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Emotion, motivation and decision making: A feeling is for doing approach

Emotion, Motivation, and
Decision Making
A Feeling-Is-for-Doing Approach
Tilburg University
nyone who has ever made an important life decision—about a partner,
house, career, investment, and so forth—knows that intuition plays an
important role therein. Even though people may be aware of the fact
that they should make important decisions in a rational, consequential manner,
and even if they try hard to do so, the reality is that when making these choices
and decisions, people are often overwhelmed by preferences toward some of the
options that they cannot easily verbalize. For example, when buying a house, the
rst impression of the house seems to be crucial. These rst intuitive impressions
are often based on peoples initial emotional response, which does not require
extensive cognitive deliberation. If it doesnt feel right, the chances are slim that a
person acts on it. When the click is there, however, that person is easily prepared
to overspend on it. This chapter reviews some of the emotional processes that play
a role during decision processes and delineates how emotions may operate in an
intuitive manner. For more general reviews of the role of affect and emotion in
decision making, we refer the reader to Finucane, Peters, and Slovic (2003); Isen
(2000); Ketelaar (2004, 2006); Loewenstein and Lerner (2003); and Pieters and
Van Raaij (1988).
A core premise in this chapter is that emotional processes form at least part of
the intuitional component of decision making (cf. T. Betsch, chap. 1, this volume).
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We conceptualize emotions as motivational processes that prioritize certain goals
and thereby mobilize and give direction to behavior (cf., Bagozzi, Baumgartner,
Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2000; Frijda, 1988, 2006; Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries,
2007a & b). This emotional inuence may take place via conscious experience but
may also occur more or less automatically. Put differently, we argue that emotions
can implicitly activate associated goals that manifest themselves behaviorally. This
motivational part of emotional experience has been relatively understudied.
In the remainder of this chapter, we rst illuminate the nature of affect and of
emotion. Next, we argue that to understand the effect of affect on decision mak-
ing, one has to go beyond valence and study the effects of specic emotions. We
then review different approaches to studying the effects of specic emotions and
show how these relate to different elements of the emotional experience. We end
with proposing a research agenda including issues that should be considered in
research on emotion in decision making.
Affect is a generic term that refers to many experiential concepts including
moods, emotions, attitudes, evaluations, and preferences. The dening feature is
the valence dimension. Valence is a term borrowed from physics and chemistry
(Solomon & Stone, 2002), and it refers to the positivity or negativity of an experi-
ence. Thus, any experiential concept that is valanced can be considered affective.
The valence dimension is a fundamental one with respect to many psychological
experiences (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Russell, 1980). It is obvious that
decision scientists have a strong interest in affect because the valence aspect of
affect is so easily related to utility. Positive affect creates utility (or satisfaction)
and negative affect creates disutility (or dissatisfaction; e.g., Mellers, Schwartz, &
Ritov, 1999). Freud (1920/1952) even argued that our entire psychical activity is
bent upon procuring pleasure and avoiding pain(p. 365). Thus, affect refers to
positivity and negativity, to goodness and badness, to pleasantness and unpleasant-
ness, favorability and unfavorability, and pleasure and pain. Affect is sometimes
used as a synonym for emotion, but this is not only incorrect (emotions are affec-
tive, but not all affect is emotion) but also hinders progress into ones insight into
the role of emotion in decision making as becomes apparent in the next sections.
The exact denition of emotion has been a matter of dispute among psycholo-
gists, philosophers, and other researchers (Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981) mainly
because of the wide array of possible emotions that one can experience (guilt,
shame, regret, disappointment, envy, gloating, anger, fear, joy, pride, to name only
a few) and because there is no dening characteristic that applies to all emotions.
However, there is agreement on several aspects. Emotions are acute; they are rela-
tively momentary experiences. This differentiates emotions from moods, which
typically last longer, and from other more general affects. Emotions are about
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something or someone: You are angry with someone; you regret a choice, and so
forth. Emotions typically arise when one evaluates an event or outcome as relevant
for ones concerns or preferences. One does not become emotional over something
trivial. Moreover, emotions are cognitively impenetrable: One cannot choose to
have or not have emotions given certain events or outcomes that are relevant for
ones concerns (Frijda, 1986, p. 468).
Emotions have multiple components, and they can be differentiated from each
other on the basis of these. One of these components is the appraisal pattern that
gives rise to the emotion. Appraisal refers to the process of judging the signicance
of an event for personal well-being. Appraisal theory (for a review, see Scherer,
Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), the dominant approach in emotion research, maintains
that specic emotions are associated with specic patterns of cognitive appraisals
of the emotion-eliciting situation. People may differ in the specic appraisals that
are elicited by a particular event, but the same patterns of appraisals always give
rise to the same emotions. An understanding of appraisals is important because it
may help researchers to understand why specic emotions arise and hence provide
a solid theoretical basis for emotion manipulation. Research on appraisal processes,
however, remains relatively mute when it comes to predicting behavior (Frijda &
Zeelenberg, 2001).
The other components of emotion that we address here are more closely linked
to behavior. Together, these components comprise the experiential content of the
emotion. Basic emotion research on experiential content (Davitz, 1969; Roseman,
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Wallbott & Scherer, 1988) has investigated a wide range of
characteristics to differentiate emotions. Roseman et al. (1994) proposed that emo-
tions could be differentiated in terms of the following ve experiential categories:
feelings, thoughts, action tendencies, actions, and emotivational goals. Feelings
are perceived physical or mental sensations. Thoughts are ideas, plans, concep-
tions, or opinions produced by mental activity. Action tendencies are impulses or
inclinations to respond with a particular action. Actions include behavior that may
or may not be purposive. Emotivational goals describe the goals that accompany
discrete emotions (wanting to avoid danger in case of fear or wanting to recover
from loss in case of sadness). These emotivational goals are similar to what Frijda
has referred to as changes in patterns of action readiness(p. 351; Frijda, 1986,
2006). Action readiness refers to motivational states that may involve attentional
focusing, arousal, muscular preparation, or actual action, goal priority, or felt read-
iness. Action readiness is dened by having control precedence, which means that
it may overrule other goals. Many emotions can be differentiated in terms of action
The experiential content of an emotion thus reects how emotions are felt and
what emotions mean to the person experiencing them; it is the real emotional
experience. Specic appraisals elicit specic emotions with specic experiential
contents. In the recently developed feeling-is-for-doing approach, Zeelenberg and
Pieters (2006) reserved a special role for the experiential content of emotions and
for the motivational aspect that is part of it. We have proposed that this experi-
ential content is the proximal cause of all that follows, including specic adaptive
behavior. Knowing the experiential content of an emotion therefore implies
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knowledge of the motivations that arise during this experience. For example,
when one realizes that the experience of anger in consumers goes with feelings
like exploding, thoughts of unfairness and violence, and tendencies to let go and
behave aggressively, it simply follows that these consumers are motivated to retali-
ate (Bougie, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2003). This knowledge allows researchers to
make specic behavioral predictions. We return to this later, but rst, we turn to
how emotion is related to decision making.
