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The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?
Abstract
This essay shows how the various Islamic communities or jamaats that emerged in the Muslim republics of the Russian North Caucasus during the early 1990s have evolved since then. Originally conceived as peaceful religious organisations embracing strict Islamic Salafi principles, many of these communities have transformed themselves into fighting units sharing many of the traits of jihadist Islamic movements worldwide. By analysing the radical Islamic discourse and the strategies of leading jihadist fighters in the Russian North Caucasus, this essay also illustrates how their views, ideas and tactics have become similar, if not identical, to the beliefs that are being held and thepractices that are being conducted by fighters of global and regional jihadist movements worldwide.
... It was only in 2004-5 that many young Muslims, including previously peaceful Salafis, such as Mukozhev and Astemirov, started to engage in violent jihad against the existing secular regimes of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia (Sagramoso 2012). In the late 2000s, these fighting jama‛ats radicalised even further, and became closer in their aims and strategies to the global Islamic jihadist movement. ...
... Islamist fighters in the North Caucasus increasingly viewed themselves as being part of the broader Islamist global jihadist movement and started adhering to the strict Salafi principles of tawhid (oneness of God) and takfir (accusation of apostasy) (see Chapter 18). As a new generation of younger fighters emerged, national aspirations slowly gave way to transnational Islamist dreams of participating in the current global jihad (Sagramoso 2012). ...
... This was clearly demonstrated by the declaration of the 'Caucasus Emirate' by Chechen leader Doku Umarov in November 2007, and by the appointment of non-Chechen fighters, such as Anzor Astemirov, to key positions in the resistance movement. Moreover, North Cauca sian jihadists' websites, such as Kavkazcenter, VDagestan3 or Islamdin, made constant refer ences to other jihads currently taking place in the Muslim worldin Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestineand regularly report the views of famous Islamic jihadist preachers, such as sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki and Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi (Sagramoso 2012). In the 2010s some North Caucasian jihadists also adopted an explicitly anti-Western and anti-Jewish discourse, as they engaged in a series of indiscriminate terrorist acts against civilian targets, as indicated by the March 2010 attack in the Moscow metro and the January 2011 attack on the Domodedovo airport (Sagramoso and Yarlykapov 2013: 68). ...
... These have ethnically defined nonstate actors at their core and are similar in the aspiration to secede and become independent and in the history of conflict between the majority and minority ethnic groups (Oresman and Steingart, 2003). Although some scholars on the North Caucasus argue that the insurgents' views and ideas have become similar or even identical to the beliefs of other jihadist movements (Sagramoso, 2012), we would like to explore whether or not the visual communication of the jihadist groups conforms to this argument. ...
... The case of the insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus in general has probably received more global media attention, due to the long-term military resistance in this area. This case has attracted more scholars who focus on issues related to neojihadist groups and radicalisation (Larzilliere, 2007;Rigi, 2004;Sagramoso, 2012;Schaefer, 2010;Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2006). Scholars have also observed the Neojihadist Visual Politics in Chechnya and Xinjiang 3 shifts in ideology in the insurgent movement in the North Caucasus. ...
... Despite reflecting the neojihadist narrative, the nationalist cause in Uyghur videos appears to be in the foreground and the religious narrative in the background. Although an ideological shift from nationalism to global neojihadism has been noted in the ideology of other Asian conflicts (e.g. that of the Patani [see Andre, 2012] and, in part, the Chechen [Sagramoso, 2012]), this is less present in the Uyghur case, where the nationalist cause still appears to be prominent. YouTube is a crucial (cyber)place for informal education and global radical politics and, as a source of data, presents fascinating avenues for investigating the incorporation process of the new media into/by the various social movements and social movement organisations. ...
YouTube videos offer a rare opportunity to gain an insight into the sequestered world of neojihadism. This study examines and compares the lines of the visual narrative associated with two Asian insurgencies that help to form the global Islamic social movement: the insurgency in Chechnya (North Caucasus) and that in Xinjiang (China). The purpose of the article is to describe the narratives used by the Islamic militants addressing the conflict and to identify similarities and differences in the use of visual rhetorical techniques by neojihadist groups to propagate their worldview. The study of the visual narratives promoted in the videos will help to provide a better understanding of the impact of the neojihadist narratives on the creation of collective identities. Our findings suggest that these narratives have similar features, which can be identified in a set of sub-narratives. Within the common pattern, however, significant differences can be found, especially in the interpretation of the videos by the audiences.
... In the North Caucasus, the evolution of the armed groups' ideology from nationalism to radical Islamism has typically been interpreted through the prism of either their conversion and integration to global Salafi-jihadist networks (Hahn 2007;Sagramoso 2012), or, on the opposite, as an evolution that was largely forced and tactical (Wilhelmsen 2005;Bakke 2014). This latter strand has integrated more nuanced analysis as the armed groups moved away from their initial grievances and scores of their fighters left for Syria (Moore 2015). ...
... Leadership passed to commanders like Basayev who were ready to use suicide terrorism against Russian and Kadyrov's forces. Following a period of guerrilla and terrorist warfare, the insurgency underwent a generational and ethnic change as veterans of the first war exited the stage (Sagramoso 2012). By 2006, Maskhadov, Basayev, Ruslan Gelayev, Abdul-Halim Sadulayev, who took the leadership of the insurgency in 2005, and other commanders had been killed. ...
Insurgents in the North Caucasus switched from the al-Qaeda-affiliated Imarat Kavkaz to the Islamic State after 2014. Although this transition was partially the result of Imarat Kavkaz's military defeat, it has also settled two decades of tension over ideology. It signalled the victory of Salafi-jihadism over a nationally rooted (radical) Islamism and led to a break between the insurgents and the Caucasian context. This de-territorialization of grievances for the war has in turn increased the threat of radical Islamist violence for Russia.
