A preview of this full-text is provided by American Psychological Association.
Content available from The Humanistic Psychologist
This content is subject to copyright. Terms and conditions apply.
The Self and the Integral Interface:
Toward a New Understanding
of the Whole Person
D. B. Sleeth
Of all psychology concepts, perhaps none has a more lengthy history or engendered
more controversy and ambiguity than that of the self. Indeed, the self has come to
mean so many things that it hardly means anything at all. Consequently, there is cur-
rently no single theory integrating all the various meanings of the self concept.
Therefore, the primary purpose of this paper is to develop an overarching
metapsychology by which all aspects of the self can be understood.
To accomplish this purpose, this article engages in a hermeneutic analysis of the
self as it appears in cognitive behavior psychology, the psychoanalytic theories of
ego and self psychology, and humanistic–existential theories of the self. In so doing,
it is possible to identify two principle concepts by which the various aspects of the
self can be compared and classified: the conflation frame, the collapsing of entity, in-
tellect, and identity into a single rendering of the self; and the integral interface, the
overriding theoretical framework within which each of these aspects of self can be
appropriately differentiated and subsumed.
Over the years, theorists have been at no loss to speculate about the basic principles
which govern the operation of the psyche. Perhaps nowhere is this more clearly the
case than with theories involving the self. Indeed, a number of even epic edifices
now dot the landscape. Certainly, the theorists have not shirked in trying to settle
matters, offering their insights liberally. Yet, there is little consistency among these
many references:
The literature of the self is massive and confusing. Terms are not always concepts;
sometimes they merely cover vacuums. A redundancy exists: “self,” “identity,”
“identity themes” (along with mysterious hybrids: “ego identity” and “self identity”),
THE HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGIST, 34(3), 243–261
Copyright © 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Correspondence should be addressed to D. B. Sleeth, P.O. Box 1907, Lower Lake, CA 95457.
E-mail: Daniel_Sleeth@Adidam.org
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.