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EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: A Competence-Responsibility Gap?

Authors:
1
Draft - To appear in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (Eds.), International Responsibility: EU and International
Perspectives, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012 (forthcoming)
EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: A Competence-
Responsibility Gap?
Ramses A. Wessel & Leonhard den Hertog
1
‘Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security...’
2
I. Introduction
Even after twenty years existence of a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the
European Union, the division of competences between the Union and its Member
States in this area remains unclear. Insight in this division has become more
important in view of the increasing role of the EU in global security governance.
3
Due to its complex and to some extent sui generis nature, the question to which
extent the EU would in general be covered by the rules on international legal
responsibility has led to some debate. However, most contributions focused
exclusively on the European Community, or later on the Unions competences
on the basis of the TFEU.
4
The relevance of more clarity regarding the different
roles an international organization and its Member States play at the global scene
was recently underlined, when the Court of Appeals in The Hague ruled that The
1
Respectively Professor of the Law of the European Union and other International
Organizations at the University of Twente, The Netherlands, and EXACT Marie Curie
PhD Fellow at the Universities of Cologne, Germany & Edinburgh, United Kingdom. The
authors wish to thank Christiane Ahlborn (Amsterdam Center for International Law) for
her useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2
European Council, European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world, 2003. See also:
European Council, Report on the implementation of the ESS Providing Security in a changing world,
2008, p. 1.
3
See also M Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the
Restructuring of European Diplomacy (Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS),
2011)
4
See E Paasivirta and PJ Kuijper, „Does one size fit all?: The European Community and the
Responsibility of International Organisations‟ (2007) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International
Law 2005 169; S Talmon, „Responsibility of International Organizations: Does The
European Community Require Special Treatment?‟, in M Ragazzi (ed), International
Responsibility Today (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 405; F Hoffmeister,
„Litigating Against the European Union and its Member States‟ (2010) European Journal of
International Law 723.
2
Netherlands was responsible for some actions of military personnel as part of the
UN military mission during the Srebrenica crisis in 1995.
5
The Treaty of Lisbon clarified the international legal status of the European Union
by codifying its international legal personality (Article 7 TEU). At the same time it
refrained from categorising the nature of the competence under both the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) under one of the headings in Title I TFEU: exclusive competences (Article
3), shared competences (Article 4), and competences to support, coordinate, or
supplement the actions of the Member States (Articles 5 and 6). Article 2(4) TFEU
merely states that a competence exists:
6
The Union shall have competence, in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, to define and
implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing
of a common defence policy. One may argue that CFSP and CSDP are not
categorised in the TFEU because these policy areas (in contrast to all other policy
areas of the Union) do not find their basis in the TFEU, but in the TEU. Yet, even
there no express indications can be found as to the type or division of competence
we are dealing with in this area. While it may be tempting to argue that we are most
probably dealing with a combination of supportive, coordinating, supplementing, or at best
shared competences,
7
the exclusion of mixed agreements calls for international
agreements in the area of CFSP and CSDP to be exclusively concluded by the EU.
8
The purpose of the present contribution is to investigate some questions emerging
from the new and ambitious global role of the EU in combination with the unclear
division of international responsibility between the EU and its Member States in the
area of foreign, security and defence policy. In that sense this paper aims to
contribute to the on-going debate on the relationship between international law and
5
Court of Appeals The Hague, Mustafic and Nuhanovic [2011] LJN BR0132.
6
Yet, compare the (we would argue, somewhat absurd) view that a CFSP competence as
such is lacking as Member States merely use the Union to exercise their own competences.
C Hermann, „Much Ado About Pluto? The Unity of the Legal order of the European
Union Revisited‟, in M Cremona and B de Witte, EU Foreign Relations Law Constitutional
Fundamentals (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008) 20.
7
Cf. M Cremona, „Defining Competence in EU External Relations‟, in A Dashwood and M
Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing
Landscape (Cambridge, University Press, 2008) 34, 65: „[…] the CFSP appears to be a type
of sui generis competence that shares characteristics of both shared and complementary
competences.
8
Cf. RA Wessel, „The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences,
Mixed Responsibilities‟, in A Dashwood and M Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU
External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape (Cambridge, University Press, 2008)
152, 156-157.
3
EU law,
9
albeit with a strict focus on the perhaps still different position of CFSP
and CSDP. As the EU has become increasingly active in global governance, the
questions of who takes responsibility (internally) and who can be held responsible (externally)
become more important.
The following section will re-assess the division of competences within the post-
Lisbon European Union in the area of CFSP and CSDP. The main question here is
who may act under CFSP and CSDP. Furthermore, the analysis will present the
international legal framework regarding international responsibility of the EU and its
Member States in the area of CFSP and CDSP. In the concluding section we aim to
see to which extent there is a fit between internal competences and external
responsibility.
I. Who Acts under CFSP and CSDP?
A. The Nature of the European Union
The legal nature of the European Union remains important in order to be able to
say something on its possible international responsibility. The Lisbon Treaty not
only integrated the European Community into the European Union, but the current
Treaty on European Union also explicitly provides that The Union shall have legal
personality (Article 7), thus making an end to the academic discussion on the legal
status of the Union.
10
That there is still some uneasiness on the part of some
Member States, is reflected in Declaration No. 24, attached to the Lisbon Final Act:
The Conference confirms that the fact that the European Union has a legal
personality will not in any way authorise the Union to legislate or to act beyond the
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties. Like many
Declarations, this one is also stating the obvious. After all, the principle of attributed
(or conferred) powers forms a starting point in international institutional law and is
even explicitly referred to in the new TEU, this time with no exception for the
(CFSP):
9
See in general on this issue: E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti and RA Wessel (eds.), International
Law as Law of the European Union (Boston/Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011).
10
See on this discussion the many references in RA Wessel, „The International Legal Status of
the European Union‟ (1997) European Foreign Affairs Review 109; as well as RA Wessel,
„Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU‟ (2000) European Foreign Affairs Review,
507.
4
Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to
attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States(Article 5).
11
Similar careful considerations can be found in Declarations no. 13 and 14, which
underline that the changes do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as
they currently exist [...]
12
and do not prejudice the specific character of the security
and defence policy of the Member States.
Hence, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty we are left with one
international legal entity: the European Union. And, it is difficult not to regard this
entity as an international organization and hence within the scope of the Draft
Articles on the International Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO)
as adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) of the UN in August 2011
and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 2011.
13
This latest version
of the Draft Articles is the latest stage in a development that started in 2002, when
the ILC took up this project. The convergence of the „bits and pieces‟ that were
originally said to make up the Union‟s structure
14
has created a new institutional and
normative situation. Indeed, the past years revealed that the nature of the Union can
best be understood when the complex relation between the different policy areas
and between the Union and its Member States is taken into account.
15
This complex
nature has not prevented the Union from becoming an international independent
actor.
16
11
On the basis of Art. 5 TEU the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity also apply to
all Union policy areas, although the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of
Subsidiarity and Proportionality seems to focus on „legislative acts‟ only and these acts
cannot be used for CFSP matters.
12
Emphasis added.
13
International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Arts. on the responsibility of international
organisations, with commentaries 2011‟, Adopted by the ILC at its sixty-third session, in
2011, and submitted to the General Assembly as part of the Commission‟s report covering
the work of that session (A/66/10) (2011) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol.
II, Part Two, 5, see in particular pt. 6 where the Commentary refers to Art. 57 of the Arts.
on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.
14
Cf. D Curtin, „The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces‟
(1993) CMLR 17.
15
RA Wessel, „The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order: An Increasingly Coherent
Framework of Action and Interpretation‟ (2009) European Constitutional Law Review, 117.
Compare for a political science perspective also S Stetter, EU Foreign and Interior Policies:
Cross-Pillar Politics and the Social Construction of Sovereignty (Oxford, Taylor & Francis, 2007).
16
The term is used by Paasivirta and Kuijper, above, 181 to differentiate the European
Community from more „classical‟ international organizations, which are in their view
predominantly a forum for their members.