... In this context Maskhadov, probably under pressure from the new reality and harassed by the continuous criticism of some increasingly strengthened Islamist groups (Le Huérou et al. 2014), began to make concessions to Islam and, in a risky maneuver, approved of the introduction of sharia in the Chechen judicial order. 10 To the gradual Islamization of the institutions-a reflection of what was happening in Chechen society-must be added the inability of the government to achieve the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory (Sagramoso 2007). This enabled the constant activity of organized crime and Islamist guerrilla groups, culminating in the invasion of Dagestan in 1999; the hostage crisis at the Dubrovka theater in Moscow in 2002; the high-profile assassination of pro-Russian leader Akhmad Kadyrov in 2004; and in the same year, the massacre at Beslan school. ...
... Maskhadov, after direct confrontations began and martial law was decreed (Askerov 2015), personally led the defense of Grozny until the withdrawal into the mountains in 2000, and only then did the president decide to adopt a strategy of guerrilla warfare (Sagramoso 2012;Akhmadov and Daniloff 2013;Dowling 2015). In addition, there is proof that, at minimum, he supported sabotage (Ware 2005) against Russian civilians, such as the June 2004 attack on the town of Nazran in the Republic of Ingushetia (Jeffries 2011;Pokalova 2015). ...
The purpose of the present article is to establish what links there may be between leadership styles and war and peace policies in the Russia–Chechen conflict. To do so, we analyze the styles of two unrecognized executive leaders, Aslan Maskhadov and Doku Umarov, both of whom were involved in the same conflict with different peace policies. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we overview the literature on leadership styles in armed conflict situations and construct a theoretical framework. Second, we review the historical and biographical context. Third, we examine the interview content-analysis methodology for the measuring of leadership style. Fourth, we classify Maskhadov and Umarov on the basis of leadership styles, and compare policies implemented by these leaders with those of other leaders in a context of internal armed conflict. Finally, we present conclusions and future prospects.
... Throughout the 2000s voting patterns in Crimea were in line with those in Ukraine's south-east (Tsentral'na Vyborcha Komisiya 1998-2012, thereby consolidating the perception of the Crimean issue having been resolved. Moreover, the strong support for President Yanukovych and his Party of the Regions in the years prior to 2013 did not single out the region as a potential separatist hotspot (Tsentral'na Vyborcha Komisiya 2010). ...
... In recent years there have been a growing number of scholarly studies which locate the Chechnya case within broader literatures on terrorism, insurgency and jihad. In particular there have been studies of the dynamics of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence (Kramer 2004(Kramer -2005Hughes 2007b;Lyall 2009), studies of nationalist and Islamist rebel motivations (Janeczko 2014;Toft and Zhukov 2015), and studies of the role of indigenous forces in support of counterinsurgents (Souleimanov and Huseyn 2014), and studies of jihadi linkages between Chechen fighters and Al Qaeda (Sagramoso 2012). The main inferences drawn from these studies concern the nature and effectiveness of insurgent and counterinsurgent tactics. ...
In this article, we not only extend the concept of linkages and leverage to the realm of conflict studies, we also add an important linkage – ideas about political power which we call power ideas – and we expand on the causal mechanisms that turns linkages into leverage in a conflict situation. We examine the impact of the power ideas of nationalism and Islamism in the cases of two major conflicts in the region: Crimea and Chechnya. Within-case comparison of episodes of conflict-prevention vs. annexation (Crimea in the 1990s vs. 2014) and violent conflict vs. cooptation in Chechnya (1990s and 1999 onwards) provides the empirical basis to assess the scope and limitations of the international context allowing for the activation of power ideas and their transformation into leverage.
... During the same period, the rebellion transformed. While clearly driven by nationalist goals in the early and mid-1990s (Bakke 2015), repression targeted against religious groups, support from transnational jihadist networks, and generational change among its cadres facilitated a gradual Islamization of the separatist movement (Sagramoso 2012;Wilhelmsen 2005). 107 105. ...
A ground-breaking study on how natural disasters can escalate or defuse wars, insurgencies, and other strife.
Armed conflict and natural disasters have plagued the twenty-first century. Not since the end of World War II has the number of armed conflicts been higher. At the same time, natural disasters have increased in frequency and intensity over the past two decades, their impacts worsened by climate change, urbanization, and persistent social and economic inequalities. Providing the first comprehensive analysis of the interplay between natural disasters and armed conflict, Catastrophes, Confrontations, and Constraints explores the extent to which disasters facilitate the escalation or abatement of armed conflicts—as well as the ways and contexts in which combatants exploit these catastrophes.
Tobias Ide utilizes both qualitative insights and quantitative data to explain the link between disasters and the (de-)escalation of armed conflict and presents over thirty case studies of earthquakes, droughts, floods, and storms in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. He also examines the impact of COVID-19 on armed conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and the Philippines.
... Salafis also accept donors from Saudi Arabia to carry out the actions of the movement (Emmerich 2020;Rosadi 2015). This group, which always adheres to the Qur'an and the instructions of the prophet and his companions, likes to eradicate heretics, so that sometimes the da'wah carried out by this movement often causes social friction (Sagramoso 2012;Sefriyono 2015). ...
This study aims to analyze the social discourse contained in salafi da'wah content on the Surau TV Youtube channel. By looking at the content distributed by salafi groups in West Sumatra, this study uses qualitative research methods with data collection techniques using digital data and literature studies. Furthermore, the data analysis in this study is using Robert D. Benford and David Snow framing analysis which includes; diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. This study finds that there are three social discourses contained in Surau TV content including: addiction to technology, usury transactions, and interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims. Surau TV diagnoses problems in implementing Islamic law, starting from the technological aspect, Socio-cultural and religious attitudes are issues that need to be considered in upholding Islamic law and forming harmonious relations between religions. In its prognostic strategy, Surau TV creates content that incorporates the application of Islamic law in everyday life. In addition, the motivational strategy, Surau TV invites for tips to apply Islamic law in daily life in order to create a generation that is in accordance with Islamic law.Studi ini bertujuan menganalisa wacana sosial yang terdapat dalam konten dakwah salafi di channel Youtube Surau TV. Dengan melihat konten-konten yang disebarkan oleh kelompok salafi di Sumatera Barat, studi ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan teknik pengumpulan data menggunakan data-data digital dan studi literatur. Selanjutnya analisis data dalam penelitian ini yakni menggunakan analisis framing Robert D. Benford dan David Snow yang meliputi; diagnosis, prognosis dan motivasional. Studi ini menemukan bahwa terdapat tiga wacana sosial yang terdapat dalam konten Surau TV diantaranya: kecanduan dalam berteknologi, transaksi riba, dan interaksi antara muslim dan non muslim. Surau TV mendiagnosis, permasalahan dalam menerapkan syariat Islam mulai dari aspek teknologi, sosial budaya dan sikap dalam beragama merupakan permasalahan yang perlu diperhatikan dalam menegakkan syariat Islam dan membentuk hubungan yang harmonis antar agama. Dalam strategi prognosisnya, Surau TV menciptakan konten-konten yang berunsur penerapan syariat Islam tersebut dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Disamping itu, strategi motivasionalnya, Surau TV mengajak untuk kiat menerapkan syariat Islam dalam kehidupan sehari-hari demi menciptakan generasi yang sesuai dengan syariat Islam.
