Unfair allocation of gains under equal price in cooperative purchasing

Abstract

Cooperative purchasing is becoming more and more common practice. However, many cooperative initiatives end prematurely or do not flourish. Important reasons indi-cated for these problems are directly or indirectly related to the unfair allocation of gains. The purpose of this paper is to analyse causes of unfairness in current cooperative practices, and in particular unfairness resulting from using the Equal Price allocation concept. I suggest that the unfair effects of this commonly used concept are caused by neglecting a specific part of the added value of cooperative initiative members. Moreover, I prove that when using the Equal Price concept organisations will receive fewer gains if they increase their volume past 38% of the total volume of a cooperative initiative. In case of a constant total volume I prove that Equal Price reaches its maximum pay-off when the volume of an organisation equals 25%. I conclude by emphasizing the importance of cooperative members becoming aware of allocation concept problems. Further research will involve possible solutions to these problems.

Full text

Working Paper – Bursary Winner
IPSERA 2005 Conference 20-23 March 2005, Archamps, France
Unfair allocation of gains under equal price
in cooperative purchasing
SCHOTANUS FREDO
1
Abstract / Summary
Cooperative purchasing is becoming more and more common practice. However,
many cooperative initiatives end prematurely or do not flourish. Important reasons indi-
cated for these problems are directly or indirectly related to the unfair allocation of gains.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse causes of unfairness in current cooperative
practices, and in particular unfairness resulting from using the Equal Price allocation
concept. I suggest that the unfair effects of this commonly used concept are caused by
neglecting a specific part of the added value of cooperative initiative members.
Moreover, I prove that when using the Equal Price concept organisations will receive
fewer gains if they increase their volume past 38% of the total volume of a cooperative
initiative. In case of a constant total volume I prove that Equal Price reaches its maximum
pay-off when the volume of an organisation equals 25%. I conclude by emphasizing the
importance of cooperative members becoming aware of allocation concept problems.
Further research will involve possible solutions to these problems.
Key words
Cooperative purchasing; allocation of gains; equal price; cooperative game
theory.
1
University of Twente Initiative for Purchasing Studies (UTIPS), University of Twente, PO Box 217, 7500 AE
Enschede, Netherlands; Tel.: +31 (0)53 489 4715. Email:
http://www.bbt.utwente.nl/ompl/chairs/utips/staff/Schotanus
14
th
Annual IPSERA 2005 Conference, Archamps, France
975

UNFAIR ALLOCATION OF GAINS UNDER EQUAL PRICE IN COOPERATIVE PURCHASING
Introduction
Cooperative purchasing initiatives as purchasing consortia, purchasing groups, and buying
offices are not a new idea (Hendrick, 1997). Studies of cooperative purchasing go back as far
as 1927 (Mitchell). Ever since, many definitions have been used for cooperative purchasing.
In this paper cooperative purchasing is defined as the sharing or bundling of purchasing
related information, experiences, processes, resources or volumes to improve the performance
of all participating organisations.
Cooperative purchasing has received relatively little attention in purchasing
management research. In addition, cooperative purchasing research so far has focused
primarily on inductive explanations of practice and qualitative deductive reasoning (Laing,
1997; Mudambi, 2004). The use of quantitative deductive reasoning has been limited until
now (Essig, 1998; Heijboer, 2003). The lack of research attention seems unjustified, with
cooperative purchasing being more and more well-established (Doucette, 1997; Macie, 1995;
Major, 1997; Sickinger, 1996; Zentes, 2000).
One specific issue receiving little research attention is the allocation of the direct
financial gains resulting from cooperative purchasing. Important reasons indicated for
cooperative purchasing problems – dealing with differences in size, anti-trust, no commitment
and ‘fear of parasites’ – are related to the allocation of gains (Heijboer, 2003; Schotanus,
2004).
Usually, purchasing consortia use the so-called Equal Price (EP) allocation concept
for allocating price savings obtained by pooling their purchasing power: all organisations pay
the same price per item. While practically appealing, EP may lead to unfair outcomes. For
instance, the situation could occur that an organisation increases its purchases through the
initiative, but in return receives a smaller amount of the total gains. This could slow down
potential growth and harm the stability of the cooperative initiative.
This has been reported previously by Heijboer (2003), but a systematic analysis is
still lacking. Furthermore, it seems that many consortia using EP are unaware of its potential
unfairness. To this end an in-depth survey was carried out as a foundation for this paper
(Schotanus, 2004). All cooperative initiatives in this survey used EP. Most initiatives (73%)
indicated not being aware of all possible unfairness effects of EP. The actual financial gains
are on average indicated as being the most important reason to purchase cooperatively. Other
studies confirm these results (Aylesworth, 2003).
This paper provides an analytical analysis of unfair outcomes of using EP, provides
recommendations for purchasing consortia as how to deal with it, and contributes to more
awareness and understanding of the problem. In a more general sense this paper aims to
contribute to the quantitative deductive development of purchasing management. The main
questions in this paper are: (1) how does EP lead to unfair outcomes, and (2) which
circumstances determine the extent of unfairness?
The organisation of the paper is as follows. First, I develop a formal model of
cooperative purchasing that enables analysing unfairness effects while using EP. In the next
section I use the model to investigate what exactly makes EP result in unfair outcomes. I do
this by decomposing the added value of a consortium into three components and study how
applying EP affects each component separately. In the following section I study how the
degree of unfairness is affected by the relative stake of each consortium member. In the final
sections I discuss the limitations of the research, draw conclusions, and provide recom-
mendations for purchasing consortia and scholars in the field.
14
th
Annual IPSERA 2005 Conference, Archamps, France
976