5
Indeed, by now is has become widely accepted that the EU as such may bear
international responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.
17
It seems to fit the
definition of an international organization used in the DARIO:
For the purposes of the present draft articles, the term international
organization refers to an organization established by a treaty or other
instrument governed by international law and possessing its own legal
personality. International organizations may include as members, in addition
to States, other entities.
Obviously, the act must be attributable to the EU under international law.
18
It has
been observed that the ILC Draft Articles make no mention of the notion of
„regional economic integration organization‟ (REIO).
19
This notion was invented to
permit an organization like the EU to participate in multilateral treaties and
conventions as a contracting party alongside states.
20
In the absence of special rules
for the EU, we will follow the general rules on responsibility of international
organizations in our assessment of the responsibility of the EU and its Member
States in the area of foreign, security and defence policy.
B. The Legal Nature of the External Competence: CFSP
Although „the nature of the Union‟s external competence is an important factor in
the allocation of international responsibility,
21
this nature is not so easy to establish
in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. As indicated above, both CFSP
and CSDP are not mentioned in the categorisation of competences in Article 3
TFEU. There are indeed good reasons to argue in favour of a „shared competence‟
external action in this area. A shared competence allows both the Union and its
Member States to take the necessary decisions, but Member States‟ competences
may be exercised only to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence
(Article 2, paragraph 2 TFEU). In fact, it could be argued that this is the case in
CFSP. Although there are good reasons to presume that pre-emption does not
17
Cf. Hoffmeister, above, 724.
18
Chapter II of the ILC Draft Arts. deals with the question of attribution.
19
The 2004 Energy Charter Treaty (Art. 3) defines a REIO as an organization constituted by
states to which they have transferred competence over certain matters a number of which
are governed by this Treaty, including the authority to take decisions binding on them in
respect of those matters.
20
Paasivirtaa and Kuijper, above, 205.
21
Hoffmeister, above, 743.
6
apply to CFSP,
22
it is equally difficult to maintain that established CFSP decisions
and international agreements do not at all restrict Member States‟ freedom to act
externally. As argued elsewhere, possible internal restraints on Member States‟
freedom to conclude international agreements in CFSP fields can stem from both
CFSP treaty norms and CFSP secondary measures. The degree of restraining effect
of those CFSP norms is also determined by the potential role that the judiciary may
play in ensuring that those norms are enforced, as well as the interpretation given to
the specific CFSP principle of loyal cooperation.
23
As rules of the organization‟ (see
section II below) these restraints may play a role in establishing responsibilities.
In that sense, the effect of CFSP norms on Member States‟ powers could be
envisaged in the light of the Court‟s pronouncements on the effects of Community
powers in the fields of development cooperation or humanitarian aid. This case law
suggests that since the Community competence in these fields is not exclusive but
„parallel‟, the Member States are accordingly entitled to enter into commitments
themselves vis-à-vis non-Member States, either individually or collectively, in the
Council or outside it, or even jointly with the Community.
24
If we would accept the
idea of „shared‟ competences under CFSP, Member States would have less room for
manoeuvre. Could this even lead to „exclusivity‟ in relation to CFSP? Article 3,
paragraph 2 TFEU reads:
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative
act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal
competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter
their scope.
Indeed, CFSP rules will not find their basis in a „legislative act‟.
25
That being said,
when this provision is read in conjunction with the loyalty principle enshrined in
Article 28, paragraph 4 TEU, it seems too early to rule out exclusivity in the field of
CFSP completely, particularly in view of the fact that the Court would have
22
See Cremona, above, 65 as well as D Thym, „The Intergovernmental Constitution of the
EU‟s Foreign, Security & Defence Executive‟ (2011) EUConst 453.
23
C Hillion and RA Wessel, Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under
CFSP‟, in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional
Fundamentals (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008) 79.
24
Joined Cases C181/91 and C248/91 European Parliament v Council of the European
Communities and Commission of the European Communities [1993] ECR I3685 (Bangladesh
case); Case C316/91 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [1994] ECR I625
(EDF case).
25
See Arts. 24(1) TEU and 298(3) TFEU.
7
jurisdiction in respect of this Article. After all, the Union‟s external activities in the
form of the conclusion of international agreements are booming and Member
States‟ actions increasingly risk affecting common rules or altering their scope.
While the creation of CFSP norms depends on the political will of the Member
States, once these norms have been established, their very purpose is to restrict the
freedom Member States traditionally enjoy in their external relations. Allowing
Member States to affect or even act contrary to common norms established by
EU international agreements would amount to rendering most of the CFSP and
CSDP provisions in the EU Treaty nugatory.
Also in relation to possible international responsibility, the emerging question is
whether a hierarchy of competences can be established: to what extent are Member
States bound by agreements concluded by the Union, and do these agreements
restrict their individual freedom in external relations? In this respect, there appears
to be no reason not to apply the so-called Haegeman doctrine to CFSP agreements
and to regard them as forming an integral part of Union law.
26
Article 216(2)
TFEU indeed states that Member States are automatically bound by the agreements
as a matter of EU law and vis-à-vis the EU. The question remains whether perhaps
a „direct effect‟ of the agreements could even be construed.
27
This would place the
Member States in a different position towards the agreements than in other
international organisations. Yet, no a priori external effects result from this.
28
C. To What Extent are Member States Bound by EU External Action?
Indeed, apart from the question on the nature of the competence, the question who
is bound (internally, inside the EU) by international agreements (and perhaps
decisions) concluded in the area of CFSP and CSDP seems important to be able to
assess the division of possible international responsibility.
26
As provided by the ECJ in relation to international agreements concluded by the European
Community: Cases C181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449 and C104/81 Kupferberg [1982]
ECR 3641. See in the same line D Thym, „Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge der
Europäischen Union‟ (2006) 66 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 900.
27
See for a negative answer to this question Thym, „The Intergovernmental Constitution‟,
above
28
Cf. also the Drafting history of the infamous Arts. 36 bis of the 1986 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. C Bröllmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law:
International Organisations and the Law of Treaties (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007).
8
In the area of CFSP and CSDP, international agreements are concluded by the
Union. The Union has made full use of its competence in this area.
29
By using the
pre-Lisbon Article 24 TEU competence (in conjunction with Article 38 TEU in the
case of agreements in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters), the European Union has entered the international stage as a legal actor
with obligations and responsibilities. This turned the provision into the general legal
basis for the Union‟s treaty making whenever agreements could not be based on the
Community Treaty. These days, the competence to conclude international
agreements can be found in one single legal basis for the entire Union: Article 216
TFEU, which provides:
The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or
international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the
framework of the Union‟s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the
Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding act of the Union or is likely to
affect common rules or alter their scope.
That this competence stretches beyond the TFEU itself and includes the domain of
CFSP is underlined by Article 37 TEU, which provides that the Union may
conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations in areas
covered by this Chapter (named „Specific provisions on the Common Foreign and
Security Policy‟).
30
All international agreements are, in the end, concluded by the Council.
31
In contrast
to other Union areas, no mixed agreements are concluded in the area of CFSP and
29
Cf. A Sari, „The Conclusion of International Agreements by the European Union in the
Context of the ESDP‟ (2008) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53; P Koutrakos,
„International Agreements in the Area of the EU‟s Common Security and Defence Policy‟,
above; and RA Wessel, „The EU as a Party to International Agreements: shared
competences, mixed responsibilities‟, in A Dashwood and M Maresceau (eds.), Law and
Practice of EU External Relations (Cambridge, University Press, 2008) 152. Indeed, these
„agreements‟ can be considered treaties in the sense of Art 2(1)(a) of the 1969 and 1986
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties as they fulfil all generally accepted criteria. See,
in general, A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge, University Press, 2007); and J
Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International
1996). Most agreements can be found in the international agreements database of the
Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/).
30
This Chapter (2) also includes Section 2: Provisions on the Common Security and Defence
Policy.