... We believe that the negative effect of religious fractionalization exists because religious ideology can function as a rallying point that the Islamification of the North Caucasus insurgency led to overcoming ethnic cleavages in this multiethnic region of Russia, with jihadist agenda taking hold of the regional insurgency and overshadowing multiple ethno-separatist agendas. 114 A second factor which is frequently espoused relates to regime type and regime centrality. Böhmelt and Clayton investigate under which conditions governments rely on either on paramilitaries or PGMs compared to no auxiliary forces. ...
Why do some countries harbor pro-government militias (PGMs), while others do not? We assert that the deployment of PGMs depends on topographic, social, and political structures within which governments and rebels operate. Drawing on the concept of opportunity structures, we postulate that structural conditions within which governments are embedded in constitute a contributing factor to the existence and multiplicity of PGMs. Data from the Pro-Government Militia Dataset along with a two-stage hurdle model reveal that personalist regime type and civil wars increase the likelihood of PGM emergence. In contrast, ethnic fractionalization, onshore oil fields, drug production, number of rebel groups, and military prowess influence the number of PGMs.
... Hence, the region started soon experimenting with the rise of jihadi Salafi ideology often labelled by the Russian government and state media as 'Wahhabism'. Sunni extremist local armed groups engaged in the fight against the Russian central authority adopted this ideology as their framework (Chifu, 2011;Sagramoso, 2012;Sokirianskaia, 2007). ...
... Youngman (2019) and Wilhelmesen and Youngman (2020) comprehensively explain how North Caucasian fighters, many of whom had already resided outside of the Caucasus and had at times become members of different communities (Youngman, 2016), formed a plurality of warring factions. Some driven by collective survival and more local imperatives (Campana & Ratelle, 2014), and others inspired by strategic objectives of ultimately establishing an Islamic State (Sagramoso, 2012). Nevertheless, as Ratelle (2013) illustrates, taken together, the North Caucasian fighters sought to collectively resist the Russian state and its local proxies. ...
The study of the Chechen wars that shaped the North Caucasus following the Soviet Union’s demise is much ploughed terrain. While the first Chechen war (1994–1996) received a secular narrative, seeking national self-determination, the second war (1999–2009) propelled a religious narrative. One critical question remains unanswered. Challenging established interpretations, a third wave of Russo-Chechen violence emerged, manifested in increasing numbers of Chechens fighting Russian forces and their allies in the ongoing Syrian conflict. The latest wave begs the question how a secular independence movement evolved in such a way as to develop first regional and subsequently supra-regional religious overtones? Examining the temporal phases of Chechnya’s conflicts as a continuum, rather than piecemeal, identifies an underlying structure that explains the development of the conflicts’ key issues and changes. Fundamentally, within-case process tracing demonstrates that horizontal inequalities ( H I s ) between Russians and Chechens, i.e. unequal access to economic assets as well as political, social and cultural participation explain the violence ( V ). Accounting for the ubiquity of H I s and the conflict’s political environment, I expand the chain of causality that turns H I s into V by so-called power ideas ( P I s ), i.e. ideas about how political power should be organised, such as nationalism or Islamism. Departing from the causal role of H I s , I examine the role of P I s in transforming secular nationalism into regional and supra-regional jihad. The mechanism of transition has thus far confounded strategists and planners. My study will establish a clear historical narrative that illuminates this previously elusive metamorphosis and present a sharper, clearly defined picture of the causes of a conflict transiting multiple stages and just as many interpretations. Ultimately it offers potential to yield schematic findings with conceivably significant implications for other contemporary conflicts.
... Hence, the region started soon experimenting with the rise of jihadi Salafi ideology often labelled by the Russian government and state media as 'Wahhabism'. Sunni extremist local armed groups engaged in the fight against the Russian central authority adopted this ideology as their framework (Chifu, 2011;Sagramoso, 2012;Sokirianskaia, 2007). ...
Terrorism, violent attacks and political Islam have affected the North Caucasus since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. If in the past the Caucasus Emirate was the leading terrorist organisation in the region since 2014 the Islamic State gained popularity and established the Vilayat Kavkaz (Caucasus Province) as part of the Caliphate exploiting the local critical socioeconomic condition and promoting the jihadist propaganda in the Russian language (i.e. the magazine 'Istok') also thanks to the considerable presence of North Caucasian foreign fighters among the ranks of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Although currently the international coalition forces mainly defeated the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, this organisation still jeopardises the North Caucasus often identified as the most volatile and impoverished area of the Russian Federation characterised by ethnic conflicts, the rise of Salafism, stagnation, and corruption. This study aims at stressing that the Russian government has elaborated a strategy mostly based on special military operations and massive investments in tourism and logistics which can exacerbate more the precarious status quo of the region favouring the dissemination of jihadist propaganda because it does not consider the historical, sociocultural, ethnic, and religious background. The region is not exempt to jihadist propaganda and terrorism and, if the Russian government cannot financially and economically support the regional leaders or will not change its approach, terrorism and political Islam could critically influence the North Caucasus posing a dangerous menace to the stability and security of the Russian Federation and entire Eurasia.
