Conflict, Inequality and Dialogue for Conflict Resolution in Latin America: The Cases of Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela

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... Conflict resolution must be able to provide space for conflict parties to actively participate in order to find meeting points to resolve problems. What is emphasized in conflict resolution is the balance between improving relations and solving problems International Journal of Human Resource Studies ISSN 2162-3058 2019 (Barnes, 2005). This paper will discuss the lesson of conflict intervention and resolution from the Indonesian Military Ordinariate (Ordinariatus Castrensis Indonesia/OCI). ...
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The diversity of tribes, religions, races, groups, and cultural expressions in various dimensions make Indonesia one of the most vibrant cultures in the world. However, it cannot be denied, that diversity has the potential to trigger social conflicts that can threaten the unity and unity of the nation and state and disrupt a safe and peaceful shared life. The long history of the Indonesian journey proves that social conflicts often occur due to the differences in ethnic groups, religious, racial background, and inter-group (SARA). Therefore, conflict resolution efforts are a necessity for Indonesia to realize a safe and peaceful shared life. This study was aimed to study the conflict resolution based on the history of the Indonesian Military Ordinariate in mitigating and resolving conflict. In general, there are two approaches to conflict resolution, namely intervention in security or stability and humanitarian intervention. Security interventions (stability) usually use military power to resolve conflicts, whereas humanitarian intervention integrates the strength of culture and local wisdom as a basis for resolving conflicts. Humanitarian intervention in resolving conflicts usually results in sustainable, peaceful reconciliation. A peace that occurs between the parties to the conflict is not due to compulsion under military pressure or State power but is born from the awareness of the parties to create mutually reconciling society.
... The types of social protection responses developed during the crisis were significantly influenced by a series of participatory government-sponsored consultations called Mesa de Diálogo, which included a range of society-based actors such as labour, business, NGOs, piqueteros (those who actively picketed), social movements, political parties and religious groups (Barnes, 2005). The consultations showed the government's willingness to listen to those who were publicly expressing opposition to the situation, but Mesa did not succeed in putting an end to civil unrest and protests. ...
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A series of economic and transformational crises in Latin America during the 1990s and the early 2000s pushed many households into poverty. In this paper we look at the two most significant of those crises that took place in Mexico and Argentina and explore the policy measures that were put in place to mitigate their impact on the economy and more importantly, on the population. For this purpose, the analysis looks at a series of transmission channels form economic shocks through the macro to the meso-level, the effects of these impacts on households and their behaviour, and more specifically on children. The paper sheds some light on the different angles through which the current (and future) crisis might affect individuals, particularly children. More importantly, the paper draws out some lessons learned from the effective and ineffective policy responses put in place almost ten years ago, which can be relevant to infom decision makers dealing with policy responses to mitigate the impact of poverty and vulnerability in the wake of the current crisis.
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This synthesis paper is motivated by a concern about the effects of the current financial crisis on children and their care givers, who are often particularly vulnerable when crises strike. Substantial evidence from developing countries associates negative growth with worse human development outcomes, particularly for children. A key reason for concern is that, if children are adversely affected by shocks, this often has lifelong and potentially inter-generational consequences. Inadequate nutrition at a critical time in a child's life, inadequate or absent health care at a critical moment, being withdrawn from school in order to work and/or being denied adequate child care and protection may all have consequences that cannot be reversed later, to say nothing of cases of avoidable infant and child mortality.
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The challenge for the [Chávez] administration is to devise a way to include dissenting voices and respect minority views while still carrying out the changes desired by the Venezuelan people. The alternative is a tyranny of the majority in the name of revolutionary change.
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Contradictory findings, that economic inequality may have a positive, negative, or no impact on political conflict, are a puzzle for conflict studies. Three approaches have been used t o explain the inconsistent findings of the EI-PC (Economic Inequality-Political Conflict) nexus: statistical modeling, formal modeling, and theory building. Because analysts have tended to possess different research skills, these three approaches have been employed in isolation from one another. Singly, however, all three approaches have proved deficient and are unlikely to solve the EI-PC puzzle. The most fruitful approach is to combine the assumptions of the theory builders and the deductive approach of the formal modelers with the various empirical tests of the statistical modelers. Such an approach to the EI-PC puzzle produces a crucial test of the Deprived Actor and Rational Actor theories of conflict. The approach is also our best hope for solving the other long-standing puzzles in conflict studies.
