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Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and Their Political Identities

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... Looking at nonelectoral activities, however, there is evidence that this group is and desires to be politically active beyond voting, and the types of activities such groups engage in depends on group members' country of origin. More recent work demonstrates that Asian Americans, despite generations of geographic concentration, are becoming more important in electoral contests across the United States (Wong et al. 2011). Wong et al. (2011) find higher levels of educational attainment do not necessarily lead to increased political participation among Asian Americans. ...
... More recent work demonstrates that Asian Americans, despite generations of geographic concentration, are becoming more important in electoral contests across the United States (Wong et al. 2011). Wong et al. (2011) find higher levels of educational attainment do not necessarily lead to increased political participation among Asian Americans. Yet when they disaggregate nationality from race, they find there are great variations in political participation. ...
... The recentness of immigration, social class, educational attainment, and English proficiency graft themselves onto these national origins. Consequently, Wong et al. (2011) find that, when controlling for generation, many of the distinctions in participation between national origin groups fall away. ...
Article
American identity has become a racialized norm that is primarily applied to those racially identified as White. We examine what it means to be an American from the perspective of racial and ethnic minorities who may not be viewed as prototypical Americans. Because we know comparatively little about what American identity means for those who are not White, it is important to understand this attachment in order to understand how “other” Americans articulate their identity and how their political actions and attitudes are influenced by those sentiments. Using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, we examine attachment to American identity for racial and ethnic minorities (i.e., Blacks, Asians, and Latino/a people) to evaluate levels of political participation and sentiments toward discrimination. Using a novel measure of Americanness (measured here as the extent to which people feel “allegiance” to America and their sense of “belonging” as Americans) we describe the differences between how racial and ethnic groups view their American identity, and how that perception influences electoral and nonelectoral participation. We find not only that there are differences in how various groups attach to American identity, but also that the impact of this identity attachment on electoral and nonelectoral participation is moderated by race and ethnicity.
... The primary focus of research on Asian Americans has been concentrated on the relationship between political participation and group consciousness/linked fate. Previous research notes that Asian Americans tend to have weaker linked fate than Latinos and are more likely to identify with an ethnic group based on their national origin than having pan-Asian group consciousness (Masuoka 2006;Wong et al. 2011). Wong et al. (2005 found that group consciousness has little effect on voting but does affect other types of political activities. ...
... Group identification refers to an individual's awareness of belonging to a certain group and having a psychological attachment to that group based on the perception of shared beliefs, feelings, interests, and ideas with other in-group members (McClain et al. 2009, p. 474). As the concept of race has been so important and consequential in establishing and maintaining systems of power in the United States, scholars studying group identity have largely focused on racial identity and its impact on the political behaviors and attitudes of individuals (Allen et al. 1989;Broman et al. 1988;Masuoka 2008;Min 2014;Stokes-Brown 2006;Wong et al. 2011). Beyond the simple feelings of in-group closeness, many researchers conceptualize racial identity as a multidimensional construct consisting in part of the physical, psychological, sociopolitical, and cultural elements of life for racial groups in the United States (McClain et al. 2009, p. 474). ...
... Along with Latinos, the Asian American population is also very diverse in terms of national origin, language, and immigration history, and there is no one ethnicity that predominates in this group (Aoki and Takeda 2008;Lien et al. 2004;Wong et al. 2011). Thus, scholars have challenged the formation of a monolithic Asian American bloc and highlighted the importance of recognizing intragroup heterogeneity in studying Asian Americans (Arora et al. 2021;Drouhot and Garip 2021;Huang 2021;Wong et al. 2011). ...
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This study explores the factors that influence Asian Americans’ perception of interracial commonality with Blacks and Latinos. Using the 2018 Civic Engagement and Political Participation of Asian Americans Survey, this research tests a model of competing theoretical explanations for Asian Americans’ intergroup commonality: group consciousness, group identity, views of discrimination, and intergroup contact. Results from ordered logistic regression analyses suggest that group consciousness, ethnic identity, and intergroup contact via friendship are robust predictors of Asian Americans’ feelings of closeness to Blacks and Latinos. However, Asian Americans’ perceptions of discrimination are unlikely to result in higher levels of the perceived commonality with outgroups. This study provides a valuable addition to the existing literature on interminority relations by identifying opportunities for Asian Americans to join cross-racial alliances. The conclusion of the article points to the important role that community-based organizations can play in bringing specific Asian American ethnic groups into such coalitions and promoting direct interactions between Asian Americans and other racial groups.
... While scholars operationalize racial inequality differently, most scholars agree that Blacks experience the most discrimination, then Latinos, then Asians, with Whites experiencing the least (Chong and Kim 2006;Masuoka and Junn 2013;Sanchez and Vargas 2016). 2 African Americans' shared history of discrimination has increased group consciousness or linked fate (Dawson 1994;McClain and Stewart 2010;Miller et al. 1981), collective action (Chong and Rogers 2005;Shingles 1981), and support for descriptive representation (Tate 1994), liberal policies, and the Democratic party (Dawson 1994;Smith 2013). Scholars studying Latinos and Asians show that group heterogeneity (e.g., ethnicity, citizenship, and generation) moderates the identity-to-politics link (Fraga et al. 2006;Lee 2008;Wong et al. 2011). Research highlights how discrimination against Latinos and Asians often takes similar forms: stereotypes, xenophobia, and policy threats such as immigration restrictions or English-only legislation (Aoki and Takeda 2008;Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2018;Masuoka and Junn 2013;Schmidt et al. 2010). ...
... Asian Americans often report lower levels of discrimination than other racial minority groups (Kim and Lee 2001) and personal experiences with discrimination are often more impactful on Asian consciousness than perceptions of group discrimination (Masuoka 2006). The group's extensive diversityin terms of language, socioeconomic status, immigration history, and ethnicityand the fact that the majority of Asian Americans arrived after 1965 means that panethnic identity may be latent and context-dependent (Kim and Lee 2001;Junn and Masuoka 2008), and Asian Americans may emphasize ethnic ties over pan-ethnic ties (Lien, Margaret Conway, and Wong 2004;Wong et al. 2011). Finally, Asian Americans are infrequent targets of political mobilization (Wong 2008) and exhibit weaker partisanship (Hajnal and Lee 2011), meaning that individual perceptions may not catalyze collective support for a party or candidate. ...
... This, broadly, suggests that Asian Americans' perceptions of relative group discrimination are unassociated with their partisan choice, which would explain the null results among anti-Asian discrimination in our analyses of vote choice. Alternatively, it could suggest that other identities are more salient (Wong et al. 2011). Whites exhibit partisan differences in perceptions of relative group discrimination, with Democrats consistently perceiving their group as experiencing the least, and Republicans being most likely to perceive all groups as experiencing equal amounts of discrimination. ...
Article
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Scholars of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics (REP) have demonstrated that discrimination shapes the political behavior of Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Whites. This scholarship, however, tends to focus on a single group or employ variables that make intergroup comparisons difficult. Using data from the 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey, we examine individuals’ perceptions of the discrimination their racial or pan-ethnic group faces relative to other groups and the relationship between those perceptions and presidential vote choice. We argue that perceived relative group discrimination captures group-level perceptions of racial hierarchy in the United States, and present evidence that these perceptions significantly influenced vote choice in the 2016 presidential election. Whites who believe their racial group experiences more discrimination than other groups were significantly more likely to cast a vote for Donald Trump. This finding contradicts similar studies identifying White awareness of their dominance as a catalyst of pro-group behavior. Conversely, Latinos who expressed a greater sense of relative group discrimination were more likely to cast a vote for Hillary Clinton. We replicate these findings across multiple datasets and find that relative group discrimination is associated with partisanship among Blacks, Latinos, and Whites since at least 2012.
... However, the data landscape is changing as the number of Asian Americans increases and as new survey instruments, such as the National Asian American Survey (NAAS 2020) become available. The NAAS was fielded in 2008 and again in 2016, with a focus each time on gathering information on Asian Americans' political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors (see Wong et al. 2011). ...
... Similarly to citizens in general and among naturalized citizens, some research indicates that Asian Americans who are more established in society-such as older individuals, those with more schooling, and those with higher incomesare more likely to vote (e.g., with CPS data, see Bass and Casper 2001b;with NAAS data, see Yoon 2015). However, other studies (Junn 1999;Lien 2004;Wong et al. 2011;Xu 2005) suggest that socioeconomic factors may not predict electoral participation among Asian Americans overall, or for national origin groups, to the same degree as for the U.S. population in general. For example, Masuoka, Ramanathan, and Junn (2019) reported that higher socioeconomic status is not associated with a higher likelihood of electoral participation once the requirement of registration is satisfied, using a registered citizen sample from the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey data. ...
... Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables of interest in this analysis, and the number of cases and weighted percentages are presented for the two analytical samples: all registered Asian Americans and naturalized registered Asian Americans. We weight the data using the NAAS sample weight variable, which uses a raking method and the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey data to produce nationally representative estimates by race, nativity, age, state of residence, and education (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017;Wong et al. 2011). The effective samples are representative of 2.7 million Asian Americans and 2 million naturalized Asian Americans. ...
Article
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The authors address the gap in what is known about voting among Asian American ethnic subgroups using National Asian American Survey 2016 Post-Election Survey data to investigate the propensity to vote in the 2016 presidential election across two samples: registered Asian Americans and registered naturalized Asian Americans. The authors use logistic regressions to examine voting behavior across 10 Asian ethnic subgroups for the first time. Across both samples of Asian Americans and naturalized Asian Americans, Chinese Americans demonstrate a lower propensity to vote than most other Asian ethnic subgroups, while Asian Indian and Bangladeshi Americans demonstrate a higher propensity to vote. Among all Asian Americans, being female, being older, and having more education all pattern higher rates of reported voting in the 2016 presidential election, while for naturalized Asians, time in the United States and higher levels of education are associated with a higher likelihood of voting in the 2016 presidential election.
... This issue is even more complicated among Asian Americans. One of the important but also obscured aspects of Asian Americans' political behavior is partisanship (Hajnal & Lee, 2011;Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee, & Junn, 2011). Scholars in American politics in general are in consensus that temporal stability of partisanship is one of the reasons why party identification is the most efficient predictor for political behaviors (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1966;Converse, 1964;Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, & Weisberg, 2008), and remains a powerful way to shape people's attitudes toward policy (Green, Palmquis, & Schickler, 2002;Lenz, 2009;Zaller, 1992). ...
... Asian American is one of the fastest growing immigrant communities in the United States, with more than half of Asian American populations were foreign-born. For foreign-born Asian Americans came to the United States with varying levels of educational background, political knowledge of American politics and English proficiency (Lien, 2006;Ramakrishnan, 2005;Wong et al., 2011). For many Asian immigrants, their political socialization is the process of acquiring coherent knowledge of the parties and their associations with the issues that is easily accessible when subjects are exposed to party cues. ...
... Prior studies show that a high level of political knowledge moderates the effects between political values and vote preferences (Zaller, 1992). Wong et al. (2011) also find that the more education Asian Americans received, the more likely they perceived the political commonality with other Asians and non-Asians. As scholars have pointed out, lower levels of participation among foreign-born immigrants could be caused by the lack of socialization into American political institutions (Junn, 1999;Tam Cho, 1999). ...
Conference Paper
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A long-lasting empirical puzzle regarding immigrant political incorporation is that Asian Americans are less likely to participate politically and identify with the parties. Underlying this propensity of partisanship acquisition is how much Asian Americans know about American politics, and how policy attitude congruence and political knowledge shape the way in which Asian Americans think about politics. This paper used item response theory with a novel political knowledge scale to measure how political knowledge affects partisan choice. Using the original survey experiment (N=2,706) collected in 56 universities in the United States, I show that Asian Americans' partisan preference is affected mostly by policy preference, and political knowledge has a moderating effect on policy preference but not much on party cues. I theorize that the development of knowledge structure of the parties can help Asian American immigrants crisply discern the partisan preference. My findings provide new evidence on the sources of partisanship acquisition among Asian Americans and qualify the presumption that policy congruence facilitates the development of partisanship for Asian Americans.
... The term "Asian American" is uniquely American; developed first by the Census Bureau and later taken on by Asian American activists seeking to build political power (Espiritu 1993;Aoki and Nakanishi 2001;Lai and Geron 2006;Ancheta 2006). The term describes a vast array of individuals in the United States who trace their origins to the Asian continent (Nakanishi 1991) and is applied regardless of being native or foreign-born; of immigration status, naturalization status, or the number of years of residencyall of which have been found to be varying predictors of Asian American political participation (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991;Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001;Lien 2010;Wong et al. 2011). Highly skilled H1(b) visa holders often from East or South Asia are Asian American, just as refugees and asylees from the Vietnam War are Asian American. ...
... Underlying the relationship between a candidate and their co-ethnic community are group-based resources, such as group identity, group consciousness, and linked fate, which scholars have long posited racial and ethnic minorities may rely upon to effectively participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972;Verba, Nie, and Kim 1987;Leighley 2001). According to the National Asian American Survey, naturalized citizens and nativeborn Asian Americans are more likely to identify with the "Asian American" racial label (Wong et al. 2011). In an investigation of immigrant generation and voting, Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) find that unlike European immigrants, voting among Asian Americans increases with each subsequent generation. ...
... Secondly, research has shown that Asian Americans mobilize for a coethnic candidate regardless of party affiliation (Sadhwani 2020). One reason for this could be that nonpartisanship or even party switching is a rational strategy for immigrant voters (Hajnal and Lee 2011), who often report feeling shut out or ignored by the major parties (Wong et al. 2011). Thus, I would expect to find a similar pattern of support for co-ethnic candidates even in districts with two Republicans on the ballot, but this of course is an area in need of additional examination. ...
Article
Do voters use the race or ethnicity of a candidate in selecting whom to support? This paper examines the voting behavior of Asian Americans in elections in California. The analysis hinges on co-partisan elections stemming from California’s open primary system where two candidates from the same party compete, and thus a candidate’s party no longer serves as a reliable cue for voters at the ballot box. Using surname matched vote returns for seven state assembly and two congressional elections between 2012 and 2018, I find evidence of bloc voting in every race where an Asian American candidate is pitted against a non-Asian. When Asian candidates compete, however, evidence of polarization at the national origin level is found. The findings have theoretical implications for understanding the dynamics of co-ethnicity and descriptive representation for Asian Americans, as well as practical implications for the study of elections and minority voting rights.
... The current literature suggests that Asian American candidates may increase political participation among members of their panethnic group, but the mechanism driving these outcomes is unclear. Moreover, there is little evidence of how effective panethnic-identity appeals are relative to national-origin appeals, which for many are a primary locus of social identity (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004;Wong et al. 2011). ...
... I posit that place of birth shapes identification with and responsiveness to identity-based appeals. Specifically, I hypothesize that foreign-born individuals are more responsive to national-origin appeals than Americanidentity appeals because they identify more strongly with their country of origin (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004;Wong et al. 2011). In contrast, US-born individuals are more responsive to panethnic-identity appeals than American-identity appeals because panethnic identities are unique to the American racial order (Alba and Nee 2003). ...
... More generally, how do Asian Americans develop partisan preferences? Existing work points to several potential explanations, including linked fate, immigrant incorporation, and discrimination (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017;Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004;Wong et al. 2011). ...
... Asian Americans have experienced, and continue to bear the brunt of, various forms of racial discrimination (Kim 2003;King 2000;Masuoka and Junn 2013;Ngai 2004;Reny and Barreto 2020;Takaki 1989). Yet they are seemingly unparalleled in being marginalized without the type of durable and collective sense of racial identity that generally characterizes African Americans and their political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Cain, Kiewet, and Uhlaner 1991;Hajnal and Lee 2012;Junn and Masuoka 2008;Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004;Nakanishi 1991;Tam Cho 1995;Wong 2005;Wong et al. 2011). Indeed, the Asian American case stresses how the presence of racial discrimination is sometimes insufficient to catalyze collective action in US politics, particularly when a group in question is highly internally diverse, as Asian Americans are (e.g., Tam Cho 1995;Wong et al. 2011). ...
... Yet they are seemingly unparalleled in being marginalized without the type of durable and collective sense of racial identity that generally characterizes African Americans and their political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Cain, Kiewet, and Uhlaner 1991;Hajnal and Lee 2012;Junn and Masuoka 2008;Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004;Nakanishi 1991;Tam Cho 1995;Wong 2005;Wong et al. 2011). Indeed, the Asian American case stresses how the presence of racial discrimination is sometimes insufficient to catalyze collective action in US politics, particularly when a group in question is highly internally diverse, as Asian Americans are (e.g., Tam Cho 1995;Wong et al. 2011). Alas, unlike the bonding experience that slavery and its legacies have been for Black racial identity, Asian Americans are comprised of individuals from various national origin groups with different trajectories, languages, andmany timesantagonistic histories toward each other (Takaki 1989). ...
