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The Cognitive Psychology of Belief in the Supernatural
... Looking at TMT through the conceptual lens of this paper, the source of the anxiety triggered by mortality salience could be identified in entropy, as death by definition increases both real (physical) entropy and perceived (psychological) unpredictability regarding the posthumous 'fate' of the system. Afterlife beliefs can be considered an adaptation, providing selective advantages to individuals and/or groups (for example the belief in the survival of the mind implies the existence of immortal supernatural agents that make us behave in a socially responsible manner just by 'observing' our actions (Bering, 2006), or can be rather seen as an evolutionary by-product (of death anxiety, like TMT clams, of simulation constraints -the inability of the mind to imagine its' non-existence (Bering, 2002) or of the above-mentioned ToMM). Finally, afterlife beliefs can also be regarded as memes, the cultural equivalent of genes, promoting their own continuance, not necessarily to the benefit of the individual or group hosting it (Dawkins, 1976;Stewart-Williams, 2018). ...
Complexity is a paradigm whose relevance is currently expanding beyond the domain of ‘hard’ sciences. Humanities and social sciences could greatly benefit from using it as an antidote to reductionism, and religious studies in particular is a field in great need of defragmentation and a broader theoretical perspective. This paper’s ambitious aim is to propose such a perspective while frequently crossing interdisciplinary borders and, by drawing inspiration from and criticizing the work of evolutionary anthropologist Richard Sosis, to offer an integrative analytical framework for the study of religions as allopoietic complex adaptive systems. Firstly, this paper describes the core features of complex systems (non-linear, autopoietic/allopoietic, entropy reducing, open, adaptive, emergent). Secondly, it identifies religions as abstract complex systems and their basic components as signal/noise distinctions of informational inputs from the environment. More importantly, it posits that they fulfill an entropy reducing function in psychic systems by the emergence of meaning. Lastly, it builds a model of religious systems and identifies six building blocks: rituals, myths, taboos, supernatural agents, authority and afterlife beliefs, following Luhmann in claiming that individuals are not part of the system, but of the environment. Consequently, the cooperative behavior of individuals to form social structures cannot constitute the ultimate output of the system, but only a behavioral effect of the actual one, meaning.
... "Człowiek jest z natury zwierzęciem religijnym" -tak Spilka, Hill i Hood (2009) konstatują syntetyczne wyjaśnienie genezy ludzkich wierzeń (por. Bering, 2006). Sugerują przy tym immanentny charakter religijności jako danej człowiekowi konstytucjonalnie (por. ...
Diversity, which is characteristic feature of Middle Asia, attracts attention of tourists, adventures’seekers, scientists and others. It is so fascinating to compare the three countries – such dissimilar as Nepal, Tibet and Bhutan. The article presents everyday and spiritual life of the people and especially women from these countries, on the religious – Hindu and Buddhist – background.
... There are dozens of different sects for each of the major religions (World Fact Book, 2013); and religious organizations have an enormous influence on the world's political climate (Chomsky, 2007). At the core of most religious systems is a belief in the supernatural (Barrett, 2000;Bering, 2006). Supernatural entities are often (but not always) conceptualized in anthropomorphic terms (e.g., God, the loving father; Barrett and Keil, 1996;Guthrie, 1980) and have the ability to violate one or many natural laws (e.g., God can be in many places at one time; Barrett, 2000;Boyer, 2005). ...
Converging lines of evidence suggest that belief in divine intervention is associated with pro- social/moral behavior. The present study tests the hypothesis that one's belief in divine intervention will predict willingness to commit a subset of moral violations that emphasize group commitment. Via an internet survey, participants (N=201) responded
to the Moral Foundations of Sacredness Questionnaire (assessing Individualistic and Binding sacred values) and a modified God Intervention Scale (Divine Intervention Scale). Separate correlation analyses for religious, agnostic, and atheist individuals showed significant positive correlations among three of the five moral foundation scales (loyalty,
authority, and purity) and the measure of divine intervention for the religious group only. In addition, a comparison of the three groups revealed significant differences on three moral foundation sub-scales that comprise the binding foundation measure. Results support the notion that belief in an intervening Divinity is associated with reduced likelihood to commit moral violations, especially violations in the domains of loyalty, authority, and purity.
