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Exploitation or Conservation? Can The Hunting Tourism Industry in Africa Be Sustainable?

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Exploitation or Conservation?Exploitation or Conservation?Exploitation or Conservation?
Can The Hunting Tourism
Industry in Africa
Be Sustainable?
iStockPhoto/Dan Kite
Exploitation or Conservation?Exploitation or Conservation?Exploitation or Conservation?
Can The Hunting Tourism
Industry in Africa
Be Sustainable?
“To measure and retain the rich biodiversity of
Africa . . . we need to break with traditional
thinking to catalyze a new vision and join hands
in new partnerships.”—Nelson Mandela
1
African Elephants and Mount Kilimanjaro -
Amboseli National Park, Kenya.
by Nicolas Jordan Deere
22 EnvironmEnt www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org voLUmE 53 nUmBEr 4
The term “hunting” is one
that holds many negative
connotations, with hunting
opposition claiming that it
is not only immoral but in direct con-
tradiction to the values of a humane
society.2 Alternatively, Mahoney ar-
gues that hunting has played an influ-
ential role in our survival as a species
and that the morals of modern-day
society have disconnected us from
the processes of the natural world.3
Due to growing public concern and
increased pressure from politicians,
hunters are now beginning to recog-
nize the need for change to ensure
the longevity of hunting by making it
more socially acceptable.4
Hunting bans across Africa have
been relatively ineffective in protect-
ing wildlife, as they reduce the value
of wild animals and therefore reduce
local interest in protecting the animals.5
Since the establishment of the hunting
ban in Kenya in 1977, the country has
recorded a decline in number by 40 to
90 percent in most animal species.6 Al-
ternatively, hunting tourism has been
extremely successful as it attaches an
economic value to the wildlife and
therefore encourages the cooperation of
local people in conservation efforts for
economic gain.
Since the publication of “Our Com-
mon Future” in 1987, sustainable de-
velopment has been at the forefront of
environmental policy, attempting to
combine economic growth and social
development with conservation initia-
tives.7 At the International Council for
Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC)
workshop in Barcelona it was accepted
that hunting tourism was an effective
conservation tool with social, economic,
and environmental benefits.8 However,
the question remains, how can such a
consumptive method of tourism prove
to be sustainable? The mere concept of
killing to conserve seems counterintui-
tive. By reviewing current hunting tour-
ism practices in Sub-Saharan Africa, the
sustainability of the hunting tourism in-
dustry is investigated in this article, pro-
viding recommendations to promote the
sustainable use of wildlife resources.
African Hunting Tourism
Uncontrolled hunting by early set-
tlers and explorers in Africa led to the
extinction of quaggas (Equus quagga),
blue buck (Hippotragus leucophaeus),
and the cape lion (Panthera leo mela-
nochaitus).9 Recognizing the impact of
hunting on game populations, hunters
made major contributions to the estab-
lishment of protected areas for wildlife
during the twentieth century, and during
this time private landowners permit-
ted the hunting of game on their land.9
However, it wasn’t until the 1970s that
landowners realized the economic po-
tential of providing hunting packages to
foreigners.10 Presently in Sub-Saharan
Africa an area of 1,394,000 km2 is uti-
lized as game ranches for trophy hunt-
ing, compared to the 1,087,320 km2 of
protected areas established as national
parks.11 A further breakdown, detail-
ing the difference in areas covered by
national parks compared with game
ranches, is displayed in the table here.
In South Africa the majority of game
ranches fall on privately owned land
due to changes in legislation that al-
located to landowners ownership of
wildlife and permitted its consumptive
use to generate income.12 Private land-
owners are required to possess a hunt-
ing outfitters permit, which attempts to
regulate the industry by ensuring that
only professionals can authorize and
Country Area covered
by game
ranches
(km2)
Percentage of country Area covered by
National Parks
(km2)
Percentage of
country
South Africa
160,000
13.1
56,500
4.6
Tanzania 250,000 26.4 134,881 14.1
Botswana 133,451 23.0 104,120 18.0
Namibia 94,052 11.4 107,125 13.0
Fig 1.1: Adapted from Lindsey et al.11
Adapted from Lindsey et al.11
JULy/aUgUst 2011 www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org EnvironmEnt 23
oversee hunting. All hunting fees are
paid directly to the landowner, who
does not have to pay a hunting fee to the
government.13 Although private land-
owners are under no legal obligation to
monitor wildlife populations, hunting
practices are reviewed by nine provin-
cial administrations that have the power
to suspend hunting if it is perceived to
be done in an unsustainable manner.13
In Botswana, Namibia, and Tanza-
nia, game ranches fall on state-owned
land in the form of either controlled
hunting areas (CHAs) or wildlife man-
agement areas (WMAs). WMAs strictly
prohibit any form of land use other than
hunting, whereas CHAs provide oppor-
tunities for non consumptive forms of
tourism such as wildlife photography.14
CHAs and WMAs are subdivided into
blocks, which are leased by the gov-
ernment to hunting companies (known
as outfitters) for a fee. Initially tourists
pay a fee to the outfitter; however, ad-
ditional fees are then charged by gov-
ernments to tourists for conservation,
firearm permits, and trophy export.15
Regardless of whether land is pri-
vately owned or state owned, hunting is
only permitted in the presence of a hunt-
ing guide, who ensures that animals are
killed in a humane way.16 Further regu-
lation of hunting is enforced by quotas,
which determine a viable number of
animals that can be killed to ensure that
hunting is sustainable. Quotas are set in
accordance with population estimates,
and it is generally considered that 2 to
7 percent offtake is sustainable as this
allows for alternative forms of mortal-
ity on wild animal populations, such
as disease, starvation, and predation.17
Alternatively, on private game ranches
enclosed by a fence around the perim-
eter the quota is dictated by the carrying
capacity of the habitat.18 Hunting regu-
lations also dictate that in species with
marked sexual dimorphism, only sur-
plus males can be harvested, to reduce
the impact of hunting on reproduction.
In other species, where such differences
are not as apparent, both sexes can be
taken, providing the females are not
nursing or accompanied by dependent
young.17
In terms of the hunting tourism in-
dustry, sustainable development can be
achieved if it is environmentally sensi-
tive, economically viable, and socially
appropriate.19 It is in relation to these
factors that the industry is next dis-
cussed in greater detail.
