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Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion und ihre Folgen
Abstract
Die Einführung der Einheitswährung Euro wird allgemein als „Jahrhundertprojekt“ apostrophiert. Sie -widerlegt zum ersten Mal
in der Geschichte das Prinzip „Ein Land - eine Währung“ . Mit der Inkraftsetzung der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU)
kamen unabhängige Staaten der Europäischen Union (EU) überein, ihre eigene Währung zugunsten einer gemeinsamen aufzugeben.
Das neue Prinzip lautet nun „Ein Markt — eine Währung“ . Damit ist gemeint, daß es eine logische Konsequenz der ökonomischen
Integration ist, daß ein Binnenmarkt nur mit einer Einheitswährung funktionieren kann. Vorbild dabei sind stets die USA, deren
„Binnenmarkt“ ja gerade dadurch gut zu funktionieren scheint
... In order to ensure the primary aim of price stability, fiscal policy (for which member states are still formally responsible) is incorporated into the framework of a comprehensive co-ordination process. Such a mechanism is provided by the Growth and Stability Pact, which includes a multi-level supervision and co-ordination process (Breuss, 2000). As part of this process, EU members have to produce annual stabilisation programmes (participants of EMU) or convergence programmes (those EU countries that are not yet participants of EMU), in which they commit themselves to balance their budgets in the medium term. ...
EU membership implied for Austria in the first place considerable adjustments in the area of economic policy and also of the private sector. In many policy areas the government had to cede competence to the Community. Austria as the fourth-richest EU member state, is a net payer to the EU budget. The participation in the Single Market increased competitive pressure and brought liberalisation in areas which were protected before. This process is still going on. An overall economic evaluation indicates that EU membership produced welfare effects – mainly for consumers – of about 2 percent of GDP. Since 1995, the full integration of Austria in the Single Market and in the early stage of EMU resulted in an cumulative increase of real GDP of 3 percentage points (or of about ½ percent per year).
Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy-makers and among the latter. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply-side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand-side shocks. More generally, cooperation among fiscal policy-makers in the EMU is nearly always superior to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, yielding a strong case for the coordination of fiscal policies.
The EMU sets new standards for public finance. In particular, the Stability and Growth Pact aims at a budget ``close-to-balance or in surplus''. Austria is lagging behind in this respect. First, this paper discusses the reasons for that. Then, two scenarios of budget consolidation are analyzed with the Wifo macroeconomic model. In the case of the crash-scenario, which balances the budget already in 2002, the pure Keynesian solution would result in a decline of real GDP of 1% after six years. The precautionary consolidation scenario (balanced budget in ten years) would result in a real GDP loss of only 1/2%. With supply-side effects (incentives for investment due to privatization and UMTS licences sales or credibility effects), real GDP declines only by 1/3% in both scenario. Taking a consolidated view of the tax reform 2000 and the budget consolidation, on balance, the overall effects are rather positive than negative.
Overall, the ECB managed monetary policy quite satisfactorily in the first phase of EMU. Nevertheless, this paper asks whether monetary policy could not have been improved. In the last three years, Euroland was confronted with the first external shock. Oil prices increased considerably, leading to an increase of headline inflation of over one percentage point in 2000/2001. With a specific Taylor rule one can very well understand, how the ECB sets interest rates, but it turns out that monetary policy based on the estimated Taylor reaction function was rather backward than forward-looking. While it reacted with a lag to the actions of the US Fed, it was overly cautious by targeting total HICP inflation. Here it is strongly argued and also demonstrated with model simulations that a monetary policy oriented towards "core" inflation would have resulted in a much better economic performance. The business cycle downturn could have been mitigated with no additional inflation risks.
Die Europäische Währungsunion hat die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen in Europa entscheidend verändert. Davon sind die einzelnen wirtschaftspolitischen Bereiche ganz unterschiedlich betroffen. Wie sehen für die Wirtschaftspolitik die Erfahrungen nach dem ersten Jahr mit dem Euro aus? Und welche Änderungen werden sich in der Zukunft ergeben? --
The potential impact of the new institutional framework for EMU financial policymaking might have on the ability of European policymakers to ensure financial stability and manage financial crises within is the subject of this study. It focuses, in particular, on the allocation of lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) and banking-supervision responsabilities among the European Cnetral Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs), national supervisors, and national treasuries of the eleven member countries.
This paper develops a theory of central bank accountability. Two aspects of accountability are considered. The first one is transparency of actual monetary policy, the second aspect is the question of who bears final responsibility for monetary policy. Monetary policy is transparent if there is little uncertainty about the central bankers preferences. Transparency enhances the central bank's accountability. Another way to make the central bank accountable is to shift final responsibility for monetary policy in the direction of the government. This can be achieved by making the cost of overriding the central bank lower. The paper shows that accountability through transparency leads to a lower expected rate of inflation and less stabilization of supply shocks. Accountability through shifting final responsibility in the direction of the government leads to higher inflationary expectations and more stabilization of supply shocks.