... There is a wide-ranging and influential body of research on the development of reasoning in natural domains (Carey, 2009;Gopnik & Schulz, 2007;Kuhn, 1989) and the development of causal explanatory reasoning in particular (Crowley & Siegler, 1999;Gopnik & Wellman, 2012;Keil, 2006;Keil & Wilson, 2000;Legare, Gelman & Wellman, 2010;Legare, Wellman & Gelman, 2009;Legare & Lombrozo, 2014), yet reasoning about supernatural or divine powers has not been studied as extensively or as systematically. Research on this topic is certainly being pursued (e.g., Barrett, 2000;Barrett, Richert & Driesenga, 2001;Bering, 2006;Lane, Wellman & Evans, 2010;Legare & Souza, 2012;McCauley, 2000;Rosengren, Johnson & Harris, 2000;Shtulman & Lindeman, 2016;Watson-Jones, Busch, Harris & Legare, 2017;Woolley, 2000), but investigators have rarely asked whether and how natural thinking and supernatural thinking are reconciled and integrated in the minds of those who practice both. The dearth of research on this topic is likely due to several factors, including the view that supernatural thinking is not amenable to empirical investigation (Rosengren et al., 2000) and the practice of studying cognitive development divorced from the cultural contexts in which it occurs (Callanan, 2006;Cole, 2005;Legare & Harris, 2016). ...
Humans use natural and supernatural explanations for phenomena such as illness, death, and human origins. These explanations are available not just to different individuals within a society, but to the same individual, coexisting within a single mind. This chapter proposes that understanding the coexistence of qualitatively different explanations is fundamentally a cognitive-developmental endeavor, speaking to general questions of knowledge acquisition, socialization, and the interaction of cognition and culture. The chapter first reviews research demonstrating that coexistence of natural and supernatural explanations is not a short-lived, transitional phenomenon that wanes in the course of development, but is instead evident (and widespread) among adults. It then speculates on the psychological origins of coexistence and discusses implications for metacognition. Finally, directions are proposed for future research to inform understanding of how individuals incorporate natural and supernatural explanations across content domains, development, and cultures.
... There are dozens of different sects for each of the major religions (World Fact Book, 2013); and religious organizations have an enormous influence on the world's political climate (Chomsky, 2007). At the core of most religious systems is a belief in the supernatural (Barrett, 2000;Bering, 2006). Supernatural entities are often (but not always) conceptualized in anthropomorphic terms (e.g., God, the loving father; Barrett and Keil, 1996;Guthrie, 1980) and have the ability to violate one or many natural laws (e.g., God can be in many places at one time; Barrett, 2000;Boyer, 2005). ...
... Bering identified three possibilities for humans' tendency towards religious belief: 1) it is simply a vestige of a time when human knowledge could not explain life and death, and religious belief filled the vacuum of knowledge; 2) it is strictly a product of cultural indoctrination; 3) it is an evolutionary product that humans are predisposed to developing. 7 If religious belief is a vestige of an earlier time, then it has outlived its usefulness now that science can more accurately describe life processes. If it is neither a vestige nor a product of indoctrination, then by Bering's logic, there would likely be a genetic predisposition, an evolutionary root to religious belief. ...
... The pleasure and annoyance of these entities was associated with reward and punishment by the mortals. These interactions between humans and supernatural agents, especially during spirit possession, are part of folk psychology all over the world (Spanos 1994;Bering 2006;Cohen 2008). In this lies the survival of the imagination of God and its family. ...
Earlier religious formations everywhere dynamically engaged in pursuit of knowledge. Of particular interest is direct experience of knowledge rather by learning through practice; former approximates gnosis and latter refers to logos. Study of transcendental experiences was an ambitious project of William James, the founder of modern psychology. The present paper makes it more explicit by looking into correlative thinking and paranormal experiences. Second, the advances in cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicate integration of gnosis and logos, and they perhaps access discrete cognitive processes analogous to Kahneman’s (American Psychologist 58:697–720, 2003) System I (intuition) and System 2 (reasoning). Third, gnosis, trance and intuition are correlated. Lastly, exceptional mental states have significance for psychological well-being.
... Simulation constraints give rise, on his account, to systematic " illusions " and " errors " (Bering 2006b, 454-5). Folk beliefs in supernatural agents are natural, according to Bering, but they are also " disarmingly irrational " (Bering 2006a, 145) and " fantastically illogical " (Bering 2011, 125). ...
