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Structuring a Sustainable Letters of Marque Regime: How Commissioning Privateers Can Defeat the Somali Pirates
Abstract
Piracy is a complex problem that threatens maritime safety and interferes with global commerce. Supported by networks of financiers and negotiators, Somali pirates viciously attack seafarers across expansive stretches of the Indian Ocean. Despite costly naval interventions, pirates continue to strike. Powerful nations from around the globe have been unsuccessful at stemming the problem because they have focused on capturing and prosecuting a relatively small number of seagoing pirates, while allowing pirate networks to operate with near impunity. To prevent future attacks, an effective and sustainable deterrence regime must be implemented to target the financiers and sophisticated kingpins who lead pirate networks. This Comment examines a new approach based on an age-old solution-privateers. The U.S. Constitution expressly provides that Congress, by issuing letters of marque, can enable private entities to conduct maritime warfare on behalf of the nation. Successive generations of American governments have employed letters of marque to combat maritime threats efficiently. Once more, the commissioning of privateers might prove to be an appropriate tool in the battle to dismantle pirate networks. Given the dispersed nature of the problem and relatively limited capabilities of the pirates, this Comment argues that privateers may provide a more cost-effective and sustainable approach than deploying naval forces. It suggests how a new regime for deploying privateers against Somali pirates could and should be established consistent with international law under either international or domestic frameworks.
... This has given a contemporary understanding of those licenses and it has been considered a viable legal option to be employed by the USA (Richard, 2010;Schwartz, 2010), but is obviously not the same as was issued to privateers in the 'Golden Age of Piracy' from the 1650s to the 1730s, (as privateering was abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856). That possibility was contemplated in a wider sense by Hutchins (2011) developing the concept of how such a legal framework could be structured under both domestic and international regimes, and proposing the establishment of an international system of issuing Letters of Marque and how it might effectively deter pirates while adequately compensating and controlling privateers. Atallah (2011) emphasized that piracy must be tackled head-on; he assumed that piracy could not be stopped solely at sea and that development of a comprehensive land-based approach is essential. ...
In the paper Piracy at Sea: Somalia an Area of Great Concern (Baniela, 2010), a general up-to-date vision of piracy at sea in Somalia was analysed. As piracy at sea has political, socio-economic, security and humanitarian dimensions, the international community requires a thorough approach that embraces a comprehensive and multi-faceted response of effective counter-measures, both onshore and offshore. So as a follow-up to that paper, the objective of this one is to analyse the impact of the current strategy in the struggle against piracy in Somalia carried out by the international community focused solely at sea and to examine the proposals to find a solution to the problem on land.
Chapter 5 emphasizes PMSC labour-centric stances in its focus on sea power. With the conventional forces norm in mind, this chapter identifies the milieu in which PMSCs are injected, one that favours expensive and sophisticated technology for decisive effect, for replacing personnel on land, and for augmenting state prestige. The result is that there is a space for a PMSC presence, but one should note a difference in kind because PMSCs do not and cannot access the marketplace for sophisticated naval machines. For the PMSC industry, this is not necessarily a bad thing because rather than replicate the characteristics and limitations of state forces, PMSCs instead compensate for the qualitative and quantitative challenges that these forces confront. This chapter makes this plain in its extended consideration of PMSCs countering Somali pirates, an endeavour that has been both largely labour-centric and framed by states and others in a defensive mode.
In times of widespread illegal fishing, fisheries law enforcement is a big challenge for coastal States, which often lack the necessary resources to properly police their maritime zones (internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ)). As a result, enforcement efforts of coastal States often produce an insufficient “demonstration effect” (through monitoring, control, and surveillance) and “deterrence effect” (through enforcement and sanctions). This inadequate enforcement capacity can be supplemented by inter-State cooperation and public-private partnerships with non-profit, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or other private entities such as for-profit private security companies (PSCs). However, environmen- tal law enforcement powers, such as search, question, arrest, and use of force, are usually allocated to specific governmental law enforcement agencies, such as the coast guard, government environmental agencies, customs agencies, or the navy. This raises the question if, and to what extent, other States or private actors such as NGOs and PSCs could assist in or take over law enforcement functions. This article approaches this issue from an international legal perspective. It first provides case studies of inter-State cooperation and public- private partnerships in fisheries law enforcement for factual background. Particular attention is paid to parallels in the practice of inter-State cooperation and public-private partnerships. The case studies are followed by legal analysis from the perspective of public international law with a focus on the international law of the sea. Finally, the article offers some general conclusions about the legality of such cooperation schemes, as well as practical potential benefits and risks associated with them.
