Hard-Earned Income and Tax Compliance: A Survey in Eight Nations

Abstract

Is the effort invested to achieve taxable income,a relevant factor for tax compliance? If the value of income increases with the effort exerted, reluctance to pay taxes should be high. On the other hand, if income is perceived as compensation for one’s endeavor, there is too much at stake to take the risk of being audited and paying a fine. Consequently, tax evasion should be more likely if income was obtained easily. These contradicting predictions were tested in a questionnaire study with samples from eight countries (Australia, Austria, England, France, Italy, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland; N = 1,223). Results show that the effort exerted to obtain taxable income,and the aspiration level matter in compliance decisions. Hard-earned money,is more likely to be reported honestly to tax author- ities, particularly if the aspiration level can be satisfied by honest tax reporting. Keywords: tax compliance, tax evasion, effort, sunk costs, tax morale

Full text

S. Muehlbacher et al.: Hard-Earned Income and Tax ComplianceEuropean Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13( 4):298–304© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
Hard-Earned Income
and Tax Compliance
A Survey in Eight Nations
Stephan Muehlbacher
1
, Erich Kirchler
1
, Erik Hoelzl
1
, Julie Ashby
2
,
Chiara Berti
3
, Jenny Job
4
, Simon Kemp
5
, Ursula Peterlik,
Christine Roland-Lévy
6
, and Karin Waldherr
1
1
University of Vienna, Austria,
2
University of Exeter, UK,
3
University of Chieti-Pescara, Italy,
4
Australian National University, Australia,
5
University of Christchurch, New Zealand,
6
Université René Descartes, Paris V, France
Abstract. Is the effort invested to achieve taxable income a relevant factor for tax compliance? If the value of income increases with the
effort exerted, reluctance to pay taxes should be high. On the other hand, if income is perceived as compensation for one’s endeavor,
there is too much at stake to take the risk of being audited and paying a fine. Consequently, tax evasion should be more likely if income
was obtained easily. These contradicting predictions were tested in a questionnaire study with samples from eight countries (Australia,
Austria, England, France, Italy, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland; N = 1,223). Results show that the effort exerted to obtain taxable
income and the aspiration level matter in compliance decisions. Hard-earned money is more likely to be reported honestly to tax author-
ities, particularly if the aspiration level can be satisfied by honest tax reporting.
Keywords: tax compliance, tax evasion, effort, sunk costs, tax morale
Introduction
Without question, paying taxes hurts. It may particularly
hurt if one has had to work hard to earn income, whereas
money achieved rather easily – such as from capital gains
– may go as easily as it was realized. The question ad-
dressed in this paper is whether reluctance to pay taxes
varies with the degree of effort put into earning one’s in-
come. Are taxes on hard-earned income more likely to be
evaded than taxes on income achieved without any effort?
Or does the effort invested to earn taxable income deter
from evasion, since paying a fine following an audit would
further reduce effective income?
To enhance compliance, economic models emphasize the
importance of audits and fines (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972;
Srinivasan, 1973).However, the probabilityofbeing detected
is extremely low in most countries – for example, the audit
probability in the U.S. isestimatedto be about1% (Andreoni,
Erard, & Feinstein, 1998) – and fines are relatively low. In
Austria, tax evasion is penalized with a maximum of twice
the evaded amount; the actual penalty, however, rarely ex-
ceeds 40% of the evaded amount. Nevertheless, the majority
of taxpayers pay their dues honestly. Tax evasion is lower
than the neoclassical economic model predicts. Thus, since
the early work of Schmölders (1960) and Strümpel (1966),
the focus of tax research is on determinants of tax morale
beyond economic variables. Subjective knowledge of tax
law, perceived distributive, procedural and retributive fair-
ness have been identified – among other things – to affect tax
morale and compliance (for a recent literature review see
Kirchler, 2007).
Another relevant factor in compliance could be the
workload or effort necessary to obtain taxable income. On
the one hand, it can be assumed that hard-earned income is
subjectively of higher value and consequently reluctance
to pay taxes may be especially high. On the other hand, if
the net income after honest payment allows compensation
for one’s sunk effort, the risk of being audited might deter
from evading taxes. In the study presented in this paper,
these competing predictions are tested in samples from
eight nations, which all differ in their levels of tax morale.
