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On sacrificial heroism
Abstract
For thousands of years people have saved their loudest praise for individuals who made ‘the ultimate sacrifice.’ Recently, however, many people have begun to equate suicide terrorism with sacrificial heroism. These assertions benefit from a general lack of conceptual clarity regarding the nature of sacrificial heroism itself. Therefore, this paper aims to explore, describe, and define sacrificial heroism, arguing that it requires two primary things: the risk of something highly valued; and the attempt to achieve a directly morally positive result. The paper then reviews four representative scenarios, including two types of suicide terrorism and two types of sacrificial heroism, in order to highlight several critical differences between those actions that deserve to be praised as supremely heroic and those which clearly do not.
... Paul George Neiman 3218 E. 54th Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 55417, USA pgneiman@stcloudstate.edu See also Lankford (2013). 5 Foley quotes an alternative report of Camus' comments: 'I must also condemn the use of terrorism which is exercised blindly in the streets of Algiers for example, and which could one day strike my mother or my family' (Foley 2008: 98). ...
Politically motivated attacks against civilians are typically evaluated by focusing on objective factors, such as the loss of innocent life, the justness of a rebel organization's political vision, and whether the attacks are successful in advancing that vision. Albert Camus' philosophy on rebellion provides an alternative approach that focuses on subject experience of the rebel. The rebel experiences a genuine moral dilemma created by the passionate desire to fight injustice and the feeling of universal solidarity that encompasses even those who the rebel believes it is necessary to kill. From this standpoint, any action the rebel takes is immoral. Camus thus makes authenticity the focus of his analysis. Authentic rebels continue to value solidarity, which creates a limit on how violence can be used in rebellion. Drawing from The Rebel and The Just Assassins, this paper develops several criteria for immoral but authentic acts of political violence, which are then applied to suicide bomb attacks directed against civilians.
... To shed further light on the psychological and behavioral differences between suicide terrorists and sacrificial heroes, I examine specific cases in Chapter 5 and compare them across key variables (see also Lankford 2012b). The suicide attacks include Hanadi Jaradat's suicide bombing of an Israeli restaurant and Mohamed Atta's 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. ...
The psychology of suicide terrorism involves more than simply the psychology of suicide. Individual differences in social dominance orientation (SDO) interact with the socio-structural, political context to produce support for group-based dominance among members of both dominant and subordinate groups. This may help explain why, in one specific context, some people commit and endorse terrorism, whereas others do not.
... To shed further light on the psychological and behavioral differences between suicide terrorists and sacrificial heroes, I examine specific cases in Chapter 5 and compare them across key variables (see also Lankford 2012b). The suicide attacks include Hanadi Jaradat's suicide bombing of an Israeli restaurant and Mohamed Atta's 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. ...
Lankford's essential empirical argument, which is based on evidence such as psychological autopsies, is that suicide attacks are caused by suicidality. By operationalizing this causal claim in a hypothetical experiment, I show the claim to be provable, and I contend that its truth is supported by Lankford's data. However, I question his ensuing arguments about beauty and goodness, and thereby the practical value of his work in counterterrorist propaganda.
... To shed further light on the psychological and behavioral differences between suicide terrorists and sacrificial heroes, I examine specific cases in Chapter 5 and compare them across key variables (see also Lankford 2012b). The suicide attacks include Hanadi Jaradat's suicide bombing of an Israeli restaurant and Mohamed Atta's 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. ...
For years, scholars have claimed that suicide terrorists are not suicidal, but rather psychologically normal individuals inspired to sacrifice their lives for an ideological cause, due to a range of social and situational factors. I agree that suicide terrorists are shaped by their contexts, as we all are. However, I argue that these scholars went too far. In The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers, I take the opposing view, based on my in-depth analyses of suicide attackers from Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and North America; attackers who were male, female, young, old, Islamic, and Christian; attackers who carried out the most deadly and the least deadly strikes. I present evidence that in terms of their behavior and psychology, suicide terrorists are much like others who commit conventional suicides, murder-suicides, or unconventional suicides where mental health problems, personal crises, coercion, fear of an approaching enemy, or hidden self-destructive urges play a major role. I also identify critical differences between suicide terrorists and those who have genuinely sacrificed their lives for a greater good. By better understanding suicide terrorists, experts in the brain and behavioral sciences may be able to pioneer exciting new breakthroughs in security countermeasures and suicide prevention. And even more ambitiously, by examining these profound extremes of the human condition, perhaps we can more accurately grasp the power of the human survival instinct among those who are actually psychologically healthy.
