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Philosophy in the Contemporary World 15:1 (Spring 2008)
_________________________________
Tolerance: A Virtue?
Towards a Broad and Descriptive
Definition of Tolerance
Bart Engelen and Thomas Nys
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Universiteit van Amsterdam
bart.engelen@econ.kuleuven.be
T.R.V.Nys@uva.nl
_________________________________
A
BSTRACT: This article focuses on the difficult issue of what exactly goes on
when an individual tolerates something. It focuses on the problem of why an
individual would ever choose to allow for some practice that he deems
unacceptable while having the power to do something about it. After
distinguishing between different attitudes (tolerant as well as intolerant), this
article argues that individuals can have various reasons for deciding to tolerate
what they deem wrong. As such, we defend a broad conception of tolerance,
which goes against the grain of recent literature in which tolerance is generally
understood as a virtue.
IN THE LITERATURE ON TOLERANCE there is a divide between those
who conceive of it as a virtue, and those who do not. Although most of the
contemporary authors on the topic are situated within the first camp,
1
we would like
to team up with the second.
We deliberately aim to stay clear from the normative issues surrounding
tolerance. Consequently, we have nothing to say about what should be tolerated and
what not. Instead, we focus on the purely conceptual and explanatory issue of what
exactly goes on when an individual tolerates something. Our aim is to reformulate
the concept of tolerance by shifting the discussion from the normative level
1
See for example: “the concept of toleration I discuss is the strict or narrow one, namely, that which is
distinguished from other types of restraint, like indifference or pragmatic compromise. (…). It focuses
primarily on the ethical, rather than the political context, that is, on toleration as a virtue of individuals
relating to other individuals” (Heyd 1996: 10).
Tolerance: A Virtue? 45
(“should we tolerate?”) to the descriptive one (“can we tolerate?”). In this respect,
we take the following definition of tolerance as a starting point: “the paradigm
example of toleration is the deliberate decision to refrain from prohibiting,
hindering or otherwise coercively interfering with conduct of which one
disapproves, although one has the power to do so” (Horton 1998, 429-430).
2
This
definition allows us to distinguish between three necessary requirements to speak of
tolerance: the individual (1) finds a particular practice or action objectionable or
even unacceptable (disapproval), (2) has the means to stop this practice (power) but
(3) decides not to do anything about it (self-restraint).
Take the example of homosexuality. Our aim is to investigate what goes on
when an individual decides to tolerate homosexuality. Applying the
abovementioned definition, we tentatively claim that such an individual (1)
disapproves of homosexuality but (3) decides not to interfere with the conduct of
gays (2) even in cases where he has the means to do so.
Immediately, the question arises why an individual (3) would ever choose to
allow for some practice if he (1) deems it unacceptable and (2) has the power to do
something about it. The problem we want to address here lies in explaining how one
is able to tolerate what one deems wrong.
3
Tolerating seems to be a remarkable
attitude, since it is difficult to understand how one can allow for such practices if
one genuinely objects to them. In search for a solution to this problem we will try to
reframe the concept of tolerance by distinguishing various categories of behaviour.
This classification is the result of a closer inspection of the abovementioned
requirements for tolerance.
I. Those who agree and those who don’t care
If we concentrate on the first requirement then it is clear that people who
experience no initial sense of objection cannot be labelled ‘tolerant’, even though
they have the power to intervene and refrain from doing so. For those who
wholeheartedly agree with a certain practice, there is no question of tolerating it.
The idea that homosexuals are tolerant with regard to homosexuality is simply
absurd. To tolerate originally means ‘to bear something unpleasant’ and if there is
no resistance whatsoever—if there is no burden to bear—then ‘tolerance’ is nothing
short of a misnomer.
Another possibility is that one is completely indifferent about a certain practice:
one simply does not care whether it is performed or not. One neither disapproves of
it, nor does one feel committed to defend it. To take our example, it is possible that
2
See also: “the core of the concept of toleration is the refusal, where one has the power to do so, to
prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds objectionable” (Horton 1996, 28; see also
Horton 1987, 521). Nevertheless, we defend a different view than Horton himself, who goes on to
understand tolerance as a virtue. In contrast with this broad definition (which leaves open which reasons
one might have for not interfering), he favours a narrower one: “of course, people’s reasons for showing
restraint are crucial to identifying their conduct as being tolerant. (It is partly for this reason that I have
serious doubts about a purely descriptive concept of toleration)” (Horton 1996, 39).
