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Indoctrination, Imagination and Moral Education
Dr Charlene Tan
National Institute of Education
Nanyang Technological University
Email: hpctan@nie.edu.sg
Introduction
Indoctrination has been described as the paralysis of one’s intellectual imagination where
that mind becomes closed on those issues which are fundamentally open, and the capacity
for imaginative enterprise is severely diminished. While this definition of indoctrination
is uncontroversial, the problem arises in the area of moral education. Given the fact that
children have yet to possess moral autonomy and acquire a moral point of view, a number
of philosophers have argued that indoctrination is inevitable in moral education. This
conclusion poses a dilemma for parents and teachers who desire to teach moral values to
their children and students without indoctrinating them. This paper argues that such a
dilemma stems from a flawed understanding of indoctrination. By presenting a more
complete understanding of indoctrination and the process of moral education, this paper
shows how children can be taught a set of substantive moral principles and values in a
non-indoctrinatory way. Far from paralyzing one’s intellectual imagination, such a
conception of moral education encourages moral autonomy and, in the process, educates
imaginative minds.
Indoctrination and Imagination
Indoctrination is commonly regarded as reprehensible and antithetical to education or
some educational ideals such as rationality, autonomy or open-mindedness. In particular,
a number of philosophers have described indoctrination as the paralysis of one’s
intellectual imagination (Laura, 1981; 1983; Laura and Leahy, 1989; Leahy and Laura,
1997; Neiman, 1987; Tan, 2004). The imagination of an indoctrinated person is paralyzed
in three ways. Firstly, the person holds to beliefs or values without any good reasons or
rational justification.
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Bruce Suttle defines indoctrination as an activity intended to
produce a set of beliefs accompanied by the person’s being denied the rationale for the
alleged truth of the beliefs (1981, p. 152). William Losito avers that teachers should not
indoctrinate values “in such a way so as to avoid the consideration of the evidence in
support of those values” (1990, p. 109). Secondly, an indoctrinated person not only lacks
good reasons for holding to beliefs; he or she is unable to justify these beliefs. In other
words, such a person has an uncritical spirit. Peter Wager regards indoctrination as
“causing a person to hold a belief which they are unable to justify on rational grounds”
(1981, p. 192). Similarly, R.S. Peters defines indoctrination as “getting children to accept
a fixed body of rules by the use of techniques which incapacitate them from adopting a
critical autonomous attitude toward them” (1973, p. 71). An indoctrinated person is
incapable of critically inquiring into the worthiness of the belief (Siegel, 1988, p. 80).
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Such a person is “fitted with a frame of mind which discourages any critical analysis and
evaluation of the beliefs” (Suttle, 1981, p. 152). Michael Taylor adds that “indoctrination
impairs the ability to hold beliefs on the grounds that there are better reasons for holding
these particular beliefs than others; so indoctrination interferes with the ability to be self-
determining with regard to beliefs and judgments” (1985, p. 25). In such a case, the
child’s moral autonomy is limited. Joseph Kupfer explains:
Indoctrination typically supplies authoritarian principles for the authoritarian
personality to follow. …. Moral education is incompatible with imparting
authoritarian beliefs because the content of authoritarian beliefs necessarily limits
the moral autonomy of children by constraining them to think in prescribed ways.
(1994, p. 63).
The third aspect is closed-mindedness, as evidenced by the inability to consider
alternatives. Laura elaborates that “the mind becomes closed on those issues which are
fundamentally open, and the inability to imagine things as they are not imprisons the
human being in the world of things as they are” (1983, p. 45). In other words, the person
holds to a dogmatic style of belief where the domain of intellectual freedom is constricted
rather than enlarged. Since dogmas set authoritarian limits, not logical limits, to what it is
permissible to think, all forms of dogmatism “close minds, and a closed mind is nothing
more than a paralysis of imagination” (Laura, 1981, p. 10). Alven Neiman (1987)
highlights the importance of having the ability to imagine alternatives and the willingness
to consider their point and worth: “Any educational system that intends to prohibit this
sort of imaginative enterprise, or inherently results in severely diminished capacities for
such imagination, indoctrinates” (1987, p. 244).