... Second, it is highly affiliated with modern Salafi-Wahhabi puritanism and transnational Islamic organizations. Many researchers argue that almost every contemporary Islamic militant movement is part of, or at least influenced from, the culture of Wahhabism and Salafism (Stemmann 2006;Sagramoso 2012;Wiktorowicz 2001;Tyson 2011). Radical groups in some Southeast Asian countries are also departing from this deadly ideology that is supported by a large financing and operation of a transnational movement system, also functioning as local agents (Abuza 2003; for a discussion about the funding of terrorism in international sphere, see Shapiro and Siegel 2007). ...
Radicalization is a terminological conflation of the two meanings in the context of extreme beliefs or behaviors adopted by individuals or groups as a justification for the use of violence to achieve the objectives. Since radicalization primarily emphasises on, and departures from, the understanding and cognitive processes, the role of peaceful and moderate education in this case can be effectively utilized to serve as a considerably relevant means to prevent it. In addition, radicalization is also limited by the social, political, and economic contexts of a particular region, and combined with the degree of individual autonomy in the search for identity. Accordingly, the deradicalization efforts actually necessitate the consideration of the sociopolitical culture as the basis for policy makers. It is based on the consideration that the radicalization of Islam, even though strongly characterized by transnational movement, contains local elements leading to the radicalization as occasionally random and ununiformed violence in the Muslim world. The findings suggest some valuable strategies to deconstruct the idea of radicalization that can be implemented in several ways, including building and empowering local characterization of Indonesian education of Muslims in particular and of Southeast Asian in general, and reducing the Wahhabism extreme teachings and such highly irrational and ahistorical Arabization ideas and programs in Indonesian context.
... Some authors argue that the IK is ideologically aligned with Al Qaeda (AQ) and a member of the so-called "global jihadist movement." Hahn, the most prominent proponent of this view, has-in highly polemical and politicised terms-argued that the IK is ideologically "in lockstep with AQ." 20 In a more balanced contribution, Sagramoso has asserted that the IK is guided by "similar, if not identical," beliefs and shares AQ's "strategic objectives-the establishment of an Islamic state in the Caucasus, to be ruled by Islamic Shari'ah law." 21 Others, however, have viewed the insurgency's ideological transformation as being significantly more limited. Campana and Ratelle, for example, argued that recruitment and targeting are determined principally by "local imperatives," with groups focused on survival rather than implementing a grand strategy, while Campana and Ducol show that, although IK websites utilise "global jihadi rhetoric," they predominantly "reflect local dynamics" and, critically, define their enemies in local terms. ...
In October 2007, veteran Chechen field commander Dokka Umarov proclaimed the formation of the Caucasus Emirate (IK), formalising the victory of the North Caucasus insurgency’s Islamist wing over its nationalist-separatists. During Umarov’s time as leader, the North Caucasus experienced sustained violence and the IK claimed responsibility for multiple terrorist attacks in and beyond the region. However, despite the importance of ideology in understanding insurgent behaviour, the IK’s ideology and Umarov’s role in shaping it remain understudied. Using Social Movement Theory’s concept of framing to analyse Umarov’s communiqués throughout his lengthy tenure (June 2006–September 2013), this article identifies three distinct phases in Umarov’s ideological positioning of the insurgency: nationalist-jihadist (June 2006–October 2007); Khattabist (October 2007–late 2010); and partially hybridised (late 2010–September 2013). The article contributes to debates over typologies of jihadist actors by highlighting the difficulties in applying them to the North Caucasus and provides a clearer understanding of the IK’s ideological transformation and the limits to its engagement with external actors. The article also illustrates that weakness was a key factor in explaining that transformation and identifies several avenues for research that could further enhance our understanding of the IK’s ideology and the role it plays.
... 48 For detailed accounts of the first Russo-Chechen war, see Lieven (1998); Cheterian (2008); Gall and de Waal (1998);Tishkov (2004); Sakwa (2005). 49 For more on foreign Islamist involvement in the North Caucasus see Sagramoso (2012). 50 In the contemporary north-eastern Caucasus there are between 40 and 50 Sufi wirds, about 20 of them headed by living shaykhs. ...
Following the break-up of the USSR in 1991 the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus -corresponding to present-day Azerbaijan and the Russian North Caucasus - have been in a continuous process of renegotiating their Islamic identity and the role of Islam in the processes of nation-building. This has involved a complex set of factors, including the correlation between the rise of Islam and socio-economic well-being (or the lack of it), the level and longevity of Islamic heritage, the relationship between Islam and the nature of the ruling post-Soviet Caucasian regimes, and the degree of susceptibility to the region’s exposure to foreign influences, Islamic and Western. This article examines some of these factors from an historical perspective, concentrating on how the political elites and the populace variously dealt with essentially external influences in the course of their centuries-long incorporation within successive political empires. From the seventh century AD these were Islamic, emanating from the Umayyad, Abbasid, Timurid, Ottoman and Safavid empires; and from the nineteenth century, Russian Orthodox and Soviet atheist. An analysis of the dynamics set up by these influences and the distinctively Caucasian Muslim responses to them is crucial in understanding how current elites and their antagonists in the region embrace, reject and otherwise instrumentalise Islam.
... The corollary of this was that much of the history of the region in the Soviet period became sanitised. 8 In short, from a 6 Thus, social and cultural changes in post-Soviet Muslim Caucasus and their political implications are addressed in Ware (2010); Gammer (2008); Sagramoso (2007); Dannreuther and March (2010); Pilkington and Yemelianova (2003); and Yemelianova (2010). The historical development of Circassian, Abaza, Abkhaz and Ubykh languages and myths is examined in Colarusso (2002) and Richmond (2008). ...
Este artículo tiene como objetivo aportar datos complementarios, fiables y replicables sobre el conteo de víctimas provocadas por las guerrillas del Cáucaso norte, para explicar su actual debilidad. La metodología empleada es el análisis de contenido de todas las publicaciones realizadas entre 2010 y 2019 en su órgano oficial de propaganda, Kavkaz Center. Esto se complementa con un análisis del contexto histórico. Se concluye que existe una coincidencia general en el aumento y la disminución de las variables producción propagandística y víctimas causadas a lo largo del tiempo. Por tanto, el escrutinio de la propaganda de las guerrillas ayuda a conocer su vigor con mayor certidumbre que si solo se tiene en cuenta el número de ataques perpetrados. Replicar el análisis en otros contextos permitiría conocer si puede establecerse una norma en ese sentido.
