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Ukraine's relations with the West since the Orange Revolution

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This article argues that many of Ukraine's problems are long-standing and remain unresolved because government policies are virtual (i.e. do not conform to official documents or statements) thereby reducing the effectiveness of the West's (here understood primarily as NATO and the EU) engagement with Ukraine and the ability of Kyiv to pursue its declared foreign policy objectives. The article discusses Ukraine's relations with the West through cycles of Disinterest, Partnership and Disillusionment. Under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma three cycles equated to Kravchuk's presidency (Disinterest, 1991–94), Kuchma's first term (Partnership, 1994–99) and second term (Disillusionment, 2000–04). Three cycles partially repeated itself during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency with Partnership (2005–06) after the Orange Revolution followed by Disillusionment (2007–09), often described as ‘Ukraine fatigue’. US Disinterest in Ukraine from 2009 is an outgrowth of the Barrack Obama administrations ‘re-set’ policies with Russia resembling the ‘Russia-first’ policies of the early 1990s George W. Bush administration. US Disinterest covers the late Yushchenko era and continued into the Yanukovych presidency. The West held out a hope of Partnership for Viktor Yanukovych following his February 2010 election after taking at face value his claim of becoming a more democratic leader, compared with during the 2004 elections, coupled with an expectation he would bring political stability to Ukraine. Partnership quickly evaporated into Disillusionment the following year.
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Ukraine's relations with the West since
the Orange Revolution
Taras Kuzio a
a Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1717
Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC, 20036, USA
Version of record first published: 16 Apr 2012
To cite this article: Taras Kuzio (2012): Ukraine's relations with the West since the Orange
Revolution, European Security, 21:3, 395-413
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Ukraine’s relations with the West since the Orange Revolution
Taras Kuzio*
Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036, USA
(Received 24 June 2011; final version received 4 January 2012)
This article argues that many of Ukraine’s problems are long-standing and remain
unresolved because government policies are virtual (i.e. do not conform to official
documents or statements) thereby reducing the effectiveness of the West’s (here
understood primarily as NATO and the EU) engagement with Ukraine and the
ability of Kyiv to pursue its declared foreign policy objectives. The article
discusses Ukraine’s relations with the West through cycles of Disinterest,
Partnership and Disillusionment. Under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid
Kuchma three cycles equated to Kravchuk’s presidency (Disinterest, 1991 94),
Kuchma’s first term (Partnership, 199499) and second term (Disillusionment,
200004). Three cycles partially repeated itself during Viktor Yushchenko’s
presidency with Partnership (200506) after the Orange Revolution followed by
Disillusionment (200709), often described as ‘Ukraine fatigue’. US Disinterest in
Ukraine from 2009 is an outgrowth of the Barrack Obama administrations ‘re-
set’ policies with Russia resembling the ‘Russia-first’ policies of the early 1990s
George W. Bush administration. US Disinterest covers the late Yushchenko era
and continued into the Yanukovych presidency. The West held out a hope of
Partnership for Viktor Yanukovych following his February 2010 election after
taking at face value his claim of becoming a more democratic leader, compared
with during the 2004 elections, coupled with an expectation he would bring
political stability to Ukraine. Partnership quickly evaporated into Disillusion-
ment the following year.
Keywords: Ukraine; Viktor Yushchenko; Viktor Yanukovych; Disinterest; Part-
nership; Disillusionment
Ukraine’s weak capacity to undertake reforms and pursue foreign policy objectives
are long-standing and remain unresolved because government policies are virtual in
important areas such as the rule of law, constitutional reforms, reducing corruption
and EuroAtlantic integration. Virtual policies are those which are routinely laid out
in legislation, presidential decrees and official statement and rhetoric that are
ignored by Ukrainian leaders. Virtual policies resemble Soviet style extortions to
fulfill five year plans or the extensive human and national rights laid out in Soviet
constitutions that were contradicted by actual policies and outcomes and the realities
of everyday life for Soviet citizens.
Democratization has twice been threatened during Kuchma’s second term in
office (200004) and immediately following Viktor Yanukovych’s election in 2010.
Ukraine’s inability to implement policies and changes, including those which Kyiv
*Email: tkuzio@rogers.com
European Security
Vol. 21, No. 3, September 2012, 395413
ISSN 0966-2839 print/ISSN 1746-1545 online
#2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2012.655272
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signs up to with international organizations, reduces the effectiveness of the Wests
engagement with Ukraine and the ability of Kyiv to pursue its declared foreign policy
objectives (see Kuzio 2011a). Partnership with Ukraine under Kuchma, Yushchenko
and Yanukovych has therefore been followed by Disillusionment in Kuchmas second
term, Viktor Yushchenkos third year and Viktor Yanukovychs second year in office.
During the last two decades of Ukrainian independence Kyivs relations with the
West (here primarily understood as NATO and the EU) have gone through three
cycles of Disinterest, Partnership and Disillusionment (see Table 1). Under Ukraines
first two Presidents, Kravchuk and Kuchma, Disinterest throughout the Kravchuk
era (199194) was followed by Partnership during Kuchmas first term in office
(199499) and Disillusionment in his second term (200004) (see Kuzio 2003).
Since 2005, these cycles have been partially repeated in the case of Yushchenko
and fully in the case of Yanukovych. Partnership with the West, particularly with the
US and NATO, followed the 2004 Orange Revolution and Yushchenkos election but
lasted only during his first two years as Ukrainian president. This was quickly
followed by Disillusionment (often described as Ukraine fatigue) during his last
three years in office. US Disinterest in Ukraine re-appeared in 2009 with the
replacement of US President George W. Bush by Barrack Obama. The Obama
administrations Russia resetpolicy resembles US prioritization of Russia (usually
described as Russia-first) in the early 1990s under President George W. Bush. The
EU has expressed Disinterest in Ukraine (and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) more generally) throughout the first two decades following the
disintegration of the USSR. The EU and Ukraine launched negotiations for an
Association Agreement following Ukraines entry into the WTO in May 2008, a
major component of which is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
(DCFTA). This Partnership has developed into Disillusionment in 2011 in response
to selective use of justice against the political opposition and democratic regression
more broadly.
The West did not back either of the two main candidates (Tymoshenko and
Yanukovych) in the 2010 Ukrainian elections (unlike in 2004 when the West largely
sympathized with Yushchenko) giving President Yanukovych a honeymoon period
until the end of that year. During the honeymoon period the West offered
Yanukovych a Partnership based on the premise that he had transformed into a
democrat since the 2004 elections, when he was associated with mass election fraud,
and in the hope he was ready to play by the rules, not with the rules, in NATO
Secretary General Xavier Solanas well-known words spoken to President Kuchma.
