From the Streets and Squares to Social Movement Studies: What Have We Learned?

Abstract

n the editors’ introduction they noted how the various mobilizations starting in 2011 raised important questions for social movement scholars. The various articles in this issue have explored the emergence, dynamics, and significance of the social mobilizations, contestations, and confrontations that started with the Arab Spring mobilizations and continue to this day. This concluding article is focused on three main aspects that emerge from the editors’ dialogue with the different contributions. The first is the context, beginning with a political-economic account of neoliberalism, the various crises of legitimacy that it has fostered over the last three decades, and the role of new media (ICTs) in engendering these mobilizations, their coordination, and globalization. The second aspect focuses on some of the characteristics of this cycle of contention, mostly the actors and their networks, identities and the new practices of occupying public space. The third and last part represents an attempt to evaluate the general trajectory of these mobilizations over the last two years.

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Current Sociology
61(4) 541 –561
© The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0011392113479753
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From the streets and squares
to social movement studies:
What have we learned?
Tova Benski
The College of Management-Academic Studies, Israel
Lauren Langman
Loyola University, USA
Ignacia Perugorría
Rutgers University, USA
Benjamín Tejerina
University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, Spain
Abstract
In the editors’ introduction they noted how the various mobilizations starting in 2011
raised important questions for social movement scholars. The various articles in this
issue have explored the emergence, dynamics, and significance of the social mobilizations,
contestations, and confrontations that started with the Arab Spring mobilizations and
continue to this day. This concluding article is focused on three main aspects that
emerge from the editors’ dialogue with the different contributions. The first is the
context, beginning with a political-economic account of neoliberalism, the various crises
of legitimacy that it has fostered over the last three decades, and the role of new media
(ICTs) in engendering these mobilizations, their coordination, and globalization. The
second aspect focuses on some of the characteristics of this cycle of contention, mostly
the actors and their networks, identities and the new practices of occupying public
space. The third and last part represents an attempt to evaluate the general trajectory
of these mobilizations over the last two years.
Corresponding author:
Tova Benski, School of Behavioral Sciences, The College of Management-Academic Studies, 7 Rabin Blvd,
POB 25073, Rishon Lezion 75190, Israel.
Email: tovabenski@gmail.com
479753
CSI61410.1177/0011392113479753Current SociologyBenski et al.
2013
Conclusion

542 Current Sociology Monograph 2 61(4)
Keywords
Crises of legitimation, horizontalism, identity, Internet, neoliberalism, Occupy,
precariat, space
Introduction
This monograph issue of Current Sociology has explored the emergence, dynamics, and
significance of the social mobilizations, contestations, and confrontations that started in
December 2010 with the Arab Spring mobilizations and continues to this day. We won-
dered whether these mobilizations represent the leading edge of a major world historical
transformation that is now in process or are they simply expressions of momentary frustra-
tions that will soon fizzle out and fade. In this monograph, we have brought together schol-
arly studies of mobilizations from the Middle East, including Israel, Southern Europe, and
the United States. At this point, we would like to draw some tentative inferences from this
work and draw out some implications for the study of social mobilizations.
In what follows we offer some additional analytical dimensions to understand these
mobilizations. These dimensions are organized around three main aspects that emerge
out of the dialogue with the different contributions. The first is the context, beginning
with a political- economic-account of neoliberalism, the various crises of legitimacy that
it has fostered over the last three decades, and the important role of new media (ICTs) in
engendering these mobilizations, their coordination and globalization. The second aspect
focuses on some of the characteristics of this wave of contention, mostly the actors and
their networks, identities, emotions, and the practice of occupying space. The third and
last part represents an attempt to evaluate the general trajectory of these mobilizations
over the last two years.
Prelude
From the very earliest moments of capitalist industrialization, people, especially workers,
have organized to contest its adversities and seek reforms, if not revolutions that might
end its inequality, its immiseration, and its dehumanization. From the revolutions of 1848
to the Paris Commune to communist revolutions, we have seen various waves of conten-
tion. As national capitalisms morphed into a global system, there were many conflicts and
contestation over land, resources, pollution, working conditions, etc. In many cases union
organizers were harassed and even murdered. But in the advanced countries, there was
little note of such struggles. Prior to the 1980s, mobilizations and protests in developing
countries were given little attention in the media of the advanced countries. But this would
change in the 1990s, especially when the Zapatistas of Chiapas first used the Internet to
denounce the injustices inflicted by the Mexican state, which was typically tied to the rul-
ing economic classes. The messages and demands of the Zapatista movement were widely
circulated; they became one of the first mobilizations to gain international notice via the
World Wide Web. By the end of the 1990s, it was evident that there was a large and grow-
ing alternative globalization movement involving an increasing number of transnational
activist organizations, INGOs, and NGOs from labor unions to church groups to environ-
mentalists, feminists, etc. (Keck and Sinking, 1998). Little known outside activist

Benski et al. 543
communities, but various social movement organizations (SMOs) quickly embraced the
Internet to inform, mobilize, and coordinate mobilizations. Then came the massive World
Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle and the importance of the Internet was
evident when the meetings were cancelled. With subsequent confrontations, followed by
the birth of the World Social Forum in Brazil, there was not only a rapid growth of global
justice movements, but thanks to the Internet, mobilizations in one place could inspire
others, activists could share tactics and even coordinate actions across the globe – such as
when 20 million people protested against Bush and Blair’s invasion of Iraq. Within a short
time, massive protest demonstrations in Genoa and Toronto publicized the growing adver-
sities of neoliberal globalization. The symbolic coming of age of these global justice
movement mobilizations was the emergence of the World Social Forum in Brazil where
thousands of social movement organizations gathered, and continue to gather to share
ideas, tactics, and strategies and develop global networks to contest the varied adversities
of neoliberal global capitalism. The wave of protests of 2011 that spread from the Middle
East to Europe and to the USA can be seen in terms of the culmination of accumulated
grievances, many of which that had fueled earlier protests and/or actions seeking eco-
nomic, political, social, and/or environmental justice.
The context: Political economy and crises of legitimacy
Neoliberalism and its discontents
While each of the current movements has had its own unique national context, cultural
traditions, history, and course of development, there are a number of common trajecto-
ries which need to be considered to advance the theoretical understanding of the 2011–
2012 mobilizations. The starting point for such considerations is the nature of current
capitalist globalization in which a seamless, deterritorialized world market embraced
neoliberalism as its legitimating economic ideology. As Harvey (2007) put it, neoliberal-
ism is a theory of political economic practices that presuppose that human well-being can
best be advanced by liberating entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within in a society
that strongly embraces the rights to private property, free markets, and free trade. In the
last three decades neoliberal ideology has led to major reductions in state intervention
and/or regulation of the economy, major retrenchments from government-provided ser-
vices and resources, and above all, the reductions if not curtailments of various benefits,
entitlements, and obligations of the state that provide for the welfare of its citizens (e.g.,
daycare, health care, education/retraining, and/or retirement pensions). Instead, the pri-
mary emphases have been on servicing foreign debts and privatization of various gov-
ernment services and/or utilities that are vital to every society’s development (such as
water, oil, waste disposal, communications and electricity). But while the retrenchments
and/or privatization of services may indeed adversely affect some people in the short run,
the global elites believe that in the long run the rising tide of the free market will raise all
ships. The results of infrastructure building supported by the World Bank, the lending
policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the neoliberal trade policies of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), encouraging the unrestricted flows of goods, ser-
vices, and capital, have not confirmed this prediction.

