ArticlePDF Available

On the ontological status of autism: The 'double empathy problem'

DOI:10.1080/09687599.2012.710008
Authors:
Damian Milton at University of Kent
Damian Milton
Download full-text PDF
Read full-text
Download citation

Abstract

In recent decades there has been much debate over the ontological status of autism and other neurological ‘disorders', diagnosed by behavioural indicators, and theorised primarily within the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychological paradigms. Such cognitive-behavioural discourses abstain from acknowledging the universal issue of relationality and interaction in the formation of a contested and constantly reconstructed social reality, produced through the agency of its ‘actors'. The nature of these contested interactions will be explored in this current issues piece through the use of the term the ‘double empathy problem', and how such a rendition produces a critique of autism being defined as a deficit in ‘theory of mind', re-framing such issues as a question of reciprocity and mutuality. In keeping with other autistic self-advocates, this piece will refer to ‘autistic people', and ‘those who identify as on the autism spectrum', rather than ‘people with autism'.
Content uploaded by Damian Milton
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Damian Milton on Oct 26, 2021
Content may be subject to copyright.
CURRENT ISSUES
On the Ontological Status of Autism: the ‘Double Empathy Problem’.
Damian E M Milton*
University of Birmingham
(Received 8th June 2012; final version received xxxxxxx)
Abstract
In recent decades there has been much debate over the ontological status of autism and other
neurological ‘disorders’, diagnosed by behavioural indicators, and theorised primarily
within the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychological paradigms. Such cognitive-
behavioural discourses abstain from acknowledging the universal issue of relationality and
interaction in the formation of a contested and constantly reconstructed social reality,
produced through the agency of its ‘actors’ (Garfinkel, 1967). The nature of these contested
interactions will be explored in this current issues piece through the use of the term the
‘double empathy problem’ (Milton 2011a), and how such a rendition produces a critique of
autism being defined as a deficit in ‘theory of mind’, re-framing such issues as a question of
reciprocity and mutuality. In keeping with other autistic self-advocates, this piece will refer
to ‘autistic people’, and ‘those who identify as on the autism spectrum’, rather than ‘people
with autism’ (Sinclair, 1993).
Introduction
Socrates: ...Can you point out any compelling rhetorical reason why he should have put his
arguments together in the order that he has?
Phaedrus: You do me too much honour if you suppose that I am capable of divining his
motives so exactly. (Plato, 1973: 78).
In recent decades there has been much debate over the ontological status of autism and other
neurological ‘disorders’, diagnosed by behavioural indicators, and theorised primarily within
the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychological paradigms. The triad of dominant
theories that include: theory of mind deficit, executive dysfunction, and weak central
Corresponding author. Email: damianmilton.sociology@yahoo.com
coherence theory, as well as behavioural diagnosis and behavioural psychological
intervention paradigms; all position autism as a neurological disorder, a pathological
deviance from expected functional stages of development. This approach when applied to the
education of those diagnosed becomes a ‘treatment program’ of modifying the ‘autistic
person’ as ‘best one can’ to fit in with the mainstream culture of society. Such views are
informed by research that champions the use of the randomised controlled trial, yet discounts
the subjective experiences of those who identify as being on the autism spectrum themselves
as worthy of rigorous academic study. Such cognitive-behavioural discourses abstain from
acknowledging the universal issue of relationality and interaction in the formation of a
contested and constantly reconstructed social reality, produced through the agency of its
‘actors’. The nature of these contested interactions will be explored in this current issues
piece through the use of the term the ‘double empathy problem’ (Milton 2011a), and how
such a rendition produces a critique of autism being defined as a deficit in ‘theory of mind’
and social interaction, re-framing such issues as a question of reciprocity and mutuality.
Assumptions of social relationality
The inability to ‘read’ the subtext of a social situation is often deemed to be a major feature
of those diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum, yet it is suggested here that social
subtext is never fully given as a set of a priori circumstances, but is actively constructed by
social agents engaged in material and mental production. There is a tendency in the
application of positivist methodologies in cognitive psychology and science to incorrectly
assume that there is a set of definable social norms and rules that exist for people to follow.
