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Islam and the Language of Human Rights in Nigeria: "Rights Talk" and Religion in Domestic Politics
Abstract
How do Islamic political actors engage with international human rights discourse in new Muslim-majority democracies? While most scholarly research focuses on the role of transnational actors in shaping the local adoption of rights norms, this article focuses on how even incomplete democratization can empower religious actors to engage in meaningful local debates over how to define the relationship between religious values, democratic meanings, and rights. The article presents a case study of Nigeria, where Muslim activists have used rights talk to advance the implementation of Islamic law (sharia) under the post-1999 democratic regime. It also explores how these activists' use of rights language to pursue sharia policies that conflict significantly with international rights norms challenges human and women's rights groups in Nigeria, who must walk a careful line between appeals to universal norms and religiously grounded arguments in their own advocacy.
... Some scholars have noticed that anti-abortion rights activists in recent years seem to be using more "pro-woman" framing instead of focusing on the fetus and using frames describing abortion as murder (Rose 2011;Saurette and Gordon 2013). Others have documented the way in which human rights can be discussed and used in ways to support certain types of rights (such as religious rights) even while those using them are opposed to many other international human rights norms and treaties (Kendhammer 2013;Bob 2012). However, these are the only studies to my knowledge that have studied this type of usage of human rights frames by conservative actors. ...
... Yet, he does not provide clear evidence of this process, and thus it requires further empirical research. However, the idea of framejacking is useful to the extent that it identifies the process through which actors one would otherwise not expect to be using human rights (due to a tradition of suspicion of universal human rights institutions and claims) claim human rights ideas and language for themselves, thus challenging their opponent's claims to human rights and, potentially, reducing the effectiveness or resonance of their opponents' frames (or increasing the effectiveness of their own frames) (Kendhammer 2013). ...
... While the effect did not hold for Ireland or Korea, it is nonetheless an important finding and suggests that the study of abortion debates in countries where abortion has already been made legal is just as important to understanding social movement strategies as the study of abortion debates in countries where there is a struggle to make abortion legal or countries where the debate is more unsettled. There are many studies of women's movements in places where there is a struggle for women's rights (Naples and Desai 2002;Banaszak 2006;Reilly 2007;Merry 2009;Basu 2010;Walsh 2010;Htun and Weldon 2012;McCammon 2012a;Narain 2013;Stachursky 2013;Tsetsura 2013 to name just a few), but there are fewer studies (particularly comparative studies outside of the United States) of the movements that counter these struggles (Ferree et al. 2002;Dillon 1996;Blee and Deutsch 2012;Kendhammer 2013 are some exceptions). Even fewer studies outside of the United States focus on the movements against women's rights, abortion rights, or human rights that appear or continue in countries after these rights have been granted and the debates relatively "settled." ...
Why do some social movements in abortion debates get more attention from the news media than others? Do movements that support the status quo receive more attention than those opposing the status quo? Through quantitative content analysis of eight major newspapers in South Korea, Ireland, and Canada and fieldwork in South Korea and Ireland, I theorize that antistatus quo groups – whether they are for or against abortion rights – may reopen debate conditions in their countries by strategically using international human rights norms and frames and gaining standing in the news media in environments that tend to be hostile to their views.
Advisor: Ari Kohen
... Analyses of the policy process around the minimum marriageable age policy have hitherto been focused on the impact of the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Nigeria. Scholars have noted the adoption and practice of Islamic religious law by state governments as the determining factor for whether those states adopt the policy with all its provisions (Ogunniran, 2010;Kendhammer, 2013;Nzarga, 2016;Kawu & Abdur-Rahman, 2013). This is a valid perspective, because religion generates conflicts regarding the definition of childhood or the need for a minimum marriageable age. ...
Nigeria has the eleventh highest incidence of early marriage – marriage before the age of 18 – in the world. This is problematic because early marriage has been shown to have significant health and socioeconomic disadvantages for girls. In 2003, the Child Rights Act (CRA) was adopted by the federal government of Nigeria. One of its provisions was a prohibition of early marriage. As of 2022, 25 of Nigeria’s 36 states had adopted the CRA. However, only 23 have adopted its minimum marriageable age provision without exception. This paper discusses the factors affecting the adoption of the CRA’s minimum marriageable age policy, arguing that although religion provides a legitimate perspective on adoption decisions, women policy actors have also played a significant role. This paper therefore both presents a more comprehensive approach to understanding this policy process and provides support for the presence and participation of women in policymaking as an effective approach to the problem of early marriage.
