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THE QUEST FOR RELIGIOUS PURITY IN NEW AGE,
EVANGELICALISM AND ISLAM
RELIGIOUS RENDITIONS OF DUTCH YOUTH AND THE
LUCKMANN LEGACY
Johan Roeland, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, Martijn de Koning
and Ineke Noomen
Introduction
Even though it is beyond doubt that the once virtually omnipresent
churched Christian religiosity has lost much of its former appeal in
particularly the Northwestern-European countries (e.g., Norris and
Inglehart, 2004), there are other and arguably more interesting stories
to tell about the fate of religion in the West than that of its inevitable
decline. ese other stories address the changing shapes of religion
among the remaining faithful, and the younger generations among
them in particular (e.g., Achterberg et al., 2009).
To gain insight into religion’s changing character in the contem-
porary West, this article discusses contemporary religious discourses
and practices among youngsters in the Netherlands, where the Chris-
tian churches have lost even more of their former appeal and legiti-
macy than almost anywhere else in the Western world. Substantially,
we address New Age spirituality, Evangelicalism and Islam, the three
most popular, vital and visible strains of religion among contempo-
rary Dutch youth. e three are nowadays not only embraced much
more enthusiastically by the younger generations than any other type
of religion, but moreover attain some striking features in their hands
that serve to set them apart from the traditional types of church-based
or mosque-based religion embraced by older generations of faithful.
Research has indicated that in the Netherlands and most other
Western countries post-Christian spiritualities of life (‘New Age’) are
more popular among the younger generations than among the elderly
(Houtman and Aupers, 2007; Houtman and Mascini, 2002), while
in Christian circles Evangelicalism is the single type of religion that
today manages to arouse great enthusiasm among the young (Roeland,
2009). Although, needless to say, Evangelicalism is quite distinct from
Roeland, Johan, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, Martijn de Koning and Ineke Noomen. "The Quest For
Religious Purity In New Age, Evangelicalism And Islam Religious Renditions Of Dutch Youth And The
Luckmann Legacy." Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion: Volume 1: Youth and Religion. Ed. G.
Giordan. Brill, 2010, pp. 289-306
290 .
New Age spirituality and sets itself decidedly apart from it, we will see
that there are nevertheless striking resemblances between the two that
account for their popularity among the young. Likewise, the Islamic
discourses and practices found among particularly Moroccan-Dutch
youngsters, in particular those involved in Sala networks, dier strik-
ingly from these of their parents and equally strikingly resemble what
we nd among New Agers and Evangelicals.
From a theoretical point of view, the common features New Age,
Evangelicalism, and Islam attain in the hands of contemporary Dutch
youngsters highlight some major weaknesses in omas Luckmann’s
(1967) classical account of modern religion as radically privatized.
is is not without signicance, because his e Invisible Religion is
arguably the most important book in sociology of religion since World
War II and has shaped sociology of religion more than any other book
during the last four decades.
Luckmann’s main argument is that, although structural dierentia-
tion in modern society inevitably results in an erosion of the Christian
monopoly, this does not simply mean the end of religion. Instead, he
maintains, a ‘market of ultimate signicance’ emerges, where religious
consumers shop for strictly personal packages of meaning that remain
without wider social and public signicance. Ever since the appear-
ance of Luckmann’s book, accounts of modern religion as radically
privatized, fragmented and socially and publicly insignicant have
almost attained the status of sociological truisms. Modern religion has
hence endlessly been understood as ‘almost an exclusively psychologi-
cal phenomenon, with very limited and indirect social consequence’,
as Besecke (2005: 187) rightly points out, adding that ‘Luckmann’s
characterization of contemporary religion as privatized is pivotal in
the sociology of religion; it has been picked up by just about everyone
and challenged by almost no one’ (Ibid.: 186). We demonstrate in this
paper, however, that this is not at all what we nd among young Dutch
New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims: their religion is neither ephem-
eral and supercial (section 2), nor socially unorganized (section 3),
nor publicly insignicant (section 4).
Luckmann’s book is hence just as much to be praised for its much-
needed widening of sociology of religion’s scope beyond the study
of rmly institutionalized Christian religion (Aupers and Houtman,
2009) as it is to be blamed for the relentless portrayal of modern reli-
gion as ‘socially insignicant’, ‘uncommitted’, and ‘strictly personal’.