After elaborating our predictions in more detail, we com-
pare tax morale in the participating nations as measured by
our survey, and report results from testing the predictions
on the impact of effort on tax compliance.
Effort and Tax Compliance
Whereas from a rational perspective the value of income
should be independent of its source, psychologically it
DOI 10.1027/1016-9040.13.4.298
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):298–304 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers

makes a substantial difference, whether an outcome was
reached by luck or skill. In experiments by Loewenstein
and Issacharoff (1994), participants who were informed
that they had obtained a coffee mug for their performance
in a prior task, valued the mug more highly than those who
believed they had received it by chance. Further, partici-
pants who received a mug as a prize for exemplary perfor-
mance on a task valued it more highly than those who ob-
tained it regardless of their poor performance.
With regard to income, it can be expected that its value
increases subjectively with the amount of effort invested
to obtain it. According to findings on source dependence
in valuation of objects, hard-earned income should be of
more value than income obtained easily. Consequently,
paying taxes out of one’s own pocket should be perceived
as a loss. Within the framework of prospect theory (Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979), it can be expected that in high
loss situations people are especially risk seeking and try
to avoid losses. The assumption of effort changing the
taxpayer’s value function is presented in Figure 1. The
payment of the same amount of taxes (–x) is perceived
as a more severe loss (V’(–x)) in the steeper value func-
tion for hard-earned income, than in the value function
for income obtained easily (V(–x)). Predictions on tax
behavior deriving from these assumptions are straightfor-
ward: Depending on the effort put into earning taxable
income, its (subjective) value and reluctance to pay taxes
increases. Noncompliance is therefore likely if hard-
earned income is to be declared.
A similar prediction is supported by research on sunk
cost effects. Though from an economic perspective, only
incremental, that is, future, costs should be considered as
decision criteria, Arkes and Blumer (1985) demonstrated
that investments of money, effort, or time made in the
past do affect actual decisions. In decisions under risk,
thepresenceofsunkcostsleadtomoreriskseeking
choices than an absence of prior losses (Thaler & John-
son, 1990). More recent research, however, points out
that sunk cost effects partly depend on the nature of prior
investments. Financial sunk costs should be distin-
guished from temporal (Soman, 2001) and behavioral
sunk costs (Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 1997). Regarding the
latter category, Zeelenberg and van Dijk (1997) argue
that the sunk cost effect can reverse if a certain monetary
compensation is expected due to the effort invested in
work. In their experiment, participants had to imagine
that they had worked a whole day and were expecting
their payment. Their supervisor either offered to pay
them an amount that had been previously negotiated or
invited them to gamble with the possibility of earning
twice as much as the negotiated salary or earning nothing.
The safe option of receiving the expected payment was
chosen more often than in a control condition, where par-
ticipants did not learn about the events before the choice.
Complementary findings are reported by Arkes et al.
(1994) from a series of studies on windfall gains, that is,
unexpected gains. Windfall gains were more readily in-
vested in risky gambles than expected gains. Thus, in
contrast to financial sunk costs, prior investments of ef-
fort seem to result in risk-averse choices. For tax behav-
ior this would mean that taxable income earned by high
effort is likely to be declared honestly. Even though ef-
fective income could be increased by evading taxes, be-
ing noncompliant would bear also the risk of being au-
dited and paying a fine. If the honestly declared net in-
come corresponds to the aspired compensation of one’s
effort and work, the individual level of aspiration (Hel-
Figure 1. Change of value function in prospect theory de-
pending on the amount of effort put in earning one’s in-
come.
Figure 2. Shift of reference point in prospect theory’s value
function as consequence of expecting compensation for in-
vesting a high amount of effort.