3
This problem is situated at the conceptual level. In contrast, the bulk of the literature focuses on the
normative paradox: why should one tolerate what one deems morally wrong? As will become clear, we
aim to avoid this paradox by defining tolerance in morally neutral terms.
46 Thomas Nys and Bart Engelen
one does not care at all about the sexual preferences of gays (or heteros for that
matter). Whether homosexuality is allowed or prohibited, a person who is
indifferent will not intervene, since he simply does not feel involved. It has
extensively been argued in the literature that such an attitude of indifference cannot
be the basis of genuine tolerance (Mendus 1989, 8; Mendus 1992, 1251; Nicholson
1985, 162).
4
If tolerance is not to be sought with those who agree or those who
couldn’t care less (Forst 2001, 193; Horton 1998, 430), it should be sought
elsewhere.
II. Plain Intolerance
But first, let us exclude another possibility, namely the prototypical case of
intolerance. Consider a person who objects to homosexuality and who tries his very
best to purify the world from such ‘repulsive’ or ‘unnatural’ behaviour. He believes
that homosexuals should be punished or that they should receive treatment for their
‘illness’. When he sees homosexuals holding hands he will insult them or even use
violence to put an end to such ‘obscenities.’ Let us call this plain intolerance.
5
People who are plainly intolerant essentially put their foot down when they are
faced with something they deem objectionable. If they believe something is wrong,
they invariably react. They feel that they cannot let things pass. Consequently, they
do something about it and use their power to prevent these things from happening.
Although they clearly experience an initial sense of rejection, they obviously cannot
be called tolerant since they do not fulfil Horton’s third requirement (self-restraint).
However, it is clear that we all fit this description from time to time. Moreover,
we often believe that we have good reasons for putting our foot down. Some
practices are so abhorrent, harmful, insulting, annoying or wrong that we believe
that we should interfere, or that it is even our duty to put an end to them.
Yet, leaving aside the issue when one should be intolerant and translate one’s
sense of rejection into action, we want to stress that, at a descriptive level, this type
of behaviour is remarkably consistent. There are no mysteries here: these people
just put their fists where their mouths are. Taking their values seriously, they
consider deviant behaviour as an insult that should be properly avenged. While they
might be criticized for their simple- and single-mindedness, they cannot be accused
of inconsistency or hypocrisy.
Of course, the situation can occur that a person wants to put his foot down, but
lacks the necessary means to do so (Horton 1998: 431; Meyer 2002: 550-551). His
intolerance fails in that he is unable to do something about a certain practice he
deems highly objectionable. Some people might be horrified by the very thought of
4
See also: “Normally, one cannot be tolerant of something if one is either indifferent to it or approves of
it. Acting tolerantly characteristically implies some sort of negative attitude or judgment on the part of
the tolerator—ranging from mere dislike to intense moral disapproval—towards that which is tolerated”
(Horton 1998, 431).
5
It must be noted that someone who is plainly intolerant does not always perform physically harmful
behavior. Someone who meticulously corrects every mistake in an informal letter is intolerant as well.
What characterizes the plainly intolerant is that he translates his feelings of rejection into action. The
distinguishing mark lies not in the way in which he reacts, but in the fact that he reacts. He takes his
value system to be absolute and seeks to impose it on others.
Tolerance: A Virtue? 47
homosexuality but might be unable to voice their disgust or contribute to the
downfall of gays. Such people are condemned to allow what they deem wrong,
simply because they do not have the power to intervene. Yet, since they do not fulfil
Horton’s second requirement (power), they cannot be labelled ‘tolerant.’
III. Tolerance?
Now let us move to those cases in which all three conditions are fulfilled.
