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Trying, Intending and Attempted Crimes
Abstract
Understanding the relationship between the mind and the body requires understanding both the influence of body on mind, as in sensory perception, and the influence of mind on body, as in action. Motions of the body, it seems, are actions only if springing in some way from something in the mind. It seems likely that describing the aspects of the mind from which actions spring, not to mention describing what this "springing" amounts to, will require saying something about trying to act. After all, in many cases trying to act seems to be the first thing that a person does in translating her plans and her aims into action. In order to act, it seems, we ordinarily first have to try. To try to act, however, is not merely to prompt action; it's also to act. Some behavior, even if only a twitch, is required for an agent to be trying. Thus trying seems to have a foot both in the mental and the physical and so it seems, and has seemed to others, to be the crucial element in the mind-body connection exhibited in action.
... In this sense our quarry is not the notion of attempt as used in the law, which requires the performance of certain canonical steps and not just mere mental preparation (think of what's required to be convicted of attempted murder). So we're aiming at a target quite different from that of (e.g.)Yaffe (2004Yaffe ( , 2010.Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved. ...
... Hornsby (1995, p. 529 and n. 11) makes this point using a version ofBratman (1987)'s video game case. 12 SeeHampshire (1959, p. 107) McCann (1975,Adams (1986Adams ( , 2007,Adams and Mele (1992),Ludwig (1992Ludwig ( , 2021,Yaffe (2004Yaffe ( , 2010,Grano (2011Grano ( , 2017,Shepherd (2016, p. 422).13 But seeThalberg (1962),Hedman (1970), McCann (1986,Ludwig (1992) andBuckwalter et al. (2021) for dissent.Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. ...
An action is agentially perfect if and only if, if a person tries to perform it, they succeed, and, if a person performs it, they try to. We argue that trying itself is agentially perfect: if a person tries to try to do something, they try to do it; and, if a person tries to do something, they try to try to do it. We show how this claim sheds new light on questions about basic action, the logical structure of intentional action, and the notion of “options” in decision theory. On the way to these central ideas, we argue that a person can try to do something even if they believe it is impossible that they will succeed, that a person can try to do something even if they do not want to succeed, and that a person can try to do something even if they do not intend to succeed.
... An alternative sort of relevance is social relevance, which typifies work in the social sciences. A clear case in connection with intention is [40], which studies the role of intention in the legal penal system. A rather different type of relevance, and the one I focus on in this article, is what might be called artifactual relevance. ...
... These different perspectives are not mutually exclusive, and in fact there is a healthy cross-pollination among them. Thus for example the legal discussion in [40] is in direct dialog with the philosophical literature, and the Cohen and Levesque theory of intention [4]—to which I will return later—is directly inspired by Bratman's theories, in particular [2]. Still there are important differences among the perspectives, with important implications to the role of logic and formal theories in general. ...
While logical theories of information attitudes, such as knowledge, certainty and belief, have flourished in the past two
decades, formalization of other facets of rational behavior have lagged behind significantly. One intriguing line of research
concerns the concept of intention. I will discuss one approach to tackling the notion within a logical framework, based on
a database perspective.
... See Bratman (1987), Ch. 3. For a helpful discussion of Bratman's norms, see Yaffe (2006). 11 McCann (1991) and Pears (1985), e.g., hold this view. ...
In contemporary philosophy of action, the existence of intentional and unintentional action is relatively uncontroversial. What is controversial is whether there exists a third kind of action—action that is neither intentional nor unintentional. This third kind of action is known in the literature as non-intentional action. In this paper, I develop a pair of arguments in favor of non-intentional action. More specifically, I argue that non-intentional action exists in the form of lucky and side-effect acts.
... See, e.g. (Yaffe, 2004, p. 512, Zhu, 2010). 17 One can easily imagine that you intend to give your friend a ride to a different city, intending also to visit the shopping mall right after you will turn back from the city where Murphy has an exam. ...
It is probably not a big exaggeration to say that contemporary philosophy of action (or: action theory), especially the one from the analytic tradition, has been shaped by the work of G. E. M. Anscombe and Donald Davidson. So, if we abstract from the Aristotelian, Humean, or Kantian roots and inspirations, it is rather plain that action theory does not have a long tradition. Nevertheless , I believe that it would be unjust oversimplification to say that Anscombe and Davidson were the only 'founding parents' of action theory. Among those who contributed to its development in no less degree is Tadeusz Kotarbiński. This is a bold claim. The name of this Polish philosopher-one of the most prominent figures from the Lvov-Warsaw School-is almost completely absent in the mainstream action theory. My goals in this essay are two. Firstly, I would like to show the reasons why Kotarbiński's so-called praxiology is a philosophy of action which should be considered as no less important for the tradition of analytic action theory and for contemporary action-theoretical debates as the classics. Secondly, I shall try to explain why Kotarbiński's action theory--despite its incontestable philosophical value--has remained almost unnoticed in the mainstream for over half a century.
The structure of this essay is as follows. I start with a brief description of what praxiology is. Second, on the basis of selected examples, I try to show its most typical and attractive--from the perspective of classic and contemporary action theory--aspects and features. Third, I shortly sketch my answer to the question why Kotarbiński's praxiology in its original form has had to meet serious difficulties when it comes to its reception and interpretation. I end the essay claiming that the issue behind these difficulties not only veiled the classic character of praxiology and its contemporary attractiveness, but it also is responsible for its original shape as the Polish analytic action theory.