In 2011, the honeymoon period with Yanukovych stagnated as Ukraine began to
experience democratic regression and as a consequence relations between Kyiv and
Table 1. Ukrainian foreign policy cycles, 19912011.
Disinterest Leonid Kravchuk 199194
Partnership Leonid Kuchma 1 199499
Disillusionment Leonid Kuchma 2 200004
Partnership Viktor Yushchenko 200506
Disillusionment Viktor Yushchenko 200709
Disinterest Viktor Yushchenko/ Viktor Yanukovych 2009
Partnership Viktor Yanukovych 2010
Disillusionment Viktor Yanukovch 2011
396 T. Kuzio
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Brussels and Washington deteriorated. This culminated in a crescendo of NATO,
EU, Council of Europe, US, Canadian and European condemnations of the
sentencing of former Prime Minister and opposition leader Tymoshenko to seven
years imprisonment on 11 October 2011. A short Western Partnership with
Yanukovych of only one year was followed by Disillusionment in the Yanukovych
administration that will last until the 2015 presidential elections. The Wests
Disillusionment in Ukraine is compounded by US Disinterest in geopolitical
competition with Russia in Eurasia, a different strategy to that pursued by the
Clinton and Bush administrations in 19942008.
Kuzio (2003) analyzed three cycles under Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma. This
article analyses the factors behind the cycles under Presidents Yushchenko and
Yanukovych. The Yushchenko presidency was defined by two cycles of Partnership
and Disillusionment. US Disinterest emerged in 2009 but it was balanced by an
emerging new EU Partnership with Ukraine. Under Yanukovych three cycles cover a
shorter time frame of Disinterest (2009), Partnership (2010) and Disillusionment
(2011). The crisis in Ukraines relations with the West that emerged in 2011 is
deeper and will last longer than that during Kuchmas second term in office.
Partnership (2005
06)
In April 2005, during Yushchenkos successful visit to Washington, Ukraine looked
set to swiftly move toward NATO membership and after the visit, Ukraine was
invited into NATOs Intensive Dialogue on Membership Issues. This was to be
followed by an invitation into Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the November
2006 Riga summit of NATO. The fast-track membership strategy could have brought
Ukraine into NATO in 201012 by capitalizing on European and North American
sympathy for Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko, who had been
poisoned in the 2004 election campaign, had toured the globe in 2005 collecting state
and national awards. Following the March 2006 elections, Washington pressured
Yushchenko to quickly establish an orangecoalition and government so that
support for a NATO MAP could be presented as giving support to pro-Western
reformers. President Bush was scheduled to visit Ukraine in June 2006 to give his
support to a reformist government and orangecoalition ahead of the Riga NATO
summit.
With Tymoshenkos eponymous bloc (BYuT) winning more votes than Yush-
chenkos Our Ukraine in the 2006 elections it was her political force that had the
right to appoint a candidate for prime minister (according to an agreement made
between opposition leaders). Nevertheless, Yushchenko, who had removed Ty-
moshenko as prime minister in September 2005, was determined not to permit her to
return as head of government and negotiations toward a coalition dragged out over
three months. By June 2006, Yushchenko was inclined to support a grand coalition
between Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions that would leave the head of Our
Ukraine Yuriy Yekhanurov as Prime Minister US pressure allegedly made
Yushchenko switch to an orangecoalition with BYuT. An orangecoalition was
eventually established in late June but it quickly collapsed and was replaced by an
Anti-Crisis coalition formed by the Party of Regions, Communist Party of Ukraine
(KPU) and Socialist Party. The new coalition appointed Yanukovych as prime
minister in August 2006.
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President Yushchenko was unable to place the countrys national interests (i.e.
Ukrainian security and NATO membership) above that of his personal conflicts with
Tymoshenko (a similar trait he possessed with Yanukovych who five years later
prioritized imprisoning Tymoshenko over an Association Agreement with the EU).
Four governments under Yushchenko lasted only between 1 and 2 years making it
impossible to launch a NATO information campaign to increase public support for
membership under three orangegovernments, two of whom were led by
Tymoshenko. Improving low public support for NATO membership was a key
criteria for obtaining Western European approval for Ukraines NATO membership.
Following the 2007 pre-term elections Anatoliy Grytsenko was not re-appointed as
Defense Minister sending another signal that NATO membership was not
Yushchenkos priority. Grytsenko, Defense Minister under three governments in
200507, including the Yanukovych Anti-Crisis coalition, is highly respected in
Brussels, Washington and other Western capitals as a committed military reformer
who is personally untainted by corruption. Yushchenko replaced Grytsenko by his
loyalist, Yekhanurov, who had no military experience. Prime Minister Yanukovych
told NATO that Ukraine was disinterested in joining a MAP and Ukraine did not
receive a MAP at NATOs Riga summit.
There were two other reasons why the fast-track strategy to NATO membership
failed, both of which could re-appear if Ukraines NATO membership was again
placed on the agenda. The first was the organization by the Party of Regions and its
Russian nationalist and left-wing allies of anti-NATO and anti-American rallies in
the Crimea leading to the cancellation of SEA BREEZE maneuvers in 2006 and
2009. The rallies raised the specter in some Western European NATO members that
Ukraine could be destabilized if it joined NATO. The second factor, an outgrowth of
an exaggerated fear of Ukraines regional divisions as a threat to the countrys
territorial integrity, was fanned by Russian leaders. In speech to the NATO-Russia
Council at the Bucharest NATO summit President Vladimir Putin said that Ukraine
was an artificial countrythat would fall apart if it joined NATO. His warning came
only five months before Russia invaded Georgia and annexed South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. When Putin raised the question of Ukraines alleged artificiality,hewas
indirectly threatening there would be a growth of separatism in Russophone eastern
Ukraine and Crimea in the event that Ukraine pushed to join NATO (see Kuzio
2010).
Under Kuchma, EUUkrainian relations were guided by the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement that provided little encouragement for Ukraine to under-
take deep-seated reforms. President Kuchma introduced wide embracing programs
on integration with the EU in June 1998 and July 2000 decrees but these were never
reflected in his domestic policies. As typical statements of intent never to be
implemented into actual policies they resembled Soviet five-year plans that were
never implemented by the Communist Party.
In 200405, when Ukraine underwent a democratic breakthrough, the EU was
pre-occupied with enlargement to post-communist Central-Eastern Europe and the
three Baltic States, and by the constitutional crisis after France and the Netherlands
had rejected the European constitution in national referendums. The EU could not
therefore develop a Partnership with Yushchenkos Ukraine similar to that developed
by NATO and the Bush administration.