How can researchers obtain reliable responses on sensitive issues in dangerous settings? This Element elucidates ways for researchers to use unobtrusive experimental methods to elicit answers to risky, taboo, and threatening questions in dangerous social environments. The methods discussed in this Element help social scientists to encourage respondents to express their true preferences and to reduce bias, while protecting them, local survey organizations, and researchers. The Element is grounded in an original study of civilian support for the jihadi insurgency in the Russian North Caucasus in Dagestan that assesses theories about wartime attitudes toward militant groups. We argue that sticky identities, security threats, and economic dependence curb the ability of civilians to switch loyalties.
This article intends to revisit the role of foreign fi ghters in the Chechen war and its aftermath, looking particularly at their impact on Islamic developments in Chechnya and Dagestan during the 1990s–2010s. The article challenges the argument, which is predominant in the literature, that foreign jihadists were primarily responsible for transforming the Chechen insurgency from a secular movement into a religious one. Instead, it argues that Islamist tendencies and Salafi circles were present in the North Caucasus before the outbreak of the First Chechen war. Secondly, this article contends that local Salafi jamaats, in conjunction with foreign jihadist fi ghters, provided the mobilization structures and the ideological framing for the radicalization of the Chechen/ North Caucasus rebel movement. By examining the Salafi -jihadist discourse of both foreign and local Salafi s operating in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s and 2000s, the article shows how foreign Salafi s infl uenced and helped shape the ideological framing of local Salafi politicians and rebel jihadist groups. Yet, this article also shows that many of these Salafi -jihadist projects failed to gain broader societal support. They did not resonate with the local populations in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s–2000s. A fi nal section of this article looks at events in the past decade, particularly at developments since the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In this context, the article explains why many young Muslims in Dagestan became themselves foreign fi ghters and travelled to Syria/Iraq to fi ght for and live in the Islamic State. It concludes that Salafi projects, although not indigenous to the region, prospered as a result of the interaction between local Salafi s and foreign jihadist fi ghters and recruiters.
Islamic law denotes as haram any forbidden behavior, object, beverage, or food. Despite subscribing to a similar Salafi ideology, very few jihadi groups use violence against haram targets (e.g., brothels, casinos, statues, liquor stores, mixed sex schools, and gay clubs). This study argues that haram-centered violence unites ethnically-mixed jihadi groups by fostering a superordinate Islamic identity that enables them to overcome their collective action problems. As a result, ethnically-mixed Salafi jihadi groups deploy haram targeting much more than homogenous ones. Using new disaggregated group-level data, our analyses demonstrate that the ethnic structure of Salafi jihadi groups shapes haram targeting, both in Dagestan and on a global scale. The article discusses these findings and directions for future research on religious violence.
Excessive religious attitudes have shown an increasing trend among young people in some research results. This research intends to examine the transmission of anti-pluralism in the digital media space of millennial youth. For this purpose, researchers used a qualitative case study method by collecting data through site observations used by millennials, searching for documents on digital media, and interviews with several youths, some of whom had been influenced by the doctrine of anti-pluralism. The results of this study indicated that adherents of anti-pluralism had transmitted this understanding in the digital space of millennials through hyperlinks between sites. These links are used to transform understandings, among others: anti-difference, sole ruler of truth, thaghut, anti-Pancasila, and revolution. This transmission was an effort to carry out clandestine regeneration with the young millennial generation who are the primary users of this media. Abstrak Sikap keberagamaan berhaluan keras telah menampakkan tren peningkatan di kalangan kaum muda dalam beberapa hasil penelitian. Penelitian ini bermaksud untuk mengkaji tentang transmisi antipluralisme pada ruang media digital kaum muda milenial. Untuk keperluan tersebut, peneliti menggunakan metode kualitatif studi kasus dengan pengumpulan data melalui observasi situs yang dipergunakan oleh kaum millineal, penelusuran dokumen pada media digital, dan wawancara dengan beberapa pemuda yang di antaranya pernah terpengaruh doktrin antipluralisme. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa para penganut antipluralisme telah melakukan transmisi paham tersebut dalam ruang digital kaum milenial melalui tautan (hyperlink) antar situs. Tautan tersebut dimanfaatkan untuk mentransformasikan pemahaman-pemahaman, antara lain: antiperbedaan, thaghut, pemilik kebenaran tunggal, anti-Pancasila, dan revolusi. Arah yang terbaca dari transmisi ini adalah sebagai upaya untuk menjalankan kaderisasi bawah tanah (clandestine) dengan sasaran utama generasi muda milenial yang merupakan pengguna utama media ini.
This chapter focuses on deradicalisation, a concept and a practice that has become popular in initiatives that seek to govern Muslims in the Sahel. A key element in the vocabulary of the state and international organisations operating in the region, deradicalisation emerged in the last decade as a major social engineering project intended to reform Muslims and to rebirth them to positive values and norms. To this end, the deradicalised subjects are expected to “clean up”, “be treated”, “relax their views”, and embrace responsible citizenship. Espousing a developmentalist agenda and philosophy, deradicalisation translates into a strategy that tackles Jihadism and restores good Islam. Both curative and preventive, it is understood as the clinical intervention on both an ailing social body and a lunatic individual subject. That is why it targets individuals and specific groups, such as Imams, preachers, disenfranchised youth, and jihadi prisoners who are perceived as the social base and the main agents of radicalisation. What is the content of this curative intervention? How did this social engineering programme come to represent one of the main lenses through which Muslims are perceived today and in turn experience state policies? What is the interest of examining deradicalisation for an anthropology of Islam and Muslim life in the region? The chapter contends that Sahelian states have embarked on an Islamic reform project through deradicalisation programmes.
Terrorism connected to the North Caucasus has been pervasive in Russia between 1992 and 2018. Based on an original dataset, this article presents statistics on rates of terrorist attacks outside of the North Caucasus, their geography and targets, and the tactics used. It argues that terrorism by North Caucasian insurgents has retained a strategic logic despite their conversion to radical Islamism. Accordingly, the erosion of its strategic logic was the principal factor that determined the end of North Caucasian terrorism is a case that allow analysts to examine.