... To shed further light on the psychological and behavioral differences between suicide terrorists and sacrificial heroes, I examine specific cases in Chapter 5 and compare them across key variables (see also Lankford 2012b). The suicide attacks include Hanadi Jaradat's suicide bombing of an Israeli restaurant and Mohamed Atta's 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. ...
Despite growing evidence to the contrary, it is still widely assumed that suicide terrorists are not actually suicidal. However, this review supports recent studies which suggest the opposite, and presents initial evidence that much like other suicidal individuals, many suicide terrorists appear to be driven by clinically suicidal risk factors, including: (1) the desire to escape the world they live in, (2) the desire to escape moral responsibility for their actions, (3) the inability to cope with a perceived crisis, and (4) a sense of low self-worth. By establishing the links between suicide terrorism and suicidality, scholars may be able to better understand the nature of these violent attacks and develop more effective ways to stop them.
... To shed further light on the psychological and behavioral differences between suicide terrorists and sacrificial heroes, I examine specific cases in Chapter 5 and compare them across key variables (see also Lankford 2012b). The suicide attacks include Hanadi Jaradat's suicide bombing of an Israeli restaurant and Mohamed Atta's 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. ...
For years, it has been widely agreed on that suicide terrorists are not suicidal individuals, and that behaviorally, they are more similar to noble soldiers who are willing to sacrifice themselves for a cause. However, upon closer examination, it appears that the foundation of this conventional wisdom is extraordinarily shaky. There are many reasons to think that both event-based and psychological risk factors for suicide may drive the behavior of suicide terrorists. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that more than 75 individual suicide terrorists have exhibited these classic suicidal traits. Given the power that the stigma of suicide may have to deter future suicide terrorists, it is critical that governments, scholars, and practitioners examine this issue once again.
The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers proposes that suicide terrorists are psychologically and behaviorally similar to other people who commit suicide, due to a range of individual, social, and situational factors. Some commentators agree, while others are skeptical, given the lack of information about many attackers' lives. However, the book's position is not simply based on individual case studies; it is also supported by other independent assessments, the confirmation of empirical predictions, the paucity of contradictory evidence, and new applications of evolutionary theory. It is undisputed that human beings behave as the author suggests; it is unknown if they behave as the conventional wisdom suggests. Those who argue that suicide terrorists are psychologically normal and altruistically sacrificing their lives for an ideological cause should bear the burden of proof for those claims.
Research on the characteristics of suicide bombers is reviewed. Contrary to previous commentary, it is suggested that suicide bombers may share personality traits (such as the "authoritarian personality") that psychological profiles of suicide bombers might be feasible, and that the suicide bombers may be characterized by the risk factors that increase the probability of suicide.‐
In the United States, it seems unlikely that a foreign terrorist group would be able to assemble and maintain the required infrastructure within our borders that would provide a platform for a sustained campaign of suicide bombings. However, a strategy of infrequent suicide bombings supplemented by psychologically manipulative rhetoric during the intervals between attacks is plausible and could amplify the fear level. Attacks against high-value targets, use of weapons of mass destruction, or maintenance of an infrastructure on foreign soil with an operational capability for suicide attacks within our borders, would further amplify the psychological fallout. In either case, the potential psychological effects on society - including pervasive insecurity, reduced travel, commerce, and long-term investment, and foreign policy shifts in acquiescence to terrorist pressures - easily dwarf the potential physical effect of suicide terror on American soil. Therefore, identifying strategies to counter the psychological effects of suicide terror and promote resilience is an indispensable aspect of taking away its potential value to terrorist organizations around the world. Who becomes a suicidal terrorist and why is, perhaps obviously, a multifactorial "etiology" including significant developmental, psychodynamic, social, cultural, biological, temperamental, situational, and tactical-instrumental determinants. In other words, multiple "ingredients" often are needed in the manufacture and delivery of a suicide terrorist, or "human bomb" (Table 1, see page 706). For direct victims of terrorism and mass disasters, the principles of psychological support are relatively well developed. For the wider, societal target of the suicide bomber, psychological response is less well defined. Focusing on the intended effects of suicidal terror provides empowering insights to potential victims, enabling them to identify the boundary between rational and irrational fear and to neutralize the primary weapon of the suicide bombers (Table 2, see page 705).