... International organizations have characterized the Muslim world as a "desert of non-compliance" due in large part to provisions that refer to shariʿa (Modirzadeh 2006:192) and have unambiguously condemned its application, even when implemented democratically (Kendhammer 2013a) and the most sensationalized aspects of some shariʿa-based penal codesincluding floggings, amputations, and stonings -do not occur (Kendhammer 2013b). Even more Global Norms vs. Global Actors 9 benign discussions of shariʿa among global actors tend to define it as illegitimate: in a 2008 letter to the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted with concern that wartime chaos was forcing Afghans to "revert" to shariʿa (Ban 2008:7). ...
Many scholars argue that local cultures are an impediment to the diffusion of “global” norms. Others point out that local populations domesticate global cultural elements by integrating them into preexisting cultures, generating hybridized systems. In the current study, I argue that local cultures are not necessarily impediments to cultural change and hybridization is only one aspect of cultural domestication. Instead, I find that individuals attribute global norms to local cultural objects as a means for disassociating putatively universal norms from the powerful actors that dominate international politics. I illustrate this process using the case of support for shariʿa (sometimes called Islamic law) in majority‐Muslim countries. Results of multimethod analyses show that with the exception of attitudes about gender roles and sexuality, Muslims who support implementing shariʿa do not systematically object to many so‐called global norms; in fact, they may express more enthusiasm about democracy, tolerance for people of other religions, optimism about scientific advances, and concern for environmental preservation than those who oppose implementing shariʿa. Likewise, many Muslims assert their full participation in global society on terms not dictated by Western actors by repackaging ostensibly universal norms as components of the unambiguously local shariʿa.
... Además del análisis de los movimientos, redes y grupos, también han recibido atención las organizaciones, en especial las ong. Su estudio estuvo enfocado en la capacidad de incidencia y los límites de su actuación, a partir del análisis de casos o experiencias, especialmente en África (Aberese Ako, Akua Anyidoho & Crawford, 2013;Finnegan, Saltsman & White, 2010;Kendhammer, 2013;Ocholla, 2011;Osaghae, 2008;Press, 2013) y en América Latina (Benavides, 2012;Valencia, 2014;Lachenal & Pirker, 2012;Santos & Rodríguez Garavito, 2007;Abregú, 2008). ...
¿Cómo es que personas que no han sido víctimas de violaciones a derechos humanos se convierten en defensores/as? En el artículo se presenta el proceso de construcción identitaria de defensores/as de derechos humanos en México. El proceso comparte tres rasgos: la formación de intuiciones iniciales de justicia que los lleva a rechazar situaciones de inequidad social y abusos de autoridad; un momento de ruptura que los lleva a dedicarse a la defensa de derechos humanos como opción de vida; y un proceso de consolidación como activista de derechos humanos.
The case of Bariya Magazu In late 2000 a legal case in Northern Nigeria involving women's and children's rights attracted much Canadian attention. Bariya Magazu was sentenced to be flogged for having sexual relations outside marriage, and that sentence was carried out. Her case raises the issue of cultural imperialism in promoting supposedly international human rights norms. In particular, it raises the questions of what is a child, and what is 'cruel, unusual or degrading punishment'. It also shows how women's rights can become a focal point for indigenous politics, thereby also raising the question of who is the most appropriate actor to defend an individual's human rights. Thus, this Canadian case addresses the larger issue of world human rights politics, and the fear that many Western human rights advocates express of inadvertently acting as cultural imperialists. In this article I analyze various elements that affected this case. My purpose is to show its multiple social and political facets, some of which were not evident to the Canadians who tried to intervene to protect Bariya Magazu. My purpose is also to show how both Canadians (and more generally, 'Westerners' as a group) and Nigerians misinterpret each others' motives and fundamental moral beliefs. The Bariya Magazu case illustrates the world-wide politics of resentment, and reinforces the necessity for cultural sensitivity in advocating human rights norms. Simultaneously, however, it underlines the importance of both the international feminist and the international human rights movements. In analyzing this case, then, I put aside my own personal views. I support unreservedly all the rights of women and children enshrined in international human rights documents; I oppose all forms of corporal and capital punishment; and I oppose punishment of individuals merely because they engage in consensual sexual relations. Certainly, women should not be punished for acts for which men go free, nor should women be used as ideological scapegoats in situations of economic and political uncertainty, as now appears to be the case in Northern Nigeria. Many Nigerian feminists, Muslim and other, agree with me, as I will discuss below. Nevertheless, the purpose of this article is to discuss the social, legal, and political issues surrounding the Magazu case, not to advocate for her rights.
