When police should say “no!” to gratuities

Full text

Winter/Spring 2004
E X C H A N G E
Police Gratuities
Police Gratuities / 33
STEPHEN COLEMAN
The issue of police acceptance of gratuities has long been
a source of contention. Many writers on police corrup- tion see the acceptance of even the smallest gift or benefit
as the beginning of the end of an honest officer’s career.
Others suggest that the acceptance of gratuities does
little harm, and that there may in fact be positive benefits
in the practice, not just for the officer involved, but for
society as a whole. In this paper I examine the practice of
accepting gratuities in order to highlight some particular
When Police Should Say “No!” to Gratuities
Stephen Coleman is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Applied
Philosophy and Public Ethics and Lecturer in the School of
Policing Studies, Charles Sturt University, Australia.
The law enforcement officer, representing government, bears the heavy responsibility of maintaining, in his own
conduct, the honor and integrity of all government institutions. He shall, therefore, guard against placing himself in a
position in which any person can expect special consideration or in which the public can reasonably assume that special
consideration is being given. Thus, he should be firm in refusing gifts, favors, or gratuities, large or small, which can,
in the public mind, be interpreted as capable of influencing his judgment in the discharge of his duties.1
In 1988 Criminal Justice Ethics published Richard Kania’s
provocative paper “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’
to Gratuities?”1 An ex-law enforcement officer and now
criminal justice professor, Kania swam against the
conventional wisdom (though probably not conventional
practice) concerning police gratuities. He offered an
account of the moral ambiguity of gratuities that helped
to explain the “disconnect” between police leadership
and frequent police practice.
His paper, frequently reprinted in student course
packs and popular anthologies,2 continues to attract
discussion. The editors of Criminal Justice Ethics recently
received two responses to Kania’s essay, and invited
Richard Kania to reflect on the issues fifteen years after its
initial publication. We are grateful for his doing so. The
initial respondents have graciously followed up.
JOHN KLEINIG
Introduction
NOTES
1 Richard R. E. Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’
to Gratuities?” Criminal Justice Ethics 7 no. 2 ( 1988): 37-49.
2 The essay is reprinted in full or part in Morality in Criminal
Justice, ed. Daryl Close and Nicholas Meier (Wadsworth Pub-
lishing Company, 1995); Police Misconduct: A Reader for the 21st
Century, ed. Michael J. Palmiotto (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 2001); and Joycelyn Pollock, Ethics in Crime and
Justice, 4th edn 2004 (Belmont, CA: Thompson/Wadsworth,
2004).

Criminal Justice Ethics
situations in which their acceptance will always cause
problems, and thus to draw attention to those situations
in which police ought to say “No!”
It is not my intention to provide an exhaustive
investigation of the practice of accepting gratuities, or to
describe every situation in which gratuities ought to be
refused. My intention, rather, is to draw attention to those
types of situations in which the acceptance of gratuities
will inevitably lead to problems of one sort or another. I
also recognize that in an ideal world there would be no
need to question what sorts of gratuities ought to be
refused, and what sorts accepted, for an ideal world
would have no need of such transactions. But given that
we live in a world in which such transactions are valued
by both giver and receiver, it seems to me that it is
necessary to seek some solution to this problem—a
solution that recognizes that value, while at the same
time avoids the problems that the acceptance of gratuities
can cause.
In order to clarify the issues and problems involved, I
begin with an overview of the main theoretical positions
on the acceptance of gratuities canvassing the main ar-
guments opposing the acceptance of gratuities, and the
arguments in favor of their acceptance. It should be noted
though that wherever I speak of “gratuities,” this term
can also be taken to include other discounts, gifts, and
benefits offered to police.
I Why Police Should Not Accept Gratuities
(1) The slippery slope to corruption
Police corruption is undeniably a serious problem. Some
police departments have become so riddled with corrup-
tion that the public comes to see every police officer as
bent. Many writers have suggested that the first step
toward a police officer becoming corrupt is the accep-
tance of gratuities.
2
Lawrence Sherman, for example, sug-
gests that there is “a continuum of graft stages”
3
from the
acceptance of gratuities, to the acceptance of bribes in
relation to such things as bar-closing hours, to the accep-
tance of payoffs from gamblers and prostitutes, to even-
tual involvement in narcotics. He sees both the police
officer who accepts a free cup of coffee and the police
officer who is involved in drug dealing as corrupt—it is
only a matter of the degree of corruption involved. This
slide into serious corruption is seen by Sherman and
many others as a “slippery slope.” Once an officer is on
the slope, the slide into serious corruption is, if not inevi-
table, at the very least difficult to stop.
John Kleinig points out that there are at least two
different types of slippery slope arguments used when
asserting that the acceptance of gratuities will lead to
corruption, and both of these types of arguments can be
employed in a variety of different ways.
4
The two main
types are the logical slope, and the psychological slope,
and it is worth taking the time to distinguish the two.
Logical slippery slopes exist when there are no clearly
defined boundaries that can be used to draw distinc-
tions between different cases, and thus any line drawn
in the sand between two extremes will have some degree
of arbitrariness about it. Suppose that a particular com-
pany allows its employees to accept “small” gifts from
prospective suppliers. How should “small” be defined
in those circumstances? Clearly a gift that has no mon-
etary value would be acceptable, and an expensive piece
of jewelry would be unacceptable, but there exists a large
gray area in between in which the acceptability or
unacceptability of a gift is not so clear.
In relation to police acceptance of gratuities, it could
be argued that although there seems to be a big difference
between accepting a cup of coffee and accepting a six-
figure bribe to look the other way while a murder is
carried out, this is not really the case. For there is a logical
slippery slope here, given that there is only a small differ-
ence between accepting a cup of coffee, and accepting a
cup of coffee and a doughnut, and only a small differ-
ence between accepting a cup of coffee and a doughnut,
and accepting a free meal, and only a small difference
between that and a gift, and another small difference to
accepting a large gift and another small difference to
accepting . . . a whopping great suitcase full of cash in
small denomination, unmarked, non-sequential bills.
Thus it could be argued that since there is no clear bound-
ary between accepting a cup of coffee and accepting the
suitcase of cash, one ought not to accept the cup of coffee.
As Kleinig points out, arguments like this ignore the fact
that while the differences between the individual stages
may be insignificant, they have a cumulative signifi-
cance.
5
This makes the difference between a cup of coffee
and a suitcase full of cash significant, even if we cannot
say for sure at what point between them the line between
acceptability and non-acceptability is crossed. If a man
is bald when he has one hair, and when he has two
hairs, and when he has three hairs . . . this does not mean
Stephen Coleman / 34

Winter/Spring 2004
that he is still bald when he has ten thousand hairs. We
may not be able to say with certainty when he is no
longer bald, but we can say that a man with ten thou-
sand hairs is not.
Another way of applying the logical slippery slope is
to suggest that though the acceptance of a gratuity by a
police officer is not a serious wrong, it is nonetheless
wrong. Thus the only difference between a police officer
who accepts a cup of coffee and a police officer who
accepts a thousand-dollar bribe is the degree of wrong-
ness involved. The suggestion is that by accepting the
small gratuity, a police officer has shown a willingness
to be corrupted, and has thus removed any logical rea-
son for objecting to more serious practices. The only is-
sue that remains to be settled is the length to which the
officer will allow him- or herself to be corrupted. How-
ever, there seems to be a flaw in this argument as well.
There is only a difference in the degree of corruptibility
between the police officer who accepts a cup of coffee
and the police officer who accepts a suitcase full of cash.
But there is only a difference in the degree of hairiness
between the man with one hair and the man with ten
thousand hairs, and we have seen that there is an impor-
tant difference between them, for one is bald and the
other is not. If the analogy between baldness and cor-
ruptibility holds, then it would seem that though one of
the police officers is certainly corrupt, there is at least the
possibility that the other may not be, for if one hair does
not make a man hairy, then one cup of coffee may not
make a police officer corrupt.
Psychological slippery slopes are slopes that do have
boundaries between cases, unlike logical slippery slopes.
However, psychological slippery slopes are based on the
proposition that human beings have a tendency to ex-
tend boundaries, and if an absolute proposition is con-
verted to one that is any way flexible, then, human na-
ture, being what it is, will extend that flexibility to its
absolute limits.
The application of this type of slippery slope argu-
ment to the issue of police corruption is fairly obvious. If
certain practices at the “top” of the slope are allowed
(such as the acceptance of the free cup of coffee), there
will be a tendency for police officers to go on to other less
acceptable practices as they slide down the slope, until
eventually police officers engage in wholesale extortion,
burglary, and drug dealing. Perhaps the most significant
difference between this type of argument and the logical
slippery slope argument is that the proponents of this
type of argument do not have to concede the dubious
point that the practices at the top of the slope are in
themselves unacceptable. All that is necessary is to show
that allowing such practices has a tendency to lead to
other more unacceptable practices. Nor is it necessary for
proponents of this type of argument to suggest that ev-
eryone will slide to the bottom of the slope. If only a few
police officers slide into serious corruption, then, given
the seriousness of this problem for the police force as a
whole, this would be enough to justify banning practices
at the top of the slope.
However, there is an empirical question that needs to
be answered here. Does the acceptance of minor gratu-
ities lead to more serious corruption, at least in some
cases? Sherman certainly thinks so, and his analysis has
some anecdotal support in the writings of corrupt police
who have told the story of their decline.
6
Other writers
are more dubious. Michael Feldberg, for example, sug-
gests that the argument that gratuities lead to corruption
is similar to the argument that marijuana use leads to
heroin/cocaine addiction.
7
He points out that most po-
lice are experienced in the arts of inducement and decep-
tion, and can tell the difference between a harmless gra-
tuity and open bribery.
8
But though this may be true, it
does not show Sherman’s assertion to be false. It does not
mean that, because one can tell the difference between a
gratuity and a bribe, one will not accept the bribe when it
is offered.
When Police Should Say ‘No’ to Gratuities / 35
Banning gratuities almost certainly will
not guarantee an end to corruption.
I would suggest, however, that there are still at least
three problems with the psychological slippery slope
argument. The first is that, despite the anecdotal evi-
dence, there is no real proof that the acceptance of gratu-
ities leads to corruption. Moreover, if, as Richard Kania
suggests,
9
it is true that the acceptance of gratuities is a
social norm for police, then it should surely be no sur-
prise if the few corrupt police who have told their stories
actually engaged in the practice. I am sure that these
corrupt police officers also arrested and interviewed sus-
pects, typed reports, investigated crimes, and so forth,
but no one has ever suggested that these practices lead to
corruption.
The second problem is that even if there is a link
between the acceptance of gratuities and later corrupt
conduct, then, if one wants to prevent the later corrupt
conduct, it cannot simply be assumed that the best way
to do this is to ban the acceptance of gratuities. To speak
more generally about the situation, if one knows that X

Criminal Justice Ethics
causes Z and that Z is something that one wishes to
prevent, then it certainly does not immediately follow
that to prevent Z one should ban X, for X might also have
some positive effects that would be lost were X banned. It
might well be the case that these positive effects of X
outweigh the negatives of Z. For example, it is a known
fact that increasing the level of education of a given
community (X) will result in an increase in the suicide
rate of that community (Z).
10
Does this mean that in order
to prevent an increase in the suicide rate, we should keep
the level of education generally low? Of course not, for an
increase in the level of education produces other benefits
that tend to outweigh the increase in the suicide rate.
Now, in the case of gratuities, although the other benefits
are not so immediately obvious, this does not mean that
they do not exist. Thus if one wishes to prevent corrup-
tion, even if the acceptance of gratuities could lead to
later corrupt conduct, this does not mean that one should
immediately ban the acceptance of gratuities. A very care-
ful study of the benefits of accepting gratuities would
need to be undertaken first, lest one risk cutting off one’s
nose to spite one’s face.
One must also consider the fact that banning gratu-
ities almost certainly will not guarantee an end to cor-
ruption. This is elementary logic. In its simplest form, the
argument in favor of banning gratuities seems to be: “if
we allow gratuities, then we get corruption; therefore we
should ban gratuities, so we do not get corruption.” The
logical form of this argument would appear to be, “If A
then B, not A, therefore not B.” And as any good first-year
logic student knows, this is a common logical fallacy, the
fallacy of denying the antecedent. An obvious reply is
that banning gratuities is intended only to reduce cor-
ruption, not eliminate it. The success of such a move
would depend heavily on the extent to which the accep-
tance of gratuities does have a tendency to cause corrup-
tion, a point which, as I have noted, is yet to be ad-
equately established.
Kania implies that there is another problem with the
psychological slippery slope argument when he sug-
gests that the attitude of the recipient determines the
ethical status of accepting a gratuity.
11
If he is correct,
then it is solely the attitude of the recipient that deter-
mines the slipperiness of the slope. I shall return to this
point later.
(2)
The democratic ethos of policing
Although he does not agree with the slippery slope argu-
ment against the acceptance of gratuities, Michael
Feldberg nonetheless feels that there is a case for their
non-acceptance. His suggestion is that the acceptance of
gratuities “can be demonstrated to conflict with the just
distribution of social benefits in society.”
12
Feldberg re-
flects on the history of policing, and notes that the fore-
runners of modern police systems were actually fee-for-
service systems of policing.
13
Citizens received “only the
protection, detection, and restitution of stolen property
that they paid for directly.”
14
Feldberg had previously
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of a fee-
for-service system of policing with participants in his
U.S. seminars on law enforcement ethics (taught with
Professor Howard Cohen) and the consensus among the
participants in these seminars was that the disadvan-
tages of such a system would greatly outweigh the pos-
sible benefits.
15
The suggestion was that since police ser-
vices were a public entitlement, restricting their avail-
ability to those who could afford to pay would create a
social injustice. The feeling among the seminar partici-
pants was that, if anything, the poor needed police ser-
vices far more than the middle and upper classes, and
that the institution of a fee-for-service system would mean
that those who most required the services would least
receive them. Given that, in a democracy, public services
should be equally available to all, allowing a fee-for-
service system for policing would be “anti-democratic.”
Feldberg’s suggestion is that the acceptance of gratu-
ities parallels a fee-for-service system. Those businesses
(and they usually are businesses) that provide police
with better “gratuities” will receive a disproportionate
amount of police protection.
If, for example, Officer Smith chooses to take his dinner at
restaurant A because he is offered a discount there, then
restaurant A receives a disproportionate share of the
officer’s presence. His cruiser in the parking lot and his
uniformed presence at a table are far greater deterrents to
crime than is the general presence of police in society as a
whole. Restaurants B, C, D, and E, where the food might be
better, but the discount policy not as generous, do not
receive a similar benefit of personal police presence for
extended periods of time.16
The conclusion of the argument is that though gratuities
are not actually bribes, they are at the very least a cousin
to bribes in that “they are rewards to the officer in ex-
change for his or her willingness to perform—or not
perform—duties according to the wishes of the payer.”
17
However, Feldberg notes that small vices have small
effects, that the free coffee and discount meals that police
receive seem a minimal compensation for the risks of
police work, and that we need not begrudge them.
18
He
also notes that police have to eat somewhere, but main-
tains that police should be as democratic as possible in
the distribution of their time, both on and off duty.
Stephen Coleman / 36