This ideology is also supported more explicitly by functionalist sociologists. This is not the
philosophy propounded by those of a phenomenological or ethnomethodological persuasion
however. The ‘theory of mind’ and ‘empathy’ so lauded in normative psychological models
of human interaction, refers to the ability a ‘neuro-typical’ (NT) individual has to assume
understandings of the mental states and motives of other people. When such ‘empathy’ is
applied toward an ‘autistic person’ however, it is often wildly inaccurate in its measure. Such
attempts are often felt as invasive, imposing and threatening by an ‘autistic person’,
especially when protestations to the contrary are ignored by the NT doing the ‘empathising’.
The ‘double empathy problem’: A disjuncture in reciprocity between two differently disposed
social actors which becomes more marked the wider the disjuncture in dispositional
perceptions of the lifeworld - perceived as a breach in the 'natural attitude' of what
constitutes 'social reality' for ‘neuro-typical’ people and yet an everyday and often traumatic
experience for ‘autistic people’.
To expand on the above definition, the ‘double empathy problem’ refers to a breach in the
‘natural attitude’ that occurs between people of different dispositional outlooks and personal
conceptual understandings when attempts are made to communicate meaning. In a sense it is
a 'double problem' as both people experience it, and so it is not a singular problem located in
any one person. Rather, it is based in the social interaction between two differently disposed
social actors, the disjuncture being more severe for the non-autistic disposition as it is
experienced as unusual, while for the ‘autistic person’ it is a common experience (Milton,
2011b). The ‘empathy’ problem being a ‘two-way street’ has been mentioned by both
‘autistic writers’ (Sinclair, 1993) and NT writers alike (Hacking, 2009), yet despite such
protestations, the ‘lack of theory of mind’ myth persists.
The stigma of being ‘othered’ and the normalisation agenda
To be defined as abnormal is potentially to be seen as 'pathological' in some way and to be
socially stigmatised, shunned, and sanctioned. Then if there is a breakdown in interaction, or
indeed a failed attempt to impose upon or align toward expressions of meaning, than a person
who sees their interactions as 'normal' and 'correct' can denigrate those who act or are
perceived of as ‘different’ (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). If one can apply a label on the ‘other’
locating the problem in them, it also resolves the applier of the label’s ‘natural attitude’ of
responsibility in their own perceptions and the breach is healed perceptually, but not for the
person who has been 'othered' (Said, 1978).
Internalised oppression and psycho-emotional disablement
The imposition of one’s views upon another and the subsequent internalisation of this view
can be seen to be a form of internalised oppression, where the negative connotations of the
normative model of pathological difference becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy (Becker,
1963), leading to a self-imposed psycho-emotional disablement (Reeve, 2011). For those who
resist such self-identifications and attempts to normalise, however ‘well intentioned’, are
experienced as an 'invasion' of the ‘autistic’ ‘lifeworld’ by people wanting to modify one’s
behaviour to suit their purposes and not one’s own (Milton and Lm, 2012).
Autism and knowledge production
Although compared to many categorisations of disability, autism has attained a great deal
more public attention and that one could say that the label has become a fetishised
commodity and even a global industry (Mallet, 2011), yet it is an industry that silences the
autistic voice from any participation, other than in the form of a tokenistic gesture. Therefore,
far from owning the means of mental production about one’s own culture, the ‘autistic
individual’ becomes the 'product' of the industry, the 'thing' that is 'intervened' with. 'Services'
are provided for the carer's of ‘autistic people’ with often little attention given to the needs of
the ‘autistic person’ as they perceive them to be. Autism is not just an ‘invisible disability’ to
many in terms of a behavioural definition, the ‘autistic voice’ is made ‘invisible’ within the
current culture of how knowledge produced about ‘autistic people’ often excludes
empowered ‘autistic advocates’ from such processes.
