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... Education and religion are the most commonly examined aspects of social status in the attitude transmission literature. Individuals with higher education have been found to have less traditional family attitudes (Gelissen, 2003;Vollebergh et al., 2001) and less traditional attitudes toward gender roles (Moen et al., 1997). The difference is explained by the different living conditions and opportunities of people with different backgrounds (Gans & Silverstein, 2006). ...
... The difference is explained by the different living conditions and opportunities of people with different backgrounds (Gans & Silverstein, 2006). Religious people have been found to have more traditional attitudes on family and gender issues than nonreligious people (Cunningham & Thornton, 2005;Gelissen, 2003;Thornton et al., 1983). ...
... Axinn and Thornton (1996) found that girls are more likely to express prodivorce views. The same has been shown with the data of European Value Studies for women and men (Gelissen, 2003). However, in an earlier study, Thornton (1985) found no differences in the acceptance of divorce between boys and girls. ...
Previous studies have shown that family attitudes tend to be transmitted across generations; however, less is known about the process of value socialization within a family. This study examines attitudes toward divorce in Estonia across 2 generations: children of both sexes (14–17 years old) and their mothers. The results indicate some divorce attitude transmission from mothers to daughters but not to sons. These findings also suggest that the relationship between children and parents has a significant influence on the perception of divorce by children and on how children cope with family dissolution.
... Finally, we consider the national context, which refers to the country one lives in. The national context constitutes a general cultural setting that affects individuals' attitudes, including permissiveness toward divorce (Gelissen, 2003). By using data from the latest wave of the European Values Study (EVS), we are able to explore an unprecedented number of 44 European countries that greatly vary in the level of divorce experience. ...
... This implies that high levels of acceptance of divorce facilitate autonomous decisions regarding union dissolution, as couples who decide to divorce will face relatively low levels of ostracism in society. Previous research has shown that levels of acceptance of divorce have increased in Europe (Gelissen, 2003;Kalmijn, 2010), and this development has gone hand-in-hand with a substantial increase in divorce rates since the 1960s (Eurostat, 2011). As mentioned, personal divorce is positively related to pro-divorce attitudes, suggesting that rising divorce rates will lead to higher levels of permissiveness. ...
... If divorces are more common in one's country, people may-again through observation-learn that divorce is a legitimate way out of an unsatisfying marriage. Gelissen (2003) indeed observed that when a country's divorce rate is higher, people are more tolerant toward divorce. We therefore predict that: ...
In this study, we assess whether divorce experiences in three social contexts shape individual’s permissiveness toward divorce.
Using European Values Study data from 44 countries, we find that—net of personal divorce experience—parental divorce before
the age of 18 (socialization context); parental divorce after the age of 18, divorce of child, and divorce of relatives (context
in adult life); and country’s divorce rate (national context) are related to more permissiveness toward divorce. Value climates
in these three contexts clearly mediate the relationships between experiences and attitudes, but parental divorce before the
age of 18, divorce of child, and divorce of relatives still are independently and positively related to permissiveness toward
divorce. These findings suggest that divorce experiences affect pro-divorce attitudes on top of prevailing value climates
in social contexts that are relatively close to the individual. Finally, robustness tests show that personal divorce is not
only an important determinant of pro-divorce attitudes, the role played by divorce experiences in the three contexts also
depends on being divorced or not. Moreover, singles are more strongly affected by their surrounding contexts than people with
a stable relationship.
... Both American and European studies have examined trends in divorce attitudes (Thornton 1985; Van den Akker, Halman, and De Moor 1994;Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001;Liefbroer and Fokkema 2008). In addition, studies have examined individual determinants of divorce attitudes (e.g., Thornton 1985;Trent and South 1992;Martin and Parashar 2006), and to a lesser extent also cross-national determinants (Gelissen 2003;Toth and Kemmelmeier 2009). Such research is relevant, not only because attitudes influence behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975;Fishbein 1977, 1980), but also because widespread negative attitudes may lead to stigmatization of divorcees (Kalmijn and Uunk 2007;Kalmijn 2010). ...