In the Natural history of religion, Hume attempts to understand the origin of our folk belief in gods and spirits. These investigations are not, however, purely descriptive. Hume demonstrates that ontological commitment to supernatural agents depends on motivated reasoning and illusions of control. These beliefs cannot, then, be reflectively endorsed. This proposal must be taken seriously because it receives support from recent work on our psychological responses to uncertainty. It also compares quite favorably with its main competitors in the cognitive science of religion.
... "Człowiek jest z natury zwierzęciem religijnym" -tak Spilka, Hill i Hood (2009) konstatują syntetyczne wyjaśnienie genezy ludzkich wierzeń (por. Bering, 2006). Sugerują przy tym immanentny charakter religijności jako danej człowiekowi konstytucjonalnie (por. ...
Diversity, which is characteristic feature of Middle Asia, attracts attention of tourists, adventures’ seekers, scientists and others. It is so fascinating to compare the three countries – such dissimilar as Nepal, Tibet and Bhutan. The article presents everyday and spiritual life of the people and especially women from these countries, on the religious – Hindu and Buddhist - background.
... More direct support for this suggestion comes from recent cognitive studies on religion and human development. Some anthropologists and psychologists argue that religious ideas are based on natural psychological predispositions of the human mind, some of which (such as understanding goal-directedness and making mentalist attributions) may be hardwired by evolution (Atran, 2002; Barrett, 2001; Barrett & Keil, 1996; Bering, 2006a Bering, , 2006b Bloom, 2002; Bloom & Weisberg, 2007; Boyer, 1994 Boyer, , 2001 Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Hood, 2009; McKay & Dennett, 2009). However, even if modern people are naturally predisposed to having certain ideas about the supernatural entities, this does not necessarily mean that the people who have these ideas also believe that these supernatural entities really exist or that they will keep these ideas throughout their lives. ...
The widely spread view on magical beliefs in modern industrial cultures contends that magical beliefs are a bunch of curious phenomena that persist today as an unnecessary addition to a much more important set of rational beliefs. Contrary to this view, in this article, the view is presented, which suggests that the belief in magic is a fundamental property of the human mind. Individuals can consciously consider themselves to be completely rational people and deny that they believe in magic or God despite harboring a subconscious belief in the supernatural. Research also shows how engagement in magical thinking can enhance cognitive functioning, such as creative thinking, perception and memory. Moreover, this article suggests that certain forms of social compliance and obedience to authority historically evolved from magical practices of mind control and are still powered by the implicit belief in magic. Finally, the article outlines areas of life, such as education, religion, political influence, commerce, military and political terror, and entertainment, in which magical thinking and beliefs of modern people can find practical applications.
... that scientific ideologies may not offer adequate epistemic structures for these domains of life. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to postulate that, under conditions of acute stress in which issues surrounding the purpose and meaning of life are salient, invoking a religious ideology may be more comforting than invoking a scientific ideology. Bering (2006), for example, recounts the story of how, the day after his mother's death, upon hearing her wind chimes start to sound outside her window he (an avowed atheist) automatically thought: ''That's her! She's telling us not to worry!'' (p. 148). Indeed, these kinds of thoughts may occur even in non-believers because when bad things happen, i ...
... The premises are straightforward: the forces of evolution , and in particular the process of selection, are not exerted only on our bodies. As Jesse Bering (2006, p. 142) put it, " minds bear the thumbprint of evolution as well. " The mind of a given organism, just like its physiology, is genetically adapted to its ancestral environment. ...
For a long time, social and cognitive scientists followed their own course, not really wondering what their academic neighbors were working on. The origin of this mutual indifference has been well laid out by Dilthey's distinction between the Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences) built upon the discoveries of explanatory physical mechanisms, and the Geisteswissenschaften (cultural sciences) driven by the hermeneutic comprehension of sociohistorical phenomena. This division of scientific labor is still apparent with in the disciplinary organization of the academic world, with every subdiscipline struggling to reach one of the essential aims of science: the cumulative growth of knowledge. Incompatible paradigms thus tend to develop in parallel their own theories and evidence, judging other approaches or related fields as being a priori irrelevant. Most of the time, this theoretical and methodological incompatibility results from conflicting anthropological views, which tend to go from one extreme to the other: the human mind is either seen as a "blank slate", molded by the boundless force of contingent historical cultural systems in which it is immersed, or, on the contrary, as a set of universal, prewired abilities that allows it to make sense of its environment, mostly all by itself. Recently, new insights into this everlasting opposition have been given by some neurobiologists, philosophers and psychologists. To them, pitting nature against culture as two opposite forces between which human species are tossed back and forth, escaping from biology to be better enslaved by culture and conversely, is pointless. To them, nature and culture are not necessarily inversely proportional; on the contrary, the human mind is believed to be "prewired" for the cultural learning and knowledge acquisition that will eventually allow it to escape from a strict genetic determinism.