544 Current Sociology Monograph 2 61(4)
The increased permeability of national borders enabled massive exodus flows of man-
ufacturing jobs from the high-wage, unionized workforces of Europe and the United
States to far lower waged workers throughout the Far East and Southeast Asia. The direct
consequences of deindustrialization have included precarious conditions for workers,
alarming levels of unemployment, part-time intermittent employment, rapidly growing
inequality, and widespread poverty in many of the world’s developed or developing
economies. Meanwhile, the rich elites of this new global economy have accumulated
unimagined wealth. Neoliberalism promised prosperity for all, but when the tide rose,
many of the ships were chained to the bottom and wound up sinking.
As the global economy became increasingly integrated over the last few decades, and
production moved to Asia, there was a major shift from the production of goods to finan-
cialization as the basis of profits. This shift has unavoidably led to financial speculation
as a major form of profit maximization and to what has been called ‘casino capitalism’
(Strange, 1986). As a result, the global economic system has become even more prone to
various fiscal crises. Thailand, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina are but a few examples of
economic meltdowns that resulted from the implementation of neoliberal adjustment
policies and the ‘financialization’ of economies that took place under the umbrella of
what in the 1990s was called the ‘Washington Consensus.’ In many ways, these earlier
crises can now be seen as dress rehearsals for what would come about in 2007–2008 with
the implosion of the US financial system that subsequently led to the sovereign debt
based ‘euro crisis’ of today in which massive austerity programs that displace many state
workers, and those dependent upon them, are making bad situations far worse.
In the articles in this collection, it is evident how the neoliberal, global economy cre-
ated and/or amplified socioeconomic inequality, blocked social mobility, and led to a
growing precariat facing increasing costs of living from basic commodities such as bread
or rice to cooking oil to cottage cheese – not to speak of housing or health care. As we
have seen, in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions this inequality, coupled
with indifferent, authoritarian governments allied to global capital, initiated the massive
protests in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, etc. – see articles by Moghadam, Desrues,
and Grinberg in Current Sociology 61(4). These mobilizations in turn inspired the mobi-
lizations of Spain (Perugorría and Tejerina), Greece (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos),
and Portugal (Baumgarten). Finally, after a massive mobilization and occupation of the
Wisconsin Capital to protest the union busting of the Tea Party Governor, media cover-
age of Tahrir Square, and a call for action by Adbusters and inspiration from Egypt, the
Occupy Wall Street movement erupted and eventually spawned about 1600 more
occupations.
Crises of legitimacy
The neo-Marxist legacy of critical theory has allowed us to ‘bring political economy
back in,’ while duly noting that these mobilizations were not classical worker-based
contestations over wages and benefits organized by unions or socialist parties. One com-
mon theme of these various movements is that in each case, the mobilizations were the
consequences of crises of legitimacy (Habermas, 1975). As Benski and Langman (this
issue) have argued, for Habermas, legitimation crises occur when there are failures in the

Benski et al. 545
objective ‘steering mechanisms’ of the systems of advanced capitalist industrial societies
that provide (1) adaptation, namely the economy that produces and distributes goods and
services, and (2) social integration, secured by ideology and the state. While system
integration depends on mechanisms of domination (e.g., the state and the mass media),
social integration draws on normative structures – value systems that express norms and
identity as well as secure loyalty and cohesion. Each form of integration possesses dis-
tinct logics and, in turn, a different kind of rationality. Social integration comes through
socialization and the creation of meaningful ‘life worlds,’ namely a culture/ideology that
legitimates the social system and provides individuals with personal meaning. In con-
temporary societies, the instrumental logics of states and markets have ‘migrated’ into
the subjective realms where they have ‘colonized’ the ‘life worlds.’ As a consequence,
crises at the level of political economy impact the subjective, and its hermeneutic logics
of identity, desire (motivation), and values (Habermas, 1975, 1985). At times of struc-
tural crisis, as previously noted, people often withdraw their loyalties and commitments
to the existing social order and/or its elites. This in turn creates spaces for alternative, if
not critical discourses, views, values, understandings, and even new identities.
From emotions to mobilization
The structural contradictions and implosions that disrupt an actor’s life world elicit
intense emotional reactions, ‘moral shocks’ (Jasper, 1997). Such emotional reac-
tions were not much considered by Habermas and his privileging of Reason. For
Standing (2011), the dominant emotions of the growing precariat are anger, anomie,
anxiety, and alienation. As the articles by Perugorría and Tejerina and by Benski
and Langman in this monograph issue show, structural crises do not simply foster
social movements per se. These crises need to elicit emotional reactions that in turn
can be easily interpreted within existing frames of understanding, or perhaps, peo-
ple can negotiate and construct new frames that resonate with actors’ social/network
locations, identities, character structures, and values. Thus emotions such as anger
joined with powerlessness may impel actors to claim or reclaim agency by joining/
creating networks where alternative visions can be negotiated and actors engage in
collective struggles to work toward social change. The humiliated and denigrated
might seek recognition and dignity. But to attain these goals, there needs to be
socioeconomic transformation.
While social movement theories have given little attention to emotions, an important
aspect of the contemporary movements is the extent to which crises of legitimacy insinu-
ate themselves within the realms of subjectivity, identity, and motivation. Most of the
current studies in this issue have shown how such emotions have clearly played an
important role. In each of the movements analyzed in this monograph, we have seen how
the political economic crises fostered basic ‘reflex emotions’ (Jasper, 2011) such as
anger, fear, anxiety, and uncertainty. Thus it is no accident that in the article by Perugorría
and Tejerina we have seen that the protestors of Spain define themselves as Indignados;
Baumgarten noted how the Portuguese demonstrators called themselves the Geração à
Rasca (the desperate generation), or as Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos pointed out, the
Greek activists of Syntagma Square called themselves the ‘Outraged.’ While many social