Winter/Spring 2004
Feldberg’s “anti-democratic argument” is indirectly
criticized by Kania.
19
He points out that direct police
services are already unevenly distributed in society. There
are some members of society who are heavy users of
police services, and some who rarely, if ever, require
direct police presence. Although police service is extended
equally in the abstract, the reality is quite different. He
suggests that heavy users of police services feel a sense of
debt for their heavy usage, and so wish to repay this debt
to the police in some way. Hence the offering of gratu-
ities. This a point to which I will later return.
(3)
The public perception
Much of the writing on the issues of police gratuities
emphasizes the problem that gratuities cause in relation
to the public image of police, yet there have been very few
studies of the public attitude to police acceptance of gra-
tuities. Most studies examine only police attitudes to
acceptance of gratuities. A study that has surveyed the
attitude of the public to police gratuities was conducted
by Tim Prenzler and Peta Mackay, and published in
1995.
20
Their study attempted to assess the attitude of the
people of Brisbane, Australia, to the police acceptance of
gratuities.
The results of their survey were extremely interesting,
especially in light of the background to the study. Brisbane
is the capital city of the Australian state of Queensland.
Several years before the study was undertaken, the
Queensland police force was wracked by a massive cor-
ruption scandal that sparked off a Royal Commission
into police corruption in Queensland. The report of this
commission (known as the Fitzgerald Inquiry) found
evidence of massive endemic corruption in the Queens-
land police force, and made over one hundred recom-
mendations to the government of the time.
Despite this background, and the commonly imputed
link between the acceptance of gratuities and later cor-
rupt activities, Prenzler and Mackay’s 1995 study found
that only 31 percent of respondents were opposed to
police accepting gratuities in any situation.
21
However,
76 percent of respondents were opposed to police accept-
ing regular free coffee, cold drinks, or discounted meals
while on duty.
22
Probably the most significant result in
the study was found in the reasons that the respondents
gave for their non-approval of the acceptance of gratu-
ities. Fifty-nine percent said that it created the expecta-
tion that a favor or service would follow,
23
48 percent
said that they thought it made officers look as though
they were corruptible,
24
and 47 percent thought that the
acceptance of a gratuity would lead to other more serious
forms of corruption.
25
These results suggest that, at least
in the public eye, the acceptance of gratuities is the start
of a slippery slope. Prenzler and Mackay themselves
conclude that the only solution for police is to accept a
“no gratuities” code.
26
The main reason for this is that police actually need
public support if they are to carry out their duties effi-
ciently. A public perception that police are corrupt, wheth-
er or not true, will have a deleterious effect on police
performance. To avoid this problem, police need to avoid
even the appearance of corruptibility.
II Why Police Should Accept Gratuities
(1)
The building blocks of positive social relationships
Richard Kania suggests that under certain circumstances,
police in particular, and also other justice officials, ought
to be encouraged to accept gratuities. He grounds this
suggestion on the fact that most people who offer such
gratuities do not have as their purpose the corruption of
the police force, but instead feel that they owe some sort
of debt to the police, and are attempting to repay that debt
by the means that they have at their disposal. Kania
quotes the example of a short order cook who provided
him with a free meal.
27
This cook felt a sense of indebted-
ness to the police for the security they brought by fre-
quent visits to his establishment. Although this was a
service that the police were routinely obligated to pro-
vide, this did not detract from the personal indebtedness
that the cook felt. His response was a personal one: a free
meal.
As I mentioned before, police services are not distrib-
uted equally. Some citizens are heavier users than oth-
ers, and Kania suggests that it is generally the heavier
users of police services who offer gratuities to police. In
general, the intention of the offers is not to induce police
to later corruption, but to thank police for the task that
they have already done. Kania suggests that an analogy
with tipping is appropriate.
28
He suggests that tip recipi-
ents recognize that they are being tipped for services
already rendered, and that neither the tipper nor the
tipped feel any future obligation from the transaction.
The gratuities that are offered to police in these sorts of
situations should be seen as tokens of an ongoing legal
When Police Should Say ‘No’ to Gratuities / 37

Criminal Justice Ethics
and ethical relationship, suggests Kania, and they should
be accepted by police “as the building blocks of positive
social relationships between our police and the pub-
lic.”
29
When gifts or gratuities are offered in these sorts of
situations, in which the intention of the giver is only to
thank the police for the services already provided, and
the intention of the recipient is merely to build up good
relations between the public and the police, Kania thinks
there is no ethical problem with the acceptance of gratu-
ities. It is only in situations in which the provider of the
gratuity is attempting to build up a “credit” for future
use that such transactions are problematic. Even in those
situations, Kania believes that it is ethical for the police
to accept the gratuities provided that they are not received
in that way, but rather are received as expressions of
gratitude. He suggests that “the perception of the recipi-
ent toward the exchange is more critical than that of the
giver in the categorization of an exchange as ethical or
unethical.”
30
If the gratuities do not alter the way in
which police officers carry out their duty, then it is ethi-
cal for officers to receive gratuities. Gratuities accepted in
this way are merely the building blocks of good social
relations between the police and those with whom they
have regular contact.
I would suggest that there are problems with Kania’s
interpretation here, especially with regard to his “tip-
ping” analogy. The first problem is that people who
routinely receive tips come to expect those tips, and in
some cases even demand them. Seeing police gratuities
as “tips” will inevitably lead to trouble, a problem that
Kania does not fully recognize. When discussing the
problems that can be caused if an officer misinterprets an
offer from a merchant, Kania mentions the following
case:
Having become accustomed to free meals at one restaurant,
an officer returned there some time after being assigned to
another beat. The bill for the full price was presented, and
the officer did not have sufficient cash to pay. He had to
summon another officer there to help him out with the
payment. What he had been taking as a “gratuity” or “gift”
had been an “investment” that the manager no longer had
to keep up.31
Although Kania appears to think that the biggest prob-
lem in this story is the officer’s misinterpretation of the
restaurant’s offer, I am equally worried about the officer
expecting the gratuity, to the extent that he did not have
the money to pay. What “debt repayment” arrangement
might have been arrived at if there had not been another
officer present who could assist with payment of the bill?
I would suggest that it is situations like this that are
likely to lead to corruption.
The second problem with the tipping analogy is the
suggestion that there is no future orientation in the ex-
change. This is not always the case. If I give you a gener-
ous tip for example, I may well expect better than average
service from you in the future. Even if the tip is not
generous, I may feel that a certain level of tipping is
required to ensure that I receive even adequate service in
the future. Both of these seem to be problems if the anal-
ogy is applied to policing. If someone tips the police
generously, it is likely that he or she is seeking to build
up credit for the future, and it would, I think, be unethical
for the police to accept such gratuities. These would be
attempts to corrupt police. This is especially the case
when the tipper asks at the same time for the officer’s
personal pager number (or equivalent), but also applies
in cases in which the generous tips are offered to all
officers. If someone feels that he or she needs to provide
gratuities to the police in order to receive adequate polic-
ing service, then this is reminiscent of the fee-for-service
objection proposed by Feldberg. Both over-tipping and
feeling required to tip seem problematic, though neither
seems to me to be quite as bad as the case of the police
expecting gratuities, which can certainly lead to corrup-
tion.
Another suggestion, one that I will not explore further
here, is that police should see the acceptance of tips as a
threat to their status as professionals. Most profession-
als do not receive tips, and so, if police wish to be seen as
professionals, they should not accept tips either.
Kania’s argument in favor of the acceptance of gratu-
ities can also be criticized on other grounds. He suggests
that if the gratuities do not alter the way in which police
officers carry out their duty, then it is ethical for officers
to receive gratuities. But the acceptance of gratuities may
well affect the way in which police officers carry out their
duty without them even realizing it. If the fact that cer-
tain establishments offer gratuities causes police officers
to spend more time at those establishments, to the detri-
ment of others, then the acceptance of gratuities has af-
fected the way in which police officers do their job, even
if only in a subtle way. This harks back to Feldberg’s
anti-democratic argument against the acceptance of gra-
tuities.
(2)
The false sense of corruption
Kleinig points out another reason why it might be rea-
sonable to allow police to accept at least some gratuities.
If the slippery slope to corruption has been over-empha-
Stephen Coleman / 38

Winter/Spring 2004
sized in police training, then those officers who accept
gratuities might feel that they are already corrupted and
that there is therefore no reason not to proceed to other
worse practices.
32
Over-emphasis of the slippery slope
tends to make an officer who accepts something as simple
as a cup of coffee feel as though he or she has just taken a
large bribe. If officers feel that they are already compro-
mised, they might find it easier to make more significant
compromises later, because they feel that they have noth-
ing to lose. As Kleinig points out, this problem can be
avoided by ethics trainers emphasizing Feldberg’s anti-
democratic argument, rather than the corrupting slip-
pery slope argument. Officers who feel that they have
allowed an unequal distribution of police resources by
accepting a free cup of coffee are less likely to feel that
they have something to hide than those who feel that
they have succumbed to corruption.
33
III When Police Should Say “No!” to Gratuities
Having discussed the theory of the acceptance of gratu-
ities, I wish now to turn to the practicalities of the matter.
I want to discuss five types of situation that are particu-
larly problematic for police, and to suggest that in these
types of situation gratuities should always be refused,
even when the policies of the local police department
would allow their acceptance. I also wish to outline the
problems in devising a policy regarding the acceptance
of gratuities, and to explain why most policies are at the
same time both too restrictive and too permissive.
The five situations that I want to examine are: (1)
when gratuities are offered because the recipient is a
police officer; (2) when gratuities are offered on a regular
basis; (3) when the value of the gratuities offered is dis-
proportionate to the services rendered; (4) when the per-
son offering the gratuity is under the impression that
certain services will be provided only if a gratuity is
offered; and (5) when the person offering the gratuity is
not authorized to do so.
(1)
Gratuities offered because the recipient is a police officer
There are many situations in which people offer gifts or
benefits to those who have helped them, or to those who
have performed a service on their behalf. Such interac-
tions are a part of human relationships and in most
situations are quite unproblematic. I might give a bunch
of flowers to the neighbor who has looked after my chil-
dren while I have rushed out to a forgotten appointment,
or buy a box of chocolates for the friend who has helped
me to move house. These situations can also include
cases in which the person who has served me has actu-
ally received payment for that service. An example of this
might include a bottle of wine given to the plumber who
has come to my house in the middle of the night to fix my
blocked sewer. However, when these situations involve
police officers, they become more problematic, because
the line between gratitude and attempted bribery is not
always clear.
There is obviously the potential for gifts, gratuities,
and discounts to be offered to a law enforcement official,
such as a police officer, in an attempt to influence the
way in which that officer does his or her job. It may be
that the discount or benefit is offered to attempt to con-
vince the officer to spend more time at one particular
establishment than others. Or it may be that the discount
or benefit is offered in an attempt to convince the officer
to overlook certain actions or inactions of the one offer-
ing the benefit. Whatever the motivation behind the gra-
tuity being offered, any situation in which the gratuity is
being offered because the recipient is a police officer
must be considered suspect. Realistically, there can be
only two motivating factors here: either the person offer-
ing the gratuity is attempting to influence the officer in
some way (large or small)—in which case the gratuity
should of course be rejected—or the person offering the
gratuity feels that he or she has to offer a gratuity to a
police officer. This latter case recalls the tipping analogy,
in which people feel that they are required to tip if they
expect to receive any sort of service. The public has al-
ready paid for police service through its taxes, and should
not feel required to make additional payments to the
police in the form of gratuities.
Thus gratuities offered to police officers because they
are police officers ought always to be rejected, either
because they are being offered as an attempt to bribe the
officer in some (albeit usually small) way, or because
they are being offered through what one hopes is the
mistaken feeling that it is necessary to offer something to
the police in order to get any sort of service.
Two things should be noted here. First, there is a
difference between a gratuity being offered to someone
who happens to be a police officer, and that same gratu-
ity being offered because that person is a police officer. An
example illustrates the point. Suppose a police officer
has a relative who owns a restaurant, and that relative
When Police Should Say ‘No’ to Gratuities / 39

Criminal Justice Ethics
invites all the members of his immediate family to eat for
free at that restaurant as often as they like. Free meals are
thus being offered to a person who happens to be a police
officer, but the free meals are being offered because that
police officer is a relative of the owner, not because that
person is a police officer. It would be quite different had
the restaurant been owned by someone who was not a
relative and who made it known that police could eat for
free in his restaurant. That would then be a case of a
gratuity being offered because a person is a police officer
(in this case probably as an attempt to get more police to
eat there, with the likelihood that this would make the
restaurant less prone to disturbances and a less inviting
target for thieves).
The second thing that should be noted is that simply
because a gratuity is offered to a range of people who are
not police officers, it does not necessarily mean that it is
reasonable for police to accept it. For example, a gratuity
offered only to police and uniformed security guards is
no better than a gratuity offered only to police, and even
a gratuity offered to all emergency services personnel is
still in some sense being offered to police officers only
because they are police officers. My point is simply that if
a gratuity is being offered because the recipient is a po-
lice officer, it should always be refused, and that this is a
test of what should always be refused, not of what ought
always to be accepted.
(2)
Gratuities offered on a regular basis
Another situation in which police ought always to refuse
to accept gratuities is when those gratuities are offered
on a regular basis. It is quite common for gratuities of-
fered to police to fit into both of these first two categories;
that is, offered to them because they are police, and of-
fered on a regular basis. Examples include such things
as free drinks, free or discounted meals, free entry to
clubs, and so on. Even when these gratuities are not
being offered solely because the recipient is a police of-
ficer, there is still a case for refusing them if they are
offered on a regular basis.
The three main problems with gratuities being offered on
a regular basis are that they can come to be expected (as was
the case in the previously quoted example from Kania34);
the acceptance of gratuities on a regular basis is likely to
fall foul of Feldberg’s anti-democratic objection35; and the
acceptance of gratuities on a regular basis tends to create
a relationship between the giver and the receiver which has
the effect of creating a conflict of interest for the police
officer where none previously existed.
I have already mentioned the problems that occur
when gratuities come to be expected, or even demanded,
by the recipient. This can happen only in situations in
which those gratuities are given on a regular basis. Thus
if police do not accept any gratuities that are offered on a
regular basis, these particular problems will not occur.
Acceptance of gratuities on a regular basis will also
tend to fall foul of Feldberg’s “anti-democratic” argu-
ment.
36
Since the regular acceptance of gratuities tends to
cause a modification of the behavior of those accepting
the gratuities, this practice will tend to cause the uneven
(and unfair) distribution of police resources in society.
Those establishments and individuals who favor the
police with better gratuities on a regular basis are likely
to see more police, and thus gain extra protection from
the extra police presence. Although such an effect is
likely to be small at the level of the individual officer, the
effect is more significant if it is examined on a service-
wide basis. There is also the undeniable fact that regular
acceptance of gratuities can undermine the public per-
ception of police, as shown by Prenzler and Mackay.
37
The impression that extra police presence can be bought
for the cost of a cup of coffee or a greasy hamburger is not
an impression that the police should cultivate.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the regular
acceptance of gratuities creates a relationship between
the giver and receiver where no such relationship previ-
ously existed. This inevitably creates a conflict of interest
in any future situation that involves the people who
have offered those gratuities. Conflict of interest in polic-
ing is a significant and under-acknowledged problem,
and deserves far more attention than it has previously
been given. This is what really lies at the heart of the
International Police Code of Conduct’s ban on gratuities:
“Thus, he should be firm in refusing gifts, favors, or
gratuities, large or small, which can, in the public mind,
be interpreted as capable of influencing his judgment in
the discharge of his duties.”
38
The relationship created
between the giver of the gratuity and the receiver of that
gratuity, rather than the actual value of the gratuity itself,
is what is seen as problematic, for that relationship may
have the tendency, or may be perceived to have the ten-
dency, to influence the judgment of the police officer in
the course of his duties.
All of these problems can be solved by police simply
refusing to accept any gratuities that are offered on a
regular basis.
(3)
Value of gratuities offered disproportionate to services
rendered
Another clear problem for police in accepting gratuities
is when the gratuity or gift is disproportionate to the
service rendered by police. One can imagine, for example,
Stephen Coleman / 40

