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Irene van Staveren is Associate Professor of Feminist Development Economics at the Institute of Social Studies, The
Hague, and Professor of Economics and Christian Ethics at Radboud University Nijmegen. Olasunbo Odebode is a
Coordination Specialist (NRAs) in the UN Resident Coordinator's Office at the UN House in Abuja, Nigeria. The
views expressed in the article do not reflect the position of her office, as the article was written entirely in a personal
capacity with the co-author. Odebode’s PhD at the Institute of Social Studies was on the livelihoods of Yoruba women
in Nigeria.
903
©2007, Journal of Economic Issues
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES
Vol. XLI No. 4 December 2007
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions:
A Case Study of Yoruba Women in Nigeria.
Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
For the modern man the patriarchal relation of status is by no means the
dominant feature of life; but for the women on the other hand, and for the
upper-middle class women especially, confined as they are by prescription
and by economic circumstances to their ‘domestic sphere,’ this relation is
the most real and most formative factor of life.
(Thorstein Veblen [1899] 1931, 324)
While a century ago, institutional economists like Thorstein Veblen recognized
gender norms as important institutions in the economy, today this particular type of
institution receives less attention in institutional analysis. At the same time, feminist
economists have found the notion of an institution useful for the analysis of the
relationships between gender and the economy. We will argue that the understanding
of gender norms as institutions necessitates a distinction between institutions that
have similar effects for everyone and institutions that have asymmetric effects, that is,
systematically different effects on different groups. We will illustrate our argument
with a case study on the livelihoods of Yoruba women in Nigeria. The case study will
show how gender norms result in an asymmetric institutional setting for women and
men, even when norms about women’s labor force participation, individual control
over income, and partners’ contribution to the household budget are symmetric. The
article will conclude that an understanding of some institutions as asymmetric will
enable both institutional analysis and household analysis to include attention to
power, ideology, and change more systematically.
The structure of the article is as follows. First, we discuss gender norms as
institutions, and link Veblen’s path-breaking work on patriarchal institutions to more
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Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
recent feminist economic work. The next section elaborates the distinction between
symmetric and asymmetric institutions, followed by a brief discussion of intersections
of gender norms and ethnicity, culture, and class. Then we introduce our case study
with primary data collected among poor Yoruba women in the city of Ibadan, Nigeria.
The next two sections present our findings on economic norms and family norms
among the Yoruba. This is followed by a section that analyzes the interaction between
both types of norms. We end with a conclusion.
Gender Norms as Institutions
Whereas a century ago, Veblen recognized gender norms as exemplary for how
historical and cultural patterns influence the economic process of provisioning, today,
institutional economics seems to be less concerned with gendered institutions.
Certainly, today, gender norms are recognized as influential institutions, but Veblen’s
deep concern with patriarchal institutions does not play a key role in institutional
analysis anymore. Explicit concerns with gender norms seem to have become one
specialized area among others. This was not so for Veblen, who did not merely analyze
the role of patriarchal norms out of an exclusive interest in women’s disadvantaged
position,
1
but rather studied these norms in order to understand how power and
ideology affect the economy. As Ann Jennings (1993, 113) has argued when referring
to Veblen (1964): “Veblen’s views of the ‘Barbarian status of women’ were linked to a
larger opposition to social hierarchy rooted in invidious distinctions.” This integrated
attention to gender norms has led Veblen to various important insights, for example,
on the role of the household in late nineteenth century United States, with middle
class women expressing men’s status through their (supposed) leisure. In The Theory of
the Leisure Class, he notes that:
. . . the position of woman in any community is the most striking
index of the level of culture attained by the community, and it
might be added, by any given class in the community. This
remark is perhaps truer as regards the stage of economic
development than as regards development in any other respect.
At the same time the position assigned to the woman in the
accepted scheme of life, in any community or under any culture,
is in a very great degree an expression of traditions which have
been shaped by the circumstances of an earlier phase of
development, and which have been but partially adapted to the
existing economic circumstances, or to the existing exigencies of
temperament and habits of mind by which the women living
under this modern economic situation are actuated. (Veblen
1931, 353)
Today, institutional economists who are concerned about gender norms plea for a
more systematic, Veblenian, attention to gender in institutional economics. The
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
905
reasons for such a plea partly emerge from insights provided by feminist economics.
Jennings (1993), for example, has argued that institutionalism could build on the
feminist critique of Western Cartesian dualisms such as public/private, economy/
family, mind/body, rational/emotional, and competitive/nurturant. She has shown
that these categories are not neutral but imbued with symbolic gender meanings,
referring to stereotypical characterizations of femininity and masculinity. The
genderedness of dualisms underlying much of mainstream economic thought of
rationality, households, and the division of labor, is key to the understanding of the
various levels at which institutions operate, she argues. At the same time, however, we
should be aware about their cultural specificity and not assume that they are the same
across cultures, as this paper will illustrate. In particular, as Sandra Harding (1986,
167-79) has claimed, African worldviews do not neatly fit the portrayal of Cartesian
dualisms. We should be very careful with universalizing categories such as “the
African woman” (Olson 1994, 88-89) or polygamy (Hale 1995), as they conceal
intersections with class and ethnicity as well as other social differentiations. From
such cultural awareness, Anne Mayhew (1999) has emphasized the shared
understanding in feminist and institutional economics of the cultural specific and
social construction of economic reality. She notes that in both schools of thought
power is recognized as a central force in the economy and that therefore the power of
gender norms would make a logical part of institutional analysis. William Dugger
(1996) has brought the various power relations together in the recognition of “four
modes of inequality” (race, gender, class and nation) each of which supported by
institutional arrangements making use of myths. In yet another contribution on
similarities between institutional and feminist economics, Charles Whalen and Linda
Whalen (1994) conclude that both approaches represent a holistic ontology, a
pragmatic epistemology, and a comprehensive view of values. Finally, William Waller,
in an article with Jennings (1990) warns us that institutionalists may run the risk of
slipping back into the Cartesian dualisms dominating mainstream economics. Waller
and Jennings alert us to the influence of culture on our knowledge creation, which
may blind our view on certain issues, such as gender. It is therefore that they advise us
to “. . . look at the cultural process of inquiry as outsiders to better see the prejudices
embedded within it, and employ a method similar to the one that Thorstein Veblen
applied to his inquiry into modern industrial economies” (Waller and Jennings 1990,
618).