Environmental Impacts
To fulfill the environmental require-
ments of sustainability, hunting tour-
ism must be of value to conservation
through the preservation of habitats
and the protection of wildlife. Although
protected areas afford this, they are not
large enough to contain or maintain
wide-ranging, viable animal popula-
tions.20 Alternatively, game reserves
encompass a far greater area (high-
lighted in the earlier table), which could
provide a greater network of protected
areas for game species, facilitating an
increase in population size and genetic
variation between populations.
The economic success of hunting
tourism hinges on the quality of the
game species harvested, which in turn
relies on the quality of the habitat to pro-
vide their environmental needs. There-
fore, it is in the best interests of hunting
operators to maintain pristine habitats
for game species. Agricultural expan-
sion is a major cause for concern among
conservationists, as it leads to habitat
fragmentation and ecological degrada-
tion.21 Game reserves play a pivotal role
in protecting wildlife habitats, as they
attach economic significance to land ar-
eas that would normally be utilized for
agriculture.22 There is much evidence to
suggest that hunting is less destructive
than other nonconsumptive forms of
ecotourism, such as photographic tour-
ism.23 Hunters have less impact on the
environment than photographic tourists
as they require fewer local amenities
and infrastructure, therefore reducing
habitat degradation.24 The income gen-
erated from the hunting industry far ex-
ceeds that generated from other forms
Hunter in Botswana.
iStockPhoto/Lucian
Hunters have less impact on the environment
than photographic tourists as they require fewer
local amenities and infrastructure, therefore
reducing habitat degradation.
24 EnvironmEnt www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org voLUmE 53 nUmBEr 4
of ecotourism and is derived from fewer
tourists, reducing their ecological im-
pact while providing increased revenue
for conservation initiatives.25 In fenced
reserves the controlled hunting of over-
populated herds is an important aspect
of habitat management, as this keeps
animal populations below carrying ca-
pacity, preventing ecological degrada-
tion.15 However, fenced reserves have
received much criticism as they block
migratory routes.26
Although hunting opposition mem-
bers argue that hunting by tourists will
result in the widespread extinction of
greater numbers of animal species, this
is not necessarily the case.15 Bontebok
(Damaliscus pygargus dorcas), black
wildebeest (Connochaetes gnou) and
cape mountain zebra (Equus zebra ze-
bra) have all been successfully rein-
troduced in South Africa as a result of
financial assistance provided by hunt-
ing tourism.27 Similar success has been
achieved with the southern white rhi-
noceros (Ceratotherium simum simum),
and from 1968 to 1994 populations
increased from 1,800 to over 6,370 on
privately owned game ranches.28
However, concerns have been raised
about the evolutionary consequences of
hunting, as the most sought-after trophy
animals are usually those with the best
physical characteristics.29 By remov-
ing animals with superior genes from a
population the genetic integrity of that
population is compromised, casting
doubt over the long-term sustainability
of hunting tourism.
Misconduct by game ranch owners
threatens the hunting tourism industry’s
viability as an effective tool of conser-
vation. Some game ranch owners cross-
breed closely related species to create
unique trophy animals that would prove
more desirable to hunters; examples of
such hybrids include the red wildebeest
and the white springbok.30 Such ge-
netic manipulation that alters coloration
can compromise an animal’s ability to
evade predation. To diversify the range
of species available to hunters, outfit-
ters have introduced exotic species
to game ranches, which can facilitate
habitat degradation and loss of biodi-
versity.30 Other forms of misconduct in-
clude hunting practices from which the
trophy animal has little or no chance of
escape, such as canned or put-and-take
hunting.11
The hunting industry is often consid-
ered self-regulating, as modest offtake
is required to ensure trophy quality re-
mains high over subsequent years.11
Nevertheless, this kind of exploitation
carries the risk of reducing popula-
tion size to a point where hunting is no
longer profitable and in extreme cases
leaves the species vulnerable to extinc-
tion.9 To avoid overexploitation, quotas
are established to ensure hunting re-
mains sustainable. However, due to a
lack of resources, population estimates
that determine quotas are often infre-
quent and the result of educated guess-
work, relying on anecdotal evidence
from professional hunters and wildlife
officers.31
Quotas have also been criticized
for their failure to acknowledge how
animal breeding systems may affect the
ability of a species to respond to hunting
pressure. Caro et al. analyzed the affect
of paternal care and infanticide on the
sustainability of current hunting quotas
and found both decrease the sustain-
able offtake.17 The detrimental effect of
hunting on species that practice infanti-
cide has been well documented in lions
(Panthera leo), which are particularly
susceptible to male offtake as the re-
moval of pride-holding males increases
juvenile mortality.32
Due to the legal repercussions of
the killing of game as a preventative
measure for crop damage and livestock
predation, it is difficult to ascertain
how many animals are killed in these
circumstances. In turn, this makes it
equally as difficult to consider this
when establishing quotas. In a review
of the Selous game reserve, Caro et al.
found that although most species were
netic manipulation that alters coloration
can compromise an animal’s ability to
evade predation. To diversify the range
of species available to hunters, outfit-
ters have introduced exotic species
to game ranches, which can facilitate
habitat degradation and loss of biodi-
versity.
clude hunting practices from which the
trophy animal has little or no chance of
escape, such as canned or put-and-take
hunting.
ered self-regulating, as modest offtake
is required to ensure trophy quality re-
mains high over subsequent years.
Nevertheless, this kind of exploitation
carries the risk of reducing popula-
tion size to a point where hunting is no
longer profitable and in extreme cases
An African Buffalo Bull. Photographed at Mabula Game Reserve, South Africa.
Wikimedia Commons/Paul M Rae
The true toll that illegal offtake is taking may
never be known and what is considered to
be sustainable offtake may be nothing more
than unsustainable exploitation.
JULy/aUgUst 2011 www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org EnvironmEnt 25
being hunted at sustainable levels, quo-
tas for eland (Taurotragus oryx), harte-
beest (Alcelaphus buselaphus), lion,
reedbuck (Redunca arundinum), sable
antelope (Hippotragus niger), warthog
(Phacochoerus africanus), and water-
buck (Kobus ellipsiprymnus) were set at
unsustainable levels.17 However, the au-
thor admitted that although retaliatory
killings and illegal offtake are preva-
lent, these weren’t taken into account
due to the aforementioned difficulties in
estimating the number of animals killed.