Implications for service providers
There is a spectrum in theory and practice more generally regarding service provision for
‘autistic people’, between at one end those adhering to techniques of behavioural
modification, so that children are socialised into what are deemed appropriate behaviours of
socially functional future roles. At the other extreme of this spectrum is an ethos of
interactive mutuality concerned with the empowerment of individuals and communities, and
where dominance and imposition of authority is seen as ‘dysfunctional’. Expressions of these
extremes could be said to be found more frequently in discourses regarding best educational
practice for ‘autistic people’, ranging from the efforts of the Lovaas model of Applied
Behavioural Analysis, through to child-focused and democratic educational ideological
preferences. These narratives and practices can be said to be embedded within the wider
discursive debate that exists between the medical and social models of disability as played
out in the field of autism. It is the view of this author that there is an increasing complacency
around the idea that lead professionals and practitioners have a good understanding of what
'good autism practice' entails, for me this is an ongoing imperfect process of interaction and
should never be seen as a given.
Conclusion
The lack of 'social insight' seen to be manifested in the actions of ‘autistic people’ is both
biologically and socially derived, and yet is also historically and culturally situated in
discourse. The experience of a lack of realisation or the lack of insight is a very common one
in social interactions of many varieties however, and leads to the ‘double empathy problem’
between differently disposed social actors. Such divergences of perception are inevitable to a
greater or lesser extent. So it is true that autistic people often lack insight about NT
perceptions and culture, yet it is equally the case that NT people lack insight into the minds
and culture of ‘autistic people’, or that they may lack social insight in other social situations
due to an easily repaired natural attitude, and the aligning tendencies of their peers. One
could say that many autistic people have indeed gained a greater level of insight into NT
society and mores than vice versa, perhaps due to the need to survive and potentially thrive in
a NT culture. Conversely, the NT person has no pertinent personal requirement to understand
the mind of the ‘autistic person’ unless closely related socially in some way.
In analysing the interactions that ‘autistic people’ have with the wider population, it is easy to
problematise the definition of autism as a ‘social deficit’ located within an individual’s mind.
Differences in neurology may well produce differences in sociality, but not a ‘social deficit’
as compared to an idealised normative view of social reality. Such definitions may help to
signpost disability support services, but they are no way of defining autism in any kind of
holistic sense.
Socrates: But suppose the words used are ‘just’ and ‘good’. Don’t we then go each his own
way, and find ourselves in disagreement with ourselves as well as with each other?
Phaedrus: Undoubtedly. (Plato, 1973: 77).
References
Becker, H. (1963) Outsiders. New York: The Free Press.
Garfinkel, H. (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Hacking, I. (2009) “Autistic autobiography”, in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society: Biological Sciences, Vol. 364(1522): 1467-1473.
Mallet, R. (2011) ‘Buying New Normals?: When Impairment Categories Become
Commodities’, Theorising Normalcy and the Mundane, 2nd International Conference.
Manchester Metropolitan University.
Milton, D. (2011a) 'Who am I meant to be': in search of a psychological model of autism
from the viewpoint of an 'insider'. Critical Autism Seminar 18/01/11. Sheffield Hallam
University.
Milton, D. (2011b) ‘”Filling in the gaps”, a micro-sociological analysis of autism’.
Theorising Normalcy and the Mundane, 2nd International Conference. Manchester
Metropolitan University.
Milton, D. and Lm (2012) ‘“They judge me on the bit they can see...”: how normative
practices have led to the psycho-emotional disablement of autistic people’, Critical Disability
Discourse (in review).
Murray, D., Lesser, M. and Lawson, W. (2005) ‘Attention, monotropism and the diagnostic
criteria for autism.’ Autism. Vol. 9(2), pp. 136-156.
Plato, trans. Hamilton, W. (1973) Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII. London: Penguin.
Reeve, D. (2011) ‘Ableism within disability studies: The myth of the reliable and contained
body.’ Theorising Normalcy and the Mundane, 2nd International Conference. Manchester
Metropolitan University.