We follow Dugger (1996), as well as many others, who have characterized
patriarchy as a system of gender inequality. This system is supported by institutions
that are gendered and therefore working out asymmetrically for men and women. The
next section elaborates the notion of asymmetric institutions and argues in what ways
gender norms differ from symmetric institutions. The following section links gender
norms to the household, acknowledging that within households, gender norms
interact with other social norms, in particular norms about culture, ethnicity and
class.
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Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
Symmetric and Asymmetric Institutions
Not all institutions are asymmetric, of course – if they were, there would be no need
to distinguish them from symmetric institutions. Many institutions are symmetric,
that is, having similar effects on different social groups. Examples are driving on the
left or right side of the road, universal primary education, exchange rates, or language
(although even these may be affected to some extent by social differentiations). Hence,
the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric institutions requires clarification.
The sociological account of institutions by Patricia Yancey Martin (2004) may be
helpful, since she has provided a detailed characterization of institutions, combining a
wide variety of views in sociology from Parsons to Giddens. One of the strengths of
sociological thinking about institutions is the recognition of asymmetries at the level
of structures, identity, and symbolic meanings. Martin (2004, 1256-8) discusses five
features of institutions that refer to asymmetries, which are, we think, relevant for
institutional economics. These are features of institutions that:
both constrain and facilitate behavior by group members
are characterized by particular expectations, rules, and procedures
are internalized by group members as identities
have a legitimating ideology, and
are organized in accord with and permeated by power.
Below, we briefly discuss these features, with reference to gender norms, elaborating
Martin’s own connections of each of these with gender.
2
“Constrain and facilitate behavior by group members.”
Gender-based constraints and facilitations are created by what Nancy Folbre
(1994) has referred to as gendered structures of constraint. Such structures constrain
as well as define people’s behavior in the following sense: “Citizens can do X, non-
citizens cannot. Men can do Y, women cannot” (Folbre 1994, 40). But gender norms
are also challenged, evaded, bended, and negotiated by women, leading to a process of
institutional change. Indeed, as she explains, “groups organized along lines of gender
and age make particularly conspicuous efforts to reinforce the institutional
arrangements that they find advantageous, and to change those they find
burdensome” (Folbre 1994, 1).
“Social positions and relations that are characterized by particular
expectations, rules, and procedures.”
Men and women partly engage in different social practices, such as those
related to the gender division of labor, as Jennings (1993) has pointed out.
Expectations about gender roles are expressed very early in a child’s socialization, and
shape a child’s development into typically masculine and feminine roles. The
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
907
expectations and roles will subsequently shape the choices men and women make in
their lives. For example, in the labor market, in which job segregation is maintained
through a complex institutional setting of entry barriers, images, and valuations of
stereotypically but invisibly labeled masculine and feminine jobs (Elson 1999).
“Internalized by group members as identities.”
Based on her empirical work on the economic position of women in South
Asia, Bina Agarwal has recognized that gender norms “are revealed not only in the
division of labor and resources between women and men, but also in ideas and
representations – ascribing to women and men of different abilities, attitudes, desires,
personality traits, behavior patterns, and so on” (1997, 1). This suggests that gender
norms are able to affect an agent’s identity, which is precisely what Geoffrey Hodgson
has identified as being part and parcel of the old, Veblenian institutional economics:
“Different institutions can act as more than constraints on behavior: they may actually
change the character and beliefs of the individual” (Hodgson 2004, 257). In the case
of the symbolic meanings of gender attached to men and women, attention to
gendered identities implies “a recognition that ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ matter for
the way in which decisions are made and resources allocated” (Katz 1997, 26).
“Legitimating ideology.”
Gender norms are legitimized through shared beliefs as well as through male
interest protecting these norms. This, in turn, may prevent the development and
implementation of more efficient solutions to coordination problems, when these
require a breaking-up of gender norms, as Veblen had noted sharply, when he
recognized that patriarchal norms often lead to inefficiencies. Geoffrey Hodgson
(1984) has provided a good example of this in the area of human resource
management. He refers to an instance in which male supervisors took away women
workers’ control over their work speed, believing that such control would provide
them with too much freedom. The result of this was a reduction in labor productivity.
“Organized in accord with and permeated by power.”
Waller and Jennings point at the role of power in institutions, and
acknowledge that attention to power always had a central place in institutional
thought. “Institutionalists have always dealt with the use of power through
multifaceted systems of status and hierarchy” (Waller and Jennings 1990, 620). Status
and hierarchy allow that men, as Anne Marie Goetz notes, “tend to act, across
divisions like class or race, more cohesively than women do in defense of certain
gender interests, and they do so in ways which mean that public institutions help to
forge connections between men’s public and private power” (Goetz 1997, 17). At the
same time, it is important to recognize that gender is not a unified, homogeneous
institution because the power relations implied are continuously played out, openly or
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Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
hidden. Drawing on the work by Commons, Mayhew, for example, states that
“economic organization has been understood as the consequence of conflicting
interests among groups who make use of power and of the accepted processes of
adjudication in the society in question” (Mayhew 1999, 484). Barbara Harriss-White
(2000, 236) therefore recognizes that the market, as an institution, “has the capacity
to be a site of ethnic and/or gender subordination as well as of liberation.”