... Of the relatively few studies that tried to explain crossnational value differences (Hofstede 1980;Gundelach 1994;Halman 1995;Inglehart 1997;Inglehart and Baker 2000;Toth and Kemmelmeier 2009), almost all are macrolevel studies that related aggregated data on attitudes to aggregate-level country characteristics. Gelissen (2003) constitutes an important exception, as he performed a thorough multilevel analysis of the cross-national determinants of attitudes towards divorce in Europe. As do most studies, though, his research focused on attitudes towards divorce in general rather than on attitudes towards divorce in the presence of children. ...
... Existing studies on macro-level determinants of divorce attitudes examined a number of quite different types of country-level characteristics, including welfare state typologies (Gelissen 2003), economic factors (Toth and Kemmelmeier 2009), and cultural factors (Gelissen 2003;Toth and Kemmelmeier 2009). We selected a limited set of countrylevel factors that we expect to be particularly relevant in understanding country differences in the attitudes towards divorce involving young children. ...
We examine differences across Europe in attitudes towards divorce involving young children. Our main hypothesis is that these attitudes are partly based on people’s assessment of the consequences of divorce for the children involved, and thus that these attitudes are less favourable in countries where poverty among single parent households is common than in countries where such poverty is rare. Our sample consists of 37,975 individuals from 22 countries, obtained from the European Social Survey (2006). Multilevel analyses are performed. Findings confirm our main hypothesis. Additionally, cross-level interactions indicate that poverty among single parents has the strongest impact on mothers’ divorce attitudes.
... Even though divorce and union dissolution of parents is becoming more and more common, this family form does not align with the traditional model of the two-parent family in which most current adults have grown up. The extent to which there is, and used to be, a social stigma associated with singlemother households is highly dependent on the country and social context of the family in question, as the acceptance of parental separation differs across countries, social groups, and over time (Gelissen, 2003). We argue that belonging to this non-standard family type, deviating from existing social norms, could result later in life to being less conforming and holding more liberal attitudes. ...
... Parents who separate are likely different from those who do not, therefore we control for differences between these groups. Religiosity is an important factor in attitudes toward divorce (Gelissen, 2003), and is also related to political conservatism and right-leaning political positions (Jost et al., 2009;Van der Brug, 2010). Therefore, religious socialization is included in the EVS analyses and mother's religiosity during childhood in the SHP analyses. ...
The increase in divorce rates over the past decades challenges the traditional image of the two-parent family, as new family forms are increasingly more common. Yet, the traditional view of the family has remained central to political socialization research. Therefore, we propose and empirically test a theoretical framework regarding the consequences of parental separation for processes of political socialization. While the impact of parental divorce has been studied extensively by sociologists, the political implications of this impactful life event have remained largely uncovered. We identify two mechanisms that we expect to predict more leftist political orientations in children of separated parents compared to those from intact families: experiences of economic deprivation and single-mother socialization. Multi-level analyses using the European Values Study (2008) and two-generational analyses with the Swiss Household Panel (1999–2020) support our expectations, indicating that in case of parental separation offspring tends to hold more leftist political orientations, controlling for selection into parental separation and the intergenerational transmission of political ideology. We find empirical support for mechanisms of economic deprivation and single-mother socialization across our analyses. The implications of our findings are that in the family political socialization process, offspring's political orientations are not only influenced by their parents' ideology, but also by formative experiences that result from the family structure.
... Religion, as it provides a source of more traditional family values and higher moral commitment, has been shown to exert a notable influence on marital stability (Gelissen, 2003;Call and Heaton, 1997;Hoem and Hoem, 1992). Research by Call and Heaton (1997) indicates that more frequent church attendance leads to lower risk of divorce. ...
