No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Europeans' Preference for Ethnic Residential Homogeneity: Cross-National Analysis of Response to Neighborhood Ethnic Composition
Abstract
This article examines Europeans' preference to reside in neighborhoods without ethnic minorities. The analysis is based on data from 20 countries obtained from the 2003 European Social Survey (Jowell and the Central Coordinating Team 2003). The data show that in most countries very few Europeans report living in areas with some or with many ethnic minorities, and that in most countries a substantial number of respondents consider their ideal neighborhood one that does not have residents who are ethnic minorities. Multilevel regression analysis reveals that preference for place of residence as a response to its ethnic composition is significantly affected by both individual-level and country-level characteristics. At the individual level, preference for ethnically homogeneous residence tends to be more pronounced among socioeconomically weak and vulnerable populations, conservative populations, and individuals who reside in communities without ethnic minorities. The country-level analysis demonstrates that preference to live in neighborhoods without ethnic minorities tends to increase with the relative size of the non-European ethnic population and to decrease with economic prosperity. Further analysis reveals that in Europe, preference for residing in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods is influenced by three major social psychological factors: social distance, perceptions of the negative impact of foreigners, and preference for cultural homogeneity. The findings are discussed and evaluated in light of the general literature on structural sources of threat, prejudice, and choice of community, and are compared to findings revealed by research in the United States.
... For example, Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam are more segregated than Surinamese in Amsterdam (Musterd 2005;Logan 2006;Musterd and Van Kempen 2009), Caribbean blacks in cities in the UK are less segregated than either Bangladeshis or Pakistanis (Peach 1999;Musterd 2005;Johnston et al. 2002) and in Lisbon Brazilians are less segregated than Indians (Musterd and Van Kempen 2009). However, despite these meaningful cross-city and crosscountry differences, ethnic residential segregation in Western Europe is substantial and widespread with the ethnic-neighborhoods being viewed as the least desirable place of residence (Bolt et al. 2008;Semyonov et al. 2007). ...
... It should be noted that state intervention in decisions regarding immigrants' residential location is much more common in West European countries than in the traditional immigrant societies such as the United States, Canada or Australia (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998) Studies suggest that native born Europeans prefer to live in communities where immigrants do not reside (Gorbunova et al. 2015;Semyonov et al. 2007).While there is no evidence that members of ethnic minorities object to having members of the majority group as neighbors, it is highly possible that some immigrants actually prefer residing in an ethnic neighborhood than in 'all European' neighborhood. This is so because the ethnic neighborhood can provide members of the immigrant population with shelter from discrimination and with ample advantages that are not available elsewhere. ...
... According to sociological theory a steady and substantial increase in flows of immigrants and in the size of the immigrant populations are expected to increase anti-immigrant sentiment and opposition to immigration (e.g. Semyonov et al. 2007). It has been long argued that rise in the relative size of a minority population (such as immigrants and ethnic minorities) is likely to increase threat of competition over social, cultural and economic resources among members of the majority native-born population. ...
... Similarly, Card et al. (2005) found that, when they controlled for levels of education, older people have stronger anti-immigrant views. 40 Another study (Semyonov, Glikman and Krysan, 2007) noted that individual-level odds of developing positive contact with members of ethnic minorities are lower among older people. Other studies arrived at similar conclusions even when analysing intolerant attitudes expressed towards a particular group. ...
... The link between educational attainment and intolerant attitudes has been frequently observed in the research literature. According to available evidence, well-educated individuals tend to be more tolerant (Semyonov, Glikman and Krysan, 2007), have more positive views on immigration (Herreros and Criado, 2009;Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009) and are more positive about the effects of immigration on the economy and on quality of life (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005). Correspondingly, the less educated a person is, the more negative a stance he or she tends to hold about receiving immigrants in his or her country (Ervasti, 2004). ...
... Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its well-established relationship with education (Winkleby et al., 1992;Evans et al., 1997), socio-economic status has also been identified as a factor associated with intolerance in a range of studies included in this review. Available evidence suggests that vulnerable and socio-economically weak populations are less tolerant (Semyonov, Glikman and Krysan, 2007) and lower social status seems to be associated with increases in the perception of ethnic threat (Schneider, 2008). 41 In addition, manual workers, the self-employed, and routine non-manual workers were found to be more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties in comparison with the service class (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002). ...
... This study asks whether xenophobia is reduced the same way for immigrant groups of different racial profiles via interethnic contact and residential mixing. While prior crossnational studies have examined interethnic contact and residential segregation (Semyonov and Glikman 2009;Semyonov, Glikman, and Krysan 2007), none has examined whether these determinants are shaped by race. ...
... Intergroup contact differs from economic and cultural threat not only in its xenophobia-reducing effect but also because it implies a source of attitudes that is not purely structural. Contact differs among individuals partly as a result of their own preferences for ethnic heterogeneity (Semyonov et al. 2007). Intergroup contact theory thus inserts a dose of cautious optimism since it allows for increased familiarity between groups to reduce anti-immigrant sentiment. ...
Research has shown that immigrants in Europe face exclusion in an increasingly hostile political climate. However, few studies comprehensively investigate whether exclusionism is patterned by a pervasive race–ethnicity hierarchy. This article bridges anti-immigrant attitudes research with the symbolic boundaries literature, which identifies Islam and Muslim “otherness” as a bright ethnic boundary. I use 2014 European Social Survey data to test whether immigrants of different racial–ethnic profiles are excluded along a preference hierarchy and whether this hierarchy structures intergroup contact, a well-known depressor of anti-immigrant sentiment. In all sample countries, I find that same race and Muslim immigrants are the most and least preferred immigrant groups, respectively. Further, while natives’ residential isolation is typically mediated by interethnic contact, both forces exert a dual influence on anti-Muslim exclusionism only. Results qualify the optimism of intergroup contact theories and indicate an extensive targeting of Muslims for exclusion beyond xenophobia or general racist sentiment.
... The attitudes variables measure (1) negative attitudes towards the religious out-group (Sterkens and Anthony, 2008) and (2) the preference for residential segregation (Semyonov et al., 2007;Tabory, 1993). These two attitudinal outcomes are in line with a distinction between cognitive and behavioral components of out-group attitudes (Sandefur and Lam, 1985). ...
... Perceived group threat was measured by nine variables ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) such as "I am worried that job prospects for members of my group would decline due to the presence of other religious groups" and "I am afraid that customs of my group will be lost due to the presence of other religious groups" (see Appendix 1 for the full list). These variables have been successfully used in other studies to measure perceived group threat posed by ethnic minority groups (Scheepers et al., 2002;Schneider, 2008). Although in the literature a distinction is made between realistic threat and symbolic threat (Stephan et al., 2000(Stephan et al., , 2002, the results from the factor analysis with oblique rotation indicated that the variables are highly interrelated and load on a single factor. ...
This study examines the relationship between interreligious contact and negative attitudes towards the religious out-group. It uses unique survey data collected by the authors among Christian and Muslim students in Maluku and Yogyakarta (Indonesia) and Mindanao and Metro Manila (the Philippines). Even after taking self-selection effects into account, interreligious friendships reduce negative attitudes towards the religious out-group. However, casual interreligious contact increases negative out-group attitudes. Also individuals who experienced interreligious violence have more negative out-group attitudes than those without such experience. The experience of interreligious violence has no influence on the effect of interreligious friendships but it further deteriorates the relationship between casual interreligious contact and out-group attitudes. Perceived group threat is an important mechanism explaining the effects of both positive and negative interreligious contact. [125].
... In Europe, and Germany in particular, with lower levels of segregation, such preferences are not that pronounced. In Germany, only 23.3 per cent of the population would prefer to live in an ethnically homogeneous neighbourhood and 37.9 per cent actually do -these are among the lowest numbers in Europe (Semyonov et al., 2007). Moreover, education and income positively influence the attitude towards living in an ethnically diverse neighbourhood. ...
... Thus, middle-class natives should be rather tolerant towards ethnic minorities, at least when they share the same social status. Even if ethnic minority pioneers might evoke fears about declining school quality and property values or increasing crime rates among white neighbourhoods, more time spent in the neighbourhood and a higher familiarity with the ethnic other should decrease natives' negative attitudes (Pettigrew, 1998;Semyonov et al., 2007). This, however, does not seem to be the case. ...
Increasing ethnic and social diversity in cities does not translate into diverse networks of urbanites. Particularly for white middle-classes in gentrified neighbourhoods, there is evidence on boundary drawing to 'unwanted groups' such as ethnic minorities and lower-classes. Rarely have these studies focused on the networks of ethnic minorities, the actual diversity-bringers. I will contribute to the understanding of why and under what circumstances diversity in neighbourhoods gets translated into people's daily practices, hence also networks, by analysing those of middle-class Turkish-Germans in Berlin. Based on interviews and network analysis, I will show that a neighbourhood's ethnic diversity, fellow residents' attitudes towards diversity and the built environment play an important role in building category-crossing ties. Owing to a lack of reciprocity in establishing ties, Turkish-Germans in neighbourhoods with a high share of native-Germans actually have more ties to Turks than those in a more diverse neighbourhood.
... This effect constrains the prospects of economic incorporation and mobility for individuals who belong to minority groups by increasing the level of discrimination (Evans & Kelley, 1991;Lieberson, 1980;van Tubergen et al., 2004). Studies documenting the impact of ethnic competition on social relations commonly analyze discrimination by measuring the impact of the proportion of the minority group among the local population (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2007;Welch & Payne, 2010). ...
... Social distance was measured by the share of blacks in each immigrant group (cf. Lieberson, 1980;Portes & Rumbaut, 2006;Semyonov et al., 2007;Welch & Payne, 2010). Finally, ethnic competition was measured by the share of the local labor market held by the largest four ethnic groups other than the group of the respondent. ...
Previous studies about contextual effects on immigrant economic attainment have generally relied on information from detailed case studies. Focusing simultaneously on characteristics of immigrant groups and the receiving society, these studies produced insightful but strikingly different accounts of the dimensions of the context that affect economic attainment. Responding to this limitation, this paper constructs a comprehensive model of effects of contextual factors on immigrant earnings attainment using 2000 US Census data on all immigrant groups. The paper employs multilevel modeling in studying the effects of both ethnic community resources and external conditions on earnings attainment. Results indicate that both ethnic community resources and external conditions are dominant in shaping earnings attainment by immigrants. Especially important are group resource advantage and the economic conditions at the local labor market.
... In Surveyexperimenten, die in Online-Access-Panels in Deutschland implementiert wurden, deutet sich an, dass Nachbarschaften mit höherem Anteil zugewanderter Personen unbeliebter sind (Schlueter et al. 2018). Im internationalen Vergleich scheint Deutschland jedoch eher in geringerem Maße an einheimisch homogenen Nachbarschaften interessiert (Semyonov et al. 2007). Dies lässt sich durchaus als schwachen Hinweis auf Motive für eine Kundendiskriminierung deuten. ...
Der ungleiche Zugang zum Mietwohnungsmarkt, die ungleiche Versorgung mit Wohnraum sowie die starke räumliche Segregation nach ethnischer Zugehörigkeit stehen im Mittelpunkt des Beitrags. Ethnische Ungleichheiten im Wohnungsmarkt sind vielfach dokumentiert und hängen ganz offensichtlich mit weiteren ethnischen Ungleichheiten, etwa im Arbeitsmarkt, zusammen. Genauer zu untersuchen ist, ob die ethnischen Ungleichheiten im Wohnungsmarkt durch Diskriminierungsprozesse zu erklären sind. Unterschieden werden nachfolgend die Diskriminierung beim Zugang zum Wohnungsmarkt, die Preisdiskriminierung und die Diskriminierung in Abhängigkeit von Merkmalen des Wohnumfeldes. In theoretischer Perspektive werden insbesondere präferenzbasierte und statistische Diskriminierung behandelt. Weiterhin wird diskutiert, wie diese Formen der Diskriminierung mit räumlicher Segregation zusammenhängen. Nach der Darstellung methodischer Probleme bei der Erfassung von Diskriminierung werden Ergebnisse aus Feldexperimenten vornehmlich in Nordamerika und Europa vorgestellt. Insgesamt zeigen sich belastbare Indizien für Diskriminierung. Während die Ergebnisse der Feldexperimente dafür sprechen, dass mit steigender Informationsmenge über die Bewerbenden die ethnische Diskriminierung in der Regel zurückgeht, sind die Zusammenhänge mit räumlicher Segregation weitaus weniger eindeutig. Im Fazit wird für eine Erweiterung der Forschung zu ursächlichen Mechanismen um Suchprozesse, soziale Netzwerke und institutionelle Akteure plädiert.