SCHOTANUS F.
A cooperative purchasing model
To analyse the effects of the Equal Price (EP) allocation concept, I model cooperative purcha-
sing initiatives by taking into account price reduction due to economies of scale (Heijboer,
2003). Of course other issues also play a role in the success of establishing and managing
cooperative initiatives. Here I focus on the actual cooperative financial gains as this is
indicated as being an important reason to purchase cooperatively. Furthermore, quantity
discounts of some products may be very dependent to i.e. individual transportation costs,
decreasing the direct cooperative financial gains. These items are left out of the focus.
For the price per item p(q) I assume a decreasing volume discount is given, with more
items being purchased. Of course there is a minimum price p
0
, so p(q) is a convex function.
This gives the demand elasticity of price: the change in percentage in the price resulting from
a change in percentage in the quantity demanded (Ramsay, 1981).
In addition, I assume the total purchasing volume
(
)
qpq
⋅
to be increasing with the
number of items being bought. These assumptions hold for many practical situations (Dolan,
1987; Melymuka, 2001). This model is defined as a Cooperative Purchasing-game or CP-
game(N,q,p) (Heijboer, 2003). N is the number of organisations, q is the number of items each
organisation i wants to purchase and p is the price per item. The total gains function v(S) of
each coalition S is defined as the gains it generates by buying items together compared to the
situation where each of the organisations has to buy these items on its own:
() ( ()) ( )ii i
iS iS iS
vS q pq q p q
∈∈
=⋅−⋅
∑∑
i
∈
∑
(1)
The model builds on cooperative game theory. In cooperative game theory it is assumed that
gains can be made when all players cooperate. One of the problems that are addressed in this
theory is how to divide these gains in a fair way among all players. Each of the players should
receive a fair part of the total gains (Dyer, 2000).
Unfairness illustrated
With the following case I will illustrate the gain allocation effects of current practices in
cooperative purchasing. Consider 3 organisations purchasing 60 items cooperatively. The
price p for the items as a function of the quantity q that will be ordered is known as:
()
2
01
1
( ) 959 (1 )=⋅+ = ⋅+
i
ii
c
pq p c
qq
for q
i
> 0 (2)
Here p
0
represents the minimum price, c
1
and c
2
are used to further shape and scale the
function. The three organisations use the EP-concept: all organisations pay the price that can
be obtained with the volume of the grand coalition N. This case can be modelled into a CP-
game as is shown in Table 1.
Working Paper
977

