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LETTER
A public health frame arouses hopeful emotions
about climate change
A Letter
Teresa A. Myers & Matthew C. Nisbet & Edward W. Maibach & Anthony A. Leiserowitz
Received: 18 January 2012 /Accepted: 22 May 2012 /Published online: 28 June 2012
#
The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Communication researchers and practitioners have suggested that framing climate
change in terms of public health and/or national security may make climate change more
personally relevant and emotionally engaging to segments of the public who are currently
disengaged or even dismissive of the issue. To evaluate these assumptions, using a nationally
representative online survey of U.S. residents (N0 1,127) conducted in December, 2010, we
randomly assigned six previously identified audience segments on climate change to one of
three experimental conditions. Subjects were asked to read uniquely framed news articles
about climate change emphasizing either the risks to the environment, public health, or
national security and the benefits of mitigation and adaptation-related actions. Results show
that across audience segments, the public health focus was the most likely to elicit emotional
reactions consistent with support for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Findings also
indicated that the national security frame may possibly boomerang among audience seg-
ments already doubtful or dismissive of the issue, eliciting unintended feelings of anger.
1 Introduction
Effectively engaging the American public on climate change—including its causes, impacts,
and solutions—remains both a major research question and a communication challenge.
Climatic Change (2012) 113:1105–1112
DOI 10.1007/s10584-012-0513-6
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10584-012-0513-6)
contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
T. A. Myers
:
E. W. Maibach
Center for Climate Change Communication, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
T. A. Myers
e-mail: tmyers6@gmu.edu
M. C. Nisbet (*)
School of Communication, American University, Washington, DC 20016, USA
e-mail: nisbet@american.edu
A. A. Leiserowitz
School of Forestry, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, USA
Effective public engagement requires understanding the cognitive, affective, and behavioral
nature of audiences (Lorenzoni et al. 2007). In this paper we focus on the affective dimension
of climate change engagement—a dimension that has received little research attention—
examining the potential for various frames to elicit emotional reactions consistent with
climate change mitigation and adaptation goals.
Social scientists have long understood that the way an issue is framed has important
consequences (Goffman 1974; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Framing—whether inten-
tional or not—involves selectively emphasizing certain dimensions of an issue over others,
setting the context for per ception and discussion aro und specific causes, risks, policy
actions, and costs/benefits that might result from these actions. The frame used suggests
both the diagnosis of the problem as well as prescriptions for what should be done about it
(Nisbet 2009; Scheufele 1999). Moreover, the way an issue is framed—in the media or in
other communications— interacts with aud ience members’ pre -existing schema, mental
models and values. As a consequence, a specific message frame is particularly influential
to the extent that it is relevant—or applicable—to the audience’s preexisting predispositions
and perceptions (Nisbet and Scheufele 2009; Scheufele 1999).
Recent analyses of the U.S. public have mapped how climate change-related predispo-
sitions and perceptions vary across six distinct ‘interpretive communities’ of individuals
called “Global Warming’s Six Americas” (Maibach et al. 2010). These audience segments
range along a continuum of knowledge, attitudes, and behavior, from the Alarmed (who
accept climate change as a problem, are concerned, and who are looking for opportunities to
take personal and political action) to the Dismissive (who reject the reality of climate change
and strongly oppose action). Individuals in the four interpretive communities in the middle
of the continuum are less certain in their views on climate change, more ambivalent about
the risks and relative importance of the issue, and more likely to be disengaged personally
and politically. (See Fig. 1 for the most recent distribution of the American public across
these six segments; Leiserowitz et al. 2011).
Climate change has historically been framed as an environmental problem. More recently,
it is increasingly being framed as a poli tical problem. Social scientists, however, have
suggested a variety of potential alternative frames, each of which can validly and accurately
emphasize other relevant dimensions of the issue—such as public health, national security,
extreme weather events, and/or the economy (Nisbet 2009; Nisbet and Scheufele 2009;
Maibach et al. 2010). Such alternative frames may be more effective at engaging audiences
than the environmental or political frames that currently dominate public discourse.