... The most-studied aspect of this line of research has been households' ethnic background. From this perspective, native households tend to move into native-dominated neighborhoods and to avoid immigrant-dense neighborhoods, whereas non-native households tend to move into more mixed neighborhoods [8,11,13,36,56,57]. ...
Some have argued it is possible to infer different groups’ contributions to ethnic residential segregation from their individual neighborhood preferences. From this perspective, natives tend to be more segregation-promoting than non-natives, since they prefer neighborhoods where they are the majority. It remains unclear, however, whether this holds when one evaluates their contributions to segregation within a dynamic perspective. Using register data from Statistics Sweden, I define and model ten different groups’ residential behavior based on their ethnicity and family composition. I thereby simulate the residential mobility of the full population of Stockholm municipality residents from 1998 to 2012. Even though my results at the micro-level are consistent with previous studies, the simulation results show that foreign singles’ mobility patterns are more segregation-promoting than any other groups, since this group shows a greater in-group feedback effect regarding choice of new neighborhoods, an effect that increases their flow from low-to-high segregated neighborhoods progressively. My results suggest that (1) integration initiatives would be more efficient if focused on this particular group and (2) a proper evaluation of micro-behaviors’ implications for macro-patterns of segregation requires a dynamic approach accounting for groups’ heterogeneous behaviors and their main interdependencies on shaping segregation over time.
... People generally prefer to distance themselves from those who do not share their norms and values (Howells, 1966). Indeed, this tendency toward homophily is strengthened among people with strong attachments to the norms and values of the in-group, and it has been shown to result in spatial and social segregation of peoples with differing values (Schelling, 1971;Semyonov et al., 2007). Moreover, people avoid intergroup contact when they wish to protect important values from cultural dilution (Waterman & Kosmin, 1988) and when they predict that contact with strangers will result in anxiety (Landmann et al., 2019). ...
The conflict in Syria created a dire humanitarian situation, as nations around the world struggled with how best to deal with the more than 6.6 million Syrian refugees who fled their homes to escape aggression. Resistance to granting refugee status to individuals often originates in the belief that the influx of refugees endangers national security because of the presumably extremist religious and political beliefs that refugees hold. The present research surveyed Syrian refugees residing in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq (N = 1,000). The results revealed that the majority of surveyed refugees did not intend to migrate to the West and would rather return to their home country. More importantly, refugees most interested in moving to Western countries were the least likely to subscribe to Islamist extremism or to harbor negative sentiment toward the West. Theoretical and practical implications for addressing the current refugee crisis are discussed.
... Variables explaining neighborhood choice could contribute to some degree to the variation in the outcome variables (van Ham and Manley, 2012). For example, as people tend to prefer neighborhoods with a certain level of homogeneity (Semyonov et al., 2007), they may choose to cluster in neighborhoods with similar sociocultural backgrounds. This clustering could bias the results at the neighborhood level, since people of different backgrounds might have different expectations when evaluating neighborhood quality or well-being aspects. ...
It has been argued that the residential environment could play a role in the lower health and well-being commonly found in deprived areas. Yet, more knowledge is needed on how residential environmental quality together with neighborhood satisfaction relate to neighborhood socioeconomic deprivation. This paper explores the links between neighborhood deprivation and neighborhood characteristics, neighborhood satisfaction, and well-being, using survey and geospatial data from Oslo. Findings on physical neighborhood characteristics show that deprived neighborhoods are not underprivileged in terms of green space, public transport, and local amenities. However, perceived neighborhood characteristics – evaluated by their residents – were found to be negatively associated with neighborhood deprivation. These results suggest that deprived neighborhoods have higher perceived noise and lower perceived safety, cleanliness, aesthetic quality, reputation, and place attachment. Neighborhood satisfaction and emotional response to neighborhood were found to be lower in deprived neighborhoods. Overall, evidence from this study suggests that even when green space, public transport, and local amenities are evenly distributed, residents of deprived neighborhoods may still experience lower levels of neighborhood satisfaction and lower emotional response to neighborhood due to differences in neighborhood qualities such as perceived safety, noise, and place attachment.
... First of all, immigrant populations are on average more religious than native populations in these countries (Van Tubergen and Sindradottir, 2011). Secondly, the prevalence of segregated structures in host countries reduces opportunities for interaction between immigrant and native populations (Semyonov and Glikman, 2009;Semyonov et al., 2007). Immigrant youth are more likely to have immigrant neighbours around and are more befriended with co-ethnic and co-religious peers (Simsek et al., under review;Smith et al., 2016), and therefore are less likely to be raised in a secular community than native youth. ...
Little is known about the religious development of youth in Europe. In light of the growing ethnic diversity of Western European populations, this paper examines two groups of youth with an immigrant background, i.e. Christian and Muslim youth, and compares their religiosity to that of Christian native youth. We differentiate between three indicators of religiosity, namely, subjective importance of religion, frequency of service attendance, and praying frequency. In addition to comparing the changes in the mean of religiosity between groups, we also investigate variations within groups over time. We employ the first three waves of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU), which were collected between 2010 and 2013 with adolescents residing in 958 classes within 480 schools in England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Multiple group linear growth models show that there is an overall slight decrease in subjective importance of religion, frequency of service attendance and praying frequency for Christian youth, while Muslim youth do not experience any significant change on these accounts. Furthermore, the changes in service attendance and praying frequency vary significantly between youth within all groups, while the change with regard to subjective importance of religion varies most within Christian youth and least within Muslim youth.
... Though it is apparent that acculturation occurs as a result of both the immigrants' attitudes and the receiving society's orientations and policies, the focus of the present study is specifically on the immigrants' side. For this reason, we did not include in our review studies that investigated the relationship between PSOC and acculturation attitudes in receiving community members (Castellini, Colombo, Maffeis, & Montali, 2011), PSOC and prejudice (Mannarini, Talò, & Rochira, 2017;Prezza, Zampatti, Pacilli, & Paoliello, 2008), and PSOC and ethnic heterogeneity in urban contexts (Semyonov, Glikman, & Krysan, 2007;Wilson & Baldassarre, 1996). ...
Based on the theoretical framework of multiple psychological sense of community (MPSOC) and acculturation models, the study explored the relationships between territorial (TPSOC) and ethnic PSOC (EPSOC) and the acculturation behaviors of 2 groups of immigrants who settled in Italy, namely, Albanians (N = 230) and Sri Lankans (N = 131). Based on survey data and quantitative analyses (general linear models), TPSOC and EPSOC were considered first separately and then combined, according to a bidimensional model of MPSOC that resulted in four combinations (dual membership, receiving society membership, ethnic membership, and no membership). The findings highlighted significant variations across groups. Among Albanian participants, both TPSOC and EPSOC were positively associated with integration and negatively with marginalization. Dual membership was positively associated with integration, prevailing ethnic membership with separation, and no membership with marginalization. Among Sri Lankan participants, EPSOC showed a positive association with separation. Dual membership was associated with marginalization, prevailing receiving society membership with assimilation, prevailing ethnic membership with separation, and no membership with integration.
... Why do members of ethnic minorities and majorities live in different areas and attend different schools? Although institutional factors (e.g., government, financial services, real estate industry, see Charles, 2003;Dawkins 2004), social class differences (Alba & Logan, 1993;Clark, 2002;Quillian, 2002) or the preferences of minority group members (Clark, 2002;Ihlanfeld & Scafidi 2002;Krysan & Farley 2002) may also contribute to segregated neighborhoods, a large literature has evolved on the issue of why majority group members tend to avoid neighborhoods with a greater proportion of minority residents (Charles, 2003;Krysan, 2002;Quillian, 2002, Semyonov, Glikman, & Krysan, 2007. In fact, many researchers consider anti-minority sentiments, whether in form of stereotypes (Krysan et al. 2009), perceived threat (Semyonov et al., 2002), prejudice (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996), or more subtle variants of outgroup bias (Krysan 2002), to be of key importance for understanding why majority members avoid residential areas with a higher proportion of minority members. ...
Research on intergroup contact has mostly viewed desegregation as a necessary condition for contact to unfold its power to reduce prejudice. Through residential and school choices, however, prejudice also contributes to segregation. To shed light on this bidirectional link, we conducted two survey-based experiments with stratified quota samples of German adults. In Study 1, respondents with less contact and more prejudice indicated a lower likelihood of renting an apartment in a neighborhood with a larger proportion of minority members, although housing quality and crime rate were held constant. In Study 2, similar results were obtained for the likelihood of enrolling their child at a school with a larger proportion of minority students. Building on these results in a computer simulation, we find that because contact only reduces prejudice, but does not produce pro-minority preferences, spontaneous desegregation is unlikely to occur even under the most favorable structural and economic conditions.
... Consequently, answering how and why two groups fail to mix, or why segregation is accentuated, is an important venture in itself. Explanations for why groups mix or not tend to center on economics, discrimination, or preferences (Barra, Contucci, Sandell, & Vernia, 2014;Contucci & Sandell, 2015;Semyonov, Glikman, & Krysan, 2007;Yinger, 1995). As illustrated by Schelling (1971) in his checkerboard model, patterns of residential mixing and segregation arise from people's migration movements. ...
The social mechanism program has been successful in sociology and neighboring social science disciplines, such as criminology and political science. However, in our view the literature on social mechanisms is still too preoccupied with intratheoretical and metatheoretical discussions, and we find very few empirical applications. This is surprising since one of the basic aims of the social mechanisms approach from the start has been to achieve better integration between theory and empirical analyses. Yet of all the previous edited volumes and special issues dedicated to social mechanisms (or to analytical sociology, for that matter), we find only a small number of chapters that are empirically oriented in the sense that they address and try to answer a substantive empirical research question. This is unfortunate: By leaving out the dirty work of empirical analysis, social mechanisms theorists risk surrendering the potential influence of the approach. As a result, new (statistical) methods rather than new approaches to theorizing drive the practice of social science research. Most social scientists are driven by substantial empirical interests, that is, they share a set of questions they want to find answers to, rather than being motivated by abstract methodological and/or theoretical interests. Proponents of the social mechanism approach need to show by example that this approach is a valuable framework for researching broad, mainstream social science issues. This is what we do in this special issue.
... While there are several explanations for residential segregation, some researchers emphasize individual neighborhood preferences as a major contributing factor in creating and maintaining segregation (Bobo and Zubrinksy 1996;Fossett 2006;Krysan 2002a;Krysan and Bader 2007;Schelling 1971;Semyonov, Glickman, and Krysan 2007). The importance of race per se, racial proxies, and racial associations in informing residential preferences is highly contested (i.e., Charles 2003;Emerson, Yancey, and Chai 2001;Harris 2001). ...
Several perspectives dominate as explanations for neighborhood preferences: pure race, racial proxy, race-based neighborhood stereotyping, and race-associated neighborhood factors. This analysis extends and supports the pure race and race-associated neighborhood factors arguments by showing that these theories are applied differently depending on respondents' social class, race and ethnicity, and whether they are talking about white, black, or Latino neighborhoods. Race-associated factors are emphasized for white and black neighborhoods, but pure race serves as a better theoretical framework for understanding people's preferences for Latino neighborhoods. I analyze qualitative interview data, using maps of real neighborhoods and hypothetical neighborhood show cards, to examine the neighborhood preferences of 65 white, black, and Latino residents in Ogden, Utah, and Buffalo, New York.
... Consequently, answering how and why two groups fail to mix, or why segregation is accentuated, is an important venture in itself. Explanations for why groups mix or not tend to center on economics, discrimination, or preferences (Barra, Contucci, Sandell, & Vernia, 2014;Contucci & Sandell, 2015;Semyonov, Glikman, & Krysan, 2007;Yinger, 1995). As illustrated by Schelling (1971) in his checkerboard model, patterns of residential mixing and segregation arise from people's migration movements. ...