Legal reform is necessary but not sufficient to realise women's rights. This paper compares two campaigns for legal reform in Nigeria: attempts to domesticate the UN Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in federal law, which resulted in defeat of the bill in 2007, and a successful campaign to introduce legislation to prevent the mistreatment of widows in Anambra State. It considers the role of religion in the campaigns, by examining how the women's movement engaged with religious actors. The research shows that religious beliefs, discourses, and actors had a significant influence on the outcomes of the campaigns, in part because of the content of the proposed legislation, but also because of the strategies adopted by the campaigners and the interests of the religious bodies concerned. Despite the implication of religion in gender inequality, these cases show that religious teachings, leaders, and organisations can be allies rather than obstacles in achieving progressive social change.
Human rights as an international political project are closely tied to claims of universality. Attacks on the universality of human rights, however, are also widespread. And some versions of universalism are indeed theoretically indefensible, politically pernicious, or both. This essay explores the senses in which human rights can (and cannot) be said to be universal, the senses in which they are (and are not) relative, and argues for the "relative universality" of internationally recognized human rights.
The place of Islamic law in Nigeria has undergone three significant adjustments in the past half-century. The first, the “Settlement of 1960”, was brokered by the British in the run-up to Nigerian independence. The second, the “Debacle of 1979”, resulted from the constitution-making process that preceded the birth of the Second Republic. The third, the “Revival of 1999”, is still in progress today in the twelve northern states that are implementing sharia. Nigeria’s Christians deplore the Revival of 1999 and have many theories about its causes. This paper argues their own responsibility in the matter. The Settlement of 1960, under which the Muslims made large concessions but also won certain perquisites in return, was working to the general satisfaction. In the constitution-making process of 1976-78, however, in the fight over the proposed Federal Sharia Court of Appeal, Christian intransigence wrecked the Settlement of 1960 and produced instead the Debacle (for Islamic law) of 1979. By fighting and winning this battle the Christians missed an opportunity to settle with the Muslims the place of Islamic law in Nigeria on reasonable, honorable, and stable terms, instead sowing some of the seeds of twenty years of Muslim discontent that helped bring on the Revival of 1999. Indeed, the paper argues, but for the Debacle of 1979, of which the Christians were the authors, the Revival of 1999 would not have happened and we would not be witnessing the implementation of sharia in northern Nigeria today.
The sharia implementation programs of twelve states of northern Nigeria are briefly described. Reasons for concern are noted. But ten reasons are given for thinking that sharia implementation on the whole represents progress for the states concerned and for Nigeria. Three reasons relate to the fact that the political units implementing sharia are states within a larger federation. The steps taken are a victory for democracy as well as for federalism. The Muslim majorities of the implementing states are reclaiming their heritage and their right to develop it themselves. Among other things they are developing Islamic law. The steps taken will help to defuse tendencies to violent Islamic fundamentalism, will help to eliminate political illusions, and may result in better government. In conclusion the early overreactions of Nigeria’s Christians, the Kaduna riots of February 2000, and the Kaduna compromise are briefly described. [This paper was originally published in Swedish Missiological Themes, vol. 90, no. 2 (2002), pp. 163-171]
The relations between sharia and national law in Nigeria have varied widely from time to time and from place to place within the country – which after all was first brought under a single administration only in 1914. In sections 1-4 of this paper the complex history of our subject is sketched, culminating in the programmes of ‘sharia implementation’ that began in 1999 in twelve of Nigeria’s northern states. Sections 5-9 concentrate thematically upon the present day. Many details of the incorporation of sharia in the laws of Nigeria are discussed, including the Sharia Courts and the Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes now in place in the sharia states, the continuing application of uncodified Islamic personal law and other Islamic civil law throughout the north, the effects of sharia implementation on women and non-Muslims, and the constitutional questions the sharia implementation programmes raise. The conclusion, section 10, discusses the likely fate of Islamic criminal law in the sharia states, and gives some reason to think that sharia implementation has on the whole been a positive development for Nigeria.