Winter/Spring 2004
an officer who is called to a minor burglary at a depart-
ment store and is told by the owner to take an expensive
leather jacket as a thank-you gift. When the value of the
gratuity is disproportionate to the service rendered, as in
this case, it is clear that the gratuity can be interpreted
only as an attempt to bribe the police, to build up credit
for the future, and it should be rejected. I include the brief
discussion here only for the sake of completeness.
(4)
Gratuity offered to secure certain services
Police can encounter situations in which a person is, or
appears to be, under the impression that either (a) it is
necessary for them to offer a gift or gratuity of some sort
in order to secure the provision of certain police services,
or (b) that offering a gift or gratuity would help to secure
the provision of extra police services. This may be the
case even where those services would be supplied re-
gardless of whether a gratuity is offered, or even where
police are obliged to provide those services. Although it
is obviously problematic for a police officer to provide
those services only if a gratuity is offered (that is, for the
officer to require the “payment” of a gratuity before offer-
ing to provide those services), it can seem less problem-
atic for an officer to accept a gratuity when the officer
knows that the services would be provided in any case,
whether the gratuity was offered or not. The following
scenario illustrates this point:
A police officer attends a burglary, where uninsured goods
of a substantial value have been stolen from a store. The
police officer examines the scene of the crime in the
presence of the store owner, and determines that entry to
the store was obtained by breaking a rear window. Upon
examination of the window, the officer notices what
appears to be a clear set of fingerprints upon the glass
adjacent to the point of entry, and comments on this fact to
the store owner. The owner immediately offers a small gift
to the officer, “as a measure of thanks,” and then suggests
that the fingerprint branch be called to the scene to record
those fingerprints, and to see if that information could be
used to attempt to track down the perpetrator and recover
the goods. The officer knows that policy requires that the
fingerprint branch be called to the scene as soon as possible,
and she was about to inform the store owner of this fact
just before the owner offered the gift. The officer accepts
the gift (since it has not altered the way in which she has
carried out her duty) and then calls the fingerprint branch
and asks them to attend the scene of the crime.
Although acceptance of the gift has not altered the way
in which the officer in this case has done her duty, accep-
tance of a gift in such a case would tend to create the
impression that the offering (and acceptance) of the gift
was the reason that the officer had immediately called
the fingerprint branch. In other words, the store owner is
likely to form the mistaken impression that offering the
gift was necessary to secure the additional police ser-
vices provided in this case.
There are two reasons why police departments need
to guard against the impression that extra services can
be bought in such a way. The first is that fee-for-service
systems of policing, of which this could be considered a
type, are anti-democratic, as already noted by Feldberg.
39
The second is that by appearing to offer special services
in return for some sort of payment (in this case payment
of a small gift), an officer helps to create the public im-
pression that she is corruptible, as noted by Prenzler and
Mackay.
40
One of the problems for public officials is the fact that
they must not only carry out their duties impartially, but
they must also appear to be carrying out their duties
impartially. Even though the store owner is mistaken in
his impression that the offering of a gift has helped to
secure speedy attendance of the fingerprint branch, po-
lice must be at pains to ensure that such a mistaken
impression is not given the chance to arise. Thus police
ought to refuse any gratuity where a person is, or ap-
pears to be, under the impression that either (a) it is
necessary for them to offer a gift or gratuity of some sort
in order to secure certain police services, or (b) that offer-
ing a gift or gratuity would help to secure extra police
services.
(5)
Gratuity offered by unauthorized person
A final problem with the acceptance of gratuities, though
rarely mentioned, is that of gratuities being offered by
those who are not authorized to offer them. Kania’s ex-
ample of the short order cook seems to be appropriate
here.
41
At no point in his discussion does Kania even
examine the question of whether the short order cook is
actually authorized to give a free meal to a police officer.
I think it is reasonable to assume that he is not. Thus in
accepting the free meal, the police officer is effectively
condoning, and even collaborating in, a theft. Police of-
ficers are supposed to be impartial guardians of the law,
and thus must not condone or collaborate in thefts in the
form of unauthorized gratuities, benefits, gifts, or dis-
counts. If a gratuity is offered by someone not authorized
to offer it, the police officer should always refuse it, what-
ever its value.
When Police Should Say ‘No’ to Gratuities / 41

Criminal Justice Ethics
Before concluding, I would like to examine some of the
problems of formulating a policy on the acceptance of
gratuities, and to make some suggestions as to how these
problems might be overcome. The ideal of any policy is to
allow the acceptance of those gratuities that will be ben-
eficial to the police officer’s work—in line with Kania’s
suggestion that some gratuities build positive social re-
lations between the police and the public
42
—while at the
same time excluding those gratuities that pose problems
for policing. The problem with most codes that allow the
acceptance of certain gratuities is that they are at the
same time too permissive and too restrictive. Let me illus-
trate this with some examples.
Suppose we have a police department with a “no
gratuities” code which prohibits acceptance of any gra-
tuities, gifts, or benefits. One problem with such a code is
that it can be carried to ridiculous lengths. A former
student once told me a story of his work with a govern-
ment department that investigated corrupt conduct. Their
policy was complete refusal of gratuities. The depart-
ment held a Christmas dinner at a nearby restaurant,
and at the end of the meal were served coffee with “com-
plimentary chocolates.” The head of the department in-
sisted that the chocolates had to be refused, since they
had not been paid for, much to the anger of the owner of
the restaurant, who insisted that the chocolates were
given to anyone who ordered coffee.
A more serious problem with a “no gratuities” code is
the fact that there will certainly be situations in which
the code would actually inhibit a police officer’s perfor-
mance of his or her job. Imagine an officer who goes to the
home of a victim of violent crime in order to get a state-
ment from the victim. The victim is badly shaken, and
asks the officer to have a cup of tea with her while mak-
ing the statement. The “no gratuities” code will mean
that the officer must refuse the cup of tea, which is likely
to put the victim offside straight away. It might be sug-
gested that the officer refuse the tea, but take a glass of
water, but this really does not solve the problem since
even water has some value. In cases like this, the actual
value of the gratuity offered (that is, the value of a single
tea bag) is far more symbolic than real. I think that in
situations such as this the police officer should accept
the cup of tea, as in all likelihood she will actually get a
better statement from the victim if she does. But this
would mean abandoning the “no gratuities” code for a
code that allows acceptance of certain gratuities.
So let us consider a gratuities code that allows the
acceptance of a light refreshment, such as a cup of tea or
coffee. This would allow the officer to accept the cup of
tea from the victim of violent crime, but would also allow
the acceptance of gratuities on a regular basis from busi-
nesses. A 24-hour gas station that provides free drinks to
police might well receive the benefit of extra police pres-
ence due to this service, to the detriment of other nearby
establishments that are equally deserving of police time.
If the other establishments feel that they must also pro-
vide free drinks for police in order to gain equal police
presence, then we have a situation in which people are
effectively paying for police presence. This situation may
develop into a bidding war for better police protection:
one place offers free coffee, so the other offers coffee and a
doughnut, so the first offers sandwiches as well. . . .
Perhaps the answer is a policy that forbids the accep-
tance of gratuities from businesses. But there are some
situations in which it seems appropriate to accept gratu-
ities from businesses, such as the previously described
case in which a statement is taken from a victim of vio-
lent crime, while there are also some situations in which
individuals might benefit from offering regular gratu-
ities to police, such as the lone security guard who al-
ways offers the police coffee from his thermos. Prohibit-
ing acceptance of gratuities from businesses would pre-
vent police from accepting the first of these, but allow the
acceptance of the second, which seems to be precisely the
situation that should be avoided.
Other codes attempt to get around the problem of gra-
tuities by placing a limit on the value of gratuities that
can be accepted. The biggest problem with such a code is
that the value of a cup of coffee or tea is so small that
these codes would always allow its acceptance, yet, as
we have already seen, the regular provision of free drink
can cause problems for police. A further problem with
such policies is that there seem to be some situations in
which it is appropriate for police to accept gifts of signifi-
cant value. Imagine a homicide detective who has been
working on a particular case for several years. In this
time he has had regular contact with the victim’s family.
Eventually the case is cracked, and the perpetrator is
brought before the court, found guilty, and sent to jail.
The victim’s family then sends a case of wine to the
detective as thanks for all the work that he has done over
the last few years. It seems reasonable for the detective to
accept this gift, which is certainly given in recognition of
IV The Problems of Creating a Gratuities Policy
Stephen Coleman / 42

Winter/Spring 2004
services already performed rather than in expectation of
services to be rendered in the future. Yet most gratuities
polices would force the detective to refuse this sort of gift;
a code that based acceptance on the value of the gift
would certainly force refusal. Clearly there is a need for a
code that will prevent acceptance of inappropriate gra-
tuities, but will allow the acceptance of genuine displays
of gratitude.
I would suggest that the only answer to these sorts of
problems is to create a code that allows officers to exer-
cise their own judgment about the acceptance of gratu-
ities. Such a code would need to specify the sorts of
gratuities that should be refused, and should outline the
sorts of situations in which they might be accepted. Since
one of the major problems with the acceptance of gifts
and gratuities is their hidden nature, such a code should
also include provision for the recording and audit of
gifts of significant value.
Police are entrusted with significant powers, and are
expected to exercise sound judgment within guidelines
in a wide variety of circumstances. I would suggest that
the best way to deal with the problem of gratuities is to
provide police with guidelines in this area, and then let
them exercise their judgment.
When Police Should Say ‘No’ to Gratuities / 43
NOTES
1 Article 9 of the Canons of Police Ethics: Police Code of
Conduct, 1991, in Professional Law Enforcement Codes: A Docu-
mentary Collection, ed. J. Kleinig & Y. Zhang (Westport, CT:
Greenwood, 1993), 96.
2 See, for example, Lawrence Sherman, “Becoming Bent:
Moral Careers of Corrupt Policemen,” in Moral Issues in Police
Work, ed. F. Elliston & M. Feldberg (Totowa, NJ: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1985), 250-67.
3 Sherman, “Becoming Bent,” 259.
4 John Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996), 163-87.
5 Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, 175.
6 See for example the story of Robert Leuci in Robert Daley,
Prince of the City (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978).
7 Michael Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Demo-
cratic Ethos of Policing: The Case of the Free Cup of Coffee,”
in Moral Issues in Police Work, 267-76.
8 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic Ethos
of Policing.”
9 Richard Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to
Gratuities?,” Criminal Justice Ethics, 7 no. 2 (Summer/Fall
1988): 37-49.
10 Emil Durkheim, Suicide, trans. J. Spalding & G. Simpson
(1952, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 163-65.
11 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 42-47.
12 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing,” 270.
13 Feldberg points to the example of the Bow Street Runners
in London, in “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing,” 271.
14 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing,” 271.
15 The participants of the seminars were “professional police
officers who currently (had) training responsibilities, such as
academy classroom instructing, curriculum development, field
training, training management, and so forth. Almost all have
had experience as ‘street cops,’ many at a supervisory as well
as patrol level.” At the time of writing the article, Feldberg
and Cohen had presented the seminar “seven times to more
than 200 participants” (“Gratuities, Corruption and the Demo-
cratic Ethos of Policing,” 270).
16 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing,” 274.
17 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing,” 275.
18 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing,” 276.
19 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 40
20 Tim Prenzler & Peta Mackay, “Police Gratuities: What the
Public Think,” Criminal Justice Ethics, 14 no. 2 (Winter/Spring
1995): 15-25.
21 Prenzler & Mackay, “Police Gratuities,” 22.
22 Prenzler & Mackay, “Police Gratuities,” 22.
23 Prenzler & Mackay, “Police Gratuities,” 23.
24 Prenzler & Mackay, “Police Gratuities,” 23.
25 Prenzler & Mackay, “Police Gratuities,” 23.
26 Prenzler & Mackay, “Police Gratuities,” 18.
27 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 39.
28 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 40.
29 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 37.
30 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 44.
31 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 46.