In this article, we study the effects of the 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid on ethnic segregation in Spain. Using large-scale Spanish register data consisting of information on 5.4 million international migration events on a monthly basis and 13.9 million intermunicipal migration events, of which 3.8 million events concern the foreign-born population’s internal migration within Spain, the analyses show that ethnic segregation increased (i.e., the average geographical distance) between Arab immigrants and native Spaniards shortly after the terror bombing, but that no such effect was found for other immigrant groups. The analysis also shows that this was a relative short-term effect: After about 1 or 2 years, ethnic segregation started to decline again (and thus resumed the declining trend that was observed during the years before the terrorist bombing). We interpret these results in terms of belief formation mechanisms. Because of priming and framing effects, the terrorist bombings accentuated the salience of ethnic categorizations and induced threat-attributing ethnic stereotypes, which were influencing migration behaviors. However, not only did native Spaniards become more reluctant to live in close proximity to Arab immigrants, Arab migrants also became more inclined to move closer to coethnics, possibly because of a perceived threat to become victims of discriminatory behaviors of the majority population. Priming and framing affects abated after a while, and migration behaviors started to return to normal again. Finally, we discuss a variety of survey data to substantiate the argument that belief formation mechanisms played an important role in these processes.
... A Dutch study finds similar trends; immigrants from non-western origin were more likely to move to concentrations of non-western migrants and less likely to move out of them than natives (Bolt, Van Kempen, andVan Ham 2008, 1376). A cross-European analysis revealed that preferences to reside apart from ethnic minorities among native Europeans are fairly similar to preferences of whites in the US (Semyonov, Glikman, and Krysan 2007). Such discriminatory practices are supported by other European research outcomes, which signals 'white flight' and 'white avoidance', continuously feeding ethnic spatial segregation (Bråmå 2006;Hedman, Van Ham, and Manley 2011). ...
Prevailing Anglo-Saxon theories on urban segregation based on class and ‘migrant-status’ have often been rejected for continental European cities, mainly because of different economic and labour market structures and higher levels of state interventions and welfare support in the latter type of cities. As urban economies in continental Europe are growing ever more global and welfare states are in continuous restructuring we seek to investigate whether a typical European socially balanced migrant city, the city (and metropolitan region) of Amsterdam, is developing into the direction of a more outspoken ‘double dual’ condition with populations getting more spatially segregated in terms of class and migrant status. This study looks at developments in terms of the spatial dynamics of the ‘native’ and immigrant population of different classes. We find that the region is undergoing a transformation, which for now reduces spatial concentrations and inequality. As the urban core is gentrifying and some suburban neighbourhoods are declining, the typical dichotomy of a poor-migrant central city versus affluent-native suburbs is vanishing. These developments point to a different type of social-migrant city, one with a patchwork of residential milieus along social and cultural lines. However, we challenge the sustainability of that patchwork over time.
... at the country level, we need to determine whether immigration rates help to explain eu-related fears. following research on ethnic prejudices and residential preferences (semyonov, glikman & Krysan, 2007), it might be expected that higher numbers of migrants provide a more fertile context for the articulation and diffusion of xenophobic attitudes. they may thus be an indirect asset for eurosceptic opinions. ...
This chapter examines attitudes of European citizens towards the EU. Taking up previous research on Euroscepticism, it focuses on potential fears associated with the EU and the process of European integration. In particular, we strive to find out if citizens are concerned about negative effects of the EU on the situation in their own country, and if their assessments varied across different issue areas (e.g., economy, labour market, culture, social security and politics) and between countries. Finally, we are interested in explaining differences with reference to factors at the individual and country levels. Based on data from the 2008 EVS, we found that European citizens do not voice a generalized, amorphous and diffuse fear about the potential consequences of the EU on their own country. Undoubtedly, we can distinguish more pessimistic and optimistic countries, and more and less worried population groups. However, most fears relate to specific issue areas. Indeed, citizens worry more about the economic consequences of EU membership than about the impact on social security systems, and they worry much less about effects on national cultures and identities. Additionally, individuals turned out to be rather sensitive to the specific context and situation in which they live, in particular to the immediate labour market situation. Moreover, citizens’ fears tend to mirror the specific social-structural position they find themselves in. The greater their vulnerability and the higher the national rates of unemployment, the more inclined they are to fear for detrimental consequences of European integration.
... They also reveal varying levels of socioeconomic outcomes and differential adaptation processes across second generation immigrant groups (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003;Thomson and Crul, 2007;Simon, 2003;Worbs, 2003). The growing body of research on immigrants in Europe repeatedly demonstrates that in most European countries ethnic minorities, especially immigrants from non-European countries and those of the Muslim conviction, are not only geographically concentrated, often in areas of relatively high social deprivation and scare labor market opportunities (Mustered, 2005;Semyonov et al. 2007, Peach, 2005 but they also experience difficulties in integrating into main stream European society and its economy (Model 1999;Algan et al., 2009;Heath, Rothon and Kilpi, 2008). On basis of these studies, it would be reasonable to expect that second generation non-European, especially immigrants of the Muslim conviction, would be disadvantaged in attainment of labor market outcomes. ...
... Moreover, residential segregation is an increasingly widespread phenomenon, in part due to people's preference for living near those who are like them. A substantial number of Europeans wish to reside in areas without ethnic minorities (Semyonov et al., 2007). Half the population across Europe is resistant to ethnic diversity (unequally distributed by social class) and a growing majority of people (two out of three) hold the view that there are, after all, limits to a multicultural society (Coenders et al., 2003). ...
... La última gran explicación de la segregación estriba en el racismo y discriminación voluntaria o involuntaria por parte de los individuos o la sociedad, a través de las propias relaciones interétnicas y del racismo practicado por las diferentes instituciones —Estado, entidades financieras, inmobiliarias, urban manager, constructoras, etc. (véanse Munnell et al., 1996; Yinger, 1995 Yinger, , 1998 McConnel y Akres, 2010;). Más aún, Massey y Denton (1993) y Jargowsky (1997) sostienen que los espacios urbanos segregados que concentran la pobreza son fruto de la discriminación y no de la descentralización urbana (véanse, Semyonov y Glikman, 2009; Fong y Hou, 2009). Hasta el punto que los autóctonos —o en su caso primeros inmigrantes— controlan el mercado residencial y eligen a sus vecinos atendiendo a sus rasgos físicos y/o culturales (Semyonov et al., 2007). ...
The article discusses, first, the spatial segregation experienced by immigrants in Andalusia (Spain), and then the main causes for this. For those questions are used to measure the index of dissimilarity and interaction. In addition, we completed the research to explore the elements that determine the segregation process, for this purpose there was a survey of the immigrant population in Spain. The results show that the residential market in the municipalities where immigrants are highly segmented inserted from the nationality or place of origin. Similarly, the causes of this segregation respond to economic and ethnic exclusion.
... None of these studies document preferences in terms of neighborhood ethnic composition. Using the European Social Survey (ESS), one of the rare datasets containing information on neighborhood preferences, Semyonov, Glikman, and Krysan (2007) show that the French, and more generally Europeans, tend to live in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods and overwhelmingly report they wish to reside in areas without Rathelot and Safi 45 ethnic minorities. The authors also show that in addition to socioeconomic predictors of these preferences, racial prejudice measured by a set of social psychological variables holds consistent explanatory power. ...
This article provides empirical results on patterns of native and immigrant geographic mobility in France. Using longitudinal data, we measure mobility from one French municipality (commune) to another over time and estimate the effect of the initial municipality’s ethnic composition on the probability of moving out. These data allow us to use panel techniques to correct for biases related to selection based on geographic and individual unobservables. Our findings tend to discredit the hypothesis of a “white flight” pattern in residential mobility dynamics in France. Some evidence does show ethnic avoidance mechanisms in natives’ relocating. We also find a strong negative and highly robust effect of co-ethnics’ presence on immigrants’ geographic mobility.
... The growing body of research on the topic suggests that ethnic residential segregation across European cities is substantial, widespread, and for the most part, growing (e.g., Karsten et al. 2006;Logan 2006;Malheiros and Vala 2004;Musterd 2005;Musterd, Ostendorf, and Breebaart 1998;Peach 1997Peach , 2005Van Kempen and Van Weesep 1997). Currently, most metropolitan centers in Europe are characterized by distinctly segregated ethnic neighborhoods that are viewed by native Europeans as the least desirable place of residence (Semyonov, Glikman, and Krysan 2007). Nevertheless, it is not clear from the literature whether and to what extent residence in ethnic neighborhoods in Europe is associated with greater fear of crime and lower sense of safety. ...
Employing data from the 2002 European Social Survey for 21 national representative samples, we provide the first cross-national analysis of the relations between ethnic composition of neighborhood and perception of neighborhood safety in the European context. The data reveal considerable variation both across countries and across individuals in perceived safety. Bi-level regression analysis shows that perceived safety tends to be lower in countries characterized by a high imprisonment rate and among Europeans who are physically and socially vulnerable (e.g., among women and elderly people, and among populations of low income and low education). Net of individual-level and country-level attributes, the analysis shows that perceived safety is lowest in neighborhoods mostly populated by non-European ethnic minorities and highest in neighborhoods mostly populated by Europeans. The effect of ethnic composition of neighborhood on perceived safety holds even after controlling for previous personal exposure to crime and views toward minorities' impact on crime. We discuss the results in comparison to findings in the United States and in the light of theory in order to delineate the ways that views and perceptions about places are formed and shaped.
... Most research on discrimination is based on the attitudes of the majority-group to the minority group and focuses mostly on one country or a small group of countries (Devine, 1989; Hagendoorn & Sniderman, 2001; Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005). Some studies have compared the attitudes of the majority group across several countries (Kunovich, 2004; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov, Glikman & Krysan, 2007; Semyonov, Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2006; Semyonov, Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2008). Few studies have analysed the attitudes of the minority group towards the majority or other minority groups, but these studies are generally situated in one or a small number of countries (Berry & Kalin, 1979; Bobo & Hutchins, 1996; Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind & Perhoniemi, 2006; Snellman & Ekehammer, 2005; Verkuyten, 2002; Verkuyten, 2005; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). ...
Drawing on the second and third wave of the European Social Survey, we analyse the perception of in-group discrimination of 7034 immigrants from 177 different countries of origin in 14 European Union countries. In addition to testing the effects of individual factors, such as education, religion, and migration history, we estimate the effects of macro-characteristics of both origin and destination countries. We distinguish four dimensions of explanations: immigration, religion, economic circymstances and immigration policies. The influence of adherence to Eastern Orthodox, Jewish and non-Christian religions on perceived in-group discrimination is significant, and can not be explained by characteristics of the origin or destination countries. The migration history of these groups is also relevant for the perceived discrimination: immigrants who are citizens of the country of their destination, who speak the majority language at home and who are married to a native perceive in-group discrimination less often. There are strong effects of the macro-characteristics of the country of origin. Immigrants from poorer origin countries perceive in-group discrimination more often. There are also a significant effects of immigration policies of the country of destination: easy access to long term residence, more relaxed rules for family reunion, no special policy or a more easy entrance to the labour-market for immigrants and a higher level of job protection decreases perceived in-group discrimination among immigrants.
... Although empirical findings as to the effect of the economy are somewhat mixed (see e.g. Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2008;Scheepers et al., 2002;Semyonov et al., 2007;Sides and Citrin, 2008;Strabac and Listhaug, 2008) these arguments can be tested with the hypotheses that years with poor economic conditions will have lower levels of support for immigration and immigrants (H3). ...
Why does public opinion change over time? Much debate on this question centers on whether it is caused by the replacement of people or by individuals changing how they think. Theoretical approaches to this question have emphasized the importance of birth cohort succession, generational differences, and changing macro-economic conditions. In this article, we consider the extent to which these processes can account for changing attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. We use a new approach to the study of time trends in public opinion to analyze over 20 years of data on attitudes in Canada. This approach uses multi-level analysis to split attitudinal change into its cohort and period components. We find that most attitude change is the result of changing macro-economic conditions. In contrast, birth cohort succession has little effect. While there is modest evidence of generational differences in attitudes, these differences do not comprise a major part of the overall trend.
... Moreover, residential segregation is an increasingly widespread phenomenon, in part due to people's preference for living near those who are like them. A substantial number of Europeans wish to reside in areas without ethnic minorities (Semyonov et al., 2007). Half the population across Europe is resistant to ethnic diversity (unequally distributed by social class) and a growing majority of people (two out of three) hold the view that there are, after all, limits to a multicultural society (Coenders et al., 2003). ...