546 Current Sociology Monograph 2 61(4)
movements claim to express anger and indignation, few create an identity based on their
emotions.
We must note in this context that constellations of emotions, groupings such as anger
and hope, anxiety and joy, were also among the primary factors motivating people to first
participate in and then sustain activism through continued involvement in demonstra-
tions and direct actions. Furthermore, participants were evidently experiencing joy, effi-
cacy, and empowerment derived from their ‘encounter’ with others in a similar situation
amid these protests (Perugorría and Tejerina, this issue). These socially constructed con-
stellations of emotions that might join humiliation and hope, or anger, while not among
the primary factors driving people to participate nevertheless often provide participants
with a number of emotional gratifications such as solidarity, agency, recognition, mean-
ing, and empowerment derived from their ‘encounter’ with others in similar situations.
In addition, most of these mobilizations were marked by groundbreaking displays of
humor, irony, and parody that could be announcing the inception of a new type of ‘ludic
activism,’ with pleasure, play, and creativity at its core.
Social media
As we have pointed, most of these movements were responses to the adversities of global
capitalism. But as many commentators have highlighted, globalization has also meant a
time and space compression in that with jet aircraft and high speed railroads, people can
quickly move across the globe. But today, with the Internet, people can not only com-
municate with vast numbers of people all over the world, but can communicate and
coordinate protest activities in real time, and broadcast live images of protest activities
throughout the world.
What must be noted is the increased fluidity of our age, what Bauman (2000) called
‘liquid modernity.’ There has been a move from a world that is ‘solid and heavy’ (like the
Gutenberg Bible) to shifts and flows of what is now quite ‘liquid, light’ and easily flows
– like Internet-based information. If Marx said all that is solid melts into thin air, today
we would note that upon ‘melting,’ almost everything – people, goods, and information
– quickly flows and moves about unhindered by traditional barriers such as time, dis-
tance or national/social boundaries. In this way, the movements that began in Tunisia
quickly became the catalyst, inspiration, and model for other MENA mobilizations that
in turn spread to Southern Europe, Israel, and eventually the United States.
The control, coordination, and communication between actors of the current global
economy, especially its manufacturing, transportation, banking, and financial markets,
have depended on the Internet. But at the same time, given the adverse consequences of
globalization, that very same Internet, together with the cellular phone, has become use-
ful, indeed crucial to the many social movements that would contest the adversities of
globalization. This was evident when the Zapatistas first gained notoriety. The protests
against the WTO in Seattle gave rise to Indymedia (www.indymedia.org/en/), which
pioneered the use of the Internet to disseminate alternative frameworks to counter the
misinformation from the corporate controlled media and inform other activists, if not
media, about protest activities. Since that time, Indymedia has become a major source of
information for progressive activists throughout the world. Their volunteer-based

Benski et al. 547
information is free of the distortions of the mainstream corporate-controlled media. This
was especially clear in 2009, when there were massive protests against the rigged elec-
tion in Iran that kept the fundamentalists in power. But thanks to Indymedia and Al
Jazeera, these protests, and their brutal repression, were seen across the globe.
The Internet has thus enabled the emergence of ‘virtual public spheres’ where
information could be disseminated, adversities could be recognized and debated, and
actors became involved in various ‘Internetworked’ social movements (Langman,
2005), provoking a qualitative change in the constellation of social movements to
such a degree that according to Castells ‘the networked social movements of the digi-
tal age represent a new species of social movement’ (Castells, 2012: 15). As Mason
(2012) has put it, the 2011 movements were planned on Facebook, organized on
Twitter, broadcast on YouTube, and then amplified and distributed by Al Jazeera or
Indymedia that spread news of these events all over the world – often in real-time
coverage. The Internet has not simply enabled speaking truth to power, but widely
disseminates those ‘truths,’ ‘counter-hegemonic’ discourses, to vast multitudes
adversely impacted by the power of neoliberalism. At moments of crisis, people
become more open to such critiques.
One of the important points that we must now consider is how the transnational nature
of the recent mobilizations depend on the use of ICTs, the Internet, and social media. The
self-immolation of the Tunisian student was the starting point for many of the events in
the MENA and Europe. Some contagion effects were also engendered by the spread of
information on the Internet. It does not only provide activists with a toolkit for organiz-
ing and real-time coordination of protest demonstrations, but by making information
widely available, it serves an educational function that also promotes greater democracy.
Indeed, the proliferation of smart phones and tablets has represented a quantum leap in
the use of technology. In the present mobilizations it has been used to disseminate infor-
mation, link between different networks and social media users, enhance the process of
meaning construction, organize protests in advance, coordinate protest activities in pro-
cess, and globalize the movements.
In the last few years, with the proliferation of smart phones, etc., social media sites
have become an integral part of movement activity, especially in organizing protest.
Indeed, although the use of the Internet (ICT), social media, especially Facebook and
Twitter, as well as cellphone videos posted to YouTube or pictures to Flickr are relatively
recent, these tools have been used long enough to provide us with the beginnings of a
history. Prior to the Tahrir Square mobilizations, three Egyptians set themselves ablaze
and again the news, via television, the web, and social media went viral. One of the inter-
esting contributions of the Vicari article (this issue) is the excellent history of the use of
mass media by activists from television to the Internet. Another contribution is the use of
Twitter as a platform for sharing alternative information, connecting activists and the
public, and meaning construction in the Italian mobilizations. Indeed, in the cases of
Greece and Israel, the protests began with Facebook postings. The Occupy Wall Street
movements began with an online call from Adbusters magazine to occupy Wall Street.
Soon hundreds, tens of hundreds, and eventually tens of thousands joined the protests
and occupations. The nature of global capital has fostered a globally based geopolitics of
resistance dependent on the Internet, cell phones, and social media.

548 Current Sociology Monograph 2 61(4)
However, the use of the Internet and social networks still find some limitations. As
previous research has noted (Kwak et al., 2010: 10), and the contribution of Vicari has
exposed, Twitter influences the traditional and dominant media, as a new alternative
medium to share information, but it does not encourages long-lasting conversational
processes. It appears as a tool ‘centered on domestic protest events,’ conversations are
not ‘durable’ or ‘interactional,’ ‘most of the top players in the stream were individual
twitterers,’ ‘the analysis of usage dynamics showed that public reasoning around
social contention on micro-blogging platforms is more likely to enact news media
mechanisms rather than real networking processes,’ ‘it does not foster dialogical
interactions among users (via replies),’ and ‘Twitter and the like seem to work more
as news media rather than as truly interactional platforms for dialogical public sphere
dynamics’; in conclusion, ‘individuals interested in discussing social contention use
micro-blogging platforms to engage in the mediatization of dissent, that is, they
enhance the debate of specific protest issues and develop protest themes aligned to, or
diverging from, those covered by the mainstream media’ (Vicari, this issue). In this
sense, as the full use of social media is still being assimilated by society, it is desirable
to begin to introduce nuances in the analysis of their role in the emergence of virtual
social networks.
Some characteristics of the 2011–2012 wave of
mobilization
Actors and networks
As most of the articles in this issue have shown (see, for example, Grinberg, Moghadam,
Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos, Langman, Desrues, Perugorría and Tejerina, and
Baumgarten), these mobilizations generally consist of coalitions of diverse groups who
come together to oppose the political and/or economic elites. But the overwhelming
numbers of the participants in the 2011–2012 waves of mobilizations have been the
young and often middle classes, many of whom can be thought of as members of the
‘new classes’ of cultural workers. As the articles in this issue have shown, there are sev-
eral reasons why the young form the bulwark of the current movements. First and fore-
most, it is the young that have borne the brunt of the economic crises and retrenchments.
This is especially true for recent college graduates who ‘played by the rules’ but were
then unable to find work or at least work commensurate with their levels of education.
And these youth are especially savvy in the use of the Internet, social media and cellular
phones. In some places in Southern Europe like Spain, Portugal or Italy, a significant
number of youth, almost 50%, are unemployed. And when employed, these young men
and women have tended to fill the ranks of the growing precariat, that is, the workers
with insecure and often intermittent jobs, and few if any social entitlements that are
being urged to be ‘flexible’ and ‘employable’ (Standing, 2011).
1
Second, given a general
distrust, if not disdain of the economic and political authorities, young and often not so
young activists tend to be highly anti-authoritarian in general; and the horizontalism of
their movements and encampments stresses a direct, participatory democracy of equals.
The young are both more prompted by the dire economic conditions they face, enabled