It goes without saying that emotion plays a large role in decision making. Early theo-
rists have recognized this, and have discussed it in quite some detail (Bentham,
1789/1948; Jevons, 1871/1965; A. Smith, 1759/1976). Despite this early interest, how-
ever, emotion never really made it into decision research. This was partly due to the
fact that emotion was seen as intrinsically unstable and unpredictable and partly
because it could not be measured objectively. Jevons (1871/1965), for example, stated
“I hesitate to say that men will ever have the means of measuring directly the feel-
ings of the human heart” (p. 11). Thus, although there never was any denial of the
inuence of emotions, it needs to be stressed that the early observations of A. Smith
(1759/1976) and his contemporaries were not followed up empirically. The two early
limitations, unpredictability and immeasurability, have been removed since then.
The impact of emotion on behavior is actually simpler and more systematic than
previously thought. First, emotions can be measured reliably in various verbal (e.g.,
via rating scales) and nonverbal ways (e.g., via Facial Action Coding System or facial
Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999; Parrott & Hertel, 1999). Moreover, the number of dis-
tinct emotions is fairly limited (compared to a virtual endless amount of cognitions),
and they behave lawfully (Frijda, 1988, 2006). Hence, clear, electromyography, sta-
ble, and predictable consequences and correlates of emotion exist.
Consequently, there is a renewed interest in the role of emotion in decision
behavior from both economists and psychologists. In this current decision research
(as in many elds outside core emotion theory), however, emotions are often con-
ceptualized as valenced feeling states. That is, emotions are often equated with
affect and reduced to a value on a positive–negative dimension. Positive emotions
are thought to add utility, and negative emotions subtract utility. Decision making
then comes down to “hedonic calculusin which pain and pleasure are summed,
and the net best alternative is picked (see also, Jevons, 1871/1965). Cabanac (1992)
argued that emotions can be compared in terms of pleasure, and he referred to this
as a “common currency.” Also, in Mellers et al.s (1999) subjective expected plea-
sure theory,counterfactual emotions (regret, disappointment, elation, rejoicing,
and surprise) are expressed via a single “pain–pleasure” dimension.
Such a one-dimensional, valence-based approach falls short for several reasons
(see, for a more elaborate discussion, Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). First, not all
negative emotions have the same effect as we review later. Second, some emotions
are difcult to place on the positive–negative dimension (are pride, schadenfreude,
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relief, and hope unequivocally positive or negative emotions?). We thus argue that
especially when one is interested in motivational and intuitive processes in deci-
sion making, a focus on the mere valence of emotions is insufcient. We came
to this conviction based on a number of reasons, aptly summarized by Solomon
and Stone (2002). These emotion philosophers (Solomon & Stone, 2002) recently
reviewed the emotion literature and concluded that
The analysis of emotions in terms of “valence, while it recognizes some-
thing essential about emotions . . . is an idea that we should abandon and
leave behind. It serves no purpose but confusion and perpetrates the worst
old stereotypes about emotion, that these are simple phenomena unworthy of
serious research and analysis. (p. 431)
Thus, when interested in how emotions inuence behavioral decision making,
a focus on specic emotions is clearly required. Luckily, this has been realized by
a number of decision researchers. We review their efforts following.
Studies that have revealed the differential impact of specic emotions are accumu-
lating, and several perspectives that account for these inuences begin to emerge.
We consider them in detail, but rst, we want to make clear that for our current
purposes, we are only concerned with the direct impact of specic experienced
emotions. Thus, we do not discuss the inuence of expected or anticipated emo-
tions, although they prove a valuable extension to traditional expected-utility mod-
els of decision making (e.g., Mellers et al., 1999; Van der Pligt, Zeelenberg, Van
Dijk, De Vries, & Richard, 1998). Neither do we discuss indirect effects of emotion
on decision making, although it has been shown that emotions may bias peoples
judgments via the selective recall of similarly valenced memories (e.g., Bower,
1981) and by inuencing the depth (i.e., heuristic or systematic) of cognitive pro-
cessing (e.g., Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Our focus is on those instances in which
specic emotions exert a direct impact on behavioral decisions that is not medi-
ated by changes in the nature and content of basic cognitive processes. Hence, we
highlight the more intuitive side of emotional inuences on decisions.
Emotions and emotional inuences can be either endogenous or exogenous
(cf. Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). This distinction is consistent with the general
role that factors can play in causal processes. We refer to emotions as endogenous
when the experience is relevant to the decision at hand and an integral part of the
goal-setting and goal-striving process. For example, the anxiety experienced when
deliberating a risky choice or the regret experienced over an earlier investment
when determining whether to invest further are endogenous. Likewise, the anger
about goal frustration is endogenous. Exogenous emotions or emotional inuences,
on the other hand, are those that are not related to a current decision and are
external to the actual goal-setting and goal-striving process, although they may—
exogenously—inuence this. They constitute the carryover effects of emotions or
mood states resulting from a prior experience, such as watching a happy or a sad
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movie, on subsequent unrelated decisions. Thus, an endogenous emotion is part of
current goal pursuit, whereas an exogenous emotion comes from outside, and its
effects may steam throughcurrent goal pursuit. The distinction between endog-
enous and exogenous emotions is important, as it may determine the extent to
which ndings on emotional inuences are relevant to theoretical accounts of such
effects as we outlined following.
Perspectives on the direct inuence of specic experienced emotions on deci-
sion making fall into either of two categories, although both are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. They differ in whether they emphasize the informational or
the motivational properties of emotions (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). We argue
for the superior suitability of motivational perspectives in accounting for effects of
emotions on decision making and propose a research agenda to further theorizing
on the emotional inuences in decision-making processes.