Indoctrination and Moral Education
This understanding of indoctrination as the paralysis of one’s intellectual imagination -
characterized by the absence of any rational justification for one’s beliefs or values, the
inability to justify one’s beliefs and values, and the inability to consider alternatives –
poses a problem for moral education. Given the fact that children have yet to possess
moral autonomy and acquire a moral point of view, a number of philosophers have
argued that indoctrination is inevitable in moral education. Firstly, there is a need to
indoctrinate the child to possess certain desirable habits of conduct and positive character
traits, in particular, moral reasoning and promote moral autonomy. A.C. Kazepides avers
that “since young children are not capable of deliberately choosing to do the right action
or capable of being persuaded rationally, some non-rational methods … must be used in
order to insure inculcation of the desirable habits of conduct” (1969, p. 178). Wagner
adds that “educators generally recognize that the students must be indoctrinated into
appreciating those character traits that one will subsequently adopt freely as a member of
the life form of educated persons” (1982, p. 191). Calling this dilemma “the paradox of
moral education”, Peters elaborates on the need to indoctrinate:
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What then is the paradox of moral education as I conceive it? It is this: given that it
is desirable to develop people who conduct themselves rationally, intelligently, and
with a fair degree of spontaneity, the brute facts of child development reveal that at
the most formative years of a child’s development he is incapable of this form of
life and impervious to the proper manner of passing it on (1966, p. 271).
Secondly, there is a need to indoctrinate the child to acquire a moral point of view. Suttle
explains:
(S)ince it is impossible to be initiated into the moral order by means of moral
reasons and evidence, it follows that however one acquires membership in the
moral order – that is, going from an amoral point of view to a moral point of view –
it could not have been due to being moved by moral considerations. In essence then,
having a general moral point of view which allows and requires one to take into
account the moral significance of things is most likely the product of moral
indoctrination (1981, p. 156).
Arguing that indoctrination is inevitable, C.J.B. Macmillan writes that “(i)nsofar as a set
of fundamental convictions is necessary for an individual to enter into any language
games[sic], then the mode of teaching comes very close to what recent commentators
consider indoctrination” (1983, p. 370). R. Scruton, A. Ellis-Jones and D. O’Keefe also
reason that since “a large part of morality” is marked by “foregone conclusions”, moral
education should therefore consist in large part in “a concerted attempt to induce a closed
mind” (1985, p. 286). In the same vein, Taylor (1985) posits that the facts of child
development make the use of indoctrination “necessary” and “successful” in moral
education. This is affirmed by James Garrison who describes indoctrination as
“inevitable” and “desirable” and even goes as far as to assert that “this failure to
indoctrinate would perhaps be analogous to murder, or at the very least, abortion” (1986,
p. 272). Others who agree that moral indoctrination is inevitable include Basil Mitchell
(1990) and Charles Harvey (1997).
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Non-Indoctrinatory Non-Directive Moral Education
J.B. Connors (1998) observes that fears of indoctrination used by the Nazis and
Communists to train their youth led post-war educators to strip moral education of its
emotional appeals in favor of critical thinking or rational strategies. The assumption is
that indoctrination is avoided when students are allowed to make their own decisions and
discover values for themselves (Connors, 1998; Kilpatrick, 1992; Lickona, 1991; Ryan,
1994). The underlying concern of indoctrination is part of the reason for the origin and
popularity of non-directive moral education. For instance, Ann Margaret Sharp advocates
the “community of inquiry” for moral education at elementary school level where the aim
is to help children understand and use the tools of inquiry so they can arrive at their own
answers. Explaining the advantage of this value-neutral method, she writes: “Such an
education is the antithesis of indoctrination as it aims to give children the intellectual
tools that they need to think autonomously about moral issues, … and eventually move
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toward the formation of their own answers” (1984, p. 3). Other well-known examples are
the Values Clarification approach and the Moral Dilemmas approach of Lawrence
Kohlberg (1978; 1981). The first approach seeks to merely clarify values or preferences
by helping children and teenagers to consider their own preferences and predict possible
resultant consequences. As long as one is clear about one’s preferences, the goal of moral
education is thereby achieved. Followers of Kohlberg, on the other hand, aim to provide
the “structure” by encouraging the students to give reasons for their moral choices at a
higher stage of moral development. In both approaches, moral content is eschewed on the
grounds that to teach that anything is morally right or wrong is indoctrinatory. As
William Hare observes, any form of didacticism, moralizing and authoritarianism is set
aside in favor of Socratic questioning where the teacher maintains absolute neutrality
(1987, p. 105). The prevalence of this non-directive moral education is seen in the
Humanities Curriculum Project of the Schools Council in England and the Canadian
Critical Issues Series in Canada. Their position is summarized by Lawrence Stenhouse,
the director of the Humanities Curriculum Project who pronounces that “the teacher
could not be an arbiter of truth or warranter of knowledge” (1983, p. 168). Other attempts
to teach moral education in an non-directive manner include Ekdal Buys’ Universal
Prescriptivism (1981) and Joseph Kufper’s concept of moral autonomy (1994).