Indeed, we will argue in this paper that the Luckmann legacy may have
291
blinded sociologists of religion to processes of religious revitalization
and rejuvenation that are taking place right before their eyes in West-
ern countries like the Netherlands. Although, needless to say, much
more research is needed to draw up a fair balance of the empirical
correctness of the Luckmann legacy, we underscore that what follows
is based on years of empirical research in each of the three religious
subcultures in the Netherlands (e.g., Aupers, 2004; Aupers and Hout-
man, 2006; Bartels and De Koning, 2006; De Koning, 2008a; Houtman
and Aupers, 2007; Houtman and Mascini, 2002; Noomen et al., 2006;
Roeland, 2008, 2009).
Religious Privatization or Religious Purication?
New Age Spirituality: ‘Eternal Spiritual Wisdom’
Ever since the appearance of Luckmann’s book New Age spirituality
has been understood as, the best example of a modern type of reli-
gion that constitutes nothing more than an incoherent collection of
strictly personal spiritual ideas and practices. Participants in the spiri-
tual milieu, it has been repeated again and again, tend to draw upon
multiple traditions, styles and ideas simultaneously, combining these
into idiosyncratic packages. New Age has thus been understood as a
‘consumer religion par excellence’ (Possamai, 2005: 49), ‘pick-and-mix
religion’ (Hamilton, 2000), ‘do-it-yourself religion’ (Baerveldt, 1996)
or a ‘spiritual supermarket’ (Lyon, 2000). Every single person in the
spiritual milieu, Possamai maintains, constructs a ‘subjective myth’ and
it is as if ‘every human being should have his own paradigm’ (2005:
57) , while Steve Bruce (2002: 99) characterized New Age as a ‘diuse
religion’, noting that ‘there is no (. . .) power in the cultic milieu to
override individual preferences’.
ese relentless portrayals of New Age spirituality as religiously
incoherent blatantly miss the shared and undisputed discourse of
‘self-spirituality’ in the holistic milieu, a discourse that paradoxically
demands and hence produces these omnipresent practices of individ-
ual bricolage. Ironically, then, these practices stem from a shared and
morally binding religious discourse that insists that one should ‘follow
one’s personal path’ and ‘listen to one’s inner voice’, rather than ‘prov-
ing’ its non-existence (Aupers and Houtman, 2006). is uncontested
discourse of ‘self-spirituality’ postulates that the sacred cannot be
found ‘out there’, like the transcendent personal God of Christianity
292 .
or Islam, but rather ‘in here’ (Heelas and Houtman, 2009). In Heelas’
(1996: 19) words: ‘[. . .] the most pervasive and signicant aspect of the
lingua franca of the New Age is that the person is, in essence, spiritual.
To experience the ‘Self’ itself is to experience ‘God’, ‘the Goddess’,
the ‘Source’, ‘Christ Consciousness’, the ‘inner child’, the ‘way of the
heart’, or, most simply and [. . .] most frequently, ‘inner spirituality’’
(emphasis in original). Put crudely, then, New Agers believe that peo-
ple do not have one, but two selves: they contrast a ‘mundane’, ‘con-
ventional’, ‘unnatural’ or ‘socialized’ self, demonized as the ‘false’ or
‘unreal’ product of society and its institutions, with a ‘higher’, ‘deeper’,
‘true’, ‘natural’, ‘authentic’ or ‘spiritual’ self.
is spiritual self is conceived as laying hidden behind, beyond, or
underneath the mundane self, residing in the deeper emotional lay-
ers of consciousness and understood as representing the person one
‘really’ or ‘at deepest’ is. It is believed to be intimately tied up with a
universal power, life force or energy (mostly referred to as ‘ki’ or ‘chi’)
that holistically permeates and connects ‘all’, that is, nature, society,
and the cosmos. One’s feelings, intuitions, and experiences are under-
stood as emanations of this spiritual self, so that acting according to
them is understood as connecting to this whole. According to New
Agers, one should hence ‘follow one’s heart’: do what ‘feels good’ and
refrain from what ‘feels bad’. ‘e basic idea’, again in Paul Heelas’
words (1996: 23), ‘is that what lies within—experienced by way of
‘intuition’, ‘alignment’ or an ‘inner voice’—serves to inform the judg-
ments, decisions and choices required for everyday life’. In New Age
spirituality, in short, taking one’s personal feelings and intuitions seri-
ously is conceived as bringing life into line with who one ‘essentially’
or ‘at deepest’ is, and consequently as connecting to ‘all that exists’ (see
also Hanegraa, 1996).
is New Age discourse understands established religious tradi-
tions as awed and alienating renditions of this eternal spiritual truth,
because these have buried the latter under layers of dogma and doc-
trine, imposed upon the laity by powerful and dogmatic priesthoods.