UNFAIR ALLOCATION OF GAINS UNDER EQUAL PRICE IN COOPERATIVE PURCHASING
Table 1: CP-game for three organisations
Coalition S Quantity Price per item Total v(S)
{1}
{2}
{3}
35
10
15
1.121
1.262
1.207
39.246
12.625
18.102
0
0
0
{1,2}
{1,3}
{2,3}
45
50
25
1.102
1.095
1.151
49.597
54.741
28.775
2.273
2.607
1.952
{1,2,3}=N 60 1.083 64.980 4.993
Now the gains that each case organisation receives when the cooperative initiative {1,2,3}
uses the EP-concept can be calculated and analysed:
Organisation i gains: q
i
· (p(q
i
)
- p(q
N
)) while using EP
Organisation 1 gains: 35 · (1.121 – 1.083) = 1.341 (largest organisation)
Organisation 2 gains: 10 · (1.262 – 1.083) = 1.795 (smallest organisation)
Organisation 3 gains: 15 · (1.207 – 1.083) = 1.857
Total gains: 1.341 + 1.795 + 1.857 = 4.993
A remarkable outcome is that using EP leads to a situation where the largest organisation
receives the smallest part of the total gains. The smallest organisation however receives the
largest part of the total gains. The largest organisation could object to this allocation, as the
largest organisation adds the most value to the cooperative initiative. The smallest organi-
sation adds the least value, as will be shown in the next section. Such an unfair situation could
lead to instability in the cooperative initiative, because the largest player could leave the
initiative or could lower its commitment.
How does Equal Price lead to unfairness?
In this section I extend the model to investigate the underlying mechanism that causes EP to
produce unfair outcomes. I do this by formally defining the added value of consortia, breaking
it down into three components, and studying the impact of EP on each component.
The added value of a purchasing consortium
In real life situations organisations can add value in several ways to a cooperative initiative.
Here, the added value, or in other words the total gains an organisation creates for the
cooperative initiative, is defined as the total gains of the coalition minus the value the other
organisations can establish without organisation i (Borm, 1992):
(
)
(
)
{
}
(
)
\
i
M
vvNvNi=− (3)
Note that in the model the larger the organisation is, the more value this organisation adds to
the initiative. Given M
i
(v) the added value of the case organisations 1 and 2 is:
Organisation 1 Added Value: 4.993 – 1.952 = 3.041 (largest organisation)
Organisation 2 Added Value: 4.993 – 2.607 = 2.386 (smallest organisation)
To obtain more insight into the added value, I split this value into three different parts: (1)
gains for and by an organisation created by joining a cooperative initiative (m
i
), (2) gains
14
th
Annual IPSERA 2005 Conference, Archamps, France
978

SCHOTANUS F.
created by an organisation for the other organisations in the initiative (n
i
) and, (3) gains for an
organisation created by the other organisations in the initiative (o
i
). The added value M
1
of i.e.
case organisation 1 can be divided into these three types of gains as is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: gains of organisation 1
Gains Description Calculation Total
m
i
= gains for and by 1
:
/
(min ( ), ( ) ( ))
j
i
ii
Si S
jSi iN
qpqpqpq
∈
∈∈
⎧⎫
=⋅ −
⎨⎬
⎩⎭
∑
∑
=35
⋅
(1.121-1.083)
=1.341
n
i
= gains by 1 for N \ {1}
//
(( ) ( ))
j
jj
jSi jSi jS
qp q p q
∈∈ ∈
=⋅ −
∑∑∑
=25
⋅
(1.151-1.083)
=1.700
o
i
= gains for 1 by N \ {1}
:
/
max ( ( ) ( )),0j
ii
Si S
jSi
qpq p q
∈
∈
⎧⎫
=⋅−
⎨⎬
⎩⎭
∑
=35
⋅
(1.121-1.121)
=0
Total maximum claim of 1 =M
1
=3.041
Equal Price neglects one component of the added value
The EP-concept neglects one component of the added value as is shown in theorem and proof
1:
Theorem 1
The Equal Price concept neglects n
i.
Proof
(
)
/
/
// /
(() ( ))
(() ( )) ( ) ()
(() ( )) ( ) ()
(()( )( )( )) ( )()
(() ( )) 0 (
iii i
iN
ij
ii i
iN jSi
ij
ii i
iN jSi
jji j
ii i
jSi jSi iN jSi
i
ii
iN
equalprice v q p q p q
qpq p q p q pq
qpq p q p q pq
qpqp qp qpq p q pq
qpq p q p q
∈
∈∈
∈∈
∈∈∈ ∈
∈
=⋅ −
⎧
⋅− ≤
⎪
=
⎨
⋅− >
⎪
⎩
⋅+ − − ≤
=
⋅− +
∑
∑∑
∑∑
∑∑∑ ∑
∑
/
:
:
/ /
)()
(min ( ), ( ) ( )) max ( ( ) ( )),0
j
i
jSi
ji
ii ii
Si S
Si S
jSi iN jSi
ii
pq
qpqpqpq qpqpq
mo
∈
∈
∈
∈∈ ∈
⎧
⎪
⎨
>
⎪
⎩
j
⎧
⎫⎧
=⋅ − + ⋅ −
⎫
⎨
⎬⎨
⎩⎭ ⎩
=+
∑
∑∑ ∑
⎬
⎭
Because n
i
is neglected, EP is unfair in situations where organisations differ significantly in
size:
Organisation 1 Equal Price: (m
1
+ o
1
) = 1.341 (largest organisation)
Organisation 2 Equal Price: (m
2
+ o
2
) = 1.795 (smallest organisation)
Organisation 1 Added Value: (m
1
+ o
1
) + n
1
= 1.341 + 1.700 = 3.041
Organisation 2 Added Value: (m
2
+ o
2
) + n
2
= 1.795 + 591 = 2.386
Working Paper
979