398 T. Kuzio
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In 2005, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that
covered countries lying to the south and east of the EU; that is, countries both within
and outside geographic Europe. Ukraines relations under the ENP were clouded by
being included together with countries in Northern Africa who could never join the
EU because they are not geographically part of Europe. Ukraine implemented yearly
Action Plans under the ENP in 200508. Two Tymoshenko led governments (2005,
200710) lobbied parliament to adopt legislative reforms that would enable Ukraine
to join the WTO. When the Party of Regions was in opposition (especially in 2005
06) it voted with the KPU against legislative reforms required to join the WTO.
In May 2008, the Eastern Partnership was presented by the foreign minister of
Poland with assistance from Sweden at the EUs General Affairs and External
Relations Council in Brussels and inaugurated in Prague the following May. The
Eastern Partnership complements the Northern Dimension and the Union for the
Mediterranean by providing an institutionalized forum for discussing visa agree-
ments and DCFTA within Association Agreements. The EU and Ukraine launched
negotiations for an Associate Agreement and DCFTA in 200708, followed by
Georgia and Moldova in 201011. Authoritarian Azerbaijan and Belarus (until the
fraudulent December 2010 presidential elections when its membership of the Eastern
Partnership was suspended), and semi-authoritarian Armenia are unlikely to sign
Association Agreements with the EU. Russia is not a member of the Eastern
Partnership.
In 200507, the Ukrainian parliament adopted legislation necessary for
Ukraines accession to membership of the WTO. Of particular importance was
legislation prohibiting the production and distribution of pirate compact discs of
which the country had been a major production center. Ukraine missed the
opportunity to join the WTO in 2005 and 2006 because of political instability and
opposition from the Party of Regions and KPU. The second Tymoshenko
Government (200710) laid the groundwork for Ukraines membership of the
WTO in May 2008 which subsequently opened up negotiations for an Association
Agreement and DCFTA. The DCFTA, if it is signed, will not be an achievement of
the current authorities. They are only following up on what was laid out by their
predecessors, including me, the head of parliaments committee on European
Integration Borys Tarasiuk (2011) pointed out.
In November 2009, the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council adopted the EU-
Ukraine Association Agenda that replaced the former ENP Action Plan. The ENP
Action Plan will prepare for, and facilitate entry into force, the new Association
Agreement, of which the DCFTA is one component. A list of priorities for action
was jointly agreed by Ukraine and the EU for 2010, Yanukovychs first year in office,
although few of these were implemented (see later). Unlike Association Agreements
signed in the 1990s with Central-Eastern European countries, Ukraines Association
Agreement with the EU does not offer a membership perspective.
As Ukraines relations with NATO went into decline in 200708 those with the
EU began to improve. The major difference between both international organizations
was that entering MAP would have led to Ukraines NATO membership whereas an
Association Agreement would have opened up the EUs internal market but not
offered membership. Every Ukrainian president has sought to obtain a statement
from the EU that outlined a future membership perspective, even when they were
Presidents, Kuchma and Yanukovych, who did not uphold European values at home.
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The EU would presumably be unable to offer a membership perspective to only
Ukraine without offering it to all six Eastern Partnership countries.
Disillusionment (2007
09)
Disillusionment with Yushchenko gradually emerged from summer 2006, when
Yanukovych unexpectedly returned to power, to spring 2007, when Ukraine
experienced its third political crisis since 2005. President Yushchenkos dissolution
of parliament in April 2007 created a political and constitutional crisis that was
resolved by compromise pre-term parliamentary elections in September. Ukrainian
and Western legal experts doubted the constitutional right of the president to
dissolve parliament even though there was sufficient provocation by the Anti-Crisis
coalition in seeking to buy up opposition deputies.
The Party of Regions agreed to compromise after Yushchenko offered them a
grand coalition with Our Ukraine following pre-term elections. Yushchenko was
again repeating multi-vector coalition negotiations he had similarly held in 2006 with
the Party of Regions (negotiated by Yekhanurov) and BYuT (negotiated by Roman
Besmertnyy). In the September 2007 elections orange political forces (BYuT and Our
Ukraine-Peoples Self Defense) won a slim majority of 228 deputies (226 being the
minimum for a coalition). The slim majority made it impossible for the Tymoshenko
Government, that came into power in December 2007, to rely on a stable
parliamentary majority in the next three years. At least one-third of Our Ukraine-
Peoples Self Defense were out right hostile to Tymoshenko, including the Presidents
Chief of Staff Viktor Baloga and the United Center Party, a new party established in
2008 by 15 Our Ukraine-Peoples Self Defense deputies.
The next two years (200809) were dominated by public feuding between
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko, presidential accusations of Tymoshenkos betrayal
(August 2008), implosion of the orange coalition and its revival (September
December 2008) and collapse of negotiations for a BYuT-Party of Regions coalition
(MarchJune 2009). As former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer said,
Yushchenko made the chances of achieving a NATO MAP in December zero on
October 8, the day he disbanded parliament in autumn 2008. The Party of Regions
aggressively blockaded the parliamentary rostrum to prevent the adoption of
government policies and promoted populist legislation in November 2009 that
derailed the next tranche of the 2008 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-by
Agreement. The legislation was signed into law by President Yushchenko in the
pursuit of his personal vendetta against Tymoshenko and her government.
The autumn 2008 global financial crisis, during which Ukraines Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) collapsed by 15 per cent, added to deep-seated political instability
making it impossible for Ukraine to pursue a coherent foreign policy. This was
clearly visible in the 17 January 2009 gas crisis when Ukraines president and prime
minister publicly quarreled over the strategy to pursue and over the contract that was
eventually signed. Tymoshenkos 2009 gas contract became the basis upon which she
was sentenced to seven years imprisonment in October 2011. Yushchenko, alone
among opposition leaders, has supported the sentence.
By 2008 memory of the Orange Revolution had been replaced by Ukraine fatigue
(Disillusionment), Germany was in its ascendancy in NATO and the EU (following
the outpouring of German patriotism in the 2006 World Cup held in Berlin) while
400 T. Kuzio
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President Bush was approaching the end of his second term in office. By 200708,
Germany had taken over from France as the strongest Western European opponent
of NATO and EU enlargement into the CIS (Rice 2011, pp. 671672).
Although Prime Minister Yanukovych had ruled out a NATO MAP in 200607,
President Yushchenko continued to seek Ukraines entry into MAP. In January 2008
President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko and Parliamentary Chairman
Arseniy Yatseniuk signed a joint letter to NATO requesting the April Bucharest
summit invite Ukraine into the MAP process. President Bushs visit to Ukraine was
postponed to April 2008, when he gave his support to Ukraine entering MAP, timed
to take place in the same month as the Bucharest NATO summit. With Germany
particularly opposed to Ukraine receiving a MAP in Bucharest, NATO did not take
this step. A NATO resolution stated that Ukraine and Georgia would become
members one day without mentioning MAP, how this would happen or when
membership would take place.