Religious traditions are as such not rejected tout court, but rather seen
as placing too much emphasis on ritual conformity and institutional
side issues, while ‘deep down’ they all refer to this same eternal and
universal spiritual wisdom. In eect, New Age understands established
religious traditions and institutions as alienating and misleading to
the extent that they dene themselves as conicting with and superior
to one another. ey are seen as ‘manmade’ and hence ‘articial’ and
293
‘inauthentic’ corruptions that have subordinated the eternal spiritual
wisdom to institutional interests (Hanegraa 1996: 325). Practices
of individual bricolage are hence rooted in the so-called philosophia
perennis or ‘perennial philosophy’ that stems from Western esoteri-
cism and maintains that ‘there are many paths, but just one truth’.
Evangelicalism: ‘Going One’s Own Way with God’
Something similar goes for Protestant Evangelicalism. e conviction
that faith is primarily and eventually exclusively about the ‘heart of
the believer’, i.e., about personal commitment rather than mere con-
formity to religious institutions, of course is and always has been a
decisive feature of Protestantism. Although this emphasis on the heart
of the believer has not prevented Protestantism from accepting all
sorts of mediations between God and the individual, the conscious-
ness and faith of the ‘single individual’ (Weber 2002[1930]: 60) and
his or her immediate and unmediated relationship to God have always
constituted Protestantism’s single locus of practice and belief, in eect
downplaying the relevance of supra-individual mediations and insti-
tutions (Keane, 2007). Evangelicalism, embraced enthusiastically by
many young Dutch Protestants today, epitomizes and radicalizes this
decisive feature of Protestantism (Roeland, 2009).
Contemporary Dutch Evangelicalism emphasizes the individual
believer’s personal relationship with God as the core of faith, not infre-
quently as a reaction to a rmly institutionalized Protestantism that is
held to be too much preoccupied with the organization of the church
or the righteousness of dogma. Much like New Agers, Evangelicals
hence feature a Jamesian aversion to—or, at the very least, relativiza-
tion of—the ecclesiastical organization of faith. ‘It is all’, to quote a
respondent from Roeland’s (2009) study of Evangelical youngsters in
the Netherlands, ‘about your personal life. It is not about the church
you attend. It is all about your personal relationship with God. Your
personal relationship with Jesus. Your personal relationship with the
Holy Spirit.’ is young man exemplies the Evangelical conviction
that church authorities and dogmas are subordinated to the individual
believer’s faith and his or her personal relationship with God. Faith is,
to quote another respondent, primarily about ‘going one’s own way
with God’ and the compass to guide one on one’s path is found in
one’s personal feelings and experiences rather than in the authority of
the church and its religious doctrines.
294 .
Contemporary Dutch Evangelicalism pushes the typically Protestant
impetus towards the ‘purication’ of religion to its limits, spawning a
radical religious individualism, i.e., an authentication of unmediated,
experiential faith and a primacy of the epistemological principle of
the authority of the self (Campbell, 2007: 344 ; Van Harskamp, 2000;
Versteeg, 2009). Given this emphasis on personal feelings and experi-
ences it is hardly surprising that spokesmen (spokeswomen can hardly
be found in these circles) of more traditional and conservative strains
of churched Protestantism point out Evangelicalism’s resemblance to
the type of New Age spirituality discussed above. ey observe that
Evangelicalism, just like New Age, encourages practices of ‘bricolage’
and ‘pick ‘n’ choose religion’ and lament its detrimental consequences,
particularly the erosion of church authority and dogma. e conser-
vative Protestant theologian Horton, for instance, was quoted in the
Dutch orthodox Protestant newspaper Het Reformatorisch Dagblad
(January 9, 2008) as saying that he considered Evangelicals ‘religious
zappers’, who ‘compose their own religious cocktail, which is drenched
by emotionalism’. Orthodox observers like Horton hence suggest that
the Evangelical search for authentic and puried faith ends up in mere
hyper-individual subjective preferences (Cotton, 1995), similar to the
portrayal of New Age as radically fragmented and individualized in
the sociological literature.