In conclusion, the five asymmetric features of institutions recognized by
Martin enable us to characterize gender as a complex, multi-dimensional institution
shaped unequally for men and women, with men generally benefiting more than
women in terms of access to and control over resources, the household division of
labor, the distribution of rewards, and decision-making power. Such an
understanding of gender as an asymmetric institution promises a richer
understanding of gender norms than economic approaches to gender analysis where
gender tends to be seen as either an individual behavioral constraint (as in the new
institutional economics), as stemming from individual preferences (as in the new
home economics), or as part of the fallback position (as in household bargaining
theory). This leads us to refine the commonly used symmetric definition of
institutions in economics into one that more explicitly acknowledges that institutions
may not be neutral social rules/norms influencing behavior similarly across groups.
Drawing on Hodgson (2004, 424), we would like to characterize institutions as
durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social
interactions in society either similarly, differently, or unequally for different groups in
society. When the effect is different or unequal for different groups, we can speak of
asymmetric institutions.
Gender Norms and Intersections with Culture, Ethnicity and Class
Norms often interact with each other and therefore institutions are often found to be
related. For such interactions between institutions in the economy, Harriss-White
(2000, 237) has argued that “[e]xchange processes are constituted by, and constitute in
turn, a wide set of social institutions: state, locality, class, ethnic group, caste, religion,
kin, age and gender.” So, whereas gender norms in general may be regarded as an
asymmetric institution, the specific expression of such norms will often be mediated
through other institutions, resulting in a complex, layered set of institutions, such as
the labor market, the firm, property rights, the tax system, or public services. Such
institutions then become “bearers of gender,” as Diane Elson (1999) has noted.
One particular institution that deserves attention as a bearer of gender is the
household. Veblen already noted its embeddedness in patriarchy: “The ‘home’ is the
household with a male head” (Veblen [1899] 1931, 355). This is still valid today, as
Goetz has noted, because the family and the household are still “the primary
institution[s] in which women’s entitlements and capabilities are so distorted as to
undermine their capacity to manage transactions to their advantage in other
institutions” (Goetz 1997, 5). The household, hence, is very often a gendered
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
909
institution, while at the same time the household mediates other institutions, such as
class, race, and ethnicity (Peterson 1994; Olson 1994; Andersen and Hill Collins
1997; Marchand and Parpart 1995; Harriss-White 2000). However, households are
not by definition gendered, and hence asymmetrical. Feminist ideals of a society with
gender equality include visions of households that represent equal respect for all its
members. Such visions of post-patriarchal households include ideals of single-sex
households, one-person households, and households consisting of men and women
who may take up partially different roles, but this would not result in unequal positions
of men and women.
In developing countries, the household is a rather fluid concept due to the
wide variety of types of households (extended households, in- and out-migration in
households, multiple households in polygamous marriages) and complex differences
between the concepts of “household” and “family” (Guyer 1981). Whereas for
Immanuel Wallerstein and Joan Smith (1991) the commonality between different
households is perceived to be basically economic, namely a common pool of income,
researchers familiar with sub-Saharan Africa reject the idea that income pooling
between husband and wife and/or other members of the household would be a
necessary requirement for an institution to be identified as a household (Fapohunda
1988; Blumberg 1991a; Clark 1994). Households, hence, mediate gender, but also
mediate social differences such as class (Harriss-White 2000). In an African context –
in which our case study is situated – the notion of class goes beyond typical Western
categories such as capitalist/worker, or white collar/blue collar worker but often
involves people’s self-identification (Jackman 1994). In developing countries class
boundaries are better expressed along the lines of the formal/informal economy, that
is, the status of economic activities and the level of security they give, acknowledging
that the boundary between the two is not very clear.
Poor Yoruba Women in Ibadan: a Brief Overview
Our case study derives from a larger study on the livelihoods of urban Yoruba women
in the city of Ibadan, Nigeria (Odebode 2004). The study entails a survey, carried out
in 2001, among 191 Yoruba women in the city, and interviews, done in 2002, with 31
women (taken from the survey sample). The Yoruba believe in strong, patrilineal
kinship ties as a means of holding society together, which is apparent in the extended,
patrilocal family system.
Nigerian institutions are highly gendered, as has been described, for
example, by Abdul-Mumin Sa’ad (2001). Family institutions involve strict gender
norms on marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance, which all appear to be
very restrictive for women. Sa’ad states that married women become de facto the
property of their husband, they do not inherit land or resources, divorce is strongly
disapproved of and therefore rare, and child custody is given automatically to the
father. About inheritance, he writes that “as properties of men rather than their
equals, women are themselves inheritable items in many traditional rural
communities in Nigeria” (Sa’ad 2001, 74). He notes that women have no individual
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Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
property rights, their work on family farms is unpaid, and they have a very high
burden of unpaid work in the household in which men do not share much.