This suggests that the hunting pressures
on game species perceived as problem
animals may be greater than originally
considered; therefore, quotas for such
species should be reviewed to prevent
conservation initiatives being impeded.
Corruption also plays a role in de-
stabilizing hunting quotas, as corrupt
officials are thought to provide wealthy
hunters special permits which authorize
quota exempt offtake.38 Furthermore,
in Tanzania, quotas established by the
Wildlife Department have been in-
creased by government officials without
adequate scientific justification.39
Until more scientific measures are
put in place to produce more accurate
population estimates, the true toll that
illegal offtake is taking may never be
known and what is considered to be sus-
tainable offtake may be nothing more
than unsustainable exploitation.
Tourism
The estimated annual revenue gener-
ated from hunting in Sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries is US$201million from
18,500 hunters, which dwarfs that gen-
erated across Eurasia, which is an esti-
mated US$33 million to 39 million from
approximately 60,000 hunters.11 The ac-
companying table details the annual in-
come of the four countries studied.
The table demonstrates that coun-
tries such as Tanzania and Botswana,
which primarily derive their income
from big game species such as elephants
(Loxodonta africana), lions, leopards
(Panthera pardus), and buffalo (Synce-
rus caffer), are able to generate higher
revenue through less species killed.
This is due to the inflated fees charged
to hunt big game species and results in
higher revenue for less offtake. A per-
fect example of this can be observed by
comparing statistics between Botswana
and Namibia, countries that have simi-
lar populations and wildlife resources.40
During the 2000 hunting season Bo-
tswana generated US$12.6million
for 2,500 trophy animals; to compete
with that figure Namibia, with a high-
value game species offtake of 3 per-
cent, would have to kill 13,310 trophy
animals.41 Such conclusions have clear
implications on the management of
the tourist hunting industry, by reach-
ing equilibrium between high value big
game species and low value plains game
species (e.g., kudu Tragelaphus imber-
bis and gemsbok Oryx gazella) outfit-
ters can potentially reduce the hunting
pressure on plains game species. Al-
though prices for hunting different spe-
cies of game vary between companies,
a comprehensive guide of current game
prices in South Africa is available in the
appendix.
Statistics from the table here only
display the direct income generated
from the killing of trophy animals and
not multiplier effects such as taxidermy
costs, accommodation, airfares, and in
country travel which in 2004, generated
an additional US$38.71 million to the
South African economy.42 Furthermore,
approximately US$2.15 million worth
of venison is produced which can either
be sold or given away to local commu-
nities as a valuable source of protein.10
The hunting tourism industry not
only injects large amounts of revenue
Fig 1.2: Adapted from Lindsey et al.11 *Percentage of total hunting revenue unavailable.
Country
Annual
Revenue
(US$million)
Animals
shot per
year
Most hunted species (with percentage of
revenue generated where possible)
South Africa
100
53,885
Lions (8.2%), kudu (13.2%), gemsbok (8.7%)
Tanzania 27.6 7,034 Buffalo, lions, leopards (42% collectively)
Namibia 28.5 22,462 Gemsbok*, kudu*, warthog*
Botswana 20 2,500 Elephants (42%), impala*, steenbok*
Adapted from Lindsey et al.11 *Percentage of total hunting revenue unavailable.
26 EnvironmEnt www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org voLUmE 53 nUmBEr 4
into the economy but provides in-
creased job opportunities. The hunting
industry has been directly responsible
for the creation of up to 6,000 jobs in
South Africa, 4,328 in Tanzania, 2,125
in Namibia, and 1,000 in Botswana.11
In the Eastern Cape Province of South
Africa game reserves have increased
employment 3.5 times, increased the
average wage 5.7 times, and provided
training that would not normally be
available.10 Furthermore, in Sankoyo
village, Botswana, a survey revealed
that since the establishment of the
hunting industry in 1996, 77.4 percent
of residents had been employed by the
hunting industry, 58.3 percent of which
had never previously been employed.43
This demonstrates how the hunting in-
dustry is providing increased opportu-
nities for local communities to improve
their quality of life.
Although the hunting tourism indus-
try undoubtedly promotes economic
growth, it does not necessarily provide
the same economic benefits to local
communities. On state-owned land,
profits are allocated to centralised gov-
ernment bank accounts and are eventu-
ally filtered back to district councils to
distribute throughout local communi-
ties accordingly.15 Unfortunately, rev-
enue is often siphoned away by corrupt
officials, meaning that district councils
and local communities don’t receive
the potential benefits such finances
would afford them.44 Furthermore,
centralized bank accounts increase
transaction costs, which in turn de-
crease the revenue available for local
communities.15 The proposed solution
to such problems involves collecting
and banking revenue at a local level.
However, corruption not only occurs at
a governmental level but also at a local
level, and it is not uncommon for dis-
trict officials to reap all the economic
benefits of hunting tourism.43
Social Impacts of Hunting
Tourism
It is a common thought that West-
ern societies have enforced their con-
servation practices on African nations
without regard for how they perceive
wildlife.45 Population growth requires
an increasing amount of land to be al-
located to agricultural and industrial ex-
pansion; therefore, it is of little surprise
that local African communities oppose
the conservation of wildlife and habi-
tats.15 This conflict dictates that wildlife
must provide an economic incentive
to local communities if conservation
efforts are to be successful. Although
outfitters provide local communities
with improved infrastructure, artificial
water sources, and much-needed health
care to remote regions, relatively few
economic incentives are derived from
hunting tourism, leading to negative at-
titudes toward the industry.46
Community-based natural resource
management (CBNRM) plays a piv-
otal role in promoting sustainability by
utilizing funds generated from hunting
tourism to align conservation interests
with rural development.40 The CBNRM
concept involves devolving wildlife re-
sources to local communities and per-
mitting their consumptive use as a form
of income generation to improve rural
Tourism
without regard for how they perceive
wildlife.
pansion; therefore, it is of little surprise
that local African communities oppose
the conservation of wildlife and habi-
tats.
must provide an economic incentive
to local communities if conservation
Elephant from Kruger Park, South Africa.