A Quest for Pure Islam
Contemporary renditions of Islam as found among Moroccan-Dutch
youth feature a similar quest for religious purity beyond established
Islamic traditions and institutions. Already from the 1990s onwards,
researchers have witnessed an increasing salience of Muslim iden-
tity and Islam among Moroccan-Dutch youth (e.g., Bartelink, 1994;
Buitelaar, 2002; Phalet, Lotringen, and Entzinger, 2000; Sunier, 1996),
understood back then as an attempt to escape the impossible choice
between ‘being Moroccan’ and ‘being Dutch’ (De Koning, 2008a;
Entzinger and Dourleijn, 2006; Ketner, 2008). is strategy backred
however when aer ‘9/11’ the focus of media and politics shied to
Islam and Muslims and their alleged lack of loyalty, and even threat, to
Dutch society (Vliegenthart, 2007). Since then, Islam has increasingly
been portrayed as prone to terrorism, intolerance, and oppression of
women, and Moroccan-Dutch youth feel that they have come to be
treated less willingly by the native Dutch. is situation only aggra-
295
vated aer Pim Fortuyn’s election campaign and subsequent assassina-
tion in 2002; public statements by critics of Islam like Ayaan Hirsi Ali,
eo van Gogh, and Geert Wilders; the release of Hirsi Ali’s anti-Islam
movie Submission in 2004 and nally the murder of Van Gogh in that
same year.
In short, Moroccan-Dutch youth have increasingly come to expe-
rience the Dutch Islam debate as a struggle against their religion,
which forces them to once again make an impossible choice—this
time between ‘being Muslim’ and ‘being Dutch’. is has made them
increasingly self-conscious about their religious identity and has drawn
them into debates about ‘what Islam really says’ about, for instance,
violent attacks against non-believers, homosexuality, the position of
women, living as a Muslim in a non-Islamic country, and so on. In
this context, the Islam of their parents has lost its ‘self-evidence’ and
‘naturalness’ and their own Islamic identities are increasingly actively
constructed and negotiated. is applies to girls in particular, because
much more than boys they nd their behavior and attire scrutinized
by other Dutch Moroccans and the native Dutch alike. ey challenge
the latter’s stereotypes of ‘oppressed Muslim women’ and criticize the
gender inequalities they experience in their relations with the former.
More than anything else, the increased salience of Islamic identi-
ties among Dutch Muslim youth has spawned a quest for ‘real’ or
‘true’ Islam, understood as more ‘pure’ than the compromised and
particularistic Islam preached in most Dutch mosques. e latter is
understood as diluting the message of ‘true’ Islam in such a way that
it ‘oends neither God nor the West’, thus compromising ‘true’ Islam
by selling out in exchange for nancial subsidies or mere approval of
the Dutch authorities. Dierences between various strains of Islam in
the Netherlands, a consequence of immigration from various Islamic
countries (particularly Morocco and Turkey) and regions with distinct
cultural and religious traditions, undermine the plausibility and legiti-
macy of each of these even further. If young Muslims nd out from
their classmates that, for instance, ‘Moroccan Islam’ diers in crucial
ways from ‘Turkish Islam’, it becomes quite clear to them that these
cannot both claim to represent ‘true Islam’.
Precisely this awareness sparks a desire to separate truth from falsity
that results in a process of religious ‘purication’ that is not unlike
what we nd among New Agers and Evangelicals. Because the estab-
lished traditions and institutions are dierent among themselves, they
come to be understood as shaped by historically grown traditions
296 .
and/or (in the case of Islam) national cultures, and hence as ‘false’
and ‘inauthentic’. In the case of Islam, this spawns strongly felt needs
among Moroccan-Dutch youth to disentangle national culture and
Islam, resulting in an ongoing purication of their cultural repertoires.