This paper reviews workforce diversity literature and its research findings. We identify important gaps between the literature and the challenges of diversity management. These gaps include lack of organizational level analysis, tokenism, and artificially constructed research settings that cannot address a variety of cultural contexts. Furthermore, most studies do not investigate underlying beliefs and values or managerial interventions. We conclude that the diversity field itself is not very diverse and has been dominated by US-centric research. We provide suggestions for future research themes: language diversity, cultural contextualization of diversity, and social class diversity.
... In line with this hypothesis, Wilson and Baldassare (1996) claimed that residents living in more ethnically heterogeneous cities have a lower sense of community. A further confirmation of the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and sense of community is found in a survey involving citizens from 20 European countries (Semyonov, Glikman, & Krysan, 2007): the majority of the respondents answered that their ideal neighborhood would not include ethnic minorities. A recent study (Hombrados-Mendieta et al., 2009) examines how the presence of immigrants affects the sense of community and the quality of life in different city neighborhoods. ...
This study investigates the sense of community and interethnic relations in two different metropolitan areas that vary in ethnic heterogeneity. The study was conducted in Milan, Italy using a sample of 318 participants living in different city districts that vary in ethnic heterogeneity (low vs. high). The participants completed a questionnaire that assessed their psychological sense of community, blatant and subtle prejudice, host community acculturation strategies, and some measures of contact (quality, quantity, and type). The results indicate that high ethnic heterogeneity is related to a lower sense of community, higher blatant prejudice, and exclusionism. Residents living in lower ethnic heterogeneity neighborhoods reported closer contact opportunities and lower levels of prejudice. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
... Most research on discrimination is based on the attitudes of the majority-group to the minority group and focuses mostly on one country or a small group of countries (Devine, 1989; Hagendoorn & Sniderman, 2001; Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005). Some studies have compared the attitudes of the majority group across several countries (Kunovich, 2004; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov, Glikman & Krysan, 2007; Semyonov, Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2006; Semyonov, Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2008). Few studies have analysed the attitudes of the minority group towards the majority or other minority groups, but these studies are generally situated in one or a small number of countries (Berry & Kalin, 1979; Bobo & Hutchins, 1996; Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind & Perhoniemi, 2006; Snellman & Ekehammer, 2005; Verkuyten, 2002; Verkuyten, 2005; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). ...
Empirical studies on individual behaviour often, implicitly or explicitly, assume a single type of decision rule. Other studies do not specify behavioural assumptions at all. We advance sociological research by introducing (random) regret minimization, which is related to loss aversion, into the sociological literature and by testing it against (random) utility maximization, which is the most prominent decision rule in sociological research on individual behaviour. With an application to neighbourhood choice, in a sample of four European cities, we combine stated choice experiment data and discrete choice modelling techniques and find a considerable degree of decision rule-heterogeneity, with a strong prevalence of regret minimization and hence loss aversion. We also provide indicative evidence that decision rules can affect expected neighbourhood demand at the macro level. Our approach allows identifying heterogeneity in decision rules, that is, the degree of regret/loss aversion, at the level of choice attributes such as the share of foreigners when comparing neighbourhoods, and can improve sociological practice related to linking theories and social research on decision-making.
Using data from the 2002 and 2014 waves of the European Social Survey, enriched with contextual data, we examine the impact of perceived ethnic enclaves upon several social outcomes of their residents. Diversity studies usually find a strong negative relationship between social trust and increasing ethnic heterogeneity for majority members. What happens however in residential areas such as ethnic enclaves that offer more opportunities for bridging contacts for majority members and for bonding among migrants and minorities? Our results show that majority, 1st and 2nd generation residents of enclaves have on average poorer social outcomes than non-residents. Nevertheless, residential sorting forms a large part of the enclave penalty story when it comes to the well-being of all groups in the study and the levels of trust and perceived discrimination of the 2nd generation. Importantly, our study suggests that enclaves are not necessarily areas in which people are doomed to chronic unhappiness, and we do not find conclusive evidence that lack of exposure to outgroupers is to blame for lack of trust across ethnic boundaries. Poorer personal and regional economic conditions exacerbate the negative association of the enclave residents with trust, happiness and social distance.
Einstellungen gegenüber zugewanderten Personen und ethnischen Minderheiten können auf lokaler Ebene konkret Wirkung entfalten. In diesem Beitrag werden ethnische Wohnraumpräferenzen untersucht, die als eine Ursache von ethnischer Segregation gelten. Dazu wurden mit der Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS) aus dem Jahr 2016 aktuelle, umfangreiche und bevölkerungsrepräsentative Daten genutzt. Durch die Bewertung hypothetischer Nachbarschaften mit unterschiedlichen Anteilen ausländischer Bewohnerschaft konnten individuelle Toleranzgrenzen ermittelt und mit weiteren Individualmerkmalen sowie der realen Nachbarschaftskomposition in Zusammenhang gebracht werden. Somit kann die Untersuchung neben der Debatte zur Kontakthypothese und Bedrohungstheorie auch zum Diskurs über Nachbarschaftseffekte beitragen. Der Fokus liegt dabei hauptsächlich auf der deutschen Mehrheitsbevölkerung ohne Migrationshintergrund. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass nur ein geringer Teil der Mehrheitsbevölkerung ausschließlich ethnisch homogene Nachbarschaften bevorzugt. Der Großteil scheint mäßig gemischte Wohnumgebungen zu präferieren oder zumindest zu akzeptieren. Da diese Toleranzgrenzen in den meisten Fällen in der Realität nicht überschritten werden, sind für Deutschland keine Ausweichhandlungen wie White Flight oder Avoidance zu befürchten, die eine bisher geringe ethnische Segregation im Wohnraum verstärken würden. Die Befunde multivariater Analysen stehen im Einklang mit bisherigen Erkenntnissen aus der Forschung zu interethnischen Einstellungen – ältere, niedriger gebildete oder politisch eher rechts eingestellte Personen bevorzugen Wohngebiete mit geringerem Ausländeranteil. Wahrgenommene Bedrohung durch ausländische Personen steht wie erwartet im starken negativen Zusammenhang mit der Toleranz für ausländische Nachbarn. Positive interethnische Kontakte gehen hingegen nur in geringerem Maße mit ethnisch heterogener Wohnraumpräferenz einher. Während ein höherer wahrgenommener Anteil ausländischer Personen in der eigenen Nachbarschaft auch mit einer Präferenz für stärker ethnisch gemischte Wohnräume korreliert, zeigt die Berücksichtigung des tatsächlichen Anteils in unterschiedlich definierten Umgebungen keinen systematischen Zusammenhang.
Purpose
A great deal of research has been conducted on the fear of crime (FOC) to date. Despite this attention, there are a wide range of equivocal results in determining the segment of the population most likely to be afraid.
Methods
A meta-analysis was conducted using 114 studies in order to gauge a quantitative relationship between FOC and several demographic variables at both the individual (e.g., race, gender) and neighbourhood (i.e., the presence of incivilities, collective efficacy) level. The current analysis resulted in 572 effect sizes.
Results
The results show that 8 of the 12 selected demographic characteristics significantly predicted FOC.
Conclusions
While data identifying the most fearful segments of the population are generally robust, a moderator variable analysis revealed several elements in the design of individual studies significantly impact the trends they observe, particularly the way FOC is measured and the phrasing of FOC questionnaires.
Jerome Krase verfolgt in seinem Essay die Frage nach der Möglichkeit und den Voraussetzungen von Inclusive Cities unter heutigen globalisiert-transnationalisierten Bedingungen. Er nimmt die Leser_innen in seinem Foto-Beitrag mit auf Stadtspaziergänge in drei verschiedenen Ländern. Seine Analysen, historischen Rückschauen in Bezug auf den Umgang mit Minderheiten im US-amerikanischen-europäischen Vergleich und seine mit Bedacht ausgewählten Bildquellen, die uns Krase vom Everyday Life mitgibt, stehen in einem starken Kontrast zu den skandalisierend-exotisierenden Bildern, die uns die Massenmedien zur Interpretation von Neuer Mobilität und Diversität – insbesondere seit der ‚Wiederentdeckung‘ des Islam infolge 11/09 – nahe legen: Krases visuell-basierte Analysen lassen das Leben in mobilitätsgeprägten Quartieren vor allem als das erscheinen, was es ausmacht – als ein relativ problemloses und unspektakuläres Zusammenleben von Menschen, mit situierten Wissens- und Erfahrungsräumen in der urbanisierten Stadtgesellschaft.
This paper analyzes the residential conditions of immigrants in Spain. Drawing on the concepts of living and housing measure the situation from the indicators of stability, adaptation, livability and accessibility. Data were obtained from the application of a 1738 housing survey and registration of expert housing conditions. The results show a poor housing situation, which affected differently depending on the origin of immigrants.
This book is intended to provide a new approach to the study of global values and global value change, based on representative international survey data, and above all, the World Values Survey. This theme is of growing interest not only to the international social science community, but also international policymakers and business and financial executives in the framework of international values and business studies. Since the book is also designed to serve advanced graduate courses in sociology, political science and economics at Universities, government and business staff training centers, diplomatic academies et cetera, this book also contains themes for 10-20 minute statements (1000-2000 words) that students and course participants should be able to prepare after attending a course on global values. Furthermore, this book covers the entire population in an ever-growing number of countries, and now already comprising some 90% of the total global population on earth. The importance of this data for international politics cannot be overestimated: foreign ministries, international organizations, ministerial planning departments of national governments, national intelligence agencies, international bankers and investors, pension fund managers, global insurance enterprises, organizations of national and international security, NGOs and religious communities can all benefit from these freely available data, which indeed will revolutionize our discourse on international politics and political culture. In our book, we will attempt to define "cultures" on a global scale largely following Alesina and Guiliano (2013). Although some of our preferred World Values Survey indicators are different from those used by Alesina and Guiliano (2013), there is sufficient resemblance between the two approaches, and also there is a high correspondence between the choropleth geographical maps of global values, resulting from the research attempt by Alesina and Guiliano, and our own investigations. We show in this book that the world economic rise of the global South, among them the BRIC countries and the countries of the Arab Gulf, is no coincidence: economic growth in the post-crisis period from 2008 onwards is highly and positively correlated with family values. All too often, the loss of religion and the rise of the shadow economy, including in leading Western countries, go hand in hand. The decay of family values, which are so deeply enshrined in the religious commandments of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and which are also basic to the other global religious civilizations, goes hand in hand with the decay of economic and social values and are explored in this book.
Este trabajo analiza las condiciones residenciales de los inmigrados en Andalucía. Tomando como referencia los conceptos de habitar y de vivienda digna medimos la situación a partir de los indicadores de estabilidad, adecuación, habitabilidad y accesibilidad. Los datos se obtienen de la aplicación de una encuesta en 1 738 viviendas y el registro experto de las condiciones de las viviendas. Los resultados muestran una situación residencial deficiente, que afecta en forma diferente en función del origen del inmigrado.
The article discusses, first, the spatial segregation experienced by immigrants in Andalusia (Spain), and then the main causes for this. For those questions are used to measure the index of dissimilarity and interaction. In addition, we completed the research to explore the elements that determine the segregation process, for this purpose there was a survey of the immigrant population in Spain. The results show that the residential market in the municipalities where immigrants are highly segmented inserted from the nationality or place of origin. Similarly, the causes of this segregation respond to economic and ethnic exclusion.
However much we appreciate the enormous scientific contribution by Professor Ronald Inglehart, who initiated the international data collection of the World Values Survey, our re-analysis of the very World Values Survey data [“roll-outs” of the World Values Survey data wvs1981_2008_v20090914.sav] brought us to question Inglehart’s theories, with which he and his associates interpret the mass of the World Values Survey data. Their theoretical approach does not use a sufficiently number of hard-core indicators how global publics view central issues of economic policy, and their theories overemphasize a secularistic view of the religious phenomenon in modern society. Their theories predict the gradual waning of the religious phenomena in parallel with the increase of human security, and even cherish at times the tendencies brought about by such a waning of the religious element in advanced democracies. Inglehart spells them out: higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the erosion of parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life et cetera. Is that really something to cherish?