UNFAIR ALLOCATION OF GAINS UNDER EQUAL PRICE IN COOPERATIVE PURCHASING
Relationship between the degree of unfairness
in the outcomes and presence of relatively large members
and general rules
The impact of member size on m
i
, n
i
, and o
i
In the model there are three disadvantages to the EP-concept which apply especially to large
members. First, n
i
is always increasing with more items being purchased by organisation i.
Therefore it becomes less attractive for larger cooperative members to use the EP-concept.
After all, n
i
is not incorporated in this concept, and the larger the value of n
i
, the more these
members are put at a disadvantage.
The second disadvantage is that o
i
becomes 0 after a certain point. This point is
independent of the price structure (p
0
, c
1
, c
2
), the number of organisations, and the division of
the volumes of these organisations. The point where o
i
becomes 0 is always reached when the
volume of organisation i equals exactly 50% of the total volume of the initiative. In such a
case a large organisation i using the EP-concept receives just the value of m
i
+ o
i
= m
i
+ 0 =
m
i
. The maximum value of o
i
is always reached when the volume of organisation i equals
exactly 20% of the total volume. This part of the o
i
-disadvantage applies therefore to
organisations purchasing more than 20% of the total cooperative volume. In this case larger
organisations receive a relatively small part of o
i
. Proofs have been omitted here.
Thirdly, past the point where the volume of large organisation i exceeds 50% of the
total cooperative volume, m
i
will become smaller by an increasing volume of organisation i.
At least past this point the total EP-outcomes always decrease - as o
i
is already 0 - even if this
organisation increases its volume through the initiative.
The 38% rule
Figure 1: Type of gains for organisation 2 with different quantities
of q
2
while q
1+3
= 50 is constant
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 99%
q
2
as a percentage of q
1
+ q
3
M
2
n o m
equalprice
i
equalprice
i
+ n
i
= M
i
14
th
Annual IPSERA 2005 Conference, Archamps, France
980

SCHOTANUS F.
Theorem 2
While using the EP concept and given the price function (2), consortium members
purchasing more than 38% of the total volume are always put at a disadvantage;
they will receive fewer gains with an increasing volume.
Proof
(
)
22
01 01
02
02
· ( ( ) - ( ))
· ( ( ) - ( ))
= · -
=
=⋅+ ⋅+
⋅⋅
⋅
ii i
i
i
i
i
equalprice v q price q price N
cc
qpc pc
qN
pcq
pc q
N
Here, and, \=+
ii
NqNq
()
02 02 02
1,5
02 02 02
1,5
1,5
1,5
' - + 0
2
2
- + 0
2
2
11
- + 0
2
2
11
- + 0
2
2
1
+ - 2 0
3 - 5
= = 38 %
2
⋅⋅ ⋅⋅
==
⋅⋅ ⋅⋅
=
=
⋅
=⋅ =
⋅
=
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
pc pc pcq
equalprice v
N
qN
pc pc pcq
N
qN
q
N
qN
FFR N
if q FFR N then
N
FFR N N
FFR
FFR
FFR
The only dependent variable in this proof is η in the following continuous price function:
()
2
01
()
η
=⋅+
i
i
c
pq p c
q
for q
i
> 0 (4)
η represents the elasticity of the price function. Until now I assumed η always being 0,5.
However, 0,5 is an estimated average value (Dolan, 1987) and in practice η may vary. For
values of η between -1 and 1 the following function applies (see also Figure 2):
1
10
ηη
ηη
+
⋅−−+FFR FFR = (5)
Working Paper
981

