network mediated benefits. Negative consequences are amongst others
restricted access to opportunities, restrictions on individual freedom, excessive
claims and downward leveling norms. This study takes into account the
sources of reciprocity, enforceable trust and bounded solidarity, and includes
both positive and negatives consequences of social capital.
Figure 2.3: Sources and consequences of social capital
Source: Portes (1998).
Consummatory:
Value introjection
Bounded solidarity
Instrumental :
Enforceable trust
Bounded solidarity
Reciprocity
Social capital:
Ability to secure benefits
through membership in
networks and other social
structures
Positive consequences:
Norm observance
Family support
Network mediated benefits
Negative consequences:
Restricted access to opportunities
Restrictions on individual freedom
Excessive claim on group members
Downward leveling norms
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
17
Some studies suggest differentiating political and social capital, in order to
overcome problems of using social capital as a catch-all concept for non-
material factors in poverty. Some authors define political capital in more
general terms in relation to multiple channels for influence and applicable to
both individuals and collectives. For Baumann (2000: 6) political capital ‘is
one of the key capital assets on which people draw to build their own
livelihoods’. Claims and assets are defined as ‘rights’ that are politically
defended, and that ‘how people access these assets depends on their political
capital’. Booth and Richards (1998) describre it as the mechanism of
patronage, negotiation, persuasion and influence, enabling other assets to
become better realised. Rakodi (1999: 318) stresses the importance of ‘access
to decision-making’ in the political process for the poor. Devas (2002: 208)
defines political capital as ‘the scope which individuals and/or groups have to
exert influence on decision-making which affects them, decision-making being
defined widely as both formal and informal and both de facto and de jure
which affects them’. Others define political capital especially in relation to
policy making and applicable to organisations of the urban poor (McLeod
2001a). Still others distinguish between instrumental and structural political
capital (Birner and Wittner 2000: 6). Instrumental political capital ‘consists of
the resources which an actor….can dispose of and use to influence policy
formation processes and realise outcomes which are in an actor’s perceived
interest’. Structural political capital ‘refers to the structural variables of the
political system - including ‘perverse political capital’ such as institutions of
repression - which influence the possibilities of diverse actors to accumulate
instrumental political capital and condition the effectiveness of different types
of political capital’. This study differentiates social capital into social,
organisational and political relations.
Collectively claimed spaces
Collectively claimed or created spaces are defined as relatively autonomous
spaces created ‘from below’ by people for themselves (Cornwall 2001/2).
These spaces emerge out of sets of common concerns or identifications and
may come into being as a result of popular mobilisation, such as around
identity- or issue-based concerns, or may consist of spaces in which like-
minded people join together in common pursuits (Cornwall 2002). They might
also be ‘third’ spaces, where social actors reject hegemonic space and create
spaces for themselves (Soja 1996).
The debate on collective action and social movements is rooted in late 19th
century Europe, in particular with the work of the French psychologist Le Bon
(Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009). The concepts of social movement
Chapter 2
18
theory have been especially applied to European, American and South
American contexts. They have been much less applied in sub-Saharan African
contexts, and if so predominantly with regard to South-Africa. Recently social
movements and collective action theory is gaining renewed attention in the
context of the chronic poverty (Bebbington 2006/9; Mitlin 2009) and
globalisation debates (Clark 2003; Keane 2003; Taylor 2005).
There are many definitions of social movements in the literature. A widely
accepted general definition views social movements as ‘interlocking networks
of groups, social networks and individuals, and the connection between them is
a shared collective identity that tries to prevent or promote societal change by
non-institutionalised tactics’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999). This definition, just
like the definition of Mamdani (1995) which refers to social movements as
entailing ‘…..the crystallisation of group activity autonomous from the state’,
suits African social processes as it is ‘inclusive and encompasses the
distinctions not only between community and class or popular and elite
movements, but also between organised and unorganised, spontaneous or
anomic movements’ (Nasong’o 2007). The definition of Della Porta and Diani
(1999) in addition to Mamdani’s definition also includes social movements that
oppose formal bureaucratic organisations for institutional change, which seek
to control the state or effective inclusive citizenship, or defend and maintain
their autonomy and rights against domination and violation (Amadiume 1995;
Olukoshi 1995, quoted from Nasong’o 2007).
Theories on social movements can be classified into four dominant
perspectives or paradigms (Della Porta & Diani 1999). The recently formulated
framework by Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009) further classifies
them under the umbrella of classical or contemporary approaches (Table 2.1).
For reasons of definitional clarity it is chosen to present the four perspectives
on social movements on the basis of the latter. Each approach also represents a
more specific definition of social movements.
Classical approaches are collective behaviour theory, mass society theory and
relative deprivation theory. These theories rely on the same general causal
sequence moving from ‘some form of structural strain (for example
industrialisation, urbanisation, unemployment) that produces subjective tension
and therefore psychological disposition to engage in extreme behaviours (such
as panics, mobs) to escape from these tensions’ (Van Stekelenburg &
Klandermans 2009).
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
19
Table 2.1: Theories on participation and the emergence of social movements
Classical
approaches
Contemporary approaches
Mass society,
collective behaviour
Resource
mobilisation
Political process
approach
Social constructivistic
approaches
Why people
protest
Grievances,
discontent,
anomie,
class conflict
Resources,
opportunities,
social networks
efficacy
Political
opportunities
(cognitive
liberation)
Social construction of
reality:
- (meaning)
construction
- identity
- emotions
- motivation
Who protests Alienated,
frustrated,
disintegrated,
manipulated,
marginalised
people
Well-organised,
professional,
resourceful
social networks;
embeddedness
Coalitions
between
challengers/
political elites;
embeddedness
Countercultural groups,
identity groups;
embeddedness
Forms of protest Spontaneous,
irrational,
expressive,
violent
(panics, fashions,
mobs, crime)
Rational,
planned,
instrumental
(institutional
politics,
lobbying,
interest groups)
Rational,
instrumental,
polity oriented
(elite contention
lobbying,
indigenous
minorities
disruption i.e.
sit-ins, strikes)
Ideological, expressive,
identity oriented,
(cultural and religious
organisations,
self help groups,
alternative lifestyles)
Source: Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans (2009).
Contemporary approaches concern resource mobilisation theories, the political
process approach and social-constructivistic approaches (ibid: 20). Resource
mobilisation and political process are examples of structural and rational
approaches. Structural approaches consider grievances as omnipresent and
view as the key question in participation research not so much why people are
aggrieved, as why aggrieved people participate. Resource mobilisation places
an emphasis on the internal features of resources and organisational aspects.
Resources can be material resources - jobs, incomes, savings and the right to
specific incomes and service - as well as non-tangible resources – such as
authority, leadership, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills and habits of
industry. Organisational aspects are considered a function of the resources
controlled by an organisation to accomplish its goals. Resource mobilisation
theory has been criticized over its heavy leaning on vocabulary of economics
and its depiction of social movements as rational entities weighing up the costs
and benefits of their action (McCarthy & Zald 1977, based on Van
Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009), its failure to acknowledge the strength of
indigenous resources like informal networks (Mc Adam 1982, based on ibid),
Chapter 2
20
and its failure to acknowledge the power inherent in disruptive tactics (Mc
Adam 1982, based on ibid).
The political process approach emphasises the external features of the political
and institutional environment in which social movements operate. The three
central ideas of the political process approach are: ‘first, a social movement is a
political rather than a psychological phenomenon; second, a social movement
represents a continuous process from its creation to its decline rather than a
discrete series of developmental stages; third, different forms of action
(‘repertories of contention’) are associated with different spatial and temporal
locations’ (Tilly 1986, based on Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009). The
form of action chosen by social movements are not purely random and depend
on factors such as the structure of the political system (e.g. democratic
institutions, the existence and structure of political parties, and possibilities for
direct participation), the level of representation and cultural traditions (Tarrow
1994, based on Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009). Criticism on the
political process approach concerns the divergent results in different contexts
and the lack of theory concerning the specific mechanisms that link political
process to movement activity for explanation (Koopmans 2005, based on Van
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009). In addition, incentives and expectations
as well as opportunities and constraints necessarily involve interpretation
(Goodwin & Jasper 1999, based on Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009).
The social-constructivistic approach represents an agency approach. It
concentrates on how individuals and groups interpret the material and social-
political conditions and focuses on the role of the cognitive, affective and
ideational roots of contention.13 Social-constructivistic approaches were
initially dubbed New Social Movements theory. New social movements, also
referred to as ‘political’movements’, ‘cut across class lines, work with high
levels of autonomy from the state … lobby and pressurize government
agencies over development and social issues, and tend to be organized on an
ad-hoc basis (Della Porta & Diani 2006). Social constructivistic approaches
show similarities with classical approaches regarding the recognition of the
importance of cognition and emotion to collective action. Classical approaches
however perceive cognition and emotions as pathological, while social
constructivistic approaches see them as normal, central aspects of social and
political life. ‘Social constructivistic approaches try to understand why people
who are seemingly in the same situation respond so differently’ (Van
Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009). Collective action is a group rather than an
individual phenomenon, but in the end it is individuals who decide whether or
not to participate. This raises the question of what connects the individual to
the collective. Central to the social constructivistic approach are the social
psychological notions of the construction of meaning, identity, emotions,
motivation and culture. A common framework for integration of these
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
21
variables has not yet been formulated (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans
2009) .