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This paper examines the impact of inequality on poor people in Latin America. It is argued that development policies in Latin America and other developing regions should focus not only on eliminating poverty and deprivation but also on preventing and reducing inequality. By inequality we refer not only to differences in income or consumption between population groups but also to divergences in the access to social and political rights (education, health care, voting, and so on). Although conceptually related, poverty and inequality are two distinct phenomena and it is possible that falls in poverty may be accompanied by increases in inequality and vice-versa. In fact, many Latin America countries have experienced the former in recent years. In the long-term, however, persistent inequalities as those observed in the Latin America region will undermine efforts to reduce poverty and destitution due to the emergence of poverty traps caused by the impossibility of economic and social mobility of certain population groups. This will have important consequences for the challenge of achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty worldwide by 2015. In addition, persistently high inequalities will also impact negatively on crucial economic, social and political variables and will thus seriously undermine the success of any development strategies.
Violent political conflict has typically been studied either from an economic discontent or a political opportunity framework. This study proposes a conjunctural model, which hypothesizes that the production of grievances due to economic inequality varies systematically and interacts with political opportunities to generate violent political conflict. Using multiple regression analysis, this cross-national research examines the interaction between economic inequality and political opportunities, and their direct effects on political violence. Findings provide support for the conjunctural model propositions that political opportunity structures moderate the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict. Specifically, the positive effects of income inequality and separatist potential on political violence are enhanced in weak states. The impact of class exploitation on violent political conflict is moderated by regime structure and political institutionalization. Findings suggest that political opportunity structures may operate in different ways for challenges rooted in class as opposed to ethnic inequalities.
This volume analyzes the judicial reform processes funded by international donor organizations in Latin America. As billions of dollars are spent on judicial reform, it is pertinent to ask about the fate of these projects. The authors examine the way in which international organizations rationalize and prioritize their reform proposals and agenda in Latin America; how reform agendas are implemented and followed up (or not); how international donor organizations relate to national governments and civil society, and to each other; and what factors account for the successes and failures of their reform initiatives. The book also addresses the question of the connection between rule of law reform and broader processes of regime consolidation and state building, from both a political and a social perspective.
Journal of Democracy 10.3 (1999) 64-77 On 6 December 1998, Venezuelans elected as their new president Hugo Chávez Frias, a former lieutenant colonel and the leader of two failed coup attempts in 1992, effectively putting an end to the pacted political arrangement that had been in place in the country for the past 40 years. That arrangement, known as the Punto Fijo system, had been characterized by the alternation in power of two powerful and deeply rooted political parties, the center-left Acción Democrática (Democratic Action, or AD) and the center-right Social Christian Party (COPEI). Neither Chávez, who won 56 percent of the presidential vote, nor Henrique Salas Römer, who finished second with 40 percent, was the nominee of either of these parties (though Römer was endorsed by both of them late in the campaign). Moreover, in legislative elections held the previous month, the combined representation of the two parties fell well below 50 percent of the seats in both houses of Congress. The Punto Fijo system originated with the fall of the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958, when AD, COPEI, and the Democratic Republican Union (URD) signed a pact at Punto Fijo to share power and oil wealth, regardless of which one of them won the elections. As a result of this arrangement, Venezuela developed into a model democracy for the hemisphere, withstanding the pressures of a guerrilla war, military rule in its southern neighbors, and the booms and busts of the oil industry. That model democracy, however, also generated a government dominated by AD and COPEI, which created hierarchical national organizations and relied on oil revenues to satisfy the needs of their major constituencies. State subsidies gave everyone a bit of the wealth, but income distribution remained inequitable and the parties gradually took control of most organizations within civil society. By the 1980s, plummeting oil revenues and a massive foreign debt brought Venezuela's dependence on oil into stark relief. The population, however, still seemed to believe that Venezuela was a rich nation and that oil wealth was their inherent right. They blamed a corrupt elite for siphoning off this wealth and found their scapegoat in Carlos Andrés Pérez, who had served his first term as president during the fabulous boom of the mid-1970s, and then in 1989 had become the first Venezuelan president elected to a second term. The population expected Pérez