Introduction and overview over violent mobilization in the North Caucasus: Recent developments and context, conflicting identities, state and sub-state violence, causes and limits of violent mobilization in the region.
This article analyses the mechanisms and the logic behind the large flow of young Dagestani Muslims to the Middle East, to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq-either to fight jihad or simply to live under Shari' a law. It examines the reasons behind the decision taken by many Dagestanis to fight jihad in Syria and Iraq, rather than at home in the North Caucasus, in support of the Caucasus Emirate insurgency. The article addresses this conundrum through the powerful lenses of Social Movement and Collective Framing Theories. It argues that an aggressive ISIS online propaganda campaign framed around effective messages of Muslim victimhood, the glories of the Islamic State, and the duty to carry out jihad-as well as very effective personal face-to-face recruitment efforts carried out by adherents of the Islamic State in Dagestan-played a key role in mobilising young Dagestani Muslims to emigrate to Syria and Iraq. These elements, together with the territorial successes of the Islamic State on the ground seem to account for the significant flow of North Caucasus Muslims, Dagestanis in particular, to the Middle East. Furthermore, for those willing to fight jihad against Russia's 'infidel' regime, cost-benefit analysis argued in favour of joining the fight in Syria and Iraq over fighting at home in Dagestan.
Disengagement from militant groups has often been explained in individual terms such as battle fatigue or the desire to rejoin family and friends. We seek to examine empirically which other factors, beyond individual-level determinants, have influenced disengagement processes among militants belonging to different types of Chechen militant organisations. Drawing empirical insights from unique in-depth interviews with former members of the Chechen insurgency, their relatives, eyewitnesses to the Chechen wars and experts with first-hand knowledge of the researched phenomena, this study examines disengagement among jihadist and nationalist Chechen militants. Focusing on group-level factors, such as the capacity to resist external pressures, the use of violence, in-group social bonds and group cohesion, this article demonstrates that disengagement has been a less viable course of action for Chechen jihadists than for nationalist militants.
In this article, we present the findings of the first systematic scoping review of scientific literature on radicalisation into violent extremism since the al-Qaeda 9/11 attacks in 2001. We selected and categorised all scholarly, peer-reviewed, English-language articles published between 2001 and 2015 that empirically investigated the factors of radicalisation into violent extremism (N = 148). In the analysis we consider two main dependent variables (behavioural and cognitive radicalisation) and three main independent variables (push, pull and personal factors). 'Push' and 'pull' factors of radicalisation emerge as the main factors of radicalisation across studies focused on different geographical areas and ideologies. This article points to the need to focus more on personal factors, especially in developing countries.
Following the collapse of the USSR, a violent jihadist organization called the Caucasus Emirate emerged in Russia, before subsequently splitting up in 2015 when most of its members swore allegiance to the Islamic State. The root causes of violent radicalization are complex but, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), there are certain universal “push factors”: perceptions of injustice, human rights violations, lack of rule of law, social-political exclusion and widespread corruption. Since all the factors coincide in the North Caucasus, the hypothesis of this study is that the lack of rule of law has been one of the main push factors leading to violent extremism in the specific case of the Republic of Ingushetia.
Typically, when analysing contemporary Russian–Chechen conflicts, the relegation of the nationalist struggle to a secondary role by the religious battle waged by the North Caucasus insurgency is pinpointed as one of the fundamental differences between the First and Second War in Chechnya. This article discusses how it was reflected in one of the most important media of the Chechen Islamist insurgency: the Kavkaz Center. To this end, 2859 English language news items posted on the website during 2001–04 were reviewed using media frame analysis.
This essay reviews the copious scholarship on nationality policies and interethnic relations in Russia that has been published in the West since the fall of the USSR. Emphasizing English-language scholarship, the article examines the influential conceptual frameworks and key themes taken up by North American and Western European specialists in the study of Russian nationality questions, both in regard to the Russians themselves as well as the other nationalities living within the Russian Federation. The principal conclusion offered is that Western scholarship on nationality issues in post-Soviet Russia underscores the profoundly ambiguous legacy left by the Soviet period in the national arena.
Insurgencies have proven to be highly adaptive movements that exploit their environments and change and mutate in order to survive. States and international actors have long grappled with ways to thwart such adaptations. In this respect, disengagement initiatives that offer insurgents opportunities for alternative livelihood seem to present a viable mechanism for weakening insurgencies. Analyzing the case of the North Caucasus insurgency, this article examines the interrelation between such variables as insurgent crises, government disengagement programs, and foreign attempts to co-opt the insurgency. It is argued that disengagement programs implemented during the second Chechen conflict prevented the insurgent command from pledging allegiance to Al-Qaeda because insurgents had to preserve their local orientation to compete for their bases of support. In 2014, however, the North Caucasus insurgents pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria as no viable disengagement opportunities existed at the time and their only route for survival was to join a global insurgency.
Drawing on unique interviews with former jihadists from Russia's autonomous republic of Dagestan, this article is the first to examine the impact of ethnicity on jihadist groups' methods of organization and operations, primarily in terms of their target selection, local support, and recruitment and leadership policies. It distinguishes between largely monoethnic rural jamaats—or jihadist groups—and multiethnic urban jamaats, pointing to the contested nature of ethnicity, particularly in the latter group. It examines the steps taken by the leadership of urban jamaats to overcome ethnic cleavages and avoid interethnic tension both within the jihadists' ranks and with regard to the local population. The article illustrates that, as a divisive phenomenon in multiethnic urban jamaats, ethnic identity has been deliberately downplayed by the leadership of these groups at the expense of strengthening supra-ethnic Salafi-jihadist identity. The article also highlights the significance of ethnic identity in jihadist groups, in spite of it being contradictory to Salafi-jihadist doctrine.