Many believe that intended harms are more difficult to justify than are harms that result as a foreseen side effect of one's conduct. We describe cases of harming in which the harm is not intended, yet the harmful act nevertheless runs afoul of the intuitive moral constraint that governs intended harms. We note that these cases provide new and improved counterexamples to the so-called Simple View, according to which intentionally phi-ing requires intending to phi. We then give a new theory of the moral relevance of intention. This theory yields the traditional constraint on intending harm as a special case, along with several stronger demands.
Our planning agency contributes to our lives in fundamental ways. Prior partial plans settle practical questions about the future. They thereby pose problems of means, filter solutions to those problems, and guide action. This plan-infused background frames our practical thinking in ways that cohere with our resource limits and help organize our lives, both over time and socially. And these forms of practical thinking involve guidance by norms of plan rationality, including norms of plan consistency, means-end coherence, and stability over time.
But why are these norms of rationality? Would these norms be stable under a planning agent's reflection? I try to answer these questions in a way that responds to a skeptical challenge. While I highlight pragmatic reasons for being a planning agent, these need to be supplemented fully to explain the force of these norms in the particular case. I argue that the needed further rationale appeals to the idea that these norms track certain conditions of a planning agent's self-governance, both at a time and over time. With respect to diachronic plan rationality, this approach leads to a modest plan conservatism.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
This paper makes use of recent empirical results, mainly from experimental economics, to expore the conditions under which people will cooperate and to assess competing explantions of this cooperation. It is argued that the evidence supports the claim that people differ in type, with some being conditional cooperators and others being motivated by more or less sophisticated forms of self-interest. Stable cooperation requires, among other things, rules and institutions that protect conditional cooperators from myopically self-interested types. Additional empirical features of the behavior of conditional cooperators also imply that rules and institutions are required to produce stable cooperation.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
In this paper I present an underappreciated puzzle about intention. The puzzle is analogous to the famous Preface Paradox for belief, and arises for any theory according to which intentions are all or nothing states governed by two popular and plausible rational norms. It shows that at least one of these three assumptions must be substantially revised, and thus that many standard views about intention cannot be true. I consider two general strategies for responding to the puzzle. The more conservative approach retains the assumption that intentions are all or nothing states, and attempts to marshal independent arguments for modifying one of the two puzzle-generating norms. I briefly discuss this line of response and conclude that there is prima facie reason to reject the more commonly defended of the two, the Consistency norm, which requires a particular relationship between one’s intentions and one’s beliefs about those intentions’ execution. I then explore a more radical approach: a solution that parallels the well-known partial belief response to the Preface Paradox. According to this solution, the puzzle about intention ultimately derives from the mistaken thought that the paradigmatic conclusions of deliberation are fully committed states of intention. Instead, I suggest that what we call intentions, and think of as all or nothing states, may in fact often be only partially committed states, which I call states of inclination, and which must be governed by slightly different norms. In addition to showing that my theory of inclination may give us a motivated way out of the puzzle, I provide independent arguments for thinking that we have such mental states, and I say what I can about their nature and the norms that regulate them. These arguments do not depend on the viability of the more radical response to the puzzle. They purport to show that inclinations are psychologically real, and that countenancing them is necessary for vindicating plausible descriptive and normative truths about mental phenomena.
Résumé
Dans cet article, je montre que quatre normes de rationalité associées aux intentions peuvent être déduites de normes similaires s’appliquant aux acceptations en contextes délibératifs, un type d’état mental apparenté mais irréductible aux croyances par lequel un agent tient certains faits pour acquis lorsqu’il délibère. Je montre que cette approche, que je nomme le pragmatisme hybride, évite certaines limitations de l’approche la plus prisée dans la littérature, le cognitivisme, et qu’en comparaison avec les approches purement pragmatistes, principales rivales du cognitivisme, le pragmatisme hybride rend mieux justice à nos intuitions relatives aux normes associées aux intentions. Je montre enfin que le pragmatisme hybride permet d’expliquer comment les intentions influencent le raisonnement pratique, et de ce fait, comblent un vide important dans les théories contemporaines.
In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.
Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations.
I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what
in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest
sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency
and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue
that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction
of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain
how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my
views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert.
This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences.
Pia 115, and Practical Reason, esp
- Intentiolls Bratman
Bratman, Intentiolls, Pia 115, and Practical Reason,
esp. 37-41;
Of course, this is just the sort of thing that those who take the strong consistency requirement to be inviolable
- Bratman
- Plans Intemiorls
- Practiclli Reason
Bratman, IntemiorlS, Plans, and PractiCllI Reason, 194.
10. Of course, this is just the sort of thing that those who take the strong consistency requirement to be inviolable would deny to be possible.
Ginet takes all three cases to illustrate that an agent can try to do somdhing without intending to do it. However, Ginet is simply assuming that an agent does not intend to do what he believes he will not do
- Carl Ginet
Carl Ginet, "Trying to Act;' in Freedom and Determinism, ed. J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke,
and D. Shier (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 89-102. Ginet takes all three cases to
illustrate that an agent can try to do somdhing without intending to do it. However, Ginet
is simply assuming that an agent does not intend to do what he believes he will not do, and
so concludes that the people in all of his examples lack the intention to act. Thus, the argument to follow, if it succeeds, refutes this aspect of Ginet's position.