31
The debate on whether these agreements are concluded by the Council on behalf of the
Union or on behalf of the Member States seems not only to be superseded by practice but
also accepted by most experts in EU external relations law. Cf. R Gosalbo Bono „Some
9
CSDP. In fact, the entire decision-making process as well as the conclusion of the
agreement does not reveal a separate role for the Member States. Apart from the
references to the EU in both the texts and the preamble of the agreements and the
fact that adoption and ratification is done on behalf of the Union, this is confirmed
by the central role of the Union‟s institutions and organs, and the final publication
in the L-series of the Official Journal (decision on inter se agreements of the Member
States are published in the C-series). Indeed, fairly strange operations would be
needed to demonstrate that a treaty concluded under such circumstances has instead
created legal bonds between the third party concerned and each one of the Member
States of the European Union.
32
Nevertheless and in line with our observations in the previous section internally
both the Union and its Member States seem to be bound by the agreements. This is
underlined by Article 216, par. 2, which simply states: Agreements concluded by the
Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States.
Prima facie, for third parties this does not change anything: only obligations for the
EU arise from these international agreements and Member States obligations
subsequently follow on the basis of Union law. At the same time, the question
emerges whether this provision would play a role in the light of the special position
of the rules of the organization in the law on the responsibility of international
organizations (infra).
33
EU external action, however, not only takes shape in the form of international
agreements. International responsibility may be triggered on the basis of a number
of other actions and situations, including the external effects of CFSP decisions,
Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order‟ (2006) CMLRev, 354; Thym, „Die völkerrechtlichen
Verträge der Europäischen Union‟, above, 863; C Tomuschat, „The International
Responsibility of the European Union in E Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union As an
Actor in International Relations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 181; RA Wessel,
„The EU As a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences? Mixed
Responsibilities?‟ in A Dashwood and M Maresceau (eds), The Law and Practice of EU
External RelationsSalient Features of a Changing Landscape (Cambridge, University Press,
2008) 145; and RA Wessel and G Fernandez Arribas, „EU Agreements with Third
Countries: Constitutional Reservations by Member States‟ in S Blockmans (ed), The
European Union and International Crisis Management: Legal and Policy Aspects (The Hague, TMC
Asser Press, 2008) 291.
32
C. Tomuschat, „The International Responsibility of the European Union‟, above, 1812.
Cf. also P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union (Oxford, University Press,
2004) 159; P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006)
406–9 and Gosalbo Bono, „Some Reflections‟, above, 3546.
33
See extensively on these rules: C Ahlborn, „The Rules of International Organizations and
the Law of International Responsibility‟ (2011) to be published in International Organizations
Law Review.
10
CSDP actions and missions and the participation of the EU in international
organizations.
34
Within the limited scope of the present chapter we will only be able
to touch upon some of these issues.
III. EU External Action and International Responsibility
In our assessment of the applicable rules we will follow the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations, adopted on second reading in 2011.
On the basis of Article 1, the Draft Articles apply to the international responsibility
of an international organisation for an internationally wrongful act; as well as to the
international responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act in
connection with the conduct of an international organisation.
35
Not being dealt
with in the Articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts,
the latter paragraph is meant to inter alia incorporate those cases of State
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts by an international organisation
where a State is a member of that organisation, such as the Member States of the
Union.
36
The DARIO suggest as a point of departure that the EU is responsible for its own
internationally wrongful acts. Draft Article 3 states: Every internationally wrongful
act of an international organization entails the international responsibility of that
organization. Article 4 lists the conditions for an internationally wrongful act by an
international organization that entails the international responsibility of that
organization: There is an internationally wrongful act of an international
organization when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to
the international organization under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach
34
See on the latter KE Jørgensen and RA Wessel, „The Position of the European Union in
(other) International Organizations: Confronting Legal and Political Approaches‟, in P
Koutrakos (ed.), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Chaltenham, Edward
Elgar Publishers, 2011) 261.
35
The wording of this second paragraph used to read (in the 2009 version): „The present
draft articles also apply to the international responsibility of a State for the internationally
wrongful act of an international organisation‟ [Emphasis added]. One may assume that the
wording was changed since the conduct of the international organisation need not
necessarily be wrongful, for example in the case of coercion. The authors thank Christiane
Ahlborn (PhD Researcher, University of Amsterdam) for this valuable comment. See for
the previous version of the Draft Arts.: ILC, Draft Arts. on the Responsibility of
International Organisations‟ (2009) Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
61st session, UN Doc. A/C.6/64/10, 39.
36
See in particular pt. 6 of the DARIO Commentaries where the Commentary refers to Art.
57 of the Arts. on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.
11
of an international obligation of that organization. The next question is what
conduct can be attributed to the Union.
According to Draft Article 6(1):
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the
performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of
that organization under international law, whatever position the organ or
agent holds in respect of the organization.
This somewhat obvious rule indicates that conduct by organs and agents can
establish the international responsibility of the Union. According to Draft Article
6(2), the „rules of the organisation‟ shall be applied when determining the organs
and agents‟.
37
In view of the Union rules on internal responsibility, there are good
reasons to interpret the term organs and agents‟ as „institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies and their servants‟ as used is in the TFEU.
38
In any case, as is suggested by
the broad definitions of „organs and agents‟ in Draft Articles 2(c) and (d), the Draft
Articles do not envisage the attribution of conduct to „depend on the use of
particular terminology in the internal law‟ of the Union.
39
In the area of CFSP/CSDP this would thus cover not only conduct of the Council,
but also of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy,
the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU External Action Service
(EEAS), agencies, such as the European Defence Agency or the EU Institute for
Security Studies and of individual representatives in the framework of EU‟s CFSP.
It would also include the EU delegations (transformed from „Commission
delegations‟ as they existed in the pre-Lisbon era) and civilian and military missions.
However, these missions are probably better covered by Article 7, as discussed
below. At the same time, however, Article 6 also raises the question of whether
37
This is not the only criterion however, as „in exceptional circumstances, functions may be
considered as given to an organ or agent even if this could not be said to be based on the
rules of the organisation‟: Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 19.
38
Cf. Hoffmeister, above, 740, who refers to Arts. 340(2) and 263 TFEU as well as to Art.
51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Art. 10(2) confirms that also „the breach
of any international obligation that may arise for an international organisation towards its
members under the rules of the organisation‟ is included in the Draft Arts. Ahlborn argues
that this second paragraph could have been deleted, see: C Ahlborn, above.
39
Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 17. The commentary invokes also some case law on
the point such as the ICJ Advisory Opinion, Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the
United Nations, ICJ Reports 1949, 177, where the Court held that an agent is „any person
through whom it [the international organisation] acts‟.
12
Member States could, in certain cases, be seen as organs or agents of the Union.
40
It
is here that some argue, although it is not expressly acknowledged by the ILC,
41
that
the „organic link‟ between an IO and Member States is relevant.
42
For example, as
even the ILC Rapporteur acknowledges,
43
WTO case law accepted Member States
as „organs and „agents‟ of the Union in several instances.
44
Moreover, from inter alia
EU case law it can be deduced that the notion of „normative control‟ by the Union
over its Member States is relevant to establish an „organ‟ or „agent‟ situation, even if
the Member State action merely „falls in the scope of Union law‟ (as opposed to
situations of MS implementing Union law). Hoffmeister describes these situations as
those in which „the Member States are under a duty not to overstep certain
boundaries set by Union law‟ and concludes from EU case law that „when it is
established that Union law governs both the substantive legality of and the available
remedies for a measure, then the Union exercises normative control over it.‟
45
This
EU case law is relevant, especially in light of the increased importance of „rules of
the organisation‟ in the 2011 Draft Articles.
46
In the area of CFSP these cases would
arguably be rare, but cannot be fully ruled out. An example could be Member State
conduct vis-à-vis a third State falling in the scope of a CFSP agreement concerning
the exchange and protection of classified information.
47
Moreover, Draft Article 7 makes clear that:
The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international
organization that is placed at the disposal of another international
40
Although „the distinction between organs and agents does not appear to be relevant for the
purpose of attribution of conduct to an international organisation‟, the „agent‟ definition
„only covers persons or entities which do not come within the definition under
subparagraph (c) [that of „organ‟]: Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, resp. 18 & 12.
