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The Measurement of Creativity: From Definitional Consensus
to the Introduction of a New Heuristic Framework
Mark Batey
Psychometrics at Work Research Group, Manchester Business School
The scientific study of creativity has proven a difficult undertaking. Researchers have
employed a diversity of definitions and measurement methods. As a result, creativity
research is underrepresented in the literature and the findings of different studies often
prove difficult to draw into a coherent body of understanding. A heuristic framework to
explicate the different methods by which creativity may be studied forms the basis of
this article. Drawing upon existing conceptions of the creativity construct and previous
efforts to provide structure to creativity research, the new taxonomic framework exam-
ines creativity from 3 primary perspectives in the form of a 3-dimensional matrix. The
implications of the taxonomic framework for creativity research are examined. The new
taxonomic framework contributes to the understanding of creativity research
through the introduction of a comprehensive heuristic to guide future research and
the interpretation of previous studies.
The cultural value placed upon creativity in the arts,
sciences, technol ogy, and political endeavor is immense.
Creative people and their products have received adu-
lation throughout history (Nettle, 2001), to such an
extent that it has been argued that creativity constitutes
humankinds’ ultimate resource (Toynbee, 1964). Crea-
tivity is an essential part of organizational innovation,
which, in turn, drives economic prosperity (Amabile &
Khaire, 2008). Yet, despite the undeniable importance
of creativity, it is relatively infrequently studied in com-
parison to other similar constructs like intelligence or
personality (Batey & Furnham, 2006; Guilford, 1950;
Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).
Researchers have long been interested in the scien-
tific analysis of creativity (Co lvin, 1902; Colvin &
Meyer, 1906; Dearborn, 1898). Over the years, there
have been many approaches adopted in the study of
creativity (Kaufman, Plucker, & Baer, 2008; Mumford,
2003; Runco , 2004). Some researchers have adopted a
psychoanalytic perspective, some a psychometric
approach, some cognitive, others social–psychological,
and latterly neurobiological efforts to study creativity
have been instigated. At once this diversity is both
encouraging, in that a wide variety of research para-
digms have been investigated, and discouraging, in that
creativity research has been described as a degenerating
research program (Glover, Ronning, & Reynolds,
1989).
It may be argued that the primary issue to hamper
creativity research centers around the lack of a clear
and widely accepted definition for creativity, which, in
turn, has impeded efforts to measure the construct
(Batey & Furnham, 2006). Some researchers equate
creativity with domain-changing, transcendent works
of greatness; others find creativity in the artwork of chil-
dren (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009). Given that there is
such diversity in the interpretation of the field of creativ-
ity, it is not surprising to discover that there have been a
host of different ways suggested in which the construct
may be studied. This diversity has made it difficult to
synthesize the results of different studies and research
streams. This article presents a novel heuristic frame-
work with which to understand how creativity may be
assessed. The heuristic emanates from a critique and
understanding of how creativity has come to be defined.
It is hope d that such a framework can allow for the inte-
gration of the diversity of approaches, as well as guide
future research.
Correspondence should be sent to Mark Batey, Psychometrics at
Work Research Group, Manchester Business School, Booth Street
East, Manchester, UK M15 6PB. E-mail: mark.batey@mbs.ac.uk
CREATIVITY RESEARCH JOURNAL, 24(1), 55–65, 2012
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1040-0419 print=1532-6934 online
DOI: 10.1080/10400419.2012.649181
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DEFINITION
There have been recent integrative efforts to describe
and delineate the field of creativity research (Batey &
Furnham, 2 006; Plucker, Beghetto, & Dow, 2004). With
regard to definitions, many researchers have adopted the
‘‘new and useful’’ definition of creativity (Mumford,
2003); which suggests that a creative product is that
which is deemed to be novel or original and useful or
adaptive. Another area of agreement has involved the
concept that creativity may refer to a person (or per-
sons), processes, products, and also the environmental
press (Rhodes, 1961=1987). However, it is important
to consider how the term creativity has come to be
understood and defined.
The historical background of the term creativity has a
significant bearing on attempts to define the construct.
The most significant issues that underpin creativity defi-
nitions concern Western versus Eastern perspectives,
and creativity as divine intervention. Creativity as the
original product of an individual is a predominantly
Western perspective. The earliest perceptions of creativ-
ity were dominated by the story of the creation in Gen-
esis. From here, the concept of creation as originality
and utility arose and influenced subsequent interpreta-
tions of the properties of creative products. This con-
trasts with an Eastern view of creativity as the
expression of personal truth or as self-growth (Lubart,
1999). The paradigmatic approach that has dominated
creativity research has almost exclusively adopted this
Western perspective of creativity as novelty and utility.