There are a few reasons why a non-directive approach to moral education is
unacceptable, the first reason being the circularity involved in the argument. Philosophers
who stress the importance of moral reasoning in the teaching of moral education already
assume that children are already capable of moral reasoning. But as pointed out earlier,
one has to use non-moral methods to teach moral values to a child who has yet to acquire
a moral point of view. This is the source of the moral dilemma faced by educators and
parents who are concerned that what they are doing is tantamount to indoctrination. Even
for children who have reached the age of reason and are capable of moral reasoning, non-
directive moral education has been criticized for teaching and promoting certain
substantive values implicitly. A case in point is the two phases in the development of
Kohlberg’s research on moral education. Jan Steutel (1997) points out that the second
phase is the “just community approach” where virtues like trust, caring, collective
responsibility, a spirit of discipline and democratic participation comprise the central
aims of moral education. Even in the first phase where the structure, rather than the
content of moral reasoning is advanced, the virtue of “will-power” which is composed of
virtues like self-control and perseverance is needed. In both phases, it is evident that
certain moral values are being espoused by the learners. Thirdly, directive moral
education is necessary as part of belief inculcation for children. Children need to be
initiated into some form of initial worldview or primary culture before they can make
sense of the world. This process of belief inculcation involves a non-rational process. For
children, rationality is possible “only when grounded upon a platform of pre-rational
training, of initiation into a form of living, acting and speaking”, for “even doubt
presupposes a bedrock of certainty gained through non-rational training” (Neiman 1989:
p. 9). This “platform of pre-rational training” is the world picture that is the substratum of
all my inquiring and asserting. These practices constitute the background that is
necessary for rational discourse to take place. It is the inherited background against which
children distinguish between true and false. Wittgenstein explains:
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The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e., it[sic] learns to act according to
these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that
system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to
shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or
convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it (1969, p. 144).
A few philosophers have elucidated this idea of initial worldview or primary culture.
Bruce Ackerman (1980) proposes the idea of a “primary culture” as a precondition for the
child to have a substantive set of practices, beliefs and values. He argues that the
“cultural coherence” provided by the family and cultural community is vital for the
individuals to develop their own views (p. 141). This is essential as a cornucopia of
discordant beliefs will only prevent the development of the child’s abilities. This view is
echoed by Peter Hobson who avers that children need to “start off with a stable
framework of reference or set of standards to guide them in regard to important decisions
that have to be made as they grow towards maturity” (1984, p. 67). This initiation of the
child into a particular way of life provides a standpoint of understanding from which to
judge it later and compare with alternative codes. In other words, the organized and stable
world with a worldview functions as a cognitive map of the world for the children
(Runzo 1989, p. 45). Toon Tarris and Gun Semin (1997) concur that the primary culture
provides a comprehensive and integrated ethical package that includes widely shared,
objectively important core values such as caring, honesty and fairness as a subset of the
religious values. Highlighting the need for parents to provide a primary culture, William
Galston argues that parents should foster strong convictions in their children so that
rational deliberation among ways of life is more meaningful (1998, p. 479). James
Giarelli explains that “a discussion of public moral education must be situated in a
concrete context in which the opportunities presented to us for participating in an ethical
life are seen as products of a particular historical and social situation” (1981: 370-371).
