Content uploaded by William Costanza
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by William Costanza on Feb 17, 2015
Content may be subject to copyright.
This article was downloaded by: [William Costanza]
On: 28 February 2012, At: 12:35
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20
Hizballah and Its Mission in Latin
America
William Costanza
a
a
Liberal Studies Program, Georgetown University, Washington, DC,
USA
Available online: 22 Feb 2012
To cite this article: William Costanza (2012): Hizballah and Its Mission in Latin America, Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 35:3, 193-210
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.648155
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation
that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any
instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary
sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,
demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,35:193–210,2012
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2012.648155
Hizballah and Its Mission in Latin America
WILLIAM COSTANZA
Liberal Studies Program
Georgetown University
Washington, DC, USA
The activities of Hizballah in Latin America generally have been viewed by governmental
authorities in the region as a security concern primarily because of its importance in
bilateral relations with the United States rather than as an internal terrorist threat
targeted against their sovereign interests. This article explores Hizballah’s network
and past activities in South America to assess the nature of Hizballah’s strategic aims
in the region in support of its global organizational goals. The author argues that
the perception of Hizballah as a legitimate political organization by Latin American
governments has hampered efforts to effectively apply counterterrorism resources to
root out the entrenched Hizballah infrastructure in the region that can potentially carry
out directives by the Hizballah leadership or by serving as a proxy of Iran.
Background
Hizballah,
1
which in Arabic literally means “Party of God,” is a radical Shi’a organization
based in Lebanon. It emerged initially as a militia in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion
of southern Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war. With the help of Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard, Hizballah was organized to serve as a vehicle to spread the “revolution” of Ayatollah
Khomeini among the Shi’a community in Lebanon. The Lebanese government and much of
the Arab and Muslim world regard Hizballah as a legitimate “resistance group” and political
party.
2
It also provides extensive social welfare services to Shi’ite communities in Lebanon,
particularly along Lebanon’s southern border that it shares with Israel. One of Hizballah’s
political goals, as stated in their 1985 manifesto, was the departure of Israeli forces from
southern Lebanon which was finally achieved when Israel withdrew their forces in June
2000. However, leaders of Hizballah were not satisfied with only an Israeli withdrawal and
have gone beyond their original declarations to consistently call for the destruction of Israel
which their manifesto refers to as a “Zionist entity... built on lands wrested from their own-
ers.” Within a broader political context, Hizballah views Israel as a tool of the United States
and has declared its “determination to fight the U.S.,” which it views as its greater enemy.
3
Hizballah’s program of “resistance” is buttressed by a well-trained paramilitary organi-
zation that acquitted itself well in direct confrontation with Israeli forces during Hizballah’s
last major military engagement with Israel in the summer of 2006. Hizballah also main-
tains a shadowy terrorist wing that has often been associated with the name Islamic Jihad
Organization (IJO). Deeb refers to the IJO as a front used by Hizballah to conduct covert
Received 18 August 2011; accepted 10 October 2011.
Address correspondence to William Costanza. E-mail: wac22@georgetown.edu
193
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
194 W. Costanza
operations and cites evidence that indicates Hizballah’s tacit admission of IJO’s operational
ties to the Hizballah organization. For example, Deeb notes that former Hizballah leader
’Abbas al-Musawi stated that it was a Hizballah martyr who carried out the bombing of the
U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. The IJO subsequently claimed responsibility for the
attack.
4
The IJO has similarly claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks since
the mid-1980s including the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992.
5
It
is unclear, however, the degree of direct control that Hizballah senior leaders have over the
IJO that was created by Iran under an Hizballah umbrella but believed to be responsive
primarily to Iranian tasking.
6
The IJO, in this sense, represents the terrorist nexus between
Iran and Hizballah that is almost protean in nature and extremely difficult to unravel and
define from published reports.
To support its activities, Hizballah derives funding from a variety of sources. Accord-
ing to government officials, Iran “has a nine-digit line item in its budget for support to
terrorist organizations” that is estimated to include more than US$10 million per month
for Hizballah.
7
The organization also generates its own funding through the solicitation
of private donations and by the diversion of revenue from businesses, charities, and reli-
gious organizations set up to serve as “fronts” as a means to surreptitiously collect and
transfer f unds to Lebanese accounts under its control. In addition, Hizballah is involved in
numerous criminal activities to include drugs and arms trafficking, human smuggling, trade
in contraband, money-laundering and financial fraud that have been observed not only in
the Middle East but also in Asia, Africa, North America, and South America. For exam-
ple, with regard to Hizballah money-laundering activities in South America, a Hizballah
front company located in the Tri-Border area (TBA) reportedly remitted roughly US$50
million between 1995 and 2002, according to the Paraguayan public prosecutor for drug
trafficking and terrorism.
8
The Lebanese ambassador assigned to Paraguay and Argentina,
Hicham Salim Hamdam, confirmed that the remittance of money in the amount cited was
correct but claimed that the money was “humanitarian aid for orphans of Muslims killed in
action.”
9
Hizballah Strategic Interests in Latin America
The primary strategic interest of Hizballah in Latin America has been and continues to be the
need to raise funds to supplement its other income streams derived from global collections
outside the Middle East provided by the Shi’a and Lebanese diaspora communities primarily
in Africa and Asia, in addition to the direct funding it receives from Iran. In Africa, for
example, Hizballah fund-raising was revealed in 2003 when a flight from Benin in West
Africa bound for Beirut crashed on take-off killing several Hizballah officials on board
carrying US$2millionincontributions.TheArabmedianotedthat“thisamountrepresented
the regular contributions the party receives from wealthy Lebanese nationals in Guinea,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Benin and other African states.”
10
As recently as 2010, there was
evidence that this financial support was continuing. Hizballah gave Hassan T ajeddin the
equivalent of a state funeral following his death in the crash of Ethiopian airlines flight 409
that went down off the coast of Lebanon on 24 January 2010. Tajeddin had been identified
by authorities as the owner of the Angolan-based Arosfran Company. His brother, Kassim
who served as a board member of Arosfan was designated by the U.S Treasury Department
as a fund-raiser for Hizballah who funneled millions of dollars to his brother in Lebanon
who was a Hizballah commander.
11
In the same manner, Hizballah has relied on the Lebanese diaspora in Latin America,
mostly concentrated in the TBA, to generate funding through expatriate remittances and
a variety of illicit activities.
12
Hizballah also relied on a broad range of front companies,
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
Hizballah’s Mission in Latin America 195
criminal enterprises, and activities to generate illicit funds. Hizballah’s financial structure
in Latin America is similar to the family/clan based structure found in its Africa-based
financial organization. In addition to a TBA presence, Hizballah-connected clan members
can be found in the Colon free trade zone in Panama, Isla Margarita, Iquique in Chile
and Shi’ite enclaves in Sao Paulo.
13
The permissive environments allowing transnational
criminal networks and Islamic extremist group like Hizballah to easily operate in regions
like the TBA, is the pervasive lack of credible governance and security. The culture of
corruption is deeply entrenched and widely accepted as a way of life for those that reside
in the TBA.
14
In addition to its effort to generate funding in Latin America, Hizballah has been also
characterized as a proxy for Iran.
15
This raises the question “Why would Iran need Hizballah
to serve as its proxy in Latin America?” when Iran has been openly seeking to improve ties
with selected Latin-American countries. The need for a proxy would seem even less urgent
in light of the recent aggressive policy initiatives by current Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad to openly expand bilateral ties with Latin American countries, which have
clearly raised Iran’s profile among U.S. policymakers, causing a great deal of concern.