Despite being disappointed by the Bucharest summit, Yushchenko continued to
lobby for a NATO MAP (Rice 670672). He pointed out Ukraine has fulfilled yearly
Action Plans with NATO since 2003 that do not radically differ in scope from MAPs.
President Yushchenko said, We have in effect been functioning under a MAP for
quite a long time. Ukraine completely fulfills annual target cooperation plans
(Kuzio 2009a). Former Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk said, In effect, the
Action Plan is de facto a Membership Action Plan. Because nearly all of the types of
activities outlined in MAP are in the Action Plan (Martyniuk 2008).
In the second half of 2008, supporters of Ukraines NATO membership did not
give up either and proposed polices to bypass MAP. NATO General Secretary Jaap
De Hoop Schefffer said after the December 2008 review meeting that, All elements
I repeat, all elements of the decisions regarding Ukraine and Georgia taken by the
NATO heads of state and governments in Bucharest still stand. All elements. The
General Secretary continued, And that includes, very much, that they will one day be
members, if they so wish, of course. And it is important to add, when they meet
NATO standards. Pifer believed that a post-MAP Plan Bneeded to be developed
by NATO that should send a positive signal to Ukraine and Georgia while not
conceding them to Russias sphere of influence (Pifer 2008). NATO, in Pifers view,
should reiterate that it sees both countries as future members while at the same time
not accepting President Medvedevs demand for a Russian zone of privileged
interestsin the CIS. In addition to this, NATO, Pifer believed, should deepen its
existing cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia.
In 200809, the US and Britain downplayed the significance of a MAP for
Ukraine and Georgia to keep Ukraine on a membership path. The US representative
to NATO said that MAP had accumulated too much symbolismand that it
therefore could no longer be used. Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs Dan Fried said that the MAP debate had taken on a life of its own
and that Ukraine and Georgia could be brought into NATO by other routes
(Dempsey 2008). Fried said, MAP was never an end in itselfand that it is not the
only way to get there(Erlanger 2008) US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice
discussed the idea of Ukraine and Georgia by-passing MAP through enhancing the
role of the NATO-Ukraine commission established in 1997 (when Ukraine and
NATO signed a Charter) and the new NATO-Georgia commission established after
the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia.
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France, Germany, Norway, Luxembourg, Spain and Italy were opposed to what
they perceived as by-passing MAP. The US and Britain argued that their proposal
was merely an alternative way of implementing the Bucharest declaration supporting
eventual NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. An American official was
exasperated by the German stance. ‘‘Theyre clinging to MAP, but they refuse to use
it. They will use it only when a country is already ready to become a NATO member,
so why insist on it? They say that they want to preserve it as a final hurdle. We say,
Lets get out of this hamster ring, since everyone really is in agreement, and get on
with it’’’ (Erlanger 2008).
Ukraines Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko gave a positive diplomatic spin on
the outcome of NATOs December 2008 review meeting believing NATO had offered
MAP through the backdoor. At this stage we achieved the result that we sought,
Ohryzko said. Today, we de facto received an Action Plan to prepare ourselves for
entry into NATO, adding, In 2009 we begin our actual integration into the Alliance
(Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko 2008). The BBC (2008) also wondered,
Anyone standing outside the NATO bureaucracy might well ask what the fuss was all
about. Georgia and Ukraine have a Membership Action Plan in all but name.
Yushchenko and Ukrainian officials also stressed to NATO and US policy-
makers that Ukraine is a net contributor to security and would be a positive
contributor to enhancing NATO security. Ukraine, for example, has participated in
every NATO operation, including Afghanistan. Tarasiuk, head of parliaments
committee on European Integration, pointed out that, Among European countries
Ukraine remains the greatest contributor of forces and resources to UN peace-
keeping operations and Ukraine is the only country to participate in every
peacekeeping operation under NATO command. Tarasiuk continued, De facto
Ukraine undertakes a lot more work in this sphere than certain Alliance members.
This provides us with experience and increases the international authority of our
state(Tarasiuk 2008). President Yushchenko pointed to the, high assessment of
Ukraines contribution to numerous peacekeeping operations and missions con-
ducted under the aegis of NATO and the United Nations(Kuzio 2009a).
Ukrainian units operated in NATO and UN operations in Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Liberia, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and
Eritrea, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Georgia. Ukraine is the tenth
leading contributor of personnel and the third largest provider of strategic air
transportation for UN operations. Ukraines net contribution to peacekeeping
operations, President Yushchenko believed, would, strengthen the role and security
capabilities of the alliance(Kuzio 2009a).
Nevertheless, for the path outlined by Ohryzko to have remained on target would
have required the election of a pro-Western candidate in Ukraines 2010 election.
But, when it became obvious in the latter part of 2009 that Tymoshenko and
Yanukovych would be the two candidates who would inevitably enter the second
round of the 2010 elections Yushchenko threw his support behind Yanukovych, the
anti-NATO candidate. While Yanukovych had opposed Ukraine entering MAP since
2006, Tymoshenko, although not as adamant as Yushchenko in her support for
NATO membership, had signed the January 2008 letter requesting MAP status
together with Yushchenko and Yatseniuk. Yushchenkos support for Yanukovych
over Tymoshenko in the 2010 elections was illogical as his election would undermine
policies that were dear to him, such as Ukraines national identity, democratization
402 T. Kuzio
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and EuroAtlantic integration. The only explanation is that Yushchenkos personal
dislike of Tymoshenko and desire for revenge against her in 2006, 2010 and 2011
outweighed his support for Ukraines national interests. In this regard, Yushchenko
was little different to Yanukovych who in 2011 was ready to sacrifice Ukraines
Association Agreement with the EU by organizing a show trial of Tymoshenko and
her imprisonment.
Disinterest (2009
)
Independent Ukraine has worked with four US presidents and these can be divided
into two groups in terms of their policies and attitudes toward Ukraine. The
presidents who sought to engage with Ukraine the greatest were Democrat Bill
Clinton and Republican George W. Bush while the two presidents who pursued a
Russia-firstand Russia re-setpolicies were Presidents Bush (senior) and Obama.
Democrats and Republicans have therefore both been supportive of strong
engagement with Ukraine (Clinton, George W. Bush [younger]) or prioritizing
Russia (George W. Bush [senior], Obama). US policies toward Ukraine are
dependent on the personality of the president, the situation on the ground in
Ukraine and Eurasia and the international geopolitical situation during the period of
time the president is in office.
Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, like Presidents Jimmy Carter and
Ronald Reagan, were also ideological presidents committed to enlarging NATO to
post-communist Europe which they acquainted with expanding the zone of
democracy from West to East. Post-communist states have used NATO as a stepping
stone to join the EU. President George W. Bush was ideologically committed to
democracy promotion, giving a 2003 speech on the 20th anniversary of National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) (Bush 2004). President Obama is less committed
to this objective, a change that has been welcomed by Russia which sees this as US
withdrawal from Eurasia.
The Obama administrations Russia resetpolicies toward Eurasia resemble
those of former President George Bush (senior) in the early 1990s who had the
misfortune to give what became known as the chicken Kyivspeech to the Soviet
Ukrainian parliament in July 1991 when he called upon Ukrainians to not push for
independence from the USSR. Of course, the geopolitical situation is different for
Obama, two decades later, whose Russia re-setpolicy has eclipsed US policies
toward the non-Russian states of Eurasia. The US position has been advantageous to
Russia because Obama, unlike his predecessor, does not actively support NATO
enlargement or assertive democracy promotion and Ukraine is therefore less
important to his administration whose priorities are the domestic economy,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and the Arab Spring.
The Obama administrations Russia resetpolicy does not mean that Washington
has fundamentally changed its stance toward Ukraine. After all, the US has and
will continue to be the strongest Western supporter of Ukraines independence,
territorial integrity, energy independence and democracy. In addition, the greatest
number of Ukraine experts in any Western capitol city are located in Washington,
DC (Kuzio and Deychakiwsky 2005). Indeed, since autumn 2010, the US has been a
strong critic of democratic regression in Ukraine, as seen in the condemnation by the
White House of Tymoshenkos imprisonment (see Freedom House 2010).
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The Obama administration has stepped back to permit Brussels to take center
stage in developing relations with Ukraine and other countries in the Eastern
Partnership. As most vividly seen during the Libyan crisis the EU is adrift without
US leadership and the EUs policies toward the Eastern Partnership have been
incoherent and lacking in substance. Popescu and Wilson, Senior Fellows at the
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), issued a lengthy analysis of EU
policy toward the Eastern Partnership in which they called for, sharpening the edge
of its policies, defining clearer red lines and actively policing them, and investing
more political capital in the neighborhood(Popescu and Wilson 2009).
The Obama administrationsre-setwith Russia and US geopolitical withdrawal
from Eurasia may have opened avacuum permitting Russia to export authoritarianism
to Ukraine and Eurasia. Russia has been traditionally opposed to NATO enlargement
into Eurasia but Moscow is also becoming increasingly vocal against EU enlargement,
lobbying and pressuring Kyiv to choose the CIS Customs Union over an Association
Agreement and DCFTA. The Obama administrationsre-settherefore does not
respond to Russian strategic interests that are at odds with those of the US. The EU has
limited resources and little geopolitical vision for Ukraine and the Eurasia region.
Partnership (2010)
The West did not sympathize with either of the two main candidates in the 2010
elections Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. Indeed, judging from Wikileaks, cables
from the US Embassy in Kyiv were very negative toward Tymoshenko and believed
that Yanukovych had changed since 2004. In the 2010 elections, Tymoshenko was
routinely depicted as a populistand chameleonby US cables from Kyiv and
Western media (Kuzio 2011b). Respected Yale University historian Snyder (2010)
wrote of Tymoshenkosauthoritarian tendenciesand believed it is Tymoshenko
rather than Yanukovych who today draws comparisons with Vladimir Putin(see
also Karatnycky 2010). The lack of Western favoritism toward either of the two
candidates in the 2010 elections was different to 2004 when there was clearly Western
sympathy for Yushchenko.
US political consultants working for Yanukovych since 2005 lobbied the US
Embassy in Kyiv in support of Yanukovychs allegedly new democratic profile (see
Harding 2011b). Yanukovych promised political stability and a changed (democratic)
man and the West wanted to believe him. A Financial Times (2010) editorial wrote,
Only a stable Ukraine can achieve economic reform and recovery. Ms. Tymoshenko
is the polar opposite of a stabilizing force. Mr. Yanukovich, for all his manifest faults,
may prove the lesser evil(see also Snyder 2010 and Karatnycky 2010 for praise of
Yanukovychs new democratic politics).
In reality, in the 2010 elections Tymoshenko and Yanukovychs profiles, programs
and foreign policy priorities were available as a guide to their future actions (see Kuzio
2009b, 2009c). Some of this mistaken optimism in regard to Yanukovych was
understandable in the wake of a disappointing five-year tenure by President
Yushchenko. Ukraine fatigue emerged after years of political instability, constitutional
crises, inter-elite fighting, and the experience of (together with Iceland, Hungary and
Latvia) Europes worst economic-financial recession, forcing the government to seek
an emergency IMF Stand-by Agreement. An allegedly different Yanukovych, touted
as now pro-democratic, seemed to represent a breath of fresh air.
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At the same time, Yanukovych would be a different Ukrainian president on the
foreign policy arena. In April 2010, the Kharkiv Accordsextended the Black Sea
Fleet base in Sevastopol to 204247 and in July 2010 a new foreign policy was
adopted that ruled out NATO membership. US Disinterest in Ukraine had arrived at
the right time as Yanukovych was disinterested in the US (whom he believed was
behind the Orange Revolution and the denial of his election victory) and NATO.
Yanukovych is the first of four Ukrainian presidents to not support Ukrainian
membership of NATO. The Yanukovych administration sought to lobby Washing-
ton, maybe in the hope of encouraging it to turn a blind eye to democratic regression,
by handing over highly enriched uranium during the April 2010 nuclear security
summit in Washington, DC.
Both parliamentary committees on foreign policy and European integration
voted to recommend to parliament to reject the Kharkiv Accordswhile a third
parliamentary committee on military and national security was split down the
middle. Western policy-makers criticized the agreement in terms of how it was
adopted and Western governments and international organizations remain lukewarm
toward the treaty believing it will negatively impact upon Ukraines integration into
Europe. As NATOs Parliamentary Assembly pointed out, While the Ukraines
democratically elected leadership has every right to make strategic foreign policy
decisions, it would be preferable that the decisions of such long-term strategic
importance were made after extensive and comprehensive public and parliamentary
debate, rather than in a haste and without any attempts to engage the opposition
(NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2011). During the vote only 211 deputies were
registered and therefore 25 of the 236 votes in support of ratification were
undertaken on behalf of deputies who were not present (a common occurrence in
the Ukrainian parliament which has been nicknamed piano voting).