In the Netherlands and elsewhere the position of Roman law as an integral part of legal studies is now under a serious threat. This is not a matter for civilians only. International lawyers have good reason to be concerned. Public international law is not only in its origins the product of the European Roman law tradition; its development too owes much to imported Roman law principles and institutions. These have not been rendered obsolete by the massive United Nations codifications and the enormous development of international law in the last fifty years. There is no international legislature and therefore no "global constitution". However, a common legal system overarching the material rules is indispensable. Traditionally, this function was fulfilled by Roman law. Because this threatens to disappear from general legal education, it makes sense to strengthen the historical introduction, notably its Roman law component, in the curriculum of future international lawyers. Somewhat to my surprise, this pragmatic conclusion leads me to agree with the conclusion of Professor Baldus' comparative study and to vindicate Laurens Winkel's practice as a teacher of the history of international law.
The federal government routinely pays individuals for tips that facilitate its regulatory and law enforcement efforts. However, in the aftermath of public reaction to Linda Tripp's role in bringing the Clinton-Lewinsky affair to light, combined with recent hostility toward IRS informant and collection practices, such bounty programs have fallen out of social and political favor. Indeed, the bounty programs federal agencies offer are vastly inconsistent and devoid of a clear understanding of the incentives facing potential informants. These political and technical shortcomings of bounty programs undermine their effectiveness. In this article, Ferziger and Currell examine four federal bounty schemes - the False Claims Act and the schemes created by the SEC, IRS, and U.S. Customs Service - constructing an economic model to aid agencies and legislators alike in the formulation of more efficient and effective bounty programs. The authors first articulate a framework through which existing programs can be analyzed, elucidating such factors as informant anonymity, bounty award amounts, administrative program costs, and program publicity. Upon this framework, the authors set forth their comprehensive model of the incentives and motives underlying agency-informant interaction throughout the bounty process. Taking into account a host of socio-political concerns, the authors then demonstrate the real-world applicability of the economic model they have fashioned.
This article criticizes mainstream customary international legal theory as lacking authority and legitimacy. Few customary international law (CIL) norms are, in fact, customary. All customary law, international or otherwise, acquires its legitimacy from the normative belief of a community. Norms may be inferred from the repeated acts believed to be required using the inductive method. CIL, however, has become a device for judges, advocates, and self-interested states to deduce or create new norms without regard to the beliefs or participation of the vast majority of states and their people. CIL norms are constructed from non-binding resolutions and soft law instruments rather than widespread state practice or evident belief. In a diverse world of many different values, interests, and cultural histories valid CIL norms will be rare. The article suggests only more democratic consensual processes will produce effective norms in a decentralized international community without a consensus on values.
Martin N. Murphy describes how piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a serious and ever growing problem since decades. The piracy that has become increasingly prominent internationally since 2005 now looms as a dangerous distraction to the greater threat presented by the political chaos in southern Somalia, although it nonetheless represents a worrisome danger to vessels using the major shipping-lanes through the Gulf of Aden and along Somalia's east coast. Piracy not only exploits but also contributes to state weakness by corrupting local and national officials and politicians. Piracy is a global phenomenon but not a global problem. So long as this remains the case, and local governments have the means and the will to address the problem, the US and other international players should become involved only if invited.