Today, societal and economic development is discontinuous; regional centers of the world economy shift at an enormous speed; and above all, religion and family values can be an important assett in the stability of capitalist development. Economic growth inexorably shifts away from the North Atlantic arena towards new centers of gravitation of the world economy. Alberto Alesina’s and Paola Giuliano’s new maps of global values (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013) present a real break with the hitherto existing secularistic consensus of global value research. Their maps of family ties, respect for parents et cetera coincide with the global map of economic growth today.
Leading representatives of the global economics profession now start to take up the challenge to interpret the mass of the data from the World Values Survey project on their own. The essay by Barro and McCleary (2003) was an important beginning and a good example of how today economic research uses data from the World Values Survey project to study the relationship between religion, denominations and economic growth.
Alesina (2013); Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007); Alesina and Guiliano (2010, 2011, 2013); Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012); and Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) all show how the economic discipline can gain hard-core, quantitative and valuable insights from comparative knowledge about such phenomena as generalized trust and social capital, individualism, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and perception of poverty, and religious practice for economic processes.
In our re-analysis, we use the advanced statistical multivariate analysis technique of the Promax factor analysis, which allows for correlations between factors. It is available to the global public via the IBM-SPSS statistical package XXI. We eliminated missing values by listwise delition.
In our first re-analysis, there were 92289 interview partners from around the globe with complete data for all the 30 variables of our research design. Our main model explains 47.89% of the total variance of all the 30 variables. We highlight the relationships between the original 30 variables and the newly derived factor analytical dimensions:
a) economic permissiveness
b) traditional religion
c) racism
d) higher education for the younger generation (education gap between the generations)
e) distrust of the army and the press
f) authoritarian character
g) tolerance and respect
h) the 'ego' company (i. e. the rejection of obedience and unselfishness as values in education)
i) [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy
We also look at the trajectory of global society by analyzing the factor scores along the path of the Human Development Indicator of the UNDP (“human security indicator”, also used by Inglehart and his associates).
Economic permissiveness clearly captures the dimension of lawlessness, moral-ethical decay and the shadow economy, so prominent in contemporary economic theory of growth. In statistical terms, it is the most important of all the resulting factors.
Traditional religion is linked in a very complex way to the absence of economic permissiveness. We also look at the exceptional performers (“residuals”) which best avoided economic permissiveness on each stage of secularization.
We also present Chropleth maps of human values across the globe, and show the regional implications of our analysis.
Our global value development index combines law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy. The weight, given to each factor, corresponds to the Eigen values listed in this work. Our country results show that the five best ranked countries of our entire globe are all western democracies with a solid historical anchoring of their societies in the traditions of the Enlightenment – Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia. But we already find among the next five countries Canada, the two developing countries Vietnam and Tanzania, and the EU-member countries Italy (predominantly Roman Catholic, with a long history of liberal Catholicism since the Second Vatican Council) and Finland (predominantly Protestant). Our global value development index ranks the predominantly Muslim nation of Morocco twelfth – just behind the United States of America – and still ahead the Latin American democracy Uruguay and the EU-country Germany, to be followed by Bosnia and Indonesia.
While in general terms our analysis is quite optimistic about the civil society foundations for a stable democracy for several Muslim countries, including Morocco, Bosnia, Indonesia, Turkey and Jordan, our analysis is fairly pessimistic for the former communist countries and successor states of the former Soviet Union, predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim alike.
In a second factor analysis, we re-analyze the question of Islam and feminism, based on an analysis of all respondents from the World Values Survey. The Muslim population covered in this survey comprises representatives of 62.6% of the Muslim population of our globe.
The data were based on the following variables:
* Age
* Education level (recoded)
* Highest educational level attained
* How important is God in your life
* How often do you attend religious services (never?)
* Important child qualities: religious faith
* Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women (reject)
* Sex (Gender)
* University is more important for a boy than for a girl (reject)
* Acceptancy of woman as a single parent
The respondents (all denominations) comprised n = 173231 representative global citizens in 83 countries and territories. After Promax factor analysis, three factors explained 53.8% of total variance. While the distance to religious practice is explained to some 4% by the education level (correlation between the two factors is 0.192), one can say with certainty that there is no real sharp contradiction between religion and feminism on a global scale. And while gender determines feminist convictions, contained in our analysis to some 40%, it is also evident that feminist convictions are not only held by women, but also increasingly by enlightened men, non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Interestingly enough, our data also show that people supporting typical feminist contentions, like female access to tertiary education and jobs even at a time of crisis (Factor 3), are not necessarily too strongly in support of the acceptancy of women as a single parent (factor loading 0.352, i. e. only 12.39% of variance explained). Single parenthood is a form of household organization very common now in Western countries: the argument is that marriage is an outdated institution et cetera. Support for single parenthood by women is rather an expression of the distance towards religion around the globe (factor loading of 0.431, i. e. 18.58% of variance explained).
Data emerging from the World Values Survey in the first decade of the 2000s also seem to suggest that the precariousness, which more and more characterizes the economies of leading Western countries leads toward an implosion of what Inglehart and his sociological school of thought interpreted as “self-expression values”. Our analysis of the time series element in the World Values Survey data shows that indeed, global value change seems to correspond to various ups and downs. To this end, we calculated which countries – in descending order – had very high increases or decreases in non-traditional values over preceding World Values Survey surveys from the original WVS website Inglehart’s own data (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54). The very idea that self-expression values in the West are imploding, while in other regions of the world they are rising, is a challenge to existing value theories.
The world, described by Inglehart and Baker, 2000, where in advanced industrial societies people pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures no longer seems to exist for the “1.000 Euro” generation born after 1975, which experiences more and more job insecurity and hardly finds full-time tenured work opportunities, let alone the financial means to travel to long-distant countries. No wonder then that “self-expression” is dramatically declining in the West.
We also highlight the fact that the latest wave of World Values Survey data, wave 6, from 2010 - 2014, released in May 2014 contains an item which directly asked 74,044 respondents in 52 countries whether they think that self-expression is an important value for child education. The correlation between these data and Inglehart’s self-expression index is negative and the R^2 between the two variables is almost 20%.
Among the twenty countries of our globe with a strong resilience of the self-expression tendencies, there is a greater number of Muslim countries (i.e. members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) among them. Let us think for an instance Inglehart’s theory to its end: according to the World Values Survey data, among the twenty superstars of a resilient trend towards self-expression we find Jordan; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Nigeria; Turkey; Algeria; Egypt; and Uganda!
The most notable implosions or slow developments of self-expression – independent from the secularization process – had to be noted by contrast in western democracies. The resilience of self-expression is explaining more than 1/5 of economic growth in the world system. Muslim countries are among the trend leaders in both directions, i.e. the resilience of self expression, and economic growth during the crisis years. Our Choropleth maps in this part of our article underline our contentions. Even a pure Inglehartian world values analysis would have to come to the conclusion that the value basis of Western society is eroding.
So while the methodology of the two approaches – Inglehart’s and our own – is different, the same conclusions can be drawn from it.
With all the extensions of the World Values Survey project over the last decades, both in terms of geography as well as the completeness of the data, the Inglehart world map of global values recedes into the memory about a world order, which no longer exists and which was severely shattered in its foundations by the tsunami of the global economic crisis of 2008. As we try to show in this article, it was also shattered by the long shadows of the internal corrosion, which social decay and the loss of values brought about long before the 2008 crisis hit the North Atlantic arena.
In addition, we present a still more conclusive proof of the interrelationship between the different types of permissiveness and the weight these factors have in relationship to the other variables contained in the World Values Survey data. Based on our analysis of the complete available data based on 28 items from the World Values Survey from 70 countries of the world, including the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) member countries Albania; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Burkina Faso; Indonesia; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Nigeria; Turkey; and Uganda we attempt to show the interrelationships between permissiveness, the shadow economy, educational values, and other socio-political variables, like fundamental positions on the market economy and democracy.
The nine factors to be extracted from the data for more than 90.000 representative respondents in 70 countries are the following:
• moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’)
• acceptancy of the shadow economy(‘Permissiveness 2’)
• distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’)
• educational values: independence and imagination
• distance to market economy values
• education values: responsibility and tolerance
• educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving
• right wing acceptance of inequality
• educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work
Contrary to Inglehart’s expectations about a positive role of the low importance given to religion in society, and divorce and abortion being fully accepted, it emerges that the two factors of permissiveness (permissive family values and the loss of hard-core Max Weberian economic values) are closely interrelated with one another and with the loss of religious values.
Table 5.3 of our article shows the factor loadings for each of the variables analyzed here. The variables with a high importance for “effective democracy”, i. e. tolerance and respect for other people, rejection or acceptance of corruption, and the assessment of democracy as such and vis-à-vis military rule, are highlighted in our Table 5.3. Nowhere there is a notable negative or positive factor analytical loading of beyond 0. 333 (>10% of variance explained) confirming that religious people are antidemocratic, right-wing, and pro or anti-market.
In addition, the structure of the factor loadings even suggests the following:
a) distance from religion is even a motive to reject a democratic political system
b) moral/sexual permissiveness goes hand in hand with economic and social decay
Table 5.4 shows the correlations between the promax factors, extracted from the correlation matrix between the variables of our model. Table 5.5 and Maps 5.1 to 5.9 show the country values for our analysis (“factor scores”) as well as the cascades of moral and social decay in the Western countries and also the evidence for the Muslim countries with available data. Graph 5.5 finally summarizes the pessimistic research findings, which rather support the views of Barro and Schumpeter against the secularistic and permissive logic, proposed by Inglehart.
In Table 5.6 we provide our readers with clear-cut Pearson-Bravais correlation coefficients between the data presented by Hofstede and Inglehart and the factor scores from our own analytical dimensions, presented in this work on the bases of promax factor analysis with individual data from up to more than 80 countries. Table 5.7 shows the Pearson-Bravais correlations between the Ralston et al. dimensions and our results. Ralston et al. is an application of the Schwartz categories to global business people. There was an enormous reception of the works of Shalom Schwartz, an Israeli psychologist and Professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem especially in the expanding field of international business studies. Our quantification of Schwartz’s theory relies exclusively on Ralston et al. The reason is simple: Ralston et al., 2011 – somewhat in the tradition of Hofstede - use samples, based on business people (Hofstede: one company, IBM; Ralston et al., 2011: business people in general). Thus his sampling is restricted to a certain segment of society, while Schwartz’s categories are much more encompassing. To provide more encompassing tests of Schwartz’s theory in the framework of theories of overall global value change would be the theme for another essay, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
In Chapter 12 we analyze correlations and also show the relationships of the Ralston et al. business people data with our own dimensions. As with Hofstede and the GLOBE Project, influenced by Hofstede, there is, as we already mentioned, a problem of limited country samples in Ralston et al., 2011. To understand the Ralston et al. framework, one has to emphasize that Schwartz himself presented analyses of data from up to 73 countries, validating seven basic cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them: West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, and South Asian, Confucian influenced, and African and Middle Eastern.
His seven dimensions are
1. Embeddedness
2. Hierarchy
3. Mastery
4. Affective Autonomy
5. Intellectual Autonomy
6. Egalitarianism
7. Harmony
In many ways, we can show that Hofstede’s Power Distance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Long-Term Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint very well correspond to our own factor analyses. The same happens with Inglehart’s main dimensions, traditional versus secular, and survival versus self-expression, which we can well interpret in our own system. In all cases, however, we could avoid some of the problematic assumptions, still inherent in the research by Hofstede and Inglehart.
Table 5.8 shows the correlations of the country scores from Ralston et al.’ work with standard socio-economic indicators. Interestingly enough, Muslim population shares and OIC membership present high correlations with the Ralston et al. factors “Embeddedness”, “Hierarchy” and “Mastery”.
We then debate current contentious political cleavages, especially in Europe in the light of the empirics, as suggested by the World Values Survey. These days, in the leading world newspapers we read stories which tell us a lot about the conflicts about global values in countries like Europe today. Is prostitution justifiable? Is homosexuality justifiable? The French socialists, it seems, for example seem to think that one is not, and the other is. President Hollande and his administration put considerable political energy into legalizing homosexual marriages and prohibiting prostitution. But global citizens hold another view, and there is a high positive correlation of 0.632 between the two items in the World Values Survey, based on 218877 individuals from around the globe. I.e. people in favor of the complete acceptability of homosexuality will also be in favor of the complete acceptability of prostitution and vice versa.
Graph 5.1 highlights the politically, socially and ethically robust and globally applicable message of our article on the drivers of “effective democracy”: a sound gender political agenda, ending the political discrimination of women, and economic freedom will be conducive to “effective democracy”. Nevertheless the path towards “effective democracy” will be one of ups and downs, and especially in developing countries, there will be also certain limits for a too rapid economic liberalization in terms of “effective democracy”.
As the manuscript to this article was about to be finished, the new data of the World Values Survey, 2010-2014 were released, containing yet another enormous wealth of new data, including on the Muslim world. We have chosen to concentrate on two phenomena, which received a large attention on the pages of this article – tolerance and democracy.
In Table 5.12 we calculate a simple UNDP Human Development Index type of Index of Tolerance, minimizing the rejection of neighbors with the following characteristics among the publics of the above mentioned countries of wave 6 of the World Values Survey:
People who speak a different language
People of a different religion
Immigrants/foreign workers
People of a different race
According to the World Values Survey data, the most tolerant nation on earth today is Uruguay, followed by Sweden; New Zealand; Spain; Trinidad and Tobago; Poland; Rwanda; Colombia; Chile and Australia.
Uzbekistan, Morocco and Kazakhstan are nowadays ahead of Germany; and Pakistan, Qatar and Tunisia are more tolerant than the EU-member country Romania. Some Muslim countries such as Turkey (which is still ahead of the OECD-member country South Korea), have still a poor performance.
Table 5.13 and Maps 5.9 to 5.12 list the World Values Survey results for the average importance given by the global publics to democracy and the standard deviation of this indicator. Where the standard deviation is low, opinions on democracy – either way – are undivided, while high standard deviations indicate that the publics are – often bitterly – divided on the issue of democracy.
Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very high internal divisions on this issue are Tunisia; Mexico; Romania; Armenia and Yemen. While there is a general consensus that democracy is important, there are important dissenting voices. Nostalgia for past more authoritarian patterns of government can go hand in hand with economic discontent with present conditions. Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are the Netherlands; Egypt; Sweden; Turkey; and Cyprus. For anyone, attempting to turn back the clocks of history in such countries could result to be a very costly error. The recent introduction of internet censorship in Turkey would be just one example showing the relevance of this hypothesis.
Countries with still a below than average importance assigned to democracy, but already very high internal divisions on the issue are Libya; Philippines; Qatar; the Occupied Palestinian Territories; and Russia. In these countries and territories, debates on the issue of democracy will surge, one way or the other. While the average importance assigned to democracy is still lower than the world average, the divisions on the issue are already very high, and unforeseen events could trigger a popular movement for more participation and democracy. Finally, countries with a below than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are Singapore; Rwanda; South Korea; Estonia; and Lebanon. One might expect that the current stagnation in the democratic development of the country will continue: publics don’t assign a great importance to democracy, and they are hardly divided on this issue.
Table 5.13 and our maps also have another, more immediate and direct implication: the dire state of the support of democracy in many Western countries, currently hit by the economic crisis and austerity packages, and the surge of democracy in the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular. That Egypt is ahead of Germany, Uzbekistan ahead of the EU-members Poland and Spain, and a number of other Arab and Muslim countries in general ahead of the United States; and Qatar ahead of the EU-member Estonia with justification could be celebrated by the Arab and Muslim readership of this article.
JEL Classification: A13; Z12; P48; O017; N3
Keywords: Relation of Economics to Social Values; religion; other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights, Formal and Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements; Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy
This article examines lifeworlds and transformations in multiethnic and multireligious neighborhoods in Germany. The author illustrates how by way of minute everyday interactions and encounters, individuals and groups experience each other and devise new practices that aim to accommodate the cultural and religious needs of all involved. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in Stuttgart, this article argues that neighborhood spaces, everyday encounters, and ensuing cultural compromises are of fundamental importance for the construction of multiethnic and multireligious urban futures. The article focuses on the interaction of Muslim and non-Muslim individuals and groups in the context of individual, small group interactions, and larger neighborhood events. The author illustrates how concrete changes are negotiated and have become part of local practices and a distinct neighborhood ethos of cultural understanding and cooperation.
Segregated ethnic neighborhoods are prevalent in most contemporary European cities. Whereas patterns of segregation have been studied extensively in America, research on immigrants’ segregation and residential location in Europe is relatively new. The present research utilizes data from the European Social Survey to examine patterns of locational attainment among immigrants across 13 European countries and the extent to which they are influenced by immigrants’ tenure in the host country, socio‐economic characteristics, preferences for residential location, exposure to discrimination, and ethnic and cultural origin. The analysis reveals that residential attainment varies considerably across ethnic and cultural groups: immigrants from Asia or Africa as well as Muslims are less likely to reside in neighborhoods which are perceived to be inhabited mostly by Europeans. Although the effects of generation, ethnic origin, and Muslim religion on residential location are quite uniform across countries, some meaningful cross‐national differences in patterns and levels of immigrants’ residential segregation are observed and discussed. Net of other effects, differential residential preferences and perception of discrimination are found to influence perceived ethnic composition of immigrants’ neighborhoods.
This study examines patterns of ethnic residential integration in Great Britain and the United States. Using data from 2000/2001 censuses from these two countries, we compute segregation indexes for comparably defined ethnic groups by nativity and for specific foreign-born groups. We find that blacks are much less segregated in Great Britain than in the United States, and black segregation patterns by nativity tend to be consistent with spatial assimilation in the former country (the foreign-born are more segregated than the native-born) but not in the latter. Among Asian groups, however, segregation tends to be lower in the United States, and segregation patterns by nativity are more consistent with spatial assimilation in the United States but not in Great Britain. These findings suggest that intergenerational minority disadvantage persists among blacks in the United States and among Asians in Great Britain. We caution, however, that there are important differences in levels of segregation among specific foreign-born Asian groups, suggesting that assimilation trajectories likely differ by country of origin. Finally, the fact that segregation levels are considerably higher in the United States for a majority of groups, including white foreign-born groups, suggests that factors not solely related to race or physical appearance drive higher levels of ethnic residential segregation in the United States.
Ethnic residential segregation has long been viewed as a major structural mechanism through which ethnic and racial minorities are denied equal access to opportunities, rewards, and amenities. Residential segregation also decreases opportunities for establishment and development of social ties and contacts between members of ethnic minorities and members of the majority population. This article examines the complex inter-relations between ethnic residential segregation, inter-ethnic social contacts and attitudes toward minorities within the context of European societies. It specifically examines the following hypotheses: first, ethnic residential segregation (i.e. residence in homogeneous all-European neighbourhoods) restricts opportunities for establishment and development of inter-ethnic social contacts; second, positive inter-ethnic contacts are likely to reduce anti-minority attitudes (i.e. perception of threat and social distance); and third, contact mediates the relations between the ethnic composition of neighbourhood of residence and anti-minority attitudes. Using data from the 2003 European Social Survey for 21 European countries a series of multi-level regression models are estimated to examine the hypotheses within a cross-national comparative framework. Although the findings generally support the theoretical expectations, they also underscore the complex ways in which patterns of ethnic residential segregation affect attitudes toward minority populations through inter-ethnic contacts. Explanations for the findings are offered and discussed in light of the theoretical expectations presented at the outset of this article.
The creation of a balanced ethnic mix at the neighbourhood level is a common objective of contemporary housing policies in
many European countries. According to its proponents, these policies aim to stimulate social mobility and social integration,
often within a wider attempt at urban regeneration. Germany is looking back at a long tradition of mixing strategies aimed
at ethnic desegregation. Whereas other countries take a more subtle approach, targeting ethnic segregation indirectly by means
of a social or housing mix, some German cities have tried to prevent ethnic concentrations by imposing moving-in bans or quotas
on foreigners in certain quarters, restrictions that are still maintained under the recent anti-discrimination legislation.
In applying a constructionist approach, the article critically discusses the reasoning behind the German policies. It tries
to shed light on some shared features in the discourse on ethnic segregation across Europe and highlights the particularities
of the German strategies. It further tackles the question of future prospects for desegregative housing policies against the
background of demographic realities, the entrance of financial investors in the (German) housing market and the ongoing shrinkage
of the social housing sector.
The prevailing opinion in the sociological literature is that middle-class blacks are almost as segregated from whites as are poor blacks. We re-examine this view, using a multivariate, locational-attainment approach in place of a segregation-index one. Controlling for a variety of socioeconomic characteristics, we find that middleincome, suburban African Americans live in neighborhoods with many more whites than do poor, inner-city blacks. But their neighborhoods are not the same as those of whites having the same socioeconomic characteristics; and, in particular, middle-class blacks tend to live with white neighbors who are less affluent than they are. While, in a significant sense, they are less segregated than poor blacks, race still powerfully shapes their residential options.
I don't believe that people would object to Lena Home [as a neighbor]. I don't think they would object to Harry Belafonte. I think they're afraid of poverty, and they associate welfare and low income, whether you're Italian, Greek, Irish, or upstate Clinton County.
—Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo speaking of segregation in Yonkers
The study examines change over time in sentiments toward out-group populations in European societies. For this purpose data were compiled from four waves of the Eurobarometer surveys for 12 countries that provided detailed and comparable information on attitudes toward foreigners between 1988 and 2000. A series of multilevel hierarchical linear models were estimated to examine change in the effects of individual- and country-level sources of threat on anti-foreigner sentiment. The analysis shows a substantial rise in anti-foreigner sentiment between 1988 and 2000 in all 12 countries. The rise in anti-foreigner sentiment was steep in the early period (between 1988 and 1994), then leveled off after that. Although anti-foreigner sentiment tends to be more pronounced in places with a large proportion of foreign populations and where economic conditions are less prosperous, the effects of both factors on anti-foreigner sentiment have not changed over time. The analysis also shows that anti-foreigner sentiment is more pronounced in places with greater support for right-wing extreme parties. The impact of individual-level socioeconomic characteristics such as education has remained stable over the years, but the effect of political ideology has increased. The meaning and significance of the findings are discussed within the context of European societies.
This paper addresses the complex issue of Albanian migrants' economic and social incorporation in a Greek city, Thessaloniki. The empirical base of the research is 30 in-depth interviews with Albanian migrants. Migrants' integration is seen in a dynamic perspective, which examines different contexts of incorporation: the policy framework, the labour market context, the socio-spatial environment, and the role of social networks. Exclusion and integration of migrants in the host country are seen as dynamic processes, which may be contradictory but operate in parallel. Incorporation thus becomes the process through which immigrants, despite structural and institutional obstacles, build their lives in the host society; it is strongly conditioned by time and it may also take place-specific characteristics.
Residential segregation, especially of blacks from whites, remains the common pattern in urban America. This research examines
the part that popular attitudes on residential integration may play in the process of residential integration/segregation.
Using data from a large multiethnic sample survey in Los Angeles, we examine three hypotheses about the nature of attitudes
toward residential integration. The perceived economic status difference hypothesis holds that attitudes about racial residential
integration rest upon assumptions about likely class background differences between ethnic groups. The mere in-group preference
hypothesis suggests that ethnocentrism results in mutual across-group preferences for residential contact with in-group members.
The prejudice hypothesis suggests that hostile attitudes toward an out-group shape views on residential integration. Little
evidence in support of the perceived economic status difference and mere in-group preference hypotheses can be found. Theories
of prejudice, in particular Blumer's theory of group position, provide much greater leverage on residential integration attitudes.
We discuss the implications of the results for actual behavior and aggregate patterns of racial residential segregation.
All agree that many factors contribute to ethnic segregation, but controversy continues regarding the relevance of particular factors. In my paper I acknowledge the importance of discrimination, but I direct attention to the role of ethnic preferences and social distance dynamics. I do so because many dismiss the relevance of these factors for contemporary segregation without engaging formal theories and analytic models which suggest that dynamics associated with in-group attraction and out-group avoidance may take on increasing importance as past forms of discrimination slowly fade. Agent-based modeling shows promise for exploring the issue of whether prejudice against out-groups and affinity toward in-groups can build and sustain segregation in the absence of discrimination. Research drawing on this approach is at an early stage of development but is significant for highlighting two things. One is that the implications of preferences for segregation are strongly conditioned by the ethnic demography of the city. Another, closely tied to the first, is that different views about the implications of preferences for segregation often hinge on inconsistencies in how notions of integration and segregation are applied in discussions of individual location choices, the ethnic mix of single neighborhoods, and the ethnic distributions for all neighborhoods in a city. Critiques of agent-based models of Schelling-style preference effects will carry more force when they outline models indicating how location decisions guided by preferences documented in surveys can produce or sustain integration.
This research integrates and elaborates the basic premises of H. Blumer's (1958) group position theory of prejudice. It does so in order to make explicit, more fully integrated, and empirically pliable the theoretical foundations of a sociological analysis of the nature of racial prejudice. In so doing, the research identifies important areas of agreement between Gordon Allport's approach to prejudice and that of Blumer. Blumer neither provided a full synthetic statement of his several major pieces on prejudice nor pursued sustained empirical research in the area. Hence, the present article (1) identifies the core assumptions of the group position model, (2) summarizes a recent line of empirical work examining claims embedded in the group position approach, (3) specifies how this approach difters from other closely related approaches, and (4) identifies major tasks for future theoretical and empirical work. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Almost a decade ago, the Kerner Commission warned that this country was moving toward two societies—one white and one black. Data on residential segregation indicate clear-cut boundaries for these two societies—large cities are becoming black but most suburban areas remain white. Detroit is a case in point and this led the 1976 Detroit Area Study to investigate the sources of racial residential segregation. Our approach was guided by three hypothesized causes of this segregation: (i) the economic status of blacks, (ii) the preference of blacks to be with their own kind, and (iii) the resistance of whites to residential integration. We developed several new measurement techniques and found that most evidence supported the third hypothesis. Blacks in the Detroit area can afford suburban housing and both blacks and whites are quite knowledgable about the housing market. Most black respondents expressed a preference for mixed neighborhoods and are willing to enter such areas. Whites, on the other hand, are reluctant to remain in neighborhoods where blacks are moving in and will not buy homes in already integrated areas. This last result has been overlooked by traditional measures of white attitudes toward residential integration but emerges clearly with the new measure.
This article describes recent trends in the residential patterns of ethnic minorities, specifically Turks and Moroccans, in Dutch cities. In order to evaluate the patterns and their dynamics, some general observations about segregation are included. The patterns in the big cities are compared to those observed elsewhere in the country and in other European cities. This brief comparison is followed by a discussion of how the observed spatial patterns affect the social life of the groups in question. The article concludes with a list of factors that are likely to influence the evolution of ethnic residential patterns in the Netherlands in the near future. There seem to be ever fewer reasons to believe that the trend towards increasing segregation in Dutch cities can be reversed.
In the present paper we compare public views regarding the equality of rights foreigners deserve in Germany and Israel using data from two national representative samples (ALLBUS in Germany, 1996 and Attitudes Towards Minorities Survey in Israel, 1999). The data reveal that anti‐immigrant sentiments (as expressed by the denial to grant rights to foreign workers) are more pronounced in Israel than in Germany. These findings hold even after controlling for individual socio‐economic and demographic characteristics and differential levels of threat. In both countries, support for foreigners' rights tend to increase with level of education and to decline with age. In Germany, support for rights is also affected by income (positively), right‐wing orientation (negatively), and residence in East Germany (negatively). In both countries, the most important determinant of support for foreigners' rights is the perception of threat. The greater the threat the more likely citizens are to deny rights to labour migrants. It should be noted, however, that the impact of threat on attitudes towards foreigners' rights as well as the impact of political orientation (right‐wing) is more pronounced in Germany than in Israel. While threat is the more important determinant of anti‐foreigner sentiments in both societies, it only partially intervenes between individual characteristics and attitudes toward foreigners' rights.
The debate over the role of the forces that create the patterns of residential separation has identified neighborhood preferences as one of the explanatory variables, but although we possess some empirical data on the nature of neighborhood racial preferences, the theoretical contributions have received only limited empirical evaluation. Among the theoretical statements, Schelling's model of the effects of small differences in preferences on residential patterns has provided a basic building block in our understanding of preferences, choices, and patterns. Several recent surveys of residential preferences provide the data with which to evaluate the underpinnings of the Schelling model. The preference/tolerance schedules that are derived from the data have a different functional form from that suggested by Schelling, but confirm the view that stable integrated equilibria are unlikely.
The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.
Social deprivation and social isolation perspectives provide grounds for expecting residential segregation to increase violent crime among oppressed minorities. This paper examines the impact of racial residential segregation on rates of African-American homicide victimization for large US central cities. The analyses demonstrate that black-white segregation leads to higher rates of black killing although the relationship exists only for stranger and acquaintance homicides. This suggests that social isolation, rather than social deprivation, is the mechanism by which segregation leads to higher levels of homicide among African Americans. -from Authors
This paper examines trends in residential segregation for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in 60 SMSAs between 1970 and 1980 using data taken from the 1970 Fourth Count Summary tapes and the 1980 Summary Tape File 4. Segregation was measured using dissimilarity and exposure indices. Black segregation from Anglos declined in some smaller SMSAs in the south and west, but in large urban areas in the northeastern and north central states there was little change; in these areas blacks remained spatially isolated and highly segregated. The level of black-Anglo segregation was not strongly related to socioeconomic status or level of suburbanization. Hispanic segregation was markedly below that of blacks, but increased substantially in some urban areas that experienced Hispanic immigration and population growth over the decade. The level of Hispanic segregation was highly related to indicators of socioeconomic status, acculturation, and suburbanization. Asian segregation was everywhere quite low. During the 1970s the spatial isolation of Asians increased slightly, while dissimilarity from Anglos decreased. Results were interpreted to suggest that Asian enclaves were beginning to form in many U.S. metropolitan areas around 1980.
Gordon Allport's landmark book, The nature of prejudice, defined the field of intergroup relations for social psychologists as the study of prejudice and its effects on group interactions. He organized existing knowledge about societal, group and personality determinants of prejudice acquisition and persistence in a way that suggested new directions for research. Moreover, he brought the subject of ethnic stereotyping into the mainstream of behavioral science by treating this phenomenon as a special case of ordinary cognitive functioning. The cognitive approach has since become the dominant theoretical perspective in research on prejudice and discrimination. Allport was impressed by the apparent nonreversability of ethnic stereotypes; his pessimism about the prospects for immediate prejudice reduction in the United States remains a prevalent point of view among investigators. On the optimistic side, he discerned the inherent conflict in the American mind between two strongly held value frames, social stratification and social equality, as a psychological condition favoring attitude change as the status of racial minorities improved. Forty years of social psychological research have not provided strong support for Allport's assumption that prejudice causes discrimination nor an explanation of the substantial long-term movement in the majority's racial sentiments and beliefs.
Are housing prices lower in neighborhoods with high concentrations of black residents? If so, is this relationship evidence of pure discrimination, or can it be explained by considering nonracial neighborhood traits? These questions derive their importance from the link between mobility patterns and residential segregation, and the consequent relationship between high levels of segregation and a host of deleterious outcomes. I assess the magnitude and motivations of racial aversion by conducting a hedonic price analysis of geocoded data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. I find clear evidence of lower property values in neighborhoods with relatively high proportions of black residents. However, whether it is blacks' race or their socioeconomic status that affects property values depends on whether housing units are rented or owner-occupied.
A study of the expressed preferences of four different ethnic groups in the Los Angeles metropolitan area shows strong desires for own-race combinations in the ethnicity of neighborhoods that individuals say they would choose when seeking a new residence. The results also show that Anglos are not the only group to practice "avoidance" of other racial/ethnic neighborhoods, although avoidance behavior by Anglos is the strongest. Because the issues of racial composition are socially sensitive, additional tests examined the relationship of preferences to behavior. Although many behaviors generally follow expressed preferences, members of households who expressed "no preference" also were found to largely choose own race neighborhoods. The results of this study suggest that the expressed preference for own race/own ethnicity, in combination with short-distance local moves, is likely to maintain present patterns of separation in U.S. metropolitan areas.
The research examines the impact of labor market competition and fear of economic competition on support for economic discrimination against outgroup populations. The data, obtained from a national representative sample of 1,100 Israeli citizens, focus on attitudes toward foreign workers in Israel. The findings revealed by the analysis lead to the following conclusions. First, a considerable number of Israelis view foreign workers as posing a threat to their economic interests (i.e., wage level, employment opportunities). Second, endorsement of economic discrimination against foreign workers is substantial. The analysis lends firm support to socio-psychological explanations of discrimination, suggesting that fear of economic competition (i.e., perceived threat) is more pronounced among the disadvantaged, subordinate, and vulnerable populations; and that support of economic discrimination against foreign workers is affected first and foremost by perceived threat. Further analysis provides considerable support for the split labor market model. It reveals that most of the effect of socioeconomic and employment status on the endorsement of discrimination is mediated via perceived threat of economic competition. The effect of ethnicity on endorsement of discrimination, however, is not consistent with the split labor market model. Other things being equal, Jews-the superordinate ethnic group in Israel-express higher support of economic discrimination than Arabs-the subordinate ethnic group. These findings are understood and discussed within the context of Israel as an ethno-national state.
Across Europe, urban education systems are struggling with the process of integration of immigrants in schools. The process of inclusion and exclusion in European cities shows many similarities with earlier experiences in U.S. cities. This article explores the most important aspects of this new urban phenomenon and its impact on urban school systems. It clearly shows that ethnic segregation in elementary and secondary schools is widespread in Dutch cities. This ethnic segregation is caused by a combination of residential segregation and parental choice. The article also deals with recent Dutch studies on the effects of segregation. Finally, it treats the question of how schools and authorities, in a long-standing tradition of parental choice, are dealing with this segregation. Given the debate of choice in the United States, the Dutch case offers an ideal opportunity for empirically testing some assumptions in the discussion concerning the relationship between choice and segregation.
Two opposing hypotheses seek to explain why black-white residential segregation persists despite open housing laws. One perspective argues that discriminatory practices in the marketing of real estate are responsible. Another view contends that it is the preferences of both blacks and whites for their own neighborhoods that maintain segregation. Using data from the Detroit Area Study of 1976 and 1992, the authors test the hypothesis that stereotypes among whites play an important role in explaining their resistance to integrated neighborhoods. They conclude that stereotype use links white preferences to discriminatory real estate practices in a way that helps to explain the persistence of segregation in the Detroit area.
Integrating ecological, demographic, and criminological theory, this article examines the role of violent crime and socioeconomic disadvantage in triggering population decline in Chicago neighborhoods from 1970 to 1990. The results show that high initial levels of homicide and increases over time in the spatial proximity to homicide were associated with large losses in total population across 826 census tracts. However, we also observe sharp group differences in patterns for blacks and whites. Although both black and white populations declined in response to high initial levels of homicide and socioeconomic disadvantage, increases in neighborhood homicide, spatial proximity to homicide, and socioeconomic disadvantage were associated with black population gain and white population loss. In discussing these findings, we argue that taking violent crime and spatial processes into account resolves the apparent contradiction between Wilson's depopulation hypothesis and Massey's segregation hypothesis on the increasing concentration of urban poverty.
The publication of American Apartheid (Massey & Denton 1993) was influential in shifting public discourse back toward racial residential segregation as fundamental to persisting racial inequality. At the end of the twentieth century, the majority of blacks remained severely segregated from whites in major metropolitan areas. Due to the persistence of high-volume immigration, Hispanic and Asian segregation from whites has increased, although it is still best characterized as moderate. This review examines trends in the residential segregation of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians and recent research focused on understanding the causes of persisting segregation. This discussion is organized around two broad theoretical perspectives - spatial assimilation and place stratification. After detailing the consequences of segregation for affected groups, I identify gaps in our understanding and goals for future research.
In the sociology of racial prejudice, two major paradigms can be distinguished: Cultural-environmental and social class or conflict paradigms. On the basis of Durkheimian theory, it is hypothesized that cultural-environmental variables (education, knowledge) offer stronger and more consistent explanations of racial prejudice than status variables (self-perceived class position, occupational prestige, income). To test this hypothesis, National Opinion Research Center (NORC) data are analyzed. Findings corroborate the major cultural-environmental hypothesis that racial prejudice emerges from ritually dense sociocultural lifeforms. Little support is found for the claim that prejudice arises from class conflict and competition over material resources.