Said, E. (1978) Orientalism. London: Vintage Press.
Sinclair, J. (1993) “Don’t Mourn For Us”, http://www.autreat.com/dont_mourn.html, -
accessed 10/11/09.
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. (1979) An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In D. Langbridge
and S. Taylor (ed’s) Critical Readings in Social Psychology. Milton Keynes: Open
University.
... However, in reality, very little is known about autistic abilities to generate metaphors and some research findings directly contradict this (Kasier & Mashal, 2014). Furthermore, autistic people are widely believed to operate in "I-it" relativity which the allistic do not understand and which arises as a consequence of the double empathy problem (Milton, 2012). The actual questions should be about capacity and the prospect of benefit for the participants before automatically assuming vulnerability by virtue of ableist assumptions. ...
... Mckemmish et al. (2012) refer to this as the challenges and complexities of the double hermeneutic spiral and in this light, there should be no doubt that narratives can be understood in hybrid forms because nature leaves space for the 'making' of imitation (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 47). There must be recognition after all, that autism research is particularly at odds with the double hermeneutic problem because the majority of studies look to science to categorize autistic people and explain autistic behavioral phenomena through the lens of quantitative data (Milton, 2012;Ridout, 2017). ...
... There is then a deep frustration felt by the autistic community, particularly as research continues to focus on the medical model of autism and represents a narrow, deficit-focused approach which the community is keen to dispel (Den Houting et al., 2022;Petersen, 2011;Ridout, 2017;Van Den Hoonard, 2016;Ridout et al., 2011). Certainly, there is work to be done here in building researchers' confidence to challenge those perceived systemic issues which are seen to prohibit participatory research and it could be argued that allisticness, aligned with Milton's (2012) double empathy problem, will continue to function as a visible category of humanity, providing neurotypical reasons for this displacement (Tolich, 2016). The point is that we are continuing to bear witness to what are the products of ableism; inherited with it an autism research agenda that is (i) inflexible and over-scrutinizes autistic research participants, (ii) captures autistic representation anecdotally if at all, and iii) obscures autistic voice due to differing priorities. ...
“Te Kore and the Artiste within: De-Tyrannizing Autistic Viewpoints in Life, Self, and Identity through Creative Methodologies”
Article
Full-text available
  • Jul 2023
The voices of the autistic community have been systematically forfeited in research and practice, both as a consequence of the double empathy problem and, as a direct result of albeist methodic approaches to researching and representing autism (Milton, 2012., Goodley, 2016, 2018., Heilker & Yergeau, 2011., Hobson et al, 2022., Ridout, 2017). Methodologically speaking, autism creates challenges for allistic researchers, particularly as there is an associated “exaggerated risk” of researching autistic people and as researchers frequently study and thus experience autism, from etic perspectives (Van De Hoonard, 2016, p. 585). This paper contends that these challenges have resulted in a lack of flexibility in methodologies designed to protect those at risk of harm, creating disproportionate fear and an over-surveillance of autistic research participants, despite their potential. Inertia is a direct consequence of this, which manifests itself twofold. Firstly, as the struggle researchers have in capturing meaningful and authentic autistic representation and secondly, of the methodic implications autistic inertia presents. What is suggested, therefore, is a subversion of homogeneous ways of knowing from the production of quasi-aesthetic representations of autistic voice, favoring those creative methodologies which appreciate that autism is not experienced diachronically. As to capture the realities of contemporary autistic life, dividing practices of ableism must be challenged (Goodley, 2018). Therefore, by centralizing autistic research participants as “insiders” to autistic worlds, researchers will have to lay aside academic habits and rethink, heuristically, how to privilege unobscured autistic voices through transabelism (Garland-Thompson, 2005). For in order to carve out hybrid dilatory spaces from which autistic people can develop their narrative capital, a transableist agenda must be pushed. What will ensue are creative and flexible methodologies that align with social justice beliefs and resist methodic stasis and inertia; as decisions to explore the lifeworlds we experience, as autists, comes with no modus operandi.