Privateers were first seen in action during the early 19th century. A privateer is a ship licensed by the United States to harass British vessels and confiscate their cargoes. However, without the license and a legal proceeding, the privateer could not sell its prize legally. If the prize was found to be lawful, it was sold at a court-ordered auction. In cases when the prize was valuable, but the privateer crew is short and the prize far from a friendly port, the privateer would call on the captain of the prize and suggested a deal. If the captain would agree on behalf of the prize owners to pay a ransom, the privateer would release the prize and its crew. The efforts of privateers during the War of 1812 had greatly helped the US gain independence. Privateers also performed well in the American Revolution and were successfully used by other countries for many centuries. However, privateering declined after the American Civil War. One reason is that the US made it illegal to pay or to demand ransom. Knights were to be captured personally this time, while the government opt for killing captured ships leaving privateers with to prisoners to deal with. Another is the rise of government armed forces, which made privateers ineffective for use in a war. Today, privateering has seen a revival in that capital costs are low, private and military applications are ready substitutes and competing buyers and sellers exist like military labor.
The intervention in Somalia was not an abject failure; an estimated 100,000 lives were saved. But its mismanagement should be an object lesson for peacekeepers in Bosnia and on other such missions. No large intervention, military or humanitarian, can remain neutral or assuredly brief in a strife-torn failed state. Nation-building, the rebuilding of a state's basic civil institutions, is required in fashioning a self-sustaining body politic out of anarchy. In the future, the United States, the United Nations, and other interveners should be able to declare a state ''bankrupt'' and go in to restore civic order and foster reconciliation.
In recent years, legal commentators have sharply criticized executive initiative in the war-making process. This Article examines the historical and legal background of the war powers in the Anglo-American world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The author argues that the war powers framework created by the Framers differs sharply from that envisioned by modern scholars. After exploring the Constitutional text, the political and legal context within which the Framers lived, experiences with British political history and state constitutions, and the arguments made during the ratification debates, the author concludes that the Framers created a framework designed to encourage presidential initiative in war. Congress was given a role in war-making decisions not by the Declare War Clause, but by its powers over funding and impeachment. The courts were to have no role at all. Professor Yoo suggests that the Constitution did not inadvertently exclude the judiciary. Instead, the Framers understood the Constitution as giving the two political branches weapons to struggle for influence over the war-making process - rendering judicial supervision unnecessary. The Article concludes that because the Framers failed to specify an exact relationship between the President and Congress in the area of war, precise procedures may evolve over time within the constitutional framework.
Querying data from Oracle tables is probably the most common task you will perform as a developer or data analyst, and maybe
even as a DBA — though probably not as the ETL (Extraction, Transformation, and Loading) tool expert. Quite often, you may
query only one table for a small subset of rows, but sooner or later you will have to join multiple tables together. That’s
the beauty of a relational database, where the access paths to the data are not fixed: you can join tables that have common
columns, or even tables that do not have common columns (at your own peril!).
The ongoing maritime operations against piracy off the coast of Somalia have not only put naval enforcement against piracy at sea in the spotlight, but also the legal aftermath of what to do with pirates after their capture. While warships at sea within the current legal framework of UNCLOS and the UN Security Council amplifications specifically adopted for the case of Somalia can effectively perform their tasks, the question of what to do with the pirate suspects is still not satisfactorily resolved. As a consequence, attacks against merchant vessels and international trade run the risk of being ‘consequence free’, in which the perpetrators are not being held accountable. Participating nations are confronted with the fact that military operations against piracy, which is essentially a criminal offence, need a comprehensive approach to ensure accountability. To counter this criminal activity at sea nations try to strengthen the judicial infrastructure through national prosecution or transfer suspects for prosecution in the Horn of Africa region. As these options are not considered to be enough, and hampered by other non-legal factors, some nations call for an international court as a possible long term solution.
Constitutional scholars cite three Supreme Court decisions arising from the undeclared Quasi War with France in 1798-1800 as support for the proposition that Congress may authorize war of any magnitude, and that, except in case of sudden or imminent attack on the United States, this congressional authority displaces any right of the President to use military force of even modest magnitude without prior congressional authorization. The textual hook claimed by these scholars for so reading Bas v. Tingy, Talbot v. Seeman, and Little v. Bareme is the phrase in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution that immediately follows the grant to Congress of the power To declare War - namely, the power to grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water. These additional words, it is argued, enable Congress to regulate the President's ability to use military force in a manner short of full-scale war. This prevailing interpretation of the Quasi War cases is incorrect and has special significance because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit gave it credence in 2000 in the war powers case Campbell v. Clinton and because one or more of the cases continues to be cited in litigation concerning the current war on terror.