Criminal Justice Ethics
Jim Ruiz & Christine Bono / 44
32 Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, 180-81.
33 Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, 180-81.
34 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 46
35 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing.”
36 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing.”
37 Prenzler and Mackay, “Police Gratuities.”
38 Police Code of Conduct, in Professional Law Enforcement
Codes, 96.
39 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing.”
40 Prenzler and Mackay, “Police Gratuities.”
41 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 39.
42 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 37.
At What Price a “Freebie”?
The Real Cost of Police Gratuities
JIM RUIZ & CHRISTINE BONO
Jim Ruiz, a retired police sergeant in New Orleans, is now
Assistant Professor in the School of Public Affairs at Penn
State University, Harrisburg; Christine Bono has a graduate
degree in criminal justice from Suffolk University and is
preparing to enter law school.
Criminal justice has long struggled for acceptance and
legitimacy in the larger academic community. Conceived
in the bosom of the Law Enforcement Assistance Admin-
istration (LEAA), criminal justice is still striving to break
the academic shackles of “Handcuffs and Nightsticks
101.” From those early years, teachers of criminal justice
have often been retired practitioners from the fields of
policing, law enforcement, courts, corrections, probation,
and parole.
The lead author of this article, a practitioner-turned-
academic, was long protective of policing and, when
questions were raised in the classroom, defended devi-
ant behavior and minor corruption as either innocent
and inconsequential or necessary to get the job done. As
he has progressed through academia, however, he has
come to believe that the deviant behavior he had once
considered necessary, innocent, and inconsequential is,
in fact, harmful and detrimental to policing and to the
public that police are sworn to protect and serve. One of
the police behaviors that he regularly took part in and
defended was the acceptance of gratuities. It is now the
opinion of both authors that the acceptance of gratuities
is a harmful and degrading practice and should be ac-
tively discouraged.
I Introduction
II Police as Professionals
Police have long desired that their work be considered
and classed a “profession.” Although the professional status of policing is still debated, there is no doubt that
police desire recognition as “professionals.” This desire,
however, sits awkwardly with the practice of accepting
gratuities. Gratuities are not a feature of the classical
professions, such as law, medicine, and education, which
are—at least in theory—motivated by a service ideal rather
than pecuniary gain.
Although police desire recognition as professionals,
officers frequently seek to retain the perks that ordinarily

Winter/Spring 2004
accompany service occupations that would not be gener-
ally regarded as professions: table servers, bellboys, door-
men, hair stylists, cab drivers, parking attendants, sky
caps at airports, and pizza delivery persons, just to name
a few. The acceptance of gratuities by police deprofes-
sionalizes their conduct by rewarding their service as
supererogatory rather than as an internally-motivated
responsibility.
III Formal Responses to Gratuities
Gratuities are benefits that take many forms: gifts, ser-
vices, or cash. They can be large or small. Both their giv-
ing and receiving can be variously motivated. In a well-
known account, Howard Cohen and Michael Feldberg
state that “what makes a gift a gratuity is the reason it is
given; what makes it corruption is the reason it is taken.”
1
The nexus between the acceptance of gratuities and cor-
ruption is a major factor in the formal opposition to gra-
tuities in almost all policing organizations. And so, Au-
gust Vollmer, considered one of the fathers of police pro-
fessionalism, argued against the acceptance of gratuities
because of its corruptive rather than its unprofessional
character. He believed that officers who accepted free
coffee should be fired.
2
The following is a typical descrip-
tion of that nexus:
Gratuities often lead to things like kickbacks (bribery) for
referring business to towing companies, ambulances, or
garages. Further up the scale comes pilfering, or stealing
(any) company’s supplies for personal use. At the extreme,
opportunistic theft takes place, with police officers skim-
ming items of value that won’t be missed from crime
scenes, property rooms, warehouses, or any place they
have access to. Theft of items from stores while on patrol is
sometimes called “shopping.”3
Even so, not every policing organization adopts a zero
tolerance policy toward the acceptance of gratuities. In
its Statement of Ethical Principles, the Philadelphia Po-
lice Department reminds its members that they “bear the
public trust” and that it is important for them to “protect
the safety and the rights of fellow members of society.”
4
In particular, officers are admonished not to abuse their
authority.
Two basic constraints limit use of this authority. First, it is
wrong for police to use their office for personal profit or
gain, wrong for them to accept any favor which places their
own advantage above the welfare of the public. Second, it is
wrong for officers to violate the Constitution or laws in
performance of their work.5
The Department frames the problem of gratuities as a
matter of personal and departmental integrity rather than
corruption.
Integrity
The public demands that the integrity of its law enforce-
ment officers be above reproach. The dishonesty of just one
officer may impair public confidence and cast suspicion
upon the Department as a whole. Succumbing to even
minor temptations can generate a malignancy which will
ultimately destroy an individual’s effectiveness and which
may well contribute to the corruption of fellow officers.
Officers must scrupulously avoid any conduct which might
compromise their integrity or the integrity of those with
whom they work. No officer should seek or accept any
special consideration or privilege, nor anything of value for
which others are expected to pay, solely because they are
police officers, or for performing their duty in some
manner inconsistent with the highest regard for integrity.6
Most formal codes, however, explicitly exclude the
acceptance of gratuities. Thus, in the widely used Law
Enforcement Code of Ethics promulgated by the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police, officers pledge that
they “will enforce the law courteously and appropri-
ately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never em-
ploying unnecessary force or violence and never accept-
ing gratuities.”
7
The acceptance of gratuities provides an
opportunity for corrupt intent, whether
the intent is initially that of the
giver or the receiver.
The acceptance of gratuities provides an opportunity for
corrupt intent, whether the intent is initially that of the
giver or the receiver. Once that opportunity has been
grasped, officers will find themselves on a slippery slope
of compromise and opportunism.
At What Price a “Freebie”? / 45

Criminal Justice Ethics
Jim Ruiz & Christine Bono / 46
Most textbooks and training in police academies resist
the
Reefer Madness
approach to the acceptance of gratu-
ities.
8
Reefer Madness
presented an extremist, unrealistic
image of marijuana use, thus undermining its argument.
Analogously, police academicians take the view that it is
unrealistic to portray acceptance of gratuities as the first
step on an inevitably slippery slope to serious police
corruption. To some extent, we dispute that position. Just
as the Drug Enforcement Administration has labeled
marijuana a “gateway drug,”
9
we believe that police ac-
ceptance of gratuities also serves as a “gateway” to greater
levels of police corruption. It is, however, a matter of
enhanced probabilities rather than inevitability.
Although “zero tolerance” is shown toward other
breaches of departmental rules, regulations against the
acceptance of gratuities are rarely enforced. This is de-
spite the fact that three major investigations into police
corruption—the Knapp
10
and Mollen
11
Commissions in
New York and the investigation into the Rampart Divi-
sion in Los Angeles
12
—cited the dangers of this practice.
Added to this are the voices of reform-minded chiefs of
police who have openly acknowledged the danger pre-
sented by police accepting gratuities and have made
efforts to eliminate it.
13
One of the reasons offered for this regulatory laxity is
that there would be no way to stop it. So why try? But this
is a poor excuse. Had the same position been taken dur-
ing the police professionalization movement, major cor-
ruption would still be rampant. Truth be told, the prac-
tice can be controlled, and some police administrators are
making headway.
14
IV Gratuities as Incipient Corrupters
V Police Economic Corruption
Economic corruption in American policing along with
efforts at reform date back to the late 19th century.
15
A
driving force for reform and the professionalization of
policing has been the International Association of Chiefs
of Police (IACP), established in 1893. In the forefront of
its efforts was control of street officers.
16
As we have
already noted, its 1957 code of ethics explicitly addresses
the issue of gratuities.
I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings,
prejudices, political beliefs, aspirations, animosities or
friendships to influence my decisions. With no compromise
for crime and with relentless prosecution of criminals, I will
enforce the law courteously and appropriately without fear
or favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary
force or violence and never accepting gratuities.17
When this section of the code is cited, attention is usually
paid only to the phrase “never accepting gratuities.” But
the key to understanding it is found in the first sentence
quoted, in which the officer vows not to “permit personal
feelings . . . or friendships to influence [his/her] deci-
sions.” We argue that because of the frequency and, over
time, magnitude of gratuities received, personal feelings,
friendship, and indebtedness develops between police
officers and the givers of gratuities. We cannot imagine
how a police officer could accept daily gratuities from
merchants and their employees that amount to thou-
sands of dollars annually without personal feelings,
friendships, and indebtedness to them being established.
It was the experience of the ex-practitioner author that
merchants who gave gratuities were quick to remind him
of their generosity when stopped for a traffic violation or
other minor infractions of the law. At the very least, they
expected to be given special consideration when calling
for service. Police officers who claim otherwise are either
less than honest or fortunate enough to work in cities
with loving philanthropists.
VI Putting the “Squeeze” on Recalcitrant Business Owners Who Refuse to “Pop”
Police argot is replete with code words and rationaliza-
tions that are understood and accepted by other officers
but which are likely to be unfamiliar to those outside
police circles. Although attempts have been made to be-
atify their acceptance of gratuities by claiming that it is a
way for persons in the business community to pay the
debt they perceive they owe police officers for doing their
job,
18
this high-minded if self-serving justification is be-

Winter/Spring 2004
lied by the language police officers often employ among
themselves when referring to the practice. Locations that
provide gratuities are said to “show love,” or, more com-
monly, “pop.”
19
When there is a reluctance to provide
gratuities, officers must “‘badge’ their way to a price
break, ‘flex muscle’ or wear the ‘blue discount suit.’” It
was the retired practitioner author’s experience that of-
ficers rarely went for coffee or lunch to places that did not
provide free or discounted coffee and food: “If you got no
pop, you got no cop.” Apart from the numerous restau-
rants in the New Orleans French Quarter and Central
Business District that “showed love,” all fast-food res-
taurants recognized the “blue discount suit.”
VII Lessons from the Street
(1)
“It’s time to teach this asshole a lesson”
“Field Training Officers” did not yet exist when the re-
tired practitioner author graduated from the police acad-
emy. Field training was something you received from
whomever you happened to be riding with at the time. As
the “extra man,” the new officer was assigned to a two-
man car whenever one of the regular officers assigned to
that car was off, sick, or on vacation. The retired practi-
tioner author was once assigned to an officer for two
weeks because the regular partner was on vacation. One
day they stopped for lunch at a small restaurant border-
ing the Central Business District and the French Quarter.
His partner, an older officer, had always taken him to
places where the meals were either free or half-price.
Before going in, the older officer was kind enough to let
the author know the situation. This particular restau-
rant, he said, was free.
At the end of lunch, the owner came to the table with a
bill. He told them he was sorry, but that he could no
longer give free lunch to the police. The older officer’s
face turned to stone as the owner walked away. Looking
back on it now, it is easy to see that two dynamics had
come into play. First, the owner had embarrassed the
older officer in the presence of a rookie. And second, it
was a slap in the face and a challenge to the older officer.
The bill was paid with not a word said. Once in the
police car, however, the older officer said: “It’s time to
teach this asshole a lesson. . . . We’ll deal with this
tomorrow.”
The restaurant was very popular not only for walk-ins
but also for others who drove. One of the biggest
headaches in the Business District/French Quarter is
finding a legal parking place on the street. Like most
others in the area, this restaurant was surrounded by
freight zones, crosswalks, and fire hydrants. In short,
there were few legal parking places. Because it was
commonly known that the police did not give parking
tickets near this restaurant, customers had taken to
parking in the forbidden zones. That now changed. The
following day the author and the older officer issued
over twelve parking citations to vehicles illegally parked
near the restaurant. It was not known whether the owners
of the cited vehicles were, in fact, in the restaurant.
However, as the older officer explained to the author,
“We won’t have to get many.” The following day another
ten citations were issued in the same location. A day
later, at roll call, the older officer was given a message to
stop by the restaurant and see the owner. When we
arrived, the owner came out to our car. Instead of an
angry tirade, however, the owner apologized for what he
called a “misunderstanding” and asked us to please
come in and eat in his restaurant any time: free.
What is sometimes called “noble-cause corruption”
can take various shapes. One of the forms is called the
“magic pencil”:
The magic pencil is a form of noble-cause corruption in
which police officers write up an incident in a way that
criminalizes a suspect. It is a powerful tool for punishment,
and in the hands of a value-based decisionmaker—and
that’s what police are—it carries the weight of the United
States’ massive criminal justice system. It proves the maxim
that the pen is mightier than the sword.20
Should we be surprised when that same “magic pencil”
is used to show an “asshole” restaurant owner the error
of his ways?
(2)
And then there was Barry
Barry (not his real name) owned a small restaurant and
bar located in the heart of the “wino section.” He was a
good businessman and—to my knowledge—as straight
as they come. Many of the officers who worked in the
district ate and drank at Barry’s, always for half-price.
He was also located close enough to federal and city
office buildings to bring in a heavy lunch crowd. Despite
the location, his food was known to be very good and
reasonably priced. Although he never said it, the only
thing that Barry wanted in exchange for discounted food
and drink was a direct line to the district station, a privi-
At What Price a “Freebie”? / 47

Criminal Justice Ethics
Jim Ruiz & Christine Bono / 48
lege given only to a select few who “popped” for the
police. He did not want to have to wait his turn for
service.
Barry had learned long before that when he called the
Communications Division at headquarters the response
was slow. By providing police officers half-priced food
and drink, he was given access to the district desk
sergeant’s direct line. Were a problem to arise without
officers on his premises to handle the situation (a rare
occurrence), he would call the desk sergeant directly and
the desk sergeant would immediately put out a call. The
response was also immediate. Why? Because we felt ob-
ligated to someone who “liked” the police.
The bottom line is that good business people do not
sacrifice profit without a motive. Barry’s motive was
simple. He wanted police to “show the uniform” in his
24-hour businesses and, because of the neighborhood,
he wished to be assured that if no officer was on the
premises when needed, he could get a rapid response.
On the few occasions that he called, response time could
be counted in seconds and it was likely that multiple
cars would respond.
(3)
Meet “Brother Gaston”
The first Christmas after the ex-practitioner author’s
graduation from the police academy, he was introduced
to “Brother Gaston” (as we shall call him). Brother Gaston
managed a handful of seedy, but not illegal, strip clubs
that operated outside the French Quarter. During the
year, the author had responded on numerous occasions
to calls from Brother Gaston’s clubs.
At Christmas time, Brother Gaston would put in a call
to the station telling the desk sergeant to have all the
officers assigned to the district to pass by for their Christ-
mas present. Brother Gaston‘s office was off a rear corri-
dor that linked all the bars. On his desk was a pile of $50
bills, and as each officer entered Brother Gaston would
give him or her a $50 bill, say “Merry Christmas,” and
then direct the officer to a liquor closet to take whatever
he or she desired.
Even by today’s standards, $50 and a bottle of Wild
Turkey would represent a substantial gift. It was even
better in 1968. Should the police have declined because
Brother Gaston ran seedy strip clubs? Had they refused,
would not the positive community relations be jeopar-
dized?
21
As the years passed, I watched fellow officers perfect
the art of “mooching” at Christmas time. Their technique
was to walk into bars and say loudly, “Ho, ho, ho. Merry
Christmas.” This was a hint to the owner that the officers
were there to collect their presents. It became a game or
competition between officers to see which car could bring
in the most. One year the winner was a team that accu-
mulated over fifty bottles of liquor on a single shift. Natu-
rally, any cash gifts remained undeclared.
VIII Sherman’s Slippery Slope: Individual Corruption
The slippery-slope metaphor recognizes the importance of
police peers in encouraging corruption and the role played
by the secretive elements of police culture. The slippery-
slope argument resonates well in the moral environment of
policing—it allows problems of corruption to be conceptual-
ized in terms of personal responsibility and moral weak-
ness.22
Lawrence Sherman holds that once an officer engages in
minor illegal or corrupt behavior, greater levels of corrup-
tion become easier to perform.
23
John Crank and Michael
Caldero concur: “The officer has learned how to rational-
ize illegal and inappropriate behavior and can rational-
ize more serious wrongdoing.”
24
However, not all officers
slide. The downward slide will occur only in locales in
which “grafting subcultures” already exist to “socialize
new officers into corrupt activities.”
25
Richard Kania of-
fers an example from his experience as an NYPD training
officer.
26
He told of how he intentionally took a rookie
officer to establishments that gave gratuities even though
he knew that the young officer did not want to accept
them. He continued this until an occasion on which, in
the presence of Kania and others, the owner of an eating
establishment called the rookie an “ass-hole”:
The argumentative officer was called an “ass-hole” to his
face and, in my opinion, had earned the label for his rigid
refusal to accept an inconsequential discount. In the few
months left of that inflexible but ethical officer’s appropri-
ately short, difficult, but uncorrupted, police career, he
found it necessary to bring a bag lunch and eat in the car
while his “corrupted” partners ate at discount in neighbor-
hood eateries.27
Although this may seem a matter of little consequence to
some, others have noted that this ritual indoctrination of
gratuity acceptance has a more insidious purpose. Crank
and Caldero refer to it as “The Mama Rosa’s Test.”