Wikimedia Commons/Rob Hooft
Gamekeeper with a Kafue Lechwe buck, Zambia.
iStockPhoto/Westmacott Photography
JULy/aUgUst 2011 www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org EnvironmEnt 27
livelihoods. Through participation, it is
thought that local communities will be-
gin to value wildlife and contribute to-
ward conservation in a way that African
governments, with limited finances and
resources, cannot.43
Most CBNRM schemes follow the
blueprint established by the perceived
success of the Communal Areas Man-
agement Programme for Indigenous
Resources (CAMPFIRE) program,
originally established in Zimbabwe dur-
ing the late 1980s. Between 1989 and
2006 the project generated US$30 mil-
lion, of which approximately 52 percent
was distributed to local communities to
promote rural development projects.47
No location has benefited more substan-
tially than the Masoka ward, which has
used its revenue to improve the liveli-
hoods of its rural residents by building
a four-block primary school, a two-
ward clinic, a grinding mill, and two
hand-pumped boreholes, to name but a
few.48 In addition, environmental ben-
efits have been witnessed since CAMP-
FIRE’s inception; elephant numbers
have increased, buffalo numbers are
either stable or witnessing a slight de-
crease, and habitat loss has diminished,
and in certain regions, even reversed.47
Similar success in CBNRM has been
observed in Namibia. Barnes and Mac-
Gregor reported that, in the year 2000,
US$355,900 was generated across five
conservancies; such financial returns
exceeded capital investments and con-
tributed positively to the national econ-
omy while exerting no negative impact
on wildlife populations.49
Unfortunately, such examples repre-
sent the exception as opposed to the rule
and it is widely accepted that CBNRM,
in its present form, is failing to deliver
its ecological and social objectives.
Murphree highlighted how benefit and
empowerment are critical to the success
of CBNRM—it is in relation to these
that the contrast in success between
CAMPFIRE and Namibia’s conservan-
cies and a mountain of failures are next
discussed.4
CBNRM is most successful when the
benefits of game management exceed
its costs; such associated costs can be in
the form of opportunity costs, damage
to crops or livestock, and living with
an increased risk of mortality.50 Local
communities that endure the costs asso-
ciated with living in the vicinity of wild-
life are often compensated in CBNRM
schemes with financial benefits, in-
creased employment opportunities, im-
proved infrastructure, or the availability
of bush meat at competitive prices.48
These benefits are vital as essentially
they are used to create and maintain the
interest of the community in conserving
wildlife. If such benefits fail to materi-
alize and the costs outweigh the benefits
rural residents can lose interest in such
schemes and favor unsustainable prac-
tices, such as poaching or intensive ag-
riculture, which provide a direct benefit
to their livelihoods.50
The success of CAMPFIRE and Na-
mibia’s conservancies can initially be
attributed to the regions in which they
are situated. These semi-arid lands are
characterised by shallow, infertile soil
and erratic rainfall, which act to limit
the success of agricultural practice; fur-
thermore, the prevalence of tsetse flies
in Zimbabwe restricts livestock produc-
tion.51 These restrictions imposed by the
region make the consumptive utiliza-
tion of wildlife resources a competitive
form of land use, offering more benefits
Wikimedia Commons/JanErkamp
Panthera pardus, Serengeti, Tanzania.
28 EnvironmEnt www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org voLUmE 53 nUmBEr 4
to local communities than agriculture.52
Common sense dictates that the most
profitable form of land use will domi-
nate the region; therefore, it is of little
surprise that CBNRM has been em-
braced so successfully in these areas.
CAMPFIRE was initially imple-
mented in areas with low human popu-
lation density (10 persons/km2).53 Simi-
larly, during the formative years of CB-
NRM in Namibia, there was a human
population of only 1.7 million.49 Wild-
life revenue is negatively exponentially
related to human population density,
as the increased competition results in
increased instances of human–wildlife
conflict, incurring additional costs and
jeopardizing the potential of benefit
to be derived from the scheme.54 Ad-
ditionally, benefits are usually linked
to offtake; therefore, a larger popula-
tion requires a greater offtake for the
scheme to be beneficial, and such de-
mand can lead to quotas being set at un-
sustainable levels that would endanger
the long-term viability of the program.
In areas where the potential of wild-
life to generate revenue is maximized,
communities may need to diversify to
promote the long-term sustainability
of their programs. Although utilization
of wildlife resources was the primary
source of income generation during the
early years of CBNRM in Namibia, it
was soon realized that overreliance on
wildlife resources would prove to be
unsustainable. Subsequently, communi-
ties began to generate additional reve-
nue from thatch-grass harvesting, pole-/
fuelwood harvesting, cultural services,
and crafts.49
The impact of national-level corrup-
tion, which restricts the flow of revenue
from centralized bank accounts to lo-
cal communities, has already been dis-
cussed. However, corruption is equally
prevalent at the local level, and just as
damaging. In the Administrative Man-
agement Design for Game Management
Areas (ADMADE) program, in Zambia,
authority over wildlife resources was
devolved to traditional village chiefs,
who abused their power through nepo-
tism and the use of hunting revenues to
improve their own livelihoods.55 Only
2 percent of the revenue reached rural
communities, which proved an insuffi-
cient amount to fund rural development
projects.56 This loss of benefit led to an
increased demand for poaching, which
provided meat for household consump-
tion and a much-needed source of rev-
enue for rural residents. This eventually
resulted in the collapse of the system,
as prosecuted poachers immediately
returned to illegal hunting upon release
from prison, and Wildlife Scouts, whose
original purpose was to protect game
animals against such activities, suc-
cumbed to corruption, accepting bribes
in exchange for ignorance.55
This example from the ADMADE
program demonstrates how corruption
and poaching are synonymous. Corrup-
tion removes the benefit of CBNRM
to rural livelihoods resulting in an in-
creased demand for poaching and the
unsustainable harvest of wildlife. In
the CAMPFIRE program, communi-
ties receive 50 percent of all hunting
revenue, which is distributed back to lo-
cal communities in a transparent, peer-
reviewed manner.47 This has led to a
decrease in poaching, as rural residents
perceive wildlife to be valuable to their
livelihoods.
Empowerment is crucial to the suc-
cess of CBNRM; however, properly
Outfi tters bought elephants from communities at a price
of US$8,000 and sold the hunting rights to tourists for
US$80,000, generating a profi t of US$72,000, which
the local communities did not benefi t from.
Jeep safari in the Serengeti National Park. Tourist with digital compact camera observing
an African lion pride taking a nap under a tree.
iStockPhoto/brytta
JULy/aUgUst 2011 www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org EnvironmEnt 29
empowered CBNRM regimes are rare.
Empowerment can take two forms,
through the devolution of wildlife
resources to local communities and
through the provision of training.