Information-Based Accounts
These accounts highlight the nature of inferences that people in a particular emo-
tional state are likely to draw. They emphasize the backward looking function of
emotions highlighting the cues that emotions give about past goal performance
and/or the conduciveness of the state of the world or current and future goal pur-
suit. Information-based accounts zoom in on the feedback function of emotions.
Generally, they predict emotional inuences in case of commonality between the
central appraisal dimensions associated with the emotion and the principal dimen-
sion of judgment involved in a particular choice situation. Two major information-
based perspectives have been outlined, the appraisal tendency approach (Lerner &
Keltner, 2000, 2001), and the emotion as information model (DeSteno, Petty,
Wegener, & Rucker, 2000).
The latter account in particular is heavily grounded in the seminal bodies of
research that have indicated affect-congruent inuences on judgment, initiated
by Johnson and Tversky (1983) and Schwarz and Clore (1983). Affect congruency
means that people use their feelings as a cue to infer the general state of the world,
considering the world as a place where good things are likely to happen when in
a positive mood or conversely, anticipating negative events when feeling bad. This
mechanism became known as the “How-do-I-feel-about-it”—heuristic (Schwarz,
1990) The more recently proposed affect heuristic that refers to the fact that deci-
sion makers may simply use their intuitive affective reaction toward an object or
behavior as input for their choices is another example of affect congruency (Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002).
DeSteno et al. (2000) showed that such mood-induced biases in likelihood esti-
mations extend to specic emotions as well, thus indicating increased likelihood
estimates for events with similar emotional overtones.For instance, inducing
sadness (but not anger) increased the estimated frequency of saddening events
(e.g., the number of people that will nd out their best friend is moving away),
whereas inducing anger (but not sadness) had similar effects for angering events
(e.g., the number of criminals that will be set free because of legal technicalities).
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The appraisal tendency approach (Lerner & Keltner, 2000) also emphasizes
the informational function of emotions. The appraisal tendency approach conceives
that each emotion activates a tendency to evaluate future events in line with the
central dimensions of the appraisal that triggered the emotion. These appraisal
tendencies thus are perceptual inclinations by which emotions color the cognitive
interpretation of stimuli.
Support for the appraisal tendency approach initially derived from ndings that
indicated that anger increases tendencies to perceive other individuals as respon-
sible for subsequent events, whereas sadness increases the tendency to ascribe
responsibility to the environment (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993). These
patterns are consistent with the underlying appraisal patterns of sadness (situation
responsible for negative outcomes) and anger (others responsible). Further support
comes from a series of studies in which dispositional and situationally induced dif-
ferences in peoples experiences of fear and anger have been found to be associated
with differences in risk perception (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). Fear and anger
differ in their appraisals of control and certainty, which are low in fear and high
in anger. Perceptions of risk depend mainly on peoples estimates of their abili-
ties to exert personal control in a particular situation and a sense of predictability
(i.e., certainty) over the outcome of that situation. When afraid, people make more
pessimistic judgments of risk (i.e., estimating the number of casualties due to vari-
ous events) than people who are angry. Moreover, fear was also associated with
preferences for risk-averse options, whereas anger was associated with risk-seeking
preferences (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).
Taken together, both the emotion-as-information model and the appraisal ten-
dency approach provide accounts for emotional inuences on peoples judgments,
with the latter framework providing more encompassing and detailed predictions,
as it relates emotions to a wider array of cognitive dimensions involved in judg-
mental processes. It is important to note that the information-based accounts take
a backward looking stance with respect to goal progress. That is, emotions pro-
vide information about how one is currently doing. This affective feedback informs
about the extent of goal progress, but does not provide the decision maker with
clear guidelines for how to attain these goals in the future. Before evaluating the
suitability of information-based frameworks in accounting for the impact of emo-
tions on behavioral decision making in greater detail, we rst introduce studies
that have adopted a goal-based account to explain emotional inuences.
Goal-Based Accounts
These accounts stress the implicit goals for action that are associated with an emo-
tion to explain its inuences on decisions. They emphasize the forward-looking
function of emotions. That is, goal-based accounts focus on the goal setting and
striving implications of emotions, which are by denition future oriented. Gener-
ally, they predict emotions to guide decisions in the direction of the outcome that
is (most) conducive to the attainment of the emotional goal. In earlier research, the
emotional impact on behavior has hardly ever been considered to be a goal-directed
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process but rather has been viewed as an accidental consequence of the operation
of the emotion system (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The
mood maintenance hypothesis (Isen & Patrick, 1983) presents a notable excep
tion. This hypothesis holds that when in a positive mood, people are motivated to
maintain their feeling state, whereas a negative mood instigates efforts of mood
repair, for instance, by motivating prosocial acts, which often result in positive
affect (Schaller & Cialdini, 1990). Current goal-based perspectives on emotional
inuences on decision making have moved beyond a valence-based account to fur-
ther understand the impact of specic emotions.
Several researchers have explicitly adopted this approach in documenting and
explaining the inuence of specic emotions on peoples decisions. Note that the
following studies (unless explicitly mentioned otherwise) all have reported effects
of exogeneous emotional inuences, a point that we address further in the subse-
quent section.
Fessler, Pillsworth, and Flamson (2004) investigated the impact of anger and
disgust on preferences for gambles. Fessler et al. found that disgust decreased but
anger increased risk taking. Fessler et al. referred to the different implicit goals
associated with anger and disgust to account for this. Specically, Fessler et al.
argued that disgust decreases risk-taking behavior because it motivates avoidance
of contact. Anger, on the other hand, increased risk taking because retaliation
requires to a certain extent the neglect of risk.
Raghunathan and Pham (1999) investigated the impact of fear and sadness on
risk preference in choices between gambles and job options. Raghunathan and
Pham predicted (and found) that fear, which they argued is associated with a goal
to reduce uncertainty, decreased preference for risky options. Sadness, however,
caused the opposite effect. The latter is explained by suggesting that sadness involves
an implicit goal of reward replacement, inducing a tendency to favor options with
highly rewarding outcomes.
Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein (2004) studied the differential impact of sadness
and disgust on the endowment effect (the nding that selling prices exceed buying
prices for the same object). It was found that compared to a neutral control condition
in which the traditional endowment effect was replicated, buying and selling prices
did not differ anymore after disgust was induced. Inducing sadness even caused
a complete reversal of the endowment effect (i.e., buying prices exceeding selling
prices). Rather than relying on differences in appraisal tendencies, Lerner et al.
proposed a goal-based mechanism to underlie these results. Specically, triggering
the implicit goal to expel or avoid taking in (cf. Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993),
disgust was hypothesized to reduce both selling and buying prices, respectively.