One of the most important developments in Muslim politics in recent years has been the spread of movements calling for the implementation of shari'a or Islamic law. Shari'a Politics maps the ideals and organization of these movements and examines their implications for the future of democracy, citizen rights, and gender relations in the Muslim world. These studies of eight Muslim-majority societies, and state-of-the-field reflections by leading experts, provide the first comparative investigation of movements for and against implementation of shari'a. These essays reveal that the Muslim public's interest in shari'a does not spring from an unchanging devotion to received religious tradition, but from an effort to respond to the central political and ethical questions of the day.
Whether Islam is compatible with human rights in general, and with the Declaration of Human Rights in particular, has been both a Muslim issue and a concern of the international community. Muslim rulers, Western analysts and policymakers, and Muslim extremists as well as conservative Muslims, have often agreed for diverse reasons that Islam and human rights cannot co-exist. This book argues for the essential compatibility of Islam and human rights. It offers a critique of leading Western experts who ignore or marginalize the relationship of religion to human rights. At the same time, the book re-examines the inherited tradition that forms the basis of conservative Muslim objections, arguing that it is culturally conditioned and therefore open to development and change. Finally, and most importantly, the book delineates a fresh contemporary Muslim position that argues for a correspondence between Islam and secular concepts of human rights, grounded in sacred sources as well as Islamic history and thought.
Each year, more than two million pilgrims from over 100 countries converge on the holy city of Mecca to reenact the ritual dramas that Muslims have been performing for centuries. While it is first and foremost a religious festival, the hajj is also a major political event. The Muslim world's leading multinational organization, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, has established the first international regime explicitly devoted to pilgrimage. Every large Muslim nation has developed a comprehensive hajj policy and a powerful bureaucracy to enforce it. Yet no authority-secular or religious, national or international-can really control the hajj. Pilgrims believe that they are entitled to travel freely to Mecca as "Guests of God"-not as guests of any nation or organization that might wish to restrict or profit from their efforts to fulfill a fundamental religious obligation. Blending social science with the humanities and international law,Guests of God tells the stories of hajjis and hajj managers from Nigeria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia exploring one of the greatest human experiences of our time.
How do women's rights activists mobilize in nondemocratic and culturally conservative contexts? Why do some women's movements succeed in securing the policy outcomes they seek while others fail to realize their objectives? Comparing two recent cases of feminist activism in the Middle East/North Africa region-the Moroccan and Iranian campaigns for family law reform-the article demonstrates the way that political opportunity structures shape the strategic options available to activists and influence movement frames. While a political opening is conducive to movement growth and success, including cooperation for legal and policy reform (Morocco), the closing of political space compels extrainstitutional feminist contention and transnational links (Iran). In examining the structure of political opportunity in addition to strategic choices, the paper addresses the interplay of structure and agency in mobilization processes and finds that-to paraphrase Marx-women and men make history, but not under conditions of their own choosing.
Questions over the compatibility of Islam and Human Rights have become a key area of debate in the perceived tensions between 'Islam and the West'. In many ways, discussion over the stance of Islam in relation to such factors as gender rights, religious freedom, social and political freedoms, and other related issues represents a microcosm of the broader experience of how Muslim and 'Western' communities interact and relate. This volume seeks to engage with the various debates surrounding Islam and Human Rights, in particular, challenging assumptions of a 'standard' or 'essential' Muslim perspective on Human Rights. Through a survey of the experiences of Muslim communities across the globe (the ummah), this volume highlights the dynamic way Muslims understand and incorporate Human Rights into their personal, social and political experiences. From conceptual discussions on the issues of gender rights and religious freedom, to examining Muslim communities from South East Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, leading global experts bring forth key insights into the way in which Muslim communities live and experience Human Rights. The potential for deeper engagement with this issue is critical, as it opens possibilities for more profound understanding and tolerance. © 2008 Editorial selection and matter; Shahram Akbazadeh & Benjamin MacQueen. All rights reserved.ylor & Francis Group
In recent years, scholars have struggled to explain high levels of support for both state-sponsored Islamic law (sharia) and democracy in many new Muslim-majority democracies. The origins of popular support for Islamic law in uncertain democratic environments can be considered using
the case of Northern Nigeria, where twelve states implemented sharia through democratic institutions during the early 2000s. Sharia implementation movements gain popular support by framing problems common to new democracies (corruption, inequality, poor governance) as moral concerns to be
addressed by the state's enforcement of ethical conduct. While sharia implementation has had a dubious effect on democratic governance in Nigeria and elsewhere, support for Islamic law is likely to endure within Muslim communities where governance remains poor.