View
... This does not disregard the possibility that autistic people can sometimes experience difficulties with communication -or engage in different communication strategies compared with many non-autistic people -but rather challenges the notion that the communication 'problem' lies solely with the autistic person. Specifically, the double empathy problem framework proposes that reciprocal interactions can breakdown due to a lack of mutual understanding when people process sensory (and social) information differently (Milton, 2012;Milton et al., 2018). Building on Milton's ideas, the dialogical misattunement hypothesis dismisses the idea that social difficulties in autism stem from 'disordered' autistic brains, but rather from a cumulative mismatch in the interpersonal dynamics between two people (Bolis et al., 2017). ...
Autistic young people adaptively use gaze to facilitate joint attention during multi-gestural dyadic interactions
Article
  • Nov 2023
Autistic people often experience difficulties navigating face-to-face social interactions. Historically, the empirical literature has characterised these difficulties as cognitive ‘deficits’ in social information processing. However, the empirical basis for such claims is lacking, with most studies failing to capture the complexity of social interactions, often distilling them into singular communicative modalities (e.g. gaze-based communication) that are rarely used in isolation in daily interactions. The current study examined how gaze was used in concert with communicative hand gestures during joint attention interactions. We employed an immersive virtual reality paradigm, where autistic (n = 22) and non-autistic (n = 22) young people completed a collaborative task with a non-autistic confederate. Integrated eye-, head- and hand-motion-tracking enabled dyads to communicate naturally with each other while offering objective measures of attention and behaviour. Autistic people in our sample were similarly, if not more, effective in responding to hand-cued joint attention bids compared with non-autistic people. Moreover, both autistic and non-autistic people demonstrated an ability to adaptively use gaze information to aid coordination. Our findings suggest that the intersecting fields of autism and social neuroscience research may have overstated the role of eye gaze during coordinated social interactions.
View
... We speculate that conceptualizing conversations as complex adaptive systems might provide a more inclusive perspective and ultimately a deeper understanding of such atypicality, and the interactional failures and successes involved. Neurodiversity might pose diverse constraints on conversations, including mismatched expectations (Milton, 2012;Milton, Gurbuz, & López, 2022), which might lead to diverse and perhaps mismatched use of conversational strategies across both interlocutors (Di Paolo, Cuffari, & De Jaegher, 2018). By developing a more nuanced and systematic understanding of conversational patterns across diverse constraints, we can provide a much better insight into how these patterns might differ in conversations involving neurodiverse people and the potential impact of this diversity. ...
Language‐Specific Constraints on Conversation: Evidence from Danish and Norwegian
Article
Full-text available
  • Nov 2023
Establishing and maintaining mutual understanding in everyday conversations is crucial. To do so, people employ a variety of conversational devices, such as backchannels, repair, and linguistic entrainment. Here, we explore whether the use of conversational devices might be influenced by cross‐linguistic differences in the speakers’ native language, comparing two matched languages—Danish and Norwegian—differing primarily in their sound structure, with Danish being more opaque, that is, less acoustically distinguished. Across systematically manipulated conversational contexts, we find that processes supporting mutual understanding in conversations vary with external constraints: across different contexts and, crucially, across languages. In accord with our predictions, linguistic entrainment was overall higher in Danish than in Norwegian, while backchannels and repairs presented a more nuanced pattern. These findings are compatible with the hypothesis that native speakers of Danish may compensate for its opaque sound structure by adopting a top‐down strategy of building more conversational redundancy through entrainment, which also might reduce the need for repairs. These results suggest that linguistic differences might be met by systematic changes in language processing and use. This paves the way for further cross‐linguistic investigations and critical assessment of the interplay between cultural and linguistic factors on the one hand and conversational dynamics on the other.