Zeelenberg and Pieters (1999, 2004) have compared behavioral consequences of
experienced regret and disappointment in relation to failed services. Hence, these
studies concerned the impact of endogeneous emotional inuences. Zeelenberg
and Pieters (1999) argued that such negative experiences can cause both disap-
pointment (when service delivery falls short of prior expectancies) and regret (after
a bad choice of service providers). Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004) asked consumers
to recollect negative experiences with service providers and to subsequently report
their feelings and behaviors in response to this encounter. Across the studies,
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Zeelenberg and Pieters (YEAR) found different reactions following the experience
of regret and disappointment. Regret was most clearly associated with switching
service providers; and disappointment was also associated with negative word-of-
mouth communication switching and complaining to the provider.
Finally, specic emotional inuences on decisions in social dilemmas have
been investigated. Social dilemmas typically model interactions between two or
more people involving a motivational conict between a decision to do what is best
for the group (i.e., to cooperate) or to do what is best for oneself (i.e., to defect).
Several studies have documented guilt inductions to increase the amount of coop-
erative decisions in ultimatum games (Ketelaar & Au, 2003) and prisoner dilemma
games (Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries, 2007-b). These effects
have been explained by referring to the implicit goal of making-up for transgres-
sion (Nelissen et al., 2007-b), which is associated with guilt (cf. Roseman et al.,
1994), or by addressing guilt’s theorized status as a moral emotion (cf. Frank, 2004)
that inhibits tendencies to pursue immediate self-interest (Ketelaar & Au, 2003).
Finally, fear, associated with a goal to avoid risk, was found to reduce cooperation
in a prisoner dilemma game, hence instigating players to make a less risky decision
(Nelissen et al., 2007-b). Note that the latter study also reported interactive effects
of emotion induction and social value orientations, which we turn to later.
A strict information-based perspective falls short of providing a strong account of
emotional inuences on decision making. First of all, the information-based per-
spective cannot adequately accommodate certain empirical ndings. For instance,
the effects of disgust and sadness on the endowment effect (Lerner et al., 2004)
do not readily follow from considering the appraisal dimensions associated with
both emotions. Disgust is characterized by appraisals of high certainty, human
control, other responsibility, and a strong unwillingness to attend to the situation
(C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Nevertheless, it is not apparent how a tendency to
appraise the situation along these dimensions causes a reduction of the endowment
effect, that is, a reduction of selling prices, in particular. Similarly, it seems unclear
how appraising a situation in terms of high situational control and moderate levels
of certainty (as associated with sadness) would reverse the endowment effect.
Second, other empirical ndings appear to contradict predictions of an
information-based approach. Based on the appraisal tendency approach, similar
effects would have been expected for emotions with similar appraisals. Both
anger and disgust are associated with equal levels of certainty and perceived control
(C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Nevertheless, anger and disgust have differential
effects on risk preferences (Fessler et al., 2004). Furthermore, sadness was found to
increase rather than decrease preferences for high-risk alternatives (Raghunathan &
Pham, 1999). This is odd given that sadness is primarily related to appraisals of high
situational control and moderate levels of certainty, which should, in an informa-
tion-based perspective, have led to reduced preference for high-risk enterprises.
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Clearly, one may argue that rather than a feedback effect, emotions here had a
feed-forward effect, setting goals for future pursuit rather than following the
appraisals contained in experienced emotions that resulted from past events.
Third and nally, closer inspection at a theoretical level reveals that information-
based accounts are more apt at accounting for judgment effects than at decision-
making effects and related goal pursuits. That is, emotions clearly color or bias
judgments. Such almost automatic appraisal tendency effects of emotions have
been well documented. Yet, interestingly, in these studies, the emotion is the end
of a goal pursuit sequence or exogenously induced, and this was followed by a
moment in which judgments were called for, and the latter were obviously colored
by the former. Thus, when goal pursuit ends (or did not yet initiate), and an emo
tion is still activated, it inuences judgment in an appraisal-consistent fashion. Yet,
when the emotion is part of a sequence of ongoing goal pursuit, such appraisal
consistency” effects are much less obvious. Then, one needs to know the overarch
ing goal of people and the activated emotion to predict future behavior, as we
showed earlier. Motivational perspectives, by emphasizing the implicit goals asso-
ciated with current feeling states instead of foregrounding inferential processes,
provide this link.
Sometimes integration is advocated for the informational and motivational
functions of emotions into a single model, arguing affective states [to] convey not
only situational appraisal information, but also motivational information(Pham,
2004, p. 363). Similarly, in its original formulation, the appraisal tendency approach
was claimed to encompass not only cognitive-appraisal theories but also functional
views of emotions, delineating the regulating role of emotions in shaping behavioral
responses (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Yet both assertions overlook that inference
(backward looking for meaning of past states) and motivation (forward looking for
desirable end states) are fundamentally distinct processes that require independent
demonstration and that neither of both automatically implies the other. In other
words, as we have tried to demonstrate, activation of appraisal tendencies cannot
simply be equated with the activation of goals for action. Hence, suggesting that
emotions cause different situational inferences and as a result will induce different
goals (Pham, 2004), constitutes too big a leap in the face of current data.
It is not our intention to contest the idea that emotions have at the same time
an informational and a motivational component—they do. Nor do we contradict
the assertion that both can be meaningfully related as has already been noted
by Frijda (1988, 2006) when discussing the laws of emotion.As such, we nd
ourselves supportive to (future) attempts at integrating motivational and informa-
tional effects of emotions into a single framework. In our opinion, however, such
attempts are still too premature, especially as both informational and motivational
perspectives still await further validation themselves.
In sum, not only do certain research ndings contradict predictions from infor
mational accounts; such perspectives also seem to lack sufciency and capability
to explain reported effects of emotional states on decision making. These accounts
seem to be better suited to explain the effect of emotion on cognitive procession.
Goal-based accounts seem to be more appropriate for investigating the ways in
which emotions impact the behavioral decisions people make. This is not to say that
ER9220_C011.indd 182 7/23/07 10:07:35 AM
present research adopting a motivational perspective is awless. We therefore, in
the next section, present a research agenda addressing several issues that must be
considered in future research investigating behavioral consequences of emotions.