Winter/Spring 2004
A new recruit and his training officer are eating at Mama
Rosa’s cafe. Soon they are joined by other officers. At the
end of the meal, they prepare to leave; the rookie has his
money in his hand and asks how much should he leave. The
veterans tell the rookie to shut up and put his money away.
It seems the cops have been eating free forever and the
place has never been held up, unlike other restaurants in
the neighborhood. Mama Rosa is very appreciative of this.
The rookie insists that he wants to pay for the meal, but he
is told to shut up and not jeopardize a good thing.
Here is the test. If the rookie goes along, he is tainted.
He loses his virginity. If he doesn’t play ball at Mama
Rosa’s, he won’t be trusted as a team player. If he does, the
next step is to test him in the field. This might include
dropsy testimony, or backing up another officer in court
that makes an honest mistake by supporting his partner’s
version of events. This is how it happens. A test at the
restaurant, then a test in the field.28
The Mama Rosa’s Test gauges a rookie’s loyalty to brother
and sister officers, and serves as a first measure of his or
her willingness to violate departmental rules and regu-
lations. As Keith Gilmartin notes, “loyalty becomes more
important than integrity.”
29
Kania provides an excellent
example of what happens to officers who fail the “Mama
Rosa’s Test.”
Although similar, Crank and Caldero’s account of the
slippery slope differs from Sherman’s in two important
respects:
1. First, the test is not intended to prepare the rookie for a
“grafting subculture.” It’s a test of his loyalty to the group.
Recall that Mama Rosa is appreciative of what the police do.
There is no extortion involved. If Mama Rosa has not been
burglarized, although the surrounding restaurants have
been burglarized, then the police are preventing crime by
eating at Mama Rosa’s. They are doing a moral good.
2. The second test involves supporting another officer’s
version of events. Again, it’s a loyalty test. Note that the
second test has two components. The first is loyalty—will
the rookie go along when the stakes are raised? The second
is the good-end—officers are trying to do something about
crime. That is, it involves a commitment to the noble cause.
What the second test shows us is that police loyalty to each
other and commitment to the noble cause are intertwined
phenomena. It’s part of the reason that police will protect
each other with such passion. Their beliefs and their loyalty
are linked together. The brotherhood (sisterhood) is
familial, a bond of loyalty and morality.30
IX Abusing Authority
(1)
Entitlement
Gilmartin observes that one of the central indicators of
values deterioration is the development of a culture of
perceived “entitlement.”
31
Entitlement refers to the way
in which some police officers explain away and self-
vindicate inappropriate conduct. Central to the idea is
the “malignant” belief that because one is a police of-
ficer, special rights are part of the job.
32
As an authority-
based system, policing has great potential for abuse, and
its prevention requires unwavering attentiveness. A
sense of entitlement is an abuse of authority. It is mani-
fest in the attitude that “you owe us cops for all we put
up with on the streets to serve and protect you.”
33
A sense of entitlement is central to understanding the
problem of gratuities. Preaching the “slippery slope”
and abstinence from gratuities to experienced police of-
ficers is usually greeted with snickering and closed minds.
But if associated with a discussion of entitlement, it forces
officers to confront deeply held attitudes about account-
ability—whether, in particular, they should be held to
the same standards as others. “What harm is there in
accepting a free meal compared to the carnage these
suspects at my last call just dealt to society?” “Because of
all the garbage we put up with on the streets, what’s the
big deal about a little speeding or a free meal
?”
34
The
sense of entitlement is an easy way for officers to ratio-
nalize their acceptance of gratuities. “Entitlement is the
precursor belief that leads to wrongful acts ranging from
minor to felonious.”
35
(2)
Fear or Respect?
In the minds of many police officers, accepting gratuities
raises two questions: “What does this guy want?” and
“Am I willing to go the distance, or will he or she ask for
too much?” Regrettably, the answers to these questions
will be learned only when the givers call in their marker,
and it is at this point that the officer must decide just how
far he or she is willing to go.
In the classroom, the ex-practitioner author frequently
confronts the proposition: “People do not respect police
officers anymore.” But was it ever about respect? It is
fear, not respect, that causes speeders to slow down when
they spot a police vehicle on the median strip. And, we
suggest, it is very likely that many who give gratuities do
so out of fear of what might occur or continue if they do
At What Price a “Freebie”? / 49

Criminal Justice Ethics
Jim Ruiz & Christine Bono / 50
not. As noted earlier, one of the most potent weapons in
the police arsenal is the “magic pencil” and the ticket
book. Police officers who wish to “convince” a recalcitrant
merchant that gratuities would be in his or her best
interest do not have to target the merchant’s business
directly. A better strategy is to “hang paper” (that is,
write tickets) in an area close to the targeted business.
The owner will get the message indirectly, and the officers
are simply citing violators. But a gratuity given out of
fear is not a gift. It is tribute or extortion.
(3)
Exploitation
If not extortion, which works by threat or implied threat,
the practice of taking gratuities involves an exploitation
of police authority. Howard Cohen characterizes exploi-
tation as follows:
Acting on opportunities, created by virtue of one’s author-
ity, for personal gain at the expense of the public one is
authorized to serve. The elements of exploitation then are
• A position of authority,
• An opportunity for personal gain created by that
position, and
• A causal relationship between the gain and the cost.36
All three conditions frequently exist when a police of-
ficer accepts free coffee or a free or discounted meal. The
opportunity to accept gratuities exists only because of
their authority. As Cohen notes:
It is the authority to investigate crimes, keep public order,
write traffic citations, and protect merchants that creates the
opportunities for “taking.” Thus, it is not merely taking, but
the taking in an official capacity. This feature is an important
element of exploitation.37
The use of a position for personal gain explains the
moral unsavoriness of exploitation.
(4)
Blinded by the “Freebie”
Despite formal prohibitions on the taking of gratuities,
the practice can become so common that legal violations
go unnoticed. Kania describes the following encounter
with a short-order cook:
I tried to argue the short-order cook out of giving me a free
meal on a night-watch. The cook would have none of it and
refused payment. I even reminded the cook that the owner
only gave a percentage discount. In response, the cook
replied that the owner did not work the midnight crowd,
and had a lot less to be grateful to the police for. The short-
order cook was grateful to the police; he felt that he was in
a state of indebtedness to the police. The gratuities were not
gifts given in expectation of future rewards, but, as Leach
had explained, in repayment of the debt already owed by
the late night cook.38
This illustrates well how habit/custom can seduce those
with authority. Both the short-order cook and Kania knew
that the owner discounted food to the police by 50 per-
cent. Yet, the cook took no payment for the meal because
of his “indebtedness” to the police. Was not the cook
offering that which was not his to give? If the answer is
yes, then did not the cook steal from his employer? Know-
ing that the cook was giving what was not his to give, did
Kania not become a receiver of stolen goods? Although
we are certain that Kania would not intentionally violate
the law, was it not so in this case? Therein lies the dan-
ger. Officers can be blinded to violations of law by what
appears on the surface as a genuine display of gratitude.
X At What Price a “Freebie?”
Most discussions of the practice of police accepting gra-
tuities focus on free coffee, sodas, or a free or discounted
meal. Rarely is the discussion framed cumulatively as a
percentage of an officer’s annual income. Cohen remarks
at one point that “the value of what is taken in the gratu-
ity cases can mount up as well. If value alone determined
the seriousness of taking gratuities, we might end up
with an equation of 400 cups of coffee to the television
sets.”
39
We contend that the annual take from regular
gratuities could be between $8,000 and $10,000, or even
more.
One of the authors here actively engaged in the accep-
tance of police gratuities. During that period, the New
Orleans Police Department salary was very low. In fact,
had it not been for gratuities in the way of food and
cigarettes, there would have regularly been “too much
month at the end of the money.”
40
Table 1 contains the
dollar amount of gratuities that were commonly taken,
adjusted for 2003 prices.

Winter/Spring 2004
The cost of the various gratuities was calculated on a
fifty-week work year and an eight-hour, 7:00 am - 3:00
pm shift. The coffee/soda was calculated on the
assumption of two breaks per eight-hour shift. It was this
author’s experience that a great deal more was consumed
during a shift, but for the purposes of this article we
adhere to the standard breaks. We also suggest an average
of $1.00 per coffee or soda despite the fact that “designer
coffees” may cost three to four times as much. Two cups
of coffee or two sodas purchased 247 times would cost
$494.00. It was commonly held that there was no need to
pay for something when it could be obtained free; hence,
it was the practice to wait until the shift began before
having breakfast. Doughnuts were a natural with the
morning coffee and three could easily be consumed. Krispy
Kreme doughnuts cost about 60 cents. Three doughnuts,
costing $1.80, multiplied by 247 days works out at
$444.60.
Working in the French Quarter/Business District al-
lowed access to many high-priced restaurants and ho-
tels whose managers/owners were happy to welcome
uniformed officers for lunch. Needless to say, lunch could
be quite costly. Instead of calculating the cost of these
meals, we suggest that a modest lunch could be pur-
chased for an average of $6.00. A $6.00 lunch purchased
247 times a year would amount to $1,482.00.
The author was a smoker who averaged about a pack
and a half a day, or roughly a carton of cigarettes per
week. In order to acquire enough to last a week including
days off, it was necessary to visit several different “Stop-
N-Rob” convenience stores because it was not consid-
ered good form to get more than one pack per day from
each one. An effort was made to show up no more fre-
quently than every other day. Because of the variation in
cigarette prices across the United States, we have chosen
as $3.85 the cost per pack.
41
Smoking one carton a week
would cost $38.50. Multiplied by 52 weeks the total would
be $2,002.00.
Whether on- or off-duty, finding free alcohol was never
a problem in New Orleans, particularly in the French
Quarter. At my last duty station, there was one bar that
served on- or off-duty officers all the alcohol they wanted
at no charge. To establish the cost and amount, we asked
classes of criminal justice students three questions: first,
“What type of alcohol would the average person drink if
price was no object?”; second, “How many drinks would
the average person order per night out if price was no
object?”; and third, “How many times per week would
the average person frequent an establishment that
provided free alcohol?” Most students indicated that if
they did not have to pay for them they would order
mixed drinks. Since most mixed drinks cost between
$5.00 to $8.00, we settled at $6.00 per drink. When asked
how many drinks they would consume each outing if
they were free, most responded three to five. We chose the
median of four drinks per night. In answering the third
Table 1
List of Common Gratuities
Gratuities Cost Frequency Annual Cost
Coffee/Soda $1.00 $1.00 X 494 = $494.00
Doughnuts 3@ .60 = $1.80 $1.80 X 247 = $444.60
Lunch $6.00 $6.00 X 247 = $1,482.00
Cigarettes $3.85 $3.85 X 10 = $38.50X52 = $2,002.00
Alcohol 4@ $6.00 = $24.00 $24.00 X 104 = $2,496.00
Laundry 3/p @ $11.75 $11.75 X 50 = $587.50
5/s @ $7.50 = $7.50 X 50 = $375.00
Movie Theater $8.00 X 2 = $16.00 $16.00 X 52 = $832.00
Total Annual Gratuities: $8,713.10
At What Price a “Freebie”? / 51

Criminal Justice Ethics
Jim Ruiz & Christine Bono / 52
question, many students responded “every night!”
Although this might be the case for some, we chose a
more conservative frequency of two nights a week. Four
mixed drinks at $6.00 each amount to $24.00. Going out
twice a week per year (104 times) multiplied by $24.00
yields $2,496.00.
Finding a laundry that provided free dry cleaning
was never a problem. Conservatively, cleaning of three
pairs of uniform pants (at $11.75) and five shirts (at
$7.50) per week for 50 weeks comes to $962.50.
Free entry into most movie theaters requires only that
police identification be presented. This usually suffices
to admit the officer and his or her significant other. Most
first-run theaters cost about $8.00, and the students indi-
cated that they would go on average twice a week, total-
ing $16.00. Sixteen dollars multiplied by 52 weeks totals
$832.00. It should be noted that this estimate does not
take into account significant others or free admission to
special events such as football and basketball games.
Nor does it account for special need items like tires,
general auto repair, prescription glasses, and so forth.
Clearly, the total amount would be much higher than
this conservative estimate suggests.
There is no doubt that gratuities significantly increase
a police officer’s annual income. Table 2 lists the total
annual gratuities, the average salary of a police officer in
the United States, the percentage of the officer’s annual
salary accounted for by gratuities, and the weekly and
monthly take for gratuities.
Table 2
Gratuities as a Portion of an Officer’s Annual Salary
Total annual gratuities $8,713.10
Tax & benefits on total @ 30% $2,613.93
Total gratuity gross income $11,327.03
National police officer gross salary $34,556.0042
Percentage of annual salary 33%
Weekly gratuity take $217.83
Monthly gratuity take $943.92
The total of annual gratuities for the average police
officer is multiplied by 30 percent to determine the addi-
tional income necessary to net $8,713.10. These two fig-
ures are added to arrive at the total gross income. With
an average national police gross salary of $34,556.00, the
total gross gratuity income increases the gross salary
over 33 percent to $45,883.03. If other gratuities are added
(auto parts or repairs, equipment rentals, sporting events,
eyeglasses, and so on), the gross gratuity income could
easily reach 40 percent or more of an officer’s annual
salary. Viewed in this light, it is difficult to understand
how the acceptance of gratuities by police can be classed
as a minor and inconsequential infraction of rules best
left unenforced or ignored.
XI Are Gratuities “Double Dipping”?
Another disturbing aspect of the “security” arrangement
between police officers and merchants is double dip-
ping. Few, if any, police departments take the view that
when their officers take lunch or coffee breaks they are
“off the clock.” In other words, officers are still on the
department payroll when they take coffee or lunch breaks.
During this same time period, however, their concurrent
roles as public police officers and providers of private
security to businesses creates a situation in which they
are being compensated by two separate entities. There
can be little doubt that their acceptance of gratuities
constitutes payment for their presence in a business.
This being so, the officers are being paid twice, once by
the department and once by the merchant.
Not only does this raise serious questions about the
equitable delivery of police services it also raises ques-
tions about their distribution to all citizens. Are mer-
chants who do not feel compelled to demonstrate their
gratitude and indebtedness denied access to these “spe-
cial services” simply because they failed to express their
gratitude and indebtedness? Considering the amount
taken annually, might it not set up a conflict of interest if
scarce resources or a dispute requires a choice between
the merchant and the public? Thus Hugh Barlow asks:
“When police officers serve private interests, will they
also be as diligent, professional, and alert in serving
public interests?”
43