In the last two decades there have been several bridging and synthesizing
efforts of contemporary approaches.14 Rather than placing the currently
influential focus on agency (identity) approaches of New Social Movements in
opposition to structural approaches, the current international globalising
context necessitates emphasis on the complementarity of agency and structural
approaches and their underlying - structural, political, sociological, social
psychological and cultural sociological - theories (see also Della Porta & Diani
2006; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009).15 This study aims to integrate
or synthesize structure and agency approaches and draws on selected aspects of
contemporary approaches.
The literature on social movements and collective action mentions additional
observations concerning urban contexts in African contexts. With regard to
urban contexts in developing countries, Walton (1998) observes a gradual shift
through time from collective action focused on labour issues and individual
versus collective goods (during the early urbanisation period), to collective
action focused on collective consumption and labour (during the
developmental state period), to collective action focused on political rights and
collective consumption (during the neo-liberalism period)16 (Table 2.2). Habib
and Opoku-Mensah (2009) further nuance observations in their discussion on
the role of ‘social movements in Africa’ vis-á-vis ‘the role of African social
movements’ to social movements theory.17 They challenge the two common
assertions in current social movement theory, first, a shift from the arena of
production to consumption, and second, replacements of overtly material
movements by identity movements and struggles, as too simplistic for the
South-African and wider African context. Case studies suggest that movements
in the arena of production retain vibrancy and are also crucial to the
sustainability of struggles of consumption.18 Furthermore, while identity
movements and struggles are indeed on the increase, material issues are as
relevant to these struggles as they have been to the earlier social movements. In
regard to the struggle for democracy in Kenya, Nasong’o recently
distinguished between transformative, redemptive and reformative social
movements, and identifies an increase in political and human rights civil
society organisations - especially at national level - during the nineties (2007).
The shift towards collective consumptive action is (partly) reflected in the
development literature on civil society and urban poverty of the 1990s - early
2000s. Mitlin (2001/4b) stresses the presence of some form of grassroots
organisations as the norm rather than the exception and indicates the
prevalence of many types of local organisations in low-income urban
Chapter 2
22
settlements. Among the more common factors instigating and supporting these
grassroots organisations are kinship, ethnicity, trade union involvement, city
based federations, NGOs, religious organisations, political parties, and the
private sector (Mitlin 2001/4b). These self-help groups are often catalysed into
action by need to secure land, resist eviction, provide themselves with public
goods that are not supplied (e.g. water, security) and services that the market
will not provide to them (e.g. savings and insurance) (Mitlin 2001/6). Rakodi
Table 2.2: Summary of collective action patterns by major influences and
periods of development
Periods
Early urbanisation
(ca. 1930-1960)
Developmental state
(ca. 1960-1980)
Neo-liberalism
(ca. 1980- Æ)
Major
influences
Conflict generally low.
Conflict moderate to high. Conflict moderate to high.
Economy Æ
State Æ
Civil society Æ
Collective action mainly
focused on labour issues
and individual versus
collective goods.
Collective action focused on
collective consumption and
labour.
Collective action focused on
political rights and collective
consumption.
Political relations based on
craft and rural traditions.
Institutionally channelled
political relations.
Growing popular movements
independent of state.
Source: Walton (1998).
(1993) also indicates that collective action by poor households in urban areas
is widespread, especially in organising shelter, basic services, employment and
security, occurring without government assistance. The World Bank report
‘Can Anyone Hear Us’ also found that informal networks and associations of
poor people are common both in rural and urban communities, and that in the
absence of state resources they are experienced by the poor themselves as
critical for their survival (Narayan et al. 1999). Jenkins (2001) found that urban
social movements in the developing world tend to be formed around basic
issues of survival and struggles to gain access to basics of collective
consumption, and less around broader issues such as state power and the basic
underlying economic structures (Jenkins 2001).19
The shift towards collective political and human rights action is only currently
taken up more widely in the context of the growing attention for social
movements in chronic poverty literature (Mitlin 2006/8). Mitlin (2006)
suggests that social movements in urban contexts generally engage with the
political system through a need, asset or freedom. Political engagement
strategies of these social movements are divided into three categories: social
movements engaged around issues to do with the scale and security of incomes
(as related to employment and entrepreneurship) and which are concerned with
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
23
exploitation in labour markets; social movements engaged around issues
related to shelter and related services (particularly the consumption of public
goods) and which are concerned with the dispossession and denial, and the
protection and extension of assets; social movements that engage around issues
of social and/or political exclusion and inclusion (for example those based on
political interest and/or ethnic identity). Mitlin compares the extent to which
movements by catalyst/cause are supportive to of social movement activity (i.e.
politicised, collective, mass movement), have potential to include the poor, and
to in the interests of the poor (Table 2.3). Belbin (2009) stresses that
movements are unlikely to emerge around issues of poverty per se - though
may emerge around issues of impoverishment – but rather emerge around
economic and cultural phenomena, i.e. the causes of poverty.
Table 2.3: Summary of movements by catalyst/cause of movement
Forms/locations of
exploitation,
dispossession/denial,
exclusion
Supportive to SM
and SMO (i.e.
collective and
political)
Inclusion of
poorest
Act in the interests of poorest
Labour markets Yes, in terms of
collective action
through unions.
Focus is the
employer, not the
state.
Not really. Poorest
not that likely to be
formally employed.
Informal workers
not sufficiently
protected to be able
to organise.
Unlikely, because the poorest are
generally not included. Unions may
make alliances and/or have a larger
political agenda (e.g. macro-economic
policies, minimum wages) but not that
many examples.
Street traders - markets
in goods and services,
denial of access to
trading space
Weak but some
seek political
support for
informal trading.
Primarily
defensive.
Strongly related to
urban
management and
zoning. Rarely
large scale.
Differentiation of
movements in
terms of the
profitability of
trading; not many
examples of
solidarity between
trading groups.
Poorest are the
weakest.
There is potential – but seems to be
rare. Many of the poorest do not trade
in the more profitable place, so even if
access to the central city land is
secured the poorest may not benefit.
Micro/small
entrepreneurial
activities, home workers
Weak political
orientation
Differentiation of
movements. Many
of these self-help
groups are
organised through
micro-finance
initiatives and do
not include the very
poor.
Potential. But market orientation may
result in exclusion. Rules such as
minimum contributions are not in the
interest of the poor.
Chapter 2
24
Groups facing eviction –
neighbourhoods
Yes. Generally
strong political
orientation.
Defensive action
in these cases.
Generally some in
neighbourhood –
incentive to include
if squatters. May be
tenants and hence
not involved directly
in ant-eviction
struggles.
Depends on ownership structure.
Success may exclude in time if
formalisation of tenure results in
withdrawal of the poorest. Poorest
likely on most precarious sites – least
likely to win the struggle.
Groups without secure
tenure – neighbourhood
Yes. Generally
strong political
orientation.
Collective
imperative.
May include
poorest but poorest
may not see as
relevant, or mauy
hestitate to engage
with political
process. Once
more, poorest may
be tenants and
therefore not able
to benefit.
Depends on outcomes. Options may
require some finance, in terms of
payments for land, and hence poorest
may struggle to be included.
Groups without basic
services -
neighbourhood
Yes. Generally
strong political
orientation. May
be little linking of
neighbourhoods
accross the city.
Generally includes
all in the
neighbourhood.
Tenants may not
benefit.
Access may depend on the solutions
that are secured, which are likely to be
dependent on the market.
Exclusion on grounds
of race/ethnicity
Yes. Strong
political
orientation.
All included on
‘group’ basis.
Tendency for class interests to
dominate.
Exclusion on grounds
of gender
Maybe, but may
resist strong
political identity for
gender roles.
May be interested
in drawing in the
poorest. However,
seem to be most
successful in being
inclusive if they are
orientated to basic
services.
Tendency for class interests to
dominate.
Exclusion on grounds
of being very poor or
poor/class
Requires some
kind of class
identity. This is
turn seems related
to economic
structure, spatial
development
options, and
political structures,
Differentiation
within the poor may
be significant.
May be vulnerable to majority
interests.
Source: Mitlin (2006).
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
25
Invited spaces
Invited spaces are defined as inclusive spaces legitimately provided ‘from
above’ by government, donors and/or NGOs in which citizens are invited to
participate (Cornwall 2001/2/4a). These invited spaces can be policy arenas or
‘new forms of governance’ like governance networks and partnerships. Central
to this study are especially the invited spaces of governance networks.
Governance networks have in the last two decades been discussed as post-
liberal approaches for direct democracy, supplementing neo-liberal institutions
of representative democracy (Gaventa 2006a; Sorensen & Torfing 2007).