41
Even more, the ILC stated in 2005 that „it seems preferable at the current stage of judicial
developments not to assume that a special rule has come into existence to the effect that,
when implementing a binding act of the European Community, State authorities would act
as organs of the European Community‟; ILC, Report of the fifty-seventh session, Responsibility of
international organisations (2005) UN Doc. A/60/10, Commentary on Part One, Chapter IV,
95, para. 7. However, since then the ILC has become „less categorical‟, see Hoffmeister,
above, 729.
42
See Ahlborn, above, 37.
43
Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 101.
44
See e.g. WTO Panel, Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products
and Foodstuffs (adopted 20 April 2005) WT/DS174/R, para. 7.725. For a more WTO case
law see Hoffmeister, above, 371-374.
45
Hoffmeister, op. cit., at. 741 and 742.
46
First of all, the „rules of the organisation‟ are mentioned in Art. 6(2) itself. However, the
„lex specialis‟ of Art. 64 (see last sentence) also acknowledges that the „rules of the
organisation‟ may
47
See for example the EU-Russia agreement on this matter: Agreement between the Government of
the Russian Federation and the European Union on the protection of classified information, OJ L155/57.
13
organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter
organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct.
The question, however, is whether the term „placed at the disposal of an
international organization is applicable at all to the general relationship between the
EU and its Member States. Only then would the question whether the EU exercises
effective control over the conduct of its Member States in the area of CFSP and
CSDP be relevant.
48
The question has been addressed in relation to the European
Community, and there seems to be a consensus that the idea of effective control‟
was not relevant when authorities of Member States merely carry out Community
law.
49
Much more importantly however, as the commentaries to Article 7 reveal, this
provision is most relevant in relation to civilian and military operations.
50
This
Article deals with the „situation in which the seconded organ or agent still acts to a
certain extent as organ of the seconding State‟ which „occurs for instance in the case
of military contingents that a State places at the disposal of the United Nations for a
peacekeeping operation, since the State retains disciplinary powers and criminal
jurisdiction over the members of the national contingent‟.
51
In contrast to
„normative control‟ as discussed above, the de facto effective operational control of the
missions is the deciding factor here.
52
The commentaries, by thoroughly analysing
case law and UN legal opinions, reveal that for UN peacekeeping missions (in
contrast to UN Security Council authorised military action) the UN will in principle
bear responsibility, as it exercises effective control.
53
It is tempting to apply this
argument mutatis mutandis to CSDP missions. After all, these missions may be under
operational control of the EU, through CSDP bodies of the PSC, EUMC (Military
Committee), EUMS (Military Staff) and the CPCC (Civilian Planning and Conduct
Committee). However, attribution to the IO is no rigid rule, as the above-mentioned
48
See Chapter X by Tomuschat in this volume.
49
See Paasivirta and Kuijper, above; as well as PJ Kuijper, „Introduction to the Symposium
on Responsibility of International Organizations and of (Member) states: Attributed or
Direct Responsibility or Both?‟ (2010) International Organizations Law Review 9.
50
The commentaries to Art. 7 deal extensively with those missions, in the context of UN
missions. See: Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 19-26. Hoffmeister also concludes
that Art. 7 „was mainly written to codify the rule relating to the international responsibility
of the United Nations (or regional organisations) for a military operation using the forces
of its Member States‟: Hoffmeister, above, 726.
51
See Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 20.
52
ibid: „The criterion for attribution of conduct either to the contributing State of
organisation or to the receiving organisation is based according to Art. 7 on the factual
control that is exercised over the specific conduct taken by the organ or agent placed at the
receiving organisation‟s disposal‟.
53
Ibid, 19-26. See also on this point: Blokker, above, 47. In the commentaries, the ILC also
critiques, as do many academics, the ECtHR position on „effective‟ and „ultimate‟ control in
the Behrami, Behrami and Saramati cases, see: Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 23 and
ftnt. 115 for a long list of critical academic contributions.
14
Srebrenica judgments revealed. A case-by-case analysis and application of the
„effective control‟ concept is crucial.
54
Of possible relevance to the situation in CFSP and CSDP is Article 9 of the Draft
Articles. On the basis of this Article conduct can also be considered as act of an
international organization if and to the extent that the organization acknowledges
and adopts the conduct is question as its own. This article applies only in cases
where „Conduct […] is not attributable to an international organizations under
articles 6 to 8 and could therefore be seen as an addendum to the general rules of
attribution. The situation is mirrored by Article 62, which states that a Member State
of an international organization is responsible for an internationally wrongful act of
that organization if: (a) It has accepted responsibility for that act towards the
injured party; or (b) It has led the injured party to rely on its responsibility. The
subsidiary nature of this Article 62 responsibility allows for a shared responsibility of
the organization and its Member States (as do the other Articles on responsibility),
in contrast to the attribution of conduct under Article 9 (as the other Articles on
conduct).
55
Although it would be rare for a Member State to expressly accept
responsibility for a wrongful act of the EU, the commentaries (rather vaguely)
suggest that „acceptance‟ should be widely interpreted. Hence, acceptance may also
be „implied‟ or could result „from the constituent instrument of the international
organisation or from other rules of the organisation‟.
56
Interestingly enough, the
commentaries briefly discuss the example of Article 216 TFEU, which states inter
alia that the Member States are bound by EU international agreements, as an
example of how this would not amount to „acceptance‟. This is only binding „towards
the organisation‟ and does not „produce legal effects in relation to third parties‟, as
the ECJ also held before.
57
In the area of CFSP it would be difficult to find „valid‟ cases of acceptance. With
regard to the second „option‟ of Article 62 namely that a Member State has led
the injured party to rely on its responsibility the commentaries take an identical
wide interpretation of „reliance‟. It puts forward a scenario which is not wholly
54
See further on this issue: A. Sari and R.A. Wessel, International Responsibility for EU
Military Operations: Finding the EU‟s Place in the Global Accountability Regime‟, in B.
Van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (Eds.), The Legal Dimension of Global Governance:
What Role for the EU? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, forthcoming)
55
See also Kuijper, above, 19 and Hoffmeister, above,727. See also Draft Arts. 19 & 63
which stipulate the additional nature of the responsibility Arts. under resp. Part Two, Chapter
IV and Part Five.
56
Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 97, emphasis added.
57
Ibid, 97, ftnt 356. See also: ECJ, France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, I-3574, para.
25.
15
illusory in CFSP, namely when a third party has been led to „reasonably assume that
they [the Member States] would stand in if the responsible organisation did not have
the necessary funds for making reparation.‟
58
As CSDP missions are in principle
Member State funded, a third party could reasonably assume that the Member States
will also stand in if a wrongful act is committed in the course of the mission and
reparation has to be paid. Moreover, Draft Article 40(2) stipulates that „the members
of a responsible international organisation shall take all the appropriate measures
that may be required by the rules of the organisation in order to enable the
organisation to fulfil its obligations under this Chapter [dealing with reparation].‟
Thus, the Member States may also be „drawn into‟ the reparation for Union
responsibility even if they bear no responsibility for it.
The responsibility of the Union in relation to the role of the Member States is
indeed at the core of our topic and is most prominently dealt with in Draft Article
17.
59
What happens if the Union adopts a CFSP or CSDP decision which would
force (or authorize) the Member States to commit an internationally wrongful act?
Article 17 foresees a number of situations:
„1. An international organization incurs international responsibility if it
circumvents one of its international obligations by adopting a decision
binding member States or international organizations to commit an act that
would be internationally wrongful if committed by the former organization.
2. An international organization incurs international responsibility if it
circumvents one of its international obligations by authorizing member
States or international organizations to commit an act that would be
internationally wrongful if committed by the former organization and the act
in question is committed because of that authorization.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 apply whether or not the act in question is
internationally wrongful for the member State or international organizations
to which the decision or authorization is directed.‟
Hence, the European Union itself could incur international responsibility both in the
case of binding decisions addressed to the Member States and when the latter act
because of an authorization by the Union. It is important to realise that this Article
58
Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 98.