As we argued earlier, goal-based perspectives to account for the effects of emo-
tions are recent, and researchers are just beginning to understand how emotions
work. Zeelenberg and Pieters (2006) only recently presented a rst version of
their feeling-is-for-doing account of emotions. This premature version should be
handled with care. This is what was proposed: When considering the potential
impact of emotion on behavioral decisions, one should take seriously the fact that
people may experience a whole range of different emotions, each with its idio-
syncratic experiential content and associated goals. We think that this variety of
feeling states exists for the sake of behavioral guidance. The specic emotion felt
in a situation indicates a particular problem and prioritizes behavior that deals
with this problem. Because different problems require different solutions, differ-
ent emotions produce different behaviors. If one ignores emotion specicity, one
would, for example, predict similar effects for regret and disappointment because
both emotions have a negative valence. The feeling-is-for-doing approach predicts,
therefore, differential effects for regret and disappointment and for guilt and
shame and fear and anger and many other emotions that share the same valence.
In addition, we expect that the same specic emotion in different situations may
activate different behaviors depending on the overarching goal that people strive
to. Thus, specic emotions, because of the specic meaning they convey to the
decision maker, may help one to better understand the goals and motivations of
the decision makers and hence predict better the specic behaviors the decision
makers engage in or refrain from.
In this nal section, we continue where Zeelenberg and Pieters (2006) ended,
and we point out four criteria for an adequate motivational account of emotions.
First, a more systematic approach to assigning goals to emotions is needed. Con-
sider, for example, the subtle differences between implicit goals that are alleg-
edly associated with the same emotion in several of the previously cited studies.
Whereas Raghunathan and Pham (1999) declared fear to be associated with a goal
to reduce uncertainty, Nelissen et al. (2007-b) stated that fear is associated with
the goal of avoiding personal risks (to which uncertainty reduction would be a con-
comitant). Similarly, guilt is argued to relate to a tendency to disregard ones imme-
diate self-interest (Ketelaar & Au, 2003), which would be an implicit consequence
of repairing for transgression (e.g., Nelissen et al., 2007-b). Much would be lost if
goal accounts are invoked post hoc to account for patterns of ndings, consistent
with some but not other aims of people, rather than a priori to design the appropri-
ate experimental and control conditions to test them.
If researchers relate goals to emotions in an arbitrary manner across differ-
ent studies, their results will lack comparability. This obstructs the potential for
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integrating ndings as would be required to develop a substantial body of support
for goal-based hypotheses of emotional effects. Even more problematic, the inter-
pretation of results then acquires a post hoc avor, for goals apparently can be
inferred to match any observed effect of emotions on decision making, giving the
impression that all data may support a goal-based perspective. We therefore sug-
gest that hypotheses should be based on empirically grounded catalogues of emo-
tion-related goals as for instance, provided by Roseman et al. (1994). Naturally, by
adopting similar procedures, goals can be unambiguously ascribed to previously
unstudied emotions (Bougie et al., 2003; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van
der Pligt, 1998). This procedure entails asking people to provide a detailed report
about a particular emotional experience and subsequently, to answer a number of
questions concerning specic feelings, thoughts, action tendencies, actions, and
goals associated with this experience (cf. Roseman et al., 1994).
Second, it bears reiteration that not all feelings are clearly associated with well-
dened goals for action (Frijda, 1986, 1988). Consequently, not all emotions are
equally suitable for testing goal-based hypotheses of emotional inuences on deci-
sion making. To collect meaningful results, behavioral consequences of emotions
that are unambiguously related to a particular goal need to be singled out. More
generally, it may be useful to examine in more detail which emotions are typically
goal directed and which are less so, following the lead of Bagozzi, Baumgartner,
and Pieters (1998). Although seemingly obvious, several of the previously cited
studies have ignored this point by investigating, for instance, the impact of sadness
(e.g., Lerner et al., 2004; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). Sadness is not unambigu-
ously characterized by a specic goal for action. If anything, it is accompanied
by a loss of motivation, most likely to result in passivity. This does not mean that
sadness has no function, but this function may not be directly related to the regula-
tion of action. Apart from orchestrating behavioral responses, emotions may also
serve communicative and psychological (e.g., learning) purposes. Alternatively, the
inuence of sadness may be more contingent on the specic overarching goal that
people are pursuing than on the goal ingrained in the emotion itself.
The challenges with reports of behavioral consequences of emotions that have
no clearly associated goal for action is that they are also vulnerable to impressions of
post hoc reasoning to make the data match the expectations by implementing dif-
ferent goals on different occasions. Whereas in the endowment-effect study (Lerner
et al., 2004), sadness was argued to induce a goal of changing circumstances, the
impact of sadness on (increased) preferences for risky options (Raghunathan &
Pham, 1999) was explained by attributing a reward-replacement goal to sadness.
Furthermore, reported behavioral effects of emotions that have no clearly
associated action goal are ultimately meaningless when it comes to supporting
a goal-based mechanism. Disappointment in response to failed service encoun-
ters (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004), for example, resulted in switching of service
providers, complaining, and negative word of mouth communication. Naturally,
these results outline the importance of considering specic emotions beyond
global dissatisfaction when documenting consumersreactions and clearly show
a difference between two negative feelings (i.e., disappointment and regret). Nev-
ertheless, disappointment itself is not associated with a particular goal for action.
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Hence, behavioral effects may be found but it remains unclear to what underlying
goal such responses are aimed at. These ndings, therefore, cannot provide sup-
port for a goal-based mechanism.
Third, it is useful to focus on emotion-decision linkages that are common in
decision-making practices. Highly uncommon or even weird illustrations of linkages
between emotions and decision making may be exciting but less useful to a relevant
theory of decision making. Consider, for example, thending that disgust appears
to reduce risk preferences (Fessler et al., 2004). Offering a speculative explanation
for this effect, Fessler et al. overlooked that feelings of disgust are uncommon to
say the least under natural circumstances in which individuals make risky decisions.
Hence, an effect may be found, such as making less risky gambles, but how this
bears on the theory of disgust, decision making, or emotions is less transparent.