View
... 43,44 While autistic individuals may not display non-autistic markers of empathy and may misunderstand non-autistic social norms, they still feel empathy acutely 45 and misunderstandings are bidirectional: non-autistic individuals also often misinterpret autistic social expressions and behaviors. [46][47][48] Results should be interpreted considering the following strengths and limitations. This is the first study to investigate the PAUSS longitudinally, and to include both SSD-siblings and TCs. ...
A Cross-sectional Conceptual Replication and Longitudinal Evaluation of the PANSS-Autism-Severity-Score Measure Suggests it Does Not Capture Autistic Traits in Individuals With Psychosis
Article
Full-text available
Background Autism and psychosis co-occur at elevated rates, with implications for clinical outcomes, functioning, and suicidality. The PANSS-Autism-Severity-Score (PAUSS) is a measure of autism trait severity which has not yet been validated externally or longitudinally. Study Design Participants were derived from the GROUP and SCOPE datasets. Participants included 1448 adults with schizophrenia spectrum disorder (SSD), 800 SSD-siblings, 103 adults diagnosed with an autistic spectrum condition (ASC), and 409 typically-developing controls (TC). Analyses from the original validation study were conducted with SSD participants, and extended into ASC, SSD-sibling, and TC participants. Test–retest reliability of the PAUSS at 2-weeks and long-term stability 3 and 6-years was also examined. Study Results Results differed in important ways from the original validation. SSD participants reported higher PAUSS scores than other groups, with only a fraction of ASC participants scoring as “PAUSS-Autistic.” Cronbach’s alpha was acceptable for the SSD cohort only. Two-week stability of the PAUSS was fair to good for all PAUSS scores. Long-term stability was poor for most PAUSS items but fair for total PAUSS score. Conclusions Results suggest that the PAUSS does not appear appropriate for assessing autism, with the low rate of PAUSS-Autistic in the ASC population suggesting the PAUSS may not accurately reflect characteristics of autism. The relative lack of long-term stability is cause for concern and suggestive that the PAUSS is capturing features of psychosis rather than autism traits.
View
View
View
Rethinking anxiety and depression for autistic adults through personal narratives: A mixed‐method analysis of blog data
Article
  • Nov 2023
Background Autistic adults appear to be more vulnerable to anxiety and depression than their neurotypical peers. However, definitions of emotional well‐being that are suitable for autistic adults are missing from this research, along with a missing complete understanding of what contributes to and alleviates negative emotions. Methods Autistic adults' experiences of emotions were systematically searched for within blog data from 26 autistic authors. The search strategy identified the context of emotions, without adhering to a priori definitions. Corpus‐based and thematic analyses explored the most salient contributing factors and coping responses. Consultation with autistic adults directed the research. Results Negative emotions were most salient and were accompanied by qualifying descriptions of being intense and misrepresented by single‐word labels. The impacts of negative emotions were pain and fatigue, disrupted self‐care, housing and employment, and an accumulated toll on self‐identity. Emotional regulation was achieved through monitoring physiological arousal, ownership of sensory and social stressors, investing in immersive activities, planning what to expect from daily life and rejecting deficit‐based views of autism. Conclusions The findings offer some explanation for high estimates of anxiety and depression for autistic adults, by illustrating the unsuitability of neuronormative emotion concepts and assessment tools. There are significant implications for clinical practice, insisting on a formulation of difference rather than outdated practice that foregrounds deficit and disorder. We do not suggest that these views reflect the experiences of all autistic people. This study contributes a creative and participatory method to hear the viewpoint of autistic adults. A well‐being resource is shared.