Laura and Leahy also posit that the absence of an initial framework for the children will
make any rational discussion impossible as the rational discussion of any issue
“presupposes acceptance, at least for the duration of the discussion, of some framework
of beliefs in virtue of which truth assessments can be made” (1989: 263). Aware of the
shortcomings of non-directive moral education, philosophers like Jonathan (1995) and
Carr (1991) have urged the teaching of shared normative frameworks and virtue ethics in
the formation of moral dispositions. Likewise, educators and policy-makers also put
forward a list of moral values or the core of desired moral values and behavior to guide
schools in teaching moral education. Any moral education must include the inculcation of
substantive moral principles and values in order for students to develop moral character.
This has been acknowledged, for example, by the Office for Standards in Education in
Britain which states that “if teachers do not take a clear and consistent stand on questions
of morality, schools can lack the necessary strengths of a strong ethos and tone, with
damaging effects”, especially for “those moral issues where there is plainly a high degree
of consensus in society” (OFSTED, 1994, pp. 11-12).
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Indoctrinatory Directive Moral Education
The desire for teachers and parents to “take a clear and consistent stand on questions of
morality” has led to some adopting a form of moral education that is directive and
indoctrinatory. Rejecting the possibility and desirability of moral autonomy and
reasoning for children, some philosophers argue that the direct inculcation of substantive
moral principles is necessary and desirable (Peters, 1966; Kazepides, 1969; Taylor, 1985;
Suttle, 1981; Wagner, 1981; Scruton, Ellis-Jones and O’Keefe, 1985). These
philosophers therefore reject non-directive moral education to favor a more directive
approach. They share the correct observation that moral reasoning is impossible for
children who have yet to possess the ability to reason morally. This leads them to the
same conclusion that a form of non-rational inculcation of moral principles, what they
regard as moral indoctrination, is necessary and desirable.
However, given the pejorative connotation of indoctrination, it is disconcerting for
parents and teachers to accept the fact that moral indoctrination is inevitable and
desirable. In fact, the fear of indoctrination hinders the effective teaching of moral values
by parents and teachers. Kupfer observes that some parents choose to let their children
develop “willy-nilly” without any moral education because “they see no way to
distinguish education from indoctrination, and they wish to avoid indoctrinating their
children” (1994, p. 59). Teachers also face this pedagogical dilemma as “there is surely
something paradoxical in insisting on skepticism in morals while maintaining that
teachers ought to tell pupils certain things and ought not to act in certain ways” (Gardner,
1989, p. 124). But does the mere fact that the child is taught certain beliefs without any
reasons given entail that indoctrination has taken place? While the philosophers are right
about the non-rational teaching of moral education for children, they err in adopting a
flawed understanding of indoctrination. I have earlier pointed out that indoctrination
refers to the paralysis of one’s intellectual imagination, characterized by the absence of
any rational justification for one’s beliefs or values, the inability to justify one’s beliefs or
values and the inability to consider alternatives. The mere fact that the children subscribe
to beliefs and values without any rational basis before they have yet to possess moral
autonomy and acquire moral values does not entail that indoctrination has taken place.
Neiman points out that the mere acceptance of doctrines or allegiance to various
authorities is not evidence of indoctrination; it is the ability to imagine alternatives and
the willingness to consider their point and worth that is indoctrinatory (Neiman, 1987, p.
244). Any talk on the development of moral reasoning and autonomy can only come after
the child has learnt certain moral principles or virtues in a non-rational manner. If parents
and teachers continue to deprive the child the reason for certain moral actions, and stifle
the child’s moral autonomy to the effect that the child remains uncritical and is unable to
imagine alternatives, then indoctrination has taken place. There is therefore a need to
propose a form of moral education which is directive and non-indoctrinatory.