S. Muehlbacher et al.: Hard-Earned Income and Tax Compliance 299
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):298–304

son, 1964; Weiner, 1996), compliance is likely since pay-
ing a fine following an audit would mean falling below
one’s aspiration level and experiencing the feeling of “. . .
having worked for nothing” (Zeelenberg & van Dijk,
1997; p. 682). The notion of an aspiration level serving
as alternative reference point was previously mentioned
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their seminal paper
on prospect theory. Potential consequences of such an al-
ternative reference point are exemplified in Figure 2. In
this Figure, point A represents the gross income, which
is typically used in compliance decisions of the self-em-
ployed who pay taxes out of their own pocket. From this
point the decision about whether to pay any given amount
of taxes (x) occurs in the loss domain, where prospect
theory would predict risk-seeking choices. If, however,
while completing their hard work taxpayers were antic-
ipating their net income as financial compensation for
their work, point B would serve as the reference point,
that is, the expected income. Seen from point B, outcome
(x) from evading taxes lies in the gain domain of the val-
ue function, where risk-averse choices are more likely to
occur (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
To summarize our two-sided predictions, we hypothe-
size that either high investment of effort in one’s own job
leads to high valuation of income, and in consequence, to
more tax evasion, or the opposite is true, that is, high effort
put into earning taxable income increases tax compliance
if the tax deduced income meets people’s expectations –
the aspiration level. These predictions are tested in eight
countries with varying tax morale and different sizes of
shadow economy. The countries vary in regard to tax rate,
tax practices, and norms. Assuming that the impact of effort
is a general phenomenon, valid independently of cultural
differences, we expect similar effects of effort on compli-
ance in all considered nations.
Method
Participants
Eight convenience samples were collected in Australia (Can-
berra), Austria (Vienna), England (Exeter), France (Paris),
Italy (Chieti-Pescara), New Zealand (Christchurch), Spain
(San Sebastian), and Switzerland (Zurich). Overall, 1,223
participants joined the study. Sample sizes in each nation
ranged from 117 to 211. The average age of participants was
22 years (SD = 5). Slightly more females than males partici-
pated (57% vs. 43%), which was especially the case in Aus-
tria and France. A majority of participants were students
and/or working part-time. Detailed sample descriptions for
each country are provided in Table 1.
Material and Procedure
Each participant had to complete one of four versions of a
questionnaire, describing different scenarios about the
work of a freelance architect (to decrease social desirabil-
ity, all text in the questionnaire was worded in the third
person). The work of the architect was either described as
rather easy (Low Effort Condition), with no problems in-
volved in acquiring and completing a profitable project, or
as unusually effortful (High Effort Condition), starting with
difficulties in acquiring a project, which – when the archi-
tect finally was assigned to it – turned out to be an annoying
task involving hard work. In both conditions, salary for the
project amounted to 60 800 EUR
1
. To manipulate the aspi-
ration level, participants were told that typically architects
in comparable projects earn more, that is, 62 300 EUR
(high aspiration level condition) or less, that is, 59 300
EUR (low aspiration level condition).
Subsequently, participants read that the architect consid-
ered including a deduction of travel expenditures and ac-
commodation costs in his tax report. These bills, however,
had been fully covered by the architect’s customer, writing
them off would therefore be not correct. By including the
deduction, effective salary would increase to 63 300 EUR,
but if tax authorities thoroughly check the architect’s tax
report (audit probability was indicated as 33%), a fine has
to be paid and effective salary would be reduced to 55 800
EUR. Participants had to indicate on a 9-point scale how
high they considered the probability to be that the architect
would cheat in his tax report and include the incorrect de-
duction (1 – compliance;9–evasion).
Thus, in the four scenarios of the questionnaire effort
and aspiration level were manipulated in a 2 × 2 design
with likelihood of tax compliance as dependent variable.
Note that a satisfactory income in the Low Aspiration Lev-
el Condition would be achieved with an honest tax report,
but in the High Aspiration Level Condition a satisfactory
income can be reached only by cheating in the tax report.
Table 1. Sample description by country
N Sex Age (years)
Female Male MSD
Australia 123 50% 50% 19.7 2.1
Austria 117 89% 11% 24.9 6.6
England 147 44% 56% 19.8 1.3
France 128 71% 29% 20.9 5.0
Italy 187 53% 47% 20.4 1.7
New Zealand 138 64% 36% 20.9 5.7
Spain 211 57% 43% 24.6 7.8
Switzerland 172 37% 63% 22.2 3.1
Total 1223 57% 43% 21.8 5.2
300 S. Muehlbacher et al.: Hard-Earned Income and Tax Compliance
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):298–304 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
1 In countries with different currencies, the indicated salary was 60 800 Australian dollars, 60 800 New Zealand dollars and 94 240 Swiss
francs.