Needless to say, this quest for ‘pure’ Islam is accompanied by major
debates and conicts about who interprets Islam ‘correctly’ and hence
represents ‘the truth’—particularly between youth on the one hand
and their parents and, more generally, the older generation of Dutch
Muslims, on the other (De Koning, 2008a).
is search for ‘true’ and ‘pure’ Islam is particularly salient among
those who adhere to Salasm, an Islamic purication movement that
has been active throughout the ages. It stresses the doctrine of the
unity and uniqueness of God, or tawhid, as its main tenet and claims
that the golden period of Islam ended aer the rst three generations
of Muslims (around 810 AD), referred to as the ‘pious forefathers’
(al-salaf al-salih) (Meijer, 2009). e Sala movement wants to revital-
ize Islam on the basis of an idealized and homogenized understanding
of Islam as it existed in its early years, aiming to cleanse its contempo-
rary manifestations from allegedly non-Islamic accretions like Susm,
Shi’a Islam, and local practices and doctrines held to have diluted and
sullied its true message (Meijer, 2009). e Sala movement is nowa-
days decidedly transnational, consists of local and global branches,
and is characterized by a network structure. Although Sala networks
all share the doctrine of the unity and uniqueness of God, they dier
widely in their strategies that may, depending on local circumstances,
range from quietist to political and sometimes violent activities of
da’wa—mission—and jihad (De Koning, 2009b).
Not unlike what we have seen for New Age and Evangelicalism,
many elderly rst-generation Dutch Muslims accuse their Salast o-
spring of creating massively individualized renditions of Islam through
copy-pasting texts from Islamic scholars and the Quran, and sometimes
also secular political ideologies. ey regard the resulting pastiches as
outcomes of a fatal combination of all-too-easy Internet access (and
hence access to a world of sources), ignorance about Islamic tradi-
tions, and emotional outrage about local and global Muslim predica-
ments. National Muslim organizations (Nederlandse Moslim Raad,
2007), intelligence and security services (AIVD, 2006) and research-
ers (Meijer, 2006) nonetheless understand these youthful practices of
copy-pasting as creating a dangerously radicalized Islam.
297
Although the quest for ‘pure’ Islam is not restricted to the Salast
movement, the latter has been the most successful in attracting Dutch
Muslim youth, Moroccan-Dutch in particular. is is because the
Salast movement not only teaches its doctrines and practices, but also
carves out a social space where Muslim youth can feel accepted and
can express, nurture and enhance their faith (imaan), which is under-
stood as being endangered by secular Western society. Participants of
the movement typically conceive of their identities in terms of a con-
version from ‘sleeping Muslims’ to ‘returning to Islam’, with Salasm
oering the latter in its ‘real’, ‘authentic’, and ‘unpolluted’ form.
Religious Purity beyond Traditions and Institutions
Young New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims all feature a critical
stance vis-à-vis established religious traditions and institutions. ey
understand these as ‘manmade’ and hence ‘articial’ and ‘inauthentic’
renditions of a ‘pure’ and ‘eternal’ religious or spiritual truth. New
Agers embrace the perennialist understanding that all religious tra-
ditions are essentially perverted and distorted versions of the eternal
spiritual wisdom that can be found within the self; young Evangeli-
cals want to go beyond the church and its dogmas to establish a per-
sonal and unmediated relationship with God; young Salast Muslims,
nally, are critical of the culturalized religions of their parents and aim
to return to ‘pure’ Islam.
It is clear that these religious purication processes do not entail the
strictly personal, ephemeral, uncommitted, and supercial religiosities
emphasized in the Luckmann legacy. ey do, aer all, not so much
entail moves away from established religious traditions and institu-
tions to less committing positions, but rather moves beyond these to
more committing ones. ey entail, in other words, a search for eternal
and solidly grounded religious truths that lie beyond the awed and
particularistic institutions and traditions in the real world. is is not
a postmodern ight to the surface (Jameson, 1991; Possamai, 2005),
but a quest for ‘solid’, ‘deep’ and ‘real’ foundations in a world ruined
by religious complacency and shilessness.
298 .
Sociality beyond Church and Mosque
Introduction
e second major assumption of Luckmann’s e Invisible Religion is
that contemporary religion lacks social organization. e implicit point
of reference here is, of course, the Christian church with its strong
social grip on its members. Aer the loss of the Christian monopoly
in the West, Luckmann maintains, institutionalized Christianity made
way for an open spiritual marketplace in which individuals could seek
for spiritual meaning. Just like Luckmann’s assumption of contempo-
rary religion as ephemeral and fragmented, this dichotomy between
‘thick’ and ‘greedy’ religious institutions that sustain social cohesion
on the one hand and freely roaming and socially disembedded individ-
uals on the other is also taken for granted in much of the literature.