... Earlier research, for example, found that Catholic unions were less likely to be terminated by divorce than Protestant counterparts, which was explained by the strict stand of the Catholic Church against divorce; and more recent studies report a convergence in the risk of divorce among Protestant and Catholic unions (see a review of related research by Lehrer, 1996). However, when compared to those with no religious affiliation, Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and persons belonging to other religions are found to hold less tolerant attitudes about divorce (Gelissen, 2003) and to experience lower divorce risk (de Graaf and Kalmijn, 2006). ...
The paper provides an analysis of divorce risk in first marital unions in Russia, with a major focus on the impact of premarital conception on the stability of subsequent marriage. A number of other predictors are also discussed, including age at first marriage, parity and age of the youngest child, parental divorce, place of residence, religion group and calendar period. The analysis is based on data from the Russian Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) carried out in 2004 and applies event history techniques. The results show that marriages induced by pregnancy run a higher divorce risk compared to those contracted without anticipation of childbirth.
... In other words, divorce is a process that begins with both members of the couple experiencing the emotional crisis and ends with them trying to resolve the conflict by entering a new position with new roles and lifestyles [7]. Recently, the rate of global divorce has swiftly increased due to rapid social, economic, and cultural transformation [8][9][10][11], even in religious countries with substantial social and legal obstacles for divorce such as Iran [12,13]. Sadeghi and Agadjanian [13] suggest the following: ...
Background:
The new therapeutic approach of positive psychotherapy has successfully treated severe mental disorders such as depression and mood disorders. However, existing research has not sufficiently measured the usefulness of this treatment in reducing depression and alexithymia.
Objectives:
This study thus examined the effectiveness of positive psychotherapy in reducing these two conditions in a specific population: Iranian women applying for the divorce.
Methods:
A total of 40 participants aged 20-40 with a high score in the Beck Depression Inventory and Toronto Alexithymia Questionnaire were recruited from women referred to a psychology clinic for divorce-related problems. The pretest, posttest, and follow-up were conducted with all participants, who were randomly placed in two groups: the experimental and control groups, which each consisted of 20 people. We provided eight positive psychotherapy sessions for only the experimental group.
Results:
After MANCOVA was conducted, the results showed that positive psychotherapy significantly decreased alexithymia and depression in the test population.
... An important theoretical argument in the literature is that guilt is a moral emotion, i.e., a feeling that arises from having broken a moral rule or a social norm (Tangney et al. 2007). The decision to divorce is governed by moral opinions and often disapproved of (Gelissen 2003). Although acceptance of divorce has increased, currently only 60% of the Dutch population (the population of this study) approves of divorce when parents have children under 12 (Kalmijn and Scherpenzeel 2009). ...
Guilt is believed to be a common emotion in personal relationships. Few studies, however, have examined if guilt plays a role in the divorce process. The present chapter uses unique nationally representative survey data which included questions on the extent to which parents have feelings of guilt toward their (young or adult) children (N = 3,203). By comparing married and divorced parents while controlling for an elaborate set of control variables, we describe the effect of divorce on guilt. By testing a series of variables that may moderate the divorce effect, we subsequently try to explain why divorce affects guilt. Our findings show that there are significant effects of divorce on the feelings of guilt that parents have toward their children. These effects are stronger when parents have more traditional attitudes toward family issues, in line with moral explanations of guilt. The effects are also stronger when the relationship between the child and parent is stronger, in line with explanations of guilt in terms of altruism.
... Anketna istraživanja ujedno potvrđuju da je Hrvatska pretežno konzervativno europsko društvo u kojem se održala naklonost prema tradicionalnim oblicima života u obitelji i braku (Črpić i sur., 2010.) i u kojem su stavovi o razvodu braka relativno nepovoljni (Gelissen, 2003.). Pojedini autori (Zrinščak, 2008.) ...