The United States Constitution grants to the Congress the power, among others, to issue “Letters of Marque and Reprisal.” Although the practice seems to have fallen into disuse in this century, it was an important tool of national power for the federal government created by the Framers, who placed great import on the federal government’s role in protecting international commerce and in enforcing international law.Privateering played a significant role before and during the Revolutionary War, and it persisted in American history as an economical way to augment naval forces against an enemy in wartime. A significant outgrowth of the practice of privateering was the body of law resulting from prize court adjudications. United States courts, in deciding title to ships and goods taken prize, determined issues both of domestic and customary international law. In this manner the federal courts significantly shaped the role of international law in the United States jurisprudence as well as assured the role of the United States in the ongoing development of customary international law. Case law concerning prizes and privateering is accordingly a useful vehicle to examine the interplay of U.S. constitutional law and customary international law as they both developed through the Nineteenth Century.Changes in the methods of warfare during the Twentieth Century diminished the role of privateering. But the Congressional authority to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal remains. As a means to commission private actors to augment national forces in international crises, the Letter of Marque and Reprisal could yet have modern applications. It remains for innovative executive and legislative experiment to revive the ancient practice in a form befitting modern international problems.
Somali piracy threatens to encourage others in such lawlessness on the high seas. international responses to this threat so far have proven costly, and unsuccessful. U.S. policy-makers should negotiate agreements with port states allowing the entry of U.S. merchant vessels armed to defend themselves, and Congress should issue letters of marque to encourage these vessels and their crews to defend themselves.
In the remarkably short period from April 2007 to mid-2009 a flurry of hard and soft-law-making activity has constructed an increasingly comprehensive and decentralized legal framework addressing piracy off Somalia. Warships operate under a variety of national and international mandates, and there is no single unified command covering all counter-piracy missions. Bilateral transfer agreements sit alongside a regional code of conduct, and both sit within the framework of the law of the sea and Security Council Resolutions. One-size-fits-all solutions have been eschewed for a pragmatic range of national and international mechanisms. Nonetheless, captured piracy suspects raise significant questions about their arrest, detention and transfer to a State willing to try them, especially for State parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. This article first outlines the general legal framework surrounding Somali piracy before addressing to specific human rights issues and potential ways forward.
The demise of custom as a source of international law has been widely forecasted. This is because both the nature and the relative importance of custom’s constituent elements are contentious. At the same time, custom has become an increasingly significant source of law in important areas such as human rights obligations. Codification conventions, academic commentary, and the case law of the International Court of Justice (the Court) have also contributed to a contemporary resurrection of custom. These developments have resulted in two apparently opposing approaches, which I term “traditional custom” and “modern custom.” The renaissance of custom requires the articulation of a coherent theory that can accommodate its classic foundations and contemporary developments. This article seeks to provide an enriched theoretical account of custom that incorporates both the traditional and the modern approaches rather than advocating one approach over the other.
noting that twenty-one of sixty-five pirates were below the age of fifteen)
- Id
Id. (noting that twenty-one of sixty-five pirates were below the age of fifteen).
How to Defeat Pirates: Success in the Strait
- E G See
- Michael Schuman
See, e.g., Michael Schuman, How to Defeat Pirates: Success in the Strait, TIME, Apr.
22, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1893032,00.html (noting, among others,
the work of Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia to reduce piracy in the Malacca Straits).
Collapse into Anarchy was Perfect for the Pirates of Puntland, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London)
- David Blair
David Blair, Collapse into Anarchy was Perfect for the Pirates of Puntland, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 19, 2008, at 17.