Networked Sociality
Notwithstanding their aversion to particularistic religious traditions
and ‘thick’ religious institutions, however, the spiritual and religious
quests of young New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims are certainly
not socially detached ones. New Agers, for instance, relentlessly seek
for spiritual inspiration at festivals that are the Dutch equivalents of
better-known international ones like Body-Mind-Spirit (United King-
dom) or Burning Man (United States); they visit spiritual centers
(Aupers, 2005), of which Glastonbury (Scotland) is the internation-
ally best-known example; they participate in discussion groups about
New Age bestsellers like e Celestine Prophecy or e Secret; and they
participate in group trainings and courses where they intimately sup-
port one another and experience ‘inner spirituality’ in a, quite literally,
collective embrace. In a similar vein, young Evangelicals visit musical
events and large festivals in the Netherlands, where they sing, dance,
praise the lord and experience ‘togetherness’, ‘sociality’ and ‘collec-
tive eervescence’ in a truly Durkheimian fashion. And although the
search for ‘pure’ Islam leads young Muslims away from the mosques
and imams of their parents, it simultaneously reunites them into all
sorts of discussion groups, loosely-knit networks and online commu-
nities on the Internet, as well as in lecture circles and Islamic courses
in people’s homes (De Koning, 2008a, 2009b).
In contemporary Dutch religion we are hence not so much witness-
ing the withering away of the social, as the Luckmann legacy suggests,
299
but rather the radical transformation of its organizational forms (cf.
Maesoli, 1996). Young New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims are
connected through and embedded in networked forms of sociality.
ey are all three particularly strongly present as virtual communi-
ties on the Internet and New Agers (neo-pagans in particular) were
even among the ‘rst religious subcultures to colonize cyberspace’
(Davis, 1998: 184). In these online communities they exchange infor-
mation, shape and re-arm their pagan identities and even perform
collective online rituals (e.g., Noomen et al., 2006; Penzack, 2001;
Radde-Antweiler, 2006). Some of them even consider the Internet
their ‘church—in lack of a better word’ (Nightmare, 2001). Likewise,
Evangelicals and Muslims (Becker, 2008; Benschop, 2005; De Koning,
2008b) use web forums and chat groups to exchange ideas, to ‘bond’
and ‘bridge’ and to express and re-arm their religious identities.
e Internet provides young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals and
Muslims the opportunity to immerse themselves in social networks
without losing their personal freedom, in short. As one of the pagan
respondents of Macha Nightmare (2001: 65) notes: “If I want to learn
about spirituality and have access to the Internet, I will be drawn to
choose bits from a large number of sources, rather than taking all
my information from one source. e resulting mix will be uniquely
my own, rather than something dictated by an individual tradition.”
Online networked types of sociality hence do not entail the strict social
obligations of traditional communities. ey are of a more voluntary
nature and people can easily join in and leave as they wish. It is up
to individual believers to decide on the degree and nature of their
engagement; one may stick to a particular chat room and become a
loyal visitor, or may visit it only occasionally while surng the web.
Although these ‘light’ organizational forms clearly dier markedly
from rmly organized churches and mosques, it is equally clear that
they contradict the notion that contemporary religion outside the
boundaries of these established institutions entails nothing more than
individuals who ‘do their own thing’ in splendid isolation of like-
minded others (Besecke, 2005). ese social forms are simply better
adapted to these contemporary strains of religion, that all feature a
marked aversion to established religious traditions and institutions.
Even though Evangelicalism is oen organized in churches besides
the aforementioned types of organization, these are no longer (what
Weber has called) ‘hierocratic’ organizations, i.e., bodies characterized
by a top-down, hierarchical structure and governed by authoritative
300 .
leaders with much power to control the community of believers. And
even though the Sala movement consists of several competing, and
sometimes even plainly hostile, networks characterized by ssion and
fusion, each of these nonetheless features striking ideals of friendship,
brotherhood and sisterhood (De Koning, 2009a). Contemporary quests
for religious purity are, in short, no tragically isolated and privatized
activities on a ‘market of ultimate signicance’.
e networked sociality that constitutes the major social shape of
religion among Dutch religious youth is easily overlooked by sociolo-
gists of religion, because it transcends the dichotomy between ‘thick’
and ‘greedy’ religious institutions on the one hand and self-contained
and socially disembedded individuals on the other—a dichotomy that
is not only central to Luckmann’s classical analysis, but also to much of
classical and modern sociology in general (Maesoli, 1996). We hence
conclude with Besecke (2005) that beyond this increasingly inappli-
cable dichotomy, there are vibrant social conversations about religion
and spirituality going on that need to be taken much more seriously
than sociologists of religion have typically done in the past.