List of Maps and Tables Preface Acknowledgments Note on Foreign Terms and Transliteration Introduction PART ONE: Similarities: Common Heritage of the Maghrib 1. State Formation in Kin-Based Societies 2. Islam and Family Law: An Unorthodox View 3. Women Ally with the Devil: Gender, Unity, and Division 4. Men Work with Angels: Power of the Tribe PART TWO: Historical Differences 5. The Precolonial Polity: National Variations 6. Colonial Rule: French Strategies PART THREE Three Paths to Nation-State and Family Law 7. Palace, Tribe, and Preservation of Islamic Law: Morocco 8. Elite Divisions and the Law in Gridlock: Algeria 9. State Autonomy from Tribe and the Transformation of Family Law: Tunisia Conclusion. State-Building, Family Law, and Women's Rights History, Strategy, and Policy Some Theoretical Implications Glossary Notes Bibliography Index
Why do citizens disagree about the extent to which state law should be based on Islamic law? And why do some view state laws that conform to Shari???ah as a threat to secularism, while others do not? I argue in this dissertation that how local elites frame the issues shapes the kinds of values and considerations ordinary citizens mobilize as they form their preferences. In Senegal, some Muslim groups have advocated a personal status law that would apply only to Muslims and that would conform to Shari???ah principles. They framed a Muslim personal law as a question of faith and the religious authority of the Shari???ah. Defenders of the state Family Code framed the issue in terms of the secularism of the state and the principle of legal equality for all citizens. For some men and women, religious values and commitments do lead them to support a Muslim personal law. For others, commitment to secularism and the principle of legal equality lead them to oppose such a law. Many men and women, however, profess commitment to each of the principles invoked in these debates and do not view a Muslim personal law as incompatible with Senegalese secularism or legal equality. To explain how citizens reconcile competing values and commitments, I argue that awareness of elite discourse plays a critical role. The most educated and media-exposed men and women tend to view these as incompatible issues, in part, because they are more aware of the prevailing secular interpretive package offered in the media. These findings stem from analyses using multiple methods ??? statistical analysis of an original survey of public opinion in urban Senegal, interpretive analysis of coded narratives with 800 randomly selected men and women, and content analysis of print media debates about family law reform. Through public debate over family law reform, elites and the public constantly negotiate the boundaries of the religion-state relationship and the prevailing meaning of secularism and legal equality.
By analysing the proposals contained in the report, “Promoting Women’s Rights Through Sharia in Northern Nigeria,” which was published by the Centre for Islamic Legal Studies at Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in Zaria in 2005, this paper explores the complexities and consequences of a rights strategy grounded in “an authentic understanding of Sharia.” The paper argues that this strategy may further constrain the discourses of debate for Muslim women in northern Nigeria. It also discusses how the strategy privatizes responsibility for poverty eradication, and how it ignores competing languages of social change, including Nigerian and international women’s rights.
The debate about the proper relationship between religion and politics in Nigeria has been clouded historically by ideological partisanship and conceptual confusion. This article examines the topic against the backdrop of an emergent constitutional culture in the country and the paradox that this creates in a religiously pluralistic context. It argues that it would be foolhardy to repress pluralism in the attempt to resolve this paradox, and instead defends a kind of pluralist orientation that is compatible with the desire to build and nurture a stable constitutional culture.
This article questions why Islamists approved family law reform in Morocco and not in Jordan. The answer entails three inter-related factors: the different relationships Islamists had with their respective monarchs; the strength of leftist parties and their ties to civil society; and how the respective reforms were presented by the two monarchs. This article contributes to a body of literature that argues, while not discounting ideology, that an understanding of Islamist parties requires an examination of the larger political context and Islamist responses to it.
This article takes the Minimum Age of Marriage clause of the Nigerian Child Rights Act (cra) of 2003 as an entry point through which to analyse the politics of women's rights in Nigeria. It explores some of the challenges of domesticating international human rights conventions in a context where plural legal systems and entrenched cultural norms complicate attempts to redress gender inequalities. It reviews the introduction of this legislation, the reaction of different stakeholders to it and the ways in which different women's groups and programmes have engaged with the emerging controversy over the age of marriage. Ultimately the lesson that emerges from this case is that, for international human rights treaties to make a difference for vulnerable groups such as children, they have to go beyond being evoked and advocated by groups to become tools for political action, which also means the creation of mechanisms that challenge powerful agents in society and compel accountability.