In an insightful study on women’s household decision-making in Nigeria,
Sarah Gammage (1997) has shown that there are significant gender differences
between ethnic groups in the country. She collected data on three Nigerian states,
with the Yoruba being the dominant ethnic group in Ondo state, the Ibo in Abia
state and the Hausa and Fulani in Kebbi state. On polygamy, she noted that 34% of
the women surveyed in Ondo, where the Yoruba live, are part of a polygamous
marriage, while no woman was in a polygamous marriage in Abia. Girls’ education is
apparently highly valued among the Yoruba: the gender gap in school enrolment is
lowest in Ondo. When husbands do not agree with a wife’s school choice for a child,
the mother will decide on the school and pay the school fee, in addition to the daily
expenditures for schooling, as Gammage found for the Yoruba but not for the other
ethnic groups. Interestingly, a much higher share of women in Ondo contributed to
household expenditures compared to the other states. The rate of urban women
contributing to the household budget was highest for the Yoruba (93%), compared to
the other groups (76% and 67% respectively). However, the study also revealed that
Yoruba women have the lowest decision making power – based on education, income
and fertility control – in the household compared to the other ethnic groups. Yoruba
women’s decision-making power index, running from 0 to 1, was 0.73, compared to
0.83 for Ibo and 0.89 for Hausa and Fulani women. So, a contradictory picture
emerges for Yoruba women in Gammage’s survey: they are better educated and
contribute more often to household expenditures compared to other ethnic groups,
but at the same time their decision making power in the household is lower. Our case
study hopes to provide some insights into this paradox.
First, we will present some summary data on the urban Yoruba women in
our case study. The ages of the 191 women included in the survey ranged from 25
through 59, with the majority of the women between 35 and 45 years old. The
household size was rather large, with 52% of the women living in households with 4-6
members and 32% in households with 7-9 members. Out of the 191 women in the
survey, 66% were Christian and 34% were Muslim and almost all women were
married (or had been married – only two women were single). The level of education
of the urban women appeared to be surprisingly high (see Table 1), confirming
Gammage’s findings for Yoruba girl school enrolment. The high share of tertiary
education in our data refers to the teachers, nurses, secretaries, and clerks in the
survey. This may reflect a bias in the sample as it intended to include not only women
employed in the informal economy, but also in the formal economy, leading to an
above-average share of women with vocational training and professional education.
The next table provides occupational data (Table 2). Although many women
combine a job in the formal and informal economy, the table only reflects the
women’s major occupation. This shows that the most important occupation is an
informal one, namely trading. Together, the four informal occupations included in
our data set (trader, hairdresser, tailor, and the diverse category) provided the main
employment for 99 women, which is 51.8% (90 women had formal employment,
making up 47.1%).
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
911
Education (%)
None
6
(3.1)
Primary
18
(9.4)
Secondary
82
(43.0)
Tertiary
85
(44.5)
Total
191
(100)
Table 1. Level of Education (n = 191)
Occupation (%)
Trader
58
(30.4)
Hairdresser
14
(7.3)
Tailor
18
(9.4)
Diverse
9
(4.7)
Teacher
42
(22.0)
Secretary
12
(6.3)
Nurse
16
(8.4)
Clerk
22
(11.5)
Total
191
(100)
Table 2. Main Occupation (n = 191)
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Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
The informal economy in Ibadan is characterized by relatively high-income
insecurity, low average earnings, and high underemployment, while the formal
economy in the city tends to have relative job and income stability, reasonable labor
standards and some social protection. Whereas 26% worked only in the formal
economy and 49% worked only in the informal economy, 25% combined
employment in both sectors. The largest secondary employment of the 58 women
who worked both in the formal and informal economy was by far trading: 39 women
(67.2%) said that this was their second job. So, trading appears to be the most
prevalent primary as well as secondary occupation, which is not surprising in the
context of West Africa where women traditionally have an important stake in trading
(Harriss-White 2000).
Finally, we have tried to collect data on women’s incomes, which proved to
be very difficult. First, due to irregular earnings from informal work, women were not
able to give reliable estimates of their weekly or monthly earnings. Second, revealing
one’s income is a cultural taboo among the Yoruba: even husbands and wives do not
disclose all their earnings to each other.
3
We therefore collected income data in broad
ranges in the interviews, which we present in Figure 1.
4
Most women, 13 (42%), were
found in the very low income category, four (13%) in the low income category, five
(16%) in the medium income category, while a relatively large number, nine (29%)
were found in the reasonable income category (this last category reflects more or less a
middle class income in Ibadan, largely earned by people with a formal sector job – a
minority of all Nigerian workers). The figure shows a rather uncommon income
distribution, which is quite likely to be attributed to the low number of observations
and the interview sample selection including relatively many women with jobs in the
formal economy. The interview sample deliberately included women with marked
differences in their livelihoods.
13
4
5
9
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
very low low medium reasonable
Income
Categories
Frequenc
y
Figure 1. Individual Income Levels % (n = 31)
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
913
The descriptive data presented above provides an insight into the age
distribution, household composition and the two most important resources of poor
urban Yoruba women, education and income. The picture that emerges from the data
is mixed. On the one hand, the average level of education is quite high for women in
Africa; on the other hand, the dependency rate in these women’s households is also
high, with one third of the women living in households with 7 to 9 members, which
substantially lowers per capita income. About half of the women earn an income in
the informal economy, with trading as the most frequent primary and secondary
occupation. The smaller sample, containing 31 women, gave some indication about
earnings, suggesting that the majority of the women earn a very low to low income.
Finally, cross tabulation of employment with income level reveals that formal jobs
tend to pay better than informal jobs.
5
The next two sections will analyze the major norms operating in Yoruba
households and their genderedness. These will be divided over two types: economic
norms and family norms (for a more detailed account of both types of norms in
Nigeria in general and among the Yoruba in particular, see: Krapf-Askari 1969;
Fapohunda 1988; Sa’ad 2001; and Bamgbose 2002).