The relationship between Muslims and the Russian/Soviet state differs significantly from that in both the Middle East and Western Europe. These differences result from the lengthy historical presence of Islam in Eurasia and its over two centuries long state management first by the Russian Orthodox empire, and then by the Soviet atheist state. Islam made its inroads into what later became known as Russia in the seventh century AD during the period when most proto-Russians1 were still pagans. Islamic beliefs and practices were therefore directly involved, along with Byzantine and Khazar influences, in the formation of Russian cultural, social, and political norms. In the early medieval period Russia’s southern lands experienced a creeping Islamization resulting from proto-Russia’s commercial and military engagements with her more militarily and economically advanced Muslim neighbors, the Volga Bulgaria, in particular. The spread of Islam was facilitated by proto-Russia’s Eurasian location and her largely flat landscape, dominated by steppes and lacking natural geographical boundaries with both Europe and Asia. In the tenth century, the official adoption of Orthodox Christianity by Russian rulers changed the nature of Russian state’s relations with Islam. In the sixteenth century, the continuing territorial expansion of the Orthodox Russian state, including its conquest of the Islamic Kazan Khanate and other Genghizid principalities, shifted the geopolitical balance of power in Eurasia in her favor. In the eighteenth century the Russian empire2 annexed Muslim Crimea and imposed its control over the Kazakh Small Horde.
Does a state's use of indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? The conventional wisdom suggests that it does—Stathis Kalyvas cites dozens of studies and historical cases where collective targeting of the noncombatant population provoked greater insurgent violence. But others have pushed back against this claim. These scholars have made significant advances that allow us to understand and explain when, why, and how the world's militaries have used indiscriminate violence against noncombatants with shocking regularity. This study builds on these contributions. We use interviews we conducted with ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars to provide a critical reexamination of the current theoretical debate concerning indiscriminate violence. In doing so, we argue that treating the concept of indiscriminate violence as an essentially random counter-insurgency tactic obscures the important distinction between random and retributive indiscriminate violence deployed against civilians. The distinction raises crucial questions of location and timing that have hindered efforts to evaluate the efficacy of indiscriminate violence in irregular war.
In December 2014, several high-ranking field commanders from the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz, IK), an insurgent and designated terrorist group in Russia’s North Caucasus, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Following the subsequent defection of many of the IK’s surviving commanders, IS consolidated its regional presence with the establishment of a formal branch, the Caucasus Wilayah (IS/CW). This paper uses Social Movement Theory’s concept of framing to interpret North Caucasus insurgent leaders’ response to the Syrian conflict and identify the differences in the competing factions’ articulated ideologies. It finds that IS/CW leaders have sought to draw on the emotional appeal of the “caliphate” and redirect it back into the local insurgency, while neglecting to articulate alternative tactics or goals. Those leaders who remained loyal to the IK, by contrast, rooted their opposition in jihadi scholarship and rejected the legitimacy of the “caliphate”. However, apparent ideological dif...
While scholarship on Islam in the Caucasus has focused on the late Soviet religious revival – the rise of Salafi jihadism and religious radicalisation in the northern part of these strategic crossroads – no study to date has addressed the discursive struggle over the social functions of regional Islam. This article deconstructs these discourses in order to examine the very varying, and often conflicting, representations of Islam advocated by various actors across the region and within particular republics. The article highlights the contested functions of regional Islam against the background of a religious revival that is still a work in progress.
Three very different forces are contesting social powers in the North Caucasus republics: the ex-nomenklatura from the 1980s reliant on their administrative skills, insider knowledge, and patronage networks; political capitalists or "oligarchs" wielding the weapons of violent entrepreneurship developed in the 1990s; and the social movement of young Islamist zealots rising from the mid-and lower strata in the 2000s. While the fractured elites of ex-nomenklatura and violent entrepreneurs are common results of the Soviet collapse, in the North Caucasus the cultural legacies of Islamic highlanders provided the ideological framing, transnational brokerage, and action repertoire to the third force of antisystemic rebels. The stalemated triangular contention, however, is fraught with state collapse rather than revolution.
While terrorist and insurgent groups have often combined anti-state subversion with ‘purely‘ criminal activities in order to obtain the financial means to wage their ideological struggle, little is known about the transformation of such groups into non-ideological organised crime groups (OCG) with close links to authorities. This holds particularly for jihadist groups that have on ideological grounds ruled out collaboration with their archenemies – ‘infidels’ and ‘apostates’. Using unique ethnographic data from Russia’s Dagestan, this article explores the causes and contexts of the gradual transformation of some of Dagestan’s jihadist units – jamaats – into organised crime groups collaborating with local authorities.
This article provides an in-depth literature review of the different trends and debates in the English academic literature on the violent conflicts in the North Caucasus during the post-Soviet period. This literature review is separated into three major debates and focused on four major themes that consistently appear in the study of violent conflicts in the North Caucasus: nationalism and identity (grievance), criminality and opportunism (greed), repression (revenge and trauma), and religion (radicalization). The first debate concentrates on the structural factors explaining mass mobilization in the North Caucasus following the end of the Soviet Union. The second debate underscores the role of religious radicalization in mobilization patterns in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, as well as its potential links with other conflicts (Afghanistan and Syria) and the importance of suicide bombings. Finally, the third debate focuses on the study of counter-insurgency and counterterrorism, the development of the Caucasus Emirate, and the diffusion of insurgent violence across the region. The article concludes by underlining the need to engage on a larger theorization of violent mobilization in the North Caucasus seeking to integrate structural, organizational and individual variables linking the global dynamics and local specificities of the region.
This article seeks to foster a better understanding of the diffusion of conflict in the North Caucasus. We argue that diffusion of conflict is a dynamic and adaptive process in which outcomes are shaped by the intersection of three social mechanisms—attribution of similarity, brokerage, and outbidding—and the political, social, and religious contexts. We suggest that a distinction should be made between horizontal and vertical processes of diffusion. We also approach the empirical diffusion of conflict from a different perspective, showing that non-Chechen actors have played a key role in both the diffusion process and its outcomes.
Among the consequences of perestroika and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been the rise of ethnic nationalism. In the non-Russian parts of the former USSR this process has been accompanied by the reactivation of clan and other primordial social networks which under Soviet Communism had been in abeyance. This article, based on extensive field research material, examines political and social transformation in post-Communist Kabardino-Balkariya, a Russian Muslim autonomy in the North Caucasus. In particular, it analyses the nature of the nation-building policies of the ruling regime, and its relationship with the clan system. It is also concerned with Islamic revival and Islamic radicalism in the region and their correlation with the Islam-related republican and wider federal policies. The article reveals some grey areas in the current academic debate on ethnicity and nationalism and injects more conceptual syncretism into the study of post-Communist societies.