Winter/Spring 2004
At times the best contribution a philosopher can make to
the debate on an important public issue is to express the
problems clearly enough so that discussion can progress.
This is particularly true when the issue has become mired in
cliches that push our thinking down the same roads to the
same dead ends. Not that philosophers have nothing
substantive to contribute to such debates; we too have
solutions to propose and defend. But on some issues no one
(philosophers included) will make much progress until we
stop trading the conventional wisdom that passes for
solutions and reconsider the way in which we have posed
the problem.44
Is it unreasonable to think that major police deviance
and corrupt behavior blossoms without progression? Is
it reasonable to think that police officers begin corrupt
careers by dealing drugs, robbing citizens, and commit-
ting murder? Is that the way other people begin criminal
careers? Having had the opportunity to view numerous
criminal records, it was our impression that the vast
majority of criminal careers began with petty offenses
and progressed steadily to major offenses: the slippery
slope. Most police officers will generally accept that this
is the usual mode of progression. Why should it be any
different for police officers?
The bottom line is that there is no free lunch. Nor is
the police acceptance of gratuities a minor affair when it
can account for 30 percent or more of annual income.
Whenever a businessperson cuts into his or her profit
margin by giving systematic gratuities, there must be a
substantial motivation for doing so. When police officers
take gratuities, they know that there is an ulterior motive
to the giving. However, when the annual take represents
such a significant amount of an officer’s annual salary,
can the practice be considered minor and inconsequen-
tial?
We send young officers out with no real understand-
ing of the gravity of their authority and only minimal
understanding of the true nature of the temptations they
will face. We expect them to be paragons of virtue while
often toiling in the midst of the worst society has to offer.
We do little to prepare them for this or to impress upon
them the sacred trust bestowed upon them and how
important the exercise of that authority is. Attempting to
wrap the corrupt and evil practice of gratuity acceptance
in a cloak of moral, ethical, and philosophical respect-
ability is to operate like a painter who applies fresh paint
to wood that she or he knows to be infested with termites.
XII Conclusion
NOTES
1 Cited in their “Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing: The Case of the Free Cup of Coffee,” in
Moral Issues in Police Work, ed. Frederick A. Elliston & Michael
Feldberg (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1985), 267-68.
2 G. Carter, “August Vollmer and the Origins of Police
Professionalism,” in Police Administrative Issues: Techniques
and Functions, ed. M. Pogrebin and R. Regoli (Millwood, NY:
Associated Faculty Press, 1986), 3-9; cited in John Crank and
Michael Caldero, Police Ethics: The Corruption of Noble Cause
(Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing, 2000), 69.
3 <http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/205/205lect11.htm>
(6/12/03).
4 Philadelphia Police Department, Statement of Ethical Prin-
ciples <http://www.ppdonline.org/ppd_ethics.htm> (6/17/
03).
5 Philadelphia Police Department, Statement of Ethical Prin-
ciples.
6 Philadelphia Police Department, Statement of Ethical Prin-
ciples.
7 <http://www.theiacp.org/documents/index.
cfm?fuseaction=document&document_id=95> (5/28/03).
8Reefer Madness, a propaganda film from 1936, allegedly
documents the evil effects of smoking marijuana. Its excesses
have gained it cult status.
9 http://www.usdoj.gov:80/dea/ongoing/marijuana.html
(6/29/03): “The risk of using cocaine has been estimated to
be more than 104 times greater for those who have tried
marijuana than for those who have never tried it.”
10 The Knapp Commission, established in May 1970, found
that organized crime was the single biggest source of police
corruption, that a second source of corruption was legitimate
businesses seeking to ensure easy passage through the maze
of city ordinances and regulations, and that the most
widespread form of misconduct was the acceptance of
gratuities in the form of free meals or other goods. In a
number of cases this last form of misconduct was the beginning
of more serious corruption: <http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/
pub/public/New_York_police_dept.cfm> (6/28/03).
11 Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corrup-
tion and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police De-
partment, Commission Report (Chair: Milton Mollen), City
of New York, July 7, 1994.
12 <http://lacounty.info/12SheriffRprt.pdf>, p. 6 (6/28/03).
At What Price a “Freebie”? / 53

Criminal Justice Ethics
13 J. Leonard, “Paying a Price for Freebies; Merchants’ Hand-
outs and Discounts for Police are a Tradition that Some Chiefs
Want Ended, Calling Them Unseemly and Compromising,”
Los Angeles Times, October 12, 2002, p. A1.
14 Leonard, “Paying a Price for Freebies.”
15 J. Berman, Police Administration and Progressive Reform:
Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner of New York (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1987).
16 Robert Fogelson, Big-City Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1977), 13.
17 <http://www.theiacp.org/documents/index.
cfm?fuseaction=document&document_id=95> (5/28/03).
18 Richard R. E. Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’
to Gratuities?” Criminal Justice Ethics 7, no. 2 (1988): 37-49.
19 These and the following examples of police argot are all
found in Leonard, “Paying a Price for Freebies.”
20 Crank and Caldero, Police Ethics, 72.
21 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 40.
22 Crank and Caldero, Police Ethics, 67.
23 Lawrence Sherman, “Becoming Bent: Moral Careers of
Corrupt Policemen” in Moral Issues in Police Work, ed. Elliston
and Feldberg, 253-65.
24 Crank and Caldero, Police Ethics, 66.
25 Crank and Caldero, Police Ethics, 66.
26 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 42.
27 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 42.
28 Crank and Caldero, Police Ethics, 73.
29 K. Gilmartin, “Ethics Based Policing: Undoing Entitlement”
<http://www.rcmp-learning.org/docs/ecdd1220.htm> (6/
18/03).
30 Crank and Caldero, Police Ethics, 73-74. In addition, Crank
and Caldero believe that economic and “noble cause” cor-
ruption are intimately connected: “Once started, a police of-
ficer may move back and forth across the two lines” (75).
31 Gilmartin, “Ethics Based Policing.”
32 Gilmartin, “Ethics Based Policing.”
33 Gilmartin, “Ethics Based Policing.”
34 Gilmartin, “Ethics Based Policing.”
35 Gilmartin, “Ethics Based Policing.”
36 Howard Cohen, “Exploiting Police Authority,” Criminal
Justice Ethics, 5 no. 2 (1986): 23.
37 Cohen, “Exploiting Police Authority,” 26.
38 Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratu-
ities?” 39.
39 Cohen, “Exploiting Police Authority,” 24.
40 <http://www.pagedepot.com/martystuart/hamelmn
%2D2%2D13%2D03%2Dar.htm> (6/17/03).
41 <http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/
0202.pdf> (6/20/03).
42 U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Police Departments in Large Cities, 1990-2000, Special Report
NCJ 175703 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
May 2002), 4, Table 7.
43 Hugh Barlow, Criminal Justice In America (Upper Saddle
River, NJ : Prentice Hall, 2000), 187.
44 Cohen, “Authority: The Limits of Discretion,” 27.
It is flattering to be invited to respond to critics of my
previous work in Criminal Justice Ethics,1 and it would be
even more flattering were those critics not so critical, or
were my work truly original. The position I have taken
with regard to police accepting gifts and gratuities was
not originally mine but was based on many earlier dis-
cussions of the topic. I have repeatedly noted that the
agency in which I served in the 1970s allowed its officers
to accept small gifts and taught us to distinguish them
from the conditional gratuities that the International As-
sociation of Chiefs of Police (IACP) code taught us to
reject. As I examined these matters as a graduate student,
I found arguments and evidence in support of this posi-
The Ethical Acceptability of Gratuities:
Still Saying “Yes” After All These Years
RICHARD R. E. KANIA
Richard R. E. Kania is Professor of Criminal Justice at the
University of North Carolina, Pembroke.
Richard R. E. Kania / 54

Winter/Spring 2004
tion in the views of such distinguished criminal justice
scholars as Dorothy Heid Bracey, Herman Goldstein,
and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. This is not to say that they openly
advocated the position I took, but what they and others
presented in their reasoned discussions fortified me in
staking out the position I did in 1988, defended again in
1994,2 and still support.
substantial number of violations of police anti-gratuities
policies:
Many businessmen in a community engage in exchanges or
practices with police officers that from the standpoint of the
law could bring charges of bribery. A variety of such
practices were uncovered in our observations of the police
including almost daily free meals, or cigarettes, the
profferment of gifts marking anniversaries and holidays,
and discounts on purchases. Such practices are specifically
prohibited by the rules and regulations of any police
department and subject to disciplinary action if “officially”
discovered.10
His observational data confirmed my own more
limited personal police experiences. I knew that minor
gifts and gratuities were commonplace in my agency and
in the agencies I studied in researching my dissertation.
Those establishments not offering them were few, and the
very few officers not taking them were clearly the excep-
tions. The exchanges matched Reiss’s carefully worded
description about a “profferment” of gifts, and not a
solicitation of gifts, although it would be shamefully
naïve to believe that police officers never solicit such gifts.
The Knapp Commission’s 1972 report addressed vari-
ous payments to police, observing that “[a] third category
of payments to the police is that of gratuities, which the
Commission feels cannot in the strictest sense be consi-
dered a matter of police corruption, but which has been
included here [in the report] because it is a related—and
ethically borderline—practice, which is prohibited by
Department regulations, and which often leads to cor-
ruption.”11
In the police department in which I served and in the
law enforcement agencies I observed for my dissertation
research, there was unofficial tolerance of true gratuities
and one chief of police even articulated a policy of toler-
ance. There was no evidence of bribery or other obvious
patterns of corruption, and police didactic myths con-
veyed the message that financial corruption was clearly
unacceptable conduct. Those officers were clearly distin-
guishing between the fundamental character of the two
behaviors. If there were corrupt officers accepting or
soliciting bribes, they were engaging in what Lawrence
Sherman refers to as “Type I Corruption”—occasional,
opportunistic, and solitary. Those officers were not tal-
king about, nor were being observed, taking bribes. But
they were open in accepting and discussing the accep-
tance of gratuities. There was a significant speed-bump
on the slippery slope in these agencies.
Michael Feldberg had drawn similar conclusions even
before I published my 1988 article:
The Ethical Acceptability of Gratuities / 55
Bracey saw that gratuities serve functions
beyond the improper personal enrichment
of corrupted officials, such as agency
solidarity and good relations with
some elements of the public.
Primary among my theoretical predecessors is Bracey.
She wrote about why corruption persists in spite of a
broad consensus against it and serious efforts to eradi-
cate it.3 She saw that gratuities serve functions beyond the
improper personal enrichment of corrupted officials,
such as agency solidarity and good relations with some
elements of the public. She seemed quite able to distin-
guish gratitude from corruption, and still recognizes the
value of gift exchange in building and solidifying good
police-community relations.4 This viewpoint has been
supported by Joseph A. Schafer and others as they see the
value of acceptance of minor gratuities within commu-
nity policing efforts.5
For example, Herman Goldstein saw some gratuities
as sincere expressions of appreciation for lawful services
appropriately rendered.6 Even Edwin Delattre, who is
clearly outspoken in his opposition to gratuities,7 ack-
nowledged that the “slippery slope” was not inevitable
and that some forms of hospitality shown to police were
not wrongful:
My experience leads me to conclude that, for some police,
the small kindness—like making fresh coffee when the police
arrive in the middle of the night—is just that. It is not like a
tip for a bellhop, and is not the beginning of a slippery slope.
Since the intentions of the restaurant personnel are often
equally innocent, police acceptance and appreciation are not
illicit.8
Reiss was an early researcher on police violations of
law and regulations, supervising ride-along observa-
tional studies of actual police behavior.9 His observers
witnessed few serious violations of law, but did see a

Criminal Justice Ethics
I consider the official attitude toward gratuities unrealistic,
somewhat hypocritical, and insulting to a police officer’s
intelligence. They are unrealistic because the great majority
of gratuities, such as free coffee, half-priced meals, and other
discounts come from basically honest merchants who attach
no strings or expectations to the offering. Most donors
would not expect such favors to buy them immunity from
serious violations of the law. Their intent is usually no more
than an inducement for the officer to spend more time on
the merchant’s premises, thereby offering a few minutes of
“private” security to the merchant. Officers rarely, if ever,
have to solicit gratuities, and they see them as a gesture of
welcome or thank-you for stopping by.12
Clearly there are those who disagree totally, and many
more who disagree in degrees.13 As I have encountered
the arguments against my own position, I see them com-
ing in several recurring patterns: the old slippery slope,
the appeal to professionalism, the authority and propri-
ety of the giver, the dollar value, and the imbalance in
services provided to gratuity-givers. In the time since I
first wrote on this topic I have added one new argument
on behalf of permissive gratuities policies—avoiding
“gotcha games” directed at otherwise uncorrupted gratu-
ities-accepting officers.
Richard R. E. Kania / 56
The Old Slippery Slope
On the slippery slope issue, I am simply not convinced.
As many have pointed out,14 corrupt cops typically begin
their corrupt careers by taking gratuities, but they also
typically begin their careers at a police academy, perform
a wide range of routine policing chores,15 and wear
uniforms prior to falling into corruption. These facts are
not typically associated with their subsequently being
corrupt, although, tongue in cheek, Bracey suggested re-
strictions on wearing the uniform and badge in public as
one way to curb some of the corruption problems.16 A
large majority of officers who accept gratuities do not pro-
gress into corrupt careers.
Feldberg’s argument against the slippery slope is still
compelling.17 Even Delattre, opposed to gratuities as he
is, finds the slippery slope arguments weak.18 Building
on the ideas of James Rachels, John Kleinig19 critiques two
main types of slippery slope arguments, “the logical
slope, and the psychological slope.”
After a fashion, both Kleinig20 and Stephen Coleman21
find some fault with both, as do I. The “logical slope”
argument works only by assuming that gratuities are on
the slope in the first place, that is to say, that they are
inherently wrong. That is precisely one of the points I
have been making from the beginning against equating
acceptance of minor gratuities with corruption. Lumping
ethically virtuous and neutral behaviors with unethical
behaviors creates a false slope. The “psychological
slope” arguments are stronger. Relying upon human
judgment to draw and maintain boundaries between
acceptable and unacceptable conduct always is problem-
atic. But we do not deny police the authority to use force,
even deadly force, because some officers will use flawed
judgments in exercising their discretion, and we do not
deny all police arrest powers because the occasional offi-
cer abuses his or her arrest discretion. Clearly the slip-
pery slope will work its harm in some cases, but it is never
so steep that an officer with a strong character and good
judgment could not overcome the potentially harmful
influence of the slope on an officer’s moral career.
What Do the Professionals Do?
Several critics of gratuities associate them with tips, and
then associate tips with occupations which are not
“professional.” It does not trouble me at all to associate
gratuities and tips. There is certainly nothing unethical
in giving a tip to a service worker. Nor is there any reason
to disparage giving tips to “true professionals,” nor in my
view any reason why a professional should not accept
them in good conscience.
Coleman writes: “Professionals do not receive tips,
and so, if police wish to be seen as professionals, they
should not accept tips either.”22 It is a widely held
misconception that “professionals” are not offered and
do not accept tips. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Practitioners of the “traditional” professions of
ministry, higher education, medicine, law, and the like,
are regularly and routinely given gratuities. Furthermore,
modeling policing on the “learned professions” has
numerous pitfalls, as Bracey has recognized in her
work.23 One of the recurring criticisms of professionals is
their tendency to move away from personal involvement