... Even in the time before science, people's belief in magic had been accompanied with the belief in physical causality (Boyer & Walker, 2000; Tambiah, 1990). That is why magical and religious concepts, to a large extent, are cross-culturally and historically invariant --the fact that makes some theorists assume that these concepts are evolutionary " hard-wired " into the human mind (Bering, 2006; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008). Answering the question of " why " does not, however, answer the question of how the belief in magic remains alive in the rational mind, rather than becoming a " hollow concept " , like the ether or phlogiston. ...
Since the time of Galileo (1564–1642), Western civilization has increasingly fallen under the spell of science. Despite this fact, anthropological and psychological research has shown that magical beliefs are present in both children and adults in modern industrial cultures. How can a belief in magic coexist with a belief in science in the mind of a rational, educated adult? A possible explanation is that magical beliefs survive in the rational mind by going into the subconscious. The following hypothesis is considered in the series of studies presented in this paper: in modern industrial cultures, magical beliefs appear in preschool children as a legitimate, conscious form of belief that coexists with children’s belief in physical causality and is supported by social environment. In older children and adults, under the pressure of scientific and religious education, magical beliefs descend into the domain of the subconscious. Experiments examining this hypothesis will be reviewed; theoretical and practical implications of the existence of subconscious magical beliefs in modern rational adults will be analyzed.
... Toward a cognitive science of religion Our work is hardly the only research to address the question of religion's prevalence, roots, and function. Recent work in psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology, and archaeology has been addressing such questions in building a new cognitive science of religion (e.g., Barrett, 2000; Bering, 2006; Boyer, 2001; McNamara, 2006; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003). One of the core themes of this research is that religious beliefs are a natural product of the way human minds and brains work. ...
Religious belief has been shown to offer substantial benefits to its adherents, including improved well-being and health. We suggest that these benefits might be explained, at least in part, from a "motivated meaning-making" perspective. This model holds that people are motivated to create and sustain meaning (i.e., a sense of coherency between beliefs, goals, and perceptions of the environment, which provides individuals with the feeling that the world is an orderly place), and that religious beliefs buffer the distress associated with disruptions to meaning, thus leading to decreases in distress. We further propose that religion’s palliative attributes can be measured at the level of the brain, specifically in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which produces a "distress signal" upon the detection of errors, conflict, and expectancy violation. Using a social neuroscience paradigm, we investigate four main predictions that arise from this model: (1) religion should be associated with activation in the ACC; (2) religion should decrease activation in the ACC; (3) this attenuation of ACC activity should be related to religion’s ability to buffer bodily states of distress, and not to decreases in motivation, attention, or control; (4) religion should have these effects because it provides meaning and thus buffers people from uncertainty. All predictions were supported, thus providing evidence, at the neural level, for the motivated meaning-making model's account of the salutary properties of religion.
... Excessive growth produced a cognitive capacity greater than what was necessary to survive, and this over capacity kept itself busy by imagining things beyond what we can perceive with our senses. Cognitive scientists see this as the origin of our capacity to believe in a supernatural force, such as God ( Boyer 2002, Oró 2004, Bering 2006). For our purposes, this capacity to imagine alternative responses to uncertainty is the generator of ideas. ...
This paper examines the relationship between ideas and power. We argue that social change is caused by a combination of ideas, which are inspirational, and power, which is transformative. We illustrate the argument by examining the emergence of a sustainability policy paradigm.