We begin with the book jacket photo that commands the readers attention as the horror on a Muslim womans face reminds us that the terror is not reserved for Infidels only. Then the dedication of the book is to life, while the volumes last words are a plea for peacein Charnys words, a worldwide campaign for life to be led by religious and secular leaders across the globe. The book concludes with a vignette from Islamic culture that speaks nobly of furthering peace and life, ending with the last word: inshallah. What is evident in between is Charnys humanistic approach to this most inhumane of all modern phenomena.
Suicide bombing has become the most potent weapon in the arsenal of terrorist groups in the Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere. This analysis traces the weapon’s history, both ancient and modern to the present day. It includes commentary on the benefits and costs of suicide attacks as well as the motives of the ‘martyrs’ themselves and the organizations that send them on their way. Finally, the analysis pays attention to countermeasures, policies at the disposal of the authorities to stop or at least inhibit so-called ‘martyrdom operations.’
Using twice-yearly data from 1991 to 2003, we analyze the incidents of suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad within Israel and the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Given the exploratory nature of the question, we have first estimated the relevant coefficients by using a Quasi-Maximum Likeli-hood Ratio and then checked their robustness by reestimating the model with the help of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) as an interrelated system. The results indicate that the two groups deliberately use suicide bombings as strategic weapons within the larger Israeli-Palestinian political milieu. With the Western world locked in an armed struggle with the militant extremists of Islam based on mil-lenarian ideologies, this study emphasizes the need to develop appropriate analytical capabilities to distinguish among terrorist groups and their motivations, ideologies, and tactics.
The violent true believer is an individual committed to an ideology or belief system which advances homicide and suicide as a legitimate means to further a particular goal. The author explores useful sources of evidence for an indirect personality assessment of such individuals. He illustrates both idiographic and nomothetic approaches to indirect personality assessment through comparative analyses of Timothy McVeigh, an American who bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, and Mohamed Atta, an Egyptian who led the airplane attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. The risks of indirect personality assessment and ethical concerns are identified.
The Middle East has changed clearly, substantially, and dramatically during the last decade. Yet scholarly and public understanding lags far behind these events. This book explains why the previous era came to end, giving an historical and political summation of the region. Three interlinked themes are crucial to the book. First, a reinterpretation of the era of upheaval the Middle East has just passed through. During that period, many Arabs believed that some leader, country, or radical movement would unite the region, solving all its problems. Second, an evaluation of how the historical experience of the period between the 1940s and the 1990s undermined the old system, making change necessary. Third, an analysis of the region today that helps explain future developments, in what the author terms the Era of Reluctant Pragmatism, as the Middle Eastern societies decide their relationships to the West.
The commonly accepted interpretation is that a religious motive—the desire to please God—is the principal reason why people volunteer for suicide missions. American political scientist Robert A. Pape rejects this view. For him the common thread linking suicide bombers is a political objective— driving out an occupier from one’s homeland, which they see as furthering the common good of their society. In arriving at this theory, Pape relied on the concept of “altruistic suicide,” developed by French sociologist Emile Durkheim in his pioneering work Suicide (1897). These ideas are discussed in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005), from which the passage below is taken.
This is the first scholarly book to look at the role of the 'warrior' in modern war, arguing that warriors' actions, and indeed thoughts, are increasingly patrolled and that the modern battlefield is an unforgiving environment in which to discharge their vocation.
As war becomes ever more instrumentalized, so its existential dimension is fast being hollowed out. Technology is threatening the agency of the warrior and this volume paints a picture of early twenty-first century warfare, helping to explain why so many aspiring warriors are becoming disenchanted with their profession.
Written by a leading thinker on warfare, this book sets out to explain what makes an American Marine a ‘warrior’ and why suicide bombers, or Al Qaeda fighters, do not qualify for this title. This distinction is one of the central features of the current War on Terror – and one that justifies much more extensive discussion than it has so far received.
The Warrior Ethos will be of great interest to all students of military history, strategy, military sociology and war studies.