Al-Shabaab, radical Islamic extremists, exercise de facto control over southern Somalia. See Mohamed Ahmed, Grenades Kill Five in Somalia's Seat of Parliament, REUTERS
BACKGROUNDER, May 12, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/12475. Al-Shabaab, radical
Islamic extremists, exercise de facto control over southern Somalia. See Mohamed Ahmed,
Grenades Kill Five in Somalia's Seat of Parliament, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2008, http://www
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AQ5MM20081127; Jeffrey Gettleman, Islamists Continue Advance
Through Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/world/africa/
14somalia.html;
John Patch, Send the Warships Home
Pirate Attack Density in the Gulf of Aden (2008), UNOSAT (Nov. 26, 2008), http://unosatmaps.web.cern.ch/unosat-maps/SO/Piracy/UNOSAT_SO_PirateDensity_Nov08_Lowres_v1.pdf.
86. John Patch, Send the Warships Home, ARMED FORCES J., Apr. 2010,
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/04/4537286.
Chinese Warships Escort 23-vessel Convoy off Somalia, RIA NOVOSTI
- Ria Novosti
Russian Destroyer Escorts 5-Ship Convoy off Somali Coast, RIA NOVOSTI, May 20,
2009, http://www.en.beta.rian.ru/russia/20090520/155049607.html; Russian, Chinese Warships
Escort 23-vessel Convoy off Somalia, RIA NOVOSTI, Sept. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.shebacss.com/en/media-center-30512.html.
88. Porter, supra note 44 (noting convoys worked in World War II against hard-to-kill Uboats).
Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
- Circular
- Mar
- Org
Circular, Int'l Mar. Org., Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and
Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,
MSC.1/Circ. 1334, at 12 (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/
MSC1_Circ1334.pdf.
91. Id. at 11.
Weighs Arming Ships to Fight Piracy, MSNBC
- See Christopher Torchia
See Christopher Torchia, U.S. Weighs Arming Ships to Fight Piracy, MSNBC, Aug. 13,
2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32405657/ns/world_news-europe.
at 45 (reproducing a letter of marque signed by President James Madison directing the privateer, Grand Turk, to seize "Algerine vessels, public or private, goods and effects
- Supra Eastman
- Note
EASTMAN, supra note 151, at 45 (reproducing a letter of marque signed by President
James Madison directing the privateer, Grand Turk, to seize "Algerine vessels, public or private,
goods and effects, of or belonging to the Dey of Algiers").
- Thomas A Bailey
- A Diplomatic
- Of
- American
THOMAS A. BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 65 (1955)
(stating that "the brutal Dey of Algiers was a Founding Father of the Constitution," because his
actions enraged the masses, who demanded action be taken against the pirates).
How Did the United States Defeat the Barbary Pirates?
- Nathan Williams
Nathan Williams, How Did the United States Defeat the Barbary Pirates?, HISTORY
NEWS NETWORK, Sept. 26, 2001, http://hnn.us/articles/287.html; see also NELSON, supra note
175 n.179 (explaining Washington's initial concerns about privateers before being convinced of
their strategic benefits).
Bring Back the Privateer
- David D Winters
David D. Winters, Bring Back the Privateer, U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROC., Apr. 2002, at 112;
Critics mistakenly believe this article prohibits privateers, while it actually just requires them to be properly identified as such. The article is likely a response to the deceptive practices of the Russian "volunteer navy
- Id
Id. Critics mistakenly believe this article prohibits privateers, while it actually just
requires them to be properly identified as such. The article is likely a response to the deceptive
practices of the Russian "volunteer navy," which pretended to be merchant vessels during the
Russo-Japanese War. See discussion supra notes 243-48.
noting that there is no statute, treaty, or general convention declaring that the adjudication in a prize court gives a title good against the world, but the proposition is generally conceded to be custom)
- See Arnold
- W Knauth
See Arnold W. Knauth, Prize Law Reconsidered, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 69, 74 (1946)
(noting that there is no statute, treaty, or general convention declaring that the adjudication in a
prize court gives a title good against the world, but the proposition is generally conceded to be
custom). In Oakes v. United States, the Court stated that "when... property is captured by naval
forces a judicial decree of condemnation is usually necessary to complete the title of the captors."
- Henry Wager Halleck
HENRY WAGER
HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 206, 317 (1866).