What has been particularly troubling to U.S. policymakers has been Ahmadinejad’s efforts
to form an anti-American axis with Venezuela in which Venezuelan President Chavez and
Ahmadinejad declared an “Axis of Unity” against the United States in 2007.
16
It should be
noted, however, that Iran’s bilateral interests in Latin America are not new. For example, Iran
and Venezuela were co-founders of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) in the 1960s. In addition, Iran’s non-aligned foreign policy and its election of
reformist President Sayyid Mohammad Khatami in 1997, who served as Iran’s president
until 2005, dovetailed with a shift to the left of a number of Latin-American countries that
allowed nations like Brazil to engage with Iran even in the face of U.S. pressure to isolate
the Iranian government.
The pace of Iranian engagement with Latin America quickened when Ahmadinejad
became president of Iran in 2005. Iran became the second largest investor in Venezuela (after
the United States) and has become involved in a number of joint ventures from building cars
to developing Venezuelan oil deposits. In Bolivia, Iran has invested in economic projects
and health clinics and in return received political support for its nuclear program in the
UN. In addition, President Morales stated that he planned to move Bolivia’s sole embassy
in the Middle from Egypt to Iran. Similarly, Iran has proposed or initiated projects with
Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, and Uruguay.
17
Iran has also supported fund-raising drives in
Paraguay that led to the election of left-leaning President Fernando Armindo Lugo Mendez
who subsequently designated as Foreign Minister Alejandro Hamed Franco, formerly
Paraguay’s ambassador to Lebanon.
18
Given that Hamed was a supporter of Hamas and
Hizballah, the United States, in response to this choice, advised President Lugo that Hamed
would be denied a U.S. visa and would not be allowed to fly on U.S. airlines.
19
Hizballah’s role as Iran’s proxy in Latin America is predicated largely on its perceived
role as an operational and logistical support network for Iran’s covert terrorist activities in the
region.
20
The detailed report of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) bombing
in Buenos Aires in 1994 that presented findings of the investigation by Argentina’s Attorney
General Dr. Alberto Nisman revealed numerous links between Iranian officials, Hizballah
operatives in the TBA and Imad Mughniyah, the Hizballah leader of the operational team
who entered Argentina with his team in July 1994 to conduct the attack.
21,22
Viewing Hizballah as solely a proxy of Iran would be misleading. Hizballah has its own
political agenda that it has pursued by conducting terrorist acts globally in support of their
strategic interests. For example, in addition to the AMIA attack in 1994, Hizballah also
attempted attacks during that time in other parts of the world. In 1994, Hizballah targeted
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
196 W. Costanza
the Israeli embassy in Thailand but failed in the attempt when the car to be used in the
bombing was involved in an accident. It is believed that Hizballah was also involved in the
bombing of the Israeli embassy in London on 26 July1994, which took place about one
week after the AMIA bombing. In 1995, Singaporean intelligence foiled a Hizballah plot
to attack Israeli shipping in the Malacca Straits.
Former senior Israeli intelligence officials believed that the AMIA attack was in retal-
iation against Israel for provocative actions against Hizballah targets, namely, the Israeli
bombing of a Hizballah training center in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and the kidnapping
by Israeli commandos of Mustafa Diriani who was to be used as a bargaining chip in ex-
change for Israelis held by Hizballah.
23
These same officials believed that the 1992 attack
against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires was in retaliation for the Israeli assassination
of Hizballah leader ’Abbas al-Moussawi one month earlier on 16 February 1992.
24
The support for Hizballah global attacks against Israeli and American targets was
publicly voiced in July 2006 during the Second Lebanon War by influential Iranian media
figures close to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei.
25
In 2008, Hizballah leader Hassan
Nasrallah himself declared upon the death of his top military commander, Imad Mughniyah,
who was killed in a a car bomb attack on 12 February 2008, that he was prepared for an
“open war” beyond the Lebanese theater of operations.
26
Consequently, in addition to
fund-raising, another key strategic global interest of Hizballah is to maintain a network of
sympathizers and operatives to provide logistical and operational support to highly trained
terrorist operatives who actually conduct and manage the on-site attack and depart the
country in fulfillment of Shura Council decisions implemented under the guidance of the
Jihad Council. The Hizballah support networks have been involved in preparing casing
reports of Israeli and Jewish target worldwide and have particularly strong infrastructures
in South America, West Africa, and Europe.
27
Hizballah Illicit Activities in Latin America
Based on publicly available information, the nature and scope of Hizballah’s illicit fund-
raising activities in South America are difficult to discern with any precision because it
is often derived from law enforcement actions within the context of the prosecution of
financial crimes rather than terrorist finance investigations. In South America, Hizballah is
not officially considered a terrorist organization. Consequently, simply transferring funds to
Hizballah is not a crime. It is only the illicit manner in which funds are generated or trans-
ferred that constitutes the basis for taking enforcement action. The law enforcement actions
do, however, provide insight into the types of illicit activities that Hizballah operatives are
involved in the TBA as well as other regions of South America. The challenge is trying to
identify Hizballah transactions often intertwined with or obscured by the large volumes of
illicit activities undertaken by organized crime and drug trafficking organizations. Despite
these obstacles, a report by the Naval War College estimated that Hizballah was able to
raise US$10 million a year from the TBA alone.
28
Anumberoflawenforcementactions
have provided a glimpse of Hizballah financing generated by Hizballah operatives in the
Shi’a diaspora enclaves of South America.
Tri-Border Area (TBA)
Insight into the extent of Hizballah fund-raising efforts can be gleaned from examining
the illicit activities of Assad Ahmad Barakat, the chief Hizballah fund-raiser in the TBA
who was subsequently arrested in Brazil in 2002. Barakat ran an extensive network of legal
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
Hizballah’s Mission in Latin America 197
and illicit financial ventures in the TBA in conjunction with family members and trusted
contacts. On 12 September 2001, a Paraguayan Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team
raided Barakat’s closet-sized business, Casa Apollo, in the Page shopping center in Cuidad
del Este. Although Barakat escaped arrest, the SWAT team was able to s eize a number of
boxes containing financial statements which added up to a quarter of a million dollars in
monthly money transfers sent to the Middle East. In addition to the financial statements were
descriptions of roughly 30 recent attacks in Israel and the Israeli-occupied territories.
29
The
Paraguayan prosecutor Carlos Calcena claimed that Barakat had sent half a million dollars
to what he claimed were terrorist bank accounts in Canada, Chile and the United States.
Over half million dollars in bank drafts were also sent directly to Lebanon. Among the bank
drafts was a letter from Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah to Barakat congratulating him
on his successful fund-raising efforts while acknowledging receipt of over US$3.5 million
from him for the year 2000.
30,31
The day after they arrested Saleh and Fayad, Paraguayan police raided Casa Apollo a
second time. This time Barakat was present during the raid and arrested but subsequently
escaped and fled to Brazil where he was a legal resident. Barakat’s business partner,
Salman El Reda, also fled the Paraguayan jail that same day. In May 2009, Argentina’s
chief prosecutor Alberto Nisman would s ubsequently issue an international warrant for
El Reda’s arrest for his alleged role in the AMIA bombing in 1994.