... As the research program around a concept, like racial hierarchy, begins to expand, researchers often feel real pressure to broaden and fan out this initial concept to cover new empirical terrain. In the instance of America's hierarchy, this has included efforts to integrate new groups into the conventional wisdom, such as Asian Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and others who do not quite fit the original binary framework centered around Blacks and Whites (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010;Garcia 2012;Junn 2007;Kim 2003;Lien et al. 2004;Mora 2014;Wong et al. 2011). This process has involved stretching the original concept of a top-down hierarchy to the point that it might undermine the original coherence it served (Adcock and Collier 2001;Collier and Mahon 1993;Sartori 1970). ...
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America's racial sands are quickly shifting, with parallel growth in theories to explain how varied groups respond, politically, to demographic changes. This Element develops a unified framework to predict when, why, and how racial groups react defensively toward others. America's racial groups can be arrayed along two dimensions: how American and how superior are they considered? This Element claims that location along these axes motivates political reactions to outgroups. Using original survey data and experiments, this Element reveals the acute sensitivity that people of color have to their social station and how it animates political responses to racial diversity.
... In contrast, these same partisan attitudes have not changed as much or as consistently for Whites, Blacks, and Latino/as. This lean toward the Democratic Party is important for a community that has been traditionally less likely to label themselves in partisan terms (Hajnal and Lee 2011;Wong et al. 2011). As Trump and other elites continue to consistently frame COVID-19 in anti-Asian terms, the social exclusion that Asian Americans encounter as a result may further cement this group with the Democratic Party. ...
... 7 Despite a tendency to vote for Democrats, Asian Americans are not as likely to explicitly identify with a party. Instead, a significant proportion of Asian Americans prefer to list themselves as "Independent" or "nonpartisan" (Hajnal and Lee 2011;Wong et al. 2011). Partisan identification is important because individuals who identify with a party are much more likely to vote than those who are unaffiliated (Campbell et al. 1960(Campbell et al. , 1966. ...
... These estimates are especially important in light of the history of Asian American non-partisanship, where many consider themselves to be non-partisan, moderate, or Independent. 23 The sustained change in party identification (2 points) is substantive due to how Asian Americans typically eschew party labels (Wong et al. 2011) and that Asian Americans are a rapidly growing proportion of the U.S. electorate (Budiman 2020). ...
Article
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Extending theories of social exclusion and elite messaging, we argue that Trump’s targeted rhetoric toward Asian Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic pushes the racial group, largely “Independent” or nonpartisan affiliated, to lean more towards the Democratic Party. We support this claim by combining social media (Study 1) and survey data (Study 2) analysis. Tracing 1.4 million tweets, we find that Trump’s rhetoric has popularized racially charged coronavirus-related terms and that exclusionary, anti-Asian attitudes have increased in the United States since the pandemic began. Next, by analyzing repeated cross-sectional weekly surveys of Asian Americans from July 2019 to May 2020 (n=12,907), we find that the group has leaned more towards the Democratic Party since Trump first made inflammatory remarks towards Asian Americans. Whites, Blacks, and Latina/os, on the other hand, exhibited fewer and less consistent changes in Democratic Party-related attitudes. Our findings suggest that experiences with social exclusion that are driven by elite sources further cement Asian Americans as Democrats.
... Asian Americans have weaker ties to the two major political parties and have historically opted out of identifying with the major parties, preferring instead to be label themselves as 'independent' or 'moderate' (Wong et al. 2011). The overwhelming majority of Asian Americans are foreign born (~ 65%) and do not arrive in the United States with entrenched partisan preferences. ...
... While the panethnic label of 'Asian American' is important for exerting political power as a larger coalition (Le Espiritu 1992), studies of Asian American coalitions and identity has found that as whole, Asian Americans are loosely attached to one another and that attachment is situational (Okamoto 2006;Park 2008). Fewer than a third of Asian Americans identify with the panethnic label of 'Asian American' instead preferring the national-origin label to describe oneself (Wong et al. 2011). Studies of Asian American candidate preference are often limited by a lack of largescale data, lack of candidates, or are only focused on one national-origin group. ...
... Given the long road from immigration to naturalization to the ballot box (Masuoka et al. 2018), second-generation Asian Americans are more likely to be registered and to vote. U.S. born Asian Americans are also born and raised in a context where the label "Asian American" is salient and shared experiences of discrimination and marginalization can increase racial turnout (Wong et al. 2011;Okamoto and Ebert 2010). Furthermore, extended length of time in the U.S., also leads individuals to be more accepting of the pan-ethnic/racial identifier (Lee 2019). ...
Article
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The diversity of the Asian American population presents challenges for theories of bloc voting, partisan voting, and descriptive representation. What cues (if any) do Asian American voters rely on? How informative are racial and partisan cues to Asian American voters. This article looks at the candidate preferences of Asian American voters in the 2018 election. I look at elections where an Asian American candidate was on the ballot and compare outcomes within district to the gubernatorial race (a race with no minorities on the ballot). I use surname-coded voter registration records and precinct-level vote returns to estimate Asian American candidate preferences as a racial group and by national-origin. I find strong evidence of national-origin preferences (i.e. Vietnamese for a Vietnamese candidate) among Asian American voters. In instances where the national-origin of the candidate and the national-origin of the voter did not align, voters seem to rely on partisan cues. National-origin preferences are sufficient enough that in one instance voters switched parties within the same election to vote for a candidate of the same national-origin. These findings have implications for theories of minority vote choice and challenges the existing literature on the strength of partisan cues (replication data can be found at: https://sites.google.com/view/vivienleung/research).
... Second, as related to the importance of intersectionality, the experiences and perceptions of injustice differ by nativity status within Asian Americans, but how they are linked to collective action is unclear. Investigating the structural and psychological barriers for foreign-born Asian Americans' informal political participation, such as protest and community civic engagement, which appears less constrained by citizenship and legal limitations, have critical implications for the meaningful political incorporation of Asian immigrants (Ebert and Okamoto 2015;Lee and Kye 2016;Wong et al. 2011). ...
... Although socioeconomic status indicators (e.g., high level of income, education, etc.) are strong predictors of political participation in general (Milbrath and Goel 1977), Asian Americans' political participation is substantially lower than other racialized and minoritized groups (Lien et al. 2004). This is partially explained by the findings that foreignborn status and other immigration-related factors (e.g., English proficiency) are key predictors for the low level of Asian American political participation (Lien et al. 2004;Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001;Wong et al. 2011;Xu 2005). However, these status indicators do not necessarily explain the low political participation of third-generation Asian Americans who are still significantly less likely to participate in political activities compared to other racialized and minoritized groups (Lien et al. 2004;Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). ...
... Although socioeconomic status indicators (e.g., high level of income, education, etc.) are strong predictors of political participation in general (Milbrath and Goel 1977), Asian Americans' political participation is substantially lower than other racialized and minoritized groups (Lien et al. 2004). This is partially explained by the findings that foreign-born status and other immigration-related factors (e.g., English proficiency) are key predictors for the low level of Asian American political participation (Lien et al. 2004;Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001;Wong et al. 2011;Xu 2005). However, these status indicators do not necessarily explain the low political participation of third-generation Asian Americans who are still significantly less likely to participate in political activities compared to other racialized and minoritized groups (Lien et al. 2004;Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). ...
Article
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This paper assesses how ongoing historical racism and nativism as embedded within U.S. culture requires new and important dialogues about the omnipresence of White supremacy and its interconnected mechanisms that divide communities along the lines of race and perceived in-group status. To assess the role of immigration as it is understood through paradigms of White supremacy and systemic racism, the current study examines individual-level predictors of indifference to the BLM movement based on nativity status among Asian Americans—a racialized pan-ethnic group that is comprised of predominantly foreign-born members. Using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, one of the few nationally representative surveys that include detailed information about the Black Lives Matter movement, our study includes 1371 Asian immigrants (i.e., foreign-born Asian Americans) and 1635 U.S.-born Asian Americans. Results demonstrate that reporting indifference to the BLM movement differ by nativity such that foreign-born Asian Americans were significantly more likely to report indifference to the BLM movement compared to their U.S.-born Asian American counterparts. However, the impact of nativity disappears once we account for sense of belonging and acknowledgement of anti-Black racism. The sense of belonging was significant in predicting indifference to the BLM movement among U.S.-born Asian Americans only. The findings contribute to our understanding of racial sense making for Asian Americans as well as an understanding of how White supremacy translates to anti-Black racism through multiple and interconnected mechanisms for the maintenance of White supremacy.