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Non-Indoctrinatory Directive Moral Education
Laura and Leahy propose a framework where a set of critical apparatus is introduced to
avoid indoctrination and promote the child’s intellectual imagination. This process is
elaborated as follows:
The foundations of this critical capacity can and should be laid … in …a child’s
“primary culture”. The initial steps in this process will consist in alerting the child
to the fact that good, sensible people around him or her hold different beliefs on
whatever matters are concerned …. As the capacity grows in the child to reason
about such differences, the process of alerting him or her to the foundations of such
reasons in particular ways of seeing the world (or particular aspects of the world)
can be taken further (1989: 258).
From the above, we can identify three steps in the critical apparatus, the first being the
provision of a primary culture or framework where the child is initiated into a worldview.
The Office for Standards in Education in Britain, for example, also endorses the
recommendations of the National Curriculum Council’s list which includes telling the
truth, keeping promises, self-discipline and acting considerately towards others (1994:
12). This primary culture provides the framework for the second step where the child
learns to appreciate different beliefs and values among people. For example, it is
important for children in Western countries which emphasise values like liberalism and
individualism understand and accept the fact that some other values are exalted in other
countries. Walter Feinberg (1993), who did extensive research on the Japanese society,
reports that any concept of the individual is subsumed under the collectivistic conception
of the self and community in Japan. This is in contradistinction to the Western societies
where individualism is valued. Likewise, E. O. Iheoma, commenting on the moral
education program in Nigeria, note that “humanism and communalism”, not “Western
materialism and individualism”, are “among the most cherished and viable African
values” (1985, p. 190). Thirdly, the child is encouraged to reason about such differences
and examine the foundations for such differences. In this case, the child needs to
comprehend that different countries stress on different values due to historical, cultural,
political and social factors and critically evaluate these factors. This solution allows
children to acquire moral values in a primary culture while developing their rational
autonomy at the same time. By encouraging the child to consider the basis for one’s
beliefs and values and the alternatives to these beliefs and values, the child’s intellectual
imagination is enhanced.
This solution is supported by other philosophers who concur that moral reasoning can
only take place within a belief system. Oldenquist expresses the view that we can benefit
from reasoning about dilemmas and hard cases only if we have already accepted and
internalized a “basic core of principles”. This basic core of principles which are deeply
and confidently held are essential for any society to survive as a moral community.
Oldenquist adds that “(w)ithin the moral community they may dispute, but with
confidence that at the deepest levels they are still one people (1981: 88). Echoing
Oldenquist is Taylor who states that a rational person will decide whether his moral
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reasons are desirable in terms of how well these reasons cohere with other reasons,
beliefs, and principles in his system. Put otherwise, “a person could become a rational,
autonomous agent with a system of principles or beliefs supported by reasons to which he
himself is committed and able to use” (1985: 27). Again, Mike Degenhardt underscores
the need for students to understand a set of beliefs and the standards of reasoning while
equipping themselves with the capacities to question or change the standards themselves.
He explains the balance as follows:
On the one hand, we must guide them into the forms of thought and their
appropriate standards of reasoning, so that they can order their thoughts coherently.
On the other hand, we must not prevent them being able, on occasion, to take their
own initiatives to call these standards into question (1998: 111).
Evidently, Degenhardt’s dual aims in understanding a belief system and evaluating it
critically dovetail with Laura and Leahy’s idea of a critical apparatus. Sher and Bennett
(1982) also underlined the need for a form of directive moral education which can
enhance the development of one’s moral reasons and autonomy through habits such as
honesty, fair play and concern for others. These habits “increase the impact of moral
reasons by reducing one’s tendency to be diverted” and “they surely do contribute to
moral autonomy” when coupled with an appreciation of reasons (1982: 672). Others have
adopted the same strategy for the schools where the initial culture allows the moral
autonomy of the children to flourish. For example, Terence McLaughlin proposes a set of
shared beliefs, practices and values which are “part of an initial culture which is open to
criticism and challenge” (1995: 241). Underscoring the importance of forging a common
conversation between people subscribing different beliefs, H. A. Alexander urges schools
to teach “the common heritages of liberal society and about how to challenge those
heritages (1997: 388). This approach to moral education allows us to distinguish non-
indoctrinatory socialization from indoctrinatory socialization. Andrew Blair (1983) points
out that socialization, which refers to the shaping of values, beliefs and behavior through
the use of reward and punishment, is necessary for children. The goal is for educators to
develop autonomous moral reasoning, understood as reasoning about what someone
morally ought to do in such a way that one detaches oneself from the influence of
socialization in order to make the moral judgements objectively. Blair notes that
autonomous moral reasoning can only come after the process of socialization where the
child’s moral values are shaped through rewards and punishment.