The devolution of wildlife resources
instills a sense of responsibility in local
communities, which ultimately leads to
effective management. Unfortunately,
most countries participating in CB-
NRM do not have the policy or laws in
place to legitimize devolution. In the
ADMADE program, Gibson and Marks
found that the lack of legislation sup-
porting devolution led to the participat-
ing communities having no more rights
than they did before its inception.55
Even in CAMPFIRE, a perceived suc-
cess story, devolution has been limited
and communities are only given the au-
thority to manage the finances provided
to them by hunting.57
Only the state can bestow this form
of empowerment on CBNRM regimes,
and the state is reluctant to do so as this
inevitably leads to a loss of power.48 This
leaves communities with no greater in-
fluence over their livelihoods than they
had under the fences and fines approach,
creating a breeding ground for dissatis-
faction, which results in poor manage-
ment or withdrawal, both of which jeop-
ardize the sustainability of CBNRM.
The alternative form of empower-
ment is the provision of training, which
provides rural residents with the skills
necessary to negotiate change and deal
with uncertainty. In Botswana, lan-
guage barriers and limited marketing
skills prevent local communities mar-
keting their hunting tourism businesses
in foreign countries; this restriction
effectively forces them into partner-
ships with outfitters.58 Although initial
agreements suggested the transfer of
skills from outfitters to local commu-
nities, this has rarely been practiced;
therefore, what was originally intended
to be a partnership has now become a
management contract where local com-
munities are passive participants in an
industry they were meant to inherit.58
Furthermore, this allows outfitters to
reap the majority of the economic ben-
efits of the industry. In 2000, outfitters
bought elephants from communities at
a price of US$8,000 and sold the hunt-
ing rights to tourists for US$80,000,
generating a profit of US$72,000,
which the local communities did not
benefit from.43
This demonstrates how the absence
of training forces communities into
partnerships whereby minimal financial
benefit is derived. Far from being an
isolated incident, this scenario is com-
mon amongst most CBNRM schemes.48
Alternatively, CAMPFIRE and Na-
mibia’s conservancies have demon-
strated how beneficial training can be to
local communities. Through prolonged
support from donor aid, both schemes
were able to provide training in areas
of management such as quota-setting
methodologies.47 Such training has al-
lowed both schemes to adopt adaptive
management techniques in terms of
quota setting, giving consideration to
environmental factors, animal abun-
dance, illegal offtake, and trophy qual-
ity, and readjusting quotas accordingly
to ensure harvests remain sustainable.59
Perhaps the greatest factor restrict-
ing the success of CBNRM lies in the
hands of the conservationists, who mis-
represent such schemes as a panacea for
rural poverty. By analyzing examples of
CBNRM in Zimbabwe and Namibia it
is apparent that such schemes only work
in a site-specific context. In reality, not
all regions contain adequate wildlife
populations to support CBNRM proj-
ects. In Zimbabwe, it has been noted
that 11 of the 23 districts involved in
CAMPFIRE do not have sufficient
wildlife resources to generate an ad-
equate amount of financial benefit.60
Identifying the limitations of certain re-
gions can prevent rural residents from
losing interest in CBNRM schemes and
returning to unsustainable forms of land
use. In these areas the consumptive use
of wildlife resources should be used
as a supplementary form of income to
ecotourism or ecoagriculture, if it is to
remain sustainable.61
30 EnvironmEnt www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org voLUmE 53 nUmBEr 4
Conclusions
Inaccurate quotas that permit the
harvest of unsustainable numbers of
wildlife are a major threat to the hunt-
ing tourism industry; therefore, there
is a need for the development of more
scientific methods of population es-
timate. Thermal infrared video imag-
ing has been proposed as one method
of attaining more accurate population
estimates, and, although expensive,
could be funded through hunting reve-
nue.62 Furthermore, frequent reviews of
hunting quotas and the ability to adapt
these in accordance with environmen-
tal factors can prevent quotas being set
at unsustainable levels for prolonged
periods of time. Alternatively, by es-
tablishing protected areas adjacent
to game reserves, these would act as
population reservoirs, where wildlife
populations could recover free of hunt-
ing pressure.31
Several steps could be taken to pre-
vent unsustainable hunting practices
such as agriculture and poaching desta-
bilizing quotas and jeopardizing conser-
vation initiatives. Accomplishing these
steps would require the cooperation of
local communities and reform of cur-
rent CBNRM policy to ensure the steps
are tailored to suit the resources of the
region. Furthermore, new legislation
that would allow local communities to
control their wildlife resources could
be implemented and enforced at local
and national levels to ensure that local
communities have the decision-making
skills to improve their own livelihoods.
Policies that advocate training programs
to ensure the transfer of skills from out-
fitters to local communities could also
be developed and enforced so that com-
munities could reap the maximum fi-
nancial benefits from hunting tourism.
There is also a need for a new model for
the redistribution of funds back to local
communities. Baker suggests a system
where revenue generated for local com-
munities is directly linked to offtake.63
This would ensure that communities are
vigilant against any activities contribut-
ing to the unsustainable harvest of wild-
life populations.
Misconduct among outfitters and
private landowners also requires atten-
tion, as it raises questions about the vi-
ability of hunting as an effective conser-
vation tool. In South Africa hunting can
be suspended if any of the provincial
administrations determine that hunting
practices are unsustainable or undesir-
able. Lindsey et al. suggest a similar
model whereby membership in a na-
tional hunting association is required to
hunt.11 Hunting associations would be
granted the authority to suspend hunt-
ing licences if hunting regulations were
not adhered to, and mandatory annual
fees would provide the associations
with the revenue to monitor outfitter
compliance.
Restrictions imposed by CITES
(Convention on International Trade of
Endangered Species) limit the import of
trophy animals to the home nations of
tourist hunters.63 This in turn limits the
revenue African countries can generate
from exportation and taxidermy fees.
Although CITES does not strictly pro-
hibit the export of trophy animals, new
arrangements could allow African na-
tions to derive a maximum profit from
the export of a sustainable quota of tro-
phy animals.
There are without a doubt economic
and environmental benefits of hunt-
ing tourism, but these benefits go hand
in hand with the threats of unsustain-
able quotas, poaching, corruption, and
misconduct. CBNRM schemes have
attempted to utilize the large revenues
generated by hunting tourism to merge
conservation and rural development. In
theory, this is a far more effective con-
servation tool than the fences and fines
approach; however, in practice; the
win–win approach of CBNRM is prov-
ing to be more problematic.