Pure Religion’s Social and Public Signicance
e third claim that undergirds Luckmann’s privatization thesis is
that modern religion remains rmly embedded in the private domain
and hence lacks social and public signicance (see also Bruce, 2002;
Wilson, 1976). Again, this is not what we nd among young Dutch
New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims. Although they no longer con-
sider the demands made by particularistic religious traditions and
their institutions legitimate, so that these have lost their ability to
guide them in deciding the type of lives they need to live, this does not
mean that religion tout court has lost its ability to do so. Indeed, for
the new religious purists, the ethical demands made by ‘pure’ religion
or spirituality have replaced these made by fossilized traditions and
institutions, motivating them even more than the latter to live their
lives according to these. Entailing a revitalization and rejuvenation of
religion, religious purication hence endows religion with new and
increased moral fervor.
is is even the case with New Age, allegedly the most privatized and
least socially signicant religion of the three cases under study (e.g.,
Bruce, 2002). e demand of being true to the inner self, of taking
301
one’s feelings, emotions, and intuitions seriously, means aer all that
basically everything—from sexuality to work—attains spiritual mean-
ing and signicance, making this type of religion even more dicult to
expel from the public domain than traditional churched Christianity.
“Indeed there would seem to be no activity, no matter how prosaic,
whether it be gardening, ower arranging, or even shopping, that is
not now being presented [. . .] as if it were also a spiritual exercise,
something capable of leading to self-discovery and personal growth”,
Colin Campbell rightly notes (2007: 37). e social and public signi-
cance of New Age spirituality that results from such an ‘essentially
spiritual approach to life’ (Ibid.: 38) is particularly visible in the major
role it has meanwhile come to play in the worlds of human resource
management and business leadership (Aupers and Houtman, 2006;
Costea et al., 2007).
e same goes for Evangelicalism: the experience of God’s con-
tinuous presence in one’s personal life spawns a strongly felt need
to let Him guide one in all of one’s life—in socializing with others,
in selecting a spouse, in making choices in one’s education or pro-
fessional career, etcetera (Roeland, 2009). Much of Evangelicalism’s
increased visibility and vitality in the Dutch religious landscape takes
the shape of a call for re-establishing religion as a moral resource for
politics. Indeed, a recent analysis of Dutch survey data covering the
period 1970–1996 demonstrates that while the number of Christians
has declined steadily in this country, this process has coincided with
a strengthening of the call for religious de-privatization and hence a
larger role for religion in politics (Achterberg et al., 2009). Although it
yet needs to be demonstrated that the latter trend is due to the Evan-
gelicalism found among young Protestants, the latter are clearly much
less likely than other and older Christians to accept the ‘secularist
truce’—the secularist contract that guarantees religious freedom, yet
bans religion from the public sphere by relegating it to the private
realm (see also Taylor, 2007).
e young generation of Moroccan-Dutch Muslims, nally, is also
much more occupied with their religious identity than the older gen-
erations. eir quest for a puried Islam motivates them, too, to color
more and more aspects of their private and public lives with their
newly found pure Islam. It is a mere commonplace that Salasm in
particular asserts the public relevance of ‘true’ Islam for law and poli-
tics in western societies. Although most Sala networks were quietist
until 2000, they meanwhile feature prominently in the media and in
302 .
political debates about Islam and radicalization. While the ongoing
Dutch Islam debate has almost by denition turned Islam into a pub-
lic religion by making every single articulation of Islam a matter of
public debate (Buijs, 2009; Buitelaar, 2008; De Koning, 2008a; Vliegen-
thart, 2007), the quest for ‘pure’ Islam in particular troubles opinion
leaders who regard it as invariably radical, violent and intolerant (e.g.,
Hirsi Ali, 2007). As the principal targets of these critiques, Sala orga-
nizations have been further stimulated to defend themselves against
these charges by secular and anti-Islamic critics and to speak out for
instance, about proposals to ban the face veil (niqab) or about Dutch
foreign policies (De Koning, 2009b).