Conclusion
I have therefore offered an account of moral education that avoids the problem of
indoctrination. The foregoing has revealed that an adequate moral education must avoid
the pitfalls in both non-directive and directive moral education. By presenting a more
complete understanding of indoctrination, this paper has shown how children can be
taught a set of substantive moral principles and values in a non-indoctrinatory way.
Equipped with moral autonomy, the child is able to develop an inquiring, autonomous,
critical and open-minded spirit towards the moral values held. Through this process, the
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child is able to imagine alternatives and willing to consider their point and worth. This
form of moral education does not indoctrinate – rather, it truly educates imaginative
minds.
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Notes
1
Although indoctrination is commonly associated with beliefs, philosophers have recognized that a person
can be indoctrinated in values as well. D. C. Philips indicates that many philosophers and educators “see
the instilling of values as indoctrinatory” (1989, p. 342). David Diamond also states that “one of public
education’s principal functions always has been to indoctrinate a generation of children with the values,
traditions, and rituals of society” (quoted in Stolzenberg, 1993, p. 643). Ben Spiecker (1991) argues that
indoctrination refers to the suppression of intellectual virtues and rational emotions relating to a belief,
while Henry Rosemont Jr points to certain “attitudes and behaviour” arising from a specific belief as
instances of indoctrination (1998, p. 324). That is why I reject the argument by Ivan Snook that moral
training involves the “inculcation of habits rather than beliefs and the term “indoctrination” is not
appropriate” (1998, p. 313). Apart from the fact that moral education includes beliefs such as inculcating in
the child the belief in honesty, these beliefs also cannot be separated from the corresponding attitudes,
emotions and dispositions. Another point of clarification is on the “choice” of belief. In the philosophical
discussions on indoctrination and other educational issues, philosophers often write with the impression
that we can choose our beliefs at will; in other words, all our beliefs are voluntary and intentional. For
example, J. S. Mill expresses the liberal position in religious education where the pupil has “to choose it for
himself” (1965, p. 399). Similarly Rousseau avers that religious upbringing consists of giving the child “the
means to choose for himself according to the right use of his own reason” (1974, p. 223). For this paper, I
shall adopt the view of Peter Gardner (1991) and T. H. McLaughlin (1990) that while beliefs can be
chosen, they are rarely chosen. Accordingly, the “choice” mentioned in the context of beliefs refers to the
deliberation of the outcome, rather than the outcome itself. In other words, it is the reflection about and
assessment of beliefs that are crucial to our discussion of indoctrination. Another philosopher R. F.
Dearden describes it this way: “We speak of ‘refusing’ to believe, of finding something ‘easy’ or ‘difficult’
to believe, and of feeling ‘inclined’ or ‘disinclined’ to believe. But locutions such as these could be
interpreted as expressing the different degrees of readiness and confidence with which we do or do not
assent to a proposition. Such differences of degrees would be correlative to the weight or force of evidence,
not expressive of our degree of determination to believe” (1984, p. 99).
2
Different philosophers have suggested different ages for a child to appreciate moral reasons. For example,
George Sher and William Bennett support Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory that children of age 13 still rely on
non-moral reasons for their actions, and mid-adolescence is the turning point (Sher and Bennett, 1982).
D.C. Phillips, on the other hand, argues that the age of reason should be “rolled back a long way” (1989, p.
350). Another philosopher Rodger Beehler, commenting on Rousseau’s view that children can be reasoned
with and challenged intellectually long before 12 and 14, puts the age at between 3 and 4 (1985, p. 267).
This debate on the age of reasoning is not crucial to the discussion here as what is unanimous among the
philosophers is that the “child” in question has yet been able to act in accordance with moral principles.