A PARTICULARLY thorny problem in all the major contributions to the literature on terrorism has been the relationship between terrorism by factions and state acts of terror. It is interesting to note that most of the recent academic literature has sought to avoid getting bogged down in this aspect: in general all the authors of the works reviewed below accept that it is unreasonable to insist on encompassing analyses of the complex processes and implications of both regimes of terror and factional terrorism as a mode of struggle within the same covers. There is a rich and growing literature on what most authors now term state terror, but the term terrorism is now widely used to denote the systematic use of terror by non-governmental actors. Nevertheless we should not lose sight of the fundamental truth that one cannot adequately understand terrorist movements without paying some attention to the effects of the use of force and violence by states. Indeed some of the best historical casestudies of the use of factional terrorism as a weapon vividly demonstrate how state violence often helps to provoke and fuel the violence of terrorist movements. Historically it is easy to show how the violence perpetrated by autocratic and colonial regimes has almost invariably displayed a symbiotic relationship to the violence of resistance and insurgent movements. Several excellent scholarly studies of the struggle between the French forces and the FLN in Algeria have underlined this lesson. Martha Hutchinson in her fascinating study of the FLN,1 quotes Lebjaoui, former head of the FFFLN, forcefully attacking Massu's excuse that torture was a response to FLN terrorism:
Simple logic dictates that some suicide terrorists are more significant than others. However, major questions still remain about the motives and psychology of 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta, arguably the most significant suicide terrorist in human history. This article constructs a psychological autopsy of Atta in order to provide a much more complete explanation of his behavior. First, it suggests that accounts which solely attribute Atta’s actions to religious and political ideology appear severely incomplete. It then reviews evidence that Atta may have been clinically suicidal, and that his struggles with social isolation, depression, hopelessness, guilt, and shame were extraordinarily similar to the struggles of those who commit conventional suicide. Finally, it considers how Atta’s ideology may have interacted with his suicidal tendencies to produce his final act of murder-suicide on September 11, 2011.
Terrorists attack civilians to coerce their governments into making political concessions. Does this strategy work? To empirically assess the effectiveness of terrorism, the author exploits variation in the target selection of 125 violent substate campaigns. The results show that terrorist campaigns against civilian targets are significantly less effective than guerrilla campaigns against military targets at inducing government concessions. The negative political effect of terrorism is evident across logit model specifications after carefully controlling for tactical confounds. Drawing on political psychology, the author concludes with a theory to account for why governments resist compliance when their civilians are targeted.
This is the first article to analyze a large sample of terrorist groups in terms of their policy effectiveness. It includes every foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001. The key variable for FTO success is a tactical one: target selection. Terrorist groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumber attacks on military targets do not tend to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. Contrary to the prevailing view that terrorism is an effective means of political coercion, the universe of cases suggests that, first, contemporary terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives and, second, the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. The bulk of the article develops a theory for why countries are reluctant to make policy concessions when their civilian populations are the primary target.
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Despite growing evidence to the contrary, it is still widely assumed that suicide terrorists are not actually suicidal. However, this review supports recent studies which suggest the opposite, and presents initial evidence that much like other suicidal individuals, many suicide terrorists appear to be driven by clinically suicidal risk factors, including: (1) the desire to escape the world they live in, (2) the desire to escape moral responsibility for their actions, (3) the inability to cope with a perceived crisis, and (4) a sense of low self-worth. By establishing the links between suicide terrorism and suicidality, scholars may be able to better understand the nature of these violent attacks and develop more effective ways to stop them.
Internationally, there are more than 100 different definitions of terrorism, and even within the U.S. government, there are multiple standards. This lack of consistency has helped fuel a heated debate between the West and Islamic extremists about who is truly terrorizing whom. This article evaluates charges that several past U.S. acts constitute terrorism and makes specific recommendations for how the current administration should address this problematic issue in order to increase U.S. legitimacy worldwide and help it win the war of ideas. It appears that the best approach may be for leaders to admit that the United States has engaged in terrorist-like behavior in the past, but condemn such actions as unfortunate and vow that they will not be repeated. This strategy would be similar to the President’s public statements regarding past acts of U.S. torture, and would still allow for significant differences between the United States and terrorist organizations in their respect for international humanitarian law.
This paper argues that philosophers require a strict canonical definition of terrorism if they are to be of any use in morally evaluating the changing character war. This definition ought to be a narrow, critical one, articulating precisely what is wrong with terrorism and strictly specifying which incidents fall into this derogatory category and which do not. I argue against those who avoid definitions or adopt wide and apologetic ones. The latter claim neutrality for themselves and accuse those who define terrorism strictly of political bias. The apologetics of terrorism often allege that stringent, critical, definitions of terrorism beg important questions of justification, rendering terrorism unjustifiable by definition. The apologetics of terrorism however, have an obvious political agenda. Those who deliberately blur the distinctions between terrorism and other forms of violence cannot claim academic ‘neutrality’ or ‘objectivity’ for their wide, defensive definitions, which are in fact deliberately designed to advance particular political views.