Critics of sustainable development
claim that the concept is contradictory,
as economic growth and rural expan-
sion will ultimately impede conserva-
tion aims, with the demands of an ever-
increasing population causing irrevers-
ible damage to the environment. This
certainly seems to be the case in relation
to the hunting tourism industry. Only in
rare, site-specific contexts have natural
resources been managed in a manner
that promotes social development while
upholding conservation values. In the
context of Africa, social development
and biodiversity conservation are two
opposing forces; for one to prevail, the
other must suffer.
Ultimately, the greatest challenge for
CBNRM will be its ability to remain
sustainable in the long term. By 2050
it is thought that Africa’s population
will have doubled, and with a growing
population comes increased demands.64
Considering this, it is necessary to find
other ways to sustain the population
than through dependency on wildlife
resources.
Nicolas Jordan Deere works as a Research Assistant for
CIRCLE (Centre for the Integration of Research, Con-
servation and Learning), a joint collaboration between
the Environment Department, University of York, Hes-
lington, York, North Yorkshire, United Kingdom and
Flamingo Land Ltd., Kirby Misperton, Malton, North
Yorkshire, United Kingdom.
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32 EnvironmEnt www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org voLUmE 53 nUmBEr 4
Appendix 1
Table to demonstrate the average prices of game species in South Africa in 2005 42
Table 1: Hunting Fees (Trophy & Daily Rate) in South Africa 2005
Species
Highest Price
Lowest Price
Average Individual
Price
1
Median Individual
Price
2
2004 Live Sale
Average
3
2004/2005 Males
Live Sale Average
4
African Wild Cat
$750
$150
$405
$400
$159
n/a
Baboon
$330
$0
$108
$100
n/a
n/a
Blesbuck
$1,563
$123
$369
$350
$118
$151
Blesbuck, White
$1,790
$246
$693
$668
$178
n/a
Bontebok
$3,500
$800
$1,466
$1,400
$1,475
$1,308
Buffalo, Cape
$18,750
$6,000
$11,064
$10,650
$23,608
$7,264
Bushbuck Limpopo & Cape
$1,290
$280
$726
$700
$385
$569
Bushpig
$950
$100
$398
$375
$428
n/a
Caracal (Lynx)
$1,500
-$30
$545
$500
n/a
n/a
Civet
$1,000
$50
$412
$350
n/a
n/a
Crocodile
$6,000
$2,500
$3,720
$3,500
n/a
n/a
Duiker, Blue
$1,500
$420
$881
$875
$587
n/a
Duiker, Grey
$575
$70
$261
$250
$347
n/a
Duiker, Red
$2,500
$600
$989
$950
$634
n/a
Eland, Cape
$3,500
$950
$1,824
$1,800
$696
$1,144
Eland, Livingstone
$3,750
$1,800
$2,525
$2,375
$1,616
$1,636
Fallow Deer
$1,000
$185
$570
$550
n/a
$169
Gemsbok
$1,875
$588
$1,032
$1,000
$558
$613
Genet
$750
$50
$212
$150
n/a
n/a
Giraffe
$4,500
$1,650
$2,807
$2,750
$2,210
$1,750
Grysbuck, Cape
$1,500
$300
$806
$750
$225
n/a
Grysbuck, Sharpe's
$1,800
$500
$971
$950
n/a
n/a
Hartebeest, Cape
$1,790
$500
$927
$900
$533
$562
Hippopotamus
$6,500
$2,500
$5,343
$5,810
$5,015
n/a
Honeybadger
$550
$50
$368
$400
n/a
n/a
Hyena, Brown
$2,750
$250
$950
$748
n/a
n/a
Hyena, Spotted
$2,500
$95
$827
$700
$79
n/a
Impala
$675
$146
$327
$325
$101
$173
Jackal, Blackbacked
$350
-$20
$91
$80
n/a
n/a
Klipspringer
$1,500
$300
$819
$750
$608
n/a
Kudu, Southern & Cape
$3,475
$538
$1,285
$1,200
$322
$889
Lechwe, Kafue
$4,500
$1,900
$3,433
$3,900
n/a
n/a
Lechwe, Red
$4,500
$1,400
$2,684
$2,500
$2,222
$1,635
Leopard
$12,500
$2,500
$5,289
$5,000
n/a
n/a
Lion
$29,500
$15,000
$23,646
$25,000
n/a
n/a
Monkey, Blue
$350
$20
$74
$50
n/a
n/a
Nyala
$3,500
$1,000
$2,243
$2,250
$1,031
$1,430
Oribi
$3,500
$500
$1,192
$1,000
$793
n/a
Ostrich
$1,500
$50
$555
$550
$189
n/a
Porcupine
$250
$0
$123
$100
n/a
n/a
Reedbuck, Common
$1,590
$330
$818
$800
$701
n/a
Reedbuck, Mountain
$1,590
$115
$585
$550
$202
n/a
Rhebuck, Vaal
$1,990
$500
$974
$950
$687
n/a
Rhino
$46,154
$25,000
$35,193
$36,500
$17,881
$11,526
Roan
$11,350
$9,000
$9,963
$9,750
$23,712
$4,152
Sable
$12,000
$4,000
$7,674
$8,000
$9,772
$3,442
Scimitar Horned Oryx
$9,000
$2,500
$5,300
$5,000
$2,273
n/a
Serval
$1,750
$200
$607
$488
n/a
n/a
Springbuck, Black
$1,200
$185
$589
$600
$145
$231
Springbuck, Cape & Kalahari
$675
$92
$336
$350
$83
$145
Springbuck ,White
$1,500
$400
$834
$800
$447
$651
Springhare
$150
$25
$62
$50
n/a
n/a
Steenbuck
$750
$90
$283
$278
$207
n/a
Suni, Livingstone's
$3,500
$650
$1,324
$1,200
n/a
n/a
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... Following on from the statement above, the term 'hunting' is often one that holds many negative connotations with individuals around the world and many of them claim that it is not only highly immoral but it is in direct conflict to the values of a 'humane society' (Deere, 2011). However, on an alternative note, S. Mahoney has argued that hunting has played an influential role on our survival as a species and that the morals of modern-day society have actually disconnected us from the processes of the natural world (Mahoney, 2008). ...