Obra que reconstruye el origen y evolución de las actuales redes transnacionales que, con la utilización de las nuevas tecnologías informativas como recurso organizador y aglutinador, han logrado constituirse en movimientos más o menos presionadores en la defensa de los derechos humanos, de la protección ambiental y de una mayor equidad de género, entre otros.
In 2000 and 2001, twelve northern states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria introduced Islamic criminal law as one of a number of measures aiming at "reintroducing the shari'a." Immediately after its adoption, defendants were sentenced to death by stoning or to amputation of the hand. Apart from a few well publicised trials, however, the number and nature of cases tried under Islamic criminal law are little known. Based on a sample of trials, the present thesis discusses the introduction of Islamic criminal law and the evolution of judicial practice within the regions historical, cultural, political and religious context. The introduction of Islamic criminal law was initiated by politicians and supported by Muslim reform groups, but its potential effects were soon mitigated on higher judicial levels and aspects of the law were contained by local administrators.
Abstract will be provided by author.
he gulf in perception between Islamic and secular perspectives over the meaning of human rights is growing. Media reports and western governments repeatedly charge Muslim governments from Sudan to Iran of human rights violations. In some parts of the Muslim world, a string of events indeed suggest that the violation of hu- man rights continue with little sign of immediate abatement. Tragedy is the overriding topos of the media attention that such events receive. The list can become endless, but I will only mention a few incidents in order to highlight the salient contexts and issues for the purposes of a discussion on human rights. The Turkish Muslim feminist Konca Kuris was kidnapped by a Turkish group known as the Hizbullah in 1998 and her dead body was found in 1999.1 In 1997 Egypt's highest court ruled that the writ- ings of a Cairo University professor, Nasr H~mid Abã Zayd were tantamount to apos- tasy.2 In 1992, Muslim militants assassinated the Egyptian human rights activist and essayist Farag Fouda. The 1980s witnessed the international imbroglio amounting to a debacle when Iran's clergy offered a ransom to anyone who would assassinate the In- dian-born British author Salman Rushdie for writing novels that offended Muslim sen- sibilities. On a daily basis, spine chilling reports of death and civilian casualties perpetrated by Muslim militants and the military in Algeria bewilder observers after the army's subversion of the democratic process in that country. In many Muslim countries like Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Tunisia, intellectuals are subjected to harassment by traditionalist and fundamentalist quarters alike as well as by governments for their critical study of religion and for opinions that do not meet with approval from the religious establishment. When human rights con- cerns are raised, officials from Muslim countries accuse the West of using a double standard in its application of human rights, of mounting the human right claim as an instrument of political power against nations who do not further its political and eco- nomic agendas.3 T
Recognizably different Islamic trends in contemporary Northern Nigeria can be described in terms of traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism, and each trend can be correlated to a different educational background as well as a different political orientation. Within the last two decades, each of these trends has changed, with traditionalism shifting toward modernism, and modernism becoming fundamentalism, while fundamentalism faces imminent transformation in uncertain directions. Although handy for analyzing different trends, traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism should be recognized as discursive categories that are capable of not only revealing but also erasing subtleties, linkages and nuances of constantly changing social movements.
The recent introduction of the full Sharia, the Islamic legal system, by some Northern states in Nigeria raises a number of constitutional questions and impacts the supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution. The Constitution prohibits the promotion of religion by either the federal government or any of its components states and also provides for the freedom of religion and the right of all citizens to practice their religion. At the same time, any law enacted in the country that conflicts with the Constitution is void to the extent of its inconsistency. The application of the Sharia in Nigeria prior to its recent configuration was limited to civil matters. The paper examines the constitutionality of the unilateral extension of the Sharia to crimes, and the human rights and other implications of such extension.
The processes surrounding the elaboration of democracy in Muslim societies can be examined via a comparative consideration of three West African countries: Senegal, Mali, and Niger. Departing from analyses that ask whether democracy can be established in Muslim societies, the key question is how the democratic question is framed and discussed in such religious contexts. The launching of African democratic experiments in the 1990s provoked significant negotiation and discussion both within religious society and between religious groups and the secular elite about the desired substance of democracy. These processes have gradually empowered Muslim majorities to challenge and nuance the agenda presented at the transitions, but this is a direct outcome of the democratic process itself.