Democracy is then considered a concept constantly contested and under
construction, with different forms in different settings and contexts, not as
standard recipe of a set of rules, standards and institutional designs (Gaventa
2006a).20 Governance networks can be defined as ‘relatively stable horizontal
articulations of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors; who
interact with one another through negotiations; which take place within a
regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary relatively institutionalised
framework; that is self-regulating within limits set by external forces and
which contributes to the production of public purpose (Torfing 2005; Sorensen
& Torfng 2007; Marcussen & Torfing 2003; see also Rhodes 1997; Jessop
2002).21
In the context of the debate on local governance and service delivery, neo-
institutionalists defined governance and institutions as the ‘rules of the game’
(Coase 1991; North 1990/3), though implicitly specifically referring to the
allocative and distributive rules of the game at the level of implementation.
Neo-institutionalists predominantly viewed institutions from the perspective of
‘constraints to realisation of actor preferences and how these rules can be
changed to lower transaction costs and reduce other constraints associated with
implementing policy’. Thereby they ‘optimistically supposed that institutions
can be instrumentally designed and reformed’ (see Hyden 2008).
The need for simultaneously building the ‘capacities to respond and demand’
was initially indicated by citizenship literature (Gaventa 2001), though later
also recognised wider in the literature (Romeo 2003; Krishna 2003).
Mainstream attention and donor funding remained however heavily focused on
building the ‘capacity to respond’of governments. Both the literature on
‘capacity building to respond and demand’ in this period were characterised by
an almost exclusive focus on governance process components of amongst
others transparency, inclusion/exclusion, representation and accountability. In
addition they showed an in retrospect somewhat naive belief that process
improvements would almost automatically lead to improved results, which was
Chapter 2
26
later by the citizenship literature itself described as ideological (Robins,
Cornwall & Von Lieres 2008).
Literature on ‘capacity building to respond’ focused on responsive and
efficient service delivery programmes. It was built and supported through
public sector reform programmes based on concepts of New Public
Management (NPM) originating from the early 1980s in a number of OECD
countries22 (see also Mutahaba & Ally 2008). The NPM discourse propagates a
strict division of policy formulation and implementation in its effort to develop
self-regulating public markets and self-governing agencies through design of
competitive games. Public sector reform programmes aim at a small, cost-
efficient, private sector enabling government, with mainly medium and high
level staff through simultaneous capacity development and downsizing and
retrenchment of public sector personnel – though few sub-Saharan African
countries have been able to set up effective mechanisms for controlling the
growth and costs of the public service (Mutahaba & Ally 2008). Originally
these programmes were especially focused on central government.
With the introduction of decentralisation, government capacity building
programmes shifted towards multiple-level capacity building. Three
hierarchical ordered levels of capacity building for ‘getting good government’
were distinguished (Grindle 1997), predominantly from an internal government
perspective. Firstly, human resource development focuses on training of staff
and improvement of recruitment procedures and work conditions. Secondly,
organisational strengthening focuses on improving management systems by
changing management structures or the organisational culture. Thirdly,
institutional reform targets the macro-level, including policy and legal change
and constitutional reform. The reforms in sub-Sahara Africa placed an
emphasis on improving performance in delivery of public services by:
performance incentives, sanctions and measurement; reinforcement of the
merit principle in public service; and the further rationalisation of the role of
the state and its functions (Mutahaba & Ally 2008).
The literature on ‘capacity building to demand’ focused on examining or
creating the preconditions for voice (promoting citizenship learning and
awareness-raising, building civil society organisations and the capacity to
mobilise), and amplifying citizens’ voices and fostering social movements
engaged in governance processes (ranging from advocacy research to citizen
lobbying for policy change, and citizen monitoring of performance) (Gaventa
2001; Goetz & Gaventa 2001; Gaventa 2004). It also discussed conditions
which constrain citizen participation, such as poor levels of citizen organisation
(e.g. tradition of social movements), low participatory skills to effectively
exercise influence, lack of political will, low levels of participation (e.g.
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
27
consultation in stead of decision-making), insufficient financial resources
inhibiting local governments to facilitate effective participation (Gaventa &
Valderama 1999), and constraining legal frameworks and contextual features
for citizen participation (McGee et al. 2003). Furthermore, the worldwide
transfer of the notions of participatory budgeting and citizens voice and the
related notions of deepening democracy and citizenship from their original
predominantly Southern-American contexts, were considered a potential
obstacle for a sub-Saharan African context, where even the existence of civil
society as such is questioned (Makumbe 1998; Lewis 2002).
Towards meta governance at the constitutive level
Towards the middle of the 2000s there was an increased realisation of the
mixed record of results of decentralisation and understanding that citizen and
civil society participation as well as voice did not automatically increase civic
influence. Furthermore, there was a gradual reorientation at (inter)national
level towards rule of law and state building rather than democratisation as the
primary cause for development. This context increasingly shifted the focus of
attention from voice and influence on the allocative and distributive rules of
the game towards influence on the constitutive rules of the game or politics
(Hyden et al. 2004).
Hyden indicates a shift in development thinking through the years from the
micro-level of project, to the meso-level of program, the macro-level of policy
and currently, the meta-level of politics. Governance is consequently defined at
the meta level as ‘the formation and stewardship of formal and informal rules
that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state, as well as economic
and societal actors interact to make decisions’ (Hyden et al. 2004: 16). The
optimistic assumption of Neo Institutional Economists that institutions can be
instrumentally designed and reformed with little or no attention paid to
underlying politics and power dynamics turned out to be unrealistic (Hyden
2008). Governability literature contributes to further clarification of meta-
governance in relation to the other levels of governance and indicates the need
for complementarity and adequate attention to all levels (Kooiman et al. 2008).
First-order governance takes place wherever people and their organisations
interact in order to solve societal problems and create new opportunities.
Second-order governance focuses on the institutional arrangements within
which first-order governing takes place. It constitutes the meeting ground for
those being governed and those governing and implies the reconsideration and
adaptation of the parameters of first-order governance. Meta- or third-order
governance feeds, binds and evaluates the governing exercise. In meta-
governance, governors and governed alike take each other’s measure in
Chapter 2
28
formulating norms by which to judge each other and the measuring process too
(Kooiman et al. 2008; see also Kooiman 2000; Jessop 2002).
The main response of adherents of decentralisation to the mixed record of
results has been the strengthening of the ‘capacity to respond’ through the
repetitive widening of the scope of capacity building over the years (Kuhl
2009). In the context of the increased emphasis on endogenous development
and ownership in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008
Accra High Level Forum (AHLF) on Aid Effectiveness, capacity building was
recently reformulated into capacity development (OECD 2006) and three major
changes to overcome limitations were proposed in the literature. First,
intensification of the current agenda through the current widely applied Result
Based Management (RBM) approaches in international development
cooperation, increasingly propagated by donors to ‘demonstrate’ results of
their activities (Baser & Morgan 2008: 91).23 The comparative advantage of
RBM is its focus on short-term products rather than longer-term processes. It
can be helpful in tracking immediate outcomes, but it has little to say about
capacity outcomes that emerge over the medium and long term. RBM
approaches are especially designed for situations to address problems of low
complexity where means and ends are clear, but are less applicable or may
need to be adjusted to deal with increasing complexity and uncertainty (Baser
& Morgan 2008). Second, increased acknowledgement of the importance of
linking context and content of capacity development. Grindle (2007) extends
her earlier concept of good enough governance with contextual factors. The
short list of minimal conditions for good enough governance, could be more
appropriately formulated when taking into account the contexts in which
governance reforms are introduced and the ways in which their contents affect
interests and institutional capacities (Grindle 2007). Baser and Morgan (2008)
reformulate capacity development and performance from a systems thinking
perspective based on the huge body of capacity literature beyond that produced
by the international development community. Capacity is defined as the
‘emergent combination of individual competencies and collective capabilities
that enables a human system to create value’ (Baser & Morgan 2008: 3; see
also Morgan 2006).24 It includes five core capabilities: to commit and engage
(volition, empowerment, motivation, attitude, confidence), to carry out
technical, service delivery and logistical tasks (core functions directed at the
implementation of mandated goals), to relate and attract resources and support
(manage relationships, resource mobilisation, networking, legitimacy building,
protecting space), to adapt and self-renew (learning, strategising, adaptation,
repositioning, managing change) and to balance coherence and diversity
(encourage innovation and stability, control fragmentation, manage
complexity, balance capability mix) (ECDPM 2008; Baser & Morgan 2008).
Performance is then interpreted as an emergent pattern that comes about
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
29
through the interactions of both internal and external elements and contextual
factors. Third, more emphasis on the role of politics or contextual political
factors affecting public sector capacity building initiatives (Grindle 2006).
Political preferences of elected and appointed leaders determine whether
capacity building initiatives are invested in or ignored. Political calendars or
electoral cycles create moments when significant new capacity initiatives can
be introduced or abandoned. Formal and informal political institutions
determine how much scope public officials have for introducing change
(Grindle 2006).