Currency unions Their dramatic effect on international trade
A gravity model is used to assess the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on international trade. The panel data, bilateral observations for five years during 1970–90 covering 186 countries, includes 300+ observations in which both countries use the same currency. I find a large positive effect of a currency union on international trade, and a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility, even after controlling for a host of features, including the endogenous nature of the exchange rate regime. These effects, statistically significant, imply that two countries sharing the same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies. Currency unions like the European EMU may thus lead to a large increase in international trade, with all that that entails.
— Andrew Rose
This paper demonstrates that increased international monetary cooperation may actually be counterproductive. The potential problem is that cooperation between central banks may exacerbate the credibility problem of central banks vis-à-vis the private sector. Coordinated monetary expansion yields a better output/inflation trade-off than unilateral expansion because it does not induce exchange rate depreciation. Wage setters realize that the incentives to inflate are greater in a cooperative regime, and thus time-consistent nominal wage rates are higher. Cooperation does improve responses to disturbances. Thus, a cooperative regime which contains institutional constraints on systematic inflation is definitely superior.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetized Debt? —The paper examines the interrelationship
between fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country monetary union. The worst scenario occurs when an independent central
bank sets the nominal interest rate and responds to rising government debt/GDP ratios by monetization. The result is high
inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and a large public sector. Government debt and inflation are contained if the governments
bear sole responsibility for solvency, but the public sector remains excessively large. The best scenario occurs if the central
bank removes the incentive for the governments to engineer surprise inflation by credible inflation targeting.
This paper deals with the existence and identification of are used for individual countries in order to detect changes in the mean growth rate of industrial production. A Markov switching vector autoregression model is then used to identify a common cycle in Europe. Three important results are obtained: we find a common unobserved component governing European business cycle dynamics, suggesting the existence of a common business cycle; we propose a dating of the business cycle, both for an index of industrial protection and GDP, and both chronologies appear to be consistent; and finally we retrieve an important set of stylized facts and relate these with those reported for the US. Finally two further issues are investigated: first, the contribution of the European business cycle to the individual country cycles; and second, we undertake an impulse response analysis to investigate the response of each individual country to European expansions and recessions.
The paper decomposes GDP both in terms of level per capita and growth rate, so as to identify the sources of income differences and of economic growth for all EU27 member states. This accounting approach has multiple advantages, although a number of substantial caveats should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. In particular, the detailed accounting approach helps distinguish exogenous from policy-influenced growth drivers. The combination of lower per-hour productivity and lower labour utilisation is the cause of relatively low per capita GDP in euro area and EU15 countries, while weak productivity remains the main concern in the new member states. GDP growth rate has been broken down into 12 items, including an indicator of labour quality, based upon the composition of employment by educational attainment.
This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of end-2003, and comparable indices for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s. The results confirm strong improvements in both economic and political CBA over the past couple of decades, although more progress is needed to boost political autonomy of the central banks in emerging market and developing countries. Our analysis confirms that greater CBA has on average helped to maintain low inflation levels. The paper identifies four broad principles of CBA that have been shared by the majority of countries. Significant differences exist in the area of banking supervision where many central banks have retained a key role. Finally, we discuss the sequencing of reforms to separate the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 263–296. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.25; published online 23 September 2008
In this paper we study the theory of monetary policy when the monetary authority faces asymmetries in the countries constituting the monetary union. We identify two asymmetries (shocks and transmission) in the context of a two country model. A general finding is that as the degree of asymmetries increases, the effectiveness of stabilization of output and unemployment is reduced. As a result, when asymmetries increase, the stabilization effort of the central bank declines for given preferences about stabilisation. We also find that the central bank can improve the efficiency of its monetary policies when asymmetries in the transmission exist, by using national information in the setting of optimal policies. The declared strategy of the ECB conflicts with this prescription. In practice the ECB is likely to follow this prescription, however.
The paper discusses several issues related to how monetary policy should be conducted in an era of price stability. Low inflation (with base drift in the price level) and price-level stability (wihtout such base drift) are compared, and a suitable loss function (corresponding to flexible inflation targeting) is discussed, including the index and level for the inflation target. Three ways of maintaining price stability are examined, namely (1) a commitment to a simple instrument rule, (2) "forecast targeting" and (3) monetary targeting. Both (1) and (3) are found to be inferior to forecast targeting. The benefits of credibility (private inflation expectations coinciding with the inflation target) are discussed. Credibility improves the tradeoff between inflation variability, output gap variability and instrument variability and makes it easier for the central bank to meet its inflation target. The threat of inflation and a liquidity trap are examined. Transparent inflation targeting and a contingency plan with emergency measures, including a coordinated fiscal and monetary expansion, are likely to avoid a liquidity trap, but also contribute to escaping from one if already trapped.
Zum einen für die Wirtschaftspolitiker (die sich auf den neuen kooperativen Stil umstellen müssen), zum anderen für die Sozialpartner, die ihre Lohnpolitik ebenfalls den Gegebenheiten von Euroland anpassen müssen
- Sind Bleibt
- Anpassungs-Und Lernkosten
bleibt, sind Anpassungs-und Lernkosten. Zum einen für die Wirtschaftspolitiker (die sich auf
den neuen kooperativen Stil umstellen müssen), zum anderen für die Sozialpartner, die ihre
Lohnpolitik ebenfalls den Gegebenheiten von Euroland anpassen müssen.
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