In the last section of the questionnaire, participants’ tax
morale was measured with a 5-item scale (Taxes contribute
to social equity within a state; Tax evasion is not really a
crime (recoded); Taxes are necessary to assure the func-
tioning of a state; Taxes constrain my freedom of decision
(recoded); In return for the taxes to be paid one doesn’t
receive appropriate rewards (recoded); 1 – disagree to 6 –
agree; Cronbach’s α = .58). Also, participants’ sociodemo-
graphic characteristics were collected.
The questionnaire was carefully translated by native
speakers into the respective national language of the par-
ticipating countries.
Results and Discussion
To test if the eight samples reflect the general tax morale
of the countries they were drawn from, aggregate tax mo-
rale within each country was compared with estimates by
Schneider and Klinglmair (2004; p. 42–45) for the size of
shadow economy in the year 2000. Their estimates were
used in a previous study (Alm & Torgler, 2006), where tax
morale in 15 European countries and the United States was
negatively correlated to the size of shadow economy.
2
Es-
timates from the secondary source and means for our mea-
sure of tax morale for each nation are provided in Table 2.
Whereas Swiss participants had the highest values for tax
morale, the lowest tax morale was found in Italy and Spain.
Figure 3 shows the strong negative correlation between ag-
gregate tax morale and the size of the shadow economy
(Spearman’s ρ(6) = –.83; p = .01). The negative relation-
ship between tax morale and size of the shadow economy
in the eight countries corresponds with previous findings
by Alm and Torgler (2006), and provides some evidence
for the comparability of the observed samples to the nation-
al average.
The hypothesis on the impact of sunk effort on tax com-
pliance was tested in a mixed-model ANCOVA with effort
and aspiration level as fixed factors, nation as random fac-
tor and participants’ ratings on the 9-point tax compliance
item (1-compliance;9-evasion) as the dependent variable.
Participants’ age, sex, and tax morale were included as co-
variates. The mixed-model approach was chosen because
treating nation as random factor ensures generalizability of
any observed cultural differences. By modeling nation as
fixed factor its effects would be valid only for the eight
countries participating in our study. Means and standard
deviations by experimental condition and nation are pro-
vided in Table 3.
Regarding the experimental conditions, tax compliance
was affected by the main effect of effort, F(1, 6.43) = 6.91;
p = .04, and its interaction with the aspiration level,
F(1, 2.67) = 19.73; p = .03. The aspiration level by itself
had no impact on tax compliance, F(1, 5.71) = 0.01; p =
.93. As shown in Figure 4 the main effect of effort caused
a general shift in tax compliance, that is, tax evasion was
more likely in the low effort condition (Estimated Marginal
Mean = 5.02; SE = 0.09) than in the high effort condition
(Estimated Marginal Mean = 4.69; SE = 0.09; Contrast:
F(3, 1129) = 7.14; p < .01). The aspiration level seems to
trigger the effect of effort on compliance. Whereas at low
aspiration levels tax evasion varied with effort (low effort:
estimated marginal mean = 5.10; SE = 0.13; high effort:
estimated marginal mean = 4.61; SE = 0.13; contrast esti-
mate = .24; SE = 0.11; p = .03), tax evasion at high aspira-
tion levels was not affected by effort (low effort: estimated
marginal mean = 4.95; SE = 0.12; high effort: estimated
marginal mean = 4.77; SE = 0.13; contrast estimate = –.09;
SE = 0.11; p = .41).
No main effect of nation was observed, F(7, 10.25) =
Table 2. Tax morale and estimates for the size of the shadow
economy by country
Tax morale Shadow
economy*
MSD%ofGNP
Australia 3.99 0.69 15.3
Austria 4.04 0.86 10.2
England 4.10 0.78 12.6
France 4.06 1.00 15.3
Italy 3.77 0.92 27.0
New Zealand 4.10 0.84 12.7
Spain 3.85 0.84 22.6
Switzerland 4.24 0.81 8.8
*Estimates were calculated for the year 2000 by Schneider and Klingl-
mair (2004).
Figure 3. Tax morale and shadow economy in the eight
countries.
S. Muehlbacher et al.: Hard-Earned Income and Tax Compliance 301
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):298–304
2 Two of the nations in our study, New Zealand and Australia, were not included in the analysis of Alm and Torgler (2006).