The earliest, though predominant ly Western, concep-
tions of creativi ty drew on mystical interpretations
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). Many ancient Greeks
believed that inspiration and creation resulted from div-
ine intervention. From this perspective, creativity was
‘‘associated with mystical powers of protection and
good fortune’’ (Albert & Runco, 1999, p. 18). The
consequence for the concept of creativity was that it
was considered beyond measurement and comprehen-
sion, a legacy that arguably remains today.
In time, the Greeks began to reduce the emphasis of
divine intervention by the highest gods, instead co n-
sidering creativity to be related to each individual’s
daimon or guardian spirit. By the time of Aristotle, crea-
tivity was seen as a natural event that conformed to
natural law, even if it did involve ‘‘an association with
madness and frenzied inspiration’’ (Albert & Runco,
1999, p. 15). Little by little, creative acts became associa-
ted with the abilities and dispositions of the person. As
creativity became associated with individuals, so
researchers like Galton began investigations of Heredity
Genius (Galton, 1869= 1962) and the London school or
differential movement sought to elucidate the most basic
component of creative thought production; fluency
(Hargreaves, 1927). The grounding of the scientific
investigation of creativity in the individual ability differ-
ences field led to the construct being considered a predo-
minantly intel lectual trait. Notable studies include the
work of Terman and his associates (e.g., Terman &
Oden, 1947, 1959), Guilford (e.g., 1950) and Torrance
(1974). Further, the intellectual trait background of
creativity research may have deflected focus from other
important individual differences traits such as person-
ality, motivation, values, and interests. A recent review
has examined the relationships between creativity, intel-
ligence, and personality (Batey & Furnham, 2006).
The development of the domain of psychology has
also influenced how creativity is assessed. As intimated,
the earliest psychological studies of creativity focused
upon intellectual factors. Following this trend, research-
ers began to assess creativity from the perspective of per-
sonality, a good example being the meta-analysis of
Feist (1998). Interest in cognitive psychology led to
investigations of the creative problem-solving process
(e.g., Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Newell, Shaw, &
Simon, 1964). There has also been considerable interest
in the situational factors that promote or inhibit creativ-
ity (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Shalley & Gilson, 2004). Cur-
rently, studies of the neurobiol ogy and function of
creatives and creative thinking have been undertaken
(e.g., Folley & Park, 2005; Jung et al., 2010; Martindale,
1999). The final frontier for creativity research lies in
efforts to first evaluate and then integrate this diverse
research. For this reason, confluence or syndrome
approaches to creativity have been proposed (e.g.,
Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Woodman & Schoenfeldt,
1989). Further, to integrate conceptually (or empirically)
the diverse research on creativity, a framework needs to
devised.
How creativity is defined is crucial to how the con-
struct is studied, yet ‘‘what creativity is, and what it is
not, hangs as the mythical albatross around the neck
of scientific research on creativity’’ (Prentky,
2000–2001, p. 97). As a psychological concept, creativity
has resisted unequivocal definition or clear operationa-
lisztion (Parkhurs t, 1999; Plucker et al., 2004; Runco,
2004). Most researchers agree that creativity may be
defined with regard to the terms new and useful
(Mumford, 2003). Table 1 lists some examples of the
new an d useful approach to defining creativity. How-
ever, recent research has indicated that, in many cases,
peer-reviewed creativity studies do not provide a defi-
nition of the construct (Plucker et al., 2004).
Alongside the growing consensus behind the new and
useful definition of creativity, there is also concurrence
regarding the areas to which definitions have been
attributed. Rhodes (1961=1987) suggested that defini-
tions relate to four areas: the person(s) who creates,
the cognitive processes involved in the creation of ideas,
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the press or environmental influences, and lastly the
product that results from creative activity. This 4Ps
approach appears to have gained relatively wide consen-
sus (Runco, 2004). How researchers interpret the new
and useful definition of creativity will determine how
they assess the construct. For example, if usefulness is
taken to mean utility for society as a whole, then how
creativity is measured and what populations may be
sampled is very different from the researcher who sees
usefulness as relating only to the experiment or study
at hand. Those researchers who emphasize the impor-
tance of social appraisal or ecologically valid appraisals
of the novelty and utility of a creative person or product
will be inclined to measure the construct using raters or
judges.
Those who emphasize a person-centered view of
creativity will probably assess creativity with reference
to trait attributes, like intelligence or personality (e.g.,
Eysenck, 1993; Guilford, 1950). Those who emphasize
a process-centered view will probably assess creativity
with reference to problem-solving (e.g., Finke et al.,
1992; Mednick, 1962). Those who emphasize the role
of the environment will focus on the climate for creativ-
ity (Amabile, 1996; Dul & Ceylan, 2011). However, the
dominant definition of the moment is the new and usefu l
product-oriented approach: ‘‘Over the course of the last
decade, howeve r, we seem to have reached a general
agreement that creativity involves the production of
novel, useful products’’ (Mumford, 2003, p. 107).
1
This
indicates that advocates of this approach will look to
define creativity in terms of the outputs or products of
an individual. Then, by proxy, the person who produced
the novel and useful product will be deemed creative.
In addition, the 4Ps approach indicates that assess-
ments of creativity may be broad; incorporating not
only an assessment of product, but also the characteris-
tics of the person, the press and the processes required
for creativity. Therefore, it may be hypothesised that
these different approaches have led to multicomponen-
tial models and thus measures of creativity, whereby
the person, process, product, and press are considered
in addition to the importance of social appraisal.
In summary, it has been suggested that the concep-
tion of creativity as new and useful and the 4Ps approach
already influences how researchers define and measure
the construct. It may be argued that it is now time for
these concepts to be drawn together into a systematic
model.
PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO THE
ASSESSMENT OF CREATIVITY
In the same way that it may be contended that the his-
torical background to the understanding of creativity
impacts upon the way it is measur ed, so too may the
research background. In addition, a number of different
creativity researchers have attempted to taxonomize the
ways in which creativity may be assessed. Therefore, a
few early monumental creativity research efforts are
briefly introduced here, before a consideration of differ-
ent taxonomies of creativity measurement.
Galton, Terman, and Hargreaves
Francis Galton conducted early historiometric analyses
of eminence, genius, and ‘‘productive creators.’’ In his
book Hereditary Genius (1869=1962), Galton sought to
examine the extent to which eminence or genius could
be ‘‘passed down’’ through the generations. Genius
was assessed with reference to rated social achievement
TABLE 1
Selected Definitions of Creativity
Plucker, Beghetto, and Dow
(2004, p. 90)
‘‘Creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process and environment by which an individual or group produces a
perceptible product that is both novel and useful as defined within a social context.’’
Mumford (2003, p. 110) ‘‘Over the course of the last decade, however, we seem to have reached a general agreement that creativity involves
the production of novel, useful products’’
Sternberg and Lubart
(1999, p. 3)
‘‘Creativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful,
adaptive concerning task constraints)’’
Simonton (1999, pp. 5–6) ‘‘. . . creativity must entail the following two separate components. First a creative idea or product must be
original ...However, to provide a meaningful criterion, originality must be defined with respect to a particular
sociocultural group. What may be original with respect to one culture may be old news to the members of some
other culture ...Second, the original idea or product must prove adaptive in some sense. The exact nature of this
criterion depends on the type of creativity being displayed’’
Feist (1998, p. 290) ‘‘Creative thought or behaviour must be both novel-original and useful-adaptive’’
Ochse (1990, p. 2) Bringing something into being that is Original (new, unusual, novel, unexpected) and also Valuable (useful, good,
adaptive, appropriate).
Barron (1955, p. 553) ‘‘ ...if a response is to be called original ...it must be to some extent adaptive to reality’’
1
Unfortunately, many of the tests or assessments of creativity do
not assess creative potential using novelty and utility as criteria (e.g.,
Remote Associates Test; Mednick & Mednick, 1967; and the
Barron-Welsh Art Scale; Welsh & Barron, 1963).
MEASUREMENT OF CREATIVITY
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based upon surveys of biographical dictionaries. The
significant legacy of Galton’s research was the use of rat-
ings of creativity from archival sources. Another impor-
tant research stream was the Genetic Studies of Genius
conducted by Lewis Terman and associates at Stanfor d
University (e.g., Terman & Oden, 1959). In a study
initiated in the 1920s, some 1,600 high-IQ schoolchil-
dren taken from a sample of a quarter of a million were
followed to examine the relationship between intellect
and real-world a chievement. The legacy of the approach
taken by the Terman group is that objective measures of
traits can be applied to rated achievement. Although the
investigations of Galton and Terman and colleagues had
operationalized creativity in terms of ratings of social
achievements, other researchers have approached
the problem of creativity measurement through the use
of objective tests. Following on from the work of
Spearman (1904), Hargreaves (1927) in his studies of
The Faculty of Imagination was able to isolate a factor
of intelligence that corresponded with fluent ideational
production, but was independent of g, or general intelli-
gence. The tests used to identify this f, or fluency factor,
called for multiple responses to objects seen in an
inkblot, completions to an incomplete picture, or the
production of long lists of words. The legacy of this
experimental work has resulted in a number of different
tests of divergent thinking (e.g., Guilford, 1967;
Torrance, 1974; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). These early
monumental studies have significantly shaped the way
in which creativity is assessed. There would appear to
have been two primary approaches; creativity derived
from ratings or judgements and creativity as a normally
distributed trait derived from scores on a test.
The Taxonomy of Creativity Research Methods
Several researchers have attempted to taxonomize the
various means by which creativity may be assessed. At
the most basic level, lists of the available measures have
been produ ced. However, some efforts have been made
to provide a framework for creativity measures.
Hocevar and Bachelor (1989) and Lubart (1994) pre-
sented taxonomies of the available measures at the time,
which consisted of eight categories: divergent thinking
(DT) tests; attitudes and interest inventories; personality
inventories; biographical inventories; ratings by peers,
teachers, and supervisors; judgments of products; rat-
ings of eminence; and self-reported creative activities.
These lists of available creativity measures are helpful,
insofar as they provide an indication of how creativity
has been and might be assessed. However, arguably
more useful are those efforts to provide some struc ture
to the way creativity measurement may be approached.
Eysenck (1996) proposed that the study of creativity
may either be viewed from the trait or achievement per-
spective. Trait measures of creativity are those for which
the distribution of scores conforms to the normal distri-
bution. Therefore, DT tests, intellige nce tests, person-
ality inventories, and creativity-specific self-report
measures would be included on the basis that, when
administered to a cohort, the scores obtained tend to
follow a normal distribution. He further subdivided trait
creativity measures into cognitive variables (e.g., intelli-
gence, knowledge, technical skills, etc.), environmental
variables (e.g., cultural factors, socioeconomic factors,
educational factors, etc.) and, last, personality variables
(internal motivation, confidence, non-conformity, etc.).
Each of these normal ly distributed trait measures are
postulated to synergistically interact to produce achieve-
ment creativity, which is not normally distributed.
Rather, achievement creativity has been demonstrated
to follow a Poissonian, J-shaped distribution (e.g.,
Lotka, 1926; Moles, 1958=1968; Price, 1963). Mumford
and Gustafson (1988) indicated that achievement mea-
sures may be based upon three different criteria: first,
overt production criteria such as number of patents
awarded; second, professional recognition criteria such
as prizes awarded for achievement in a domain; last,
social recognition criteria that would normally involve
judgements or ratings with regards to creativity awarded
by peers or experts.
Amabile (1996) suggested that there are three assess-
ment techniques for creativity measurement: first, crea-
tivity tests; second, objective analysis of products; and
last, subjective judgements. Creativity tests were con-
sidered to fall into three broad categories: personality
tests (e.g., Creative Personality Scale; Gough, 1979),
biographical inventories (e.g., the Creative Achievement
Questionnaire; Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005), and
behavioral assessments (e.g., DT tests). Objective analy-
ses of products are rarely attempted and involve an
objective method for identifying the creativity or orig-
inality of a product. An example of this is the analysis
of the relationship between the fame of a melody and
the level of originality of the ope ning six notes of each
melody (Simonton, 1980). The last category of creativity
measurement suggested by Amabile was subjective jud-
gements. The subjective judgment of creativity was
further subdivided into the judgment of people or
products. Judgments of people are common (e.g.,
Cox, 1926; Galton, 1869=1962), as is the product judg-
ment paradigm (e.g., Amabile, 1982; Getzels &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1976).
The taxonomic efforts of Eysenck (1996) and
Amabile (1996) together provide a relatively broad
coverage of the creativity construct. Eysenck noted the
importance of a complex interaction between person
and environment. Amabile highlighted the importance
of ecologically valid measures of creativity. It may be
postulated that the next stage for the taxonom y of
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creativity measurement involves the concatenation of
these two approaches. Future efforts to explain how
creativity may be measured need to take account of mul-
ticomponent perspectives, as well as the role of social
appraisal.
A NEW HEURISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR
CREATIVITY MEASUREMENT
The remainder of this article is concerned with the pro-
vision of a brief introduction of a new heuristic frame-
work for creativi ty measurement and some succinct
examples of how the framework can be applied. The
framework, which is presented in Figure 1,
2
draws upon
and synthesises some of the previous efforts to taxono-
mize available measures of creativity. Last, the implica-
tions of this taxonomic framework for the study of
creativity are presented.
The taxonomic framework for measuring creativity
to be presented here takes the form of a
three-dimensional matrix. Upon one axis lies the level
at which creativity may be measured. Upon another axis
lies the facet of creativity that may be assessed. The last
axis concerns the measurement approach. The similarity
of the new heuristic framework for creativity measure-
ment to the Guilfordian (1967) representation of intelli-
gence is clear. However, the similarity between the two
models lies only at the visual level.
Level
The level of creativity to be assessed is concerned with
who is to be the focal point of analysis. This is broken
down into four categories: the individual, the team,
the organ ization, and the culture. In practice, the indi-
vidual has proven to be the primary focus for study.
However, the creativity of teams may be examined
(Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006; Thompson & Choi, 2006) as
can the creativity of organizations (Nayak, 2008). This
last point is, perhaps, a little moot. The creativity of
an organization is often seen to be the aggregate of indi-
vidual creativity scores. An extension of organizational
creativity studies would involv e comparison and con-
trast of the aggregated creativity scores of individuals
in different divisions or companies within the same glo-
bal corporation. The greatest level of abstraction from
the individual involves the analysis of cultural differ-
ences in approaches toward creativity (Williams &
McGuire, 2010). It is important to note that, although
the creativity of an individual or team might be exam-
ined, the label creative could only be applied with refer-
ence to some other information. For example, an
individual (or team ) could be rated as to whether they
are perceived to be creative, or more likely their output
or products would be examined. Therefore, to undertake
an assessment of the creativity within a level (person,
team, etc.), reference must be made to the facet of crea-
tivity referred to (process utilised, product generated,
etc.), as well as the measurement approach adopted
(ratings, objective test, etc.).
Facet
The facet of creativity to be assessed is concerned with
what is to be analysed. This is br oken down into four
categories approximately corresponding to the 4Ps
approach; trait (person), process, press, and product.
The trai t approach involves the analysis of the char-
acteristics of the focus for study (e.g., what are the char-
acteristics of the person or team being investigated? Is=
are they intelligent, extraverted, aggressive, conscien-
tious? etc.). The process approach involves the analysis
of the means by which creativity is produced (e.g.,
how does the team inter act and share knowledge?
How much time does the team spend on different
aspects of decision-making? etc.). The press approach
involves the analysis of the environment in which the
focal point of analysis operate s (e.g ., what is the climate
in the organization like for team creativity?). Last, the
product approach involves an analysis of the product
to emanate from the efforts of the focus of the study
(e.g., how creative is the product=idea created by the
team?).
The trait approach to creativity measurement
(especially of the individual) has been the dominant
paradigm adopted by most creativity researchers. This
is understandable, given that in pragmatic terms the
aim of creativity studies has often been to identify the
most creative people or teams to improve society’s lot
(Albert & Runco, 1999; Guilford, 1950; Toynbee,
FIGURE 1 A graphical representation of the new heuristic frame-
work for creativity measurement.
2
It is important to note that the framework presented is a heuristic,
rather than an exact representation of how creativity can be assessed.
MEASUREMENT OF CREATIVITY
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1964). Typically, researchers have examined intellectual
or personality traits (Batey, Chamorro-Premuzic, &
Furnham, 2009, 2010; Batey, Furnham, & Safiullina,
2010; Furnham, Crump, Batey, & Chamorro-Premuzic,
2009) with more recent attention paid to subclinical psy-
chopathologies such as schizotypy (Batey & Furnham,
2008) and hypomania (Furnham, Batey, Anand, &
Manfield, 2008).
The process approach to creativity measurement
(again predominantly within individuals, but also popu-
lar in team creativity research) has been investigated to
elucidate the processes by which creative products are
produced (Finke et al., 1992). In pragmatic terms, such
research has often been undertaken to ascertain whether
creative thinking processes may be taught or encouraged.
The product approach to creativity assessment has
traditionally focussed on ratings or assessment of
products (Amabile, 1996), production criteria like
professional recognition awards or publications (Dewett
& Denisi, 2004), or suggestions made to improvement
schemes (Oldham & Cummings, 1996). Sternber g,
Kaufman, and Pretz (2002) developed a taxonomic
model that examined how different creative products
impact upon domains. At the broadest level, products
or creative contributions can accept existing paradigms
and extend them, reject paradigms and attempt to
replace them, or synthesize paradigms.
All creative people, processes, or products must be
both created within and evaluated by the prevailing
environment. The environment may be assessed in term s
of the sociocultural milieu (e.g., the Dark Ages vs. the
Renaissance), the immediate working=impacting
environment (usually the classroom, laboratory or
organization) or the characteristics of certa in individuals
within the environment (e.g., foreman, leader, teacher,
etc.). Additionally, the environment may be perceived
as a source of stimulation (Dodds, Smith, & Ward,
2002; Moss, 2002) and also evaluation (Csikszentmihalyi,
1999). In reality, the analysis of trait, process , or product
needs to also consider who is being assessed, by whom,
and using what methodology.
The configuration of the facets of creativity seems to
indicate that each of these four categories or facets is
independent. This approach is beneficial with regard to
measurement. However, the four facets are highly inter-
related. It may be contended that processes occur within
a person or persons to produce a product. This whole
process unfolds within the creative press such that it
may suggested that: Person ! Process ! Press ¼ Product.
This conceptualization of creativity as the synergy of
the 4Ps indicates that, although a single facet of creativ-
ity may be investigated (e.g., process), no single facet
exists without relation to other facets of creativity. A
product cannot be created without reference to a person
who utilizes cognitive processes within an environment.
Further, a person cannot be considered creative without
reference to some product, which, in turn, has resulted
from cognitive processes that unfolded within a specific
environment. If this contention is taken to be true, it
indicates that any comprehensive analysis of creat ivity
must be multi-componential.
Measurement Approach
The measurement approach with regards to creativity
concerns how creativity is to be assessed. Measurement
may be made objectively (e.g., hard data).
3
Within the
context of the investigation of an individual, this might
take the form of an analysis of the number of patents
awarded to an individual for innovat ive products or
the number of gallery showings for an artist. A subjec-
tive measure may be taken from the focal point of analy-
sis (e.g., an individual, team, etc.). In the context of the
investigation of an individual, this would involve scores
on a self-rating of creativity. For a team, this might be
measured using a team creativity questionnaire or aggre-
gated ratings of the perceived creativity of the team pro-
vided by individual team members. Last, measurement
may be made subjectively and externally to the focal
point of analysis (e.g., subject matter experts, judges,
etc.). In the context of the analysis of the creativity of
an individual, this might take the form of ratings of
the creativity of the individual provided by a teacher.
With regard to culture, the creativity of a sociocultural
group such as the Aztecs could be rated by subject
matter experts.
The most common forms of assessment have usually
involved objective measures of creativity, such as asking
an individual to produce a number of ideas to a stimulus
question and self-reported measures of creativity, such as
providing a list of achievements. The alternative to the
creator or creators providing an assessment of their crea-
tivity is to gather perceptions from those outside the cre-
ation process. Some commentators have argued that this
is the only viable form of creativity assessment given the
social nature of creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1996, Csikszent-
mihalyi, 1999). If creativity involves the social recog-
nition of a novel and valuable idea or product, then
society must be asked its opinion of the creation. Typi-
cally, the assessment of others takes the form of person
or persons who are conversant with the creative product
and=or the creator (peers, team members, teachers,
3
The types of data considered to be objective are likely to be open
to considerable debate. In particular, it may be argued that personality
inventory data are objective, in that a personality inventory is
‘‘independent of the subjective judgment of the particular examiner’’
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997, p. 7). However, the data are still based on
self-report.
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tutors, managers, etc.). An alternative is to ask for
subject matter expert opinion (e.g., MacKinnon,
1965). However, there are serious cons iderations in
these social recognition criteria. If asse ssment is to
be made by peers or those fam iliar with the person
or product, then judgments may be open to significant
biases. In addition, often, the great creativity of indivi-
duals remains unrecognized in their lifetime (e.g., Van
Gogh) and s ubject matter experts can often be wrong.
Similarly, within the cr eativity research tradition,
Csikszentmihalyi (1999) argued that gatekeepers may
not all ow creative ideas to be registered within a
domain, with the result that an idea may be high ly
creative but not yet recognized by the relevant
community.
In summary, a new heuristic model has been pre-
sented that takes into account the who or level of analy-
sis (individual, team, organization, or culture), the what
or facet (trait, process, press, or product) and also the
how or measurement approach (objective, self-rated,
or other-rat ed).
Using the New Heuristic Framework for Creativity
Measurement to Examine Measures of Individual
Creativity
To illustrate how the new heuristic framework for crea-
tivity measurement can be adopted, some of the poten-
tial measurement methods for examining the creativity
of an individual are presented. Table 2 lists examples
of the measures that could be used to assess individual
creativity using object ive, self-ratings, and other-ratings.
The examples in Table 2 are subsequently related to
Figures 2, 3, and 4. In each case, only one example is
provided, as there is insufficient space here to examine
possible permutations of the heuristic framework.
Objective measures. Figure 2 illustrates the areas of
the framework that relate to objectively measured crea-
tivity with regards to an individual.
Within the confines of considering objective individ-
ual trait measures, researchers have examined intellect,
TABLE 2
Potential Objective, Self-Rated and Other-Rated Measures of Individual Creativity
Level Facet Measurement Approach Potential Measure
Individual Trait Objective Divergent thinking test scored for fluency
a
Individual Process Objective Time spent considering the solution to a problem
Individual Press Objective Level of noise in room during creation
Individual Product Objective Number of patents awarded
Individual Trait Self-rated Self-rating of perceived personal creativity
Individual Process Self-rated Self-rating of the extent to which the individual perceives they combine diverse ideas
Individual Press Self-rated Self-rating of perceived threat of evaluation in the environment
Individual Product Self-rated Self-rating of the creativity of a product
Individual Trait Other-rated Expert rating of the creativity of an individual
Individual Process Other-rated Expert rating of the amount of time the individual spends problem-solving
Individual Press Other-rated Expert rating of the suitability of an environment for creativity
Individual Product Other-rated Expert rating of the creativity of a product produced by an individual
a
A fluency score is calculated by counting the number of responses provided to an open-ended question. An example being the questions posed by
Hargreaves (1927).
FIGURE 2 The new heuristic framework for creativity measurement:
Objective measures of individual creativity.
FIGURE 3 The new heuristic framework for creativity measurement:
Self-rated measures of individual creativity.
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personality, and motivation (cf. Batey & Furnham, 2006
for a revie w) in addition to other proposed measures of
creativity like the Remote Associates Test (Mednick &
Mednick, 1967) or the Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Welsh
& Barron, 1963). Latterly, researchers have begun to
examine biological trait measures (e.g., Reuter et al.,
2005).
Self-rated measures. Figure 3 illustrates the areas
of the framework that relate to self-rated measures of
creativity with regards to an individual.
In practice, the use of self-ratings of creativity has
been popular (Furnham et al., 2008), as have measur es
that assess perceived environmental characteristics
(Amabile & Gryskiewicz, 1989). In a recent study, Silvia
(2008) examined the extent to which people could recog-
nize creativity in their own ideas.
Other-rated measures. Figure 4 illustrates the areas
of the framework that relate to other-rated measures of
creativity with regards to an individual.
The other-ratings paradigm has been popular in crea-
tivity research. The provision of expert ratings of an indi-
vidual has been common (e.g., Cox, 1922; Mackinnon,
1965). Researchers have provided ratings of the creative
process (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976) and the use
of expert ratings of a product is the basis of most creativ-
ity product assessment tools like the Consensual Assess-
ment Technique (Amabile, 1982).
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
OF THE HEURISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR
CREATIVITY MEASUREMENT
Although creativity has been viewed as essential for the
progress of society and deemed to be an important area
for scientific study, commentators have argued that
research in the area is highly fragmented (Glo ver et al.,
1989) and underrepresented in the academic literature
(Guilford, 1950; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). It may be
argued that although there is a necessary and encour-
aging diversity of research approaches, the lack of a con-
sensual definition of creativity has led to a multitude of
measurement approaches, which, in turn, has hampered
synthesis of the findings of creativity research. In this
article, it has been posited that there is now definitional
consensus, in the form of an acceptance of the new and
useful and 4Ps approaches (Mumford, 2003; Runco,
2004). Taking this consensus in addition to the taxo-
nomic approaches of Eysenck (1996), who proposed a
distinction between trait and achievement measures of
creativity, and Amabile (1996), who preferred a distinc-
tion based upon creativity tests, objective product analy-
ses and subjective analyses, a new heuristic framework
for creativity measurement has been presented.
The new heuristic framework for creativity measure-
ment assumes the form of a 4 ! 4 ! 3 matrix. Creativity
may be assessed with reference to level (individual, team,
organization, and culture), facet (trait, process, press,
and product) and measurement approach (objective,
self-ratings, and other-ratings). Effectively, this suggests
at least 48 different means of assessing the creativity con-
struct. For example, the trait creativity of an individual
may be measured objectively using a DT test scored for
fluency; the processes of team creativity may be assessed
by self-ratings (provided by the team members); the
environmental press impinging upon organisational crea-
tivity might be evaluated by judges; similarly, the creative
products or artifacts created by an entire culture (e.g., the
Romans) might also be judged by subject matter experts.
Defining and elucidating the methods by which crea-
tivity may be studied scientifically has proven problem-
atic (Batey & Furnham, 2006; Plucker et al., 2004;
Runco, 2004). Therefore, any new model that attempts
to do this will also be susceptible to limitations. There
are a number of limitations of the new heuristic model.
First, it may be argued that although researchers have
begun to converge on a consensus definition (Mumford,
2003; Plucker et al., 2004), there is yet to be universal
agreement. Second, there are issues around the ortho-
gonality of the categories within the levels (person, team,
etc.), facets (trait, process, press and product) and
measurement approaches (objective, self-rated and other
rated). When, for example, does a large work team end
and an organizational unit start? Equally, as previously
mentioned, no product exists without a person or per-
sons utilizing a process within an environment. Within
the same theme, it is difficult to ascertain whether a
personality inventory is an objective measure (as it is
standardized) or whether it is a self-report measure.
However, the issue of objectivity versus subjectivity
besets all of the behavioral sciences and not just the field
of creativity. Fourth, there remains an issue as to the
FIGURE 4 The new heuristic framework for creativity measurement:
Other-rated measures of individual creativity.
62 BATEY
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extent to which every box within the model can be exam-
ined or whether such an exercise would be desirable. For
example, it might prove difficult to provide an objective
measure of the processes involved in the creativity of an
ancient culture. This issue is mitigated to a degree in that
the model presented here is heuristic, rather than exact.
Perhaps the biggest potential limitation or criticism
of the new heuristic model is that creativity cannot be
located in the model per se. Rather, creativity may be
inferred by the intersection of the relevant parts of the
matrix. For example, a rating of the product of an indi-
vidual by a subject matter expert is not creativity. Simi-
larly, a high score on a test of divergent thinking or a
large number of awarded patents is not creat ivity. At
first glance, this issue might seem to provide a serious
challenge to the utility of the new heuristic framework.
However, within the literature, it is not uncommon to
find researchers who argue that creativity resides in the
juncture between different factors (Csikszentmihalyi,
1999). Csikszentmihalyi suggested that creativity can
be found in the interplay between an individual, the
field, and the domain. Within this heuristic model, the
methods of assessment that might be employed within
each box are effectively predictors or proxy measures
of creativity. Indeed, it may be argued that because crea-
tivity involves the confluence of the 4Ps that results in a
product that is perceived to be new and useful by some
external group, that there can never be a single measure
of creativity. Rather, researchers examine proximal con-
structs that have been found to relate to creativity from
traits (e.g., intelligence, personality, etc.), process es (e.g.,
incubation, time spent considering an object, etc.), the
environmental press (e.g., the behaviour of others, orga-
nizational culture, etc.) to the prod uct deemed creative
itself (e.g., experimentally induced products like pictures
and poems to rated works of a domain-changing nature
like the theory of evolution by natural selection). This
very diversity of potential methods of measurement, it
may be contended, has given rise to difficulty in assimi-
lating and condensing the results of the multitude of
creativity studies. However, for the same reason, it indi-
cates why the field requires a parsimonious model with
which to make sense of the body of research.
There are also a number of implications and benefits
that arise from the new heuristic model. Researchers
have called for comprehensive definitions and measure-
ment taxonomies (Batey & Furnham, 2006; Plucker
et al., 2004) so that the field may advance. The new heu-
ristic framework provides evidence that a consensual
definition can be drawn from the literature and related
to common methods of understanding how creativity
may be measured (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Eysenck, 1996;
Rhodes 1961=1987). Further, the model is effectively
the synthesis of existing research, which, as a result,
should ensure that the concepts introduced wi ll fit neatly
with the existing practices and knowledge of creativity
researchers. In fact, it may be contended that researchers
need not change how they conduct research, but they
now have a comprehensive taxonomic framework within
which to locate their investigations. Given that the
dominant models for explaining creativity are multicom-
ponential (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Eysenck, 1993; Mumford
& Gustafson, 1988; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999;
Woodman & Schoenfeldt, 1989), the new heuristic frame-
work for creativity measurement provides a structure for
understanding these multicomponent approaches and
perhaps the opportunity to synthesise these various mod-
els. In time, by providing a heuristic that enables diverse
strands of resear ch to be organized and understood, this
new framework can have a significant impact upon the
understanding of previous research efforts, and also form
a template from which meta-analyses and structural
equation models can be derived.
The use of the heuristic framework might prove
valuable in that it can illustrate areas of research that
relate to creativity that have yet to be explored. In doing
so, it may help promulgate new research, but within the
auspices of a heuristic that helps make sense of the new
research findings. This last point is particularly impor-
tant. This article has presented evidence that the con-
struct of creativity is extremely broad, ranging from
individuals to cultures, from traits to products and with
measurement methods that range from objective to sub-
jective. This range is necessary and also encouraging,
but the very diversity of potential methods of measure-
ment, it may be contended, has given rise to difficulty
in assimilating and condensing the results of the multi-
tude of creativity studi es. The heuristic framework for
creativity measurement could pr ovide a structure to
follow to conduct these analyses.
Creativity is of undeniable importance, yet has lagged
behind similar research streams like intelligence
(Stenberg & Lubart, 1999). If the lack of definitional con-
sensus and clarity of measur ement methods has obfus-
cated and hampered creativity research, it may be that
the new heuristic framework for creat ivity measurement
can help structure this important field of research.
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