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Law's Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why it Matters

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Abstract

What does economics have to do with law? Suppose legislators propose that armed robbers receive life imprisonment. Editorial pages applaud them for getting tough on crime. Constitutional lawyers raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment. Legal philosophers ponder questions of justness. An economist, on the other hand, observes that making the punishment for armed robbery the same as that for murder encourages muggers to kill their victims. This is the cut-to-the-chase quality that makes economics not only applicable to the interpretation of law, but beneficial to its crafting. Drawing on numerous commonsense examples, in addition to his extensive knowledge of Chicago-school economics, David D. Friedman offers a spirited defense of the economic view of law. He clarifies the relationship between law and economics in clear prose that is friendly to students, lawyers, and lay readers without sacrificing the intellectual heft of the ideas presented. Friedman is the ideal spokesman for an approach to law that is controversial not because it overturns the conclusions of traditional legal scholars--it can be used to advocate a surprising variety of political positions, including both sides of such contentious issues as capital punishment--but rather because it alters the very nature of their arguments. For example, rather than viewing landlord-tenant law as a matter of favoring landlords over tenants or tenants over landlords, an economic analysis makes clear that a bad law injures both groups in the long run. And unlike traditional legal doctrines, economics offers a unified approach, one that applies the same fundamental ideas to understand and evaluate legal rules in contract, property, crime, tort, and every other category of law, whether in modern day America or other times and places--and systems of non-legal rules, such as social norms, as well. This book will undoubtedly raise the discourse on the increasingly important topic of the economics of law, giving both supporters and critics of the economic perspective a place to organize their ideas.
Law’s Order is webbed on my site, in two forms --a late draft in HTML, and page images
of the published book:
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Laws_Order_draft/laws_order_ToC.htm
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/laws_order/index.shtml
... This could involve considering factors such as the nature of the business, the potential impact of the discriminatory practice, and the availability of alternatives for the affected party. As Friedman suggests, "A onesize-fits-all approach to anti-discrimination law may not be sufficient to address the complexities of modern contractual relationships [15]." ...
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... This result vindicates Cardozo's intuition for the presence of a "technological" force driving the evolution of precedent toward efficiency despite the vagaries of individual judges." 6 For an interesting discussion of the application of efficiency to legal assessments and the attempt to reconcile efficiency with laissez-faire, see (Friedman 2000). See also (Hayek 2012, 64) : "The myopic view of science that concentrates on the study of particular facts because they alone are empirically observable, and whose advocates even pride themselves on not being guided by such a conception of the overall order as can be obtained only by what they call 'abstract speculation', by no means increases our power of shaping a desirable order, but in fact deprives us of all effective guidance for successful action." ...
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... Thus, through rationality, taking into account the current legal system, the individual will analyze the individual costs and benefits to make the best decision for himself. In this scenario, the relationship between Law and Economics is not merely financial, but has implications of rational choice, resulting in the effects of legislation on the behavior of individuals, so that it will take into account all externalities arising from their conduct [29] . ...
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The present article aimed to analyze the application of the economic analysis of Law as a reference for the reasoning of judicial decisions. To that end, an analysis was carried out on the definitions of what is hermeneutics and economic analysis of law, based on the construction of the matrix rule of conduct for public administration. The method of the approach followed was empirical dialectical, using bibliographic, legislative and jurisprudential research, having a reference to the Law and Economics.
... Some foreign economists (Friedman, 2000;Gelderman et al., 2020;Khantimirov et al., 2020;Bag, 2018) and jurists (White, 2009;Cimino, 2015;Kelly, 2011;de los Reyes Jr. & Martin, 2019) vol. 04, n°. ...
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Behavioural uncertainty is an important factor in building contractual relations, which can lead to significant risks in the process of concluding and implementing a contract as the main tool for economic exchange. This article explores the most typical types of opportunistic contracts, based on the personal business experience of the authors and on the practice of interaction between business entities in today’s Russian economy. An opportunistic (mined) contract is a written procedure for the interaction of economic agents providing for some contract terms and conditions that can significantly change the economic effect of the contract execution with an unjustified benefit for one of the parties to the detriment of the other party to the contract, which is not obvious at first glance, but can happen in the process of the contract implementation (or under the impact of a certain combination of external factors). The authors give a definition of an opportunistic contract, define its characteristics and consider some practical examples of the contractual opportunism manifestation. They conclude that the fundamental precondition for the widespread institutional practice of opportunistic (mined) contracts is an insufficient effectiveness of the judicial system and the judicial and other mechanisms for protecting the violated rights of business entities. The main negative effect of opportunistic contracts on economic processes is a significant increase in transaction costs.
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Chapter
This chapter uses the insights from Chapter 9 to examine the meaning of harm, and, by extension, the appropriate content of criminal law. The idea of reciprocal causation implies that harm is not a clearly defined concept, but is only understood in relation to a particular definition of legal rights. This is a manifestation of the fundamental economic insight that harm can always be defined as a foregone benefit, and benefit as an avoided harm. The chapter draws out the implications of this idea for contemporary policy debates regarding civil disobedience, cancel culture, expression of identity, freedom of speech, and victimless crimes. It concludes by acknowledging the limit of economic theory for determining the meaning of harm.
Chapter
This chapter examines doctrines in criminal law that limit an injurer’s liability. The chief of these is intent, which is a pre-requisite for finding a defendant criminally responsible. The chapter discusses the meaning of intent, and how crimes differ from torts. It also discusses procedural safeguards for criminal defendants, including the presumption of innocence and the warrant requirement for searches and seizures of evidence (as enforced by the exclusionary rule). Other protections include non-prosecution for failed attempts, and the defenses of entrapment, mistaken beliefs, and ignorance of the law. The chapter also discusses leniency for first offenses based on the idea of redemption, and concludes by offering a justification for intentional non-enforcement of certain laws.
Chapter
This chapter discusses criminal doctrines that shift liability, in whole or in part, to individuals who were not the actual cause of the harm. Topics include the felony murder rule, preventive enforcement of the law, and collective responsibility for harm (group punishment). Although the latter is generally associated with ancient legal practices, some forms of it persist in modern law. The chapter offers economic reasons for this and concludes by relating collective responsibility to insurance.
Chapter
This chapter discusses the legal institutions charged with assigning responsibility. These consist primarily of tort law for accidental harms, and criminal law for intentional harms. Secular law most likely evolved out of moral precepts that predated the existence of the state, and which acted to promote socially desirable behavior. An economic perspective on law is that it “prices” harmful behavior, thereby curbing it to an acceptable level. A consequence of this perspective is that the distinction between accidental and intentional harm is not important. This will be a theme throughout the book. This chapter also discusses the divergence between the ideal and the actual functioning of the law. Specific problems considered are the costs of detecting those who cause harm, particularly when it was done intentionally, and the credibility of threats to impose punishment when an offender is caught. Finally, the costs of proving legal responsibility as a pre-requisite to imposing punishment are discussed.
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This essay aims to examine adverse inferences in the context of evidence production in arbitration in light of the economic analysis of law. In the conduct of arbitration proceedings, adverse inferences play a significant role in clarifying the facts, shaping the strategies of the parties, and influencing the decision-making of arbitrators. The topic has received limited normative treatment, and legal scholarship attempts to propose a systematization of the institution, which still appears to be underdeveloped. Therefore, we will present a framework for the application of adverse inferences based on legal, economic, and logical parameters, as well as an analysis of arbitration cases where the subject matter has been addressed.
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