The main response with regard to ‘capacity to demand’ also faced three major
changes in the context of the mixed record of results, the increased realisation
that citizen and civil society participation and voice do not automatically imply
increased civic influence - with increased focus on meaningful participation
and actual changes in policy and practice (Cornwall & Coelho 2006) - and the
changing international development agenda. First, an increased recognition that
context matters and modifies the possibilities of state-society relationships
(Cornwall & Coelho 2006). The analysis of participation needs to be set within
the histories of state-society relations that have shaped the configurations and
contestations of the present. Political histories and cultures may embed
dispositions in state and societal actors that are carried into new democratic
arenas of participation, while at the same time these might form the beginning
of a process of change (Cornwall & Coelho 2006). Second, a shift towards
influencing (local) politics and power through new channels or methods
focused on the political arena and political agenda setting. In addition to the
more traditional methods of political capacity building through civic and
political education, more innovative channels are suggested, like linking with
the political strategies of the growing middle-classes and their residents
associations (Chakrabarti 2008), formation of or building links with political
parties, running civil society leaders for office, monitoring existing political
organisations (Gaventa 2006a). Third, the shift towards increasingly
simultaneous coalition building at local, national and global level to increase
influence and impact of coalitions and alliances on power relations and
increased globalisation (Brock, McGee & Gaventa 2004; Gaventa
2004/6b/7a+b; Bebbington 2006).
Mutuality of informal and formal institutions
Currently informal institutions are increasingly acknowledged as potential
alternative or complementary channels by parts of the development policy
world, in the context of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness calling
for greater local ownership of foreign aid. Examples are the Drivers of Change
Chapter 2
30
approach of DFID/SIDA and the OECD institutional programme (Hyden 2008;
Jütting 2007; see also UNECA 2007). This acknowledgement concerns both
social informal institutions and political informal institutions (see Helmke &
Levitsky 2006; Booth 2009). The central aim for both is to build on rather than
condemn informal institutions in order to contribute to national development
goals like reducing poverty and promoting economic growth.
In line with this, informal institutions are conceptually more precisely
distinguished from formal institutions and defined as the ‘socially shared rules,
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside
officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke & Levitsky 2004: 5). Formal
institutions by contrast are defined as ‘the rules and procedures that are created,
communicated and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as
official’ (Helmke & Levitsky 2004: 5). Easterly (2006/8) uses a related but less
precise differentiation between top-down and bottom-up institutions, whereby
the term ‘bottom-up institutions’ more or less equals ‘bottom-up informal
institutions’.25 Informal institutions may or may not have deeply rooted cultural
determinants.
These formal and informal institutions can be mutually conflicting,
complementing or undermining (Jütting 2007) and while undermining they can
still produce positive outcomes (Hyden 2008). Helmke and Levitsky (2006)
distinguish four types of informal institutions based on divergence and
convergence with effective and ineffective formal institutions: 1)
complementary institutions which fill gaps in formal rules or enhance their
efficiency; 2) accommodative informal institutions which blunt the effects of
dysfunctional formal institutions; 3) competing informal institutions, which
directly subvert the formal rules; 4) substitutive informal institutions, which
replace ineffective formal institutions. Informal rules can also be part of formal
institutions. Table 2.4 presents a comparison of formal and informal
institutions.
Table 2.4: Comparison of formal and informal institutions
Formal institutions Informal institutions
Type of exchange Impersonal Personal
Approach to rules Rule-of-law Rule-in-use
Character of rules Written Unwritten
Nature of exchange Contracted Non-contractual
Time schedule Specified Non-specified
Actor premise Organisational goal adherence Shared expectations
Implications of agreement Precise compliance Ambiguous execution
Transparency Potentially open to scrutiny Closed and confidential
Conflict resolution Third party body Self-enforcement
Source: Hyden (2008).
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
31
Social informal institutions are often generally considered a gradual and more
equal alternative to development than formal institutions (Rakodi 2004/6;
OECD 2007; Easterly 2008). Motivations for the creation of social informal
institutions can be cultural or customary practices, but can also be for reasons
of incompleteness of formal institutions, second best strategy (for reasons of
lack of power, reduced costs, ineffectiveness), or public non-acceptability of
goals pursued (Helmke & Levitsky 2004). The mutually accommodating and
constraining character of informal social and formal institutions, eventually has
to be compared with the contributions to public outcomes.26
Political informal institutions are considered to increasingly dominate formal
institutions in the sub-Saharan African context, despite recent immense support
for democratisation and good governance (Hyden 2008). The African Power &
Politics Programme recently suggested to look comprehensively at the
mutually accommodating and constraining character of formal and informal
political institutions and the overall effects on both public sector and
associational life (Hyden 2008). It discusses how the specific combination of
informal and formal institutions in the African context – with power
predominantly based in informal institutions of personal relations between
people rather than formal institutions founded in agencies that control it -
affects politics and by extension policy.
Politics is interpreted and discussed as power configuration consisting of the
basis, the reach, the exercise and the nature of power (Hyden 2008).27 The
basis of power in Africa is considered as bifurcated and narrow. It is made up
of, on the one hand, a small enclave-like set of actors dominated by
transnational corporations and diplomats adhering to formal rules, on the other
hand a myriad of relations of dependence stemming from social structures that
yet have to modernise and still rely on informal institutions. The challenge is to
further formalise the basis of power in order to extend the ‘boundaries of
possibility’- determined by the degree of social external dependency and social
stratification - for building and managing a society in an increasingly
globalised context. The reach of power often remains extensively reliant on
informal patronage networks and competing alliances of political leaders,
whereby the rulers are more likely to keep the regime going rather than trying
to use power to transform society. Migration to cities and urbanization tend to
increase transaction costs of power relations built on dependence for
maintaining a regime.28 The challenge is to move beyond merely responding to
social change towards creating true development states with both strong
capacity for change and development through constructive counter forces of
formal institutions. The exercise of power by African political leaders is often
not in a vacuum, as (informal) relations of accountability and reciprocity are
strongly present. The challenge is to formally institutionalise the self-binding
Chapter 2
32
‘inclusivist’ and ‘exclusivist’ elements of accountability and accepting defeat,
as opposed to discretionary ‘inclusivist’ and ‘exclusivist’ approaches of co-
opting and alienating (Hyden 2008: 21). The nature of power is often not
rationalised in an economically instrumental sense, while exchange relations
are often characterised by a dual utility weighing the inherent value of the
exchange relation more heavily than one’s own narrow interest – based on
value based clientelistic rationality. The challenge is to institutionalise dual
utility based instrumental and value-based rationality of empathy and
clientelism, as opposed to single utility instrumental and value-based
rationality of technocratic and dogmatic nature.
With regard to the consequences of power, Hyden (2008) indicates that the
public space in African countries is better described as predominantly
‘affective’ rather than ‘civic’, both for the governmental and the associational
arena (see table 2.5). Challenges to authority are too costly and improving
governance in these settings should start from other premises than those based
on the presence of values and norms which are found in already consolidated
democracies.
Table 2.5: The consequences of power in Africa
Public realm
Affective Civic
Arena
Governmental Nepotism Professionalism
Corruption Public accountability
Associational Needs-oriented Rights-oriented
Compliant Activist
Source: Hyden (2008).
In relation to both social and political informal institutions it is warned for
culturalist-traditonalist explanations in which modern day African societies are
treated as if they were still shaped by their pre-colonial history or framed
within predetermined cultural/ancestral patterns, or as if their history had a
meaning (a grain) derived from the distant past (De Sardan 2008; De Sardan &
Bierschenk 1998). The terms of neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and
informality are considered as often used in a too sweeping, too general and too
partial manner, while in any country there are divergences between norms and
practices and it is mainly the scope and forms of these divergences that vary
depending on the context (De Sardan 2008; see also Erdman & Engel
2006/7).29 In this study clientelism and patronage are considered as
divergences between norms and practices that are influenced but not
predetermined by historical, international and other factors.
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
33
2.4. Impacts
Impacts on quality of life
The concepts of quality of life, well-being and poverty
In the last decades there have been major debates over alternative conceptions
for development and poverty, challenging the dominant conventional economic
conceptions that merely focus on money, commodities and economic growth
(Gough, McGregor & Camfield 2007). The first debate revolved around the
extension of the idea of development from economic to human development
during the last quarter of the past century, amongst others by Sen and Martha
Nussbaum (2000). This resulted in the annual international monitoring of a
range of basic needs and capabilities through the Human Development Reports
of UNDP since 1990. The second debate concerned the reconceptualisation of
poverty from money poverty to multi-dimensional poverty of resources and
agency that mitigate vulnerability, by various livelihood frameworks during the
1990s (see Rakodi 1999). The third and most recent debate concerns the
transition from money-poverty to subjective well-being and quality of life,
returning to the individual subject and questioning substantially the ends of
development and how we conceive and measure them (Gough, McGregor &
Camfield 2007: 7).
Phillips (2006) discusses the rich landscape of families of approaches to quality
of life (QoL) and well-being (WB), with variations in the dimensions of types
of conceptualisations, value priorities, research methodology, purposes and
standpoint, and theoretical sources. Gasper (2009) summarises these 6 main
families of research approaches to QoL and WB ranging from more
individualistic to more social, with one approach consisting of two research
streams (Table 2.6): 1) Subjective Well-Being (SWB), the currently prominent
approach which has spread from psychology to economic and sociology. SWB
approaches are however not sufficient for all purposes. The remaining
approaches, except perhaps the preference fulfilment variant (3a), are diverse
interpretations of Objective Well-Being (OWB) (Gasper 2009, based on
Phillips, 2009); 2) Health Related Quality of Life; 3a) Utility - as interpreted in
20th century economic -, looking at purchasing power and/or imputed
preference fulfilment; 3b) Needs and Capabilities, which contains several
variants concerning needs fulfilment or achievement of valued capabilities
(including Sen’s capabilities approach, interpreting capabilities as positive
freedoms to achieve reasoned values) ; 4) Poverty Studies, which concentrate
on the potential quality of life of an individual in terms of opportunities and
their social determinants; 5) Community Studies, which focus on the social
Chapter 2
34
context/fabric and the quality of life of a community; 6) Societal Quality of
Life Constructs, which integrate a number of the above aspects.