... In 2011, N. Deere had noted that in southern African there was a total area of 1 394 000km 2 that was utilised as game ranches for trophy hunting. Furthermore, the author noted that 1 087 320km 2 of protected areas were used as national parks (Deere, 2011). Table 10 outlines the difference between the areas covered by national parks compared with the game ranches, while Figure 18 shows the percentage of these within each country -both of these have been adapted from Deere's article. ...
... Source: (Deere, 2011) It is interesting to note that the percentage of land for game ranches is higher, than the land for national parks, in all countries except Namibia. Furthermore, it will also be interesting to analyse how the ban on hunting in Botswana will have an influence on the use of their land areas for game ranches as they cover a larger area than national parks. ...
... Sustainable development of hunting tourism can be achieved by preserving environmental sustainability, economic viability and social adequacy. [3] Each of these pillars of sustainable hunting development, however, contains a great deal of problems and is so important for many scientists dealing with the issue. For example, Woodroffe and Ginsberg [7] consider that hunting tourism must also be useful for the conservation of natural habitats and contribute to the protection of wildlife, in order to achieve environmental sustainability. ...
... The wildlife trophy trade industry has remained static or is shrinking in Central and West Africa (Minin et al., 2016). A minimum of 1,394,000 km 2 is used for trophy hunting in sub-Saharan Africa, which exceeds the area encompassed by national parks (Deere, 2011). Suarez et al. (2009) reported that trade in wildlife trophy has grown in the recent for a number of reasons which include good roads and industrialization. ...
Technical Report
Full-text available
The study reviewed the available literature, relevance, impacts, challenges, implications and solutions associated with wildlife trophy trade in Southern Africa.
... The wildlife trophy trade industry has remained static or is shrinking in Central and West Africa (Minin et al., 2016). A minimum of 1,394,000 km 2 is used for trophy hunting in sub-Saharan Africa, which exceeds the area encompassed by national parks (Deere, 2011). Suarez et al. (2009) reported that trade in wildlife trophy has grown in the recent for a number of reasons which include good roads and industrialization. ...
... The wildlife trophy trade industry has remained static or is shrinking in Central and West Africa (Minin et al., 2016). A minimum of 1,394,000 km 2 is used for trophy hunting in sub-Saharan Africa, which exceeds the area encompassed by national parks (Deere, 2011). Suarez et al. (2009) reported that trade in wildlife trophy has grown in the recent for a number of reasons which include good roads and industrialization. ...
Technical Report
Full-text available
The study reviewed the available literature, relevance, impacts, challenges, implications and solutions associated with wildlife trophy trade in Southern Africa.
... The wildlife trophy trade industry has remained static or is shrinking in Central and West Africa (Minin et al., 2016). A minimum of 1,394,000 km 2 is used for trophy hunting in sub-Saharan Africa, which exceeds the area encompassed by national parks (Deere, 2011). Suarez et al. (2009) reported that trade in wildlife trophy has grown in the recent for a number of reasons which include good roads and industrialization. ...
Research
Full-text available
The study reviewed the available literature, relevance, impacts, challenges, implications and solutions associated with wildlife trophy trade in Southern Africa.
... The wildlife trophy trade industry has remained static or is shrinking in Central and West Africa (Minin et al., 2016). A minimum of 1,394,000 km 2 is used for trophy hunting in sub-Saharan Africa, which exceeds the area encompassed by national parks (Deere, 2011). Suarez et al. (2009) reported that trade in wildlife trophy has grown in the recent for a number of reasons which include good roads and industrialization. ...
Patent
Full-text available
The study reviewed the available literature, relevance, impacts, challenges, implications and solutions associated with wildlife trophy trade in Southern Africa.
... The wildlife trophy trade industry has remained static or is shrinking in Central and West Africa (Minin et al., 2016). A minimum of 1,394,000 km 2 is used for trophy hunting in sub-Saharan Africa, which exceeds the area encompassed by national parks (Deere, 2011). Suarez et al. (2009) reported that trade in wildlife trophy has grown in the recent for a number of reasons which include good roads and industrialization. ...
Technical Report
Full-text available
The study reviewed the available literature, relevance, impacts, challenges, implications and solutions associated with wildlife trophy trade in Southern Africa.
... The targets are large, majestic alpha males in their prime, a counterevolutionary tactic that exacerbates populations (Caro, Young, Cauldwell, & Brown, 2009;IUCN, 2016;Koshkarev, 2002;Lewis & Alpert, 1997;Shukurov, 2013); many trophy animals are threatened and dwindling. Studies show that hunting leads to steep population declines (Bashqawi, 2014;Deere, 2011;Dowsley, 2009;Gressier, 2014;Harris & Pletscher, 2002;Heffelfinger, Geist, & Wishart, 2013;Heinen et al., 2001;Knezevic, 2009;Koshkarev, 2002;Leader-Williams et al., 2005;Lindsey, Balme et al., 2013;Mahoney & Jackson, 2013;Marchand et al., 2014;Maroney, 2005;McGranahan, 2011;Naevdal, Olaussen, & Skonhoft, 2012;Singh & Milner-Gulland, 2011). Trophy hunting also sets a bad precedent: often only rich foreigners can hunt in places like Central Asia and Africa, making trophy hunting appear reminiscent of colonialism; it is motivated by conspicuous consumption and dominance, reducing beauty to possession (League against Cruel Sports, 2004). ...
Article
Full-text available
As traditional international trophy hunting destinations are becoming less accessible due to hunting restrictions and regulations, new destinations are entering the scene, such as the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, located in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan has grown to be one of the top destinations for international trophy hunting of argali Ovis ammon and ibex Capra sibirica, both of which are in danger of extinction. Empirically, the article draws on a case study from the largest region in Kyrgyzstan, At-Bashy, and 395 questionnaires with local inhabitants from 5 villages, and 1 interview with an international trophy hunting tour operator. In this article, the impacts of trophy hunting as a tourism practice in a rural context is discussed in terms of its sustainability and through the opinions of the local inhabitants. In sum, the negative impacts of trophy hunting in At-Bashy seem to overrule the positive ones, and in its current form it is not sustainable. The local inhabitants report about a decrease in argali and ibex during the last years; they receive basically no economic benefits from hunting tourism; and not surprisingly, 70% of the population rejects the further development of the industry in its current shape.