Fig. 1 Global warming’s six Americas. Source: Yale/George Mason University
1106 Climatic Change (2012) 113:1105–1112
Research on a public health frame, for example, suggests that when climate change is
introduced as a human health issue, a broad cross-section of audiences—even segments
otherwise skeptical of climate science—find the information to be compelling and useful
(Maibach et al. 2010). Framing research can identify not only which frames are likely to be
effective, and with whom, but also which are likely to “boomerang.” For example, several
studies find that messages emphasizing catastrophic, dire consequences or threats that are
geographically remote can result in less concern and more hopelessness among audiences
(Hart and Nisbet 2011;O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009).
People’s emotional reactions to messages about climate change are an important consid-
eration, yet to date they have often been overlooked both in research and in communication
efforts. Thagard and Findlay (2011) argue that “encouraging belief change…about climate
change requires dealing with emotional constraints as well as cognitive ones” (p. 342) and
Mar kowitz and Shariff (2012) identify positive emotional ap peals as one of the most
promising strategies for climate change communication. Indeed, emotional responses to
novel information occur effortlessly and almost instantaneously, influencing subsequent
cognitive processing of information (Kahneman 2011).
Emotions serve as affective prompts for engagement with an issue and lead to forming
predispositions for action when a relevant situation arises (Baumeister et al. 2007). Further-
more, emotions themselves can serve as frames by which future information is interpreted (Nabi
2003). Negative emotions, such as anger or fear, motivate us to the need to be on “high-alert”
and to seek more information about an issue (Baron et al. 1994), can lead to greater risk
perceptions and greater policy support (Leiserowitz 2006), and have the potential to transform
apathy or indifference into perceived importance and behavioral action (Thomas et al. 2009).
However , eliciting anger against the claims or proposed recommendations emphasized in a
communication strategy also has the danger of inciting action counter to the communicator’s
intent. Moreover, the effect of arousing anger is likely not uniform across audience segments, as
the target and content of an individual’sangermayvary.Forinstance,topicsthatelicitanger
among people alarmed about climate change might include how ecosystems, disadvantaged
people, and specific social groups are being harmed. By contrast, the very claim of climate
change’srealitymightelicitangeramongpeopledismissiveoftheissue.Thus,agivenmessage
could generate an angry backlash by some recipients, leading to an unintended social response,
while provoking an equally angry—yet intended—social response by other recipients.
Positive emotions can also play an important role in message response (Monahan 1995).
Feelings of hope related to climate change, for example, likely increase the probability that
individuals will choose to engage with the issue and adopt beliefs and behaviors consistent
with efforts to stem the problem (Markowitz and Shariff 2012 ; Snyder 2002; Swim et al.
2010). Hope is often aroused as perceptions of efficacy, the belief that an individual has the
capacity to implement a proposed response to a threat and that the recommended action can
effectively mitigate the threat, increase (Bandura
1977). Feelings of hope and efficacy are
strongly
correlated with a willingness to engage in pro-environmental behaviors and to
support climate change policies (Lorenzoni et al. 2007). Conversely, feelings of hopelessness
and inefficacy related to climate change are linked with a tendency to ignore the problem or to
rationalize inaction (Norgaard 201 1).
With these considerations in mind, in this study we investigate how unique audience
segments—Global Warming’s Six Americas—emotionally react to news articles crafted to
reflect three distinct climate change message frames: (1) a traditional environmental frame,
which emphasizes the consequences of climate change to ecosystems—and the benefits to
ecosystems of adaptation and mitigation-related actions, (2) a national security frame, which
highlights the risks to U.S. national security and the benefits to national security of
Climatic Change (2012) 113:1105–1112 1107
adaptation and mitigation-related actions and (3) a health frame, which stresses the health
risks associated with climate change and the potential benefits to health of adaptation and
mitigation-related actions.