59
See NM Blokker, „Abuse of the Members: Questions concerning Draft Art. 16 of the Draft
Arts. on Responsibility of International Organizations‟ (2010) International Organizations Law
Review 35; as well as J d‟Aspremont, Abuse of the Legal Personality of International
Organizations and the Responsibility of Member States‟ (2007) International Organizations
Law Review 91.
16
applies to „circumvention‟ by the Union and that hence the conduct of the
„implementing‟ Member State itself need not necessarily be unlawful; it is the
binding or „authorising act‟ of the Union that, if it were to implement that itself,
should qualify as unlawful.
60
At the same time, Member States may be responsible once they hide behind an
international organization. Article 61 provides:
„1. A State member of an international organization incurs international
responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has
competence in relation to the subject-matter of one of the State‟s
international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the
organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have
constituted a breach of the obligation.
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether or not the act in question is internationally
wrongful for the international organization.‟
As Kuijper rightfully argues:
This article sets out a series of events that virtually no State could bring
about all on its own, since it would need at least several other States as
partners in crime in order to incite the organization from the inside to
commit an act contrary to the Member States‟ international obligations to
which the organization would not be bound.
61
Moreover, the EU would have to act not in its rule-making capacity in the Article 17
situation, which is well imaginable, but in an operational capacity in the Article 61
situation, something which is less common.
62
Nevertheless, also in the relationship
between the EU and its Member States in the area of CFSP/CSDP these types of
„abuse‟ are not to be ignored completely. For example, in contrast with the Member
States, the EU is not Party to the Geneva Refugee Convention. Hypothetically, the
Member States could then attempt to circumvent their obligations under that treaty,
namely using‟ a CSDP mission to act in contravention of the principle of non-
refoulement in order to stop migration flows, for example in a maritime CSDP
60
Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 40-42.
61
Kuijper, above, 28. See more extensively on Art. 60: E Paasivirta, „Responsibility of a
Member States of an International Organization: Where Will it End? Comments on Art. 60
of the ILC Draft on the Responsibility of International Organizations‟ (2010) International
Organizations Law Review 49.
62
Kuijper, above, 28.
17
mission.
63
It is in particular in this area where the debate on the Union‟s separate
international legal status finally led to an acceptance of the legal personality of the
European Union, including all its policy areas. It is in fact the existence of this
international legal personality alongside the legal personalities of the Member States
that potentially allow both to play hide and seek.
A number of other, general, situations may be relevant in establishing the division of
responsibilities between the EU and its Member states in the area of foreign,
security and defence policy. These situations do not concern the specific relation
between the organisation and its Member States, but relate more generally to
relationships between international organizations and states. Nevertheless, we
briefly address them here as „Member States‟ are not excluded from the definition of
a „State‟.
64
First, Article 14 of the Draft Articles states that:
An international organization which aids or assists a State or another
international organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful
act by the State or the latter organization is internationally responsible for
doing so if: (a) the former organization does so with knowledge of the
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be
internationally wrongful if committed by that organization.
65
The mirror image is provided by Article 58, paragraph 1, which establishes under
the same conditions the international responsibility of a State which aids or assists
an international organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act
[…]‟. Given the close cooperation between the Union and its Member States in the
formulation and implementation of CFSP and CSDP these provisions are relevant.
It has been suggested elsewhere that this „aiding or assisting‟ may also well take
63
In the Mediterranean context it is not wholly unimaginable that a CSDP mission would
come to deal with migrant boats on the move to the EU, as NATO did in 2011. One such
incident, under which NATO did allegedly not live up to international search and rescue
obligations leading to the death of 61 migrants, is currently being investigated by the
Migration Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. See:
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/NewsManager/EMB_NewsManagerView.asp?ID=6789&L
=2
64
In fact, „States‟ are not defined at all and are not referred to in Draft Art. 2, which defines
„International organization‟, „Rules of the organization‟, and „Agents‟.
65
Emphasis added.
18
financial forms.
66
Due to the peculiar funding structure of CSDP missions the
Member States fund in principle the EU Missions this may be a possible area of
attention under Article 58.
A similar situation concerns the responsibility of an international organization that
directs and controls a state (or another international organization) in the commission of
an internationally wrongful act.
67
This is dealt with in Article 15 of the Draft
Articles. Again a mirror image can be found, which provides that:
A State which directs and controls an international organization in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally
responsible for that act if: (a) the State does so with knowledge of the
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be
internationally wrongful if committed by that State. (Article 59, paragraph 1).
A situation in which Member States direct or control the EU in the execution of
CFSP/CSDP may be difficult to find, but it is has been suggested that excessive
control over the decision-making process of an organization could lead to (joint)
international responsibility.
68
Obviously, this would be difficult to reconcile with the
idea of Member States as „seat holders‟ in an organ of an international organization,
in which view the decision-making procedure as such is irrelevant as in the end it is
the organization that takes the decision.
69
Situations in which Member States are
directed or controlled by the Union form the foundation of the CFSP. International
wrongful acts by states on the basis of binding CFSP/CSDP decisions are thus not
excluded.
To the abovementioned Articles dealing with State responsibility for aiding,
assisting, directing and controlling the conduct of international organisations
(Articles 58 & 59), the ILC has added a second paragraph in the 2011 version of the
Draft Articles which reads: „An act by a State member of an international
organisation done in accordance with the rules of the organisation does not as such
engage the international responsibility of that State under the terms of this draft
66
A Reinisch, „Aid or Assistance and Direction and Control between States and International
Organizations in the Commission of Internationally Wrongful Acts‟ (2010) International
Organizations Law Review 70.
67
See more extensively: Ibid.
68
J d‟Aspremont, above, 92: „[…] member states exerting an excessive control over the
decision-making process of the organization must be held, together with the organization,
responsible for violations of international law committed by the organization
69
RA Wessel, „Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU‟ (2000) European Foreign
Affairs Review, 507, 516.
19
Article.‟
70
This addition raises the importance of the „rules of the organisation‟ as
they suggest that it could prevent the international State responsibility from arising if
the Member States acts in accordance with them. However, it seems to the authors
that it could also potentially undermine the authority of the Draft Articles, as it
seems to allow for a „way out‟. Could it possibly mean that, if Member States act on
the basis of a CFSP decision, in accordance with EU law, they would not be held
responsible under Articles 58 and 59? The commentary indicates that „These criteria
could entail some difficulties in ascertaining whether aid or assistance has taken
place in borderline cases‟ and that this „does not imply that the State would then be
free to ignore its international obligations‟. This is akin to statements in ECtHR
judgements, such as in the Bosphorus where the Court held that Member States
cannot escape scrutiny by „hiding‟ behind the EU to which competences were
transferred.
71
The commentaries go on to state that such international obligations
„may well encompass the conduct of a State when it acts within an international
organisation‟, thus leaving the boundaries between international and „internal‟ EU
law nebulous for the present purposes. Clearly, there is a dilemma here for the ILC or
at least a paradox for the reader. The commentaries then finish by saying that if such
a situation would occur, the Member States would still be liable, but under the
Articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.
72
To the
authors it is rather unclear how this latest addition to the DARIO contributes to a
clearer delimitation of responsibility.
The Draft Articles foresee situations in which either the organization or the state is
subject to coercion by the other. The applicable rules can be found in Draft Articles
16 and 60. In view of the theoretical nature of these provisions with regard to the
relationship between the EU and its Member States, we leave this possibility out of
our discussion.
Finally it should be pointed out that a lex specialishas been added in Article 64 of
the Draft Articles which stipulates that the these Articles will not apply if „special
rules of international law‟ such as „rules of the organisation applicable to the
relations between an international organisation and its members‟ cover the
responsibility questions. The Commentaries discusses a specific example under
which these „rules of the organisation‟ may come into play: the European Union and
its Member States.
73
It is thus here that as we have seen before the internal rules
70
Emphasis added.