Economic Norms
In our case study, we found two economic norms operating in Yoruba households,
both concerned with financial independence:
partners
6
are each expected to earn an income and to contribute to
household expenditures
partners keep direct control over their income by non-pooling
7
Interestingly, these two norms are quite different from the dominant Western
economic norms of a male breadwinner and income pooling in households. Whereas
Western patriarchy, as Veblen recognized so well, turns women into dependants in
the household, West African patriarchy rather tends to make women responsible for
earning their own livelihood as well as most of their children’s and part of their
husband’s.
The two economic norms seem to be symmetric, in particular in comparison
with the Western norms of the male breadwinner and income pooling. Indeed, the
norms make no distinction between men and women – both are expected to earn an
income and to contribute a fair share to household expenditures, and both are
allowed to keep control over their own income. So, at first sight, the two economic
norms appear not to be gendered norms but symmetric.
The first economic norm, about income earning and contributing to
household expenditures, expresses the cultural importance that the Yoruba place on
independence and individual responsibility in economic affairs. This was mentioned
repeatedly in the interviews – the Yoruba strongly dislike financial dependence, by
men and by women alike. One woman phrased it thus in the interviews:
914
Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
“A woman who has children – not one or two but many – and
waits for the man to meet all her needs and the children’s
without generating an income herself is ‘dead.’”
Our survey shows that out of the 191 women, 190 (99.5%) earn an income and
contribute to the household budget. This result, however, is somewhat biased by our
research method: the sample sought to select women in their work places: in the
market, and at schools and other organizations, as well as through the snowball-effect.
Nevertheless, Gammage’s (1997) data, referred to earlier, also indicates a high share of
Yoruba women earning an income (75%), with 93% of women contributing to the
household budget. So, our earning share is likely to be an overstatement, but the
similarly high share of Yoruba women contributing to household income in
Gammage’s survey suggests that the bias is probably not extreme.
We also collected data for the married women (179) on who else was a major
contributor to the household budget. Table 3 shows that the majority is husbands:
155 (86.6%), but in 9 cases (5.1%) another household member (children, mother, or
co-wife) contributed, while 15 (8.3%) of the women were the only earners in their
households.
When we look at the expenditure side of the Yoruba household, we find
different expenditure categories culturally assigned to men and women. Table 4
indicates that women contribute more than men to a variety of major and minor
expenditure categories. In particular, women spent more than men on daily school
needs (meals, stationary, transport), food and other household needs, children’s
clothing, cooking fuel, drinking water, and social expenditures. Men, on the other
Household members
contributing:
(%)
Husband
155
(86.6)
Children
7
(3.9)
Mother
1
(0.6)
Co-wife
1
(0.6)
None
15
(8.3)
Total
179
(100)
Table 3. Other Contributors to the Household Budget (n = 179)
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
915
Table 4. Gender Division of Financial Responsibilities (n = 31)
Women’s Share (%)
Female/Male
Expenditure
Ratio
Rent
School
Fees
School
Needs
Food &
Other
Househ.
Needs
Children
Cloth
Hospital
Bills
Drugs Fuel Water
Elec-
tricity
Social
Commit
-
ments
0 : 100 90 52 32 3 74
25 : 75 3 10 13 32 32 4 3
50 : 50 23 29 35 36 13 29 6 4 39
75 : 25 20 30 34 10 10 23 6 3 29
100 : 0 10 23 41 22 30 13 26 71 90 19 29
916
Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
hand, contributed more to rent, school fees, hospital bills, and electricity. The only
category in which women and men spent more or less equally is medicine. Combining
this information with expenditure data that we collected during the fieldwork on
average volumes and prices for these expenditure categories in poor households, we
have estimated the average female contribution to household expenditures to be
around 50% of total household expenditures. So, not only do the large majority of
Yoruba women earn an income and contribute to the household budget, their
contribution is, on average, more or less equal to the men’s share. This reveals that
the symmetric norm of contributing to household expenditures is quite well followed
up in practice in Yoruba households.
The second economic norm that we found, non-pooling of incomes in
households, also appeared to have strong support from the women. But in this case,
the reasons that the women gave to explain this norm and their adherence to it did
not appeal to moral values of independence, equality, and responsibility but to the
need to protect themselves against male rent-seeking behavior or even appropriation
of their earnings and assets by men. Women made clear that they did not want to run
the risk that their husband would use their income to support his other wives and
children or to use it as a resource for marrying another wife.
“He does not even know about my savings and contributions
because we are many wives and he is not helping me in taking care
of the children.”
“I tried it before and there was a problem for two good years as my
husband moved out of the house. If I asked for money the answer
was, there was no money and if I asked why it should be, a serious
fight would ensue. He spent all the money in the account. When I
insisted on knowing what happened to the money he moved out of
the house (to stay with another woman on whom he spent the
money) because I refused to move out since we struggled to build
the house together. When he felt it was time to come back he did
but I was advised not to ask for the money again. This is a bitter
lesson I have learnt from and it will not happen again.”
“A sane and wise woman will never try to do joint savings account
with a man because it is the day a man dies that you actually know
the number of children he has.”
Our data on the second economic norm reveal that the large majority of
women, 85.7%, do not pool their income in the household: 162 out of the 189
married and previously married do/did keep their income separate from their
husband’s. Besides, the predominance of non-pooling appears not to be restricted to
incomes but also applies to savings. Again, the overwhelming majority of women keep
their savings separate: 86.2% (163 of 189 women).
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
917
The high share of earning, contribution, and non-pooling of income and
savings among the women in our survey indicates that the economic norms are quite
strong in Yoruba households. Moreover, these norms look, at first sight, symmetrical:
they do not differentiate between men and women, and clearly find much support
from the women we interviewed. Indeed, almost all Yoruba women in our sample
appeared to be financially independent, or at least to a large extent, and sharing more
or less on an equal basis the contribution to household expenditures.
This situation, however, stands in stark contrast with the disadvantaged
socio-economic position of Yoruba women as was indicated in the literature on
women’s position in Nigeria referred to above. Part of the answer to this paradox
should probably be sought in a different set of norms, which will be discussed below.
Family Norms
The main family norms that we found operating in Yoruba households are clearly
asymmetric:
marriage norms in particular on property, inheritance, polygamy and
child custody, which benefit men/fathers/sons over women/mothers/
daughters
norms on the division of labor in which women are assigned most of the
unpaid work
The interviews unanimously expressed a lack of inheritance rights and individual
property for women – what they owned was owned by the household, headed by their
husbands, except for their business assets in case of self-employed women in the
informal economy. Property rights and inheritance are clearly unequal for the Yoruba,
and are laid out in culturally embedded rules and procedures. One of our
respondents explained that:
“Amongst the Yoruba, the male child is regarded as “Arole”’ which
means “he who stays and fills the house.” And there is the saying
that a female born of a woman is only a passenger whose final
destination is her husband’s home so a woman is just for her father
to care for before she gets married.”
On the norm of child custody, the interviews made clear that women had no custody
rights upon separation or divorce. The few women who had separated or divorced
had their children with them only when and as long as they were very young. The lack
of child custody for women appeared to be an important reason behind the low
divorce rate in our survey (6%). A traditional Yoruba saying legitimizes the social rule
of father’s child custody: “baba omo lo ni omo,” meaning “no matter what happens the
father owns the children.” One woman explained clearly how this rule and its strong
ideological support constrain women’s choices:
918
Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
“Leaving the man is not the best option. When you leave because
of the suffering it is your children who will suffer for this action of
yours. Women endure suffering in their husband’s home for their
children’s sake.”
On polygamy, our data reveal that 141 (74.6%) women were in a
monogamous marriage, while 48 (25.4%) women were in a polygamous marriage.
8
However, the border between monogamous and polygamous marriages appeared to be
uncertain, because a monogamous marriage may become polygamous at any time, as
we learned from the interviews. So, even though three quarters of marriages in our
case study are monogamous, women’s marriage may change over time from one
category to the other category, sometimes without the first wife even knowing of her
husband’s new marriage arrangements. Indeed, we found that out of the 189 married
women, 20 (11%) experienced their husband taking another wife over the past six
months.
The second family norm that came up in the case study is about the division
of unpaid work over household members. When asked whether they expect help from
their husbands, 53% of the women said that they did not expect any help (except for
some repair work). Table 5 presents data on the distribution of unpaid work in the
household per task, according to the women. It shows that in all categories, the
husbands’ contribution is much lower than that of other household members.
Husbands share between 0% and 29% in various household tasks (11% on average).
Other household members provide unpaid work more often, between 51% and 89%
of the help. Husbands’ help in cleaning is completely absent, and below ten percent
for cooking and water collection. When husbands do help, this is mostly on repairs,
yet, others help more often here. This also suggests that the norms about masculine
and feminine unpaid work are quite strong – even when a woman finds herself
without any help from others in these tasks, husbands are very reluctant to share in
the workload. The quotes below illustrate the strength of the norm of women’s
responsibility for unpaid work. There is also an example of an exception – caused by
the absence of daughters – in which sons carry out some “feminine” tasks, but not
their father.
Table 5. Sharing in Unpaid Work (%) (n = 189)
Household
member
Childcare Cooking Cleaning
Wood
collection
Water
collection
Repairs
Husband
13 5 0 11 7 29
Others
64 76 89 70 79 51
Paid help
6 7 8 9 9 20
No help
17 12 13 10 5 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
919
“The wife is to clean the house and the surrounding and make sure
there is water in the house and also to cook.”
“A Yoruba man will not help at all as they believe they have no
business helping with household chores.”
“Some men help their wives while others do not. However, when
visitors are around those who normally help will not. This is to
avoid the wife being given bad names because it is generally
believed she is controlling her husband – if not, he would not be
doing female chores. For example, the mother-in-law will readily
believe this.”
“I do not have daughters and my sons do all the work with me.
There is no household chore they cannot do and this makes me
very happy because they are not useless and when they marry they
will be able to help their wives.”
In the survey, we also asked who would take care of children when the
woman is at work. While for 51 (26.7%) women, the children were deemed old
enough to be at home alone, and for 35 (18.3%) women, children were in school
during work time, 26 (13.6%) women took their children to work with them.
9
As this
solution is not possible for most formal jobs, such as teaching, it is largely women who
work only in the informal economy who literally combine paid and unpaid work by
taking their children to their food stalls, for example. It is likely that such a lack of
sharing in childcare in the household constrains the productivity of these women’s
labor considerably and reduces their mobility. At the same time, the data indicates
that children also help their mothers, and not only in unpaid work. Women in the
informal economy relied on income earning children more often: 29 out of the 99
(29%) informally employed women supplemented their livelihoods with earnings
from their children, compared to 4 out of the 90 (4%) of the formally employed
women. Together, the data on the division of unpaid work and childcare in the
household implies that women, although receiving help from other household
members do far more unpaid work and childcare than men.