2 Method
In order to assess how members of different audience segments responded to three distinct
messag e frames, we condu cted a randomized, control led message experiment using a
nationally representative online sample of 1,127 individuals. Participants were randomly
assigned to read one of three specifically framed articles each of approximately 610 words,
structured identically, but emphasizing different dimensi ons of the climate change
problem. Am ong subjects, 376 p articipant s (33 %) were asked to read an arti cle
emphasizing the environmental dimension, 351 participants (31 %) were asked to
read an article emphasizing national security, and 400 participants (36 %) were shown
amessageemphasizingthehealthdimension[SeeSupplementaryMaterialsformore
detail about the sample and the text of the articles].
2.1 Six Americas audience segmentation
Following the methodology presented in Maibach et al. (2011), participants were catego-
rized into one of six audience segments based on their existing climate change-related
attitudes, belief s, know ledge, preferences, and behaviors. These segments included the
Alarmed (180 participants, 16 %), Concerned (235, 21 %), Cautious (245, 22 %), Disen-
gaged (115, 10 %), Doubtful (191, 17 %), or Dismissive (161, 14 %).
2.2 Emotional reaction
In each condition, respondents were asked to indicate which parts of the framed message
made them feel hopeful and which parts of the message made them feel angry by clicking on
those sentences. The number of sentences that respondents clicked for each emotion was
summed to create a separate Hopeful and Angry measures.
2.3 Analysis
To test respondents’ emotional reactions to the environment, public health, and national security-
framed messages, interaction terms were created(usingdummycodes),multiplyingsegmentby
frame. (The reference category was rotated across each analysis to allow for comparison of all
groups.) Models predicting the emotional responses of hope and anger were fit using Poisson
regression (as is appropriate for count data). All models were weighted with apost-stratification
weight to match national demographic and audience segmentation characteristics.
3 Results
3.1 Predicting hope
First, using audience segment and message frame as predictors, a model was fit to predict the
number of hope-inducing sentences (complete model results shown in online supplemental
1108 Climatic Change (2012) 113:1105–1112
material , Table 1). Both were significant predictors, although message frame was only
marginally significant.
Controlling for audience segment, the health frame was the most likely to generate
feelings of hope, followed by the environment frame, and then the national security frame.
However, the frame that gave respondents the most hope differed by audience segment (see
Fig. 2). Of particular note, the health frame generated more hope than either the environment
or national security frames among the Cautious, Disengaged, and Dismissive segments (see
online supplemental material, Table 2). The Alarmed found high levels of hope in all the
messages with slightly more hope in the national security frame, while the Concerned found
the most hope in the environment message. Overall, consistent with their pre-ex isting
orientations, the audience segments on the left end of the spectrum responded more
hopefully than those on the right.
3.2 Predicting anger
Next, again using audience segment and message frame as predictors, a model was fit to predict
the number of anger-inducing sentences (complete model results shown in online supplemental
material, Table 1). Both audience segment and message frame were significant predictors.
Controlling for audience segment, the national security message was the most likely to
generate anger, followed by the environment message, while the health message generated
the least amount of anger. The frame that caused respondents to feel the most anger differed
by audience segment (see Fig. 3 and online supplementary materials, Table 3).] Overall, the
Dismissive experienced the most anger. However, they also had the most between-frame
variation in their anger responses: the national security frame elicited the most anger, and the
public health frame the least. The Doubtful also reacted most angrily to the national security
frame, and least angrily to the health frame. The Disengaged and the Cautious indicated
relatively limited amounts of anger, regardless of the message frame.
1
Among the
Concerned, the environment frame generated more anger than the national security frame,
and the health frame generated the least anger. The Alarmed were most likely to experience
anger in response to the national security frame.
4 Discussion
Our findings are consistent with past scholarship describing the influence of different
message frames in public responses to climate change (Nisbet 2009). Our results are also
consistent with past research that has found that a diversity of audience segments respond
positively to an emphasis on the public health consequences of climate change and the health
benefits of action (Maibach et al. 2010). Furthermore, although emphasizing the national
security implications of climate change has been assumed to be an effective strategy for
engaging conservatives and other groups (Boykoff 2011), our findings show that in this
1
The emotion of anger may lead to quite different actions, depending on the target and content of the anger. It
is likely that the anger experienced by audience segments convinced that climate change is occurring will lead
to action consistent with adaptation and mitigation goals. However, anger experienced by audience segments
unconvinced that climate change is occurring will likely lead to action counter to adaptation and mitigation
goals. (Analysis of the anger-producing sentences chosen by each segment supports this perspective. See the
sentence analysis in the online supplemental materials. Furthermore, analysis of the influence of anger on
support for reducing US emissions shows that the effects differed by segment—see Fig. 2 in the online
supplemental materials).