71
See: 30 June 2005, Application No. 45036/98, Bosphorus v Ireland.
72
Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 91.
73
Ibid, 100-101.
20
of the Union, including those on competences, may make their way into questions
of international responsibility.
IV. Conclusion: A Competence-Responsibility Gap?
A first glance at the division of international responsibility between the EU and its
Member States suggests that the EU itself would be primarily responsible for any
international wrongful acts in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. What
kind of internationally wrongful act could this be? Obviously, not living up to
international agreements concluded with third states or other international
organizations could result in such international responsibility. Also acts by any agent
of the Union (e.g. the Institutions, but also the High Representative, Special Envoys
and CSDP missions) which would be in violation of international obligations would
be attributable to the Union. Given the upgraded role for the EU in global
governance, more rules have become applicable to its actions.
While one could perhaps argue that there once was a difference between
Community law and CFSP law, at least post-Lisbon it has become difficult to
maintain that the constitutional relationship between the Union and its Member
States differs on the basis of a policy area.
74
So far, however, this special relationship
between the EU and its Member States is not reflected in the Draft Articles. As we
have seen, the „effective (of „factual‟) control‟ argument may be decisive in
establishing the division of responsibility between the EU and its Member States in
very concrete situations in the framework of EU military missions, but the complex
nature of CSDP decision-making and implementation calls for a case-by-case
analysis which is to take account of the special position Member States have in
conducting EU military missions. With its focus on the agency paradigm of
attribution, the DARIO‟s relevance may be limited in relation to CSDP missions.
75
Indeed, the complex nature of the cooperation between the EU and its Member
States in external situations is not only related to the division of competences, but
74
More extensively: RA Wessel, „The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order‟, above.
But see for instance Kuijper, above, 21, who argues that the divide on this point runs right
across the EU, separating its traditionally supra-national EC part from the
intergovernmental CFSP-side. In his view the foreign policy powers of Member States are
unaffected by the fact that certain aspects of foreign- and defense policy are run on a
common basis (at 20, fn. 36). Cf. also Thym, above, 454, who accepts the horizontal
constitutionalisation‟ (the same constitutional control standards apply to all areas of Union
action), but maintains that Union law is of a different nature in CFSP and CSDP, where it
is a manifestation of intergovernmental executive power, rather than law-making.
75
See more extensively: Sari and Wessel, op.cit.
21
also to the actual use of these competences in concrete situations. This allegedly
makes the assessment of international responsibility even more difficult. Even after
almost twenty years of CFSP, we have not been able to fully grasp the complexity of
the relationship between the EU and its Member States relationship in this area. Yet,
with the increasing external activity of the Union, there is a need to become more
precise.
In general, the rules in the TEU provide no indications for a conclusion that in
CFSP/CSDP the Member States would by definition be the first ones to incur
international responsibility. This would be confirmed by the specific rules on the
conclusion of EU international agreements, which uniformly cover both CFSP and
non-CSFP agreements. As most EU external action is based on international
agreements, this would not amount to a competence-responsibility gap. Yet, as we
have seen, in the area of CSDP in particular, it may not always be easy to establish
the actual competence and responsibilities depend on more than just competences.
From our analysis, the contours of how internal CFSP competences influence the
external responsibility under the DARIO emerge. Although we have seen that the
Union incurs responsibility, as a point of departure, the specific CFSP/CSDP „rules
of the organisation‟
76
allow for more complex situations. The internal division of
competences therefore „piercesthe institutional veil of the Union, inter alia via the
acknowledgement of the „rules of the organisation‟. For example, the „rules of the
organisation‟ are important in determining whether Member States could be seen as
agents or organs of the Union (cf. Article 6(2)). However, the inverse situation is
also envisaged, under which the Member States may „hide‟ behind the institutional
veil of the Union. For example, if they implement binding decisions or
authorisations they could be freed of international responsibility (cf. Article 17).
Hence, the internal division of competences is certainly relevant for the allocation of
responsibility, albeit perhaps more as an exception than as the standard rule. Of
course, in the implementation of the responsibility, there is a limit; the DARIO also
stipulates that „the responsible international organisation may not rely on its rules as
justification for failure to comply with its obligations‟ (Article 32(1)).
Another set of questions relate to the development of the European External
Action Service and to the emerging diplomatic service in third countries and the
changing status of the EU in some international organizations. The applicability of
76
Defined in Draft Art. 2 as „in particular, the constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions
and other acts of the organization adopted in accordance with those instruments, and
established practice of the organization‟.
22
„state rules‟ in this area to the EU has hardly been touched upon in academic
writings.
These are just some first thoughts that come to mind when we consider the
(planned) increasing activities of the Union at the global level. Given the
particularities of CFSP/CSDP these issue deserve special attention in the study of
the international responsibility of international organizations.
77
77
Please see chapter X by Naert in this volume.
... A implicação de uma multiplicidade de atores, que funcionam em rede, interagem e se sobrepõem, contribui também para a falta de clareza no que toca à divisão de competências formais dentro da União (Faleg, 2017;Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, 2011;Wessel, 2013). Uma questão idêntica emerge relativamente à coordenação de atores civis e militares, considerando as dificuldades sistemáticas em conjugar as suas várias formas de operar, instrumentos financeiros, etc. (Drent, 2011;Faleg, 2017 (Wessel, 2013). ...
... A implicação de uma multiplicidade de atores, que funcionam em rede, interagem e se sobrepõem, contribui também para a falta de clareza no que toca à divisão de competências formais dentro da União (Faleg, 2017;Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, 2011;Wessel, 2013). Uma questão idêntica emerge relativamente à coordenação de atores civis e militares, considerando as dificuldades sistemáticas em conjugar as suas várias formas de operar, instrumentos financeiros, etc. (Drent, 2011;Faleg, 2017 (Wessel, 2013). ...