In 1957-1958 Moroccan family law was codified in the Mudawwana, a text known for its close adherence to the classical Maliki tradition. Since the early 1980s the debate about reform has become more intense and widespread. The relatively limited reform of the Mudawwana in 1993 was closely linked to the beginnings of a process of cautious democratization. Since then the discussions have become more vehement, especially since the coming to power of a new government in 1998 consisting of former opposition parties. A year later this government presented a plan for extensive family law reforms. The plan has provoked considerable public debate over key concepts such as democracy, development, human rights, civil society, and ijtihd. Upon closer inspection, larger issues are at stake: Who may speak out in public and participate in politics? This new turn in the discussions is related to the emergence of a public sphere.
In this paper, I am concerned with understanding the recent efforts to reform the laws governing marriage and inheritance, the code de la famille or the Family Code in Mali. Since the advent of multiparty elections in the 1990s, prominent members of the Malian government and civil servants, Malian women's rights activists, secular NGOs, and international and bilateral donors have made efforts to promote various social reforms, including the advancement of women's rights and the promotion of gender equality, particularly through changes in the Family Code. While some observers have attributed the lack of reform to the increased influence of “Islamists” and/or to religiously conservative Muslims, I draw on historical research and ethnography to propose an alternative reading of the lack of institutional law reform. As I argue, the gap between Malian civil law relating to the family and the lived experiences and social practices of many Malians, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, has become even more apparent in this era of political liberalization and promotion of global human rights discourses. This has helped to make such proposed social reforms as the promotion of women's rights and family law reform more contentious and the ultimate outcome even more uncertain.
From 1977 to 1979, Nigeria prepared itself for the coming Second Republic. Most important on the agenda was the writing of a new Constitution. The Supreme Military Council (S.M.C.) appointed a Constitutional Drafting Committee, and its Draft was debated by the Constituent Assembly, which included elected members from all 19 States, as well as a number nominated by the S.M.C. The Draft, along with the changes proposed by the Constituent Assembly, were presented in September 1978 to the S.M.C. which made further alterations. That Constitution provided the basis for the subsequent elections of July and August 1979, and the formal inauguration of the Second Republic took place in October.
Despite the human rights movement’s increasing sophistication, human rights NGOs remain unsure of how to address questions of Islamic law when it conflicts with international human rights law. Islamic leaders, on the other hand, are often unequivocal in their belief that specific areas of substantive Islamic law conflict with specific aspects of human rights law, and that Shari’a law should govern in such instances. Modern proponents of Islamic law regard their prescriptive rules for society as God-created alternatives to human rights law and as a parallel path to justice and emancipation. Human rights advocates, conversely, appear deeply uncomfortable about acknowledging the apparent contradiction between human rights norms and Islamic law. When they do acknowledge the conflict, human rights proponents seem unable to articulate a coherent response. Although they believe that international human rights law should prevail, they worry that this view smacks of cultural imperialism, and, as such, leaves them vulnerable to criticism from Muslims. Behind closed doors, many human rights professionals are deeply worried about how they ought to address Islamic law. The constant need to publicly deny any crack in the edifice of the universalism of human rights has adversely affected the work of the movement.Part I of this Article very briefly discusses why I think we ought to be most interested in the work of these INGOs when appraising the effect and the effectiveness of the international human rights movement. I argue that in planning and executing their interventions, AI and HRW are, today, highly strategic pragmatists. Part II presents a typology of methods currently used by INGOs when they encounter Shari’a, and describes the four moves employed by INGOs to manage their untheorized position on Islamic law. Part III points to the costs of the current approaches and to those who bear them. I argue that the costs of the human rights movement’s professional performances in this finite arena can be identified and weighed against the benefits of international intervention as currently practiced. Part IV suggests possible ways out of the current confusion. It calls on INGOs to acknowledge the uncomfortable realities of their current position, and, assuming that INGOs will continue to take a pragmatic line in determining when and how to act, suggests that they consider new ways of engaging with Islamic law. Although I take no position on which strategy has the most potential, I provide three alternative paths forward for the movement, depending on how they choose to evaluate the costs and risks before them.