32
Sobi Mahmoud
Fayad was also arrested in Cuidad del Este shortly after the second Casa Apollo raid when
the prosecutors office found documents in Barakat’s business implicating Fayad in large
money transfers to banks in Lebanon and Canada.
33
Sobi Fayad had also been arrested in
1999 for surveilling the U.S. embassy in Asuncion. Sobi was regarded as weapons expert
by security authorities and was believed to be the Hizballah military representative in the
TBA. Sobi’s brother was a senior Hizballah leader in Lebanon, which tied Sobi directly
to the Hizballah network.
34
These same type of family/clan connections characterized the
Hizballah network in West Africa. The Fayad tie to Hizballah was not the only direct link.
Barakat had originally drawn the attention of security services monitoring the TBA based
on intelligence reports sent by Brazil to Paraguayan authorities in late 1999 and early 2000
in which Barakat was alleged to have met with Hizballah leaders during his annual trips to
Lebanon.
35
In order to generate funds for Hizballah, Barakat engaged in a variety of illicit activities.
ARandCorporationreportnotedthatBarakatandhisnetworkraisedsubstantialamountsof
money for Hizballah through film piracy, counterfeiting, racketeering, narcotics trafficking,
money laundering, weapons trafficking, and document forgery services.
36
He also reportedly
used strong-arm tactics to extort money from TBA shopkeepers sympathetic to Hizballah
by informing them that their family members in Lebanon would be placed on the “Hizballah
blacklist” if shopkeepers did not pay their quota.
37
Barakat was also implicated in the sale of
pirated software that was smuggled from Hong Kong. Paraguayan investigators discovered
that the s muggling route included the Chilean city of Iquique as a transit point where
Barakat had established several businesses. From Iquique, the goods would travel by land
to Barakat’s shop in Cuidad del Este.
38
The illicit activities of the Barakat network to finance Hizballah is not an isolated
incident. Ali Khalil Merhi, a Lebanese businessman, was arrested in 2000 for selling
millions of dollars of pirated software and sending a portion of the proceeds to Hizballah.
39
The most recent publicized incident involved the arrest by Interpol in June 2010 of Lebanese
national Moussa Hamdan in Cuidad del Este. The Interpol chief in Paraguay Jose Chena
said Paraguayan justice officials are considering an extradition request by the United States
where Hamdan was indicted for transporting and trafficking stolen goods in addition to
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
198 W. Costanza
making false statements to government officials. The criminal complaint also charges
Hamdan and three others with providing material support to Hizballah. Hamdan and his
accomplices sold fraudulent passports and counterfeit money to raise funds that were used
in an attempt to buy 1,200 M4 Colt machine guns for Hizballah from an individual who
turned out to be an FBI informant.
40,41,42
There have been major obstacles in gaining further convictions against the Hizballah
network of supporters and operatives in the TBA who continue to generate funds for
Hizballah. Consequently, much of the current Hizballah fund-raising activities have not
surfaced in public accounts of law enforcement efforts. These obstacles include weak laws,
official police corruption and a greater reliance by Hizballah to utilize the hawala system
to minimize the detection of fund transfers.
43
The Hizballah counterintelligence (CI) network has added to the list of obstacles facing
the local security services in their efforts to gain access to information about Hizballah-
related activities in the region. Known for having superb offensive and defensive CI capabil-
ities, Hizballah security entities were honed in a crucible of turbulent Middle East politics
as it struggled to maintain organization integrity while it attempted to secure territory and
facilities to establish its presence to support its political goals. The development of Hizbal-
lah’s CI capability was greatly influenced by the Padsaran Quds, the unit within the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in charge of extraterritorial operations, including the
training of Islamic terrorist groups.
44
An example of Hizballah’s CI capabilities in the TBA
were amply demonstrated in one incident when FBI agents from the New York Field Office
went to the TBA to discreetly surveil Hizballah activities. Only minimum advance notice
was given to the host country and there was no official welcoming party at the airport.
After the FBI agents deplaned and were walking across the tarmac, their pagers went off
signaling that they should call their New York office. They called immediately and learned
that a fax had just arrived to their office. It contained only a picture of the FBI agents who
had just gotten off the plane a few minutes ago.
45
On 9 December 2010, the U.S. government highlighted Hizballah’s CI activity in
the TBA when the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced
that Hizballah’s chief representative in South America, Bilal Moshen Wehbe, had been
designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) for his role in transferring
funds from Brazil to Hizballah in Lebanon. The statement by OFAC noted that in addition to
transferring funds to Hizballah, Wehbe had overseen Hizballah’s CI operations throughout
the TBA.
46
Whebe had been trained in Iran and reportedly has closed ties to the Iranian
Cultural Affairs Ministry, which in the past has provided cover for Hizballah operatives
as well as Iranian intelligence agents.
47
Wehbe’s efforts in the TBA have been aimed at
keeping a close eye on local government initiatives to uncover Hizballah activities, which
includes identifying and taking action against government informants.
Chile
Chilean law enforcement officials have claimed that Hizballah operatives began visiting
Chile in 1994 and 1995 to establish a new operational center for their activities in response
to greater attention given to the Hizballah presence in the TBA.
48,49
The Hizballah activity,
however, can more accurately be characterized as the establishment of money laundering
mechanisms to transfer funds. The locus of Hizballah activity has been centered primarily
in the Iquique Free Trade Zone (ZOFRI) in northern Chile in the form of front companies
used to launder and transfer funds to Hizballah-controlled accounts worldwide. Chilean
officials identified the following front or shell companies associated with Hizballah: Kalmar
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
Hizballah’s Mission in Latin America 199
Ltd., Las Vegas Nevada Ltd., San Francisco Ltd., Frankfort Ltd., Guarany Ltd., Teen Chile
Ltd., Saleh Trading Ltd., and Lucky Crown Ltd.
50
Concentrated investigation of Hizballah activities in the ZOFRI by Chilean enforce-
ment officials was initially prompted by information that surfaced detailing Barakat’s
activities in the TBA. In July 2001, about one year prior to his arrest in Paraguay, Barakat
traveled to Iquique and set up four businesses with Lebanese business associates in the
free-trade zone. In November 2001, Chilean Interior Minister Jose Miguel Insulza was able
to use the post-9/11 political climate to launch an investigation into all suspicious activities
in Iquique. The investigative judge in the public case, Jaime Chamorro, said that Barakat
was inv olved in the creation of three companies—Barakat Import & Export, Saleh Trading
and Saltex. Most of the companies quickly closed and little evidence surfaced regarding
financial trails between the companies, the TBA or the Middle East. There was an attempt
by Barakat’s associate, Khalil Saleh who established Saleh Trading, to transfer funds from
Iquique to Lebanon but the Chilean Central Bank intervened to block the transfer at the
request of U.S. authorities. In late 2002, Chilean authorities had noticed that a large num-
ber of people were arriving to Iquique weekly from Lebanon and hypothesized that these
individuals may have been serving as couriers.
51
The use of front companies by Hizballah as part of their business model to generate
funds has its roots in the training provided to the organization by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
Corps, which uses front companies as a mechanism to obtain nuclear technology. Hizballah
partners with Shi’a businessmen in Shi’a diaspora communities worldwide to establish
legitimate businesses to generate income with a percentage going directly to Hizballah.
52
In the case of Chile, the Barakat linked front companies were used to launder funds until the
Chilean authorities intensified their investigations, which subsequently led to the closure
of most of the front companies associated with Barakat. Similarly, Barakat used the s ame
model to generate and move funds through the front companies he established in the TBA.