1.38; p = .31, but its interactions with effort, F(7, 3.65) =
10.20; p = .01, and aspiration level, F(7, 6.48) = 4.04; p =
.05, indicate that effects of the experimental manipulations
differed across countries. In spite of these interactions the
core interaction effect between effort and aspiration level
was significant as described above. Importantly, the three-
way interaction of nation, effort, and aspiration level had
no impact on tax compliance, F(7, 1129) = 0.14; p = .99.
The covariates tax morale, F(1, 1129) = 4.21; p =.04,
and age, F(1, 1129) = 4.56; p = .03, were significantly
associated with tax compliance, the effect of sex,
F(1, 1129) = 4.56; p = .09, was only marginally signifi-
cant.
In summary, hard-earned income was more likely to
be reported honestly than income achieved easily. When
high effort had been invested, tax compliance was espe-
cially high if the aspiration level was low enough to be
satisfied by an honest tax report. Evading taxes in such
a situation would bear the risk of being audited, paying
a fine and achieving lower income than expected. Cul-
tural differences in tax compliance could not be ob-
served, though the impact of effort and aspiration level
seems to vary across nations. Some limitations to the gen-
eralizability of the present study arise from the fact that
participants were mostly recruited from student samples.
Although their average reports of tax morale correspond
with findings from other studies on the shadow economy,
it might be the case that students across cultures are more
similar than average taxpayers are. Such similarities may
be found in the level of income, the level of knowledge,
and education, but also in the level of experience with
taxpaying per se. Another potential limitation is that
choices in the tax compliance problem were without fi-
nancial consequences. Although the correlation between
individual tax morale and tax evasion was in the expected
direction, it was nevertheless small, r(1192) = –.08; p <
.01, suggesting that other factors influenced reported tax
compliance. In follow-up studies, the effect of effort on
tax evasion should be replicated with more tax experi-
enced participants and by providing monetary conse-
quences for the compliance decision.
The observation that tax compliance increases with the
effort invested to earn taxable income is consistent with
prior findings from a laboratory experiment (Kirchler,
Muehlbacher, Hoelzl, & Webley, in press) and is in line
with theory on the reverse sunk cost effect (Zeelenberg
& van Dijk, 1997). Accordingly, the presence of sunk ef-
fort results in adopting a different reference point while
evaluating outcomes of a decision and consequently en-
hances risk-aversion. Supporting evidence for the effects
of such a mechanism is provided by the interaction of
effort and aspiration level we have found in the present
study. Tax compliance was highest if high effort had been
invested and if it was possible to achieve one’s aspiration
Table 3. Tax evasion by work effort, aspiration level and country
Effort
Low High
Aspiration level Aspiration level
Low High Low High
MSDMSDMSDMSD
Australia 5.25 1.92 5.63 1.59 5.36 1.83 5.54 2.02
Austria 5.17 2.34 4.42 1.98 4.77 1.90 4.80 2.23
England 5.03 1.66 4.74 1.70 4.29 1.71 4.44 1.62
France 4.92 1.92 5.04 1.92 4.35 2.06 4.21 1.79
Italy 5.24 2.21 5.06 2.75 4.79 2.79 4.69 2.33
New Zealand 4.88 1.82 5.29 2.02 4.94 1.83 5.45 1.82
Spain 5.46 2.36 5.37 2.20 4.50 2.15 4.72 2.14
Switzerland 4.76 2.02 4.42 2.27 4.41 2.14 4.46 1.79
Total 5.11 2.06 5.01 2.14 4.64 2.09 4.77 2.03
Note. Tax evasion was measured by a 9-point item (1-compliance; 9-evasion).
Figure 4. Likelihood of tax evasion by effort and aspiration
level.
302 S. Muehlbacher et al.: Hard-Earned Income and Tax Compliance
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):298–304 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers

level without evading. If the aspiration level was higher
and a satisfying income was achievable only by cheating
in the tax report, tax compliance was lower regardless of
the effort invested.
Our findings on the effect of effort are also compatible
with research on windfall gains (Arkes et al., 1994), where
unexpected gains (such as easily earned income) were more
readily invested in risky ventures (such as tax evasion).
However, the studies by Arkes and his colleagues (1994)
suggest that windfall gains are defined by their unexpect-
edness rather than by the effort invested. In the context of
effort and taxpaying, therefore, the reverse sunk cost effect
seems to be a more plausible explanation.