View
Evaluating a new supported employment internship programme for autistic young adults without intellectual disability
Article
Supported employment initiatives have been shown to increase employment rates for autistic people who want to enter the workforce. Despite the success of supported employment initiatives in increasing employment rates, little is known about the first-hand experiences and views of those involved. In the current study, we examined the experiences and views of autistic young adults without intellectual disability (‘interns’), employers and parents regarding a previously unevaluated paid internship scheme that offers tailored support for interns and employers before, during and after the internship, the Employ Autism network. In total, 51 participants (19 interns, 22 employers, 10 parents), across eight internships, engaged in semi-structured interviews. Reflexive thematic analysis was used to identify three themes, shared across participant groups: (1) the internship was ‘an invaluable experience’, (2) the internship helped break down autism-specific barriers to employment and (3) stakeholder groups had some unmet expectations. Drawing on this multi-informant qualitative evaluation of a novel supported employment scheme, we derive recommendations of best practice for supported employment initiatives for autistic young adults without intellectual disability. Lay abstract Internships designed for autistic people can help them to find employment, but there is little research about the experiences of those involved with internship schemes. To learn more about a new paid internship scheme in the United Kingdom, the Employ Autism network, we interviewed 19 interns, who were autistic young adults without intellectual disability taking part in one of eight different internships. We also interviewed 22 employers (who worked with the interns), and 10 parents (who supported their children in the internship). The interns, employers and parents told us that the Employ Autism network was a valuable experience that helped the interns become more confident. Also, the parents said it helped the interns become more independent. All the groups said the Employ Autism network removed common barriers to employment, and interns and parents said it would help interns get a job in future. Employers and interns said they understood each other better during the internship, and employers said the internship made them think about how their organisations might have accidentally had barriers in place that could stop autistic people getting employed (barriers that they wanted to address in future). However, all groups said some expectations of the internship were not met. These findings suggest the Employ Autism network is helpful for autistic young adults without intellectual disability and employers, but that there are ways that the internships could be improved in future. We discuss the lessons we can learn from the Employ Autism network that might help others who are thinking about setting up, or getting involved in, similar internship schemes.
View
View
Social motor synchrony in autism spectrum conditions: A systematic review
Article
Full-text available
  • Nov 2023
Some researchers suggest difficulties synchronising with a partner could underpin the social differences associated with Autism Spectrum Condition, potentially acting as a marker for autism. Social Motor Synchrony (SMS) is one aspect of synchrony that could augment observational diagnostic procedures. However, the full breadth of literature examining SMS in autism has not been systematically reviewed. A systematic review following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis guidelines yielded 29 papers meeting inclusion criteria. Of 21 studies including a comparison group, all indicated weaker SMS between two autistic partners and in mixed-neurotype partnerships compared with two non-autistic partners. Papers involving mixed-neurotype pairs without a comparison group showed higher than chance SMS and demonstrated an increase in SMS over time following rhythm-based interventions. Although research so far demonstrates weaker SMS in pairs involving an autistic partner compared with non-autistic pairs, we identified several limitations which may have influenced SMS in autistic people and their partners. Further work is needed with autistic partnerships, more natural and preferred tasks within comfortable settings and partnerships, and more work to identify the basis of synchrony differences. We set out implications for design of further research. Lay abstract When two people interact, they often fall into sync with one another by moving their bodies at the same time. Some say autistic people are not as good as non-autistic people at moving at the same time as a partner. This has led some researchers to ask whether measuring synchrony might help diagnose autism. We reviewed the research so far to look at differences in Social Motor Synchrony (SMS) (the way we move together) between autistic people and people they interact with. The research suggests that interactions involving an autistic partner (either two autistic partners, or an autistic and non-autistic partner) show lower synchrony than a non-autistic pair. However, we recognised elements in the research so far that may have affected SMS in interactions involving an autistic person. One way SMS may have been affected in research so far might be the way interactions have been set up in the research studies. Few papers studied interactions between two autistic people or looked at synchrony in comfortable environments with autistic-preferred tasks. The studies also do not explain why synchrony might be different, or weaker, in pairs involving autistic partners. We use these limitations to suggest improvements for future research.