... Originally deemed artificial and incoherent (Beltran 2010;Mora 2014), this label has now become a fully-fledged identity with political effects under very specific circumstances (e.g., Barreto 2007;Manzano and Sanchez 2010;Pérez 2015a, b;Pérez et al. 2019;Valenzuela and Michelson 2016). Ditto with the transformation of Chinese, Korean, Japanese and other groups into Asian Americans (e.g., Kuo et al. 2017;Lien et al. 2004;Wong et al. 2011). And, as if this diversity of categories is not enough, many of these disparate, unique racial and ethnic groups have now coalescedby design and through elite action-into a larger mega-group, with African Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos, and others identifying, many times, as people of color (more on this below) (Pérez, forthcoming;. ...
... This omission matters qualitatively and quantitatively. To claim that racial/ ethnic identity is responsible for "minority" politics when it is not is to miss out on the very heterogeneity that we all recognize characterizes these communities (e.g., Abrajano and Alvarez 2010;Beltran 2010;Dawson 1994;2001;Garcia 2012;Lien et al. 2004;White and Laird 2020;White, Laird, and Allen 2014;Wong et al. 2011). Simply put, our conceptual scope is unnecessarily narrowed, leading us to collectively miss out on conceptual and theoretical innovations. ...
Article
This essay comments on three questions about race, ethnicity, and politics in the contemporary United States— How did we get here? Who are we now? And, where are we going next? I grapple with these questions as a political psychologist steeped in the study of intergroup politics. In this capacity, I will argue that structural (mis)calculations have paved the road toward present intergroup relations, where identity politics reigns supreme. I then discuss America's current racial landscape, arguing that reality is more complex than before, especially as it concerns political relations between Whites and non-Whites. In this regard, I will claim that political psychology holds special insights to generate new knowledge about how (non-)Whites are navigating this changing racial landscape. Finally, I will advocate, strongly, for a greater sense of wonder about the multiplicity of identities that people of color hold. In particular, I will claim that by relaxing our assumption that race is the main identity that matters to people of color, we stand to better appreciate just how adaptive non-Whites are to their political surroundings, leading us toward new insights about the origins and nature of mass political engagement and involvement.
... Previous studies have largely approached panethnicity through qualitative interviews of members of a single ethnic or racial group (Junn and Masuoka 2008;Okamoto and Mora 2014;Park 2008;Wong et al. 2011). Although these methods capture the contextual nature and complexity of multiple overlapping identities, a more strictly positivist orientation can allow for comparisons across groups when similarly structured surveys are utilized (Croll 2007). ...
... The process of panethnic identity formation is closely tied to the literature of racialization and racial discrimination. Despite immigrants' continued preference to be recognized on the basis of their national origin (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996;Wong et al. 2011), they are assigned racial and ethnic labels in their host societies (Cornell and Hartman 2007). "Asian" and "Latino" are socially constructed categories imposed upon immigrants by government agencies and the public through a racialized process of exclusion and segregation that serves to obscure diversity between and within ethnic populations (Foner and Fredrickson 2004). ...
Article
Latinos and Asian-Americans constitute the largest recent immigrant groups in the United States. Upon arrival, immigrants from these groups generally identify with their national origin despite being categorized as "Asian" or "Latino" for state enumeration. While both are racialized and excluded from mainstream identities, they differ in their internal linguistic and religious diversities, socioeconomic status, and immigration experiences. Sociologists theorized that Asian-American panethnicity is based on structural commonalities while Latino panethnicity is built upon cultural commonalities. We elaborate the theoretical understanding of contexts associated with this identification and find alternative underpinnings that shape both groups' panethnic identification. We find generation since immigration is a common basis for elevated likelihood of panethnic identification for both groups. However, among Asian-Americans, we find English proficiency and age increase people's odds of identifying with a panethnic identity over a national origin term, whereas for Latinos, political affiliation and religiosity increase these odds.
... By being "uniquely positioned at the conjuncture of white supremacy and anti-Blackness" (Kim, 2018, 226), Asian Americans are in contemporary politics racially positioned in relation to both whites and Blacks (Kim, 1999), and particularly so since the Civil Rights era when barriers against Asian immigration to the United States were formally removed (Tichenor, 2002;Daniels, 2004). Despite the bimodal distribution of higher educational attainment, occupational status, and wealth among Asian Americans that separates a relatively high-status group from a resource-deprived segment of the population (Bonilla-Silva, 2010; Wong et al., 2011), in recent years the racial position of Asian Americans overall has begun to shift upward, with some characterizing the societal status of this group of Americans as "virtually white" (e.g. Hacker, 1992;Ignatiev, 1997). ...
... In assessing where Asian Americans fit, it bears noting that they are today both the fastest-growing as well as the most heavily immigrant non-Black minority group in the United States (Wong et al., 2011). The history of exclusion and consequent migration of Asian Americans during the 20th century demonstrates the in-group heterogeneity of the population, and the complexity of Asian Americans' place in contemporary politics. ...
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As racial tensions flare amidst a global pandemic and national social justice upheaval, the centrality of structural racism has renewed old questions and raised new ones about where Asian Americans fit in U.S. politics. This paper provides an overview of the unique racial history of Asians in the United States and analyzes the implications of dynamic racialization and status for Asian Americans. In particular, we examine the dynamism of Asian Americans' racial positionality relative to historical shifts in economic-based conceptions of their desirability as workers in American capitalism. Taking history, power, and institutions of white supremacy into account, we analyze where Asian Americans fit in contemporary U.S. politics, presenting a better understanding of the persistent structures underlying racial inequality and developing a foundation from which Asian Americans can work to enhance equality.
... Asian-American citizens' depressed voting rates remain puzzling, given their elevated socioeconomic position (Logan et al. 2012). Several studies have shown that despite their resources, eligible Asian Americans participate and vote at disproportionately lower rates than other groups (Lien et al. 2004;Wong et al. 2011). Less than half of Asian American citizens voted in the 2016 presidential election (Masuoka et al. 2018). ...
... Although Asian Americans marched in every city across the country, their turnout was significantly lower than that of Hispanics (Barreto et al. 2009). What is more, Asian American group consciousness continues to be more dynamic and layered than Hispanic group identity; Asian Americans across generations simultaneously continue to identify with their heterogeneous national-origin identities such as Korean American, Indian American or Japanese American (Lien et al. 2004;Wong et al. 2011). ...
Article
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Much has been written on the positive effect of direct democracy (initiatives, referendums) on voter turnout. However, we have limited knowledge about potential differential effects on voters belonging to various ethnic groups. The paper argues that depending on a group’s responsiveness to the political context, direct democracy can (dis-)integrate voters (from) into the electorate. Empirical analysis of Current Population Survey (CPS) voting supplement survey data, together with data on the absolute use of direct democracy across US states, corroborates this theoretical expectation, however lending more support for the disintegrating assumption. Frequent direct democratic elections further widen the negative voting gap between first-generation Asian voters and voters living in the US for three generations or longer, whereas they tend to diminish this voting gap for first-generation Hispanic voters. The disintegrative pattern for first-generation Asian voters remains even significant when excluding California from the state sample, yet not the integrative tendency for first-generation Hispanics. Additional analyses using alternative measures of direct democracy and voting, and applying statistical adjustments to address causality concerns, confirm the robustness of these findings, which shed light on the so-far underexplored (dis-)integrative potential of political institutions.
... In France, Jardin shows that among descendants of migrants, the level of education and the employment status strongly affected registration and political participation in the 2007 presidential election (2013). Yet, socio-economic factors are not sufficient to account for the voter turnout gap among certain MER minority groups such as Asians in the USA (Lien 1994;Cho 1999;Wong et al. 2011). More generally, even after having accounted for factors such as income and education, voting still varies between different minority groups and the majority group (DeSipio 1998;Portes and Rumbaut 2014), a discrepancy which the socio-economic factors fail to explain (Fraga 2018). ...
... In sum, organisations educate their members and socially engage them in the electoral process (Garza et al. 1993). Numerous studies corroborate this theory, showing that integration into ethnic social networks increases the chances of Latin American, Asian and Sikh electoral participation (Hritzuk and Park 2000;Wong et al. 2011;Diaz 1996;Garza et al. 1993). This literature also highlights the role of churches in the electoral mobilisation of some groups. ...
Article
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This article critically assesses how North American and European sociological literature explains migrant, ethnic and racial (MER) minorities’ electoral participation (registration on electoral lists and voting). It highlights three main controversies around this issue. First, it looks at how models that track the electoral participation of MER minorities by focusing on socio-economic resources have been increasingly challenged by models that take into account migration and generational factors. Second, it looks at how different models debate the collective dynamics of minority groups within host countries and insist on the importance of factors such as group consciousness, the role of minority-based organisations, and the minority candidate and neighbourhood effects in determining electoral participation. Third, it deals with variations in the gaps between MER minority and national majority turnout at elections across countries and the macro-structural and institutional factors that may account for these variations. Future research would greatly benefit from comparative and intersectional perspectives and from using the analytical tools of political socialisation to investigate more in depth the role of individual trajectories and of political and social context.