Consider a person who (1) experiences an initial sense of rejection when faced with
homosexuality but (3) refrains from putting his foot down (2) even though he has
the power to do so. Somehow he is able to overcome his sense of rejection and
allow for a practice that he continues to regard as objectionable. Such a person is
not persuaded that the practice at hand is alright. Instead, he constrains himself
despite the fact that he has serious objections against it. While this distinguishes
such a tolerant person from those who agree and those who don’t care, it also gives
rise to the problem we mentioned above. How is one able to refrain from interfering
if one nevertheless believes that there are good reasons for doing so? Is tolerance
not the pinnacle of hypocrisy?
In order to understand this we should accept that the tolerant person has reasons
for allowing the practice that override his initial sense of rejection. What is tolerated
is unmistakably rejected, but to interfere with that practice would be even worse.
Hence we take Horton’s definition to imply that a tolerant person withholds his true
beliefs from being translated into action on grounds of overriding reasons. Such a
person does not stand up for his beliefs and allows his objects of care to be trampled
on.
6
An example of someone who fits this definition of tolerance is a person who
‘lets things pass’ because he is too afraid to do what he believes he has good reasons
for doing. Because he is afraid of the consequences of taking a stand, he decides not
to be plainly intolerant. We would like to dub this case pragmatic tolerance.
Although such a person cares about his values and commitments, he acts upon them
only when the cost of adherence is low. In other cases, he simply chickens out and
decides to keep his mouth shut.
7
For example, he does not rally against
homosexuals because he is aware of the fact that such criticism is regarded
inappropriate within the social environment in which he finds himself. Not willing
to risk his reputation and jeopardize his social position, he decides that it is not
worth the pain. The difference with the person who lacks the means to intervene is
that the pragmatically tolerant does not want to be intolerant (although he could be)
6
Although the objectionable practice at hand often involves a violation of one’s moral values, this is not
necessarily so. The offence can also be directed at what Frankfurt calls “the things we care about”
(Frankfurt 1988, 80-94). For example, a person might be offended by the fact that the National Anthem is
used in a commercial for tampons, although it is difficult to discern which of his moral values is violated.
For another example of a non-moral offence and its relation to tolerance, see the example of Pascal and
Wittgenstein in Van Damme (2004).
7
We use the term ‘pragmatic’ here in order to refer to prudential considerations, which can be
distinguished from more principled, moral reasons (Horton & Nicholson 1992, 4). This distinction will
become clearer in what follows.
48 Thomas Nys and Bart Engelen
while the person who lacks the power simply cannot be intolerant (although he
wants to be).
However, this is not the typical case of tolerance. Usually, when we think of a
tolerant person we do not believe that he is simply too afraid to translate his beliefs
into actions (Heyd 1996, 4). Instead, we typically think of a tolerant person as
having moral rather than pragmatic reasons for refraining from intervention. The
archetype of such moral tolerance is expressed in the famous quote: “I disapprove
of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it”.
8
For example, a
tolerant person might be convinced that, contrary to his initial sense of rejection,
homosexuals should be allowed to engage in same-sex relationships because all
humans have an equal right to express their sexuality. Since sex is essential for
human beings, homosexuals deserve to be respected in their differences. Or else,
one might regard autonomy as a central value in liberal societies, which means that
homosexuals should be allowed to live their lives according to their own conception
of the good, especially since there is no clear and discernable harm in case of same-
sex relationships between consenting adults. Or still, one might be convinced that an
uproar against homosexuality would seriously disturb the project of peaceful
coexistence within society; something which one deems far more important—on a
moral level—than one’s own sense of repulsion against homosexuals.
Both types of tolerance involve people who ultimately refrain from interference
because they have reasons that outweigh their initial sense of rejection. The first
category refrains on the basis of pragmatic or prudential reasons. Note that, on this
account, the reasons for tolerance might be selfish but need not be. A person might
tolerate homosexuality because he believes that his children will suffer from the fact
that their father will acquire the reputation of a staunch homophobe. Although he
himself is willing to take the punches, he wants to protect those he cares about from
collateral damage.
Yet these kinds of reasons, although they are not purely selfish, are still different
from those employed by someone who is moved by a more impartial form of
reasoning that transcends his personal point of view. Even if such a person does not
in any way become worse off by being intolerant, he still puts his objections on
hold. For example, he might refrain from interfering in light of the societal benefits
of tolerance, out of a strong belief in value pluralism or out of respect for the
autonomy and dignity of persons. Horton and Nicholson (1992, 3) strongly stress
that tolerance is always based on such morally praiseworthy reasons:
Not just any choice to refrain from interference seems enough for toleration.