Benski et al. 549
to mobilize, and free of the social anchors such as work or family of older cohorts –
which is not to ignore the diversity of actors.
As noted in earlier, many of the core actors in the present collective actions had been
involved in earlier progressive mobilizations and, as a result, ‘submerged networks’ of
experienced activists were already in place to form the nuclei of activists (Melucci,
1989). The articles on the Middle East, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and the United States
noted activist participation in earlier movements. This paved way for the various move-
ments of our concern. In the United States, one of the largest movements to ever take
place was the occupation of the Wisconsin State Capitol to protest the anti-union actions
of the governor. These massive protests and occupations of public space (the State
Capitol building) anticipated and inspired the Occupy Wall Street mobilization. It might
also be worth noting that in some European mobilizations, like the Greek case, organized
workers and leftist parties played important roles, especially insofar as these mobiliza-
tions often did engage in political actions (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos, this issue).
In the Spanish case, in turn, squatter movements in large cities, and several social move-
ment organizations (Real Democracy Now, Youth Without Future) also had considerable
input in the shaping of the 15M. In the case of Portugal, Baumgarten indicates a low level
of internationalization of the groups of activists and their dominant local orientation, dif-
ferentiating between two types of components: classical groups oriented towards the
state and the PPA groups – platforms of actors and collectives that practice a bottom-up
democracy and seek alternatives that do not pass through the state. Though little known
outside the region, it should also be noted that there were a number of social movement
organizations, civil society organizations, and organizers that had been active in various
protests and mobilizations in the Middle East before the ‘Arab Spring.’ Thus, as
Moghadam (in this issue) suggests, given the many feminist organizations in the MENA
countries, it is no accident that women were highly involved in the protests, joining with
other aggrieved factions.
The current movements that include large numbers of the precariat, intermittent work-
ers without real connections to unions, or work or worker organizations, are much more
likely to embrace ‘horizontalism.’ They are much more likely to engage in participatory
democracy and decision-making than traditional labor and/or political movements,
headed by various leadership cadres. This was first seen in the factory reclamations
movements in Argentina that embraced ‘horizontalism’ (Sitrin, 2006). ‘Horizontalism is
a social relationship that implies, as it sounds, a flat plane upon which to communicate.
Horizontalism requires the use of direct democracy vs -hierarchy and anti-authoritarian
creation rather than reaction. It is a break with vertical ways of top-down organizing and
relating, but a break that is also an opening’ (Sitrin, 2006). The same pattern of participa-
tory and direct democracy, and often direct action, unlike the parliamentary democracies,
was repeated in most of the other mobilizations, particularly in Greece (People’s
Assembly), Spain, Israel, and the Occupy Wall Street movements in which the ‘general
assembly’ included all participants convened to discuss strategy, tactics and goals, and all
voices were to be heard.
The analysis presented here agrees on the dual orientation of participating actors
(local versus global), the multiple composition of networks of resistance and mobiliza-
tion (classic versus new), the creation of new platforms, the articulations around the

550 Current Sociology Monograph 2 61(4)
occupation of public space and the intensive use of connections enabled through the
Internet and social networks, the diverse origin of participants with a broad presence of
youth, professional, and middle classes, as well as women’s groups and cultural and
religious minorities. This diversity and pluralism of diverse groups complicated the task
of creating community; a community based on being together and sharing identity traits
(Castells, 2012: 10).
Ideology
One of the common themes of these movements was the rejection of traditional political
ideologies and indeed, a distrust of professional politicians left or right. While many of
the activists were harshly critical of neoliberal capitalism, they did not typically embrace
socialist ideologies or parties where they existed (or the Democratic Party in the USA).
As we noted, their radical horizontalism eschewed the embrace of hierarchical organiza-
tions, even progressive ones, and that would include the majority of now sclerotic social-
ist parties and/or political leaders of generations long past. But this is not to say that these
movements were bereft of ideology, rather that the mobilizations, the critiques of the
existing conditions, and possibilities of alternatives did articulate an ideology through
their practices that envisioned a more gratifying, humanistic alternative. Given a much
larger base of support from the progressive communities of New York, the tent city of
Zuccotti Park provided occupiers with food, clothes, shelter, medical care, and books to
everyone. Much like the Paris commune, a truly autonomous, democratic community
was established.
Part and parcel of most social movements, is the framing, explaining of the current
adverse conditions, and envisioning alternative conditions that would be realized as a
result of successful mobilizations. Indeed in the West there is a long tradition begin-
ning, perhaps, with Thomas More’s Utopia, that has understood that economic inequal-
ity creates a number of other inequalities, especially in the opportunities for personal
fulfillment. The article by Langman suggested that the works of Bloch, Benjamin, and
Marcuse were indeed applicable to the movements at hand (see also Langman, 2013b).
As Bloch (1986) had argued, hope was a fundamental human emotion rooted in the
human capacity to dream, and for Freud, dreams provided wish fulfillments. In the
mobilizations considered in this issue, activists’ hope for a different kind of society
that provides people with more individual, interpersonal, and collective gratifications
was very salient. This theme was clearly evident in Marx’s emancipatory vision of a
society freed of class domination based on private property. This utopian theme found
in critical theory is a vision of yet to be realized possibility rather than a set of blue-
prints for how people might or should live (Jacoby, 2005). As Jacoby (2005) puts it, to
specify the precise nature of Utopia is to render its attainment impossible, but rather
the progressive critiques of the economic, political, and cultural domination, as articu-
lated in the movements, envision the ‘better world that is possible.’ Authoritarian
visions of the possible, typically romantic versions of the past that never was, valor-
izing both the elites and hierarchy, inevitably wind up suppressing freedom and democ-
racy, thwarting individual self-fulfillment, and in the end typically result in repressive
dystopias that crush the human spirit.

Benski et al. 551
Identity
In the 1980s, Touraine and colleagues (Touraine et al., 1983, 1987, 1990) argued that the
then au courant movements such as students, feminists, anti-nuclear, and regionalist
movements could not be understood in the same ways as traditional workers’ movements
since most of the activists were neither proletarians nor organized or led by older genera-
tions of activists tied to unions or socialist parties. These movements were not precipitated
by economic issues per se. These scholars, along with Habermas, Offe, and others, then
attempted to develop ‘New Social Movement theory’ (NSM), which was primarily con-
cerned with understanding and explaining social movements on the basis of contestations
at the levels of culture, meanings, and identities in which protests and demonstration took
place in the realms of ‘civil society’ rather than simply in the ‘political spheres.’ Moreover,
these movements were said to embrace post-materialist values and new, progressive iden-
tity formations, that would encourage agency in the creation of one’s own notions of
subjectivity and self. For Nancy Fraser (2000), identity politics provided recognition to
the marginalized; but his must require an egalitarian redistribution of resources as a means
of providing recognition and dignity to the victims of political-economic arrangements.
More than a decade ago Castells (1997) argued that the nature of globalization was
prompting both reactionary identities that would return society to a mythical, albeit bet-
ter past, and progressive, project identities that would seek to fashion new kinds of col-
lective identities unfettered from both compulsively driven accumulation of wealth and
mass mediated forms of consumer-based identities. As mentioned in the introductory
article to this monograph issue, protestors were not demanding recognition ‘just’ as citi-
zens, but as human beings with the right to lead lives worth living. One of the central
themes in the Occupy movements has been the attempt by the indignant to attain or
restore valorized identities that provide the person or the group with recognition and
dignity as opposed to their marginalization if not denigration that has resulted from the
combination of indifferent elites, economic crises, implosions, and retrenchments of
benefits previously provided by the state. These attempts to refashion identities were
especially clear in envisioning an alternative kind of society more concerned with shar-
ing, caring, inclusion, toleration, and self-determination/creativity, all of which were
sensitive to the environment – and all of which were ignored by the elites.
Although given the political economic factors noted, while these mobilizations can-
not be said to be expressions of identity politics, the issues of collective identity are quite
salient. Collective identities mediate perceptions and understandings, and many of these
events evoke many of the same collective emotions that individuals feel. The crucial ele-
ment here is that collective identity acts as a mediator between structural conditions and
responses. The role of collective identity in social movements, both conceptually and
empirically, has been argued by Polletta and Jasper:
Collective identity describes imagined as well as concrete communities, involves an act of
perception and construction as well as the discovery of preexisting bonds, interests, and boundaries.
It is fluid and relational, emerging out of interactions with a number of different audiences
(bystanders, allies, opponents, news media, state authorities), rather than fixed. It channels words
and actions, enabling some claims and deeds but delegitimating others. It provides categories by
which individuals divide up and make sense of the social world. (Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 298)

552 Current Sociology Monograph 2 61(4)
Collective identity represents the intersections of historical, economic, political, and cul-
tural contexts and moments with various aspects of class, gender, race/ethnicity, in which
individuals find groups and networks of people that share certain values or cultural styles
that are or become the collective identity shared by a group. It acts as a filter that pro-
vides selective attention to external events. But identity is not simply a set of cognitive
processes; it is acquired through social interactions and ties to groups. What must be
noted is that identity, personally or collectively, is largely shaped by a variety of social
institutions and is therefore the primary site for anchoring hegemonic discourses.
Therefore, identity itself often becomes the contested terrain where counter-hegemonic
discourses and identities resist and challenge authority.
As we have seen, identity is absolutely central in the contemporary social mobiliza-
tions in which legitimation crises challenge or undermine certain collective identities
(such as worker, provider) that in turn evoke strong, powerful emotions that would impel
people to seek to negotiate and refashion ‘project identities’ (Castells, 1997), that would
grant people dignity now and change the future tomorrow. These movements attempt to
create, negotiate, and promote new collective identities as a strategy to gain power, as
well as transform selves and eventually transform society (Polletta and Jasper, 2001).
Despite the best efforts to build a sense of belonging among the participants, trying for
inclusion with larger populations through slogans like we are ‘the 99%,’ we are ‘per-
sons,’ or ‘the middle class,’ this strategy was far from having achieved satisfactory
results. However, we can say that ‘horizontal, multimodal networks, both on the Internet
and in the urban spaces create togetherness. … Togetherness is not a community because
a community implies enduring face to face interactions and set of common values. The
attempt to forge such communities remains a work in progress for the movements. Thus,
community is a goal to be achieved, but togetherness is a starting point and source of
empowerment. Together we can’ (Castells, 2012: 225).
These movements have a highly self-reflective character, they are constantly engaged
in self-examinations, deliberations, and negotiations to create spaces of autonomy for
public discussion that takes place through the tools available on the Internet. But, most
importantly, activist groups acquire the status of social movements by occupying urban
space, holding meetings and assemblies in public space, and gaining visibility through
street demonstrations.
Occupying space
One of the major qualities of late modern capitalist societies has been the privatization of
self, the erosion of the public sphere, and cooptation/colonization of language by the
media and other cultural authorities. As a result, we have seen the rise and spread of a
more subtle kind of authoritarianism that is rendered invisible by the distractions of mass
media, growing indifference of distracted populations, and the contractions of spaces,
public or private, where free speech and democratic practices can be sustained. On the
one hand, this authoritarianism sustains neoliberal capital, but on the other hand, it can
be challenged when massive numbers of people embrace democratic values. Thus as we
have seen, one very salient common aspect of the 2011–2012 mobilizations has been the
occupation of public spaces and turning them into spaces where people can speak freely

Benski et al. 553
and enjoy direct, participatory democracy. In the past, radical actions have often started
at places of work or study and involved the occupation of such places. Although strikes
and factory or school occupations have taken place in some countries such as Egypt or
Greece, the most common form of action amid the current cycle of mobilization entailed
reclaiming the public space and transforming it into a ‘public sphere,’ a realm of civil
society that stands apart from the general commodification, social fragmentation, and
isolation typical of private space in capitalist societies. Here people can engage in debate,
explore alternative, often counter-hegemonic discourses, and render subtle forms of
domination glaringly visible and subject to challenge.
We would argue that the current mobilizations, made possible by the Internet and
cellphones, enable geographies of resistance to emerge in the public spaces of societies
that have revitalized the notion of publics contesting elite power. Mass demonstrations
and often occupations as well bring together face-to-face relationships and large crowds
whose very size is itself both empowering to the actor and a message to power. Bourguiba
Avenue, Tahrir Square, Syntagma Square, Puerta del Sol, Rothschild Avenue, and
Zuccotti Park were and still are places where the many factions of the masses of urban
discontented, indignant, and marginalized, from the unemployed college graduates to the
precariat youth of the slums, from the underpaid doctors to strapped pensioners, could
gather together, prompted by social media, and yet find face-to-face contacts, discus-
sions, and networks within a vast crowd. Such contact is essential for negotiating frames,
planning tactics, and from what we have seen, is essential for engendering emotions that
impel continued action. The occupation of the public space and its transformation into a
‘public sphere’ was achieved through two different though complementary ways: (1),
intermittent popular assemblies and (2) long-term encampments (Egypt, Tunisia,
Morocco, Israel, USA, Spain, Greece, and Portugal). The Wall Street Occupiers and the
tent camps in Spain and Israel established living, sleeping, and eating arrangements that
lasted several weeks.
What was especially important for the occupations were the discussions and analyses
in the general assemblies and ‘working groups’ that framed the problem, debated alterna-
tives, tactics, and strategies. Both instances were characterized by open debates where
any protestor could have their say. Although the working groups did much of the research
and strategizing, important decisions were often made at the general assemblies, that
operate with discussion facilitators rather than leaders, and much of the discussions were
facilitated by the use of gestures and body language.
As we discuss below, this embodied, territorialized political praxis in the streets, and
in the squares, was combined with the intensive and savvy use of ICT and social media,
which operated not only as a potent means of spreading information, but also offered a
novel form of deterritorialized space for doing disembodied politics from-the-ground-
up. Both the embodied and territorialized, and the disembodied and deterritorialized
political practices displayed in the context of these movements have tended toward hori-
zontalism and direct, participatory democracy where all participants speak (or write) –
and listen (or read) – as equals. The structural similarities between neighborhood
assemblies and social media like Twitter or Facebook have allowed participants, particu-
larly the young, to ‘flow’ from one realm to the other and back with utmost ease. As
pointed out by Perugorría and Tejerina (this issue), the political socialization of