This lecture transcript provides an introduction to Islamic law, jurisprudence, and locations of legal authority for Islamic law and government. Without going into detail regarding its many different geographical manifestations over many hundreds of years, this lecture lays out basic categories of where legal authority has been located for Muslims, and explains the concepts inherent to Islamic legal analysis. Contemporary examples especially relevant to Islamic law and women serve as a practical lens through which to ground the relevance and importance of this topic today.
This ethnographic analysis of one of the core human rights conventions suggests that despite the lack of enforceability of this convention and its operation within the framework of state sovereignty, it is similar to state law. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, or CEDAW, the major UN convention on the status of women, articulates a vision of women's equal protection from discrimination and addresses gender-based violence as a form of discrimination. It had been ratified by 171 nation states as of mid-2003. Its implementation relies on a complex process of periodic reporting to a global body meeting in New York and a symbiotic if sometimes contentious relationship between government representatives and international and domestic NGOs. Like state law, it serves to articulate and name problems and delineate solutions. It provides a resource for activists endeavoring to address problems of women's status and turns the international gaze on resisting nations. Its regulatory strength depends on the cultural legitimacy of the international process of consensus building and related social movements to define social justice in these terms. Thus, like state law, its impact depends on its cultural legitimacy and its embodiment in local cultures and legal consciousness. This examination of CEDAW as quasi law extends our understanding of law as a plural and a symbolic system rooted in a particular historical moment of globalization.
Conflicts over the status of Sharia Islamic law have dominated constitutional politics and ethno-religious relations in the Nigerian federation for decades. The adoption of stringent Sharia codes by 12 Muslim majority states in northern Nigeria, beginning with Zamfara in 1999, was particularly contentious, provoking broad concerns about the viability and survival of Nigeria's innovatively structured multi-ethnic federal system. But Sharia implementation and extension in Nigeria have followed a largely benign trajectory. The Nigerian federation's judicious combination of centrist and autonomy mechanisms has been remarkably effective in managing religious conflict and cauterising potentially disintegrative centrifugal challenges to national stability. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This article explores the common ideological ground between Islam and Christianity in Nigeria, in the ways in which gender and sexuality are configured in relation to women's bodies. The latter constitute key sites for the inscription of social norms and practices inherent in particular interpretations of religion. We proceed by examining the interplay between religion and politics in historical context and in specific concrete instances. While the religious right among Muslims and Christians share the view that women's bodies are sexually corrupting and therefore in need of control, this perspective is also found in secular institutions. At the same time Christians and Muslims are strongly opposed to controls on women's bodies that may lead to either religious group being identified as 'the other'. The linkage made between women's bodies and 'public morality' produces diverse forms of gender inequality. The moralising of political economy that these processes entail complicates the terrain on which challenges to the politicisation of religion and its gender politics need to be sustained.
After an explosion of conversions to Pentecostalism over the past three decades, tens of millions of Nigerians now claim that âJesus is the answer.â But if Jesus is the answer, what is the question? What led to the movementâs dramatic rise and how can we make sense of its social and political significance? In this ambitiously interdisciplinary study, Ruth Marshall draws on years of fieldwork and grapples with a host of important thinkersâincluding Foucault, Agamben, Arendt, and Benjaminâto answer these questions. To account for the movementâs success, Marshall explores how Pentecostalism presents the experience of being born again as a chance for Nigerians to realize the promises of political and religious salvation made during the colonial and postcolonial eras. Her astute analysis of this religious trend sheds light on Nigeriaâs contemporary politics, postcolonial statecraft, and the everyday struggles of ordinary citizens coping with poverty, corruption, and inequality. Pentecostalismâs rise is truly global, and Political Spiritualities persuasively argues that Nigeria is a key case in this phenomenon while calling for new ways of thinking about the place of religion in contemporary politics.
Islamic development NGOs find it difficult enough to finance their work, because Western donors are often reluctant to sponsor NGOs with religious affiliations. Muslim women activists working to achieve development with gender equity face an even greater challenge: they must secure funding as well as justify their goals to those within their societies who see feminism as a threat.
A Review of Literature on the Role of Religion in Women's Movements for Social Change in Nigeria, Religions and Development Working Paper #46
- Adamu
- Para-Mallam Fatima
- O J Ajala
ADAMU, Fatima, PARA-MALLAM, O. J., and AJALA, A. O. (2010) A Review of Literature on the Role of Religion in Women's Movements for Social Change in Nigeria, Religions and Development Working Paper #46 (Birmingham: UK Department for International Development).