There may be many reasons for noninterference such as indolence or cowardice
which are quite distinct from, and sometimes antithetical to, toleration. In short
we need to know the reasons for noninterference in order to identify something
specifically as an instance of toleration.
8
This quote is often mistakenly attributed to Voltaire. Instead, it originally appeared in ‘The Friends of
Voltaire’ (1906), written by Evelyn Beatrice Hall under the pseudonym Stephen G. Tallentyre.
Tolerance: A Virtue? 49
In what follows, we want to argue against this view by stressing that purely
pragmatic reasons can motivate tolerance as well.
9
IV. Reframing Tolerance
The distinction between two types of tolerance implies that Horton’s definition
of tolerance can be interpreted in two ways. According to a first, narrow
interpretation, a person is tolerant if he (1) disapproves of some practice, (2) has the
power to interfere but (3) has overriding moral reasons for refraining from such
interference. According to a second, broad interpretation, an individual is tolerant if
he (1) disapproves of some practice, (2) has the power to interfere but (3) has
overriding reasons for refraining from such interference (whatever these may be).
How does the conception of tolerance as a virtue fit into this scheme? Does it
require moral reasons for tolerance? At first sight it does not, in the sense that a
virtue is a disposition to act in certain appropriate ways (depending on the
circumstances). It is a character trait in that it is firmly entrenched in the agent’s
character. The tolerant person would be somebody who acts appropriately without
balancing costs and benefits, but from a moral habit. Nevertheless, the virtue of
tolerance rests on some important assumptions (Van Tongeren 2003, 114-115). It
requires that we put our values in perspective, i.e. that we do not hold them to be
absolute. For that reason it is a modern virtue—entirely absent in Aristotle’s
writings. As such, the virtue of tolerance presupposes a belief in pluralism and
human fallibility. In general, Aristotelian terms, one can say that the virtues of
character presuppose phronèsis, an intellectual virtue (Van Tongeren 2003, 65).
Only with these assumptions in place can tolerance ever be appropriate. Those who
tolerate for different reasons are not properly thought of as virtuous or tolerant.
Now let us return to both definitions of tolerance. While both are valid ways of
understanding tolerance, we want to argue in favour of the broad definition and
reveal a number of problems with the narrow alternative. First, the broad definition
reframes the concept of tolerance in descriptive, that is, morally neutral terms. This
allows us to avoid the normative paradox mentioned at the outset that arises from
systematically assuming that “toleration is right and the tolerator is good”
(Nicholson 1985, 160). Forst (2001, 195) aptly summarizes the paradoxical
implication of such a narrow definition of tolerance: “if both the reasons for
objection and the reasons for acceptance are called ‘moral,’ the paradox arises that it
seems to be morally right or even morally demanded to tolerate what is morally
9
In our view, Horton and Nicholson fail to separate two distinct issues. When identifying the
abovementioned “types of moral argument for toleration” (Horton & Nicholson 1992, 4), they are
focusing on the issue why tolerance in some cases is desirable or valuable. Here, they refer to ethical
theories like utilitarianism and liberalism that try to argue why tolerance in these circumstances is a
moral duty or ideal. However, they fallaciously apply these criteria to the level of the individual who has
to make up his mind whether he will interfere or tolerate some practice. The fact that tolerance is indeed
desirable or valuable from a societal point of view because of the abovementioned reasons does not
imply that people should base their actions on these reasons in order to be tolerant. Even though scoring a
goal in a soccer match is good for the team because it earns championship points, a player may have less
noble reasons for doing so (like impressing the female spectators).
50 Thomas Nys and Bart Engelen
wrong”. If one does not stipulate that the reasons for tolerance should necessarily be
moral in nature, the paradox simply disappears.
10
Second, the broad definition better fits the general meaning of tolerance as it is
used in everyday language. Not a single dictionary entry for tolerance stipulates
conditions with respect to possible reasons for doing so. The narrow definition and
its implied exclusion of pragmatic tolerance thus cannot be sustained. Instead, we
want to stress that both pragmatic and moral reasons can legitimately motivate
tolerance. Consequently, we side with authors like Crick (1971) and King (1971)
against the conception of toleration as a moral ideal.
Third, adherents of the narrow definition face a practical difficulty. How is one
to decide whether a particular act of tolerance is based on moral rather than
pragmatic reasons? After all, it is hard to distinguish between both sorts of reasons
in concrete cases. Take the example of an individual who refrains from interfering
with the conduct of homosexuals. Although his decision to refrain may well be
inspired by a form of impartial moral reasoning in which values like autonomy and
respect for others are deemed more important than his own sense of uneasiness with
homosexuals, it may well turn out that, on a deeper level, he refrains from action
simply because he is too afraid to take a stand. Another example is the person who
lets things pass for the sake of peaceful coexistence: is this based on some noble
form of impartial reasoning or on more mundane considerations like self-
preservation?
The crucial point is that it is difficult to assess which reasons actually move a
person to action. This problem is quite akin to the Kantian difference between
actions from duty and actions that are merely in conformity with the moral law.
Kant admits that an individual’s true motives are not only obscure to those who
observe his behaviour from the outside (third person perspective), but also to the
person himself (first person perspective). Proponents of the narrow interpretation
should be prepared to accept this obscurity. Of course, they could easily do so, but
then tolerance, although it is conceptually clear, might become something that is
very difficult to detect in reality. In the end, genuine cases of tolerance based
exclusively on impartial considerations might actually be very sparse.
Fourth, the broad definition has the advantage of making it possible to induce
people to be tolerant, even if they have not accepted overriding moral reasons
themselves. Our penal system allows punishing people if they cross the line.
Therefore, society sends a message that they will be punished if they would choose
to do so. Increasing the costs of plain intolerance effectively provides citizens with
pragmatic reasons for letting things pass even when there is something at stake for
them, i.e. something they care about. This way of ‘stimulating’ tolerance does not
render citizens completely unable to interfere but rather makes citizens take into
10
One can also ask whether the practice that is tolerated is morally justifiable or not. In short, we believe
that it is intuitively clear that it is possible for an individual to tolerate things that are considered morally
wrong by any standard. Blatant cases of pedophilia, for example, should never be tolerated. This provides
an additional argument to conceive of tolerance in descriptive, morally neutral terms (Crick 1971; King
1971). However, since we want to avoid normative questions regarding the limits of tolerance (what
should be tolerated and what not), we want to leave this issue aside.
Tolerance: A Virtue? 51
account the potential costs of doing so. While gay-bashing is still an option, they are
not free to do so without taking the blame.
It becomes clear, however, that tolerance is often a second-best solution. We
believe that, in a number of circumstances, it would be better if there were no initial
sense of rejection at all. Ideally, one should move beyond tolerance in that this
feeling should not merely be overridden by other considerations but should be
erased completely. The point here is that people sometimes disapprove of something
that—according to widely acknowledged standards—is not to be disapproved at all.
In such cases, we should not emphasize the value of tolerance—as theorists who
conceive of tolerance as virtuous or good would do—but rather say that people
should come to recognize each other’s values as valuable and not as things that they
deem objectionable. Later on, we will return to this claim that people do not want to
be tolerated for the sake of overriding reasons; they demand recognition and respect
for their values and practices as such.
In this respect, we want to stress that tolerance is not always desirable or good,
even when it is based on morally praiseworthy reasons. Once more, take the case of
homosexuality. One should come to see that homosexual relationships are valuable
as such, and not just by an appeal to abstract rights. The idea that homosexuality is
okay only because it fits a person’s right to self-determination, is “one thought too
many” (Williams 1981, 18). The initial sense of rejection should (eventually) make
way for appreciation or acceptance. Moreover, even those who are indifferent
towards the issue, i.e. who do not understand what all the fuss is about, are often
deemed more praiseworthy than those who are able to restrain their unsympathetic
feelings. All this makes clear that the ‘virtue of tolerance’ falls short as an ideal.