Winter/Spring 2004
with their clients, so that they are dealing with issues and
cases, not people. With police work, gratuities are quite
personalizing and, as I wrote in the 1988 Criminal Justice
Ethics article, are therefore building blocks of good
community relations.
Some years ago, anticipating the professionalism
argument from Jim Ruiz on a panel critiquing the
gratuities question, I collected a large canvas bag full of
gratuities from publishers exhibiting at the conference—
pens, pencils, letter openers, highlighters, erasers, mini-
flashlights, coffee mugs, plastic cups, note pads, pins,
calendars, and so forth. The canvas bag also was a
gratuity. In the question and answer period I presented
these to Ruiz,24 as my rejoinder to him. In the current issue
of the journal, Ruiz and Bono repeat this misrepresenta-
tion of professionals in their paper in spite of the
empirical evidence to the contrary, writing “Gratuities
are not a feature of the classical professions, such as law,
medicine, and education.”25
Lawyers also receive gifts from their happy clients.
The judge or magistrate performing a civil marriage
service is often given a gratuity in addition to the legal fee
collected for the service. Night magistrates are frequently
brought coffee and snacks by the police officers bringing
them “business.” Physicians do not only receive free
drug and equipment samples from medical suppliers
and pharmacological “drummers,” they often also
receive true gifts from grateful patients.
Christian ministers, in another of the classical profes-
sions, are often invited to dinner with members of the
parish, and they are customarily given a gratuity for
performing a marriage or baptism ceremony over and
above the rental fee for the use of the sanctuary and
reception hall. They also receive a cornucopia of small
gifts, cookies, cakes and fruit at various holidays,
especially Christmas. Rabbis enjoy similar largess from
the members of their congregations, and I suspect the
same is true for other faiths.
We professors get our free desk and examination
copies without a loss of professional status or standing,
without feeling the taint of corruption, and accept fees to
review and comment on manuscripts of books. Of course,
the publishers hope we will adopt their books, so these
might be more akin to the “expectations” that I have
written about than true gratuities. Certainly that is true in
the case of North West Publishing which offers a large
fee, as much as $4,000, to review and adopt a book.26
In addition to books and other small items coming
from publishers, students and former students bring their
professors small gifts or foodstuffs, especially at Christ-
mas and at graduation. And we professors are not un-
ethical in accepting them, as long as we do not also
acquire an inappropriate sense of obligation when we
take them. Nor are we demeaned by the offer of the gift or
by accepting the gift.
As I have argued with police gratuities, those offerings
of gifts which are given to other professions are free of
improper expectations or obligations, sociable and mo-
rally acceptable. So I say, let the police be professional by
following the actual practices of other professionals, let
them accept unconditional gratuities, just as most profes-
sionals do. If all of this is corrupting, then all of society is
hopelessly corrupt.
The Ethical Acceptability of Gratuities / 57
Who Can Give a Gratuity?
More troubling to my argument is the issue that Coleman,
Ruiz and Bono, and others have raised in critiques of my
gratuities article, about when the giver has no authority
to give. Coleman offers the following analysis:
(4) Gratuity offered by unauthorised person
A final problem in the acceptance of gratuities, though rarely
mentioned, is that of gratuities being offered by those who
are not authorised to offer them. Kania’s example of the
short order cook seems to be an appropriate example here.
At no point in his discussion does Kania even examine the
possibility of whether the short order cook is actually
authorised to give a free meal to a police officer. I think it is
reasonable to assume that he is not. Thus in accepting the
free meal, the police officer is effectively condoning, and
even collaborating in, a theft. Police officers are supposed to
be impartial guardians of the law, and thus must not
condone or collaborate in thefts in the form of unauthorised
gratuities, benefits, gifts or discounts. If a gratuity is offered
by someone not authorised to offer it, then the police officer
should always refuse it, whatever its value.27
If indeed the cook has no such authority, there may be
substance to the accusation that the officer is collaborat-
ing in theft. However, in the kind of all-night diner in
which this case was encountered, it was generally the
case at night that the cook and a single waitress were the
only employees on duty. The cook was also the person in
charge, doubling as the manager on duty. I would there-
fore assume that he had that authority by delegation.
Oddly enough, one of the most steadfast opponents of

Criminal Justice Ethics
gratuities, Delattre, has remarked on the acceptability of
the late-night staff making a fresh pot of coffee for a
visiting officer, noting that because “the intentions of the
restaurant personnel are often equally innocent, police
acceptance and appreciation are not illicit.”28
But I recall another situation in which I would not
have made the assumption about managerial authority,
and yet accepted the gift. A trucker flagged me down,
asking for directions to an address off the main routes of
our city. It was within my beat and we were close to his
destination, but the route was not straightforward, so I
suggested that he simply follow me to the address. Upon
arrival he hailed me over and offered me a large box from
his load, a box filled with bags of potato chips. Some
driver-food distributors own their packaged foodstuffs
and are operating as independent or franchised whole-
salers. Others are simply delivery men. I never inquired
and the circumstances suggested that he was making a
delivery rather than servicing a regular route as a fran-
chiser. In retrospect, I should have declined to take the
box; and I would teach that same message to my own
students.
Richard R. E. Kania / 58
The Collective Value of Gifts and Gratuities
One of the better points that Ruiz and Bono make in their
present article is that the collective monetary value of the
gifts and gratuities that an officer may receive can be quite
substantial, even if the value of each individual gift and
gratuity is relatively small.29 This is certainly the case
when meals are taken daily at the same restaurants. To
some extent, the large figures used by Ruiz and Bono
should be discounted because the cost to the merchants is
far less than that charged to the public, so that the free
coke or coffee is an outlay of just a few cents. Even so, a
few cents each day to multiple officers, every day the
business is open can amount to a large expense annually.
Officers should be aware that they may become depen-
dent on this cumulative factor, and that it could lead to
unethical exchange relationships.
Many years before, Reiss made a similar observation,
noting how important these exchange relationships were
to augmenting low police incomes. He wrote: “the pres-
sures to supplement income are considerable,”30 and, I
would add, the value of gratuities received is cumula-
tively quite substantial. Coleman raises the same point.31
To be meaningful, a departmental policy that prohibited
gratuities above some set value would have to reflect
some sort of cumulative factor. Yet, in her work, Bracey
does not seem to be concerned about the cumulative ef-
fect, arguing that immediate consumption defines the
character of the transaction as reciprocal and personal,
and hence not as cumulative or corruptive.32
However, there are times when major benefits having
thousands of dollars in value could be offered to and
accepted by a police officer without breaching ethical
standards. In one of my conversations with practitioners
about my work, I was told that one large urban apartment
complex had set aside a few apartments in their build-
ings for sworn officers who could stay rent-free, al-
though the officers paid for their own utilities. They were
asked to be on call to their neighbors and management
when not on duty or off premises. That city also provided
officers with take-home cars, so that having the officers
live there added a further dimension to police visibility.
When asked if I thought the practice was unethical, I
could not see why it would be, with the proviso that the
officers had the approval of their department (they did)
and were permitted by their department to participate in
part-time security employment for pay (they were).
The Unequal Distribution of Police Services
What Coleman discusses as “the democratic ethos of
policing” restates Feldberg’s argument that gratuities en-
courage an unequal distribution of police services.33 I am
convinced that both Feldberg and Coleman are right in
recognizing the problem, but think that Coleman is
probably too idealistic. He writes that “[t]he impression
that extra police presence can be bought for the cost of a
cup of coffee or a greasy hamburger is not an impression
that the police should cultivate.”34 Would a gourmet meal
or one of Ruiz and Bono’s “designer coffees” give a better
impression?35 Gift givers give what they have. Some offer
a smile and a greeting, others coffee and donuts, and yet
others apartments. If, as I argue, those benefits are pro-
vided without inappropriate expectations, the police of-

Winter/Spring 2004
ficer is being rewarded for doing what is proper, in this
case being close at hand, and there is no ethical problem.
As I pointed out in 1988, it is the heavy users of police
services who give more gratuities frequently. We do not
equalize police services or emergency responses. Police
go where they are needed, and go to “hot spots” more
often than to other places under their jurisdiction and
protection. Gratuities simply match those facts with ges-
tures of appreciation.
Clearly the apartment complex management, like the
restaurateur, wants to have more police presence than is
the norm, and is willing to pay indirectly to acquire that
benefit. My rationale for accepting the practice as ethical
is based on several obvious considerations: the depart-
ment approved of it, the officers had to live somewhere in
that community, and they were being called upon to
perform only lawful activities. In my days in uniform my
own neighbors occasionally sought out my services di-
rectly while I was at home and off-duty, and I was, just
like them, a home owner, paying for my own residence.
My presence increased their immediate access to police
services and gave them a greater sense of security. They
had what other neighborhoods in my community did not
get, a resident police officer living down the street. Yet the
extreme application of the “democratic ethos” argument
would suggest that my having a home was not demo-
cratic—better that I lived in a camper and parked it on a
different street each night so that my off-duty services
could be distributed more equally.
Just as police officers must find a place to live and that
choice provides an “undemocratic” benefit to their
neighbors, police officers also need a place to eat. Where-
ver they dine—whether for free, at discount, or for full
price—they are providing that restaurant with more pro-
tective service than the other establishments they do not,
at that moment, frequent. If, as the ethically rigid officer
described in my 1988 article, the officers bring bag lun-
ches and eat in their cars or go home for their meals, they
are denying their services to the general public altogether
for that brief period of time. That seems to me to be a more
serious denial of services than the alleged impropriety of
taking the discount. The critics fault the practice of eating
meals at some eateries while ignoring others. The solu-
tion to that concern is not prohibition, but training and
reasonable supervision. In my days on the force I was
trained to avoid falling into predictable patterns. My
peers did not frequent the same diners every day, and did
not dine at precisely the same time. Our supervisors
insured that the officers would not all be eating at the
same time or in the same place. Such rules were relaxed
on the midnight shifts, because there were few eating
establishments open then, but even then we were not
permitted to dine at the same time. I contend that such
practices can resolve the problem better than absolute
prohibitions of gratuities.
However, as is the case with all opinions on gratuities,
some people and agencies would strongly disagree.
When I was touring in Britain in the 1970s, I was invited
to dine for free in a police canteen located at the shire
headquarters. I was surprised that the building had a
full-service dining facility, and more surprised to learn
that the shire required all its officers to dine there, in
shifts, for all of their on-duty meals. The reason given was
the gratuities argument. It did not seem to bother the
leadership that at any meal time a third of their officers
were off their beats and dining at headquarters. That’s
one form of democratizing police service delivery: reduce
it equally to all. I occasionally wonder what impropriety
they expected from me for inviting me to dine there on the
chief constable’s tab. Was that not a form of gratuity?
What illicit obligation do I still owe them? How was my
presence among them skewing the equitable delivery of
my professional services?
The Ethical Acceptability of Gratuities / 59
How far does one carry the policy of no
special treatment for police before that
policy becomes ludicrous on its face?
How far does one carry the policy of no special treat-
ment for police before that policy becomes ludicrous on
its face? A common form of very trivial gratuity given
working officers is access to employee-only toilet faci-
lities. Customer-only facilities are also provided to on-
duty officers who are not on the premises to shop. Would
the absolutists want those courtesies also ended? The
citizen who smiles at the officer and offers a “hello” to
police is currying favor, isn’t he? Should the officer
sternly warn the cheerful greeter, “Wipe that smile off
your face, and don’t go ‘helloing’ me!”? Yes, there a
citizens who will use their courtesy behaviors, such as
smiles and hellos, and discounts and “freebies,” to curry
police favor.36 I say let them, as long as no illegal expec-
tations are being met by the police officers. If there is some
resultant small degree of skewing police services, police
managers should find other solutions to strike a better
balance than banning all gratuities.

Criminal Justice Ethics
In the fifteen years since my pro-gratuities article was
published, I have discussed it with many professionals
in law enforcement and higher education. The arguments
marshaled against it here are all familiar to me. But I have
also heard stories of how anti-gratuity policies have been
used by unscrupulous supervisors to play “gotcha” with
officers whom they dislike. Then too, subordinate officers
can catch their supervisors in violation, and use that
against them. Offering it as a variation on Thomas
Harris’s “I’m O.K., You’re Not O.K.” status,37 Ronald
Lynch exposes the practice as one of the “games” played
in law enforcement:
This is a game in which the player attempts to catch another
individual or group in a mistake, a lie, or a violation of rules
and orders so that he or she can discipline the person in
violation.38
By making rules against behaviors that are common
and typically moral, and then ignoring those rules most
of the time, we set people up for persecution. Kleinig
comes part way toward recognizing this risk when he
has written of a false sense of being corrupted,39 a point
taken up by Coleman.40 They need to see the next step to
which rigid anti-gratuity policies can lead. Historically,
minorities and women have been highly vulnerable to
such abuses of “selective enforcement” of policies, as
have “whistle-blowers” and change agents.
Even if anti-gratuity rules are not routinely used in this
way, they undermine the legitimacy of the bureaucratic
system in the manner described by Alvin Gouldner; that
is, they create the context for a “mock bureaucracy.”41 It is
a small step on a different slippery slope to go from a
“mock” pattern to an open “mockery” of bureaucratic
authority.
“Gotcha” plays out in another way. When serious
corruption is unearthed, the really crooked cops often
negotiate their survival by “turning,” identifying other
“corrupt” cops they know.42 Because every officer who
has violated the gratuities rules can be defined as
“corrupted,” even those who are “grass-eaters” are vul-
nerable to being “outed” by the really corrupt “meat-
eaters” among them.43 Indeed, turning can drag down the
reputations of ethical peers, and easily can turn into the
blackmail of supervisors and senior commanders.
What remains troubling to me is that many of those
who view gratuities as wrongful and unethical casually
associate the acceptance of gratuities with actual
bribery.44 No one advocates bribery. My strenuous con-
tention is that the acceptance of gratuities and the accep-
tance of bribes are light years apart—or should be. It is
conceptually fallacious to conflate the two. It is also a
serious policy mistake to treat them as though they were
the same. If I am labeled corrupt for having taken a freely
offered lemonade on a hot day, what additional stigma
would attach to me had I shaken down traffic violators in
exchange for not writing them citations?
A broader form of “gotcha” is played by people who
are overtly hostile to the police. By freely associating all
gratuities with corruption, they tar all police as “cor-
rupt.” The inability of those who teach applied ethics to
give our police a defense against such hostile critics
results in a failure to stand up for the character of those
police officers and agencies that do receive and permit the
acceptance of genuine, unconditional gifts.
Using Anti-Gratuities Rules to Play “Gotcha”
Conclusion: The Role of the Teacher of Applied Ethics
At no time before or after the publication of the my
original article have I advocated the violation of depart-
mental policies against accepting gratuities. Instead, I
have called upon thoughtful people to question the
policies themselves. The original thrust of the 1988 article
was that teachers of criminal justice ethics should convey
to their students the message that the practice of accep-
ting gratuities is not inherently damaging to good police
ethics.
In a few places that message is being heard, though, as
the other papers in this exchange reveal, not in as many
as I would like. Indeed, I have learned that to a statis-
tically significant degree one of the consequences of ethi-
cal instruction in some undergraduate criminal justice
courses is that students come away more critical of the
propriety of accepting gratuities. Vivian Lord and Beth
Bjerregaard describe this phenomenon:
Richard R. E. Kania / 60