... Yet a crucial question remains: to what extent is this observed dynamic replicable and applicable beyond Latino adults? To answer this, we undertook Study 3, which appraised the same chain reaction from shared marginalization, to solidarity with PoC, to shared political views among Asian American adults (N = 641): a major minoritized group, whose politics generally receive less attention in the literature on racial politics (Wong et al., 2011). ...
Article
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People of color (PoC) will soon become a demographic majority in the U.S., but this overlooks major differences in how various PoC are treated by American society and the political priorities they hold. We build a theory that explains when and why some PoC express more unified political views. Despite variation in their social positions, people of color share common sources of marginalization. For example, although Asian Americans are stereotyped as a model minority and Latinos as low-status , both are deemed perpetual foreigners . We claim that shared marginalization sparks solidarity between PoC, which strengthens their support for policies that do not implicate their ingroup, thus forging interminority unity. Using survey data, Study 1 (N = 2400) shows that Asian adults report weaker solidarity with PoC than do Latinos, plus less support for policies that accommodate unauthorized immigrants, which implicate Latinos. Studies 2 and 3 randomly assign Asian (N = 641) and Latino (N = 624) adults to read about a racial outgroup marginalized as foreign (vs. control article). This heightens solidarity with PoC, which then boosts Asian support for flexible policies toward undocumented immigrants (which implicate Latinos) and Latino support for generous policies toward high-skill immigrants (which implicate Asians). We discuss how our results clarify the opportunities and limits of political unity among PoC.
... While Asian Americans have become increasingly progressive, a new brand of Asian immigrants has entered the political sphere whose attitudes depart from the Asian American college student activists of the 1960s. 30 vative Asian immigrants has no intention of following their liberal-leaning predecessors, nor do they intend to stay silent. ...
Article
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No court case in recent history has propelled Asian Americans into the political sphere like Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, and no issue has galvanized them like affirmative action. Asian Americans have taken center stage in the latest battle over affirmative action, yet their voices have been muted in favor of narratives that paint them as victims of affirmative action who ardently oppose the policy. Bridging theory and research on immigration, stereotypes, and boundaries, I provide a holistic portrait of SFFA v. Harvard and focus on Asian Americans' role in it. Immigration has remade Asian Americans from “unassimilable to exceptional,” and wedged them between underrepresented minorities who stand to gain most from the policy and the advantaged majority who stands to lose most because of it. Presumed competent and morally deserving, Asian Americans subscribe to the stereotype, and wield it to their advantage. Competence, moral worth, and respectability politics, however, are no safeguards against racism and xenophobia. As fears of the coronavirus arrested the United States, so too has the rise in anti-Asian hate.
... To name a few, the National Black Election Study 1 was developed in 1984, the Latino National Political Survey 2 in 1989, the National Surveys of Latinos 3 in 2002, the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey 4 in 2000 and its official version 5 in 2008, and the Comparative Post-Election Survey 6 in 2008. These new data sets have enabled a large number of research to be conducted in African American, Latino, and Asian American politics [26,32,44,74,103,113]. Nevertheless, most of these surveys are short lived and thus not comparable to the ANES or GSS in terms of longevity. ...
Article
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The voices of racial minority groups have rarely been examined systematically with large-scale text analysis in political science. This study fills such a gap by applying an integrated classification framework to the analysis of the commonalities and differences in political issues that appeared in 78,305 articles from Asian American and African American newspapers from the 1960s to the 1980s. The automated text classification shows that Asian American newspapers focused on promoting collective gains more often than African American newspapers. Conversely, African American newspapers concentrated on preventing collective losses more than Asian American newspapers. The content analysis demonstrates that the issue priorities varied between the corpora, especially with respect to policy contexts. Gaining access to government resources was a more urgent issue for Asian Americans, while reducing or ending state violence, such as police brutality, was a more pressing matter for African Americans. It also helped avoid extreme interpretations of the machine coding, as the misalignment of political agendas between the two corpora widened up to 10 times when the training data were measured using the minimum, rather than the maximum, reliability threshold.
... In addition, the GOP is believed to have activated white identity (Tesler, 2016;Sides et al., 2017Sides et al., , 2019 in response to Barack Obama's electoral wins. In case of the Latino voters, the Democratic support varies by ethnicity and generation (Abrajano and Alvarez, 2012), while the Asian Americans are, overall, not well courted by either party (Wong et al., 2011). But racial minorities on average may have a weaker incentive to vote Republican. ...
Preprint
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Partisan sorting by social groups is believed to increase affective polarization and decrease group-level leverage in representation. Mounting evidence suggests that social groups are increasingly polarized in voting behavior, but how reliable are demographic labels as predictors of vote choice? We test for demographic sorting, using public opinion surveys between 1952--2020 and applying tree-based machine learning models to calculate out-of-sample predictions of presidential voting decisions. We calculate predictions based on voters' demographics and then gradually incorporate more information to test whether the electorate is becoming more predictable. Demographics alone typically can predict 63.5% of vote choices correctly. But contrary to the sorting hypothesis's implications, demographics have not grown more predictive over time, while partisanship has. Additional information about voters, such as issue positions or candidate perceptions, continue to be necessary for obtaining out-of-sample error rates of 5% or less. However, their added value decreases as partisanship's predictive power grows.
... Scholars of Latinx and Asian American politics are well versed in examining within-group differences and grappling with the complexity of collapsing difference into pan-ethnicity (Beltrán 2010;Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). In addition to differences by gender (Lavariega Monforti 2017), the attitudes and behaviors of Latinx and Asian American individuals also vary along lines of nativity, nation of origin, and language abilities, just to name a few examples (Jones-Correa 1998; Wong et al. 2011). ...
Article
The 2018 midterm elections in the United States were unprecedented in their gender and racial diversity. Voters across the country, especially younger voters, elected the most diverse U.S. Congress in history. Despite increased electoral diversity along lines of gender, race, and the intersections of both, extant literature has remained siloed, focusing on the effect of either gender or race on turnout but rarely examining both in relation to one another. Using a novel data set of racially diverse young adults that includes demographic information for congressional candidates and vote-validated data, this study investigates how the intersection of race and gender influence voter turnout across diverse electoral contexts. Our study provides important insights for both unpacking the 2018 elections and more generally understanding how race and gender interact to influence youth voter turnout as candidate profiles and electoral contexts continue to diversify.
... Group-based resources have further been used to explain the political behavior of non-Black minorities. 2 Latina/os and Asian Americans do feel a sense of linked fate (Bowler & Segura, 2011;Masuoka & Junn, 2013;Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010;Wong et al., 2005Wong et al., , 2011, although this varies by generation and national origin (Masuoka, 2006;Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010), and is weaker and more malleable compared to African Americans (Chong & Kim, 2006;Junn & Masuoka, 2008;Masuoka, 2008;Masuoka & Junn, 2013). For non-Black minorities, within-group solidarity has yielded both positive (Sanchez, 2006;Valdez, 2011) and mixed results on political participation (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999;Lien, 1994;Wong et al., 2005). ...
Article
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Recent literature in race, ethnicity, and politics has assessed how minority linked fate, defined as "the idea that ethnoracial minorities might share a sense of commonality that extends beyond their particular ethnoracial group to other ethnoracial groups (Gershon et al., in Politics Groups Identities 7(3):642-653, 2019)," shapes attitudes toward descriptive representation and support for coalition building. However, scholarship has yet to examine the influence of minority linked fate on political participation. We argue that similar to those who view the interests of co-ethnics as a proxy for their individual interests, Latina/os, Asian Americans, and African Americans who express linked fate with a more expansive minority community are more likely to take political action. This political participation results from senses of obligation to and solidarity with other racial minorities outside of their own. Results from the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey show that controlling for conventional measures of linked fate, minority linked fate is associated primarily with more system-challenging modes of political activity for Latina/os, Asian Americans, and African Americans. We conclude by positioning minority linked fate as a complementary heuristic to traditional notions of intra-racial linked fate and note how shared inter-racial linked fate informs our understanding of recent political activism among people of color. Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-021-09750-6.
... However, other scholars (Ramakrishnan, 2005;Fennema & Tillie, 1999) have found that SES predictors do not perform as consistently as indicators among immigrants in Australia as they do among those born in Australia. While socio-economic resources do play a role in helping to secure endorsement by a political party in an election, the length of residency and citizenship are more positively related to the probability of gaining meaningful endorsement by a party (Wong et al. 2011). ...
Article
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Why are there so few Australian Indians in the Australian parliament? Is it because they are not interested in politics or is it because there are structural barriers? But Australia is a nation of migrants that reflects diversity in its society. So why are Australian Indians missing in politics?
... 4 Perhaps most important have been nationwide surveys, starting with the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), followed by the National Asian American Survey. 5 Subsequent surveys also included substantial samples of Asian Americans-for example, the Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey-providing enough Asian American cases for scholars to conduct detailed analyses of subgroups (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004;Wong et al. 2011). ...
... Hajnal and Lee (2011) find out-group commonality and experience of discrimination diminishes Republican identity among Latino and Asian Americans. Other scholars attempt to explain Democratic partisanship among Asian Americans with attention to traditional factors such as socioeconomic status and perspectives on immigration (Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee, & Junn, 2011). ...
Article
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Increasingly salient in democratic politics are the divides among political parties regarding how they mobilize support between ethnic majorities and minorities. Why, then, do some members of a minority group support political parties seemingly antithetical to the interests of minority groups? We draw on group conflict theory to suggest that a partial explanation rests on perceived competition within minority groups. We test this theory by focusing on Republican Party support among Asian Americans in the United States. Based on two representative surveys and an original survey experiment of Asian Americans, we demonstrate that perceived competition among racial minority groups has a significant effect on the partisanship of Asian Americans, pushing them toward the Republican Party. Our findings provide critical implications on how race affects politics in democracies with increasingly diversified ethnic minority groups.
... From a different perspective, scholars have shown that racial identity can be a key determinant for political behavior among immigrant and minority groups (Alvarez & Garcia Bedolla, 2003;Barreto & Segura, 2014;Dawson, 2001;Garcia Bedolla, 2005;Junn & Masuoka, 2008;Lien, 1994;Lien, Conway, & Wong, 2003;Parker & Barreto, 2013;Wong et al., 2011;Zheng, 2019). Yet, existing studies have not studied the politicization of identity in relation to the party system. ...
Conference Paper
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A central problem for citizens is to understand how their political system works. The classic "Levels of Conceptualization" measure proposed in The American Voter provided an answer for White Americans in the 1950s, but has limited relevance today for citizens of non-European ancestry. Expanding on the work of Campbell et al, this paper develops a measure of Political Conceptualization that combines views about parties and candidates with views on personal identity and ethnic fairness. The measure is based on open-ended responses in a survey of Asian Americans and Latinos. Results show how, across these quite different domains of politics, citizens vary in their Political Conceptualizations from narrow and concrete to broad and abstract. Results highlight the challenge for political organizers in building coalitions among citizens who vary in their understanding of how politics works.
... As Junn and Masuoka (2008) point out, no one Asian nationality group is predominant in the United States and there is great diversity in the languages spoken within Asian-American communities. Additionally, a large segment of the Asian-American population was born outside of the United States or are children of immigrants (Wong et al., 2001). For these reasons, several studies that explore Asian-American identity formation find that this group is less likely to develop a racial identity that might increase feelings of panethnic linked fate in the same manner as African Americans (Lien et al., 2004;Masuoka, 2006;Skulley and Haynes, n.d.). ...
Article
Objective This study explores the effect of Donald Trump's candidacy, and first year in office, on Asian‐American linked fate. We argue that the use of anti‐Asian and anti‐immigrant messaging during the 2016 election, and the enactment of discriminatory policies once elected, increased feelings of panethnic linked fate among Asian Americans. Method To test our hypotheses, we assess Asian Americans’ levels of linked fate before the 2016 election, immediately after the 2016 election, and one year after the 2016 election with several time‐series surveys. Results We find that Asian‐American linked fate is higher after the election and remains high one year later. Qualitative data collected through open‐ended survey responses suggest that the increase in panethnic linked fate can be at least partially attributed to Trump's discriminatory rhetoric. Conclusion The results have implications for Asian‐American political behavior, particularly mobilization, by invoking collective action through panethnic linked fate.
... The hallmark of the Asian American community is diversity. As the Asian American community has increased in numbers, it has also become more internally diverse in terms of national origin (Wong et al., 2011). As an indicator of this diversity, for example, a recent Pew research report on the population included nineteen different national-origin groups (Budiman and Ruiz, 2021). ...
Article
This paper aims to explore attitudes toward immigration among two non-White groups, Asian Americans and Black Americans. For more than a decade, individuals from Asia have comprised the majority of immigrants entering the United States each year. Today, the majority of the Asian American U.S. population remains foreign-born. Yet using data collected from the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey and the 2016 National Asian American Survey—a time period marked by high levels of saliency with regard to immigration issues—we find that Black Americans, the majority of whom are U.S.-born, exhibit even more progressive attitudes towards immigration, both legal and undocumented, than mostly foreign-born Asian Americans. Our research challenges economic and material theories related to immigration attitudes and suggests that political connections to and “linked fate” with other minorities better explain why Black Americans exhibit more progressive attitudes toward immigration than Asian Americans.
... Despite the strict rules governing the acquisition of citizenship, the number of individuals of immigrant origin is increasing, although their political engagement is currently under-researched in Italy (Riniolo and Ortensi, 2021). Turning to intergenerational differences, existing research suggests that first generation immigrants face obstacles to political engagement related to language barriers and the difficulty in acquiring citizenship (Wong et al., 2011). Conversely, second generation immigrants tend to experience fewer barriers. ...
Article
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The persistent lack of voting rights in Italy for immigrants and the rigid citizenship regime based on jus sanguinis preclude immigrants from formal political participation. However, there are other forms of political participation practiced by immigrants. This article analyses the characteristics that are associated with immigrants’ non-formal political participation in Italy. A target variable in our analyses is the country of origin of immigrants. The prevailing scientific literature has highlighted that immigrants’ countries of origin play an important role in their psychological, social, economic and political behaviour. The country of origin and the associated background can in both repressive political systems and pre-migration discrimination have a negative effect on political attitudes and the behaviour of immigrants in the host country. Using data from the ‘Social condition and integration of foreign citizens’ (SCIF) survey conducted by the National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) in 2011–2012, our paper examines the determinants of immigrants’ political engagement in Italy with a focus on both country of origin and migratory generational differences. Using logistic regression models, we explored the engagement differences in immigrant groups in Italian politics as determined by taking an interest in Italian political issues and by participating in different non-electoral political activities, controlling for the main variables used in the literature. Moreover, our data allowed us to investigate the differences in political engagement by migratory generation. The results confirm the country-of-origin effect in spurring political engagement. In general, immigrants from more developed countries, Eastern Europe and Latin America are more interested in Italian politics than are those from African and Asian countries. Moreover, next to other control variables, being in the second generation increases the likelihood of engaging in politics as compared to the first generation.
... Despite the strict rules governing the acquisition of citizenship, the number of individuals of immigrant origin is increasing, although their political engagement is currently under-researched in Italy (Riniolo and Ortensi, 2021). Turning to intergenerational differences, existing research suggests that first generation immigrants face obstacles to political engagement related to language barriers and the difficulty in acquiring citizenship (Wong et al., 2011). Conversely, second generation immigrants tend to experience fewer barriers. ...
Article
Full-text available
The persistent lack of voting rights in Italy for immigrants and the rigid citizenship regime based on jus sanguinis preclude immigrants from formal political participation. However, there are other forms of political participation practiced by immigrants. This article analyses the characteristics that are associated with immigrants’ non-formal political participation in Italy. A target variable in our analyses is the country of origin of immigrants. The prevailing scientific literature has highlighted that immigrants’ countries of origin play an important role in their psychological, social, economic and political behaviour. The country of origin and the associated background can in both repressive political systems and pre-migration discrimination have a negative effect on political attitudes and the behaviour of immigrants in the host country. Using data from the ‘Social condition and integration of foreign citizens’ (SCIF) survey conducted by the National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) in 2011–2012, our paper examines the determinants of immigrants’ political engagement in Italy with a focus on both country of origin and migratory generational differences. Using logistic regression models, we explored the engagement differences in immigrant groups in Italian politics as determined by taking an interest in Italian political issues and by participating in different non-electoral political activities, controlling for the main variables used in the literature. Moreover, our data allowed us to investigate the differences in political engagement by migratory generation. The results confirm the country-of-origin effect in spurring political engagement. In general, immigrants from more developed countries, Eastern Europe and Latin America are more interested in Italian politics than are those from African and Asian countries. Moreover, next to other control variables, being in the second generation increases the likelihood of engaging in politics as compared to the first generation.
... First, survey and experimental research highlight the important role of mobilization in participation (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993;Han, 2009;García Bedolla & Michelson, 2012;Valenzuela & Michelson, 2016;Walker, 2020). Second, social identities can increase voting (Tate, 1994;Dawson, 1998;Barreto, 2010), political participation (García Bedolla, 2005;Wong, et al., 2011), and protest (Chong, 1991;Zepeda-Millán, 2017). ...
Article
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Scholarship in American politics finds whites’ racial resentment and status threat predict their vote choice. However, research in social identity indicates that such variables should negatively correlate with participation, attenuating resentful whites’ political power. We resolve this contradiction by studying these variables interactively, using data from the 2012, 2016, and 2020 American National Election Studies. Our primary independent variables are racial resentment and a measure of relative discrimination that captures whites’ perceptions of inequality relative to other racial/ethnic groups. Both constituent variables are negatively associated with participation. Interactively, they are positively associated with political participation. These relationships persist when we predict voter turnout, an index measuring non-electoral participation, and an index measuring civic engagement. In 2012, our interaction term moderates the negative impact of racial resentment in relative discrimination. In elections contested by Donald Trump, our interaction term has a positive substantive effect. Our findings advance scholarship on white political behavior. First, they identify a relationship between whites’ racial attitudes and participation, advancing a research program that primarily examines vote choice. Second, they clarify the relationship between different white racial attitudes. Next, they detail the conditional relationship between whites’ prejudice and politics and how it has changed over time.
... Since Espiritu's (1992) influential work, past scholarship in the past two decades in the field of APA politics has examined the influence of APA candidates and elected officials on panethnic APA voter turnout and campaign contributions (Cho 1999;Lai 2000;2011;Lai et al. 2001;Min 2014). Other studies focused on the racial positionality of APAs through statewide and national public opinion and voting behavior on issues that shape APA group consciousness (Junn and Masuoka 2008;Wong et al. 2011). The panethnic question often posited in these studies is whether APA ethnic groups will find common interests and ideology that bind a couple or several of them together or will they go it alone. ...
Book
Parler de diaspora chinoise, permet de prendre en compte à la fois les immigrés arrivés de Chine, ou des Chines (République populaire, Taiwan, Hong Kong et Macao), et les immigrés arrivés des communautés chinoises outre-mer, en particulier les réfugiés du Sud-est asiatique de culture chinoise. Au-delà des différentes routes de migration et d’exil, la diversité de la diaspora tient aussi au passage des générations : enfants et petits-enfants de migrants font vivre et transforment la vie communautaire de la diaspora et les représentations de la population d’origine chinoise en France. Le passage d’une génération à l’autre est particulièrement intéressant lorsque l’on s’intéresse aux formes d’engagement, d’action collective et de prise de parole dans l’espace public.Des collectifs de sans-papiers aux manifestations contre les violences organisées par les entrepreneurs chinois, ce numéro de De facto s'intéresse aux mobilisations d’immigrés chinois qui sont devenues un peu plus visibles depuis une décennie. Aurore Merle revient sur ces actions collectives à partir du dialogue engagé entre acteurs chinois et autorités locales en Seine-Saint-Denis. Ya-Han Chuang et Hélène Le Bail, quant à elles, décrivent le répertoire d’actions des plus jeunes, descendants de l’immigration non seulement chinoise mais plus largement asiatique. Khatharya Um évoque l’importance du travail de mémoire engagé par les Teochews du Cambodge dans un souci de transmission et de réparation. Enfin, Baptiste Coulmont introduit les questions de participation électorale encore peut explorées parmi la population d’origine asiatique.
Article
This paper adds to existing literature by reassessing the racial participation gap after placing online activity within the repertoire of minorities’ political actions. Even though Asian Americans are the most resourced in terms of Internet access, I theorize about how individual and structural-level impediments uniquely disadvantage this group from participating in politics online—widening overall participation disparities. Using data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey, I find that while the racial participation gap is similar for Latina/os and African Americans compared to whites, regardless of the activity’s platform either offline or online, disparities magnify solely for Asian Americans when considering digital modes of political behavior. The paper ends by noting how the Internet may contribute to rather than solve issues of political inequality across race and discusses distortions in which political voices are heard or muted offline and online.
Article
Extensive research on political participation suggests that parental resources strongly predict participation. Other research indicates that salient political events can push individuals to participate. I offer a novel explanation of how mundane household experiences translate to political engagement, even in settings where low participation levels are typically found, such as immigrant communities. I hypothesize that experiences requiring children of Latinx immigrants to take on “adult” responsibilities provide an environment where children learn the skills needed to overcome the costs associated with participation. I test this hypothesis using three datasets: a survey of Latinx students, a representative survey of young adults, and a 10-year longitudinal study. The analyses demonstrate that Latinx children of immigrants taking on adult responsibilities exhibit higher levels of political activity compared with those who do not. These findings provide new insights into how the cycle of generational political inequality is overcome in unexpected ways and places.
Article
Because Japanese Americans are among the oldest Asian American groups, they would be expected to have a high level of panethnicity since they apparently have much in common with other U.S.‐born Asian Americans. However, most Japanese Americans interviewed for this paper did not identify panethnically with their Asian co‐ethnics, but felt separate and distinct as Japanese Americans. Research on panethnicity has not sufficiently examined why some Asian Americans are not panethnic. Although Japanese Americans are homogeneously racialized as “Asians,” they also resist their panethnic racialization by insisting on their distinct identity as Japanese descendants. They also continue to experience cultural and generational differences with other Asian Americans. In addition, even third and fourth generation Japanese Americans are not immune to the interethnic prejudices, hostilities, and homeland tensions that continue to simmer among different groups of Asian Americans. Finally, my interviewees were not interested in panethnic activism because they apparently no longer had compelling experiences of racial injustice and socioeconomic marginalization. Nonetheless, national‐origins ethnicity and panethnicity should not be regarded as mutually exclusive opposites.
Article
We argue that two factors are important for cross-racial coalition building: policy convergence in key issue arenas and perceived interest alignment with other racial groups. Drawing on the 2016 National Asian American Survey, we examine two of the most salient issues Asian Americans consistently rate as among the most important: immigration and economic policy. Using principal component analysis, we plot mean scores by group to analyze national-origin clustering along these two dimensions. Next, we analyze national-origin differences in perceived interest alignment with Blacks and Latinos. Combining these two factors, we identify clusters of groups that have a strong potential for cross-racial coalition building and that face greater constraints. In sum, we propose a theoretical framework for understanding cross-racial coalition building that includes disaggregating Asian Americans by national origin, and then identify which national-origin groups have the greater opportunity to form such coalitions.
Article
Increased diversity has accompanied dramatic demographic growth of the Asian American population in recent years. If the common characteristic of Asian Americans is a diversity of origins, languages, resources, and cultural traits, what holds this group together, particularly in the political sphere? The model minority stereotype suggests that Asian Americans might converge around education policies. That most Asian Americans are foreign born and the tenacious power of attendant “forever foreigner” tropes suggest that immigration issues might be the basis for a shared political agenda. Analysis of the 2016 National Asian American Survey, however, shows surprising political consensus within the Asian American population outside the policy realms of education and immigration. In other policy issues, particularly those involving the government’s role, important points of convergence among these groups on certain public policies are clear. Political differences within the Asian American community are between those who are progressive and those who are even more so.
Article
Group dynamics are central to understanding race in America. Research reveals that Blacks and Latinos who report discrimination are more likely to feel interracial political commonality and intragroup linked fate. However, these findings may not extrapolate to Asian Americans, a heterogeneous group with a recent immigration history. This study examines whether type and context of perceived discrimination influence this relationship for Asian Americans. I find that interpersonal discrimination is associated with political commonality with Hispanics, whereas jobs discrimination is associated with political commonality with Blacks. Both are associated with intraracial and intraethnic linked fate. Neither housing discrimination nor police mistreatment predicts political commonality or linked fate. These findings suggest that promoting solidarity across and within racial groups requires acknowledging the differential impacts of perceived discrimination.
Article
Sociologists have long argued that a racial and ethnic category can be made under certain circumstances and remade under anothers. The panethnic category of Asian American was in fact devised to mobilize different immigrant-origin groups in the 1960s. Today’s Asian Americans have diverse opinions on numerous issues. Given this divergence, it is possible that the category will be subject to remaking or unmaking. Using survey questions from the 2016 pre-election National Asian American Survey, this article analyzes where respondents’ policy opinions converge and diverge. Using latent class models, it shows that though many Asian Americans support government interventions in health care, education, climate change, and racial justice, some diverge sharply in regard to Muslim immigration. Logistic regression models show that different experiences of immigration and differences in national origins undergird such divergence. I discuss the implications of these fault lines for the future of the Asian American category.
Article
Educational attainment is widely assumed to be positively correlated with civic participation in the United States. Yet Asian immigrants represent a civic paradox because they often report low rates of civic participation despite having relatively high educational attainment. This study investigates how educational place mediates civic participation among six Asian immigrant groups in the United States. We use the concept of simultaneity to examine the extent to which foreign and domestic educational environments mediate Asian immigrant proclivities for civic participation. Using survey data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey pre-election survey, we find exposure to foreign educational place decreases civic participation for all Asian immigrants; and educational place mediates subgroup group-level proclivities for civic participation. We conclude by discussing the significance of educational contexts relative to collective transnational simultaneity.
Article
Asian Americans are the fastest growing and most diverse minority in the United States, but they have become more alike in terms of their partisan preferences and increasing politicization. Evidence for these changes can be found in two National Surveys of Asian Americans, the first of which was completed in 2008 and showed that Asian Americans were mostly nonpartisans but also that those who were partisans tended to support the Democratic Party. The second survey, completed in 2016, however, indicated that there was an increase in the proportion of democratic identifiers and, also, a significant decline in the proportion of nonpartisans with a concomitant rise in the number of purposive Independents. These shifts suggest that there has been a distinct politicization of Asian Americans, and our purpose in this article is to identify and calibrate the factors that account for these partisan shifts.
Article
While the number of U.S. residents who speak non-English languages at home is on the rise, little is known about the sociopolitical implications of exposure to minority languages among multilingual speakers in the United States. This study analyzes whether exposure to Spanish, a U.S. minority language, impacts perceptions of linked fate among bilingual Latinos, and if so, whether the consumption of ethnic media amplifies this effect. Through a population-based survey experiment among bilingual Latinos, this study finds that Latinos who are exposed to content in Spanish are more likely to report in-group linked fate than their counterparts exposed to the same message in English. Moreover, these effects are stronger among consumers of Spanish-language news. This study contributes to our understanding of the role of minority languages and ethnic media on pan-ethnic identities and highlights the importance of the growing linguistic diversity in the United States.
Article
Intersectional analyses are increasingly common in sociology; however, analyses of voting tend to focus on only race, class, or gender, using the others as control variables. We assess whether and how race, class, and gender intersect to produce distinct patterns of voter engagement in presidential elections 2008–2016. Per existing research, we find income strongly predicts White voting. However, the class gap in voting is not statistically significant among Black voters. In contrast to common characterizations of Black people as politically disengaged, lower income Black citizens are more likely to vote than their White counterparts. Moreover, the lowest earning Black women vote at dramatically higher rates than any other race-gender combination in this income group. These findings call into question the perceived universality of the income gap in voting and widespread claims that more resources directly facilitate voting. They also have implications for our understanding of political participation, social inequality, and democratic citizenship.
Book
The political involvement of earlier waves of immigrants and their children was essential in shaping the American political climate in the first half of the twentieth century. Immigrant votes built industrial trade unions, fought for social protections and religious tolerance, and helped bring the Democratic Party to dominance in large cities throughout the country. In contrast, many scholars find that today's immigrants, whose numbers are fast approaching those of the last great wave, are politically apathetic and unlikely to assume a similar voice in their chosen country. E Pluribus Unum? delves into the wealth of research by historians of the Ellis Island era and by social scientists studying today's immigrants and poses a crucial question: What can the nation's past experience teach us about the political path modern immigrants and their children will take as Americans? E Pluribus Unum? explores key issues about the incorporation of immigrants into American public life, examining the ways that institutional processes, civic ideals, and cultural identities have shaped the political aspirations of immigrants. The volume presents some surprising re-assessments of the past as it assesses what may happen in the near future. An examination of party bosses and the party machine concludes that they were less influential political mobilizers than is commonly believed. Thus their absence from today's political scene may not be decisive. Some contributors argue that the contemporary political system tends to exclude immigrants, while others remind us that past immigrants suffered similar exclusions, achieving political power only after long and difficult struggles. Will the strong home country ties of today's immigrants inhibit their political interest here? Chapters on this topic reveal that transnationalism has always been prominent in the immigrant experience, and that today's immigrants may be even freer to act as dual citizens. E Pluribus Unum? theorizes about the fate of America's civic ethos-has it devolved from an ideal of liberal individualism to a fractured multiculturalism, or have we always had a culture of racial and ethnic fragmentation? Research in this volume shows that today's immigrant schoolchildren are often less concerned with ideals of civic responsibility than with forging their own identity and finding their own niche within the American system of racial and ethnic distinction. Incorporating the significant influx immigrants into American society is a central challenge for our civic and political institutions-one that cuts to the core of who we are as a people and as a nation. E Pluribus Unum? shows that while today's immigrants and their children are in some ways particularly vulnerable to political alienation, the process of assimilation was equally complex for earlier waves of immigrants. This past has much to teach us about the way immigration is again reshaping the nation.
Book
Despite today's booming economy, secure work and upward mobility remain out of reach for many central-city residents. Urban Inequality presents an authoritative new look at the racial and economic divisions that continue to beset our nation's cities. Drawing upon a landmark survey of employers and households in four U.S. metropolises, Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles, the study links both sides of the labor market, inquiring into the job requirements and hiring procedures of employers, as well as the skills, housing situation, and job search strategies of workers. Using this wealth of evidence, the authors discuss the merits of rival explanations of urban inequality. Do racial minorities lack the skills and education demanded by employers in today's global economy? Have the jobs best matched to the skills of inner-city workers moved to outlying suburbs? Or is inequality the result of racial discrimination in hiring, pay, and housing? Each of these explanations may provide part of the story, and the authors shed new light on the links between labor market disadvantage, residential segregation, and exclusionary racial attitudes. In each of the four cities, old industries have declined and new commercial centers have sprung up outside the traditional city limits, while new immigrant groups have entered all levels of the labor market. Despite these transformations, longstanding hostilities and lines of segregation between racial and ethnic communities are still apparent in each city. This book reveals how the disadvantaged position of many minority workers is compounded by racial antipathies and stereotypes that count against them in their search for housing and jobs. Until now, there has been little agreement on the sources of urban disadvantage and no convincing way of adjudicating between rival theories. Urban Inequality aims to advance our understanding of the causes of urban inequality as a first step toward ensuring that the nation's cities can prosper in the future without leaving their minority residents further behind.
Article
OBSERVERS as diverse as Edwin O’Connor’s Mayor Skeffington and the late Professor Henry Jones Ford have commented on the crucial role played by the political party as integrator of the immigrant into American political life, and, by the same token, into the American community.’ Ford, for example, writing as early as 1898 in his classic Rise and Growth of American Politics suggested that the vote-seeking activities of ward politicians among immigrant groups were “… probably the secret of the powerful solvent influence which American civilization exerts upon the enormous deposits of alien populations thrown upon this country by the torrent of emigration.”
Article
For more than forty years, the national-origins quota system dominated·United States immigration policy. It was not until Congress overrode President Truman's veto of the Immigration Act of 1952 that concerted effort to eliminate the quota system began, with the work of President Truman's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization. President Kennedy, long an active supporter of this effort, forwarded his legislative recommendations for immigration reform to Congress on July 23, 1963. The heart of President Kennedy's bill lay in its provisions to eliminate the national-quota system. Committee hearings on the bill were delayed until January 13, 1964, and, as no further action was taken, the bill expired with the adjournment of the Eighty-eighth Congress. On January 13, 1965, President Johnson sent his Message to Congress reiterating the recommendations of the Kennedy bill. Hearings began on February 10, 1965. A substantial part of the ensuing Congressional debate centered on a proposed numerical limitation of Western Hemisphere immigration, which was opposed by the Administration and its supporters. The Immigration Law of 1965, as finally passed, provides for a Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration to look into the matter and report to Congress no later than January 15, 1968. If not provided otherwise by Congress by July 1, 1968, a numerical limitation of 120,000 annually will go into effect on Western Hemisphere immigration. The Law, however, does eliminate the national-origins system, which was conceived in a period of bigotry and reaffirmed in the McCarthy era. A nation's willingness to reform past errors of judgment by reforming public policy is a measure of its greatness.—Ed.
Article
Fred I. Greenstein, Professor of Government and departmental chairman at Wesleyan University, is the author of The American Party System and the American People (1963, 1970), Children and Politics (1964, 1969), and Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization (1969).
Two steps forward: The Slow and Steady March toward Immigrant Political Mobilization
  • Wong J.