In conclusion, the family norms clearly favor men, who can marry up to four
wives, inherit property without needing to share with their sisters, have automatic
child custody, and hardly share in domestic work and childcare. These asymmetric
norms are not supported by values of independence and equality or responsibility, as
was the case for the economic norms, but find support in a gendered ideology,
socialization, rules and sanctions, keeping male-female power differences firmly in
place. Together, these provide the institutional foundation for the highly gendered
family norms of the Yoruba, glorifying masculine beliefs, rules, and practices, while
denigrating what is regarded as feminine. At the same time, however, these norms are
not entirely fixed over place and time: sometimes they are challenged. This was
920
Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
expressed, for example, by the eleven women in our sample (6%) who left their
husbands, despite strong social disapproval.
Interaction between Symmetric and Asymmetric Norms
In this section, we will come back to the paradox that we phrased earlier: how is it
possible that the majority of Yoruba women have such low decision making power in
the household whereas there are such strong economic norms and practices of
financial independence? Obviously, part of the answer lies in the highly gendered
family norms that constrain women’s position in Yoruba households. These norms
turn the household into a bearer of gender, as Elson had mentioned, with unequal
effects for men and women. But this cannot be the whole answer as long as the
mutual strength of the family norms and the economic norms is not addressed. One
would expect, particularly in light of feminist ideals of financial independence in
Western societies, that the economic norms operating in Yoruba households would at
least partially, if not completely, offset the negative influence of the family norms.
We will argue, however, that symmetric and asymmetric norms should not
be regarded as competing with each other. They should not be conceptualized as a
zero sum game in which more strength of the one set of norms implies a weakening of
the other. Instead, we will argue that the two types of norms are interdependent. This
interdependence is characterized by the five features that Martin (2004) distinguished
that make institutions asymmetric, and which tend to dominate the egalitarian
features that characterize symmetric institutions: (1) unequal constrains for men and
women; (2) expectations, rules and procedures; (3) internalization; (4) ideology; and
(5) organization through power.
In our case study, the economic norms, expressing values of independence
and shared responsibility, are influenced by the family norms operating
simultaneously in the household, which express male advantage and masculine ideals
and power. The seemingly symmetric norms of income earning and shared
contribution to household expenditures do indeed reflect values of autonomy and
equality. But when implemented in an institutional context that is characterized by
other norms that are asymmetric, having very unequal effects on men and women, the
practical consequences of living up to the symmetric norms are no longer symmetric.
We see that when we look at the practical implications of the asymmetric family
norms for the ability of women in Yoruba households to act according to the
symmetric economic norms. A Yoruba woman’s limited property rights and access to
resources sets her at a disadvantage in income earning compared to men. These
gendered constraints make women’s paid work less productive and also keeps their
unpaid work at very low levels of productivity, while the combination of the two also
constrains the opportunities for women to invest, to move to better earning activities,
and to save. Moreover, patriarchal child custody rights provide a disincentive for
women to leave their husbands, because, as it was expressed in the interviews, they did
not want their children to suffer “at the hands of a step-mother.” Moreover, leaving
the husband and taking their children with them requires a minimum level of income
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
921
to pay themselves for the rent, as well as the emotional strength to put up with the
criticism of the family-in-law and the disrespect shown by Yoruba people in general for
separated women. So, the interaction between symmetric and asymmetric – gendered
– norms in the household not only makes the institution of the household into a
bearer of gender but also turns the effects of the symmetric norms into unequal
outcomes. In our case study, we can trace this paradoxical process in four steps.
First, men’s stronger property rights and access to resources, as well as their
lesser time spent on unpaid work and childcare, will give them a higher earning
capacity than women. This in turn, makes it easier for men to live up to the norm of
contributing a fair share to household expenditures and enables them to keep a
higher share of their income for personal expenditures, compared to women. A
collection of empirical studies on male and female household finances, by Judith
Bruce and Daisy Dwyer (1988) as well as Rae Lesser Blumberg (1991b) shows that in a
variety of cultures, women’s income share spent on the household is higher than for
men, while men’s income share for personal use is larger than for women.
Second, masculine ideals of head of the household and sustaining the family
lineage give a strong symbolic meaning to male status, backed-up by property rights to
family land, the house and household assets. When this is not matched in practice by
men’s financial contribution to the household, men’s status is not affected much.
Thirty percent of the women said that their husbands reduced their financial
contributions to the household as soon as the women were able to increase their
contributions, while 48% of the women revealed that they regularly pay for traditional
male expenditure categories, in particular children’s school fees. Nevertheless, the
family norms favor the men, as one woman told us:
“The in-laws and others know quite all right that the woman is
working but that conception that the man is the breadwinner and as
such the sole provider is very strong in their minds.”
Instead, when women do not live up to the earning and contribution norm, they are
put under strong social pressure by the family-in-law, on whose premises they live, to
increase their contribution.
“It is definite that the man will be regarded as being the one meeting
all the needs of the wife, the children and the household in general.
Her in-laws will even complain that she is not allowing their son to
“see” them as everything he earns is being spent on the wife.”
Third, fathers’ customary right to child custody in combination with
patrilocality of the household, provides a strong disincentive for women to “retaliate”
against men’s reduced contributions with lower contributions as well or leaving the
husband. This will not only bring social disapproval but will also make it almost
impossible for women to take their children with them if they decide to leave, or were
sent away by a dissatisfied husband. Hence, women are likely to prevent separation by
922
Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
contributing even more rather than less to the household budget, in order to be able
to remain with their children and to finance their needs.
Fourth, the second economic norm, of non-pooling, allows men to hide how
much they earn, and hence, women’s claim on their income. But, at the same time,
the symmetry of this norm allows women to do the same. Indeed, women hide
information about their assets and earnings hoping that thereby they can crowd-in a
higher extra male contribution to the household budget, and keep a larger share of
their earnings as savings or investment for their businesses or children’s education.