... Also contested are the cause and legitimacy of religious belief and experience. In purely naturalistic and quite derogatory terms, Dawkins (2003) explains away religions as ''cognitive viruses'' or ''memes'' that spread among humans, even though religions are irrational and harmful (also see Bering 2006). On the other side, Francis Collins, the director of the Human Genome Project, argues that evolution and theism are compatible and that naturalistic explanations of religion and morality are wanting (Collins 2006). ...
Whether science can reach conclusions with substantial worldview import, such as whether supernatural beings exist or the
universe is purposeful, is a significant but unsettled aspect of science. For instance, various scientists, philosophers,
and educators have explored the implications of science for a theistic worldview, with opinions spanning the spectrum from
positive to neutral to negative. To delineate a mainstream perspective on science, seven key characterizations or “pillars”
of science are adopted from position papers from the world’s largest scientific organization, the American Association for
the Advancement of Science. Based on those pillars and an examination of scientific method, I argue that the presuppositions
and reasoning of science can and should be worldview independent, but empirical and public evidence from the sciences and
humanities can support conclusions that are worldview distinctive. I also critique several problematic perspectives: asserting
that science can say nothing about worldviews and the opposite extreme of insisting that science decisively supports one particular
worldview; weakening science so severely that it lacks truth claims; and burdening science with unnecessary presuppositions.
Worldview-distinctive conclusions based on empirical evidence are suitable for individual convictions and public discussions,
but not for institutional endorsements and scientific literacy requirements.
... Also contested are the cause and legitimacy of religious belief and experience. In purely naturalistic and quite derogatory terms, Dawkins (2003) explains away religions as ''cognitive viruses'' or ''memes'' that spread among humans, even though religions are irrational and harmful (also see Bering 2006). On the other side, Francis Collins, the director of the Human Genome Project, argues that evolution and theism are compatible and that naturalistic explanations of religion and morality are wanting (Collins 2006). ...
This special issue of Science & Education deals with the theme of ‘Science, Worldviews and Education’. The theme is of particular importance at the present time as
many national and provincial education authorities are requiring that students learn about the Nature of Science (NOS) as
well as learning science content knowledge and process skills. NOS topics are being written into national and provincial curricula.
Such NOS matters give rise to questions about science and worldviews: What is a worldview? Does science have a worldview?
Are there specific ontological, epistemological and ethical prerequisites for the conduct of science? Does science lack a
worldview but nevertheless have implications for worldviews? How can scientific worldviews be reconciled with seemingly discordant
religious and cultural worldviews? In addition to this major curricular impetus for refining understanding of science and
worldviews, there are also pressing cultural and social forces that give prominence to questions about science, worldviews
and education. There is something of an avalanche of popular literature on the subject that teachers and students are variously
engaged by. Additionally the modernisation and science-based industrialisation of huge non-Western populations whose traditional
religions and beliefs are different from those that have been associated with orthodox science, make very pressing the questions
of whether, and how, science is committed to particular worldviews. Hugh Gauch Jr. provides a long and extensive lead essay
in the volume, and 12 philosophers, educators, scientists and theologians having read his paper, then engage with the theme.
Hopefully the special issue will contribute to a more informed understanding of the relationship between science, worldviews
and education, and provide assistance to teachers who are routinely engaged with the subject.
... The development of organized, explanatory systems of knowledge is an integral part of human cognition and a fundamental developmental task. Although a well-established, wide-ranging, and influential body of research exists on the development of reasoning in natural domains (Carey, 2009; Gopnik & Schulz, 2007; Keil, 1992; Kuhn, 1989; Wellman & Gelman, 1992) and on the development of causal explanatory reasoning in particular (Chi, DeLeeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; Crowley & Siegler, 1999; Frazier, Gelman, & Wellman, 2009; Gopnik, 2000; Keil, 2006; COEXISTENCE OF NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL EXPLANATIONS 9 Keil & Wilson, 2000; Legare, in press; Legare, Gelman, & Wellman, 2010; Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009; Lombrozo, 2006; Wellman, Hickling, & Schult, 1997; Wellman, in press) there has been less sustained and systematic research on the development of thinking about supernatural or divine powers (but, see recent findings by Barrett, 2000; Barrett, Richert & Driesenga, 2001; Bering, 2006; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2010; McCauley, 2000; Rosengren, Johnson, & Harris, 2000; Woolley, 2000). In particular, investigators have rarely asked whether, and more importantly, how these different forms of thinking coexist in the minds of children and adults. ...
