LANGUAGE, VOLUME 78, NUMBER 1 (2002)164 malist studies as the brief summary of the chapters has hopefully shown. All articles complement the work of the festschrift’s honoree, are well-written, and contain interesting data as well as intriguing analyses, pushing the minimalist spirit further ahead. REFERENCES BOSˇKOVIC´,ZˇELJKO.1994. D-structure, theta-criterion,and movement into theta-positions.Linguistic Analysis 24.247–86. MM. 1997. Superiority effects with multiple wh-fronting in Serbo-Croatian. Lingua 102.1–20. CHOMSKY,NOAM. 1995. The minimalist program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. MM.2001.Derivationbyphase.KenHale:Alifeinlanguage,ed.byMichaelKenstowicz,1–52.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. GRIMSHAW,JANE, and ARMIN MESTER. 1988. Light verbs and H9258-marking. Linguistic Inquiry 19.205–32. HORNSTEIN,NORBERT. 1995. Logical form: From GB to minimalism. Oxford: Blackwell. KAYNE,RICHARD S. 1994. The antisymmetry of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ZAS Ja¨gerstr. 10–11 10117 Berlin Germany [Kleanthes@punksinscience.org] The mind doesn’t work that way: Thescopeand limits of computational psychology. By JERRY FODOR. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. Pp. 126. Reviewed by RAY JACKENDOFF, Brandeis University* As has been his wont in recent years, Jerry Fodor offers here a statement of deepest pessimism about the possibility of doing cognitive science except in a very limited class of subdomains. F is of course justly celebrated for at least two major ideas in cognitive science: The language of thought (Fodor 1975) and the modularity hypothesis (Fodor 1983). However, the form in which these ideas have been taken enthusiastically into the lore of the field differs in some important respects from the form in which F couched them and in which he still believes. As I hope to show, the tension between F’s actual views and those generally attributed to him plays a major rolein theposition headvocates here. Here is a summary of F’s argument, as best as I can reconstruct it. The central issue is the problem of ‘abduction’: how one determines the truth of a proffered proposition and its consistency with one’s beliefs. The chief obstacle to successful abduction is that meaning is holistic: One must potentially check the proffered proposition and inferences from it against one’s entire network of belief/knowledge. The resulting combinatorial explosion makes it impossible to reliably fix new beliefs and plan new actions within a traditional Turing-style computation. For F, this casts serious doubt on the computational theory of mind, which presumes Turing-style ‘symbolic’ computation over the syntactic form of mental representations. F dismisses a number of proposed solutions to the problem of abduction. Connectioniststyle computation, he maintains, is actually a step backward, since it cannot even capture the characteristic free combinatoriality of thought, an essential feature of the language of thought hypothesis. Here I concur; Marcus 2001 offers an extended argument to this effect. F also argues that a system of heuristics is unsatisfactory since one needs to perform an abduction to determine which heuristic to apply. I find this argument less convincing; we’ll return to it below. It isworth mentioningthat whenF speaksof ‘Turing-stylecomputation’, itis not clearwhether he intends to include massively parallel ‘symbolic’ computation. Such computation is perhaps * I am grateful to David Olson, Jerry Samet, and especially Merrill Garrett for considerable discussion concerning this book. This work was supported in part by a Fellowship at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin and in part by NIH Grant DC 03660 to Brandeis University. REVIEWS 165 mathematically equivalent to serial Turing-style computation, but it is quite different in practical terms. Certainly the brain’s form of computation is massively parallel, whether connectionist or symbolic or some combination thereof. It is interesting therefore to ask if such computation is of any practical help in solving the combinatorial explosion of abduction; F does not address this question. F’s dismissals of connectionism and heuristics, however, are just warmups for his principal line of attack. This is aimed against the thesis of ‘massive modularity’ proposed by such people as Pinker (1997) and Cosmides and Tooby (1992): the idea that the entire mind (or most of it, anyway) is made up of innate domain-specific modules. Most everybody seems to consider this a natural extension...