Again, the norm claims equality, but the implication is unequal, as women hide
financial information from their husbands as a reaction to their husband’s limited
financial responsibility.
Conclusion
The distinction between symmetric and asymmetric norms enables, we think, a more
detailed institutional analysis of norms that have unequal effects for different social
groups. Our case study has illustrated the relevance of this distinction for the case of
gender norms and gender inequality at the household level. We have suggested that
even symmetric norms in households may have unequal gender effects because they
are dominated by asymmetric norms that provide and protect socio-economic
advantages for men. The understanding of this inter-relatedness of symmetric and
asymmetric norms may help to bring back more explicitly Veblen’s concern with
patriarchy in today’s institutional analysis by reminding ourselves that institutions of
gender equality in one sphere of life will not necessarily be able to compensate for
asymmetric institutions in other spheres of life. Our case study has shown that the
seemingly gender equal norms of financial independence and sharing contributions
to the household budget will not help to support gender equality in a context in
which laws and customs are discriminating against women. An implication of this is
that policies to support gender equality should not focus on one policy area only, such
as income (for example through education and credit programs), but on the wider
institutional context of family law, property rights, and the non-material sources of
masculine status.
A second implication of our study concerns the analysis of the household in
economics. Today, the most advanced theory is the household bargaining approach
(Agarwal 1997; Kabeer 2001). This approach does take institutions into account,
either as constraints on bargaining power, or as strengthening the fallback position
(Iversen, Rosenbluth, and Soskice 2005; see also Doss 2003 for an application to
Ghana). Moreover, household bargaining theory also allows for gender norms as
objects to be bargained over, for example the distribution of unpaid tasks. While this
theory entails an important improvement over the unitary approach to households of
the new home economics, the bargaining approach has its limitations. In particular,
as has been argued by Janet Seiz (1995; 1999), it is not very good at disentangling the
interaction between different institutions. This is precisely why a more detailed
analysis of gender norms could complement a bargaining approach to the household.
Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions
923
Whereas in the bargaining approach increased income, savings, and assets are
regarded as improving women’s bargaining position, our case study has shown that
this is not necessarily the case. Rather, they may crowd out men’s contribution
without affecting men’s status. So, what is regarded as bargaining power is understood
in a gender-institutional approach as male free riding on a symmetric economic norm,
in an asymmetric institutional context. Moreover, in the bargaining approach, two
parties are assumed to bargain in order to further their respective interests, unless
one’s fallback position provides a better outcome. Our case study shows that the
interests of a third party – the children – matter too. Whereas for men, having
children is sufficient to confirm their masculinity, while the actual care for their
children is left to the mother, or another wife, women are not only concerned with
the social status of motherhood – which is considerable – but also with their
children’s wellbeing and education in their role as direct care givers. This leads some
women to accept lower individual wellbeing by remaining in the household than what
they actually could achieve without their husband.
10
So, an improvement in women’s
fallback position will not necessarily support their wellbeing in the context of
patriarchal child custody and patrilocal marriage.
In conclusion, our analysis suggests, first, that a distinction between
symmetric and asymmetric norms is important for the study of inequality. Second, we
have argued that the inequalities arising from asymmetric norms will tend to make the
effects of symmetric norms unequal as well, due to the inter-relatedness of
institutions, so that asymmetric norms tend to dominate symmetric norms.
Notes
1. Feminists working in the tradition of institutional economics would certainly agree that Veblen was
concerned with women’s disadvantaged position. Dugger (1994, 3) even states that “Thorstein Veblen
was a feminist of the first order.” But his genuine concern with patriarchy does not necessarily make
him immune from the gender-biased language of science in his days, for example in his definition of
an institution as “settled habits of thought common to the generality of men” (Veblen [1919] 1961,
239). Waller (1995) therefore, cautions institutional economists not to employ Veblen’s insights
uncritically, but to subject them to careful scrutiny for certain cultural biases of his time and place.
2. Martin (2004) used the whole list of twelve criteria to argue that gender is an institution, without
explicitly distinguishing between symmetric and asymmetric characteristics. For our purposes in this
paper on gender norms in households, we find it important to emphasize that it is particularly the
asymmetric dimensions that turn gender into an institution that differentiates women’s social and
economic position in a hierarchical way from men.
3. It is unclear to what extent the fact that the one of us who collected the data is a Yoruba woman
herself, has influenced the collection of income data positively (through an understanding of and
respect for the cultural norm) or negatively (being regarded as an insider to whom income
information should not be disclosed).
4. The monthly income categories refer to 2001 price levels and read as follows: very low = 8,900 Naira;
low = 9,000-12,500 Naira; medium = 12,600-22,800 Naira; reasonable = above 23,000 Naira. In
December 2001, the exchange rate was 132.41 Naira for a dollar.
5. Chi square = 15.16 (3 df), p < 0.01.
6. The notion of “partner” refers to husband and wife. In the case of polygamy, each wife has her own
household, of which the husband makes part, belonging to more than one household.
924
Irene van Staveren and Olasunbo Odebode
7. Non-pooling refers to separate control over individual incomes and expenditure budgets for men and
women in the household (no joint pot or accounts).
8. In Gammage’s (1997) comparative study, a higher percentage (34%) of Yoruba women appeared to be
in a polygamous marriage.
9. The remaining women (74, which is 39.8%) said they found somebody else (such as their mother,
sister, or friends) to care for their children.
10. In our case study it is not likely that women’s life-time self-interest is served by staying, for example
through an expectation of (financial) support in old age by her children. To the contrary, Yoruba
mothers have a rather low expectation of elderly care by their children because of the strong
patrilineal claims that fathers have on their children.
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