Thesis
Full-text available
EN This dissertation intends to study the mutations experienced by the European Union’s (EU) security policies, in the background of the institutionalized perception of the migratory fluxes as a security challenge, to which the EU must answer. The study addresses the shifts in EU’s security culture and its concrete operationalization, through the Common Security and Defense Policy’s mechanisms, within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Thereby, the question that guides this paper is the following one: In what way has the securitisation of migration’s flows in the European Union, most visibly since the beginning of the 1990’s until today, have influenced its security policies, both at the level of the definition of its security culture, and its operational development? Aiming at answering this question, this study primarily intends to expose the theoretical and conceptual framework applied throughout the dissertation, namely the Critical Security Theory. This framework is relevant to this dissertation, inasmuch as it promotes the expansion of the meaning of security, elevating the individual as the privileged reference object of security. Moreover, conceptually this framework draws near to the EU’s approach as a security actor. In the scope of this framework of analysis, we are also well positioned to study the development of the internal-external security nexus. This concept has informed EU’s security approach and its response to new threats, namely those perceived as interlinked with the rise of migratory flows. The dissertation further analyses the emergence of the EU as a security actor, highlighting its sui generis characteristics, which derive from its historical evolution. We undertake this study in order to better understand and explain how rising pressures associated with the growth of migratory flows have impacted EU’s security and defence policy, both at the conceptual and operational level. Realizing that these dynamics generously inform its activities for international security promotion, this study aims at understanding how they relate with the ambitions pertaining to the externalization of the migratory question. Lastly, through two case-studies, this dissertation intends to demonstrate the changes experienced by EU’s security policies, as products of the securitisation processes surrounding migration. The first case study, focused on the evolution of EU’s security culture, will be carried out by analysing the handling of the migration debate by the structuring documents in the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as discursive interventions by relevant personalities in EU’s political framework. Lastly, the study of EUCAP Sahel Niger CSDP mission presents the changes sustained by the mission and overall by the activities under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), as the operational dimension of EU’s security policies. In conclusion, we argue that the internal-external security nexus and the EU’s sui generis nature incite dialogue between its security instruments. These dynamics favour the internationalization of its internal security – which including the migration flows, after being securitized in the context of the communitarisation processes. In this context, the EU’s security culture suffers palpable changes, as the prioritized control of migration flows is transposed to its external security activities developed under the CSDP framework. This tendency conveys the externalisation of phenomena initially thought to be of internal incidence. These processes sustain the mutations of the operationalisation of EU’s security culture, while the external actions of CSDP develop practices of extraterritorial control of a securitized migration topic, against the background of the struggle to protect “Fortress Europe” and externalise of EU’s own security. PT Este trabalho pretende estudar as mutações sofridas pelas políticas de segurança da União Europeia (UE), partindo da perceção institucionalizada de que os fluxos migratórios constituem um desafio securitário a que a União Europeia deve dar resposta. O estudo aborda as alterações da cultura de segurança da União e da sua operacionalização concreta através dos mecanismos da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa, no âmbito da Política Externa e de Segurança Comum. Assim, a pergunta de investigação que orienta este trabalho é a seguinte: de que forma a securitização dos fluxos migratórios na União Europeia, particularmente visível desde o começo da década de 1990 até hoje, tem influenciado as suas políticas de segurança, quer ao nível da definição da sua cultura de segurança, quer ao nível do seu desenvolvimento operacional? Visando responder a esta questão, este trabalho propõe-se primeiramente a desenvolver o quadro teórico e concetual empregue ao longo da dissertação, nomeadamente a escola crítica dos Estudos de Segurança. Este quadro é relevante para esta dissertação, na medida em que expande o significado de segurança, elevando o indivíduo a objeto referenciador de segurança privilegiado – uma abordagem concetualmente próxima da abordagem da UE à promoção de segurança. No âmbito deste quadro de análise, estamos também bem posicionados para analisar o desenvolvimento de um nexo securitário interno-externo, que tem informado a postura securitária da União e as respostas a novas ameaças, nomeadamente aquelas que são percecionadas como derivando do aumento de fluxos migratórios. Este trabalho analisa a emergência da União Europeia como um ator securitário, tomando nota das suas características sui generis derivadas da sua evolução histórica, para melhor entender e explicar a forma como a emergência de pressões derivadas do aumento dos fluxos migratórios tem impactado a política de segurança e defesa da UE, quer ao nível conceptual, quer operacional. Percebendo que estas dinâmicas informam generosamente as suas atividades de promoção de segurança internacional, este trabalho pretende compreender como as mesmas se relacionam com a ambição de externalização da questão migratória. Por fim, através de dois estudos de caso, o trabalho propõe-se a demonstrar as alterações sofridas pelas políticas de segurança da União Europeia, fruto da securitização das migrações. Um primeiro estudo sobre a evolução da cultura de segurança da União será concretizado através da análise dos documentos estruturantes da Política Externa e de Segurança Comum, nomeadamente no que ao tratamento da questão migratória diz respeito, sendo acompanhado pela análise de intervenções discursivas de elementos políticos relevantes no quadro político da União Europeia. Finalmente, o estudo da missão PCSD EUCAP Sahel Níger apresenta as alterações sofridas por esta missão e pelas atividades sob a égide da PCSD, ou seja, a dimensão operacional das políticas de segurança da União. Concluímos que o nexo de segurança interna-externa e a própria natureza sui generis da União a conduzem a promover o diálogo entre os seus instrumentos securitários, privilegiando a internacionalização da sua segurança interna – onde se inserem os fluxos migratórios, securitizados no contexto da comunitarização. Neste contexto, a cultura de segurança da União sofre alterações palpáveis, sendo que a priorização do controlo dos fluxos migratórios se transpõe para as suas atividades externas de segurança levadas a cabo pela PCSD, seguindo a lógica da externalização de fenómenos pensados inicialmente de incidência interna. Assim se processam as mutações ao nível da operacionalização da cultura de segurança da União, sendo que nas ações externas da PCSD se desenvolvem práticas de controlo extraterritorial de uma questão migratória securitizada, enquanto se luta para proteger a “Europa Fortaleza” e se externaliza a própria segurança da União.
... Within the first decade the first specialized journals were launched, for instance Europa-Archiv and in 1963 the JCMS, covering, if marginally, the foreign affairs of the EC. It is perhaps more significant that the first (descriptive) legal studies appeared at this time (Pescatore 1961;Raux 1966), setting directions for subsequent studies of the legal dimension of (aspects of) European foreign policy (Eeckhout 2005;Govaere et al. 2004;Griller 2003;Wessel 1999Wessel , 2006. While the descriptive studies contributed valuable knowledge of a novel feature of European politics, it is theorizing that has been of enduring value. ...
... At the very end of this first phase Philippe Schmitter (1969) formulated the path-breaking 'externalization hypothesis', highlighting the international dimension of EC domestic policies. Qua the hypothesis he was among the first to spot the close connections between EC 'domestic' and 'international', a connection that was significantly strengthened by a famous European Court of Justice ruling according to which the international competences of the European Commission could be derived from its domestic competences (Wessel 2006). Unfortunately the externalization hypothesis did not have much impact on the field of study. ...
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This chapter provides a general overview of trends and advances in research on European foreign policy. It coves the period app. 1954-2014
... The problem of agency autonomy in international organizations has already been researched (see Hawkins et al. 2006;Vaubel 2006); and principal-agent (P-A) relations in EU foreign economic policy have been dealt with by several scholars (see Delreux and Kerremans 2010;Dür and Elsing 2011;Wessel and den Hertog 2012). The relevance of the principal-agent approach for the EEAS, and, more specifically, an analysis the rationale behind the delegation of power has recently been confirmed by Hrant Kostanyan (2014). ...
... A vast body of literature on P-A relations has been accumulating since the 1990s when scholars started to apply principal-agent modelling to the European Union to understand the relationship between the member states and the EU institutions (Pollack 1997(Pollack , 2003Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002), and to describe the EU and its functioning (Dehousse 2008;Franchino 2007;Kassim and Menon 2003;Scharpf 1997 and2000;Pierson 1996). A number of authors have framed EU external relations and trade policies in a P-A perspective and as a problem of incomplete contracting (see Delreux and Kerremans 2010;Dür and Elsig 2011;Wessel and den Hertog 2012). According to the P-A logic, the EU member states as "collective principal" choose to establish agents to reduce transaction costs by relieving themselves of certain tasks, by acquiring expertise, or by limiting the complexity of decision-making. ...
Article
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The European External Action Service (EEAS) is a hybrid and compound institutional actor in the EU's multi-level administration with delegated authority from the member states (MS) to conduct the EU's external action. Substantial competences, notably in the field of Neighbourhood and Trade policies, as well as Development and Cooperation remain under the control of the European Commission (Commission). At the same time, also Members of the European Parliament (EP) are more clearly voicing their interests and ownership in the EU's representation in the world. This article tests the notion of 'double-agent' - or in fact "triple-agent" - as a way of characterizing the position of the EEAS, and in particular of the EU Delegations (as the 'EU field-level bureaucracies') vis-à-vis the MS, the Commission and the EP, as an expression of complex and interrelated chains of delegation, where the EU 'embassies' have to interact with and to answer to (but not in a clear line of delegation) different (sets of) principals, namely the MS, the Commission and the EP. Based on the findings from a series of elite interviews with 47 EEAS and Commission officials and on a survey among 184 EU diplomats, the paper seeks to examine this fuzzy principal-agent relationship and uses the review process of the EEAS as an opportunity to assess the level of autonomy of the new EU foreign policy apparatus.
... The problem of agency autonomy in international organizations has already been researched (see Hawkins et al. 2006;Vaubel 2006); and principal-agent (P-A) relations in EU foreign economic policy have been dealt with by several scholars (see Delreux and Kerremans 2010;Dür and Elsing 2011;Wessel and den Hertog 2012). The relevance of the principal-agent approach for the EEAS, and, more specifically, an analysis the rationale behind the delegation of power has recently been confirmed by Hrant Kostanyan (2014). ...