to restore the easy lifestyle of the boom years, but instead, he announced El Gran Viraje (The Great Turn-Around) as his program to restore equilibrium to the economy. Announcing that the country was broke and in need of austerity, Pérez provoked a massive riot in 1989 by raising gas prices. The next two years were filled with student protests, labor strikes, and an increasingly heated political debate as Pérez attempted to carry out a radical structural-adjustment program. Then, on 4 February 1992, Lt. Colonel Hugo Chávez Frias and a group of junior army officers led an unsuccessful coup attempt against Pérez that collapsed within hours. Nevertheless, it generated wide support within the lower and middle classes, and on March 10 thousands of citizens banged on pots throughout the country to protest government policies and to support the coup plotters. A second, bloodier coup attempt took place on 27 November 1992, this time carried out primarily by the air force. It too was suppressed by forces loyal to President Pérez, but it generated less popular support because of the more violent methods of the coup plotters. After surviving these two coup attempts, President Pérez was impeached and driven from office in 1993 on a charge of misappropriation of public funds. With elections approaching in December 1993, former president Rafael Caldera, the founder of COPEI and one of the architects of the Punto Fijo agreement, broke from the party he had founded and ran as an independent on a platform of integrity, fighting poverty, and reversing El Gran Viraje. As he took office in February 1994, the banking system collapsed. Over the next four years, his government...
Scholars of democratic consolidation have come to focus on the links between political institutions and enduring regime outcomes. This article takes issue with the conceptual and analytical underpinnings of this literature by highlighting how new political institutions, rather than securing democratic politics, have in fact had a more checkered effect. It delineates why the theoretical expectations of the democratic consolidation literature have not been realized and draws, by example, on the contemporary ethnic movements that are now challenging third-wave democracies. In particular, it highlights how contemporary indigenous movements, emerging in response to unevenly institutionalized reforms, pose a postliberal challenge to Latin America's newly founded democracies. These movements have sparked political debates and constitutional reforms over community rights, territorial autonomy, and a multiethnic citizenry. As a whole, they have laid bare the weakness of state institutions, the contested terms of democracy, and the indeterminacy of ethnic accommodation in the region. As such, these movements highlight the need to qualify somewhat premature and narrow discussions of democratic consolidation in favor of a broader research agenda on democratic politics.
The lack of progress on reducing poverty in Third World countries, and its growth during the 1980s, show that one of the fundamental goals of development has not been met. Addressing the renewed concern with poverty requires knowledge about the factors affecting poverty. This paper uses logistic regression analysis to estimate the effects of variables on urban, rural, farm, and nonfarm poverty among households in Costa Rica. Results show the complexity of the issue, and imply policies to expand education through the secondary level, to create more opportunities for rural off-farm employ-
This paper argues that there is no country in Latin America where we can confidently say that income inequality improved during the 1990s. We document this fact for the 15 countries where comparable household surveys, covering most of the population, are available. What we observe are genuine distributive changes, which are being driven neither by differences in the characteristics of the data nor by the way in which the data is treated. In 10 of the countries, the lack of progress is driven by increases in inequality among the first nine deciles. In the remaining 5, the reason is a greater concentration among the richest 10% of the population. We also observe that in 7 countries, the dynamics among individuals with 14 years or more of schooling are the main reason why income distribution has not improved in the 1990s. However, the lack of progress in income distribution is not exclusive to this region. We compare Latin America internationally and find that, with few exceptions, inequality has increased less in this region than in developed countries and in Eastern Europe.
Both institutional quality and institutional stability have been argued to stimulate economic growth. But to improve institutional quality, a country must endure a period of institutional change, which implies at least a little and possibly a lot of institutional instability. We investigate the growth effects of institutional quality and instability, using the political risk index from the ICRG in a cross-country study of 132 countries, measuring instability as the coefficient of variation. Using the aggregate index, we find evidence that institutional quality is positively linked to growth. While institutional instability is negatively related to growth in the baseline case, there are indications that the effect can be positive in rich countries, suggesting that institutional reform is not necessarily costly even during a transition period. Sensitivity analysis, e.g., decomposing the political risk index by using both its constituting components and the results of a principal components analysis, using other measures of institutional quality and excluding outliers, confirm the general results, with qualifications.
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