Extending the Black Sea Fleet treaty base was never included in Yanukovychs
2010 election program and, if it had been, could have lost him elections that he barely
won by 3 per cent. Although Yanukovych called repeatedly throughout the
Yushchenko presidency for a referendum on entering a NATO MAP no referendum
was offered by the Yanukovych administration for the extension of the Black Sea
Fleet base. NATO membership and the Black Sea Fleet are controversial issues that
divide Ukrainians (unlike EU membership. See Butusov et al. 2010). In a 2008
International Foundation Electoral Systems survey nearly half of Ukrainians
supported the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet by 2017, as specified in the 1997
treaty. Twenty-four per cent were in favor of the treaty being extended and 10 per
cent for it to be ordered to immediately withdraw (Public Opinion in Ukraine 2008).
Yanukovychs honeymoon with the West in 2010 encouraged Brussels and
Washington to mute criticize of democratic regression in his first year in office. The
US was pre-occupied with the Arab Spring and other conflicts while the EU only
woke up to the lack of support for European values in the Yanukovych adminis-
tration after Tymoshenko was sentenced to imprisonment. In 2010, there were many
examples of Yanukovychs intention to build a managed democracy: unconstitu-
tional formation of parliamentary coalition (as in 2007), judicial reform that
sidelined the Supreme Court, overturn of the parliamentary constitution introduced
in 2006 and emasculation of parliament, arrests of opposition leaders and members
of the 200710 Tymoshenko Government, fraud in the October 2010 local elections,
return to Committee for State Security (KGB) style tactics against civil society
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activists and journalists by the Security Service and resumption of censorship in
Ukraines media. Limited and unpopular reforms were undertaken under the July
2010 IMF agreement during Yanukovychs first year in office, raising household
utility prices and pension reform (raising the pension age of women from 55 to 60).
The unwillingness of the Nikolai Azarov Government to raise household utility
prices for a second time in April 2011 led to the suspension of further IMF tranches.
In 2011 Ukraines relations with the IMF and EU deteriorated.
Ukraines implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2010 was
abysmal by the EUs own admission in its report released on the same day as the new
ENP policy. The EU audit of Ukraines Action Plan in 2010 found that Ukraine had
regressed in all five areas the EU believes to be crucial to a deep and sustainable
democracy(European Commission External Relations 2011). It is therefore
surprising that Ukraines Partnership with the EU lasted as long as one year in view
of numerous examples of attacks on Ukraines democracy by the Yanukovych
administration. A Wall Street Journal (2011) editorial pointed out, the sentencing of
Tymoshenko shows that Yanukovych isnt the newly minted democrat of 2010, but
the same man whose election team in 2004 hacked into Ukraines central election
commission computer(see also Harding 2011a).
Throughout 2010, the EU and US tempered their criticism of democratic
regression in Ukraine without clearly defining red linesthat could not be crossed
giving the illusion of a partnership. The EU and Ukraine continued to negotiate the
Association Agreement throughout the attacks on Ukrainian democracy and only
threatened to derail talks after Tymoshenko was sentenced. The red linebecame too
closely associated with Tymoshenko when in fact she was but the most well known of
a large number of political activists who had been repressed. Former Interior
Minister Yury Lutseno had been in jail since December 2010 on flimsy charges of
over-paying his chauffeur and was sentenced in February 2012 to four years
imprisonment. Riabchuk (2011) writes:
From the EUs point of view, Yanukovych has overstepped the mark. He ignored, in a
rather arrogant way, all the signals. For Yanukovych, however, it was not so clear why
this particular straw should have been the one to break the camels back. After all, the
West has tacitly accepted much heavier breaches of the democratic code starting with
the 2010 parliamentary coup. Why should this line really be red, since it has never been
clearly defined?
Disillusionment (2011
)
Yanukovychs foreign policy is different to that pursued by both pro-Russian
Kuchma and pro-WesternYushchenko. In 199499 the NATO card was used by
Kuchma to pressure Moscow to respect Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Ukraine joined NATOs Partnership for Peace (PfP) in January 1994 and a NATO
Documentation and Information center was opened in Kyiv in 1997, the second after
Moscow. Under Kuchma, Ukraine became the most active PfP member from the CIS
and developed extensive levels of cooperation with individual NATO countries, such
as the UK and US. In order to balance against Russia and break out of international
isolation, Kuchma sought NATO membership in July 2002. This step was reinforced a
year later by Russias threat to annex the Tuzla Island lying off the eastern coast of the
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Crimea and led the president to authorize the sending of the largest contingent of
troops from a non-NATO member to US-coalition forces in Iraq.
In contrast, Yanukovych and the Party of Regions have always adopted a multi-
vector approach to NATO. The 200204 Yanukovych Government supported
Kuchmas two requests to enter NATO MAPs at the Prague and Istanbul summits
in 2002 and 2004, respectively and his government backed the sending of Ukrainian
troops to Iraq. The 200204 Yanukovych Government fulfilled two NATO Action
Plans that differed little from a MAP. Parliaments approval of a 2003 law on
national security that enshrined Ukraines desire for NATO membership was
adopted unanimously by parliament, including by Party of Regions deputies.
Nevertheless, in 2004, when Ukrainian troops were still based in Iraq, the
Yanukovych presidential election campaign unleashed an anti-American campaign
directed against Yushchenko whose wife is a Ukrainian-American (Kuzio 2004). In
opposition in 200506 and 200709, the Party of Regions aligned with the extreme
left and Russian nationalists to oppose security cooperation with NATO but after
returning to power in 200607 and since 2010 has supported security cooperation. It
is therefore disingenuous of Yanukovych to say that relations are comfortable for
both Ukraine and NATO. They are open and honest, at least(Ukrayinska Pravda
2008). There has never been honesty in Yanukovychs and the Party of Regions
relationship with NATO.
Although Prime Minister Yanukovych had supported NATO membership
President Yanukovych moved quickly to remove it from the agenda. In April 2010,
the National Centre for EuroAtlantic Integration, which assessed the implementa-
tion of annual Action Plans, and the EuroAtlantic coordination body under the
Cabinet of Ministers were both abolished. In the same month, during Yanukovychs
visit to the US, he nevertheless said, The relations between Ukraine and NATO are
not going to changeand They will stay on the same level and with the previous
attention(Diehl 2010).
In July 2010, the Ukrainian parliament voted for The Fundamentals of Domestic
and Foreign Policylaw that dropped the goal of seeking NATO membership. As with
the April 2010 Black Sea Fleet base extension, the law was railroaded through
parliament after ignoring 420 proposed changes by the opposition and the scrutiny of
parliamentary committees. Our Ukraine deputy Vyacheslav Kyrylenko described the
vote on such an important issue of national security as a farce, adding [Parliaments]
hall is a pure profanation of the democratic processand parliament had become a
rubber stamp body(Ukrayinska Pravda 2010a). The vote was timed to occur before
US Secretary of State Hillary Clintons arrival in Kyiv on the following day.
Ukrainesnon-blocneutrality can be criticized on three grounds. First, it is not
supported by any increase in the defense budget which has in fact been slashed.