11
It should by now be clear that theorists in the field face the dilemma of choosing
between both definitions. If, on the one hand, they want to think of tolerance as
virtuous or good, they should embrace the narrow definition, according to which
tolerance is always based on morally praiseworthy reasons. If, on the other hand,
they accept the broad interpretation and label the pragmatic person tolerant as well,
they can no longer conceive of tolerance as virtuous, morally desirable or good.
Bringing together the disadvantages of the former position and the advantages of the
latter position, we believe that the burden of proof shifts to those who think of
tolerance as an inherently normative concept. In their view, tolerance is a virtue and
thus morally good, because it is defined as allowing for the right practices in the
right circumstances and for the right reasons. Leaving aside the question whether
this way of explaining the goodness of tolerance by referring to the goodness of the
reasons for tolerating begs the question or not, we believe it faces a number of
serious problems that have to be addressed explicitly by those who want to think of
tolerance as a virtue.
V. Conclusion
11
This might be compared to what Fletcher calls “the instability of tolerance” (Fletcher 1996, 171): an
attitude of tolerance always tends to tilt to legitimate rejection (and hence plain intolerance), indifference,
or acceptance.
52 Thomas Nys and Bart Engelen
We have argued that it does not matter which reasons lead an individual to
refrain from acting upon his sense of rejection towards a certain practice. This holds
not only from a conceptual point of view, but also from a societal point of view. In
the end, what matters is that citizens conform to the norms and laws that prevail in
the society they live in. Except for plain intolerance, the categories described above
all have the same outcome of non-interference. A purely ‘behavioural’ definition of
tolerance, which stresses a person’s hands-off attitude towards practices in which he
does not engage himself, might be useful from a societal point of view. Still, we
believe Horton’s broad definition of toleration, which includes the requirement of a
sense of rejection, remains useful. After all, it avoids the counter-intuitive
conclusion that even people who don’t care at all are tolerant.
Let us return to the initial problem of how a person could ever allow for that
which he sincerely objects to. Here, one might suggest that his overriding reason for
self-restraint is perhaps best understood as a desire to honour his values rather than
promote them. Such an attitude of honouring means that he is personally committed
to certain values and practices but that he does not necessarily want others to uphold
them as well (Pettit 1991, 230-231). Instead of continuously proselytising, like the
plainly intolerant person does, he lets his actions exemplify his personal values.
Such a person is satisfied with living by his own standards and does not want to
impose them on others. For example, he might go to church every Sunday without
actively urging or persuading others to do so as well (and without taking action
against those who fail to go to Sunday Mass). This would explain why a person who
takes his values seriously nevertheless doesn’t react against practices that go against
them.
However, as we have already suggested, one can legitimately ask whether such
tolerance is able to pass normative scrutiny from the perspective of both the
tolerator (“Should we merely honour our values or should we put our foot down?”)
as well as the person who is tolerated (“Do we want to be tolerated merely because
their values only need the respect of honouring?”). People do not want to be
respected as mere placeholders of values. To be respected as a person is to be
respected in one’s identity. And since this identity is constituted by the things one
cares about (Shoemaker 2003, 112), people seek recognition for those things that
are dear to them. Hence it is questionable whether a strategy of putting the
differences ‘behind closed doors’ and making them the object of private interests is
a morally praiseworthy strategy.
12
While a narrow definition of tolerance as a virtuous attitude that is based
exclusively on moral considerations overriding one’s initial sense of rejection is still
possible, we favour a broader definition that no longer stipulates that such
considerations should be moral. This way of reframing the concept of tolerance in
descriptive terms goes against the grain of recent literature in which tolerance is
generally understood as a virtue.
12
Consider, for example, Scanlon (1996, 235): “if toleration is to make any sense (…) we must
distinguish between one’s attitude towards what is advocated by one’s opponents and one’s attitude
toward those opponents themselves: it is not that their point of view is entitled to be represented but that
they (…) are entitled to be heard”. Our claim is that such a clear distinction is problematic.
Tolerance: A Virtue? 53
Acknowledgements
The authors are thankful for the financial support they received from the Research
Foundation – Flanders (Belgium). Further, they would like to thank Prof. Antoon
Vandevelde, Yvonne Denier, Sylvie Loriaux and, especially, Joris Van Damme for
their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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