Indeed, more research is needed on the functional, positive, optimal inuence
of emotions in regular decision making. Although it is by now commonplace to laud
the functionality of emotions for decision making, as a discipline, it seems to be
more attracted to the dark and grim side of emotions, which we personally believe
to be uncommon, rather than to the bright sides that most people experience much
more commonly. As a consequence, researchers know much more about emotional
obstruction than about emotional assistance to optimality. Thus, most research as
yet has emphasized carryover effects of (exogenous) emotions on judgment and
decision making. Often, researchers’ results derive a counterintuitive appeal from
demonstrating erratic consequences and the fallibility of humans. Such ndings,
however, obscure awareness of the functional role emotions play in the decision-
making process. Emotions that are relevant for the choice at hand (e.g., regret over
foregone opportunities, fear about potential outcomes, guilt over earlier misbehav-
ior) clearly show what emotions are and what they are for. They aid the decision
maker by providing quick intuitive cues on how to solve motivational conicts and
ambiguities. Moreover, effects of exogenous emotions that seem erratic at rst can
often be understood if one is aware of the effects of endogenous inuences. One of
the strengths of a goal-based perspective is its potential to determine a priori the
kind of decisions to which a particular emotion is relevant, that is, by considering
how the alternative outcomes help to attain or conversely obstruct the emotional
goal. At the same time, this implies that if an emotion is by no means relevant to
the decision at hand, ndings provide little if no support for the proposed goal-
based mechanisms.
In sum, the relevance of research ndings for goal-based hypotheses of emo-
tional effects is compromised by (a) tenuous inferences of goals (i.e., a misrep-
resentation of the cause of an observed emotional effect), (b) the lack of goals
(i.e., the inability to specify a cause), and (c) adopting irrelevant outcome measures
(i.e., documenting consequences that cannot be properly related to the cause).
This latter notion is especially relevant to consider when investigating exogenous
effects (i.e., of experimentally induced, hence irrelevant, emotions) and warrants
an increased focus on (potential) endogenous emotional inuences.
Our fourth and nal point concerns the need to move beyond the mere docu-
mentation of behavioral results of emotions to direct tests of the proposed goal-
based mechanism underlying these effects. Although the results from previously
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cited studies have demonstrated congruence between observed decisional effects
and emotional goals, this does not conclusively attest for the idea that goal activa-
tion as a result of emotional states causes these effects.
So far, only a single empirical study that we are aware of has indicated a goal-
activation mechanism to be involved in the observed consequences of induced emo-
tional states (Nelissen et al., 2007-b). In this study, Nielsen et al. (2007-b) reported
fear to reduce and guilt to increase cooperation in a prisoner-dilemma interac-
tion. These effects were qualied, however, by a signicant interaction between
the emotional state and an individuals social value orientation. Specically, fear
only decreased cooperation for prosocials, whereas only guilty proselves showed
increased levels of cooperation. Social value orientations can be understood in
terms of individual variation in the chronic accessibility of situation-relevant goals
for action. Specically, when confronted with a social dilemma, proselves only have
their self-interest in mind and attempt to make as much as possible prot, whereas
prosocials also take the other player’s interest into account. Temporal goal activa-
tion due to an induced emotional state only changes the behavior of individuals to
whom this goal was not already chronically accessible. Hence, fear, inducing a goal
to avoid personal risk, does not affect prosocials, as they are already chronically
motivated to avoid the risk of losing to the other party. Guilt, on the other hand,
associated with an implicit goal to make up for transgressions, inducing a tendency
to cooperate, does not affect prosocials, as they already have the other players
interest in mind. These interactions suggest that both emotions and individual dis-
positions operate through the same underlying mechanism of goal accessibility yet
obviously present only an indirect indication thereof. Proceeding along this line,
future studies should directly test whether emotional states are indeed related to
increased goal activity.
In this chapter, we have reviewed several ways in which theorists have accounted for
the effects of emotion on decision making. We differentiated between information-
based accounts and motivation-based accounts. We argued in favor of motivational
or goal-based accounts because we think that only this account provides a basis for
emotion-specic predictions of behavioral decisions. We refer to this approach as
the feeling-is-for-doing approach. This approach recognizes that the differential
impact of specic emotions occurs via the strong association between emotion
and motivation. Emotions arise when events or outcomes are relevant for ones
concerns or preferences, and they prioritize behavior that acts in service of these
concerns. As such, emotions can be understood as programs for intuitive decision
making, imposing on the decision maker inclinations for action that, in a given
situation, most adequately serve current strivings. Investigating these dynamics
should further the understanding of both decision processes and the dynamics
of emotional experiences. Put differently, when researchers realize that feeling is
here for the sake of our doing, we also realize that progress in studying the intui-
tive decision maker cannot be made without scrutinizing emotion.
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... Emotions are important in their role as motivators of subsequent actions (Penz and Stöttinger, 2012). Emotions activate people's goals and, thus, evoke certain behavioral responses that help them achieve these goals (Zeelenberg et al., 2007). Although researchers have examined the role of emotions in consumer decision-making in retail environments (Chang et al., 2014;Eroglu et al., 2003;Fiore et al., 2005;Kim and Johnson, 2013), studies investigating emotional aspects during counterfeit purchase situations are still scarce. ...
... To test the hypotheses, we used the scenario method, as it is widely used and accepted in consumer and emotion research -it is also effective for triggering a person's experience of a moral dilemma (Moores and Chang, 2006;Kim and Johnson, 2013;Zeelenberg et al., 2007). We developed a scenario based on the study by Kim and Johnson (2014), which described a situation where consumers had the chance to buy a pair of counterfeit sunglasses. ...
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Purpose Counterfeiting is an increasingly global phenomenon that threatens the economy as a whole and also presents a risk for the consumers. The purpose of this study is to explore moral emotions along with moral awareness and moral judgment with respect to their influence in the consumption of counterfeits. Design/methodology/approach An online questionnaire was distributed among participants (n = 225) who were asked to respond to a counterfeit purchase scenario. Findings Results highlight the importance of moral awareness as an essential element of moral decision-making. Also, moral emotions were found to influence moral judgment as well as purchase intention. Research limitations/implications A limitation refers to the fact that a scenario was used to evoke participants’ emotional responses. Although the situation was realistic and the majority of the people could very well imagine experiencing the reported scenario, results might change in an actual purchase situation. Practical Implications This study’s findings may be particularly relevant for authorities and educators who design campaigns to curtail counterfeit consumption, thus seeking to encourage consumers to recognize the several negative consequences that result from counterfeiting behavior. Originality/value This is one of the few studies that examine the impact of cognitive and emotional influences in a counterfeit purchase decision. Fighting this problem requires an in-depth understanding of consumers’ motivations and how they feel about engaging in this morally questionable behavior.