Winter/Spring 2004
After completing the ethics course, students reported that
they felt police officers accepting free meals and getting free
gifts in the community on holidays were more serious offenses.
. . . [I]t may be that many students have not had the taking
of gratuities framed as unethical behaviors. Many individuals
believe that these types of gifts are simply “perks” of the
job, and the ethics course may be the first opportunity in
which these students have thought to frame these types of
behaviors in this context. Since one of the goals of ethical
education is to get students to think about behaviors and
attitudes in new contexts, this finding indicates that the class
is meeting that goal.45
I cannot fault Thomas Barker, Daniel Carlson, Sam
Souryal, Lord and Bjerregaard, or Ruiz and Bono, for dis-
agreeing with me, but I do feel that the normative, didactic
approach they each take is not appropriate in an educa-
tional enterprise. Their students are not being exposed to
a variety of viewpoints. They are being indoctrinated.
This is an autocratic approach more suited to the police
academy training model than university education. As
Sorin Cucerai observed in a different context: “In auto-
cratic exchange, we deal with only one value scale: the
one of the agent. Other values scales either don’t exist or
are irrelevant. In interpersonal free exchange, on the
contrary, because we have two agents, we not only have
two different value scales, we also have a mutual recog-
nition of the other person.”46
Furthermore, the IACP approach is a three-party
autocratic formulation in which the IACP and its strict
adherents define for both the individual police officer
and the potential gratuity giver the ethical content of the
exchange, even if the officer and the gratuity giver would
clearly prefer to define it differently. As a rule to be
followed blindly, it thwarts ethical reasoning and intelli-
gent analysis. The IACP can feel confident in it because it
chooses to foreclose all discussion—thus the autocratic
exchange that Cucerai identifies. The IACP applies only a
normative, prescriptive approach to ethics: do as I teach.
But criminal justice educators have an obligation to do
more, to teach descriptive (ethnographic) and analytic
(meta) ethics to our students. This is this why ethics in-
struction has been advocated for the classroom and not
just the police academy.
Sherman distinguishes eight aims for ethics in
criminal justice education:
(1) stimulating moral imagination.
(2) recognizing ethical issues.
(3) developing analytical skills.
(4) eliciting moral obligation and personal responsibility.
(5) learning to deal with moral disagreement and ambiguity.
(6) dealing with the moral questions of using coercion.
(7) integrating technical and moral competence.
(8) learning the moral issues of criminal justice.47
The heavy-handed normative approach of some of my
critics frequently fails to realize Sherman’s points (1), (3),
and (4), and some critics show that they have their own
difficulties in coping with (5). Souryal is so dogmatic on
this point that I am not certain that he even desires to
stimulate moral imagination or to cope with moral
disagreement and ambiguity.48 In his classification of
police corruption, gratuities, bribes, and payoffs are
equated uncritically. Souryal continues to ignore the
1988 gratuities article, treating it and such views as un-
worthy of any serious discussion.
More intellectually open approaches are taken by such
authors as Joycelyn M. Pollock.49 She examines the ques-
tion of gratuities as a question, applying multiple ethical
frameworks and leaving the final answer to the student.
Daryl Close and Nicholas Meier present multiple view-
points on the issue.50 Schafer revisits the connection be-
tween accepting gratuities and maintaining good com-
munity relations.51 Kleinig and Margaret Leland Smith
spend a considerable amount of thought on matters of
ethical disagreement, while not dealing with the gratu-
ities question in depth.52 Kleinig returns to the discussion
of gratuities in great depth and with some sympathy for
some points made in my 1988 article.53 Michael Braswell,
Belinda McCarthy and Bernard McCarthy present some
varying viewpoints on the topic.54 Michael Palmiotto
reprints my 1988 article uncritically,55 implicitly becom-
ing an advocate for it, while still leaving the topic open to
discussion.
The recent article by Brian Withrow and Jeffrey Dailey
comes closer to the perspective that I advocate. They
challenge my 1988 article, even questioning whether one
of my defined ethical exchanges is actually ethical, but
they remain open to the moral acceptability of some forms
of exchange. They write: “Like Kania, we argue that the
intentions of givers in connection with the intentions of
receivers should define the nature of the exchange,” and
add: “In certain circumstances, our model would con-
sider the exchange of any gratuity as ethical, regardless of
its value.”56
My major disagreement with Withrow and Dailey
concerns their contention that their “model heightens the
influence of the giver.”57 Expanding on my original arti-
cle, I would hold that the intentions of the giver cannot be
known with certainty, if at all, whereas the officer con-
sidering taking a freely offered gratuity is responsible for
knowing his or her own mind. Those of us who teach
The Ethical Acceptability of Gratuities / 61

Criminal Justice Ethics
criminal justice ethics have no influence on managers of
restaurants and quick-stop stores. I leave it to teachers of
applied ethics in hospitality studies programs to develop
their own moral guidance for restaurateurs and entre-
preneurs when dealing with police.
As teachers of ethics we should be aware of the pitfalls
of unrealistic ethical standards. Prohibitions against the
acceptance of any gratuity are inducements to failure
even on the part of the most ethical police officer. Once a
police officer is labeled unethical for engaging in rational,
reasonable, and harmless social behavior, the critic of the
police has a tool with which to tar and tarnish the repu-
tation of the police.
I commend the John Kleinig for inviting this dialogue
and thank my critics for challenging me. Although I re-
main in favor of some gift exchanges, I am conscious of
the points they raise and commend them and all those
who seek solutions in policies and practices to insure
themselves against the corrosive threat that unethical
gift-giving can present. We have to educate police to a
high standard of ethical awareness, but we should not do
so by setting totally unrealistic and unattainable stan-
dards. Officers can accept gratuities and balance the
delivery of police services so that all parts of the com-
munity are appropriately protected. To argue that was
my aim in 1988, and remains so today.
Richard R. E. Kania / 62
NOTES
1 Richard R. E. Kania, “Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’
to Gratuities?” Criminal Justice Ethics 7, no. 2 (Summer/Fall
1988): 37-49.
2 Richard R. E. Kania, “Invalidating the ‘Dowd Test,’” Ethics
Roll Call [Center for Law Enforcement Ethics] 2, no. 1, (Winter
1994): 2, 4.
3 Dorothy Heid Bracey, A Functional Approach to Police
Corruption, Criminal Justice Center Monograph #1 (New
York: John Jay College, 1976).
4 Dorothy Heid Bracey, “Police Corruption and Community
Relations,” Police Studies 15, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 180-81.
5 See Joseph A. Schafer, “Community Policing and Police
Corruption,” in Policing and Misconduct, ed. Kim Michelle
Lersch (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2002), 213.
6 Herman Goldstein, Policing a Free Society (Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger, 1977), 208.
7 Edwin J. Delattre, Character and Cops: Ethics in Policing
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1989), 80-82.
8 Delattre, Character and Cops, 80.
9 Albert J. Reiss, Jr. The Police and the Public (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1971), 156-163, 170-72.
10 Reiss, The Police and the Public, 161.
11 New York City Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police
Corruption and the City’s Anti-Corruption Procedures, Commis-
sion Report [Whitman Knapp, Chairman] (New York: Bar
Press, 1972), 66.
12 Michael Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption, and the Demo-
cratic Ethos of Policing: The Case of the Free Cup of Coffee,”
in Moral Issues in Police Work, ed. Frederick Elliston and Michael
Feldberg (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1985), 268.
13 Brian L. Withrow and Jeffrey D. Dailey, “When Strings Are
Attached: Understanding the Role of Gratuities in Police
Corruptibility,” in Contemporary Policing: Controversies, Chal-
lenges, and Solutions, ed. Quint C. Thurman and Jihong Zhao
(Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury, 2004), 324.
14 For example, Daniel P. Carlson, “Taking the ‘Dowd Test,’”
Ethics Roll Call, 1, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 5, 7. See further my
“Invalidating the ‘Dowd Test’.”
15 Stephen Coleman, “When Police Should Say ‘No!’ to
Gratuities,” Criminal Justice Ethics, this issue, 35.
16 Dorothy Heid Bracey, “Proactive Measures Against Police
Corruption: Yesterday’s Solutions, Today’s Problems,” Police
Studies 12, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 176.
17 Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption, and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing,” 268-70.
18 Delattre, Character and Cops, 82.
19 Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 174.
20 Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, 174-181.
21 Coleman, “When Police Should Say ‘No’ to Gratuities,” 35-
36.
22 Coleman, “When Police Should Say ‘No!’ to Gratuities,” 38.
23 Bracey, “Police Corruption and Community Relations,”
179.
24 Jim Ruiz, “Slippery Slopes and Camels’ Noses: A Rejoinder
to Kania’s Position that Police Officers Should Accept
Gratuities.” Paper for the annual meeting of the Academy of
Criminal Justice Sciences, New Orleans, LA, March 2000.
25 Jim Ruiz and Christine Bono, “At What Price a ‘Freebie?’
The Real Cost of Police Gratuities,” Criminal Justice Ethics, this
issue, 44.
26 Thomas Bartlett, “Selling Out: A Textbook Example,” The
Chronicle of Higher Education, 49, no. 42 (27 June 2003): A8-A10.
27 Coleman, “When Police Should Say ‘No!’ to Gratuities,” 41;
see also Ruiz and Bono, “At What Price a ‘Freebie?’” 50
28 Delattre, Character and Cops, 80.
29 Ruiz and Bono, “At What Price a ‘Freebie?’” 50-52.
30 Reiss, The Police and the Public, 160.
31 Coleman, “When Police Should Say ‘No!’ to Gratuities,” 42.
32 Bracey, “Police Corruption and Community Relations,”
179.

Winter/Spring 2004
33 Coleman, “When Police Should Say ‘No!’ to Gratuities,” 36-
37; cf. Feldberg, “Gratuities, Corruption, and the Democratic
Ethos of Policing.”
34 Coleman, “When Police Should Say ‘No!’ to Gratuities,” 40.
35 Ruiz and Bono, “At What Price a ‘Freebie?’” 51.
36 Thomas Barker, “Ethical Police Behavior,” in Policing and
Misconduct, ed. Lersch, 6.
37 Thomas Harris, I’m OK – You’re OK (New York: Avon
Books, 1967).
38 Ronald G. Lynch, The Police Manager, 5th ed. (Cincinnati,
OH: Anderson, 1998), 99.
39 John Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing.
40 Coleman, “When Police Should Say ‘No!’ to Gratuities,” 38-39.
41 Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (New
York: MacMillan/Free Press, 1954), 182-187.
42 Bracey, “Proactive Measures Against Police Corruption,”
177-78.
43 The terms surfaced during the Knapp Commission. See
Commission Report, 65-66.
44 Sam S. Souryal, Ethics in Criminal Justice, 3rd ed.
(Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 2003), 347.
45 Vivian Lord and Beth Bjerregaard, “Ethics Courses: Their
Impact on the Values and Ethical Decisions of Criminal Justice
Students,” Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 14, no. 2 (Fall
Police, Gratuities, and Professionalism / 63
2003): 201, 203 [emphasis mine].
46 Sorin Cucerai, “Free Exchange and Ethical Decisions,” The
Journal of Libertarian Studies, 17, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 2.
47 Lawrence W. Sherman, Ethics in Criminal Justice Education
(Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: The Hastings Center, 1982), 17-22.
48 Souryal, Ethics in Criminal Justice, 347.
49 Joycelyn M. Pollock, Ethics in Crime and Justice, 4th ed.
(Belmont, CA: Thompson/Wadsworth 2004), 168-74.
50 Daryl Close and Nicholas Meier, Morality in Criminal Justice:
An Introduction to Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1995), 272-
75.
51 Schafer, “Community Policing and Police Corruption,” 212-
14.
52 John Kleinig and Margaret Leland Smith (eds.) Teaching
Criminal Justice Ethics: Strategic Issues (Cincinnati, OH: Ander-
son, 1997).
53 Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, 171-181.
54 Braswell, Michael C., Belinda R. McCarthy, and Bernard J.
McCarthy, Justice, Crime and Ethics, 3rd edn. (Cincinnati, OH:
Anderson, 1998), 136-37.
55 Michael J. Palmiotto (ed.), Police Misconduct: A Reader for the
21st Century (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2001).
56 Withrow and Dailey, “When Strings Are Attached,” 324.
57 Withrow and Dailey, “When Strings Are Attached,” 324.
Police, Gratuities, and Professionalism:
A Response to Kania
STEPHEN COLEMAN
In beginning this brief response, it is important to note
the many similarities my position has with Richard
Kania’s. Kania believes that police should accept some
gratuities, that the mere acceptance of gratuities does not
make a police officer corrupt, and that we need to set
realistic ethical standards for police. These are points on
which we are agreed. It was not my intention to argue
that police should refuse all gifts and gratuities. There
are occasions on which it is not only appropriate for
police officers to accept gifts from members of the public,
but actually good police practice. My aim was not to
claim that gratuities ought to be refused in all circum-
stances, but to outline particular circumstances in which
gratuities should always be refused.
I presented the paper in the manner I did because it is
far simpler to outline conditions under which gratuities
ought to be refused than to outline conditions under
which they ought to be accepted. It is relatively easy to
create rules for when gratuities ought to be refused; appro-
priate occasions for their acceptance, however, will al-
ways be a matter of judgement, not strict rule following.
Although I agree in part with Kania’s general posi-
tion, one problem with that position and in particular
with his paper, is that he over-concentrates on one di-
mension of the issue and fails to give sufficient weight to
other relevant factors. More precisely, he focuses too much
on the issue of corruption, and fails to recognize that
there may be other reasons why police sometimes ought