UNFAIR ALLOCATION OF GAINS UNDER EQUAL PRICE IN COOPERATIVE PURCHASING
Figure 2: Dependency of FFR to η
(for all η the maximum added value is reached by q=100%)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
-1,0 -0,5 0,0 0,5 1,0
elasticity
FFR
Unfair area
Fair area
With an elasticity of 1,0 and a corresponding FFR of 0%, all organisations increasing their
volume through the consortium will receive fewer gains. The smallest organisation will
always receive the largest part of the gains. The largest organisation will always receive the
smallest part of the gains.
The 25% rule
The 38% rule applies to organisations increasing or decreasing their cooperative volume. Now
I consider the situation where the total volume of a consortium is fixed. Figure 3 illustrates
this scenario for different quantities of organisation 2.
Figure 3: Type of gains for organisation 2 with different quantities
of q
2
while N is constant
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
0% 25% 50% 75% 99%
q
2
as a percentage of q
1
+ q
3
M
2
n o m
equalprice
i
equalprice
i
+ n
i
= M
i
14
th
Annual IPSERA 2005 Conference, Archamps, France
982

SCHOTANUS F.
At the point where q
2
becomes 50% of the total volume, the added value of this organisation
reaches its maximum value. At the point where q
2
becomes 25% of the total volume, the EP-
outcome for organisation 2 already reaches its maximum. With theorem and proof 3 I prove
that this is always the case in the model. Again, this percentage is independent of p
o
, c
1
and c
2
in the price structure, the number of organisations, and the division of the volumes of these
organisations.
To conclude, when using EP and assuming a continuous price function, organisations
purchasing 25% of the total volume will receive the maximum allocation of gains. Larger or
smaller members will receive a smaller amount of gains. I define 25% as the Second Fairness
Ratio (SFR) of EP with an average price function.
Theorem 3
While using the EP concept and given the price function (2), consortium members
purchasing 25% of the total volume will receive the maximum allocation of gains.
Proof
(
)
02
02
· ( ( ) - ( ))
= · -
=
⋅⋅
⋅
ii i
i
i
equalprice v q price q price N
pcq
pc q
N
Here, and,
=Nfixed
()
02 02
' - 0
2
11
- 0
2
4
25%
⋅⋅
==
=
=
=⋅ =
i
i
i
i
i
pc pc
equalprice v
qN
qN
N
q
if q SFR N then SFR
Once more, the dependent variable in this proof is η. If η = -1, SFR = 50%. This is a fair
situation as SFR equals the point where the added value reaches its maximum (50%). When η
> -1, SFR < 50%, this could lead to an unfair situation as SFR reaches its maximum before the
added value does. For SFR the following function applies (see also Figure 4):
()
1
1
η
η
=− ≤SFR FFR (6)
Working Paper
983

UNFAIR ALLOCATION OF GAINS UNDER EQUAL PRICE IN COOPERATIVE PURCHASING
Figure 4: Dependency of SFR to η
(for all η the maximum added value is reached by q=50%)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
-1,0 -0,5 0,0 0,5 1,0
elasticity
SFR
Unfair area
Fair area
Limitations and further research
Before I draw conclusions I point out the main limitations of the research that should be taken
into account. First, modelling continuous price functions is a simplification of reality. In
reality usually graduated prices are used when quantity discounts apply (Munson, 1998). For
instance, a price of 4.000 applies to 50-99 items, and a price of 3.900 applies to 100-199
items. However, when an organisation needs 98 items it will usually negotiate a lower price
than 4.000, or otherwise it will order 100 items. Therefore, I use a continuous price function in
stead of a graduated price function. All different forms of graduated prices (Dolan, 1987) can
be approximated by a continuous price function. Other researchers also proposed the existence
of continuous price functions (i.e. Dolan, 1987; Jeuland, 1983; Spence, 1977).
Secondly, I do not take into account the costs of cooperating and other advantages
than financial gains. This could compensate unfairness effects. Furthermore, in some cases a
smaller company may be able to negotiate a lower price than a larger company. Obviously the
suitability of purchasing consortia may be questioned here.
To increase the relevance and applicability of the results, further research will
incorporate (1) taking into account cooperative initiative setup and transaction costs, (2) taking
more benefits of cooperation into account than just volume discounts and (3) finding solutions
to unfairness problems by i.e. taking into account the total added value of partners.
Conclusion
In this paper I show that the Equal Price concept ignores an important part of the added value
of organisations. Therefore this concept results in unfair allocations of gains for large
members of cooperative initiatives, as buying groups or (electronic) purchasing consortia.
Moreover, I conclude that under the assumption of a convex and continuously
differentiable average price function and using Equal Price, organisations increasing their
14
th
Annual IPSERA 2005 Conference, Archamps, France
984