... Studies in collective sports show the positive effect of work focused on decision-making [26]. Zeenlenberg, Nelisseng, and Pieters [27] have studied the connection and influence between decisionmaking and motivational processes. However, despite this, teaching models continue to predominate where ability is isolated from the real-life situation [28], denying the development of decision-making skills [29]. ...
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The objective of this study was to analyze the motivational, behavioral, and cognitive effect of autonomy support in rescue and lifesaving classes within the framework of the self-determination theory. The sample consisted of 40 students aged from 19 to 26 years old (M = 20.83; TD = 1.86). Students were randomly divided into the intervention (n = 19) and control (n = 21) groups. The following were measured: the perception of the autonomy-supportive and controlling interpersonal styles, the social support for the basic psychological needs of the professor, the satisfaction of the basic psychological needs, and the aquatic competence in rescue and lifeguarding. After the application of the program, improvements were observed in the intervention group in the variables of perception of autonomy support, social support for autonomy, and competence; satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for autonomy and competence; and improvement of the cognitive and behavioral processes of aquatic competence in rescue and lifeguarding. The findings show the effectiveness of the interpersonal teaching style of the autonomy-support program by obtaining more positive results at the motivational, behavioral, and cognitive levels, as opposed to a controlling interpersonal style.
... [37][38][39][40] Similar links have emerged with cognitive variables such as self-efficacy and perceived threat. [41][42][43][44] Thus, this study explored whether path tortuosity during a child feeding task would be linked to affective and cognitive variables underlying motivation and effort during decision-making. ...
There is a pressing need to better understand how parents make feeding decisions for their children, but extant measures focus primarily on outcomes rather than examining the process of food choice as it unfolds. This exploratory study examined parents' translational movement as they moved throughout a virtual reality-based buffet restaurant to select a lunch for their child. Our aim was to explore whether translational movement would be related to cognitive and affective variables that underlie motivation, effort, and ultimate choices within food decision-making contexts (e.g., guilt, self-efficacy). Movement data were quantified in terms of path tortuosity: the degree of straightness of one's path while traveling through a space. Greater path tortuosity predicted a reduction in parents' guilt about their child feeding, above and beyond actual food chosen. Results suggest path tortuosity serves as an implicit measure of effort put forth by parents throughout the food decision-making process. Future work should continue to explore the utility of novel metrics that can be obtained from unique data sources, such as location tracking, for elucidating complicated behavioral processes such as food choice.
... Aun no encontrando estudios completos que aporten similares resultados, con- 2018, 36(1) Tabla 5. Relaciones de causalidad en la muestra de jóvenes deportistas, en cuanto a su personalidad, creencias hacia el éxito y capacidad para la toma de decisiones en jóvenes deportistas trasta principalmente la información que aportan otros autores (García-Naviera, Ruiz-Barquín, & Pujals, 2011) acerca de la no existencia de diferencias en apertura mental. En cuanto a la toma de decisiones, la muestra de deportistas indica que se perciben competentes en la toma de decisiones como indicador principal, confirmando datos de estudios anteriores que indican una mayor ansiedad y menor competencia al decidir por parte de los deportistas más competitivos (García, Ruiz, & Graupera, 2009;Light, Harvey, & Mouchet, 2014;Zeelenberg, Nelissen, & Pieters, 2008). En cuanto a la clasificación entre deportes individuales y de equipo, el resultado es que los deportistas individuales intentan ser más dominantes, sienten más agobio al decidir y se orientan mucho más hacia la tarea, mientras que los que practican deportes de equipo son más cooperativos, tienen mayor apertura mental a la cultura y a las experiencias, y se orientan más hacia el ego. ...
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Señalar posibles indicadores psicológicos sobre cómo percibe su misma conducta, permite concretar las referencias sobre cómo orientar la misma de cara a ayudar al deportista a crecer a través del deporte que practica. En constante interactividad y bidireccionalidad (tanto positiva como negativa), las vivencias deportivas permiten la percepción de determinadas respuestas psicológicas, así como características personales ejercen influencias determinantes para la práctica deportiva. Con el objetivo de describir y establecer relaciones entre algunas de estas diferencias individuales y contextuales, se realiza un estudio con una muestra aleatoria de jóvenes deportistas (N = 436). Utilizando cuestionarios de personalidad (BFQ), creencias sobre el éxito (POSQ) y toma de decisiones (CETD), se obtiene que las actitudes perseverantes son el indicador más característico de los jóvenes deportistas. Los deportistas federados difieren significativamente en mayor dominancia, perseverancia y apertura a la experiencia. Los que practican deportes colectivos señalan significativamente mejor cooperación y apertura a la cultura que los que practican deportes individuales (más orientados a ser dominantes y estar abiertos a nuevas experiencias). Además, aunque los federados indican significativamente peor respuesta ansiosa, señalan un nivel más alto en competencia y compromiso para la toma de decisiones.
... Hay estudios que señalan la influencia de los procesos cognitivos y motivacionales en el éxito deportivo. Zeelenberg, Nelissen y Pieters (2008), resaltaron la influencia de las orientaciones motivacionales sobre el proceso de toma de decisiones. Mientras, otros trabajos destacan el especial interés de vincular ambos procesos en etapas de formación (Jiménez y López-Zafra, 2009). ...
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Múltiples estudios han mostrado la efectividad de la Terapia de Aceptación y Compromiso (ACT) en el incremento del rendimiento deportivo (RD)� piragüismo, tenis, balonmano, ajedrez, etc.�, en tanto la Evitación Experiencial (EE) juega un papel importante en este. Este estudio aborda la relación entre EE y las variables psicológicas tradicionalmente vinculadas al RD en futbolistas jóvenes (Club Deportivo Vera), así como entre EE y liderazgo del entrenador. Este trabajo queda justificado por la posibilidad de mejorar el RD mediante protocolos ACT encaminados a la aceptación de eventos privados y estados corporales, enfocando sus conductas de ejecución en dirección a valores. Los instrumentos utilizados son, por un lado, el Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II (AAQ-II), que mide el grado de EE. Por otro, el Cuestionario de Características Psicológicas Relacionados con el Rendimiento Deportivo (CPRD) y la Escala de Liderazgo para Deportes (LSS). Los resultados muestran relaciones (-.457) significativas (p textless .01) entre EE y las características psicológicas vinculadas con RD. Así mismo, la preferencia de los jugadores por una conducta de liderazgo autocrática se correlaciona negativamente con dichas variables. A partir de estos resultados se propone la aplicación de protocolos ACT para el incremento del RD en futbolistas.