The aim of this article is to explore and analyze the role of foreign fighters in the recent episodes of Russo–Chechen violence in the North Caucasus. The article begins by offering a preliminary theoretical consideration of foreign fighters, indicating how the events in Afghanistan combined with the development of a Salafi-Jihadist movement that would shape subsequent conflicts in the North Caucasus throughout the 1990s. The article will then move on to identify the role of Arab foreign fighters in Chechnya, demonstrating how a complex local and global social networks enable and motivate volunteers.
A genealogy of the radical ideas that underline al-Qaeda's justification for violence shows that the development of jihadi thought over the past several decades is char-acterized by the erosion of critical constraints used to limit warfare and violence in classical Islam. This erosion is illustrated by the evolution of jihadi arguments re-lated to apostasy and waging jihad at home, global jihad, civilian targeting, and suicide bombings.
Since 2006 there has been a significant reduction in the level of fighting in the Russian republic of Chechnya between federal troops and Chechen rebels, indicating a substantial weakening of the insurgency. However, violence in the region has not entirely subsided; indeed, it has been spreading to neighbouring regions in the North Caucasus. Today, a loose network of formally autonomous violent groups, or Islamic jamaats, has developed throughout the North Caucasus, primarily in the Muslim republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Islamic ideals seem to guide and inspire much of the terrorist violence, although they are intermingled with deep nationalist sentiments, especially among rebel groups in Chechnya. However, the intricacies of the violence in the North Caucasus are much more complex, and are only partially related to the spread of radical Islam and separatist aspirations. Other underlying factors, such as the perpetuation of discredited and corrupt ruling elites, the persistence of severe economic hardship, youth unemployment and social alienation, and the absence of proper and effective channels of political expression are also driving the violence. Although hardly ever reported by the western media, events in the North Caucasus have significant implications for Europe and the wider world. The enlargement of the European Union and the inclusion of Ukraine and the three South Caucasian states into the EU neighbourhood policy have brought these countries and the adjacent areas of the North Caucasus closer to the EU. As a result, events in the North Caucasus are no longer the sole remit of countries in the region. There is a risk that instability and violence in the North Caucasus may spread into areas that are of growing significance not only to Europe, but also to the United States and the Atlantic alliance.
For decades, a new type of terrorism has been quietly gathering ranks in the world. America's ability to remain oblivious to these new movements ended on September 11, 2001. The Islamist fanatics in the global Salafi jihad (the violent, revivalist social movement of which al Qaeda is a part) target the West, but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people of all races and religions throughout the world. Marc Sageman challenges conventional wisdom about terrorism, observing that the key to mounting an effective defense against future attacks is a thorough understanding of the networks that allow these new terrorists to proliferate. Based on intensive study of biographical data on 172 participants in the jihad, Understanding Terror Networks gives us the first social explanation of the global wave of activity. Sageman traces its roots in Egypt, gestation in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war, exile in the Sudan, and growth of branches worldwide, including detailed accounts of life within the Hamburg and Montreal cells that planned attacks on the United States. U.S. government strategies to combat the jihad are based on the traditional reasons an individual was thought to turn to terrorism: poverty, trauma, madness, and ignorance. Sageman refutes all these notions, showing that, for the vast majority of the mujahedin, social bonds predated ideological commitment, and it was these social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. These men, isolated from the rest of society, were transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill. The tight bonds of family and friendship, paradoxically enhanced by the tenuous links between the cell groups (making it difficult for authorities to trace connections), contributed to the jihad movement's flexibility and longevity. And although Sageman's systematic analysis highlights the crucial role the networks played in the terrorists' success, he states unequivocally that the level of commitment and choice to embrace violence were entirely their own. Understanding Terror Networks combines Sageman's scrutiny of sources, personal acquaintance with Islamic fundamentalists, deep appreciation of history, and effective application of network theory, modeling, and forensic psychology. Sageman's unique research allows him to go beyond available academic studies, which are light on facts, and journalistic narratives, which are devoid of theory. The result is a profound contribution to our understanding of the perpetrators of 9/11 that has practical implications for the war on terror. Copyright
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Islamskie obshchini Severnogo Kavkaza: ideologiya i praktika', Caucasian Knot
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Islam and Ethno-Nationalism in the North Western Caucasus Islamic Radicalisation in the Post-Soviet Space
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Aslan Maskhadov: Rossiya uzhe perebrala vse sredstva davleniya na Chechnyu
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Al Qaeda, Transnational Jihadis, and the Chechen Resistance: Assessing the Role of Chechnya in the War on Terror
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Kredo Wahhabita Evraziya: lyudi i mify
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The Will of Abdullaah Yusuf AzzamJoin the Caravan
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‘Will the Rebels Declare the “Caucasian Emirate
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Sufizm i Wakhkhabizm na Severnom Kavkaze, Issledovaniya po prikladnoi i neotlozhnoi etnologii
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The Glitter and Poverty of Chechen Islam The Security of the Caspian Sea Region
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Milestones (Damascus, Dar al-Ilm)
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‘Strategy and Perspectives on Dokku Umarov's Rapprochement with the Radicals
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Islamskoe vozrozhdenie v sovremennoi Kabardino-Balkarii: perspektivy i posledstviya
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‘Kto i zachem eksportiroval vakhkhabism v Chechniu
- V Akaev
‘The Will of Abdullaah Yusuf Azzam
- A Azzam
‘Sovremennye islamskie dvizhenii na Severnom Kavkaze: obshchie tendentsii i razlichiya
- A A Yarlykapov
- I Babich
- A Yarlykapov
‘Religiozno-prosvetitel'skaya rol’ gazety “Zori Islama
- V Akaev
Join the Caravan: Part 3: Clarifications About the Issue of Jihad Today
- A Azzam
‘Nedosoyavsheesya vozrozhdenie umerennogo islamizma v Dagestane
- D Makarov