Table 2.6: An analytical summary of QoL and WB approaches
Families of
approaches
Focus and scope
(per variant)
Discipline(s)/
Theory base
Values Purposes and
standpoint
1) Subjective
well-being
(SWB)
Individual well-being
(WB) as felt by the
individual.
Work on ‘instant
happiness’ stresses
aspects 1 & 2 more
than does work in a
eudemonic/
reflective well-being
tradition.
Psychology,
and neo-
utilitarian
economics and
sociology. (But
psychology has
diverse
schools).
Aristotelian
philosophy
stresses aspect
3.
(Priority to)
Individuals’
judgements
of
A. pleasure/pain
B. meaning
- For description
and explanation; &
- For evaluations by
the individual or that
seek to represent
the individual
2) Health-
related Quality
of Life
[2a] Individual
WB/QoL
- Physical (and
mental)
functioning’s &
capabilities;
listed by
professionals (or
the subject
individuals),
then measured by
professionals (or
selfrated).
[2b] Health-related
QoL of communities
Health sciences - Ideas about
normal
capabilities and
functionings
- Either belief in
superior
knowledge and
judgement of
professionals; or
belief in rights and
superior
knowledge of
patients
For allocation of
rights and resources
for medical care:
- policy level
- programme level
- individual cases
3a) ‘Utility’ Here individual WB
is imputed from
individual’s
resources and/or
choices, especially
choices in real or
simulated markets.
Mainstream
market-oriented
economics
Values of market:
1. spenders’
values,insofar as
moneybacked;
2. income
distribution given;
3. people held
responsible for
own choices
(which are
assumed to
reflect
preferences)
For describing,
explaining, and
conducting
allocation
according to
market
principles
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
35
3b) Needs and
capabilities
A. Prudential values
theory
B. Human needs
theories
C. Doyal & Gough’s
theory of need
D. Sen’s capability
approach
E. Nussbaum’s
capabilities
approach
Humanistic
economics.
Philosophy.
Humanistic
psychology.
Critical social
policy.
Humanistic
economics.
Humanistic
philosophy.
Humanistic
values:
In A: what makes
lives go better.
In B:
requirements of a
decent life.
In C: avoidance of
serious harm;
social
participation.
In D: positive
freedom to
achieve easoned
values.
In E: As B plus D.
Variants B, E: for
explanation
All the theories: for
public policy
(constitutional and
legal frameworks;
strategies,
programmes,
projects, specific
allocations to
persons)
4) Poverty
studies
A. Work on poverty
lines
B. Wider concepts
of deprivation
C. Attention to
processes and
outcomes of social
inclusion and
exclusion
Social
economics
Social policy
Sociology
Similar to 3b, but:
Variant A is often
limited to material
aspects and
values; variants B
& C are not.
Variant A: for
description, and
public policy.
Variants B & C: also
for explanation
5) Community
studies
Study of the direct
value and indirect
impacts of
various forms of
social capital and
social cohesion
Sociology
Social policy
Public health
Emphasis on
people as
group members
- Explanation.
- Background work
for public policy
6) Societal
Quality of Life
constructs
A. Bernard’s
democratic
dialectic
B. Berger-Schmitt &
Noll: overarching
QoL construct
C. Social Quality
approach (Beck et
al, 2001)
Sociology
Social policy
Sociology
Liberty,
equality,fraternity
Implies all the
values listed
above.
Similar to values
of [3b], plus of [5].
For public policy
(through from
constitutional and
legal frameworks, to
projects).
Source: Gasper (2009), based on David Phillip’s Quality of Life (Phillips
2006).
Conceptions of the terms of QoL and WB vary in correspondence with the
multitude of approaches and research streams within and convey different
meanings. Gasper (2009) stresses the importance of conserving this richness,
Chapter 2
36
rather than attempting to formulate a uniform definition of QoL and WB and
‘making well-being assessment to a form of mental temperature-making’. This
corresponds with Amartya Sen’s principle that interpretations of inherently
ambiguous ideas should illuminate, not attempt to eliminate, the ambiguity.
What is considered important is to acknowledge and express that these
concepts concern evaluative judgements and express the differing values and
research instruments as well as the differing standpoints, purposes, theoretical
views and ontological presuppositions (Gasper 2009).
This study uses a social conception of quality of life, combining the approaches
of poverty studies, community studies and societal quality of life constructs.
Quality of life is conceptualised by on the one hand vulnerability of households
and collectives and on the other hand service delivery to the wider society.
Vulnerability refers to the ability of households, individuals and communities
to bend and bounce back when confronted with adverse situations (Moser
1998). Vulnerability is assessed through the components of resilience,
diversification and regularity. Resilience expresses the ease and rapidity of
recovery. Diversification refers to reduction of risk through the quantitative
spreading of access to assets and minimising the risk of missing any one asset.
Regularity expresses the reduction of risk through the qualitative frequency or
stability of access to assets. Service delivery to the wider society is assessed as
the variety of urban services that is delivered. The concept of quality of life as
such then serves as an expression of the extent to which impacts are both
serving the poor and matching the scale and the scope of the problems.
Impact of individually claimed spaces on quality of life
Contributions of individually claimed spaces to poverty reduction and
development have long been predominantly interpreted positively. Mainstream
social capital theory emphasises the importance of social capital for people to
reduce risk and vulnerability and increase resilience to shocks (Narayan &
Woolcock 2000; Moser 1998; Grootaert 2001). More critical and explanatory
research questions and nuances the contribution of social capital to poverty
alleviation. Some authors also explicitly point out its negative implications
(Portes & Landolt 1996; Portes 1998; Silvey & Elmhirst 2003). Coleman
(1988) points out that a given form of social capital that is valuable in
facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others. Portes in
addition brings together four forms of negative social capital: exclusion of
outsiders (especially in case of bonds), excess claims on group members
(especially in later stages), restrictions on individual freedoms and downward
levelling norms (Portes 1996/8, 2000; Portes & Landolt, 2000; see also
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
37
Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Others additionally emphasize social-structural
constraints and the role of ideology (Beall 2001; Long 2001; Cleaver 2005;
Bebbington 2006).
Impact of collectively claimed spaces on quality of life
The recent revival of social movements theory is focused on the impacts of
social movements on poverty reduction. Currently it is however widely
acknowledged that establishing a causal relationship between social
movements and any observed change in societies is problematic. In particular
attribution is difficult because there are usually multiple variables available
involved in any process of social change, including other actors and networks
(GSDRC 2009). Many case studies of social movements conclude their impact
on long term processes of development and institutional change remains
limited.
Until recently the majority of studies on social movements did not focus
specifically on assessing their impact, but rather on describing their goals,
tactics and experience of engagement with the state. In addition, the literature
on civil society and urban poverty until recently, especially in the early 2000’s,
for a large part explained the limited positive results of grassroots organisations
and collective action through internal features in line with the resource
mobilisation approach. Mitlin (2001) indicates that the nature of relationships
and the level of participation inside grassroots organisations suggest that they
may be limited in their capacity to assist in the reduction of urban poverty and
vulnerability (such as the exclusion from access to basic services). Leach
(1997) finds that the level of representation of the local community is
debatable, as grassroots organisations do not always make decisions according
to consensus or to principles of democratic or equity-oriented decision-making
Devas (2001) observes that many grassroots organisations act to reinforce
patterns of inequality and social exclusion, and are often dominated by men,
particularly men of higher status and/or higher income. Dia (1996) noted that
grassroots organisations are often inflexible to changes.
The contributions to poverty reduction and development might be somewhat
positively influenced by the scaling-up of promising local grassroots initiatives
- providing assistance in technical issues and group dynamics - through linking
with or participating in programmes of professional support organisations.
Some scholars in addition emphasise the potential contributions of grassroots
organisations to personal transformation and growth in self-esteem of (some of
the) members (Cleaver 2007). Recently, in the context of the increased
globalisation effects and the increased acknowledgement of the role of power,
Chapter 2
38
it is largely related to the institutional constraints. This is further
discussed/taken up in the paragraph on impacts on influence and political
rights. Impacts of the social informal channels are considered to be more
gradual and different for various sectors (Jütting et al. 2007; Rakodi 2004/6).
Impact of invited spaces on quality of life
Conditions for contributions of invited spaces until recently were mainly
formulated normatively in terms of process factors of responsiveness,
transparency, participation, representation, accountability and legitimacy. The
general belief – in approaches focusing on the ‘capacity to respond’ as well as
those focusing on the ‘capacity to demand’ - was that strengthening these
process components would automatically imply positive impacts and that ‘the
strong process dimension of governance would make it hard to draw simple
conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses (or positive and negative
nature) of outcomes at any specific point in time’ (Mitlin 2004a).