With regard to Hizballah, current security concerns have shifted away from the TBA to
Sao Paulo where an estimated Shi’a community of 20,000 reside generally supportive of
Hizballah. Hizballah reportedly supports some Shi’a immigrants to Brazil by staking them
US$50,000 to establish a business in exchange for a percentage of sales.
53
The practice of
establishing front companies worldwide clearly conforms to the Hizballah global business
model adopted from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps doctrine.
Ve n e z u el a
In June 2002, Mohammed and Chawki Hammoud, the leaders of the Hizballah cell in
Charlotte, North Carolina, were convicted on a number of charges in the United States
including generating funding for Hizballah through smuggling activities. In the early 1990s,
Mohammed Hammoud who was still a teenager, had made a number of attempts to get
aU.S.entryvisafromtheAmericanembassyinDamascusbutwasrepeatedlyrejected.
In 1992, he traveled to Isla Margarita, located 25 miles off the coast of Venezuela and
home to a large Shi’a diaspora community. Western intelligence viewed Isla Margarita as
astrongholdforHizballah.ItwastherethatMohammedlinkedupwithhiscousinsAtef
Darwiche and Ali Hussein Darwiche and acquired the fraudulent visas from a local false
document mill that allowed them to enter the United States and eventually establish the
Hizballah cell in North Carolina.
54
It is also noteworthy that Hizballah operatives from the
TBA passed through Margarita Island to obtain visas to a variety of countries on their way
out of South America after the bombings in Argentina.
55
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
200 W. Costanza
The election of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 1998 and the development of
close relations between Iran and Venezuela has made the country an even more hospitable
environment for Hizballah activities. Ghazi Nasr al Din, a Venezuelan diplomat and the
president of the Shi’a Islamic Center in Caracas, originally from Lebanon, was designated
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 2008 as a Hizballah s upporter who used his
positions to provide financial support to the organization. Nasr al Din had served as the
Charge d’ Affairs at the Venezuelan embassy in Damascus, Syria until 2008. While on
his assignment there, Nasr traveled to neighboring Lebanon to meet with senior Hizballah
officials. In addition, he has facilitated the travel to Caracas of two Hizballah representatives
to the Lebanese Parliament to raise funds for Hizballah. The U.S. Department of the
Treasury has also designated Fawzi Kan’an as a “significant” provider of financial support
to Hizballah. Kan’an, born in Lebanon, also met with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon
to hold conversations that included discussion of operational details relating to potential
kidnapping and terrorist attack plans. In addition, Kan’an received training in Iran along
with other Venezuelan-based Hizballah operatives. Both of Kan’an’s travel agencies, Hilal
Travel Agency and Biblos Travel Agency , have been put on Treasury’s designated list of
entities that support terrorism.
56
However, the current security environment in Venezuela
makes the close monitoring of Hizballah activities in-country extremely problematical and
offers Hizballah a relatively secure safe haven in South America to support operations in
the region.
Colombia
Recent evidence of Hizballah ties to Colombia s urfaced during a two-year drug trafficking
investigation known as Operation Titan conducted by Colombia and U.S officials ending
in 2008. The operation succeeded in dismantling a DTO that extended from Colombia to
Panama, Mexico, the United States, Europe, and the Middle East and resulted in the arrest
of over 100 suspects worldwide. Twenty-one of the suspects were arrested in Colombia.
57
Among those arrested in Bogota was Lebanese kingpin Chekry Harb AKA “Taliban,” who
authorities described as a “world-class money launderer” whose organization laundered
hundreds of millions of dollars per year for various criminal organizations and Middle
Eastern radical groups, primarily Hizballah. According to Colombia officials, Harb trav-
eled extensively to Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt and was in telephonic contact with Hizballah
officials. The lead investigator for the special prosecutors office in Bogota, Gladys Sanchez
stated “the profits from the sale of drugs went to finance Hezbollah.” Sanchez added that
“This is an example of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal orga-
nizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries and terrorists.” Sanchez credited the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration, which led the investigation, with playing a key role in estab-
lishing the Hizballah connection. The Hizballah connection to drug trafficking, contraband
smuggling and money laundering operations in Colombia as revealed by Operation Titan
tracks closely with how Hizballah globally generates funds in other parts of the world such
as North America, Africa, and Asia.
58
In sum, Hizballah activities in Colombia and the rest of Latin America represents only
one geographic location in their global business model designed to exploit the weaknesses
in the security and legal frameworks of selected sovereign nations struggling to cope with
arangeofsecurityissues.ThepresenceofaHizballahnetworkinLatinAmericaposes
another important security challenge to the region—the potential to serve as an operational
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
Hizballah’s Mission in Latin America 201
and logistical support base to conduct terrorist acts on behalf of its own interests or as a
proxy for Iran.
Hizballah Terrorist Activities in Latin America
The car bomb attacks in Buenos Aires against the Israeli embassy in 1992 and AMIA in
1994 marked the appearance of Middle Eastern terrorism in Latin America. The multi-year
investigation of the AMIA bombing, initially shrouded in controversy, ultimately was able
to establish links to Lebanese-based Hizballah, its support network in South America and
Iranian government sponsors, who Argentine investigators believed authorized the attack.
At the outset, the investigation was marred by incompetence and corruption. Argentine
federal judge Juan Jose Galeano, who was probing potential complicity of the Buenos
Aires Provincial Police in the bombing, was shown on videotape offering a potential
witness US$400,000 in exchange for evidence. Galeano was removed from the case in
2003 and subsequently impeached in 2005.
59,60
There was also controversy regarding the
testimony of an alleged former Iran intelligence officer, Abolghasem Mesbahi, who claimed
that former Argentine President Carlos Menem accepted US$10 million from Tehran in
exchange for blocking the investigation. Mesbahi also told the Argentine court that Iran
planned the AMIA bombing believing that it was a base for the Israeli secret service.
61,62
The investigation finally got on track under Argentine Attorney General Dr. Alberto
Nisman and Argentine prosecutor Marcelo Martinez. They released the results of their
comprehensive investigation in October 2006 formally accusing the government of Iran
with sponsoring the attack and Hizballah operatives with carrying it out.
63
The investigation
revealed that the decision to bomb the AMIA building was made on 14 August 1993 in
Mashad, Iran under the supervision of Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani. Also present
at the meeting were Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati,
intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian and Sheik Mohsen Rabbani who was serving as cultural
attach
´
eattheIranianembassyinBuenosAiresduringthetimeoftheattack.Supreme
Leader Khamenei then issued a fatwa (religious order) directing the responsibility for the
operation to be divided between the Intelligence Ministry and the Quds Force unit of the
Iran Revolutionary Guard.
The logistics on the ground were organized by Rabbani who originally entered Ar-
gentina in 1983 to serve as Sheik of the At-Tauhid mosque and subsequently named cultural
attach
´
eattheIranianembassy.TheinvestigationrevealedthatRabannihadbeenestab-
lishing a network of informants and front companies to support Iranian activities since his
arrival. Rabanni was assisted by Ahmed Reza Asghari, a special forces member of the Iran
Revolutionary Guard who had been assigned to the Iranian embassy as a third secretary. The
attorney general’s report integrates cell phone data, bank transfer information and witness
testimony to meticulously reconstruct a detailed timeline of the attack showing the transfer
of funds to Rabanni, the acquisition of the car used in the attack and his increased cell
phone calls to one cell phone number located in Foz da Iguacu in the TBA as the date of
the attack grew closer. Four months prior to the attack Rabanni requested and was granted
diplomatic status (and thus diplomatic immunity). Meanwhile, the Iranian ambassador to
Argentina, Hadi Soleimannour, left Argentina about two weeks prior to the attack. The
Iranians ambassadors to Chile and Uruguay returned to Iran the day before the attack.
The investigation also detailed the arrival of the Hizballah operational team led by Imad
Mughniyah, head of the Hizballah External Security Service who managed the operational
aspects of the attack.
64
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
202 W. Costanza
Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, who presided over the case, adopted the results of the
attorney general’s report and issued international arrest warrants on 9 November 2006, for
Iranian officials cited in the report including the Iranian diplomats serving in Buenos Aires
during that time and Hezbollah official Imad Mughniyah. In March 2007, INTERPOL after
an extensive review issued Red Notices for six of the individuals named in the report:
Mughniyah, Fallahijan, Rabanni Asghari Vahidi, and Rezai.
65
On 20 May 2009, Attorney
General Nisman issued an international arrest warrant for Salman El Reda, a Colombian
who converted to Islam, living in Foz do Iguacu. El Reda first arrived to Argentina in 1987
where Rabanni served as his spiritual leader. El Reda married Argentine Silvania Sain.
The marriage was performed by Rabanni. The investigation determined that El Reda was
Rabanni’s TBA contact for the AMIA operation serving as a link to the incoming Hezbollah
operational team. El Reda, an associate of TBA Hizballah financier Assad Ahmad Barakat,
had purchased the cellular phone that had regularly received the only calls made by Rabanni
to Foz do Iguacu during the several weeks prior to the attack. Immediately after the bombing
the phone was discarded. Nisman also charged El Reda with coordinating the arrival of the
Hizballah operational team that carried out the bombing. Silvania Sain left Argentina one
month prior to the AMIA attack. It is believed that El Reda currently lives with his wife in
Lebanon.
66
It is important to note that the modus operandi (MO) employed by Hizballah to carry
out the attack as detailed in the attorney general’s findings, was identical to the MO used
by those who attacked the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992. In the 1992 attack,
the IJO claimed responsibility. Experts and analysts of international terrorism, including
Bob Clifford who headed the FBI Hizballah Unit during that time period, indicated to
investigators and entered into the court record that the MO used in the AMIA attack is
characteristic of Hizballah.
67
The clear implication is that it is not necessary to have a
hidden Hizballah cell in Latin America to conduct terrorist attacks. What is needed is a
reliable logistical and operational support network that is compartmented from the main
attack element that enters the country just prior to the attack. In the case of the AMIA
attack, the attack element entered Argentina on 1 July 1994 with the attack taking place on
18 July 1994.
68
Consequently, the search for a hidden Hizballah terrorist cell is essentially
misguided in that, according to the Hizballah MO, the Hizballah attack element only
arrives in-country to the target site just prior to the attack. The collaboration of Iranian
diplomatic missions with local Hizballah operatives is all that is needed to establish an
in-place logistical and operational support network that can be called on at any time to
support Iranian or Hizballah terrorist attacks. This collaboration between Hizballah and
Iran in Latin America is the real threat that has implications for the productive use of
resources by security services that are charged with subverting Islamic extremist terrorist
threats.
The Governmental Response
Two divergent views characterize governmental responses to the Hizballah presence in Latin
America. On one hand, the United States views Hizballah as a global terrorist organization
and, in collaboration with selected Latin-American security services, has aggressively
pursued Hizballah members and sympathizers engaged in fund-raising and terrorist support
activities. For example, in June 2004, the U.S. Department of the Treasury took action
against Hizballah fund-raising in the TBA by designating Assad Ahmad Barakat as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist ( SDGT) under Executive Order 13224, which places
an obligation on any U.S. person to freeze any assets of the SDGT. In addition, two of
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
Hizballah’s Mission in Latin America 203
Barakat’s businesses, Casa Apollo and Barakat Import Export Ltda., were also designated.
69
In December 2006, the Department of the Treasury took action against nine more Hizballah
members and two entities in the TBA and designated them as SDGTs and thus froze the
assets of those connected to Casa Hamze and Galeria Page in Cuidad del Este.
70
The U.S.
security agencies continue to work with their counterparts in the TBA countries to analyze
threat information and monitor Hizballah activities throughout the region.
71
However, this
collaboration, while fruitful, is still limited in scope because of the differing view toward
terrorism held by countries in Latin America.
In contrast to the United States, political leaders in key Latin-American countries
have denied that a real terrorist threat exists in their countries. In the case of Brazil, the
general perception is that terrorism is viewed as an exogenous threat more associated with
the Middle East and targeted against the United States and Israel. The lack of any terrorist
attacks within Brazil has reinforced perceptions among political leaders that terrorism is not
aBrazilianproblem.AsanalystDelanneNovaesdeSouzafromtheBrazilianIntelligence
Service (ABIN) sagely noted “... any attempt to analyze terrorism strategically in Brazil
is more related to policy-making per se than any other approach taken by the U.S., the
United Kingdom or Spain, countries that were attacked by terrorism and, as a consequence,
have different and more developed tools to face it.”
72
Former president of the Camara dos
Deputados, Aldo Rebelo, stated to the audience at the Sixth Summit on National Strategic
Studies (ENEE) in 2006 that “Brazil is not a territory currently subject to international
terrorist acts.” In Rebelo’s view, Brazil’s institutional capabilities to fight terrorism is
sufficient to meet its international obligations. In essence, Brazil views its efforts to fight
terrorism within the context of international cooperation, not as a direct threat to its territory.
In contrast, former director of ABIN Marcio Paulo Buzanelli noted in 2004 that Brazil lacked
sufficient resources—material, technological, human—to address the terrorist threat. He
also noted a lack of an effective mechanism to coordinate governmental activity among
the different entities of the Brazilian government responsible for fighting terrorism.
73
The
lack of high level political recognition of the terrorist threat has undermined efforts to
strengthen counterterrorism laws in Brazil. Brazil does not criminalize terrorist financing as
an independent crime. Although legislation to criminalize terrorism and terrorist financing
was drafted by the Executive Branch, it was never sent to the Brazilian Congress for
passage.
74
The election of Fernando Lugo to the presidency of Paraguay has complicated an
already difficult counterterrorism posture in that country. Although Paraguay has been co-
operative with U.S. efforts to monitor terrorist groups in the TBA, it has severe limitations.
The U.S. State Department characterized Paraguay counterterrorism and law enforcement
efforts as plagued by “a politicized judicial system, corrupt police force and an absence
of counterterrorist financing legislation.” There are no effective immigration or customs
controls at the border and there is a fundamental lack of resources to address the is-
sue. Counterterrorism legislation has continued to languish in the Paraguayan Congress.
75
Consequently, Paraguay has limited capabilities to effectively target sophisticated terrorist
networks like Hizballah.
Argentina’s institutions were tested by the two terrorist attacks that resulted in long
protracted investigations that survived initial prosecutorial incompetence and corruption.
The Argentines have made progress in strengthening their institutions and in 2007 the
Argentine Congress criminalized terrorist financing. In addition, Argentine s ecurity forces
worked cooperatively to analyze threat information and improve analytic capabilities. The
Argentine government showed political commitment to the fight against terrorism by de-
fying Iran objections and continuing its push for the arrest of Iranian government officials
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
204 W. Costanza
charged in the AMIA bombing. In 2009, an Argentine judge requested the capture of El
Reda demonstrating a steadfast commitment to pursue counterterrorism prosecutions.