Although often conceptualized in contradictory terms, the common assumption that natural and supernatural explanations are incompatible is psychologically inaccurate. Instead, there is considerable evidence that the same individuals use both natural and supernatural explanations to interpret the very same events and that there are multiple ways in which both kinds of explanations coexist in individual minds. Converging developmental research from diverse cultural contexts in 3 areas of biological thought (i.e., the origin of species, illness, and death) is reviewed to support this claim. Contrary to traditional accounts of cognitive development, new evidence indicates that supernatural explanations often increase rather than decrease with age and supports the proposal that reasoning about supernatural phenomena is an integral and enduring aspect of human cognition.
... To understand the appeal of these theories, it helps first to understand the sorts of questions they claim to answer. Evolutionary psychologists, and cognitive scientists in general, tend to define religion as professed belief in supernatural beings (Atran 2006;Bering 2006;Pinker 2006;Tremlin 2006;Bulbulia 2007). The falsity of this belief is usually taken for granted, so that the starting point of inquiry is some version of the question, "Why do so many people hold irrational beliefs in supernatural beings"? 1 The various answers that evolutionary psychologists give to this question sometimes include psychological and social functions (e.g. ...
Cognitive science of the last half-century has been dominated by the computational theory of mind and its picture of thought
as information processing. Taking this picture for granted, the most prominent evolutionary theories of religion of the last
fifteen years have sought to understand human religiosity as the product or by-product of universal information processing
mechanisms that were adaptive in our ancestral environment. The rigidity of such explanations is at odds with the highly context-sensitive
nature of historical studies of religion, and thus contributes to the apparent tug-of-war between scientific and humanistic
perspectives. This essay argues that this antagonism stems in part from a deep flaw of computational theory, namely its notion
of information as pre-given and context-free. In contrast, non-computational theories that picture mind as an adaptive, interactive
process in which information is jointly constructed by organism and environment offer an alternative approach to an evolutionary
understanding of human religiosity, one that is compatible with historical studies and amenable to a wide range of inquiries,
including some limited kinds of theological inquiry.
This chapter examines the constructs that underlie prejudicial beliefs, including how individuals come to learn to hold such views, group-level predictors, and individual-level psychological attributes that have been shown to correlate with those predictors and ultimately, prejudice. First, indoctrination and groupthink are explored as ways that individuals come to adopt such views, most commonly through limiting their reasoning to binary thought processes. Then research on predictors such as religious extremism, right wing political orientation, and authoritarianism is reviewed which may explain ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, most commonly towards those of other races, ethnicities, cultures, religions, or sexual orientation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of individual-level psychological attributes associated with the group-level predictors and ultimately with a tendency to hold discriminatory views. These include the dichotomy between analytic and intuitive cognitive styles, directional motives driven by confirmation bias, and cognitive ability as defined by intelligence level and cognitive flexibility. By examining the reasons that people may choose to adopt prejudicial views, we may be able to develop methods to address such occurrences and limit the spread of discrimination.
Keywords: prejudice, indoctrination, religious belief, right-wing political orientation, authoritarianism, cognition
Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences.
Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences.
Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences.
Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences.
Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences.
Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences.
Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences.
Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences.
Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences.
After a broad review of relevant fields of paranormal research, we analyzed how the ghost types and distribution patterns of haunted sites in Toyama have changed during the last 100 years. The targets consisted of paranormal sightings reported in 1) a newspaper series published in the 1910s and 2) information gathered in 2018 from online bulletin boards and ghost portal sites. The 114 sites were each georeferenced and their relative distribution trends were visualized by kernel density estimation and raster calculation (search radius, 8 km; output cell size, 300 m). The most noticeable difference was the withdrawal from haunted sites in urban areas. Text analyses also revealed that both the diversity of paranormal beings and frequency of interactions with them was reduced in the 2018 materials.
[This article won The Association of Japanese Geographers Award in 2021]
This article claims that the study of religion has overlooked a feature of the human mind that may yet help to explain certain aspects of religion. Awareness, it is here argued, can vary along a dimension that is characterized by the density of associations and other inputs that accompany it. The mechanism behind this is concentration, including the stronger form of concentration here called absorption. Absorption has cognitive effects, and is at least in part responsible for the human tendency to believe in a different, " higher, " reality. Various other features usually associated with religion— including ritual behavior and asceticism—also make sense in the light of this observation.