On a theoretical level, the interaction effect between ef-
fort and aspiration level supports the model of changing
reference points, in line with the results by Zeelenberg and
van Dijk (1997). Effort is important particularly when as-
piration levels are so low that it can be reached by honest
tax reporting. Although the effect of effort for high aspira-
tion levels was not significant, it pointed in the same direc-
tion, that is, higher effort seems to increase tax compliance.
On a practical level, effort seems the more important vari-
able for mainly two reasons. First, for tax authorities aspi-
ration levels are difficult to observe, whereas the amount
of effort a taxpayer has invested could be determined more
easily. Second, aspiration levels depend on a variety of fac-
tors for example, the income level in previous business pe-
riods, by comparison to peers, and might therefore change
over time.
Practical implications from the results need to be drawn
cautiously, and would need additional empirical support.
However, the issue of effort investments and tax evasion
would imply differential audit strategies, depending on the
effort exerted in earning the taxable income. Persons who
earn their income without much effort would, according to
the present results, be more likely to evade taxes. Focusing
audits on this group would promise a higher likelihood of
finding evaders. It is too costly for tax authorities to check
all tax reports for inconsistencies, so knowing where to
look could improve efficiency. That some forms of income
are easily earned seems quite indisputable for example,
capital gains from stocks and bonds. For other forms of
income, the effort exerted may vary more strongly with
personal circumstances and with subjective interpretations.
It seems plausible, for example, that young entrepreneurs
struggle more and have to invest more effort into earning
their income than more experienced entrepreneurs. It might
also be possible to identify demographic characteristics
that are correlated with a tendency to view work as effortful
or easy.
In the words of Zeelenberg and van Dijk, “. . . sometimes
there is too much invested to gamble.” (1997, p. 677).
Translated to the tax setting, sometimes there is too much
effort put into earning one’s money to risk losing even more
by being caught after tax evasion. Although paying taxes
hurts, paying an additional fine would hurt disproportion-
ately more.
Acknowledgments
This paper is based on a presentation given by the author
as part of an invited symposium at the 26th International
Congress of Applied Psychology, Athens, 2006. We are
grateful to Stefanie Kasper and Anna-Maria Fuchs for their
help in collecting data.
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About the authors
Stephan Muehlbacher is Assistant Professor at the University of
Vienna, Austria. His research focuses on tax compliance and eco-
nomic decisions.
Erich Kirchler is full-time Professor of Psychology at the Univer-
sity of Vienna, Austria. His research interests in economic psy-
chology include money management in the private household,
well-being at work, and tax behavior.
Erik Hoelzl is Associate Professor of Psychology at the University
of Vienna, Austria. His research interests include economic psy-
chology and social psychology, in particular decision making, so-
cial influence, and affective forecasting.
Julie Ashby is currently working on a 14-month ESRC postdoc-
toral fellowship at Exeter, UK. Her interests include social and
economic psychology, and she has published research in this area.
Chiara Berti is Professor of Social Psychology at the Università
degli Studi “G. d’Annunzio” Chieti e Pescara, Italy. Her research
interests in applied social psychology include studies on justice
and juridical psychology.
Jenny Job is a postgraduate fellow at the Australian National Uni-
versity, Canberra, Australia. Her research interests are in the field
of sociology and political psychology, particularly responsive
regulation, trust, and tax behavior.
Simon Kemp is Professor of Psychology at the University of Can-
terbury in New Zealand. His research interests include economic
psychology, autobiographical memory, and the history of psy-
chology.
Ria Ursula Peterlik is a PhD student at the University of Vienna,
Austria, with research interest in financial decisions within the
private household in Vietnam.
Christine Roland-Levy is Professor at the University Réné Dés-
cartes, Paris, France. Her research interests in social psychology
focus on social representations of economic phenomena.
Karin Waldherr is currently teaching statistics at the University
of Vienna, Austria. Her main research interests are psychometrics
and eating disorders.
Stephan Muehlbacher
University of Vienna
Faculty of Psychology
Universitätsstraße 7
A-1010 Vienna
Austria
Tel. +43 1427747880
Fax +43 1427747889
E-mail stephan.muehlbacher@univie.ac.at
304 S. Muehlbacher et al.: Hard-Earned Income and Tax Compliance
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):298–304 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers