Michaels's (2000) reassessment of the relation between action and perception is endorsed. In alignment with Milner and Goodale (1995), she proposed a separation between action (i.e., control of movement) and perception (i.e., the explicit knowledge of environmental properties, including animal-referential ones), the separation being based on the reliance on different optical variables. However,
... [Show full abstract] how should the concept of affordances be incorporated into this scheme? We present data showing that affordances, both when perceived and acted on, are not susceptible to optical illusions. Because action and perception are distinguished on the basis of information used, but are also proposed to interact, it is hypothesized that, dependent on the task goal, "information for action" may be used in perception, and "information for perception" may be used in action. Participants may become more attuned to information for action when perception serves to acquire explicit knowledge about what the environment affords for action.