Religious people seem to believe things that range from the somewhat peculiar to the utterly bizarre. Or do they? According to a new paper by Neil Van Leeuwen, religious “credence” is nothing like mundane factual belief. It has, he claims, more in common with fictional imaginings. Religious folk do not really “believe”—in the ordinary sense of the word—what they profess to believe. Like fictional imaginings, but unlike factual beliefs, religious credences are activated only within specific settings. We argue that Van Leeuwen’s thesis contradicts a wealth of data on religiously motivated behavior. By and large, the faithful genuinely believe what they profess to believe. Although many religions openly embrace a sense of mystery, in general this does not prevent the attribution of beliefs to religious people. Many of the features of religious belief that Van Leeuwen alludes to, like invulnerability to refutation and incoherence, are characteristic of irrational beliefs in general and actually betray their being held as factual. We conclude with some remarks about the common failure of secular people to face the fact that some religious people really do believe wildly implausible things. Such incredulity, as evinced by Van Leeuwen and others, could be termed “disbelief in belief.”
Pour les sociologues, l’explication de l’action ne peut reposer sur la nature première de l’esprit (les mécanismes universels de détection et de traitement de l’information dont les sciences cognitives prétendent rendre compte) mais sur sa nature seconde (les raisons d’agir plus ou moins collectives qui le meublent). Même les paradigmes sociologiques les plus opposés s’accordent pour traiter le social et le culturel comme le résultat d’un patient travail de dénaturalisation qui creuse un fossé incompressible entre l’ordre réducteur des causes naturelles et l’ordre respectable, de facture mentale ou sociale, des raisons, entre les instincts de base de l’organisme et la logique de haut-niveau des significations partagées et des normes culturelles Or, l’objectif du naturalisme est précisément le dépassement de la rupture interne entre l’humain et l’animal, entre l’histoire culturelle et l’histoire biologique. Il vise à harmoniser, dans le sens de « rendre compatible », les hypothèses et les résultats des sciences sociales avec ceux des sciences naturelles, entreprise qui incite la sociologie à expliciter et à réviser les modèles cognitifs et anthropologiques auxquels elle fait implicitement appel. Un des apports potentiels des sciences cognitives et, plus généralement, du naturalisme est donc d’améliorer, de remplacer ou de falsifier, au sens poppérien du terme, les modèles cognitifs et les conceptions anthropologiques sur lesquels se basent les sciences de la société.
This dissertation approaches metaphysical and metaethical questions concerning the nature of the human person, the existence and nature of God, and the nature of moral judgment through contemporary neuroscience, cognitive science, scientific moral psychology, and analytic philosophy of mind. Contrary to proposals that seek a harmonious integration of "religion and science" this dissertation argues that contemporary bio-psychological sciences give one ample reason to be skeptical of many of the metaphysical and metaethical claims embedded in religious traditions like Christianity and Buddhism. The first three chapters of the dissertation focus on the metaphysical issue of mind-body dualism while the fourth chapter addresses closely related metaethical issues regarding the nature and origin of moral judgment.
Chapter One calls into question the truth of dualism and defends a version of psychoneural identity theory as the most adequate solution to the mind-body problem. If dualism is not true, why is it so ubiquitous across cultures? Drawing on research in both neuroscience and cognitive science, Chapter Two offers a naturalistic, bio-psychological explanation of dualism. Chapter Three applies the conclusions of the first two chapters to religious and theological concerns. The link between mind-body dualism and theism is highlighted, and it is argued that the collapse of mind-body dualism renders many versions of theism problematic. Philip Clayton's attempt to integrate an emergentist doctrine of the human person with a dualist doctrine of God is critiqued, as is B. Alan Wallace's more experiential defense of religious dualism from a Buddhist perspective. Along with a commitment to dualism, many religious traditions understand moral judgment as something objectively grounded in divine commands and/or reason. Chapter Four argues that research in scientific moral psychology implicating the emotions in moral judgment raises significant questions for theological and reason based accounts of moral judgment.