Towards the middle of the 2000s it is increasingly acknowledged that
decentralisation as such does not automatically contribute to development and
poverty reduction (Von Braun & Grote 2002; Bonfiglioli 2003; Devas & Grant
2003; Jütting et al. 2004/5). Crook and Manor (1998) in their study of four
South Asian and West African countries already indicated the poor results of
decentralisation on responsiveness in the two African countries. A major
OECD-DAC study assessing the determination of pro-poor decentralisation by
country specificities and the multi-faceted design of the decentralisation
process, found that in two-third of the analysed countries the impact of
decentralisation on poverty was either ‘somewhat negative’ or ‘negative’
(Jütting et al. 2004/5).30 Partially corresponding with other literature, the
decentralisation process was found more likely to have a positive impact on
poverty, if the central government is committed to the purpose, the involved
central and local actors have the financial and human capacity, checks and
balances are established at local level to control for rent-seeking and
corruption, and internal and external policies are sufficiently coherent with the
decentralisation policy (Jütting et al. 2004/5).
Many authors emphasise the importance of relations between and within
government organisations for effective decentralisation. National level political
commitment (by the president, members of parliament, political leaders as well
as central bureaucracy) plays a key role in the regulation, redistribution,
enforcement, and monitoring and evaluation (Zanetta 2005; see also Jütting
2004), as well as in defining the rules or policy framework for decentralisation
that determines the behaviour of lower tiers of government (Burki et al. 1999).
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
39
Incentives have to align with political objectives. In addition, a good balance
between authority and responsibility is important to ensure the satisfactory
performance of politicians and bureaucracies at lower levels of government
(Burki et al. 1999). Decentralisation often involves delicate compromises as it
ultimately aims at redistributing power and changing existing social power
structures. Often there is considerable self-interest and conflict at the central
level (movers and blockers) and between central and local level involving
clientelist relations and accountability systems (Jütting et al. 2004).
Misalignment between the structure of the government bureaucracy and the
assignment of service responsibilities to different tiers confuses incentives,
weakens accountability for service delivery, and creates conflicts of interest
instead of checks and balances – for example through the appointment of local
administrative staff by an upper tier government or belonging to a national
service (Ahmad et al. 2005).
Ensuring local capacity through mechanisms promoting good knowledge of
local conditions, political accountability, and technical and institutional
capacity is considered important (IBRD governance site, quoted from Zanetta
2005). Local human capacity for good performers depends on support policy
by central government, training, recruitment of staff (exclusive central
government recruitment of staff tends to reduce local human capacity),
information, technical equipment, experience, clear distribution of roles and
responsibilities, and decision-making capacity (Jütting et al. 2004). Local
financial capacity that stems from both central government transfers and local
taxes as well as substantial independent tax-raising powers seem to contribute
positively to pro-poor decentralisation, with the latter tending to increase
regional inequalities. Needs-based transfers from central government can be
helpful in targeting the poor. Transparency, stability and predictability of
transfers also contributes positively.31 Furthermore, the power and freedom to
decide how to spend resources – i.e. the degree of autonomy of council over
own budget (Cabannes 2004) -, generally supports poverty-focused
decentralisation, especially through increased possibilities for responsiveness
and despite the higher risks of improper and unequal allocation (Jütting et al.
2004).
Checks and balances at the local level are necessary to avoid or reduce
practices of corruption and local elite capture of the agenda. Decentralisation in
the African context often does not challenge local elites who are resistant or
indifferent to pro-poor policies. Therefore ideological commitment to the poor
by the centre and strengthening and broadening democratic accountability both
at the national and local level are crucial conditions for poverty reduction
(Crook & Manor 1998; Crook 2003). Democratic local governance initiatives
have encouraged participation and increased representation, but have provided
Chapter 2
40
little in the way of empowerment and even less in making the distribution of
benefits more equitable or reducing poverty (Blair 2000). In line with this,
Manor (2003) found that fiscal and administrative systems tend to promote
centralisation and that for decentralisation to be beneficial it must have a
significant democratic content. Furthermore, strategies and outcomes are often
very much related to the motivation of the mayor or leading group within the
council and the nature and scope of groups drawn into budgeting processes
(Cabannes 2004; Mitlin 2004a). Recent research in India indicates elite capture
of the (metropolitan) governance agenda through middle-class activism of
residents or neighbourhood associations (Baud & Nainan 2008; Chakrabarti
2008). A fundamental problem with promoting participation in ‘invited spaces’
is that often, entrenched relations of dependency, fear and dispriviledge
undermine the possibility of the kind of deliberative decision-making they are
to foster (Cornwall 2004a). Comparative action-research on gender,
citizenship and governance in South Asia, India and Southern Africa, found
that it is more difficult for women to penetrate as independent political actors
or to raise controversial issues, as local government is often more embedded in
local social structures than national government and prevailing gender
ideologies are more concentrated at the local level. Furthermore, procedures
were often found to be gender neutral and gender blind, incorrectly assuming
that women and men have equal power and status (Mukhopadhyay 2003/4).
Finally, and somewhat ideologically, decentralisation was found more
successful when it is part of a broader agenda of government reforms and
consistent with donor strategies (Jütting et al. 2004). Policy coherence can for
example be enhanced through linkages with prior and/or parallel strategies of
economic liberalisation and democratisation or land reform programmes.
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) and their possibly related trade-offs with
expanding local capacities, need to also be considered in terms of policy
coherence.
Impacts on influence and political rights
Influence and political rights
Impacts until recently were mainly analysed in terms of development results
and assets or resources. Only recently international development research has
started to bring back politics and power into research and to address ‘why and
how questions’ of poverty - involving dynamic, structural and relational factors
- in addition to ‘what questions’ (see also Harris 2007; Mitlin & Bebbington
2006; Hyden 2004/8; De Haan 2007). In this study impacts are - next to being
measured in terms of quality of life - also assessed in terms of influence and
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
41
political rights. Influence was earlier defined by citizenship literature as ‘a
tangible impact on policy making and the organisation of service delivery’
(Goetz & Gaventa 2001). In order to clearly distinguish influence and political
rights, for the purpose of this study the definitions of influence and political
rights have been formulated on the basis of conceptualisations of institutions in
the literature. Influence refers to the tangible impacts on the allocative and
distributive rules of the game or policies, processes and implementation of
service. Political rights refers to the tangible impacts on the constitutive rules
of the game. The study analyses both increases and decreases in rights and
influence.
Impacts of individually claimed spaces on influence and political rights
Impacts on influence and political rights through individual claimed spaces
were only limitedly touched upon in the literature. The Chronic Poverty
Research Centre indicates that studies of political capital have mainly focused
on the links between political capital and poverty reduction, rather than those
between low levels of political capital and poverty itself, chronic or otherwise
(CPRC website, December 2009).32 Attempts to promote inclusion of the
relationship between political capital and other capital assets within the
sustainable livelihoods framework (Baumann 2000; Rakodi 1999; Devas 2002;
Birner & Wittner 2000), failed to gain wider recognition and largely remained
limited to discussion of analytical, conceptual and practical relationship issues
(Baumann 2000; Rakodi 1999).
Impacts of collectively claimed spaces on influence and political rights
The literature so far only contains limited research findings with regard to the
impacts of collectively claimed spaces on influence and political rights. As
indicated earlier, the majority of the research literature on collective action and
social movements has been focused on describing goals, tactics and
experiences of engagement with the state, rather than the formulation of
conditions (GSDRC 2009; Bebbington 2009). Most of the available case
studies on social movements indicate that their impact on long term processes
of development remains limited (GSDRC 2009). As social movements can
mainly exert influence indirectly through other actors, they can merely modify
rather than alter processes that determine the creation of poverty (Mitlin &
Bebbington 2006). In addition, much of the literature suggests that the primary
importance of social movements is to change the ways in which society
understands poverty, rather than affect poverty through the state by placing
pressure on governments to adapt new policies (GSDRC 2009).
Chapter 2
42
Currently the chronic poverty research agenda is reformulated – in preparation
of phase 3- towards inclusion of dynamic, structural and relational factors of
poverty (Shepherd 2007; see also Bebbington 2006; Mitlin & Bebbington
2006; Harriss 2007; Mitlin 2008; Bebbington 2009).33 Within this context of
increased focus on power and structural causes of poverty, it is initially looked
for possibilities of bringing the until recently largely separated themes of social
movement and poverty together (Bebbington 2009).34 Bebbington (2009) on
the basis of a literature study identifies several causal pathways through which
social movements can potentially impact poverty: through challenges of
institutions that underlie the political economy of poverty (challenging
processes of exploitation or dispossession); through reworking the cultural
politics of poverty (challenging ideologies surrounding poverty debates);
through direct effects on assets of the poor (providing access to land, water,
shelter) and through engagement with the state (varying on a continuum from
collaborative to adversial relationships). Bebbington (2009) finds that the
relative significance of causal pathways to poverty reduction depends on the
domain of contention in question, the type of social movement involved and
the more general political economy context. In addition, the internal constraints
to relationships and participation inside grassroots organisations can also
hinder to address some of the more structural causes that result in a lack of
empowerment and powerlessness (Mitlin 2001). Examples are problems of
internal representation and democracy (including how far they can represent
the poorest), the difficulty of sustaining coherence and convergence among
actors, and tensions within movements (Bebbington 2009; Mitlin 2008). These
internal explanatory factors are almost similar to the ones the literature
mentioned earlier with regard to contributions of grassroots organisations to
poverty reduction.35 On the basis of the literature Bebbington suggests that one
of the most important effects of social movements (when they are ‘successful’)
is to induce the creation of new public institutions that contribute to poverty
reduction (Bebbington 2009).