... Such dual-system models characterize intuitive and deliberate judgments in terms of several presumably aligned aspects-one of which is emotional. 1 That is, intuitive judgments are suggested to specifically be emotional or emotionally charged in contrast to deliberate judgments, which are suggested to be affectively neutral (Kahneman, 2003;Dane & Pratt, 2007;Sadler-Smith, 2008;Zeelenberg et al., 2008). For instance, concerning intuitive judgments it has been argued that "If it doesn't feel right, the chances are slim that a person acts on it" (Zeelenberg et al., 2008, p. 173). ...
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Dual-system models propose that cognitive processing can occur either intuitively or deliberately. Unlike deliberate decision strategies, intuitive ones are assumed to have an emotional component attached to the decision process. We tested if intuitive decisions are indeed accompanied by an emotional response while deliberate decisions are not. Specifically, we conducted a psychophysiological study in which participants were instructed to decide either intuitively or deliberately if three simultaneously presented words were semantically coherent or incoherent (triad task). The degree of emotionality of these two decision strategies (intuitive vs. deliberate) was compared using changes in electrodermal activity (EDA) and the reaction time (RT) effect of an affective priming paradigm as primary measurements. Based on a valence-arousal model, our results revealed that intuitive and deliberate judgments do not differ as to their emotional valence but that they do differ in emotional arousal. Most notably, sympathetic activation during intuitive judgments was significantly lower compared to sympathetic activation during deliberate judgments. Our results reflect that a relaxed state of mind-manifested in low sympathetic activity-could underlie the holistic processing that is assumed to facilitate the proliferation of semantic associations during coherence judgments. This suggests that coherence judgments made under an (instructed) intuitive decision mode have a specific psychophysiological signature and that arousal is the differentiating component between intuitive and deliberate decision strategies. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
... Traditionally, the study of these factors (technical, physical, cognitive and emotional) was performed in isolation, while numerous studies highlighted the need for multidisciplinary studies (Ward et al., 2007). Considering studies that confirm the influence of cognitive and motivational processes on performance (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, & Pieters, 2008), the objective of this research was to analyze the level of prediction of different cognitive and motivational variables on performance in game actions, and taking into account the classification of the U-16 teams in the Extremadura volleyball league. ...
... Some decisions are more complex than others and may require extra reflection and/or information processing time. Moreover, intuition plays an important role in decision-making (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, & Pieters, 2007). Thus, people do not always strive for optimal decisions, they often settle for satisfactory outcomes. ...
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This paper reflects on the role of emotions in decision-making. The authors stress the limitations of a valence (“positivity” versus “negativity”) based approach. Emotions and their experiential content are synthetically exposed. Research has shown that even closely related emotions - such as regret and disappointment -, whether anticipated or experienced, have differential influences on the behavior of decision makers. This favours emotion-specific research in decision-making context, i.e., the pragmatic “feeling-is-for-doing” approach. We believe the emotional system is the primary motivational system for goal-directed behavior.
We propose a theory of regret regulation that distinguishes regret from related emotions, specifies the conditions under which regret is felt, the aspects of the decision that are regretted, and the behavioral implications. The theory incorporates hitherto scattered findings and ideas from psychology, economics, marketing, and related disciplines. By identifying strategies that consumers may employ to regulate anticipated and experienced regret, the theory identifies gaps in our current knowledge and thereby outlines opportunities for future research.
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Regret and disappointment have in common the fact that they are experienced when the outcome of a decision is unfavourable: They both concern "what might have been", had things been different. However, some regret and disappointment theorists regard the differences between these emotions as important, arguing that they differ with respect to the conditions under which they are felt, and how they affect decision making. The goal of the present research was to examine whether and how these emotions also differ with respect to the way in which they are experienced. Participants were asked to recall an instance of intense regret or disappointment and to indicate what they felt, thought, felt like doing, did, and were motivated to do during this experience (cf. Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Significant differences between regret and disappointment were found in every category. These differences were most pronounced for "action tendencies" (what participants felt like doing) and "emotivations" (what they were motivated to do). These results suggest that the two emotions have differential implications for future behaviour.
The 'Emerging Perspectives' offers answers by a top group of experts to the question, 'Where is judgment and decision research heading as we forge into the 21st century?' The chapters represent perspectives developed by some of the most innovative thinkers in the field. The book is organized around five themes: Fortifying traditional models of decision making - looking at traditional topics in new ways; Elaborating cognitive processes in decision making - exploring the interplay between decision research and cognitive psychology; Integrating affect and motivation in decision making - relating how affect/motivation interact with decision making; Understanding social and cultural influences on decision making - recognizing the importance of social and cultural context on decisions; Facing the challenge of real-world complexity in decision research - seeing the challenges, and rewards, of research outside the laboratory. The book concludes with a Commentary based on an analysis and synthesis of the new ideas presented here.
Describes experiments in which happy or sad moods were induced in Ss by hypnotic suggestion to investigate the influence of emotions on memory and thinking. Results show that (a) Ss exhibited mood-state-dependent memory in recall of word lists, personal experiences recorded in a daily diary, and childhood experiences; (b) Ss recalled a greater percentage of those experiences that were affectively congruent with the mood they were in during recall; (c) emotion powerfully influenced such cognitive processes as free associations, imaginative fantasies, social perceptions, and snap judgments about others' personalities; (d) when the feeling-tone of a narrative agreed with the reader's emotion, the salience and memorability of events in that narrative were increased. An associative network theory is proposed to account for these results. In this theory, an emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into associations with coincident events. Activation of this emotion unit aids retrieval of events associated with it; it also primes emotional themata for use in free association, fantasies, and perceptual categorization. (54 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
It is argued that emotions are lawful phenomena and thus can be described in terms of a set of laws of emotion. These laws result from the operation of emotion mechanisms that are accessible to intentional control to only a limited extent. The law of situational meaning, the law of concern, the law of reality, the laws of change, habituation and comparative feeling, and the law of hedonic asymmetry are proposed to describe emotion elicitation; the law of conservation of emotional momentum formulates emotion persistence; the law of closure expresses the modularity of emotion; and the laws of care for consequence, of lightest load, and of greatest gain pertain to emotion regulation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)