554 Current Sociology Monograph 2 61(4)
thousands of men and women, young and old, in these types of dual, horizontal activism
is, perhaps, one of the most important outcomes of this cycle of mobilizations and we
suggest that this practice will have impact long after these mobilizations wane.
Evaluating the trajectory of the 2011–2012 cycle of
contention: Preliminary outcomes
Perhaps the most important question for social movement scholars is to assess the impact,
if any, of the 2011–2012 mobilizations. Have these mobilizations changed the structure
of society, the economy, the political system or the culture? Was it worth the effort? The
answer to these questions is invariably ‘it depends.’ On what does it depend? To begin
with, social movements’ outcomes are notoriously hard to define, determine, and meas-
ure (Bosi and Uba, 2009; Earl, 2004). There is general agreement over the fact that
movements can have a wide range of consequences, some of them short term, others long
term. It is possible for a movement to fail in achieving its immediate goal and disband
but once the issue has been raised, it becomes part of the culture and social agenda and
perhaps years later, their goals are achieved. Perhaps for thus reason when Chou En Lai
was asked his opinion of the French Revolution, he said it was too early to tell. This
means that to a large extent, assessing the outcomes of social movements depends on the
definitions adopted of what constitutes the outcome and time span in which the effects
that we are assessing occur. It often takes a long time after a movement emerges for its
impacts to be felt, and quite often some changes may take generations to have major
impact, especially in the cultural domain. Many of the struggles over civil rights, femi-
nism, gay rights, or the legalization of marijuana have taken decades. The studies in this
monograph are very recent, and in some cases, some of the mobilizations are still unfold-
ing. In this sense it is really too early to try and assess the outcomes.
In addition to the temporal dimension, another important lens through which social
movement outcomes may be assessed refers to the different domains of movements’
goals and activism. Partly consistent with Bosi and Uba’s (2009) formulation, and with
our attempt at bringing the economy back into the analysis, we consider three main fields
of possible outcomes: the political, cultural, and economic, whether or not these were
intended or unintended goals of the 2011–2012 mobilizations.
Outcomes in the political domain have been the most frequently studied (Bosi and
Uba, 2009; Earl, 2004; Giugni, 2004). Perhaps the most influential of these studies was
by Gamson (1975). Gamson looked at success in terms of two clusters of possible out-
comes. First, the acceptance of the challengers by their opponents as a valid representa-
tive of a legitimate set of interests. And second, ‘whether the group beneficiary gains new
advantages during the challenge and its aftermath’ (Gamson, 1975: 28–29). Since then,
Gamson’s thesis has been reappraised and further developed, but in the political domain,
these are still central concerns along with measures such as changes in policies, leg-
islation, political institutions, and regimes, or the actions taken by political parties (Bosi
and Uba, 2009). Looking at the various articles in this issue, very few discussed the pos-
sible outcomes of the mobilizations. In the MENA, Moghadam (this issue) suggests that
the process of democratization is more likely to occur in Tunisia than in Egypt or
Morocco due to the vibrant civil society of Tunisia. The transition process depends on the

Benski et al. 555
structural starting conditions (employment, level of education, equality) and the institu-
tional stability (civil society, internal conflicts). It is not clear that certain minorities and
groups, such as women for example, acquired important gains in the short term in Egypt,
compared with Morocco and, above all, Tunisia.
In Israel, Grinberg (see this issue) noted that institutional political actors have acted by
closing political space to new autonomous actors. These actors are members of under-
represented groups who have suffered the consequences of the blocks to the social mobil-
ity of the younger, middle-class generation. In addition, center-left parties have coopted
activists and leaders of the movement, and have channeled its requests, which have pro-
duced a rapid demobilization of many activists. Grinberg pointed out the possibility that
the effects of the J14 will become more evident in the 2013 elections. At the time of writ-
ing our article, there was a major surprise in Israeli politics when large numbers of the
young supported Lapid’s moderate centrist party that presented a social agenda based on
the 2011 protest wave in Israel. Desrues’ analysis delves into how the hybrid political
regime of Morocco had been able to demobilize the protests, transforming its structures,
through the enactment of a new Constitution and a new distribution of power between
monarchy and democratic institutions, fostering the sectionalism of different groups in the
Moroccan society. The articles on the European movements do not deeply evaluate pos-
sible outcomes, but social mobilization has had a clear impact on the measures taken by
the different governments in specific areas: subsidies, housing, budget cuts, privatiza-
tions. However, the importance of political outcomes is perhaps clearer in Egypt, where
Mubarak eventually resigned and a more or less democratic election brought President
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood to power. But as we have seen, the highly motivated
core activists of Tahrir Square, typically young and typically progressive, had neither the
numbers nor organization of the Muslim Brotherhood that subsequently won the elec-
tions. After democratically gaining power, Morsi has since given himself dictatorial pow-
ers that have engendered massive and sometimes violent protests and demonstrations in
Tahrir Square rivaling those that ousted Mubarak. The newly passed constitution was in
many ways a step backward from the Mubarak years, especially for women. Will the
Egyptian ‘democracy’ become democratic? In Syria the insurgents are still fighting for
political changes and the conflict has taken many lives and is still raging.
Outcomes in the economic domains have often been ignored by the social movement
literature. Potential outcomes of the current cycle of contention will entail changes in the
economic system in general, in the distribution of wealth, measures initiated by authori-
ties to reduce inequalities, a move away from austerity measures, or heavier taxation of
the rich (the 1%). Amid the 2007 crisis, the United States embraced a fairly weak neo-
Keynesian agenda, bailed out major banks, and created a small stimulus plan that at least
stopped or slowed down the plunge for the banking and investment companies. Job crea-
tion did improve slightly, but most of these were low-wage service jobs. By contrast, the
severe austerity programs implemented in Southern Europe since the emergence of the
crisis, and deepened since 2010, have generally made matters worse. As a consequence,
protests still continue in Greece and Spain.
As for the cultural domain, Earl (2004: 525) claims ‘the polysemic character of cul-
ture itself as an analytic concept has produced a diverse set of research projects on cul-
tural movement outcomes.’ Earl’s review of the field provides a list of the different