... Societal attitudes towards divorce and stepfamily may affect second union formation (Goldscheider and Kaufman 2006;Goldscheider, Kaufman, and Sassler 2009). In countries where divorce is uncommon, especially in more religious countries such as Italy, divorcees may be stigmatized, making them less attractive as a potential partner (Gelissen 2003;Liefbroer and Fokkema 2008;Meggiolaro and Ongaro 2008;Ivanova, Kalmijn, and Uunk 2013). Nonetheless, although the acceptance of divorce has increased slightly over time in many European countries (Liefbroer and Fokkema 2008), in some countries negative attitudes towards divorce have prevailed when children are involved (Rijken and Liefbroer 2012). ...
Background: with rising union instability across Europe, more individuals now re-enter the partner market and eventually repartner. The increase in cohabitation may also be influencing repartnering behaviour. While several studies examine individual-level characteristics related to repartnering, few take a broader view and compare repartnering levels or explore how demographic characteristics associated with repartnering differ across Europe.
Objective: we describe levels of repartnering and the characteristics of those exposed to repartnering in 11 European countries. We then examine whether the relationship between women’s demographic characteristics at union dissolution and repartnering are similar or different across countries. Given the recent increase in cohabitation, we pay particular attention to prior cohabitation and marriage, but we also compare age at first union dissolution, first union duration, and presence of children.
Methods: using the Harmonized Histories database, we apply discrete-time hazard models separately by country and to pooled cross-national data.
RESULTS: Despite large differences in levels of repartnering, in most countries we find similar associations between demographic characteristics and repartnering. First union type did not matter after controlling for age and children, except in France, where those who previously cohabited had significantly lower risks of repartnering. Age at union dissolution and presence of children are negatively associated with repartnering in almost all countries.
Conclusions: although cohabitation has increased everywhere, prior experience of a coresidential partnership outside of formal marriage makes little difference to repartnering behaviour after controls (except in France). However, regardless of country, older women and/or mothers are less likely to form second unions.
... There has been a shift in family attitudes towards more gender equality, personal fulfillment, and acceptance of non-traditional family behaviours, such as divorce (Thornton & Young-De Marco, 2001). This shift has been very uneven across the Western world and major cross-national variation in the acceptance of divorce remains (Gelissen, 2003). ...
... These national differences are associated with different levels of tolerance toward divorce. Gelissen (2003) has shown that in low-divorce countries, divorce is normatively disapproved of, whereas in northern countries, it is considered an acceptable solution to a bad marriage, even when there are children. One could argue that higher levels of acceptance will also lead to weaker social sanctions of parents and weaker stigmatisation of the children. ...
... In family sociology, such specifications are rare. A good example, though, is the explanation of cross-national differences in the public consent to divorce by Gelissen (2003). Those macro-micro hypotheses specify how a macro-variable affects the association between a social factor and the likelihood of a divorce (divorce rate) at the micro-level. ...
The aim of this article is to integrate empirical research on divorce risks in Europe and to explain the variation of empirical findings between European countries by the different levels of modernization and differences in the strength of marriage norms. We focus on the effects of premarital cohabitation, the presence of children, and the experience with parental divorce on marital stability. More than 260 studies on divorce risks could be identified, and 120 were used for further meta-analytical examinations. We show that there is considerable heterogeneity of divorce risks within as well as between countries. Explaining the variation of effect sizes between European countries, it could be shown that in countries where more rigid marriage norms prevail cohabitation has a stronger effect on marital stability than in countries where marriage norms are weaker. Furthermore, the lower the divorce barriers are, the weaker is the association between the parental divorce and the divorce risk of the offspring.
... The moral context differs between countries. In terms of the persistence of traditional values in general and the tolerance of divorce in particular, Belgium reflects a moderate position (Gelissen, 2003; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). The normative context also differs between groups within countries (e.g. ...