View
Autistic autobiography
Article
Full-text available
Autism narratives are not just stories or histories, describing a given reality. They are creating the language in which to describe the experience of autism, and hence helping to forge the concepts in which to think autism. This paper focuses on a series of autobiographies that began with Grandin's Emergence. These are often said to show us autism from the 'inside'. The paper proposes that instead they are developing ways to describe experience for which there is little pre-existing language. Wittgenstein has many well-known aphorisms about how we understand other people directly, without inference. They condense what he had found in Wolfgang Köhler's Gestalt Psychology. These phenomena of direct understanding what other people are doing are, Köhler wrote, 'the common property and practice of mankind'. They are not the common property and practice of people with autism. Ordinary language is rich in age-old ways to describe what others are thinking, feeling and so forth. Köhler's phenomena are the bedrock on which such language rests. There is no such discourse for autism, because Köhler's phenomena are absent. But a new discourse is being made up right now, i.e. ways of talking for which the autobiographies serve as working prototypes.
View
Attention, monotropism and the diagnostic criteria for autism
Article
Full-text available
The authors conclude from a range of literature relevant to the autistic condition that atypical strategies for the allocation of attention are central to the condition. This assertion is examined in the context of recent research, the diagnostic criteria for autism in DSM-IV and ICD-10, and the personal experiences of individuals with autism including one of the authors of the article. The first two diagnostic criteria are shown to follow from the 'restricted range of interests' referred to in the third criterion. Implications for practice are indicated.
View
An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict
Chapter
  • Jan 1979
Organizational Identity presents the classic works on organizational identity alongside more current thinking on the issues. Ranging from theoretical contributions to empirical studies, the readings in this volume address the key issues of organizational identity, and show how these issues have developed through contributions from such diverse fields of study as sociology, psychology, management studies and cultural studies. The readings examine questions such as how organizations understand who they are, why organizations develop a sense of identity and belonging where the boundaries of identity lie and the implications of postmodern and critical theories' challenges to the concept of identity as deeply-rooted and authentic. Includes work by: Stuart Albert, Mats Alvesson, Blake E. Ashforth, Marilynn B. Brewer, George Cheney, Lars Thoger Christensen, C.H. Cooley, Kevin G. Corley, Barbara Czarniawska, Janet M. Dukerich, Jane E. Dutton, Kimberly D. Elsbach, Wendi Gardner, Linda E. Ginzela, Dennis A. Gioia, E. Goffman, Karen Golden-Biddle, Mary Jo Hatch, Roderick M. Kramer, Fred Rael, G.H. Mead, Michael G. Pratt, Anat Rafaeli, Hayagreeva Rao, Majken Schultz, Howard S. Schwartz, Robert I. Sutton, Henri Taijfel, John Turner, David A. Wherren, and Hugh Willmott. Intended to provide easy access to this material for students of organizational identity, it will also be of interest more broadly to students of business, sociology and psychology.
View
View
View
View
Filling in the gaps", a micro-sociological analysis of autism
  • Jan 2011
  • D Milton
Milton, D. (2011b) '"Filling in the gaps", a micro-sociological analysis of autism'.
They judge me on the bit they can see …': How normative prac-tices have led to the psycho-emotional disablement of autistic people. Critical Disability Discourse in review. Plato. 1973. Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII
  • Jan 2012
  • D Milton
  • Lm
Milton, D. and Lm. 2012. 'They judge me on the bit they can see …': How normative prac-tices have led to the psycho-emotional disablement of autistic people. Critical Disability Discourse in review. Plato. 1973. Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII. Trans. W. Hamilton. London: Penguin.
Ableism within disability studies: The myth of the reliable and contained body
  • Jan 2011
  • D Reeve
Reeve, D. (2011) 'Ableism within disability studies: The myth of the reliable and contained body.' Theorising Normalcy and the Mundane, 2 nd International Conference. Manchester Metropolitan University.
Buying new normals?: When impairment categories become commodities. Paper presented at the Theorising Normalcy and the Mundane 2nd International Confer-ence
  • Oct 2011
  • 14-15
  • R Mallet
Mallet, R. 2011. Buying new normals?: When impairment categories become commodities. Paper presented at the Theorising Normalcy and the Mundane 2nd International Confer-ence, September 14–15, in Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.