556 Current Sociology Monograph 2 61(4)
conceptualizations of the cultural consequences of social movements: values, beliefs,
and public opinion; literature, media culture, visual culture, music, fashion, language,
discourse, collective identity, and subcultures. Earlier in this article we have discussed
identity changes and in the introductory article to this issue (Tejerina, Perugorría, Benski,
and Langman) we discussed the generation and/or modification of discourse frames with
the return to the ‘inequality’ and ‘injustice’ frames and the rise of ‘real democracy’ as a
new master frame. The question to be raised interrogates the extent to which these frames
will endure. At present, it is too early to answer this question but apparently, at least
in the MENA, according to Moghadam (this issue), cultural, political, and economic
outcomes are intertwined and she argues that Tunisia could become a model of a demo-
cratic society, due to its vibrant civil society with human rights, women’s rights, and
professional associations and a strong labor market.
The outcomes of the 2011–2012 cycle of contention remain uncertain. In many
cases, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, there were important changes in the govern-
ment, slight modifications in the economies, but social structures were little changed.
Impacts in Southern Europe are still unclear and their outcomes may be more depend-
ent on German bankers that wish to save the Eurozone. We should also note that like
many other social movements, there may be very little immediate impact, but over
time, many movements do eventually affect, and transform society. As Mannheim
(1952) argued, cohorts flow through time, and each generation is exposed to a different
social, economic, political, and cultural context that shapes their consciousness, val-
ues, understandings of the world, and their identities. The Occupy movement in the
United States did not make political or economic demands, or propose legislation, or
even involve itself in the political process. Nevertheless, insofar as they changed the
national discussions from austerity to inequality, and encouraged a large number of the
younger generation to become politically involved, they were one of the key elements
of the Obama re-election (see Langman, 2013a). Moreover, the movements did impact
the consciousness of a large number of young people who are more likely to be sup-
portive of progressive government policies, and surely more tolerant of neo-Keynesian
approaches than previous generations. As this cohort flows through social time, facing
the consequences of an economy that provides fewer opportunities for its now more
politicized youth, we might expect more progressive agendas.
At the present moment, the impacts and the outcomes of these movements remain
unknown and uncertain. A detailed monitoring of the social mobilization in the coming
years and a deep analysis of its more specific claims will help to shed light on its impact
on the lives of the participants and the society’s structures. An important aspect of these
transformations, which was not an immediate object of social claims, is the change in the
social consciousness and the increased social solidarity and material support towards
those who are suffering the consequences of the economic and social crisis with greater
intensity. The levels of solidarity that have soared in recent months in countries like
Spain, Greece, and Portugal can be considered as an unexpected ripple in the wake of
this new wave of global mobilization.
Consideration of outcomes of ongoing movements – outcomes which are quite
uncertain – is always quite problematic in general but especially so for empirically
based social science. As social scientists we would like to develop some explanatory

Benski et al. 557
if not causal analyses and explanations, but when the outcome is uncertain what are
we to explain? For example, at the present moment it would seem that the election of
the Muslim Brotherhood president has resulted in little improvement in the lives of
most Egyptians and instead there have been massive protests against the government
which has employed the same ‘emergency’ rules, martial law, employed by Mubarak.
But as we have also seen, in Morocco and Tunisia, there have been movements toward
more democratic governance. This variability in outcomes, which is not independent
of the variability of the social/national context of the movement, makes it especially
difficult to make generalizations let alone predictions. Nevertheless, even ‘failed
revolutions’ provide us with empirical realities that are useful for sociological
understandings.
Rethinking social movements
Since the 1980s the field of social movement studies has been characterized by an
eclecticism with many theoretical strands but without a dominant paradigm(s). The
articles in this issue reflect this eclecticism. Thus some of the articles were informed
by different social movement traditions, some resting on rethinking older frameworks,
often embracing newer paradigms. We might note that the Resource Mobilization theo-
ries based on self-interested, rational actors, social movement entrepreneurs, and ever-
present grievances have little explanatory value for these mobilizations and indeed
they have not been used by the authors of this issue. New Social Movement theory,
with its concerns for identity, meaning, and mobilizations in the public sphere, may
serve as a starting point as was clearly noted in Langman’s article. Framing approaches
focused on the cognitive elements of socially constructed explanations and choices of
appropriate tactics and outcomes similarly can only deal with some partial aspects of
mobilization. But we argue that in both cases there is a failure to understand the extent
to which emotions are central in terms of mobilizing actors, disposing the embrace or
rejection of certain frames or tactics and the emotional correlates of particular
outcomes.
To be able to account for all of these factors requires modifications that push each
perspective toward a more eclectic approach. On the other hand, the early theories of
collective behavior made emotions, qua irrationality, central, their conservative biases
saw social movements as collections of crazed mobs following charismatic leaders
into frenzied irrational destructive nihilism. While that view is already dated, most of
the articles this collection have noted the anger, alienation, and outrage of people fac-
ing major hardships, but at the same time, these movements expressed hope for a better
future (Castells, 2012). In this sense, it is not possible to offer a single unified para-
digm to account for the different faces of the present mobilizations, and it is arguable
whether we should try to suggest a single theoretical formulation that will account for
all the different aspects of this current wave. Some of the articles in this issue even
demonstrate the benefits of crossing disciplinary boundaries (for example, Langman,
Baumgarten, Grinberg, and Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos). These authors have
incorporated insights from philosophy, political science, media theory, and even post-
modernism. We would argue that this eclecticism that enables cross-fertilization from

558 Current Sociology Monograph 2 61(4)
other perspectives provides for a more creative and invigorating field of study. But at
the moment, while writing these lines, Tahrir Square is again burning and Syria is sink-
ing into an abyss – it is too early for an all-embracing, comprehensive, social move-
ment paradigm.
Further, the horizontalism of these movements (Sitrin, 2006), and demands for radi-
cal, participatory democracy, require us to rethink the nature of leadership and organiza-
tion in such movements of resistance. This was already evident in many of the Internet
based movements, especially the World Social Forum, a movement of movements in the
‘spaces of flows.’ In most of the mobilizations discussed, the emergent, spontaneous, and
democratic practices/organization must be noted.
We might finally point out that the articles in this issue raise an important question
about the role of ideology in explaining the emergence and functioning of social
movements. While some of the articles stress ideological elements in the current
mobilizations (for example, Benski and Langman), other articles have paid less atten-
tion to this element but rather focus on the opportunity structure and the importance
of civil society (for example, Grinberg and Moghadam) or the role of Internet (Vicari).
It is of course a long-standing issue, but the movements themselves have deliberately
downplayed the ideological element in order to draw a larger base of support. The
objective of the movements to be inclusive and encourage greater participation from
people of diverse groups and political affiliations and sympathies has led to the
refraining from specific ideological references. For example in Israel (Grinberg) the
movement refrained from any politically divisive references for the sake of solidarity.
Perugorría and Tejerina mention a similar phenomenon of forbidding partisan plac-
ards and signs in Spain. But this tactic raises the important question, can such move-
ments foster progressive transformation by avoiding partisan electoral politics?
Then, on the other hand, can such politics, even if embraced, challenge the dominant
forces to foster the more humanistic visions? We would hope that the studies in this
monograph represent a step in advancing our understandings of the social move-
ments unfolding in the current decade that will shape the 21st century.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.
Note
1. For Standing, there are three ‘varieties’ of precariat that are detached from old political democ-
racy and unable to relate to 20th-century industrial economic democracy. The first variety
consists of those drifting downward from working-class backgrounds into precariousness,
the second consists of those emerging from a schooling system who are over-credentialed for
the kinds of flexible, intermittent jobs now available, and finally, there are various migrants,
marginalized or criminalized populations in situations where they do not have the full rights
of citizens. Each group is without an occupational identity, and thus not part of occupational
community with a long-established social memory giving them an anchor of ethical norms,
each has a distinctive worldview – and few have faith in existing political institutions. They
are angry, frustrated and may produce social instabilities, from violence to political extrem-
ism, hence they constitute a ‘dangerous class’ (see Standing, 2011).