The aim of this article is twofold. First, we examine whether there are differences between ex-cohabiting and former married men and women in their income change after relationship dissolution. Second, we focus on differences between divorced and ex-cohabiting men and women in coping with the changed income situation after relationship dissolution. We look at two coping strategies: increasing one’s labor-market participation and finding a new partner. We look at differences in the effectiveness of applying those strategies between separated and divorced women and men. After controlling for compositional differences, there are no differences in the effectiveness of increasing the number of hours worked between divorced women and ex-cohabiting women. Divorced women gain more financially by finding a new partner than ex-cohabiting women. There are no differences between ex-cohabiting men and divorced men in effectiveness of both coping strategies.
... These differences are expressed in a number of social and cultural domains, including differences in marriage and family living. For example, in more traditional European societies, cohabitation and divorce are less common and less accepted, marriage has a higher social status, gender roles in marriage are more unequal, female labor force participation is lower, and extended family ties are stronger (Hans-Peter Blossfeld and Hakim 1997; Gelissen 2003; Kalmijn 2003; Knudsen and Waerness 2008; Reher 1998). These indicators are strongly correlated, both with each other and with the level of economic development in a country (GDP). ...
This article discusses Oppenheimer's theory on marriage timing, reviews the way this theory was received in European demography and family sociology, and develops a new test of the theory using annual panel data from 13 European countries for the period 1994-2001. Several indicators of men's economic status are used, including school enrollment, employment, type of labor contract, work experience, income, and education. Effects of these indicators are estimated for the transition to marriage and cohabitation, as well as for the transition from cohabitation to marriage. Country differences in these effects are examined as well. The evidence provides strong support for the male breadwinner hypothesis on the one hand, and for Oppenheimer's career uncertainty hypothesis on the other. However, the relevance of these hypotheses also depends on the national context, and especially on the way gender roles are divided in a society.
Global warming and environmental deterioration have had an enormous impact on the Three Rivers Region. The rise of the monastic organizations in Tibet had its social-politic factors such as the international impacts on "Green Tibetan" movement, China's foreign non-governmental organizations (FNGO) policies, and the revitalization of Tibetan Buddhism. The first Tibetan Monastic Organization (TMO) was officially registered in Golok Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (GTAP), People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2007. Since then an increasing number of TMOs in rural Tibetan areas started to take participate in conservation around the globally important Three Rivers Region, and these TMOs have begun to make an impact on environmental governance. In this paper, we chose Badma Rinto Wildlife Conservation (BWC) as the case study to obtain a better view of peoples' perceptions on the role of TMOs in conservation and development through questionnaire, semi-structured interviews and participatory observation. The study had illustrated that the conservation efforts from BWC is widely accepted from both local communities and government, and surprisingly with expectation from communities on BWC to bring greater influence in terms of future conservation and community development. Furthermore, the environmental work for conservation in Tibetan areas must be a collaborative effort among residents, Buddhist monasteries, monastic organizations, environmental NGOs, and the government.
Divorce has been increasing worldwide, even in societies where religious impediments to it are strongest. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, divorce rates have risen rapidly since the mid-1990s. In this article, we investigate the attitude and propensity of young Iranians toward divorce and relate these attitudes and propensities to structural and ideational factors. The data are drawn from a survey of 720 married people ages 15 to 29 conducted in the city of Tehran in 2014. The results show that almost half of respondents approved of divorce as a solution for marital problems and one fifth of them have high propensity to divorce. Multivariate analyses indicate that approval of and high propensity toward divorce are significantly associated with ideational factors—namely individualism, secularism, and gender egalitarian views—and structural factors—including education, wife’s employment, and household economic insecurity—even after controlling for demographic variables. We discuss the implications of these findings for the understanding of marital stability in this rapidly changing context.