76
Chile has counterterrorism laws in place and has sought to improve its counterterrorism
capabilities. There is a continuing effort to monitor illicit activities in Iquique including
front companies that many be tied to terrorist financing. The National Intelligence Agency
of Chile is viewed as a strategic and analytical organization that advises the government on
arangeofthreatsincludingterrorism.InColombia,whilebattlinganinsurgencyandnarco-
trafficking organizations, the government has worked closely with the United States to block
terrorist assets and close terrorist-related accounts.
77
As Operation Titan demonstrated, the
political will and capability of the Colombian government to address terrorist activity has
been firmly established and is expected to continue.
In contrast the countries that have expanded their relationship with Iran, a state sponsor
of terrorism, have predictably shown little interest in improving their counterterrorism
posture. According to the Financial Action Task Force, Bolivia has deficiencies in anti-
money laundering/countering terrorist finance (AML/CFT) regime. In addition, Bolivia’s
burgeoning political relationship with Iran has created a hostile political environment for
the United States, making effective counterterrorism cooperation with the United States
improbable, particularly involving Hizballah.
The warming of relations between Ecuador and Iran also make it unlikely that Ecuador
will take the necessary steps to criminalize terrorist financing and direct that capability to-
ward Hizballah fund-raisers who may now see Ecuador as a potential safe haven. Ecuador’s
weak judicial institutions coupled with its visa-free policy and lax immigration control
have essentially opened its borders to all who want to enter. According to the U.S. State
Department, official Ecuadorian immigration statistics showed about a four fold increase
in the number of travelers entering Ecuador from 2007 to 2009 from countries designated
as state sponsors of terrorism.
78
The close relationship between Venezuela and Iran has clearly signaled President
Hugo Chavez’s intention to work against the U.S. and Western nations in counterterrorist
initiatives in the Latin America. Consequently, Venezuela constitutes a potentially secure
safe haven for Iranian and Iranian-sponsored Hizballah activities in Latin America. The
only two countries in South America that do not have an Israeli embassy are Venezuela and
Bolivia, both potential staging areas to facilitate attacks against Israeli Embassies or other
targets that Iran or Hizballah may choose to attack.
Conclusions
Differing perceptions of Hizballah have led the United States and Latin-American countries
down divergent paths in understanding and addressing Hizballah activities in Latin Amer-
ica. The United States views Hizballah as a global terrorist organization with a significant
presence on almost every continent. Its knowledge of Hizballah, derived from all-source in-
formation gathered worldwide that is vetted and analyzed, provides a comprehensive global
assessment of the Hizballah network. This broad assessment allows the United States to
compare and contrast how Hizballah raises funds and engages in terrorist activities in other
parts of the world. Consequently, this global perspective also influences the way the United
States perceives Hizballah activities in Latin American. The United States understands
that, based on information regarding Hizballah’s worldwide activities, Hizballah s eeks to
exploit the Shi’a diaspora in countries whose security and judicial institutions may be weak
or ineffective in monitoring their illicit fund-raising. None of the countries in Latin America
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
Hizballah’s Mission in Latin America 205
consider Hizballah a terrorist group, which reinforces the prevailing view among political
authorities in the region that there is no real terrorist threat (conceived strategically) in the
region and thus support to security institutions to comprehensively address the Hizballah
threat is lacking.
The view that Hizballah is a U.S. and Israeli problem by political authorities in the
region has placed the security services of countries like Brazil and Argentina in difficult
positions. As a consequence, without political backing of their efforts, the security services,
which generally understand the Hizballah threat and are willing to pursue Hizballah targets,
will choose to fly below the radar in carrying out their counterterrorist activities. Arrests
will come about based on existing criminal statutes not specific to terrorism. The lack of
appropriate terrorism and terrorist financing legislation will continue to impede their work.
The result is that the security services will remain dependent on the United States as a
source of leads and continuing support. This creates the unfortunate dynamic of security
services producing some arrests of Hizballah fund-raising operatives but understood by
the United States to be only the tip of the iceberg based on all-source estimates of money
believed to be generated in the region. Meanwhile, local politicians view the arrests as witch
hunts of individuals legally sending funds to support Hizballah, which is considered a legal
organization. Consequently, without the political will to enact effective counterterrorism
legislation and terrorism financing laws in the region, the security services’ efforts will
remain narrow and dependent on U.S. collaboration. For example, in the United States
alone, hundreds of FBI Special Agents work against the Hizballah target. In a country like
Brazil with large Shi’a diaspora communities, former ABIN Director Buzanelli has already
acknowledged that his service lacked the resources to adequately cover the terrorist threat
in a country as large as Brazil. It is unclear how Brazil will address these security issues
when they host the 2014 World Cup or the 2016 Olympics.
The U.S. global perspective of Hizballah has also led it to assess the possibility of a
terrorist attack in Latin America differently than most nations in the region. Most Latin-
American countries do not see Hizballah as a terrorist threat to their countries. The lack
of evidence confirming the presence of Hizballah operational cells in Latin America has
been proof enough in their view that such a threat does not exist. However, from a global
perspective, Hizballah does not use embedded operational targeting cells to conduct attacks.
The operational goal is to create a network of trusted local operatives in-country who would
carry out the low-level support work—renting cars, discreetly acquiring cell phones in
alias—in support of an operation if Iran or Hizballah chose to conduct an operation in their
particular area. None of the important high-level operational decision will be made in Latin
America. The network, which may never be called on, is there to provide the logistical and
operational base of support if and when it is ever called on. The low-level Hizballah support
network will be compartmented from the main operators and most likely would know only
the details of their small operational task. Consequently, the Hizballah MO is well-tailored
to function in areas with weak security institutions where low level functionaries can blend
into the local environment and operational targeting elements can easily enter and exit
across borders. This makes the detection of a support network difficult to identify without
acomprehensiveandwell-resourcedefforttouncoverit.Thisalsomakesthegrowing
influence of Iran in Latin America more ominous in that it creates potential safe havens for
Hizballah operatives in countries like Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Ecuador. There
are plenty of U.S. and Israeli targets in Latin America to choose from if Iran uses Hizballah
to carry out an attack on its behalf or if Hizballah pursues an attack independently.
In sum, the ability of security services earnestly trying to detect all of Hizballah’s
activity in Latin America is akin to a person with severe astigmatism trying to read an
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
206 W. Costanza
eye chart. Most things will remain blurry. In order to enable security services and law
enforcement to identify and rein in the Hizballah network and the continuing threat it rep-
resents, there must be political recognition that the potential for terrorism in Latin America
exists. There must also be political will to pass the appropriate enabling legislation, lacking
in many of the countries in the region, to support security services and law enforcement
efforts to operate against terrorists. In addition, resources must be made available to allow
the security services and law enforcement to carry out their duties against Hizballah and
other terrorist targets in the region. Rooting out Hizballah in Latin America should not be
treated as simply a bilateral issue of interest to the United States. Hizballah is entrenched
in Latin America in ways that are only dimly understood. Unfortunately, the security ser-
vices and law enforcement in Latin-American countries committed to fighting terrorism
are overburdened with a range of security issues that strain their resources and ability to
address a sophisticated terrorist organization like Hizballah. However, there must first be
recognition at the political level that a terrorism threat in Latin America exists along the
will to do something about it, before any improvement in counterterrorism efforts against
Hizballah can occur.