Both the sociology and the cognitive science of religion seek to explain the acquisition of religious beliefs. In this article, I offer an account of the acquisition and distribution of religious beliefs using the findings of both fields. In the process, I seek to illustrate the potential of interdisciplinary dialogue for improving our understanding of religion and its absence. More specifically, I present a prima facie case—based on existing work in the social and cognitive sciences, exploratory online surveys, and participant observation—that witnessing actions attesting to religious claims is one of the most crucial variables determining whether or not an individual will explicitly believe such claims. Further, I argue that the connection between action and belief can help produce an improved account of secularization and non-theism, defined here as the lack of explicit belief in the existence of non-physical agents.
Bowlby proposed that “the psychological problem of ensuring persistent co-operative behaviour” in groups was solved by emotional valuation of the group leader, group policy, or the group itself derived from the infant-mother attachment relationship. He described how an emotionally valued relationship with a group leader, which is rooted in early attachments, can motivate an individual to cooperate for the benefit of the group. Bowlby’s insights, studies of attachment relationships with a deity, and the application of multilevel and group selection to cooperation in religious groups together show how attachment to a deity (supernatural agent) could be a mechanism for intragroup cooperation, including the within-group cooperation required for group selection. As such, it links the attachment system, a pillar of human relationships and personality, to cooperation in groups. We also consider how the attachment system could be a basis for intragroup cooperation generally and compare this possibility to two other theories about human social cooperation, the “tribal social instincts” hypothesis and the evolution of “shared intentionality.” (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The biological and cognitive approach to religion has matured somewhat and reveals interesting results. Nevertheless, some questions arise about its foundation and development. The essay offers a review of current research in the cognitive field, focusing on its conclusions, the internal discussions, and the problems that need more study or correction. Emphasis is placed on a more intricate account of the factors involved in religious experience, discussing the proper use of the discoveries of biocognitive research and the limits that should be placed on said conclusions.
I begin by arguing that our model of religion is often based on Christianity. A Christian model of religion is going to look
for gods and creeds, churches, priests, prayer, collective worship, moral codes, each of which is absent in some of the things
we might want to call religions. And it may well ignore dietary and sumptuary rules or cult for ancestors, which are important
in some of them. Religion is a paradigm of what Wittgenstein taught us to call a “family-resemblance” concept: each religion,
like each member of a family, is like every other, in some respect, but there are few, if any, characteristics they all share.
So the first thing we need to do in trying to decide what it is we’re explaining is disaggregate the elements that come together
in Christianity; if we find that they usually come together that will be one of the things that we need to explain. What then
are the questions worth focusing on? I think that, from an evolutionary point of view, it will be two families of issues.
First will be the social and the cognitive features of religions that make their explanation challenging. A second family
of issues worth exploring, once we have identified these components, is how they fit together. Why, for example does belief
in invisible beings go with rituals dealing with disaster? Why does agreement in creeds go with creating powerful social groups
that last across the generations? When one finds broad patterns across many societies there are usually two natural types
of explanation that spring to mind. One is that the pattern reflects shared solutions to common problems, independently discovered:
evolutionary homology, as it were. The other is diffusion from common sources: in a word, copying. I suspect that much of
what is share in the organization of religions globally today is the result of diffusion. But, of course, why some patterns
diffuse successfully and others don’t is itself something that needs explaining.
The last 15years or so has seen the development of a fascinating new area of cognitive science: the cognitive science of
religion (CSR). Scientists in this field aim to explain religious beliefs and various other religious human activities by
appeal to basic cognitive structures that all humans possess. The CSR scientific theories raise an interesting philosophical
question: do they somehow show that religious belief, more specifically belief in a god of some kind, is irrational? In this
paper I investigate this question and argue that CSR does not show that belief in god is irrational.
KeywordsReligious epistemology–Cognitive science–Rationality–Justification–Religious skepticism
This paper is about moral motivation from the perspective of Kantian moral philosophy. It looks at recent literature on the
development of human sociality from within game theory, and argues that a retrieval of Kant’s views on moral theology would
be helpful in understanding an aspect of this sociality. In particular, Kant’s view that we need to postulate the existence
of God as sovereign of the kingdom of ends helps us understand the role of religion in making self-indexed and non-self-indexed
motivation consistent (i.e., motivation towards a good which is specified with essential reference to the self and motivation
towards a good which is specified without such reference). Kant’s complex views on divine punishment are also helpful, and
his views on divine assistance in the production of moral motivation can help us understand the invocation of such assistance
in signaling difficult commitment.
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