Face aux profonds changements sociodémographiques qu’a connus la famille, comment les Québécoises et les Québécois perçoivent-ils la séparation des parents et ses conséquences sur l’adaptation des enfants ? Afin de répondre à ces questions, un sondage a été réalisé auprès d’un échantillon représentatif de la population québécoise ( n = 1 202). Les résultats montrent que si la famille « traditionnelle » demeure valorisée et la séparation déplorée par la majorité, la séparation apparaît comme une solution acceptable à une vie de couple malheureuse. Des analyses de regroupement mettent au jour cinq profils d’opinions distincts dont deux sont particulièrement en opposition, soit les modernistes et les traditionalistes. L’interprétation de ces profils montre que si certains Québécois considèrent qu’une séparation est une solution préférable à une union malheureuse, ce constat ne fait pas l’unanimité. Les différences sociodémographiques relevées en comparant ces regroupements fournissent certaines pistes explicatives de la diversité des postures.
By the end of World War II, less than one million Muslims were living in Western Europe. Half a century later, the number had risen to some 15 millions, and Islam has become Europe’s second largest religion (Hunter and Serfaty 2002; Lubeck 2002; Tibi 2002). Today, Muslims are a highly visible constituency in most European countries. The growing Islamic presence may exert a profound influence on both Islamic and Western cultures and identities. In comparison with other major religious traditions, Islam appears to exert a pervasive role in contemporary politics (for a review, see Moaddel 2002). An important issue therefore concerns whether this pattern will be retained in the European context, where religion and politics are mostly differentiated (Halman and Pettersson 2003; Pettersson 2003a). An equally interesting question asks whether traditional Islamic patterns for family life and gender roles will persist in the European setting, where traditional male-dominated family institutions and patriarchal structures are increasingly challenged by demands for gender equality, one-parent households, and various cohabitation arrangements (see Gelissen 2003). Value change among Muslim immigrants may also contribute to changing ethnic relations within Europe. Such value change may also have an impact on the relationships
between different generations of immigrants.
Objectives:
Studies have shown that a parental divorce has a negative effect on parent-child relations. This study examines how adult children's divorce affects the amount of contact children have with older parents, making a distinction between the effects of being single on the one hand and the effects of divorce on the other hand.
Method:
Using data on older adults in 11 European countries, I estimate within-family regression models to compare multiple adult children per parent (19,454 children aged 30-49; 10,476 parents aged 50-96). I analyze contact frequency while taking into account coresidence and distance.
Results:
When comparing single divorced children and married children, no difference in contact is observed, but divorced children are more likely to live with their parents. When comparing among children who are single, divorced children have less frequent contact with parents than never-married children. This negative divorce effect exists for sons and daughters and is found in 9 of the 11 countries.
Discussion:
The divorce of a child has a double meaning: it leads to being single, which is associated with stronger intergenerational ties, but it is also a non-normative and stressful life event, which is associated with weaker intergenerational ties.
How do children' s life course transitions affect the well-being of their parents? Using a large panel survey among parents with longitudinal information on 2 randomly chosen children, the authors analyzed the effects of children' s union formation, parenthood, and union dissolution on changes in depressive symptoms of parents. Negative effects were found for children's divorce, and positive effects were found for children's marriage and parenthood. Mothers suffered more from a child's divorce or separation than fathers. Effects depended in part on the parent's traditional family norms, pointing to a normative explanation of life course effects. Little evidence was found for explanations in terms of altruism or selfish motivations. In a more general sense, this article supports the notion of linked lives suggested by the life course perspective. This research provides stronger support for this notion than the few previous studies that have examined it.
This research examines the relationship between family structure and subjective well-being and the extent to which cultural differences across 24 countries/regions may condition that relationship. Using the 2002 ISSP data, we examine how the effects of marriage status and the presence of children on happiness and satisfaction with family life differ according to the perceived importance of marriage and parenthood in society. We find significant cross-country differences in the relationship between presence of young children and the happiness of men, and in the relationship between the marital status of women and their happiness and satisfaction with family life.
Ein intereuropäischer Vergleich familialen Wandels lässt gleichermaßen gemeinsame Trends—wie etwa den Durchbruch von Klein-
und Kleinstfamilien—als auch bedeutsame Unterschiede—etwa in Zeitpunkt und Form der Familiengründung—erkennen (vgl. Pinnelli u. a. 2001; Roussel 1992). Diese Kombination von gesamteuropäischen Entwicklungen und nationalen Differenzen ist mit der Tatsache verknüpft, dass
familialer Wandel nicht allein von sozioökonomischen Faktoren, sondern in bedeutsamer Weise auch von sozio-kulturellen Werten
und Traditionen bestimmt wird. Noch mehr als andere Lebensbereiche sind die europäischen Familienverhältnisse durch ein Nebeneinander
traditioneller und moderner Werthaltungen und Strukturmerkmale charakterisiert (vgl. Höpflinger 1997; Kuijsten 1996). Zudem haben familiale Strukturen in vielen europäischen Ländern bisher nur eine partielle Modernisierung erfahren. Damit
variiert das Ausmaß, in dem sich neue familiale und außerfamiliale Lebensformen entwickelt haben, intereuropäisch stark, namentlich
im Vergleich nord- und südeuropäischer Länder. Ein intereuropäischer Vergleich von Familienstrukturen stellt die Aussagekraft
simpler modernisierungstheoretischer Ansätze zur Erklärung familialen Wandels teilweise infrage. Gleichzeitig wird damit die
Bedeutung nationaler Entwicklungen—welche nationale Forschungsdiskussionen zu Familienfragen dominieren—relativiert.
Little is known about if and how the effect of divorce on well-being varies across societal contexts. This article uses multilevel
models for 38 developed countries to test three hypotheses about societal differences. Data are used from the European and
World Values Studies. Results show that, in most countries, the divorced have a lower level of well-being than the married,
but the magnitude of this difference varies significantly across countries, even when compositional factors are taken into
account. The results show that the effect of divorce is weaker in countries where the family is strong, in line with notions
of support. The effect of divorce also appears to be weaker when divorce is more common, which points to the role of declining
selectivity as divorce rates go up. Mixed evidence was found for the role of norms. The divorce effect is stronger in countries
that have stronger norms against divorce, but this was only found for religious persons. Together, these three factors explain
more than half of the variance in the divorce effect. Outlier analyses further indicate that the estimates of cross-level
interaction effects are sensitive to specific countries that are in the sample.
In this paper, we develop a novel way of testing the stigmatization hypothesis. The stigmatization hypothesis argues that people who break traditional norms, experience sanctions from the people that surround them. We apply this hypothesis to the case of divorce and examine whether higher normative intolerance toward divorce in the region of residence lead to declines in social contacts after divorce. To test the hypothesis, we match data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to data from the European Values Study (EVS). The ECHP data are used to model individual changes in social contacts after divorce. The EVS data are used to develop measures of individual attitudes against divorce in 65 European regions. Multilevel analyses are used to link the two, where individuals are nested in regions. The results provide partial confirmation for the stigmatization hypothesis. We first find that attitudes about divorce not only differ significantly between countries, they also differ significantly between regions within countries. Second, in regions where there is more disapproval of divorce, women experience greater declines in contacts with friends and relatives after divorce, men and women experience greater declines in neighborhood contacts, and men are more likely to end their club memberships. Third, we find that the stigmatization effect is primarily present for divorcees who did not move after divorce. Our analyses provide more direct evidence for the operation of social norms than previous studies on family behavior have done.
This article addresses historical developments in the effects of five social determinants of divorce in the Netherlands: parental socioeconomic status, educational attainment, religion, parental divorce, and having children. Employing a national survey with information about 1,356 divorces, from 6,164 marriages formed between 1942 and 1999, event-history models show that the effects of most social determinants of divorce are stable. The effects of parental socioeconomic status, religion, parental divorce, and having children have not changed over marriage cohorts. The one and only exception lies in education. The effect of education has changed from a positive effect to a negative effect. In times when divorce was uncommon, the higher educated were more likely to divorce than the lower educated. Presently, the lower educated are more likely to divorce than the higher educated. This trend confirms Goode’s long-standing but rarely tested hypothesis about the reversing effect of social class on divorce.
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