Neutral Sweden and Finland spend between $608 and 745 per citizen on defense
while Ukraine spends only $26 per citizen. Second, neutral countries do not host
foreign military bases while Ukraine has agreed to a long-term foreign military base.
Third, Yanukovych allegedly supports Ukraines membership in the EU which is also
a bloc that has an evolving and expanding European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP). Yanukovychs non-bloc status is therefore a product of traditional Soviet
anti-NATO sentiments rather than backing for a European neutral status.
Yanukovych has been intensively pressured by Russia to drop his support for
European integration and join the CIS Customs Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan
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and Russia in exchange for discountedgas. Kyivs official response has been that
Ukraine as a WTO member cannot join a Customs Union with three countries who
are not WTO members. In addition, the EU has warned that countries can only join
one Customs Union and therefore Ukraine should decide whether this would be the
CIS Customs Union or the DCFTA with the EU. Yanukovych has supported the
DCFTA over the CIS Customs Union while at the same time undermining European
valuesat home that are incompatible with Ukraines integration into Europe.
Yanukovychs aim is to obtain the trade and economic benefits of a DCFTA
without pursuing the political requirements of an Association Agreement. At the
2010 YES (Yalta European Strategy) summit, Yanukovych never once mentioned
Ukraines desire to join the EU, stating Ukraine, will choose the speed, form and
methods of integration that conform to its national interests(Leshchenko 2011).
Yanukovych is the first of four Ukrainian presidents to be perceived in Brussels and
Strasbourg as weak on EU membership, as reflected in remarks made at the YES
summit by Elmar Brok, member of the European Parliaments Committee on
Foreign Affairs (Kyiv Post 2010). On the eve of Yanukovychs October 2010 visit to
France, French experts reached similar conclusions (Ukrayinska Pravda 2010b).
The EU and US face a dilemma. On the one hand, the West has been critical of
democratic backsliding under Yanukovych, as seen in the condemnation of
Tymoshenkos imprisonment, but this has not translated into sticks; that is,
Belarus-style sanctions. The EU uses both carrotsand stickswhen offering
membership of the union but is reluctant to use stickswhen only offering
enlargement-lite; that is an Association Agreement and DCFTA. The ECFR issued
a lengthy analysis of EU policy toward the Eastern Partnership in which it lamented
the fact The EU approach has been based on offering some carrots and using almost
no sticks, except in the case of Belarus (Popescu and Wilson 2011). The only
Eurasian country against whom there are EU and US sanctions is Belarus that are
not applied against six other authoritarian regimes in the CIS. Visa denials of
Ukrainian officials are possible but these are unlikely to be drawn up unless the 2012
elections are denounced as not having been compatible with democratic standards.
Ukraine and the EU were moving toward the DCFTA and Association
Agreement at the same time as Ukraine is consolidating an authoritarian regime
(as most vividly seen by Freedom Houses demotion of Ukraine in 2011 from a
ranking of Freeto Partly Free). Until Tymoshenkos imprisonment, the EU was
sending a signal that there was no incompatibility between growing authoritarianism
and Ukraines Association Agreement and DCFTA. EU policy would seem to be to
encourage democratization in enlargement-heavy(membership) and be willing to
accept semi-authoritarianism in enlargement-light.
Anchoring Ukraine inside a DCFTA and Association Agreement, while not the
same as EU membership, would bring immense benefits to Ukraine but these should
not come at the expense of turning a blind eye to the very European valuesthat the
EU espouses. In May 2011 the EU unveiled A new and ambitious European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP)in which it stated: A functioning democracy, respect
for human rights and the rule of law are fundamental pillars of the EU partnership
with its neighbors. The EUs new policy guidelines define deep and sustainable
democracyas including free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression
and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an
independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security
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and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment
of democratic control over armed and security force(New and Ambitious
Neighorhood Policy 2011).
Under Yanukovych a virtual dialogue between both the EU and Ukraine was
clearly seen when on every occasion Ukrainian President Yanukovych, Foreign
Minister Kostyantin Gryshchenko, Prime Minister Azarov and senior Party of
Regions deputies brushed aside Western criticism of democratic regression and
selective use of the judiciary. Party of Regions deputies have routinely lambasted
Western criticism using Soviet style language reminiscent of the pre-de´tente era. The
most prominent example of the lack of dialogue in 201011 was continued use of
political repression to intimidate Ukrainian society, policies condemned in 9 June and
27 October 2011 European Parliament resolutions (European Parliament 2011a,
2011b). Politically inspired criminal charges were not halted, as the West demanded,
and instead the authorities added new criminal charges to existing ones against
Tymoshenko. Despite widespread Western condemnation of the Tymoshenko
imprisonment on 11 October 2011 the Security Service launched three new charges
against her in the next six months that included payment for a contract killing in 1996.
While the 2009 UkrainianRussian gas contract was poorly drafted, political
decisions by outgoing administrations should not be the subject of politically
inspired criminal charges. The European Parliament resolution: Reminds the
Ukrainian authorities that the principle of collective responsibility for the decisions
of the government does not permit the prosecution of individual members of the
government for decisions that were taken collegially. Ukraines energy sector is full
of skeletons in very many closets and such charges could be applied against most
members of Ukraines elites.
If the Ukrainian authorities are unwilling to heed any EU and Western criticism
of democratic failings when Ukraine is outside the DCFTA and Association
Agreement there is no likelihood they would do so when Ukraine is inside the trade
agreement. There is no mechanism for suspending or expelling countries from the
DCFTA and Association Agreement and therefore it is important to lay the ground
rules before Ukraine joins. EU members believe it would have been better to ensure
Romania and Bulgaria got it right before they joined the EU in 2007. The seven-year
sentence and three years ban from official positions against Tymoshenko is intended
to prevent her from standing in the next four elections and to intimidate the
opposition in general. The OSCE and Council of Europe will be unable to define
Ukraines elections as having been held in accordance with democratic standards if
opposition leaders are in jail. A second factor that will lead to the OSCE to
denounce the 2012 elections is the adoption of a new election law that the Council of
Europes Venice Commission and International Foundation for Election Systems
condemned for favoring the ruling Party of Regions (Venice Commission 2011,
International Foundations for Electoral Systems 2011, Joint Opinion on the Draft
Law on Election of Peoples Deputies of Ukraine 2011).