Benski et al. 559
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Author biographies
Tova Benski is a senior lecturer at the Department of Behavioral Sciences, the College of
Management-Academic Studies, Rishon Lezion Israel. Her fields of academic interest and research
include: qualitative research methods, gender, social movements, peace studies, and the sociology
of emotions. She has been engaged in research on the Israeli women’s peace mobilizations since
the late 1980s and has published extensively and presented many papers on these topics. Her co-
authored book Iraqi Jews in Israel won a prestigious academic prize in Israel. The former presi-
dent of RC 48 of the International Sociological Association, currently she is a member of the Board
RC 48 and a member of RC 36, and RC 06, of the ISA.
Lauren Langman is a Professor of Sociology at Loyola University of Chicago. He received his PhD
at the University of Chicago from the Committee on Human Development and received psycho-
analytic training at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. He has long worked in the tradition
of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, especially relationships between culture, identity, and
politics/political movements. He is the past president of Alienation Research and Theory, RC 36,
of the International Sociological Association as well as past president of the Marxist section of the
American Sociological Association. Recent publications deal with globalization, alienation, global
justice movements, the body, nationalism, and national character. His most recent books are
Trauma Promise and Millennium: The Evolution of Alienation, with Devorah Kalekin and
Alienation and Carnivalization, with Jerome Braun.
Ignacia Perugorría is a PhD candidate in sociology at Rutgers University, working on the interaction
between identity battles, social movement networks, and political opportunity structures in the mak-
ing of ‘participatory culture.’ She is a Fulbright scholar and has also been awarded fellowships by
the Institute of International Education and the Graduate School at Rutgers University. She received
her MA in sociology at Rutgers and her BA at the University of Buenos Aires, both with honors. She
is affiliated to the Gino Germani Research Institute (University of Buenos Aires) and is currently a
visiting researcher at the Collective Identity Research Center (University of the Basque Country).
She has participated in numerous research projects with Argentine, American, and European fund-
ing, and has taught undergraduate and graduate courses both in Latin America and the United States.
Her most recent publications include Global Movements, National Grievances: Mobilizing for
‘Real Democracy’ and Social Justice and From Social to Political: New Forms of Mobilization and
Democratization edited with B Tejerina (2012). She is also the co-editor of Grassroots: The
Newsletter of the Research Committee on Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change
of the International Sociological Association. Her research interests lie at the intersection of culture
and politics, with a particular focus on cultural activism and ‘cultural citizenship.’
Benjamín Tejerina is Professor of Sociology and director of the Collective Identity Research
Center at the University of the Basque Country. His research interests include collective action
and social movements, living conditions, precariousness and transformations in work culture,
sociology of language and ethnolinguistic movements, collective identity, social conflict and
youth transitions, and sociological theory. Among his selected publications are From Social to
Political: New Forms of Mobilization and Democratization edited with I Perugorría (2012); La
sociedad imaginada. Movimientos sociales y cambio cultural en España (2010); Barrios multi-
culturales. Relaciones interétnicas en los barrios de San Francisco (Bilbao) y Embajadores/
Lavapiés (Madrid) edited with A Pérez-Agote and M Barañano (2010); Hacia una nueva cultura
de la identidad y la política. Tendencias en la juventud vasca (with B Cavia, G Gatti, A G Seguel,
I Martínez de Albéniz, S Rodríguez Maeso, A Pérez-Agote, and E Santamaría (2005); Los mov-
imientos sociales. Transformaciones políticas y cambio cultural, edited with P Ibarra (1998); and
Sociedad civil, protesta y movimientos sociales en el País Vasco, with JM Fernández Sobrado and

Benski et al. 561
X Aierdi (1995). In 1990 he received the National PhD Dissertation Award in Sociology and
Political Sciences from the Sociological Research Center (CIS, Spain). He is the president of the
Research Committee on Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change (RC 48) of the
International Sociological Association.
Résumé
Dans notre introduction, nous avons noté la façon dont les diverses mobilisations, à partir
de 2011, ont soulevé des questions importantes pour la recherche sur les mouvements
sociaux. Les différents articles de ce numéro ont exploré l’émergence, la dynamique
et l’importance des mobilisations sociales, contestations et affrontements qui ont
commencé avec le ‘printemps arabe’ et qui continuent à ce jour. Ce dernier chapitre se
concentre sur trois aspects principaux qui se dégagent du dialogue des éditeurs avec les
différentes contributions. Le premier est le contexte, et avant tout les ressorts politiques
et économiques du néolibéralisme, les diverses crises de légitimité qu’il a engendrées au
cours des trois dernières décennies, et le rôle des nouveaux médias (TIC) dans la genèse
de ces mobilisations, leur coordination et mondialisation. Le deuxième aspect porte
sur quelques-unes des caractéristiques de ce cycle de discorde, essentiellement sur les
acteurs, leurs réseaux et identités, et sur la nouvelle pratique d’occupation de l’espace
public. La troisième et dernière partie est une tentative pour évaluer l’évolution générale
de ces mobilisations durant les deux dernières années, ainsi que leurs implications.
Mots-clés
Crises de légitimité, horizontalité, espace, identité, neoliberalisme, occupation,
précariat, réseaux sociaux
Resumen
Las diversas movilizaciones que comenzaron en el año 2011 plantean algunas cuestiones
importantes para los analistas de los movimientos sociales. Los artículos que forman
este monográfico profundizan en la emergencia, el desarrollo y la significación de las
movilizaciones sociales, luchas y confrontaciones que comenzaron con la primavera
árabe y que continúan todavía hoy. Este artículo de conclusiones se centra en los
tres aspectos principales que surgen del diálogo entre los editores y las diferentes
contribuciones. El primero se centra en el contexto de las movilizaciones, comienza con
una evaluación político-económica del neoliberalismo, las distintas crisis de legitimidad
que ha alimentado a lo largo de las tres últimas décadas y el papel de los nuevos
medios de información y comunicación en la generación de estas movilizaciones, su
coordinación y globalización. El segundo aspecto aborda algunas características de este
ciclo de contención, principalmente los actores y sus redes, identidades y la estrategia
de ocupar el espacio público. El tercero representa un intento de evaluar la trayectoria
general de estas movilizaciones en los dos últimos años.
Palabras clave
Crisis de legitimidad, espacio, horizontalidad, identidad, neoliberalismo, ocupación,
precariado, redes sociales