The U.S. government can, however, play a more active role in nurturing greater political
will among Latin-American nations, which will be critical to any effort to aggressively root
out Hizballah networks in the region. One fundamental way for the United States to begin
is by increasing its influence in Latin America through deeper political and economic
engagement in the region. As with recent past administrations, Latin America has not been
ahighpriorityforU.S.policymakers.InordertoenableLatin-Americangovernmentsto
risk political capital to assist U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region, there needs to be
abeliefamongLatinAmericanleadersthattheUnitedStatesiswillingtotakeabroad,
constructive role in encouraging economic growth and stability across a range of issues.
Greater constructive U.S. engagement will enable Latin-American governments to reassess
their stance toward Hizballah and other extremist groups operating on their territories
within the context of enhancing personal security, a key element in a broader program of
promoting s table economic development, good governance, and the establishment of firmly
rooted democratic practices.
The U.S. government should also encourage cooperation among the s ecurity and law
enforcement services in the affected regions in order to help build a coordinated, regional
campaign against a range of extremist targets. The timely sharing of information is critical
to all counterterrorism initiatives. The United States should use the appropriate channels to
enhance the regional services’ analytical and operational capabilities by providing the nec-
essary resources and by promoting trust-building exercises among the services to encourage
greater collaboration against regional extremist groups.
Diplomatic efforts should also continue to maintain pressure on the national legislatures
in the affected countries to pass effective legislation to provide law enforcement with the le-
gal basis to more aggressively pursue and bring to trial individuals who are supporting terror-
ist groups through illicit activities. The political realities of the region make it unlikely that
countries, such as Brazil, will enact laws that tacitly admit to a terrorist presence on their
soil. Despite this political obstacle, the local security services generally do not share this
view. They recognize the terrorist presence and the threat it poses to public security. In
this sense, continued U.S. support toward building effective capabilities within the re-
gional security services in a way that ensures respect for human rights should be a core
counterterrorism objective as part of a reinvigorated U.S. foreign policy toward Latin
America.
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
Hizballah’s Mission in Latin America 207
Notes
1. The various transliterations of Hizballah include Hizbullah, Hizbollah, Hezballah, Hisbollah
and Hizb Allah. The author chose to use Hizballah because it is the standard spelling most often used
in U.S. government documents.
2. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2009,U.S.DepartmentofState.Availableathttp://www.
state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm (accessed 10 November 2010).
3. “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” Jerusalem Quarterly,Fall1988.Availableat
http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah
program.pdf (accessed 10 November 2010).
4. Marius Deeb, “Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis and Ideology,”
Occasional Paper Series (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1986), p. 19.
5. “Islamic Jihad Says It Bombed Embassy,” Los Angeles Times. Available at http://
articles.latimes.com/1992-03-19/news/mn-5905
1 islamic-jihad (accessed 11 November 2010).
6. FRONTLINE interview with Robert Baer, 22 M arch 2002. Robert Baer was a former CIA
case officer who served in the Middle East for many years. He is the author of See No Evil: The True
Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002).
Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/interviews/baer.html (accessed
19 November 2010).
7. Ilan Berman, “No Diplomatic Relations Until Terrorist Funding Stops,” Mclatchy-Tribune
News Service,12February2009.Availableathttp://www.ilanberman.com/5908/no-diplomatic-
relations-until-terrorist-funding (accessed 12 November 2010).
8. Martin Rudner, “Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010), pp. 705–706.
9. Blanca Madani, “Huzbullah’s Global Finance Network.” Available at http://www.
jewishdefense.org/hezbollah.htm (accessed 26 September 2010).
10. Hamid Ghiryafi, “Hizballah Officials Carrying Donations Reportedly Killed in Lebanese
Plane Crash,” al-Siyasah [Kuwait], 29 December 2003.
11. Tony Badran, “Levant in Focus: Hizbullah Acts Local, Thinks Global,” Founda-
tion for Defense of Democracies, reprinted in Jerusalem Post,23June2010.Availableat
http://cgis.jpost.com/Blogs/levant/entry/hezbollah
acts local thinks global (accessed 24 November
2010).
12. Testimony of Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow and Director of Terrorism Studies, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, 25 M ay 2005.
13. Douglas Farah, “Hezbollah’s External Support Network in West Africa and Latin
America,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, 4 August 2006. Available at
http://www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print
pub.asp?pubID=118 (accessed 24 October 2010).
14. Patricia Taft and David Poplack, “The Crime-Terrorism Nexus: Threat Convergence Risks
in the Tri-Border Area,” Fund for Peace, June 2009, p. 15.
15. Ely Karmon, “Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah: Strategic Penetration in Latin Amer-
ica (WP),” Working Paper, Real Instituto Elcano, (RIE), Madrid, 4 April 2009. Available at
http://www.ict.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/677/currentpage/1/Default.aspx (accessed 27 October
2010), pp. 31–32.
16. Parisa Hafeszi, “Iran, Venezuela in ‘Axis of Unity’ Against US,” Reuters, 2 July 2007.
17. Karmon, “Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah,” pp. 6–9.
18. Braden Webb, “Paraguay’s Persian Presence: Iran’s New Friend in Latin America,” Coun-
cil on Hemispheric Affairs, 21 August 2008. Available at http://www.coha.org/paraguay’s-persian-
presence-iran’s-new-friend-in-latin-america/ (accessed 27 October 2010).
19. John Kiriahou, “Iran’s Latin America Push,” Los Angeles Times,8September2008.
20. Karmon, “Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah,” p. 18.
21. Appendix 2: Summary of the Argentinian Attorney General Petition Regarding Issuance of
an Arrest Warrant for the Perpetrators of the 1994 Attack on the Jewish Community Center (AMIA)
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
208 W. Costanza
in Buenos Aires, quoted in Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special
Studies (C.S.S.), November 2006.
22. Imad Mughniyah was the head of Hizballah’s External Security Service in 1994 in addition
to being a key military advisor to Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Mughniyah also served as
head of the Jihad Council, which is one of the five councils that report to the Shura Council, the
top decision-making body of Hizballah. The Jihad Council is responsible for terrorist operations in
Lebanon and worldwide. Mughniyah has been implicated in numerous terrorist attacks including the
attack against the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the hijacking of flight
TWA 847. He was on the U.S. most wanted list for terrorists acts. He was killed in a car-bomb
blast in the northeast outskirts of Damascus, Syria on 12 February 2008. Global Jihad. Available at
http://www.globaljihad.net/print.asp?id=331 (accessed 22 November 2010).
23. For an alternative view see Tom Diaz and Barbara Newman, Lightning Out of Lebanon:
Hezbollah Terrorists on American Soil (New York: Ballantine Books, 2006), p. 125. They believe that
the AMIA attack was an Iran-sponsored operation that drew on local Hizballah support that Iran had
previous established in the region. Although they do not name their sources, the authors persuasively
argue that the AMIA bombing was planned far in advance of the Israeli attacks in the Bekaa Valley and
the kidnapping of Dirani in contrast to the views of the retired senior Israeli intelligence officials who
believed Israeli actions precipitated the attacks. The Hizballah M.O., which relies on careful planning,
compartmentation, and implementation, suggests that the operation against the AMIA building had
been in the works for months and not simply a quick response (an interval of only one month) by
Hizballah. Thus, the Diaz and Newman scenario appears far more plausible regarding motivations
behind the attack and tracks with the conclusions of the Argentine investigation.
24. Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Non-State Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah,” Comparative
Strategy 26 (2007), pp. 477–478, 490 (note 22).
25. Eitan Azani, “Hezbollah—A Global Terrorist Organization—Situational Report as of
September 2006,” a prepared statement submitted to House C ommittee on International R elations,
Hezbollah’s Global Reach, Joint Hearings, 109th Congress, 2nd Sess. (2006), p. 56.
26. Badran, “Levant in Focus.”
27. Bar, “Deterring Non-State Terrorist Groups,” p. 478.
28. Paul D. Taylor, “Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North
and South,” Newport Paper 21, Newport Papers, Naval War College, 2004, p. 24.
29. Anthony Faiola, “U.S. Terrorist Search Reaches Paraguay; Black Market Hub Called Key
Finance Center for Middle E ast Extremists,” Washin g ton Po st ,13October2001.
30. Ricardo Galhardo, “Paraguai pede a prisao de libanes no Brasil,” OGlobo,6November
2001.
31. Mark S. Steinitz, “Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America,” CSIS, Policy Papers
on the Americas, XIV, Study 7, July 2003, p. 9.
32. Eduardo Szklarz and Martin Barillas, “Argentina Issues International Arrest Warrant for
Terrorist Wanted in Bombing Masterminded by Iran,” The Cutting Edge,29May2009.Availableat
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=1134&page=&pagename=(accessed 1 De-
cember 2010).
33. Kevin G. Hall, “Alleged Fund-Raiser for Hezbollah Arrested in Paraguay,” Knight-
Rider/Tribune News Service, 1 November 2002.
34. Diaz and Newman, Lightning Out of Lebanon,p.190.
35. Roberto Cosso, “Brazil: $50 Million Remitted to Terrorist Groups from Tri-Border Area,”
Folha de Sao Paulo, 3 December 2001.
36. “Film Piracy and It’s Connection to Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Research Brief,
RAND Corporation, 2009.
37. Testimony of Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow and Director of Terrorism Studies, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, 25 May 2005.
38. “Paraguay: Authorities Uncover New Route Used by Hizballah Leader Barakat,” ABC
Color, 27 May 2002.
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
Hizballah’s Mission in Latin America 209
39. Karmon, “Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah,” p. 19, note 68.
40. “Suspected Hezbollah Financier Arrested in Paraguay,” AFP, 15 June 2010. Avail-
able at http://www.googlehostednews/afp/article/ALegM5g2Qu6mj7X617uE9Y3B9xSmcC14hw
(accessed 27 October 2010).
41. Matthew Hardwood, “Hezbollah’s Tri-Border Hub,” Security Management,December
2010. Available at http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/hezbollahs-tri-border-hub-007779
(accessed 4 December 2010).
42. “Two Sentenced for Trafficking Counterfeit Goods,” Department of Justice Press
Release, FBI Philadelphia, 14 July 2010. Available at http://philadelphia.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrel10/ph071410.htm (accessed 4 December 2010).
43. Pablo Gato and Robert Windrem, “Hezbollah Builds a Western Base,” MSNBC.com,
9May2007.Availableathttp://www.msnbc.comcleanprint/CleanPrintProxy.aspx?1287273372193
(accessed 16 October 2010).
44. Carl Anthony Wege, “The Hizballah Security Apparatus,” Perspectives on Terrorism 2(7)
(2008).
45. Diaz and Newman, Lightning Out of Lebanon, pp. 93–94.
46. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Hizballah Financial Network,” Press
Center, 9 December 2010.
47. Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Reporter at Large: In the Party of God (Part II),” The New Yorker,28
October 2002.
48. Leavitt testimony. The information was derived from a presentation by Chilean Police
Intelligence, Department of Foreign Affairs, at a law enforcement conference in Santiago, Chile,
2002.
49. Marc Perelman, “Feds Call Chile Resort a Terror Hot Spot,” Forward.com,23January2003.
Available at http://www.forward.com/articles/9036/ (accessed 24 October 2010).
50. Leavitt testimony.
51. Perelman, “Feds Call Chile Resort a Terror Hot Spot.”
52. Badran, “Levant in Focus.”
53. Nikolas Kozloff, “Rio Olympic Games and the Politics of Terror,” Buzzflash,3December
2010.
54. Diaz and Newman, Lightning Out of Lebanon, pp. 14–15.
55. Ibid., p. 14.
56. “U.S. Targets Hizballah in Venezuela,” U.S. Department of Treasury Facebook Page, 18 June
2008. Available at http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=12564239676&topic=5005 (accessed 6
December 2010).
57. Doug Farah, “Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling Challenges for the Merida
Initiative,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute,WorkingPaperon
U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010, p. 19.
58. Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, “Drug Probe Finds Hezbollah Link,” Los Angeles
Times,22October2008.Forfurtherdetailssee“EnColombiaDesarticulanOrganizcionvincu-
lada a Hezbollah,” Noticias,22October2008.Availableathttp://noticias24.com/actualidad/noticia/
19093/en-colombia–desarticulan-organizacion-vinculada-a-hezbollah (accessed 6 December 2010).
The statement by the Colombian Fiscalia “Por Lavar Activos de Narco y Paramilitaries: Captu-
ados Integrantes de Organizacion Internacional” can be found at http://www.fiscalia.gov.co.PAG/
DIVULGA/noticias/lavado/LavaRedInternal/Oct21.htm
59. “Argentine Bomb Probe Judge Sacked,” BBC News,3August2005.Availableathttp://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4743927.stm (accessed 7 December 2010).
60. “Argentina Removes Bomb Case Judge,” BBC News,3December2005.Availableathttp://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3289359 (accessed 7 December 2010).
61. “Flashback: Argentina Bomb, BBC News,25August2003.Availableathttp://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3179861.stm (accessed 7 December 2010).
62. “Iran Blamed for Argentine Bomb,” BBC News,3November2003.Availableathttp://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle
east/3245641.stm (accessed 7 December 2010).
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012
210 W. Costanza
63. “Iran Charged Over Argentina Bomb,” BBC News,25October2006.Availableat
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6085768.stm (accessed 7 December 2010).
64. Appendix 2. Attorney General’s Report.
65. Karmon, “Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah,” pp. 16–17.
66. Eduardo Szklarz and Martin Barillas, “Argentina Issues International Arrest Warrant for
Terrorist Wanted in Bombing Masterminded by Iran,” The Cutting Edge,25May2009.Available
at http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=11343&pageid=pagename= (accessed 1
December 2010).
67. Appendix 2. Attorney General’s Report. See note 22.
68. Appendix 2. Attorney General’s Report.
69. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Extremist, Two Companies Sup-
porting Hizballah in Tri-Border Area,” Office of Public Affairs, 20 June 2004.
70. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Hizballah Fundraising Network in the Triple Frontier,”
Office of Public Affairs, 6 December 2006.
71. U.S. Department of State, “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview,”
Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, 5 August 2010. Available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/
2009/140888.htm (accessed 1 November 2010).
72. Delanne Novaes de Souza, “Brazil’s Role in the Fight Against Terrorism,” Revista Brasilera
de Intelligencia, Brasilia ABIN 3(4) (2007).
73. Marco Paulo Buzanelli, “Encontro de Estudos de Terrorismo,”2,Brasilia(2003).
74. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports (2009).
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
Downloaded by [William Costanza] at 12:35 28 February 2012