Climatic Change (2012) 113:1105–1112 1109
instance (for reasons we speculate below) the national security frame actually generated
substantial anger among the Doubtful and Dismissive segments of the public, both of whom
lean conservative in their political outlook. Importantly, an emphasis on the environmental
risks of climate change—historically the dominant frame in climate change communication
efforts—neither inspired hope nor balanced out feelings of anger among the Disengaged,
Doubtful, and Dismissive segments of the public.
Across all audience segments, participants who read the public health message reacted
with at least some feelings of hope. Overall, 57 % of all subjects assigned to the health frame
responded hopefully to the following proposed action, suggesting that a localization of the issue
may also be an important element of effective communication (see supplemental materials
Table 4 “Top Hopeful Statements by Frame and Across Audience Segment” for details):
Redesigning our cities and towns to make it easier and safer to travel by foot, bicycle
and public transportation will reduce the number of cars on the road, reduce carbon
dioxide emissions, reduce traffic injuries and fatalities, and help people become more
physically active, lose weight, strengthen their bones, and possibly even to remain
mentally sharp as they age.
Fig. 3 Feelings of anger by frame condition across audience segment. Note: This figure depicts the estimated
marginal means of the sement by frame interaction as generated by the model
Fig. 2 Feelings of hope by frame condition across audience segment. Note: This figure depicts the estimated
marginal means of the sement by frame interaction as generated by the model
1110 Climatic Change (2012) 113:1105–1112
The results also suggest that the national security frame may generate an angry backlash,
especially among segments already Doubtful or Dismissive of climate change. Across the
three different frame conditions, the top two anger-producing sentences among the Doubtful
and Dismissive were both about national security (see supplemental materials Table 5 “Top
Angry Statements by Frame and Across Audience Segment” for details):
The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review - a national security report prepared
every four years by the Pentagon for the U.S. Congress - concludes that global
warming is a ‘key issue’ likely to harm U.S. national security in many ways.
They also argue that efforts to limit global warming are a ‘win-win’ because they will
reduce the risks of global warming and improve America’s national security.
Very few members of the other segments reacted angrily to these two statements. It is
possible that members of the Doubtful and Dismissive segments perceived the article to be
an attempt to make a link between an issue they may care deeply about (national security)
and an issue that they tend to dismiss (climate change), or they felt the article was attempting
to co-opt values they care strongly about, thereby producing a negative reaction. Alterna-
tively, it may be that participants were experiencing anger toward the experimenters for
having presented claims about global warming and national security that they as respondents
did not perceive as authenticorcredible.Furtherresearchneedstobeconductedto
understand the nature and extent of this potential boomerang effect.
Finally, outside of this experimental condition, in the context of real world communica-
tion efforts, these effects may differ due to a variety of factors. One particularly important
factor is the messenger, specifically the congruence between the messenger and the frame.
Other potentially important factors include whether the message is delivered by the media or
face-to-face, the availability of competing frames or arguments, the nature of any policy
actions proposed to address the problem, and the salience of other linked trends—particu-
larly those involving the economy and/or political polarization more generally.
Our study, overall, underscores the importance of careful theoretical and empirical
investigation of how climate change communication efforts differentially shape Americans’
views, understanding, and preferences on climate change. This research demonstrates the
potential of the public health frame to inspire hope in the context of the climate change
discussion, while simultaneously demonstrating the possibility that certain frames may be
poorly received within some interpretive communities. More research is needed to under-
stand how frames both set the context for perception on the issue and interact with emotions
in guiding public decisions and behavior
Acknowledgments This study was supported by a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health Policy Inves-
tigator Award and by the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which
permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source
are credited.
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