More concrete conditions on how the context could be made more favourable
or better anticipated through longer term strategies are however often lacking
in the literature, or it is referred to policies or to action and limited in taking
into account the roles of other actors that the social movement and the state.
Earlier citizenship literature indicated that the created issue-based ‘popular
spaces’ can potentially serve as a base from which to launch a direct
confrontation of authority from an ‘outsider’ position (Cornwall 2004a). Habib
and Opoku-Mensah (2009) also indicate the continued importance of material
struggles for other struggles in the African context. If processes of popular
protest, direct action, campaigns, lobbies, strikes and demonstrations can
achieve ‘critical mass’, they can influence decisions in otherwise closed
spaces.36 Furthermore, they can also function effectively in serving to prepare,
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
43
empower, support and legitimise those who are then delegated to enter the
‘lion’s den’ on their behalf and engage in policy deliberation in an invited
space. The literature however also indicates that ’linking’ social capital can
negatively impact associations, in general and with regard to democratic
governance in particular, if not accompanied by sufficient ‘bonding’ and
‘bridging’ social capital (Titeca & Vervisch 2008). Cornwall and Coelho’s
(2006) suggestions for citizens to participate in popular education and
mobilisation in order to learn to recognise themselves as citizens (rather than
beneficiaries or clients) and to learn ‘to cut their political teeth’ in participatory
sphere institutions and transfer these skills to other spheres, also by no way
seems to be a short and/or easy route. Some studies stress the importance of
unintended impacts by successful social movements through the spurring of
influential counter-movements (Kirmani 2008). They stress the importance of
counter-balancing the assessment of positive outcomes of social movement
activities with recognition of the limitations and possible negative implications
of engagement.
Impacts of invited spaces on influence and political rights
The research literature with regard to impact of invited spaces on influence and
political rights has been limited so far. The literature mainly focused on
pointing out the importance of voice through consultations and participatory
inclusion of the poor and taking their realities into account by showing these
realities, rather than formulating conditions for actual impact on influence on
policies and processes. Some writers are optimistic about the potential to
stimulate further participation and democratisation from below (Baochi 2001;
Avritzer 2002, quoted from Cornwall & Coelho 2006). Others pointed out the
ambivalent effects of institutionalised participation on social and political
energy and further on democratisation (Piven & Cloward 1971; Dryzek 1996;
Taylor 1998, quoted from Cornwall & Coelho 2006). Coelho and Cornwall
(2006) indicate that ‘more contingent factors can alter the balance of power,
such as unintended consequences of mutations and processes of politicisation
that accompany resource negotiations or subtle shifts that new discourses of
rights, social justice and citizenship create as they circulate through networks
that support different social actors and expand their interpretive and political
horizons’. Recent research on India found that negotiating rights through
‘political spaces’ was more effective for vulnerable low-income groups, while
negotiating rights through ‘executive spaces’ was more effective for middle-
class citizens (Baud & Nainan 2008). Linking with the political strategies of
the growing middle-classes and their resident associations is also suggested as
a viable alternative (Chakrabarti 2008). Impacts of informal political channels
are currently being explored, particularly by the Africa Power & Politics
Chapter 2
44
Programme. Mitlin already indicated possibilities through offering authorities
information they don’t have and gaining confidence and trust through joint
operations (Mitlin 2004a) and co-production, going well beyond the material
advantages to achieve a broader set of political objectives (Mitlin 2006/8).37
2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter an overview of the current debates on governance networks,
(democratic) governance assessment, decentralisation, citizenship and
deepening democracy, social capital and livelihoods, social movements and
chronic poverty was presented to set the framework for this study. Several
elements from these general debates are of particular importance to understand
the discussion on the conditions under which spaces can contribute to
improved impacts on quality of life, influence and political rights for the poor.
Spaces are understood in abstract terms as the ways in which opportunities for
engagement might be conceived or perceived, and in concrete terms as the
actual sites that are entered and animated by citizens. The further
differentiation of spaces into the types of individually claimed spaces,
collectively claimed spaces and invited spaces will serve to enable the
identification of conditions for improved impacts with regard to the full
spectrum of relevant spaces at local level and national level for the poor in
metropolitan cities. The analysis of the literature in addition shows that there is
often still a limited constellation of relevant actors to these spaces included in
research, for example with regard to the collectively invented spaces of social
movements and collective action, but also with regard to invited spaces of
governance networks. This study, where possible, will take into account the
full spectrum of relevant actors and their roles in processes, which amongst
others leads to interpreting donor agencies not only as part of the institutional
context, but also as actors with interests in concrete negotiation processes over
spaces, as well as the positive and negative internal features which influence
the impacts of spaces.
With regard to these spaces the literature shows that all debates are currently
shifting from a perspective of agency to a realistic structural approach.
Moreover, the literature recognises the role of power and the multi-level
institutional context in relationships. Spaces will therefore in this study be
conceived as underpinned by formal and/or informal institutions. Processes
within and outside these spaces will be conceived as accommodated and
constrained by formal and/or informal institutions, including structures of
opinions, beliefs and cultural norms. Institutions are thus considered as rules
that are separated from the players, which allows for the investigation of both
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
45
the accommodating and constraining roles of institutions on processes. With
regard to individually claimed spaces the factor of instrumental political capital
will be explicated next to the factors of social and organisational capital,
allowing for analysis of the relationship between political capital and other
non-material and material capital assets.
The analysis of the literature shows that until recently the focus in all research
strands was predominantly on processes rather than impacts, which were often
more or less normatively interpreted as positive. The literature also shows that
currently there is an increased call to include the factors of (positive and
negative) impacts on poverty as well as the factor of influence on institutions
by the poor in research. In this study a comprehensive approach including the
factors of processes, impacts on quality of life and impacts on influence and
political rights will be applied. Impacts on quality of life is defined on the basis
of a mixture of the social approaches to quality of life of poverty studies,
community studies and societal quality of life constructs. This allows for
assessment of impacts on quality of life in terms of vulnerability of households
and collectives and service delivery to the wider society. It expresses the extent
to which impacts are both serving the poor and matching the scale and the
scope of the problems. Impacts on influence and political rights are defined on
the basis of the notion of influence in citizenship literature and
conceptualisations of institutions in new institutional economics, governance
network and (democratic) governance assessment literature. This allows for
assessment of impacts on influence and political in terms of tangible impacts
on the allocative or distributive (formal and/or informal) rules of the game
(including policies, processes and implementation) respectively on the
constitutive (formal and/or informal) rules of the game.
Finally, the literature review also shows that the challenge of the shift in focus
from the ‘what’ to the ‘why and how’ of development is to avoid a relapse to
the structural perspective of the 1970s and 1980s that mainly provided insights
and explanations of power (im)balances without many action repertoires, and
to rather stay focussed in a balanced way on formulating conditions under
which spaces of power can sustainably deliver for the poor.
The literature review has now positioned this study within the body of relevant
literature and set the framework for research. The research questions and
further operationalisation of the theoretical concepts discussed here will be
addressed in the next chapter on research methodology.
Chapter 2
46
Notes
1 The Washington Consensus of 1990, right after the end of the Cold War, made for the shift
from the economic agenda of Structural Adjustment Programmes towards the neo-liberal
political agenda of good governance, democratisation, decentralisation and private sector
enablement. The shift towards decentralisation in Africa was mainly driven by external
interests, although it was the fourth time on the African continent to introduce
decentalisation, but the first time for this reason (Owusu 2001). For additional information
on the Washington Consensus and meta-narratives see amongst others Maxwell (2005).
2 The conditions for impact of (democratic) decentralisation on poverty reduction are further
discussed in section 2.4.1, sub-section impacts of invited spaces on quality of life.
3 Some authors consider privatisation (UNDP 2004) or outsourcing to Community Based
Organisations (Ahmad 2005) also as a form of decentralisation, though generally the term
decentralisation is exclusively reserved for transfer of functions and powers within the
public sector. Furthermore, sometimes federalism is considered the strongest form of
decentralisation.
4 Normativity especially plays a role in regard to defining good governance and good
enough governance –mainly in regard to measurement of governance at the national level -,
with the latter referring to the minimal conditions of governance necessary to allow political
and economic development to occur (see Grindle 2005/7).
5 Some authors from other research strands also emphasised the need for capacity to demand
in addition to the capacity to respond. See for example Romeo (2003) and Krishna (2003).