... A vast body of literature on P-A relations has been accumulating since the 1990s when scholars started to apply principal-agent modelling to the European Union to understand the relationship between the member states and the EU institutions (Pollack 1997(Pollack , 2003Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002), and to describe the EU and its functioning (Dehousse 2008;Franchino 2007;Kassim and Menon 2003;Scharpf 1997 and2000;Pierson 1996). A number of authors have framed EU external relations and trade policies in a P-A perspective and as a problem of incomplete contracting (see Delreux and Kerremans 2010;Dür and Elsig 2011;Wessel and den Hertog 2012). According to the P-A logic, the EU member states as "collective principal" choose to establish agents to reduce transaction costs by relieving themselves of certain tasks, by acquiring expertise, or by limiting the complexity of decision-making. ...
Article
The European External Action Service (EEAS) is a hybrid and compound institutional actor in the EU’s multi-level administration with delegated authority from the member states (MS) to conduct the EU’s external action. Substantial competences, notably in the field of Neighbourhood and Trade policies, as well as Development and Cooperation remain under the control of the European Commission (Commission). At the same time, also Members of the European Parliament (EP) are more clearly voicing their interests and ownership in the EU’s representation in the world. This article tests the notion of 'double-agent' – or in fact “triple-agent” – as a way of characterizing the position of the EEAS, and in particular of the EU Delegations (as the ‘EU field-level bureaucracies’) vis-à-vis the MS, the Commission and the EP, as an expression of complex and interrelated chains of delegation, where the EU ‘embassies‘ have to interact with and to answer to (but not in a clear line of delegation) different (sets of) principals, namely the MS, the Commission and the EP. Based on the findings from a series of elite interviews with 47 EEAS and Commission officials and on a survey among 184 EU diplomats, the paper seeks to examine this fuzzy principal-agent relationship and uses the review process of the EEAS as an opportunity to assess the level of autonomy of the new EU foreign policy apparatus.
... The Lisbon Treaty does not categorize the CFSP under one of the listed competences (Articles 3-6 TFEU), with commentators often arguing that it most likely can be viewed as a 'shared competence', allowing for both the EU and its member states to take decisions, as long as the EU has not exercised its competence. 142 Consequently, in the field of CFSP/CSDP, both the conduct of EU organs 143 as well as conduct of organs which are placed at the disposal of the EU 144 may result in the EU's international responsibility if a certain threshold of control is reached. In support of this, the little available case law which has arisen in the context of peacekeeping and peace enforcement or military operations authorized by the UN, paired with the actual decision-making practice within the EU bolster the argument that the EU will assume responsibility for EU-led operations if its standard of control and authority can be compared to the 'effective control' standard 145 developed in this regard. ...
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The book gathers a group of scholars interested in both public international law and EU law to cover different facets of the relationship between the European Union and customary international law. Considering the distinct perspectives taken by international law and EU law, while also looking into the space in between the two, individual chapters tackle complex questions such as whether and on what bases the European Union is bound by customary international law as a matter of international law and EU law; how the European Union contributes to the development of international custom; and how different stakeholders – the Court of Justice of the European Union, the EU's political organs and EU citizens – rely upon customary rules. The book thus offers a systematic account of the relevance of customary international law for the external relations and internal functioning of what is no doubt the most remarkable regional international organization of our time.
... The EU clearly seeks to position itself as a significant and unique security actor in an increasingly contested world order (Langenhove and Luk 2010;Laatikainen 2012). A large volume of academic literature has explored the development of the EU overarching security strategies (see for example Koutrakos 2013;Wessel and den Hertog 2013;Bendiek and Porter 2013;Bendiek 2017), but also its pursuit of greater leverage in global security governance across different policy fields, such as energy security (Prontera 2020), antiterrorism (Bossong 2008), and maritime security (Germond 2011). Seeking to enrich this debate, this article explores the role that the EU envisions to play in cybersecurity governance, a newly emerging and increasing important policy area. ...
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This research seeks to unpack the development of the EU as a security actor in cyberspace. Drawing on the theoretical approach of role theory, this article shows that the EU’s role in cyberspace should be understood in relationality to the other poles. On the one hand, the declining hegemonic role of the US in cyberspace as well as the divergence between the US and the EU with regard to cybersecurity governance has made the EU more aware of the need for cyber sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Therefore, the EU seeks to pursue a role of an autonomous cybersecurity player through the enactment of cybersecurity at institutional and operational level. On the other hand, under conditions of increasing interdependence, the EU has considered international cooperation to address challenges in cyberspace as a strategic priority, therefore seeking to act as a promoter of a multi-stakeholder model. Moreover, interpolariy in cyberspace determines the contestation of EU role by other poles. While the EU has recorded some small successes as a regulation-setter, emerging poles of power in the cybersecurity domain contest the EU’s desired role, promoting more state-centric approaches and seeking to transfer regulatory authority in the cybersecurity domain to the UN.
... This focus of research was launched by Tonra (2001) and further developed by Ekengren (2002) and Hellmann (2004 [AQ9]; on Europeanization, see also Chapter 22). The EU's diplomatic service has been analysed in a surprisingly limited number of studies (Bruter 1999; Duke 2003) and the same characterizes normative issues of foreign policy, such as ethics, accountability , democracy and legitimacy (Manners 2002; Karagiannis 2004; Wagner 2005; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Wessel 2006). In principle, these different kinds of explanandum are inter-related. ...
... In fact, the coming of age of the CSDP made lawyers more aware of the fact that existing international law is applicable to many of these situations. Where the application of international diplomatic law was assessed in relation to the EEAS delegations discussed above, the international rules on humanitarian law, international responsibility and immunities in relation to the CSDP formed a new research area (Naert, 2010;Wessel and Den Hertog, 2013). The preliminary conclusions of this strand of research indicate that the EU, as a global (security) actor, will have to abide by the existing international rules, despite the fact that most of these rules were created to regulate inter-state relations. ...
Article
This paper discusses the role of the so-called "rules of the organization" in the draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) on first reading. While the rules of the organization occupy a central place in the DARIO, the ILC has decided not to take a "clear-cut view" on their legal nature as either international law or internal law of the organization. This paper argues that the ILC’s indecision has left the DARIO with a fluctuating scope of application concerning various provisions such as the attribution of conduct, the breach of an international obligation, the obligation to make reparation, and countermeasures against an international organization. Since the rules of the organization are a term of art that was developed by the ILC in its work on the law of treaties and has rarely been addressed in legal scholarship, Part 1 examines the legal nature of the different components of the rules of the organization: the constituent instruments, the acts, and the established practice of the organization. While the constituent instruments are contracts between States at the moment of the creation of an international organization, they operate as constitutions during the life of the organization, giving it the autonomy to create internal law in force between the subjects of its legal order, including its member States. Part 2 therefore suggests to reconceive the rules of the organization as "internal law" of the organization as long as the organization functions effectively so as to appropriately reflect an international organization’s constitutional autonomy for purposes of international responsibility.
The International Responsibility of the European Union
  • C Tomuschat
C. Tomuschat, "The International Responsibility of the European Union", above, 181-2.
above, 19 and Hoffmeister, above,727. See also Draft Arts. 19 & 63 which stipulate the additional nature of the responsibility Arts. under resp
  • Kuijper See
See also Kuijper, above, 19 and Hoffmeister, above,727. See also Draft Arts. 19 & 63 which stipulate the additional nature of the responsibility Arts. under resp. Part Two, Chapter IV and Part Five.
See also: ECJ, France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, I-3574
  • Ibid
Ibid, 97, ftnt 356. See also: ECJ, France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, I-3574, para. 25.
Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge der Europäischen Union", above, 863; C Tomuschat
  • E Cannizzaro
Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order" (2006) CMLRev, 354; Thym, "Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge der Europäischen Union", above, 863; C Tomuschat, "The International Responsibility of the European Union" in E Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union As an Actor in International Relations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 181;
External Relations of the European Union
  • Cf
Cf. also P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union (Oxford, University Press, 2004) 159;
  • P Koutrakos
  • Gosalbo Bono
P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 406-9 and Gosalbo Bono, "Some Reflections", above, 354-6.