Article
Full-text available
Globally, the role of trophy hunting in wildlife conservation has been a topic of much debate. While various studies have focused on the financial contribution of trophy hunting towards wildlife conservation, little is known about whether hunting activities can protect wildlife forage resources. We examined the effect of illegal livestock grazing on wildlife habitat in operational and non-operational wildlife hunting blocks in Moyowosi-Kigosi Game Reserves (MKGR), Tanzania. We assessed whether the physical presence of hunting activities lowered illegal grazing and, thus, led to higher vegetation quality. We compared 324 samples of above-ground biomass (AGB) and grass cover between control (0.0007 cattle ha−1), moderately (0.02 cattle ha−1), and intensively (0.05 to 0.1 cattle ha−1) grazed hunting blocks. Likewise, we assessed soil infiltration, soil penetration, soil organic carbon (SOC), and soil Nitrogen, Phosphorus, and Potassium (N-P-K) across grazing intensity. Illegal grazing decreased AGB by 55%, grass cover by 36%, soil penetration by 46%, and infiltration rate by 63% compared to the control blocks. Illegal grazing further lowered SOC by 28% (F2,33 = 8, p < 0.002) but increased soil N by 50% (F2,33 = 32.2, p < 0.001) and soil K by 56% (H (2) = 23.9, p < 0.001), while soil P remained stable. We further examined if Hunting Company (HC) complements anti-poaching efforts in the Game Reserves (GR). We found that HC contributes an average of 347 worker-days−1 for patrol efforts, which is 49% more than the patrol efforts conducted by the GR. However, patrol success is higher for GR than HC (F1,21 = 116, p < 0.001), due to constant surveillance by HC, illegal herders avoided invading their hunting blocks. We conclude that illegal grazing severely reduced vegetation and soil quality in MKGR. We further claim that trophy hunting contributes directly to wildlife habitat preservation by deploying constant surveillance and preventing illegal grazing. We propose maintaining trophy hunting as an essential ecological tool in wildlife conservation.
Article
Data derived from several sources were used to determine basic economic values for the trophy hunting industry in Namibia for the hunting season in 2000. Some 3640 trophy hunters spent 15 450 hunter-days, taking 13 310 game animals. Trophy hunting generated at least N$134 million (US$19.6 million) in direct expenditures, or gross output. Gross value added directly attributable to the industry was conservatively estimated at some N$63 million (US$9.2 million). Trophy hunting constitutes at least 14% of the total tourism sector and is a significant component of the Namibian economy. Some 24% of the income earned in the trophy hunting industry accrues to poor segments of society in the form of wages and rentals/royalties. About 21% of income generated is captured by the government, through fees and taxes. Trophy hunting is an important contributor to development. More research on the economics of the industry is needed.
Article
In Tanzania, where tourist hunting is employed as a conservation tool for habitat protection, information on population sizes and hunting offtake was used to assess the impact of tourist hunting on mammal densities. In general, tourist hunting pressure was unrelated to local population sizes, but for most species, animals were removed at a level of less than 10% of the local population size, suggesting that over-exploitation was unlikely. Eland, however, and perhaps small antelope, bushbuck, kudu and reedbuck were hunted at levels which may be unsustainable in the long term. Analyses also identified areas of Tanzania with high levels of tourist hunting pressure, showed that, in certain areas, species with small population sizes such as eland could be declining as a result of tourist hunting, and suggested that current levels of lion and leopard offtake are too high. These findings, although preliminary, allow recommendations to be put forward for changing hunting quotas for certain species in particular areas of Tanzania.
Article
Preserving wildlife in a pristine state on a large scale is no longer feasible in view of continued human population increases, economic development, habitat fragmentation and degradation, the introduction of nonnative species, and commercialisation of wildlife products. The wise use of the planet's remaining wildlife resources will depend on management practices which recognise that indigenous people are integral parts of ecosystems. Community-based conservation, which attempts to devolve responsibility for the sustainable use of wildlife resources to the local level, can include consumptive activities, such as trophy hunting, as well as nonconsumptive forms of tourism. The trophy hunting management systems of six countries of eastern and southern Africa are profiled and critiqued, demonstrating a number of essential conditions for obtaining optimal wildlife conservation and community benefits.
Article
This paper assesses the socio- economic benefits and challenges of community-based safari hunting in the Okavango Delta, Botswana. Through sub- leasing of community hunting concession areas and selling of annual wildlife hunting quotas to safari hunting companies, local communities generate income, create employment opportunities and engage in community development projects in their villages. However, community-based safari hunting is also associated with several problems which downplay its achievements. These include: the lack of marketing, entrepreneurship and managerial skills in safari hunting business; mismanagement and misappropriation of funds; poor distribution of financial and employment benefits from safari hunting; and, reliance on foreign hunting companies and donor agencies. Community-based safari hunting can be more successful in the Okavango if stakeholders (local people, government and safari hunting operators) find solutions to these problems. The empowerment of local communities especially training and the acquisition of skills in the safari hunting tourism business by local people should be given priority. Empowerment of local people can promote a sustainable community-based safari hunting industry that is self- sustaining and capable of meeting the needs of safari hunters and local people while maintaining the ecological balance.
Article
For wildlife conservation to succeed in developing countries, people who live in or near protected areas must receive benefits that offset the costs of their reduced access to natural resources. International trophy hunting is currently generating significant economic benefits for residents of game management areas in Zambia. This has been made possible through a revolving fund and an administrative program that direct revenues from trophy hunting to local wildlife management and community development projects. Benefits might be enhanced by better biological information for management, greater local participation in the allocation and operation of hunting concessions, and the promotion of ecological and ethical standards for trophy hunting. An international system of certification for trophy hunting operations could foster these improvements. Para el éxito de la conservación de la vida silvestre en países en desarrollo la gente que vive en o cerca de áreas protegidas debe recibir beneficios que compensen los costos de la reducción del acceso a los recursos naturales. Actualmente a nivel internacional la cacería deportiva genera beneficios económicos significativos para los residentes de las áreas de manejo recreativo en Zambia. Esto ha sido posible a través de fondos revolventes y un programa administrativo que dirige las ganacias de la cacería deportiva hacia proyectos de manejo de vida silvestre y desarrollo comunitario. Los beneficios podrían mejorar mediante información biológica para el manejo, mayor participatión local en la ubicación y operación de concesiones de caza y la promoción de estándares éticos para la cacería deportiva. Un sistema internacional de certificación de operaciones de cacería deportiva podría fortalecer esos avances.