6 Citizenship literature defined voice as ‘the range of measures – such as complaint,
organised protest, lobbying, and participation in decision-making and product delivery –
used by civil society actors to put pressure on service providers to demand better service
outcomes’ (Goetz & Gaventa 2001).6 Consultation involves the ‘opening of arenas for
dialogue and information sharing’. Presence and representation involves ‘institutionalisating
regular access for certain social groups in decision-making’. Influence concerns citizen
engagement whereby citizens can translate access and presence into a tangible impact on
policy-making and the organisation of service delivery (Goetz & Gaventa 2001).
7 Originally invited and claimed spaces were also further differentiated on the basis of the
temporal dimension of relative durability of spaces for partcipation into regularised relations
(invited/long-term), fleeting formations (invited/ad-hoc), movements (invented/long-term)
and moments (invented/ad-hoc) (Cornwall 2002/4).
8 Mitlin (2006) indicates that in urban contexts place based-movements of the poor are
especially at the micro and meso-level, as the poor have an essential struggle for political
inclusion (citizenship) at the level of the city.
9 The difference between formal and informal institutions is further elaborated upon in the
section 2.3.4 on invited spaces.
10 Gaventa (2006) himself also indicates that the power cube is an ‘analytical device which
can be used – along with other approaches - to reflect on and analyse how strategies for
change in turn change power relations’.
11 Social theorists like Durkheim, Weber, Marx and Simmel laid the foundations of these
conceptualisations of social capital (Portes 1998).
12 Cleaver (2005) attributes the structural reproduction of exclusion of the chronic poor in
social relations especially to the inability to sustain their able-bodiedness; the little room to
manoeuvre in their kin and wider social relationships due to small fragile families, unstable
marital arrangements and wider derogatory perceptions of the poor; and the inability to
articulate successfully in public fora – and even where the voices of the poor are heard they
are given little weight and exert negligible influence (Cleaver 2005).
13 While the structural approaches in the US tend to pay a great deal of attention to the how
of collective action, the social constructivistic approachs in Europe attempt to explain why
individuals are inclined to such actions (Klandermans, Kriesi & Tarrow 1988).
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
47
14 Amongst others by Klandermans, Kriesi and Tarrow (1988), McAdam, McCarthy and
Zald (1996), Della Porta and Diani (1999), McAdam Tarrow and Tilly (2001), and Snow,
Soule and Kriesi (2004).
15 The new social movement perspective was renamed in the revised second edition and
could also be called the cultural representations perspective (Della Porta & Diani 2006). The
shift especially since the WSF in Seattle.
16 Collective action focused on comsumption concerns the mobilisation of consumers of
urban services, action focused on the availability of collective or public good and urban
services, and expressed in actions such as land invasions, squatter protests and street
demonstrations. Collective action focused on political (and human) rights action evolves
around the non-material issues of justice, security, freedom from repression and
democratisation.
1717 The article of Habib and Opoku-Mensah is part of a wider venture on whether social
movements are a global phenomenon that happen to be situated on the African continent, or
whether it concerns social phenomena of a sort unique to Africa and therefore difficult to
analyse in a comparative perspective (Ellis & Kessel 2009). Habib and Opoku-Mensah
address the debate on social movements in the global academy from the perspective of the
African continent’s contemporary social struggles. Despite the fundamental differences in
socio-economic contexts - African societies are not post-industrial societies – they question
whether it is intellectually sustainable to develop a theory of social movements with
universal ambitions on the narrow experiences of post-industrial societies (Habib & Opuku-
Mensah 2009).
18 Hickey and Bracking (2005) also do not describe to a language of ‘new’(lifespace) and
‘old’(workspace) social movements.
19 They often take the form of self-help groups. Self-help can be defined as ‘any voluntary
action undertaken by an individual or a group of persons which aims at the satisfaction of
individual or collective needs or aspirations’ (Verhagen 1989). It is characterised by a
substantial contribution of the individual’s or group’s own resources in terms of labour,
capital, land and/or entrepreneurial skills. As formal membership arrangements are often not
in place (equal sharing of risks, costs and benefits amongst the members; liability of
leadership and/or manager to be called to account by the membership for their deeds), it is
preferred to speak of self-help groups in stead of self-help organisations, reflecting better the
informal character of these groups. Since the 1990s residents associations have also become
a common phenomenon in urban contexts mechanism for the delivery of services by people
themselves, but also for claiming rights.
20 Klijn & Belcher (2007) differentiate four conjectures of compatibility between
representative democracy and governance networks: incompatible, complementary,
transitional, instrumental. Incompatible conjecture refers to governance networks as
challenging representative democracy and decision rules of representative democratic
institutions. Complementary conjecture refers to governance networks as providing
democratic institutions with additional linkages to society. Transitional conjecture refer to
governance networks as offering greater flexixibility and efficiency than representative
democratic institutions and will increase as the primary mode of decision making at the
expense of representative democratic institutions. Instrumental conjecture refers to
governance networks providing a means for democratic representative institutions to
increase their authority in the face of societal complexity (emphasising agreements over
outputs rather than inputs to the decision process).
21 A partnership can be viewed as a particular form of governance networks consisting of the
following features: it involves 2 or more actors; it refers to a more or less enduring
relationship between the actors based on a written or verbal agreement; mutually beneficial
relationship, without assuming equality between actors; expressed in concrete, physical
activities; contributing either directly or indirectly to a public goal (Baud & Post 2001).
Chapter 2
48
Common types of partnerships are those between government and private sector companies,
between communities and private sector, and between communities, NGOs and local
government (Baud 2000).
22 UK, New Zealand, Autralia, United States and Canada (UNDP 2003)
23 Result Based Management (RBM) is a life-cycle approach that integrates strategy, people,
resources, processes and measurements to improve decision making, transparency and
accountability. The approach focuses on achieving outcomes, implementing performance
management, learning and changing and reporting performance.
24 The concept of capabilities is based on Sen (1999), who conceptualised development as
developing the capabilities or freedoms of people by increasing the options available to
them.
25 The top-down view of institutions sees institutions as determined by laws written by
political leaders (the view of most Enlightenment intellectuals like Rousseau and
Condorcet). The bottom-up view sees institutions as emerging spontaneously from the social
norms, customs, traditions, beliefs and values of individuals within a society, with the
written law only formalising what is already mainly shaped by the attitudes of individuals
(the view of the leading critic of the top-down French Revolution, Edmund Burke) (Easterly
2008).
26 Civic-driven change literature seems to fit in here stressing the culture-based aspects of
development, though not explicitly differentiating between formal and informal institutions
and not clarifying concepts of how alternative civic driven institutions could be created
(Biekart & Fowler 2007).
27 Hyden (2008) indicates the prevailing notion of the concept of power among DPs is
‘power to’ viewing power as a capability or ability as contrary to the conflictual approach’s
notion of ‘power over’ viewing power as a relationship. In regard to the APPP it is
suggested to define power as ‘the ability to achieve a desired outcome in competition with
other actors who lay claim to the same resources needed to produce that outcome.
28 An extreme examples of coping is the imitation of the financing of patronage networks
through enterprises officially owned by the ruling party in Malawi by Mozambique and
Tanzania (Hyden 2008).
29 The terms are considered too sweeping because, for the majority of researchers, they
provide a means of saving effort on empirical analysis of the relations to which they refer.
Too general because they reduce the potential diversity of the divergences between norms
and practices to a general, abstract, ideal-typical model, which cannot be shown to have
exhausted the range of relevant situations. Too partial because they only focus on one aspect
or dimension of divergences, for example, the public-private confusion, or the distribution
of spoils (De Sardan 2008).
30 Country specificities consist of: size of the country, level of economic development,
degree of democracy and capacities. Process design of decentralisation consists of: political
factors (commitment to a real devolution process, policy coherence, donors’ involvement),
administrative factors (anti-corruption measures, division of functions, building local
capacity) and fiscal factors (type and amount of resources involved). (Jütting et al. 2004/5).
31 Predictability of transfers is enhanced through the use of formula-based allocation systems
driven by simple measures of equity and efficiency (Bird 2003).
32 Research has so far focussed on the transformation of social into political capital,
particularly in terms of how local communities and groups can influence policy (Birner &
Wittner 2000; Booth & Richards 1998) and on the links between political capital and levels
of democracy (Booth & Richards 1998).
33 In September 2010 an international conference will be held to set the research agenda of
the Chronic Poverty Research Centre for the next ten years (2010-2020)
(www.chronicpoverty.org, consulted January 2010).
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts
49
34 Bebbington (2007) mention some exceptions of studies in which the two themes were
integrated. Obviously this is also often the case with collective action for material resources.
35 Recently Mitlin (2006), seemingly built on Morgan (2006), formulated five capacities for
social movements to increase their effectiveness: the capacities to act, to be, to represent, to
relate, to strategise.
36 The earlier mentioned methodologies for capacity development to demand are also
applicable here (see 2.3.4).
37 Co-production is referred to as ‘a state that is both participatory in decision-making and
which allows local groups to be directly involved in the implementation of state policy; or,
alternatively conceptualised, a state that is willing to give financial support to development
strategies defined and undertaken by the poor themselves’(Mitlin 2006: 45). The latter is
also named bottom-up co-production (Mitlin 2008: 7).