SCHOTANUS F.
volume past 38% of the total volume of a cooperative initiative will receive fewer gains. Even
though their added value and the total gains of the cooperative initiative increase.
Furthermore, I conclude that the Equal Price value always reaches its maximum when the
volume of an organisation becomes 25% of the total constant volume of a cooperative
initiative. As a result it becomes less attractive for larger organisations to cooperate.
To conclude, if organisations are unequal in size - or size differences among
previously similar members increase steadily - and they use the Equal Price concept, it is
important that they address this issue in an open manner and develop solutions for it in order
to avoid instability of the cooperative initiative on the longer term.
References
Aylesworth, M. (2003). Purchasing consortia in the public sector, models and methods for
success. Paper presented at the International Supply Management Conference and
Educational Exhibit.
Borm, P., H. Keiding, R. Mclean, S. Oortwijn and S. Tijs. (1992). The Compromise Value for
NTU-Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 21(2), 175-189.
Dolan, R.J. (1987). Quantity discounts: managerial issues and research opportunities.
Marketing Science, 6(1), 1-22.
Doucette, W.R. (1997). Influences on member commitment to group purchasing
organizations. Journal of Business research, 40, 183-189.
Dyer, J.H. (2000). Collaborative advantage, winning through extended enterprise supplier
networks, Oxford University Press, New York.
Essig, M. (1998). Cooperative sourcing; Erklärung und Gestaltung horizontaler Beschaffungs-
kooperationen in der Industrie. Peter Lang.
Essig, M. (2000). Purchasing consortia as symbiotic relationships: developing the concept of
consortium sourcing. European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 6, 13-22.
Heijboer, G. (2003). Mathematical and statistical analysis of initial purchasing decisions. PhD-
thesis, University of Twente, Enschede.
Hendrick, T.E. (1997). Purchasing consortiums: horizontal alliances among firms buying com-
mon goods and services what? who? why? how?
Jeuland, A.P. And S. M. Shugan (1983). Managing Channel Profits, Marketing Science, 2(3)
239-272.
Laing, A., Cotton, S. (1997). Patterns of inter-organizational purchasing, EJPSM, 3(2), 89-91.
Macie, K.E. (1995). The purchasing consortium - is it right for my company? Paper presented
at the NAPM Annual International Conference.
Major, M. J. (1997). Purchasing's best kept secret. Purchasing Today(May).
Melymuka, K. (2001). Efficient? Become superefficient, Computerworld, September.
Mitchell, W.N. (1927). Purchasing. New York.
Mudambi, R.P. Schruender, A. Mongar (2004). How co-operative is co-operative purchasing
in smaller firms?: evidence from UK engineering SMEs. Long Range Planning, 37 (1).
Munson, C., M. Rosenblatt (1998), Theories and realities of quantity discounts: an exploratory
study, Production and operations management, 7(4), 352-369.
Neary, H.M. (1993). A non-co-operative bargaining model of membership expansion in a
producer co-operative, Managerial and Decision Economics, 14(5), 409-417.
Ramsay, J. (1981). Demand competition, Purchasing and supply management.
Sickinger, J.L. (1996). Coalition and consortium purchasing power: it's big, it's here, and it's
the future of strategic purchasing. Paper presented at the NAPM Annual International
Conference.
Working Paper
985

UNFAIR ALLOCATION OF GAINS UNDER EQUAL PRICE IN COOPERATIVE PURCHASING
Schotanus, F. (2004). Enhancing Trust and Stability in Purchasing Consortia: Fair Allocation
of Gains, IPSERA conference proceedings, Catania.
Spence, M. (1977), Nonlinear prices and welfare, Journal of public economics, 8, 1-18.
Yamey, B.S. (1950) The price policies of co-operative societies, Economica, 17(65), 23-42
Zentes, J.a.S., B. (2000). Allied groups on the road to complex networks. Technology in
Society, 22.
14
th
Annual IPSERA 2005 Conference, Archamps, France
986