If we understand secularization in classical Weberian terms, i.e.,
as a decline of the inuence of religious worldviews on social action
(Chaves, 1994), we must conclude that the purication of religion
invokes processes of de-secularization—processes that contradict the
claim that contemporary religion remains rmly embedded in the
private domain and lacks social and public signicance. e puried
religious worldviews of young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals and
Muslims are aer all highly salient to them and as such motivate them
to make major eorts to live their private and public lives accordingly.
Religious purication, in short, works against religious privatization
by spawning processes of de-secularization and de-privatization.
Conclusion: In Search of Religious Purity
Aer their path-breaking joint book e Social Construction of Reality
(1966), Peter Berger and omas Luckmann went dierent ways in the
sociological study of religion with e Sacred Canopy (Berger, 1967)
and e Invisible Religion (Luckmann, 1967). While they agreed about
the erosion of the Christian monopoly and the concomitant emer-
gence of religious pluralism, they disagreed about the latter’s implica-
tions for the future of religion. Berger heralded the coming of a secular
age and Luckmann expected merely religious change. According to
Berger, who assumed that the existence of competing or even incom-
patible religious truth claims would undermine the plausibility of each
of the competitors, religious pluralism would result in secularization.
According to Luckmann, as explained above, religion does not—and
indeed cannot—disappear, though it does disappear from the public
domain and become privatized.
303
While our research among young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals
and Muslims conrms that rmly institutionalized particularistic reli-
gious traditions have become less plausible and legitimate, it also sug-
gests that both Berger’s and Luckmann’s ideas about the consequences
of this circumstance for the future of religion are awed. Among reli-
gious Dutch youth, religious pluralism aer all invokes neither radi-
cally privatized, ephemeral, uncommitted, and supercial religiosities
(Luckmann), nor a full-out collapse of religious faith and a transition
to secularism (Berger). Rather than a ight away from religious tradi-
tions and institutions towards either socially uncommitted ‘consumer
religions’ (Luckmann) or a secularist outlook (Berger), we nd zealous
quests for ‘real’ and ‘pure’ religious truths that are solidly founded
beyond the existing range of ‘implausible’ and ‘inauthentic’ religious
traditions and institutions.
It is particularly striking to nd that contemporary religious move-
ments as far apart as New Age and Islamic Salasm have this hunt for
‘real’ or ‘pure’ religion in common. e two have aer all oen been
portrayed as diametrically opposed extremes on a continuum rang-
ing from respectively socially uncommitted relativism and individual-
ism to blindly committed absolutism and collectivism (e.g., Bauman,
1997). And although there is no doubt that they are in many ways
radically dierent, they are nonetheless basically identical in their
understanding of historically grown and manmade religious tradi-
tions and institutions. ey both conceive of the latter as degenerated,
diluted and distorted renditions of the ‘real’ religious truth, which has
become buried under institutional side issues, and hence as awed,
corrupted and perverted excuses for the original, imposed upon the
laity by corrupted regimes and priesthoods that are more interested
in power than in religious piety and purity.
Despite his classical analysis of the progressive disenchantment
of the world, the resulting processes of religious purication in New
Age, Evangelicalism and Islam alike are consistent with Max Weber’s
(1963[1922]) sociology of religion, in particular his ideas about ‘cul-
tural rationalization’ (Campbell, 2007). Weber’s sociology of religion
aer all assumes a universal human need of giving meaning to an
essentially meaningless world and is hence based on a conception
of culture as ‘the endowment of a nite segment of the meaningless
innity of events in the world with meaning and signicance from the
standpoint of human beings’ (Schroeder, quoted by Campbell 2007:
11). If religion loses its plausibility, it is hence not simply discarded,
304 .
but a process of religious reconstruction is sparked so as to regain
lost religious plausibility (Campbell, 2007). Such a process of ‘ratio-
nalization’ is precisely what we nd in progress among young New
Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims in the Netherlands. Exactly because
today’s religiously pluralist world embarrassingly exposes the particu-
larisms of a wide range of Islamic, Christian and other religious tradi-
tions and institutions, these lose their binding power, as Berger (1967)
and Luckmann (1967) were both right to emphasize. is does how-
ever not produce a turn away from religious committedness, but rather
a zealous hunt for ‘real’ religious truth in New Age, Evangelicalism
and Islam alike, whatever the further dierences between the three
may be.
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