British subjects appealed from decisions of American prize courts and in six cases the international arbitration tribunal established by the treaty reversed the rulings
- However
However, following the Treaty of Washington in 1871, British subjects appealed from
decisions of American prize courts and in six cases the international arbitration tribunal
established by the treaty reversed the rulings. E.M.B., Comment, Appeals from Judgments of Prize
Courts, 28 YALE L.J. 583, 587 (1919) (citing The Hiawatha, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862);
Prize Acts of 1941, 1942, and 1944
Prize Acts of 1941, 1942, and 1944. 55 Stat. 261 (1941) (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 1131
(Supp. 1945));
(citing Giles Noakes, a chief maritime security officer for an international ship-owners association, as saying "[t]he industry believes very strongly that it's not for the companies to train crews to use firearms and then arm them
- Erika Lovley
Erika Lovley, Ron Paul's Plan to Fend Off Pirates, POLITICO (Apr. 15, 2009, 4:16AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0409/21245.html.
346. See Schwartz, supra note 2.
347. Most commercial mariners lack the professional military ethics and training necessary
to conduct themselves in a disciplined fashion in combat situations. See Mark Clayton & Bridget
Huber, To Stop Pirates, Do Ships Need Firepower?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 8, 2009,
http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/view/print/209529 (citing Giles Noakes, a
chief maritime security officer for an international ship-owners association, as saying "[t]he
industry believes very strongly that it's not for the companies to train crews to use firearms and
then arm them... [c]rews could get injured or killed, to say nothing of damage to the ship").
Convention (VII) relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships. The Hague
- E G See
- Joshua Sudock
See, e.g., Joshua Sudock, Private Security Contractors Causing US Headaches, ORANGE CNTY.
REG., Dec. 31, 2010, http://m.ocregister.com/news/contractors-281002-private-causing.html.
348. Convention (VII) relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships. The
Hague, 18 October 1907, supra note 253, art. I.
at 12 (citing Prussian Government Decree on the Constitution of a Volunteer Naval Force
- Supra Twiss
- Note
TWISS, supra note 225, at 12 (citing Prussian Government Decree on the Constitution
of a Volunteer Naval Force, Jul. 24, 1870).
Admittedly, this raises legal questions about whether the military can try civilians in a court-martial. Anna Manasco Dionne, Comment
- Parrillo
Parrillo, supra note 321, at 3. Admittedly, this raises legal questions about whether the
military can try civilians in a court-martial. Anna Manasco Dionne, Comment, "In Time of
Whenever the Secretary Says": The Constitutional Case Against Court-Martial Jurisdiction over
Accompanying Civilians During Contingency Operations, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 205 (2008).
The American Attitude Towards Capture at Sea, 11 AM
- H S See
- Quigley
See H. S. Quigley, The American Attitude Towards Capture at Sea, 11 AM. J. INT'L L.
820, 836 (1917).
373. Id.
- Bill Dedman
Bill Dedman, Gitmo Interrogations Spark Battle over Tactics, MSNBC, Oct. 26,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15361458/ns/world_news-terrorism;
- Joseph Story
JOSEPH STORY, NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PRIZE COURTS 28
(1854).
Interview-Somali Pirate Kingpins Going Unpunished, REUTERS
- Andrew Cawthorne
Andrew Cawthorne, Interview-Somali Pirate Kingpins Going Unpunished,
REUTERS, Oct. 27, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLR188693 (quoting Andrew
Mwangura director of the East African Seafarers' Association).
This is London-the Capital of Somali Pirates' Secret Intelligence Operation, GUARDIAN (London)
- See Giles Tremless
See Giles Tremless, This is London-the Capital of Somali Pirates' Secret
Intelligence Operation, GUARDIAN (London), May 11, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2009/may/11/ somalia-pirates-network (noting pirate spies have infiltrated shipping operations
centers and government agencies).
interview with Yardimci shipping manager Haldun Dincel, who negotiated the release of his company's ship from pirates)
- Id
Id. (interview with Yardimci shipping manager Haldun Dincel, who negotiated the
release of his company's ship from pirates).