For years, it has been widely agreed on that suicide terrorists are not suicidal individuals, and that behaviorally, they are more similar to noble soldiers who are willing to sacrifice themselves for a cause. However, upon closer examination, it appears that the foundation of this conventional wisdom is extraordinarily shaky. There are many reasons to think that both event-based and psychological risk factors for suicide may drive the behavior of suicide terrorists. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that more than 75 individual suicide terrorists have exhibited these classic suicidal traits. Given the power that the stigma of suicide may have to deter future suicide terrorists, it is critical that governments, scholars, and practitioners examine this issue once again.
This paper examines the methodological problems involved in identifying and evaluating the extent of state terrorism. It attempts the former by examining the two parts that constitute this conceptual problem (i.e., terrorism and the state) before fusing the two in a comprehensive definition of terrorism that distinguishes between the state's terrorist and nonterrorist use of violence both at home and abroad. It then moves on to an analysis of the practical difficulties involved in applying such a definition.
Are suicide terrorists suicidal? A review of the worldwide literature on suicide terrorism uncovered five published empirical studies describing data collected from potential suicide terrorists or the surviving friends and families of deceased terrorists. The many discrepancies uncovered between suicide terrorists and other suicides on key factors known to underpin suicidality, suggest that such terrorists are not truly suicidal and should not be viewed as a subgroup of the general suicide population. Nonetheless, methods developed by suicidologists, such as the psychological autopsy, will help increase our understanding of the individual and group factors that underpin suicide terrorism.
A motivational analysis of suicidal terrorism is outlined, anchored in the notion of significance quest. It is suggested that heterogeneous factors identified as personal causes of suicidal terrorism (e.g. trauma, humiliation, social exclusion), the various ideological reasons assumed to justify it (e.g. liberation from foreign occupation, defense of one’s nation or religion), and the social pressures brought upon candidates for suicidal terrorism may be profitably subsumed within an integrative framework that explains diverse instances of suicidal terrorism as attempts at significance restoration, significance gain, and prevention of significance loss. Research and policy implications of the present analysis are considered.
In Sacred Violence, the distinguished political and legal theorist Paul W. Kahn investigates the reasons for the resort to violence characteristic of premodern states. In a startling argument, he contends that law will never offer an adequate account of political violence. Instead, we must turn to political theology, which reveals that torture and terror are, essentially, forms of sacrifice. Kahn forces us to acknowledge what we don't want to see: that we remain deeply committed to a violent politics beyond law. Paul W. Kahn is Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights. Cover Illustration: "Abu Ghraib 67, 2005" by Fernando Botero. Courtesy of the artist and the American University Museum.
This paper reviews current understandings of the psychology of suicide terrorism for psychiatrists and other mental health professionals to help them better understand this terrifying phenomenon. After discussing key concepts and definitions, the paper reviews both group and individual models for explaining the development of suicide terrorists, with an emphasis on "collective identity." Stressing the importance of social psychology, it emphasizes the "normality" and absence of individual psychopathology of the suicide bombers. It will discuss the broad range of terrorisms, but will particularly emphasize terrorism associated with militant Islam. The article emphasizes that comprehending suicide terrorism requires a multidisciplinary approach that includes anthropological, economic, historical, and political factors as well as psychological ones. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications for research, policy, and prevention, reviewing the manner in which social psychiatric knowledge and understandings applied to this phenomenon in an interdisciplinary framework can assist in developing approaches to counter this deadly strategy.
Elaborating on the notions that humans possess different modalities of decision-making and that these are often influenced by moral considerations, we conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley Problem. We presented the participants with two standard scenarios (`lever' and `stranger') either in the usual or in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected. Furthermore, when asked to express general moral opinions on the themes of the Trolley Problem, about half of the participants reveal some inconsistency with the responses they had previously given.
Most people consider it morally acceptable to redirect a trolley that is about to kill five people to a track where the trolley would kill only one person. In this situation, people seem to follow the guidelines of utilitarianism by preferring to minimize the number of victims. However, most people would not consider it moral to have a visitor in a hospital killed to save the lives of five patients who were otherwise going to die. We conducted two experiments in which we pinpointed a novel factor behind these conflicting intuitions. We show that moral intuitions are influenced by the locus of the intervention in the underlying causal model. In moral dilemmas, judgments conforming to the prescriptions of utilitarianism are more likely when the intervention influences the path of the agent of harm (e.g., the trolley) than when the intervention influences the path of the potential patient (i.e., victim).
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