Negotiations between the EU and Ukraine for an Association Agreement (within
which is included the DCFTA) were completed in October 2011 in the same month
as Tymoshenko was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. In protest the EU
cancelled Yanukovychs planned 20 October visit to Brussels. At the December 2011
EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv the EU refused to initial the Association Agreement,
the purely technical first stage in the process that signals the end of negotiations and
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completion of a final document. The EU did not wish to give President Yanukovych
a propaganda victory at the summit. Germanys position of using Ukraines
deteriorating human rights position to thwart enlargement-liteout of fear it could
one day become enlargement-heavywon out over the Polish argument to bring
Ukraine inside the Association Agreement in order for the EU to have leverage over
it and to thwart the country moving under Russias sphere of influence. The
possibility of the EU undertaking the second and third stages (signing by the Council
of Europe followed by ratification by the European Parliament and parliaments of
27 EU members) are dependent upon democratic changes in Kyiv, the EU have
stated, including Tymoshenkos release from prison and her being permitted to
participate in elections. Signing and ratification will be therefore frozen if democratic
regression inside Ukraine continues unabated and the 2012 elections are not
internationally recognized which they cannot be if opposition leaders remain in
jail. At the same time as Ukraines negotiations with the EU are frozen Moldova and
Georgias negotiations with the EU for Association Agreements are becoming more
advanced. With NATO and EU membership closed, Russia will have achieved its
objective of ensuring Ukraines only integration option is within the CIS. Moscow
received one of two major strategic objectives in Ukraine when the Kharkiv
Accordsextended the 1997 Sevastopol treaty as a base for the Black Sea Fleet until
204247. Russias second strategic objective is to gain control over Ukraines gas
pipelines through a consortium that would be controlled by Moscow.
Conclusion
During the last two decades Ukraine has experienced cycles of Disinterest, Partner-
ship and Disillusionment that have become shorter. Under Kravchuk (199194) there
was Western Disinterest in Ukraine coupled with a Russia-firstUS policy to Eurasia.
The EU continued to pursue Disinterest to Ukraine and the CIS until 200709 when
the EU launched negotiations with Ukraine for an Association Agreement, Ukraine
joined the WTO and the Poles and Swedes lobbied the EU to launch the Eastern
Partnership. During Kuchmas first term (199499) Ukraine experienced its longest
Partnership with the US and NATO. The Partnership turned to Disillusionment
during Kuchmas second term in office (200004). Following the Orange Revolution
and Yushchenkos election a promising Partnership opened up with the US and
NATO that gave Ukraine the first possibility of Ukraine joining a Euro-Atlantic
organization, NATO. The Partnership quickly evaporated into Disillusionment in
2007 with the onset of Ukraines third political crisis since 2005, return of Yanukovych
to head the government and feuding between orange leaders.
At the same time, the election of Obama changed US policies towards Ukraine
and Eurasia leading to a resumption of Disinterest found in the early 1990s. US
Disinterest, brought on by pre-occupation with the economy and other foreign crises
and military commitments, was deepened by Ukraine fatigue under Yushchenko and
the disinterest in NATO membership by Yanukovych who came to power in 2010
and his innate suspicion of the US. The EUs Partnership with Ukraine in 200710
evaporated in the face of democratic regression. Partnership with Yanukovych in
2010 had been on illusions that he had become a democrat and would bring the
stability to Ukraine that the country had lacked under his predecessor. The
honeymoon the West gave Yanukovych disintegrated into Disillusionment in 2011
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as Ukraines democracy came under sustained threat and relations deteriorated with
the West. Disillusionment will be compounded by election fraud in the 2012
parliamentary elections that will further isolate Ukraine from Euro-Atlantic
structures ahead of the 2015 presidential elections.
Notes on contributor
Taras Kuzio is an inaugural Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Fellow at the Center for
Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University.
He has been a Visiting Professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies,
Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University and Senior Research
Fellow in the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham.
His previous positions have included a Resident Fellow at the Centre for Russian and East
European Studies, University of Toronto, and Adjunct Research Professor, Institute for
European and Russian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa. Taras Kuzio has also served as
Head of Mission of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, Ukraine.
Taras Kuzio is the author and editor of 14 books, including Theoretical and Comparative
Perspectives on Nationalism and Ukraine-Crimea-Russia: Triangle of Conflict, both published
in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society series by Ibidem-Verlag, 2007. He is the
author of five think tank monographs and 25 book chapters, the most recent being Civic
Nationalism and the Nation-State: Towards a Dynamic Model of Convergencein Ireneusz
P. Karolewski and Andrzej Marcin Suszycki eds., Nationalism in Contemporary Europe
(Banham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, Lexington Books, 2009) and Ukraine. Muddling
Alongin Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry eds., Central and East European Politics: From
Communism to Democracy, Second Edition (Banham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 2011). He
has authored over 60 scholarly articles on post-communist politics, Ukraine, and nationalism
and has guest edited 6 special issues of academic journals, including a recent issue
ofCommunist and Post-Communist Studies on Communist Successor Parties in Central-
Eastern Europe and Eurasia. He is the editor of the bi-monthly Ukraine Analyst.
Taras Kuzio received a BA in Economics from the University of Sussex, an MA in Soviet
Studies from the University of London and a PhD in Political Science from the University of
Birmingham, England. He was a Post-Doctoral Fellow at Yale University.
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The 2004 Orange Revolution and election of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, who had a stellar reputation in previous positions as National Bank Chairman and Prime Minister, was viewed as a new era in Ukrainian politics, ushering in deep seated reforms and a battle against corruption. Five years on, his opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, whose election in 2004 was annulled over election fraud, replaced him as President. The failure of the Yushchenko presidency to implement the majority of the hopes placed in it by millions of voters and protestors, specifically to decisively change the manner in which politics and economics are undertaken, is a good opportunity to analyse why Ukraine is a difficult country, an immobile state, in which to undertake change of any type. Yanukovych’s first year in office points to Ukraine undergoing a regression from the only tangible benefit to have emerged from “orange” rule; namely, democratization, media freedom, and free elections.
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Ukraine's relations with the West have gone through three periods of development since 1992. When relations with Ukraine have improved this has tended to be at the same time as relations between the West and Russia declined, and vice-versa. The first period is disinterest during 1992–94 when the West prioritised relations with a reformist Russia. The second period was 1995–99 when Ukraine and the West developed a strategic partnership. From 2000, Ukraine's relations with the West are best described as disillusionment due to the growing gap between official rhetoric of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and Eurasian domestic policies.
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France Telecom has implemented an ambitious but realistic three-year plan to install ISDN access points throughout France by 1991. The plan is facilitated by the fact that France's fully synchronized telephone network is the world's most digitized. The article describes the first French ISDN achievements, starting with the world's first commercial ISDN introduction in December 1987. This is followed by a brief account of the basic developments that have allowed the public switched telephone network (PSTN) to evolve toward ISDN. The article also presents the general framework adopted to ensure nationwide coverage by the end of 1990 and to enable the French ISDN to be connected to the ISDNs of other European countries.
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