America's major urban centers are becoming increasingly multiethnic. Despite this increase in racial and ethnic diversity, extreme Black-White residential segregation remains the common pattern. As one of the most racially, ethnically, and culturally diverse cities in the world - and one of the most residentially segregated - Los Angeles represents the changing face of urban America. A multiracial sample of adults (N = 4025) is employed to examine neighborhood racial composition preferences - an important, individual-level explanation for residential segregation - and address three shortcomings in existing research. First, I assess composition preferences in a multiracial manner with an innovative replication and expansion of the Farley-Schuman showcard methodology used in the 1976 and 1992 Detroit Area studies. Second, I extend analysis of the cause of preferences beyond racial stereotypes to include parenting, homeownership, perceptions of social class difference, and common fate identity. Third, I test, directly, the effects of these factors on preferences for same-race neighbors. Results lend strong support to race-based explanations of preferences. As stereotypes toward out-groups become more negative, preferences for integration decrease: Blacks are consistently perceived in unfavorable terms, and are, consensually, the least preferred out-qroup neighbors. There is also limited support for so-called class-based explanations of preferences; homeowners prefer fewer Black neighbors. Generally, results suggest both greater resistance to integration with Blacks titan previously thought, but more openness to integration than currently exists.
The objective of this paper is analysis of the changing socio-spatial situation of immigrants in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area during the 1990s. The theoretical framing of this analysis is built on several bases: the metropolitan area's particular urban history and planning processes; the post-industrial features which are common to Southern European cities; the nature of the welfare system; and the specific characteristics of the Lisbon housing market. The analysis explores the links between the circumstances of different immigrant groups and contemporary urban social processes, such as polarisation, exclusion, residential segregation, and fragmentation of the urban social fabric. Regarding differential effects and processes across immigrant groups, two dimensions of comparison can be stressed: the distinction between the labour immigrants, mainly from Portuguese-speaking African countries, and highly-qualified migrants from the European Union; and a further distinction between the 'first wave' of labour migrants from Africa, whose numbers grew sharply after the decolonisation process of the mid-1970s, and whose migration still continues, and a 'second wave' made up mainly of East Europeans, Brazilians and some Asian groups, who arrived after 1999-2000.
Employing an alternative methodology and new data, the authors address the debate concerning the underlying causes of racial residential segregation. Are white Americans avoiding racially mixed neighborhoods because they do not want to live with nonwhites? And if so, is this the case independent of factors with which race is associated, such as crime levels or housing values? An over-the-telephone factorial experiment addresses these issues, measuring variables that shape white Americans' choice of purchasing a home. Based on a national, random-digit-dial survey of 1,663 white Americans, the effects of African American, Asian, and Hispanic neighborhood composition on whites' likelihood of buying a house are explored, as well as the other variables for which race may serve as a proxy. Results indicate that Asian and Hispanic neighborhood composition do not matter to whites. Black neighborhood composition, however, does matter, and matters even more for white Americans with children under age 18. The effect of black composition is net of the variables that whites offer as the primary reasons they do not want to live with blacks. The implications of these findings for segregation trends and for future research are considered.
Although residential "white flight" from large central cities is hardly a new phenomenon, its cumulative adverse impact on the residual population has led policy makers to be wary of instituting programs which will further exacerbate the process. Recent policy debates have evolved over the question of whether white city-to-suburb movement is affected more significantly by racially-motivated causes, or by conditions associated with the general economic and ecological conditions in the city. The present study assesses a number of previously suggested factors related to race, central city decline, and demographic structure as determinants of the white city-to-suburb movement streams in 39 large SMSAs. Treating this stream as a product of two separate mobility stages, this analysis suggests that most factors, both racial and nonracial, affect central city flight less through the decision to move, than through the choice of destination. Fiscal and ecological features of the metropolitan area are demonstrated to be important in the explanation. However, racial effects cannot be dismissed.
Residential segregation between blacks and whites persists in urban America. However evidence from the 1990 Census suggests that peak segregation levels were reached in the past. We evaluate segregation patterns in 1990 and trends in segregation between 1980 and 1990 for the 232 U.S. metropolitan areas with substantial black populations. We review the historical forces that intensified segregation for much of the twentieth century, and identify key developments after 1960 that challenged institutionalized segregation. The results suggest that the modest declines in segregation observed during the 1970s continued through the 1980s. While segregation decreased in most metropolitan areas, the magnitude of these changes was uneven. Testing hypotheses developed from an ecological model, we find that the lowest segregation levels in 1990 and the largest percentage decreases in segregation scores between 1980 and 1990 occurred in young, southern and western metropolitan areas with significant recent housing construction. Because the black population continues to migrate to such areas, residential segregation between blacks and whites should decline further but remain well above that for Hispanics or Asians.
Following the work of Blumer (1958), I extend and test a theory of prejudice based on perceived threats to dominant racial or national groups by subordinate groups. Perceived threat is hypothesized to be a function of economic conditions and of the size of the subordinate group relative to the dominant group. I test the group-threat theory using a multilevel model that combines population data with survey results on attitudes towards immigrants and racial minorities from Eurobarometer Survey 30. "Group threat" explains most of the variation in average prejudice scores across the 12 countries in the sample and has a small but statistically significant effect on the influence of certain individual-level variables on prejudice. These results demonstrate the importance of perceived intergroup threat in the formation of prejudicial attitudes and suggest a re-interpretation of past findings on the relations between individual characteristics and expressions of prejudice.
Racism is a still a central topic in current debates about multiculturalism, but there is increasing evidence that appeals to racism—as the explanation for urban behaviors and the current patterns of residential separation—are overly simplistic. In a multi-ethnic/racial context in which groups have different agendas, it is no longer useful to cast societal divisions as issues of Black versus White. This is especially true for the residential mosaic. Survey responses from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality about racial attitudes reveal strongly held own-race preferences across quite different mixes of ethnic and racial groups. The evidence from the analysis reported in this paper suggests that these strongly held ethnocentric positions will continue to have important influences on the patterns of residential separation in urban areas. To argue that White preferences and White discrimination alone are the major forces in creating behaviors and patterns of separation in the urban fabric ignores the forces for separation, which are embedded in these ethnic differences and ethnocentrism more generally. The evidence from this study reaffirms the complex ethnocentric responses not only of Whites but also of other ethnic groups.
For many decades, it has been argued that the
U.S. remains racially segregated because of discrimination in the
real-estate market reflecting whites' desire to isolate themselves from
African Americans. The only modest declines in black-white segregation
since the prohibition of such discrimination in 1968 have provoked a
competing hypothesis: residential segregation persists because blacks
prefer to live in racially isolated neighborhoods and are reluctant
to live in largely white areas. These ideas have not been subject to
empirical scrutiny.
We use open- and closed-ended survey data from more than 2,000 African
Americans in the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality to examine
blacks' preferences and the important related issue of what drives
those preferences. We find that African Americans overwhelmingly prefer
50-50 areas, a density far too high for most whites — but their
preferences are driven not by solidarity or neutral ethnocentrism but
by fears of white hostility. Moreover, almost all blacks are willing to
move into largely white areas if there is a visible black presence. White
preferences also play a key role, since whites are reluctant to move
into neighborhoods with more than a few African Americans.
In many countries and cities there is fear that large residential concentrations of ethnic minorities will hinder integration and give rise to sub-societies that may eventually come to have little to do with each other. However, while governments develop policies aimed at spatial mixing of various population categories, the actual knowledge about ethnic concentrations and their development is rather thin. This paper intends to contribute to filling this gap in knowledge about ethnic concentrations and related dynamics using very detailed spatial data on settlement patterns in the city of Amsterdam. It focuses on residential concentrations of Moroccans and Turks and analysed the changes with regard to these concentrations between 1994 and 2004. In general no indications were found that one of these groups is consciously strengthening the ethnic identity of the residential areas they live in. Although the existing Moroccan clusters did appear to have become somewhat more Moroccan, the Moroccans themselves experienced a negative migration balance in those areas. Turkish clusters became even less Turkish and there was also a negative migration balance among Turks. Furthermore, concentrations within the 1994 boundaries were, in 2004, less Moroccan and Turkish than would be expected, given the developments that took place in Amsterdam as a whole. Detailed analysis of the clusters demonstrated no clear systematic increase or expansion of existing clusters. Analyses of associations with housing supply support the assertion that the residential dynamics of immigrants must be seen primarily as resulting from a number of steps in the residential career. Residential behaviour that has been described for the immigrant categories in question can be assumed to reflect a development toward integration.
Much research finds that both Blacks and Whites prefer to live in neighborhoods that have few Black residents. The explanation usually offered for White aversion to Black neighbors is racism. Black aversion to Black neighbors, however, is often viewed as resulting from a taste for integration or as a proxy for the desire to live in affluent, safe neighborhoods with good schools. In this article I use 1990–1993 data from the Chicago Area Survey Project to revisit the issue of neighborhood racial preferences. My analysis suggests that there are few differences in the reasons why Blacks and Whites are averse to Black neighbors. Each group prefers White neighbors because neighborhoods with many Black residents tend to have high levels of poverty, crime, and other social problems. Thus, my work is consistent with the racial proxy hypothesis and serves as a challenge to the widely held pure race hypothesis.
Some segregation results from the practices of organizations, some from specialized communication systems, some from correlation with a variable that is non‐random; and some results from the interplay of individual choices. This is an abstract study of the interactive dynamics of discriminatory individual choices. One model is a simulation in which individual members of two recognizable groups distribute themselves in neighborhoods defined by reference to their own locations. A second model is analytic and deals with compartmented space. A final section applies the analytics to ‘neighborhood tipping.’ The systemic effects are found to be overwhelming: there is no simple correspondence of individual incentive to collective results. Exaggerated separation and patterning result from the dynamics of movement. Inferences about individual motives can usually not be drawn from aggregate patterns. Some unexpected phenomena, like density and vacancy, are generated. A general theory of ‘tipping’ begins to emerge.
According to ecological theory, the socioeconomic status of a minority group is inversely related to the group's level of residential segregation from the majority group. This article determines whether the level of black socioeconomic status is related to the level of black residential segregation in the city of Detroit and Detroit's suburbs. Data were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Census, 1990 Summary Tape Files 4-A. The methods employed to measure residential segregation were the indexes of dissimilarity D and isolation P*. Indexes were computed by census tract to measure segregation and isolation between blacks and whites at the same level of occupation, income, or education. The results revealed that residential segregation between blacks and whites remained high (i.e., above 50%) in both the city and the suburbs despite comparable socioeconomic status. Blacks in the suburbs were more segregated and isolated than blacks in the city at each socioeconomic level.
The measurement of segregation, the understanding of its drivers, and the effects of segregation are three interrelated issues that receive ample attention on both sides of the Atlantic. The comparative study of these subjects in Europe is not an easy task because the continent is highly fragmented and diversified. This regards the types of welfare state, but also the multitude of urban histories. Consequently, there is a lack of uniform information. Nevertheless, this paper makes an attempt to sketch the variety of ethnic and social segregation within Europe, using a large number of sources. It is shown that generally segregation levels in Europe are more moderate compared to what we can find in American cities, but these differences are not absolute. The paper also links the levels of segregation with a range of potential explanations and provides a window on European research focusing on effects of segregation.
Significant levels of separation between blacks and whites still exist in large American cities, and debate about the causes of that residential separation has been considerable. A balanced analysis of the factors that might explain residential segregation - economic status (affordability), social preferences, urban structure, and discrimination - suggests that no one factor can account for the patterns that have arisen in U.S. metropolitan areas. Empirical estimation of the impact of economic status suggests that 30–70 percent of racial separation is attributable to economic factors. However, economic factors do not act alone, but in association explanatory weight for present residential patterns. Survey evidence from both national and local studies shows that black households prefer neighborhoods that are half black and half white, while whites prefer neighborhoods ranging from 0 to 30 percent black.
The debate about causes seems most polarized over the role of discrimination. Although comments in the literature often focus on the past use of racially restrictive covenants by state-regulated agencies and discriminatory acts by realtors and financial institutions, the documented individual cases of discrimination do not appear to be part of a massive collusion to deny housing opportunities to minorities. A review of the evidence from social science investigations demonstrates that there are multiple causes of racial residential separation in U.S. metropolitan areas.
In this paper we update earlier work on racial and ethnic segregation by income to test assertions made by some observers that segregation is now largely a matter of class rather than race. Using the Summary Tape Files of the 1990 Census of Population, we measure the segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians within four categories of income: poor, lower middle class, upper middle class, and affluent. For all metropolitan areas containing at least 5000 members of the group in question, we compute indices of dissimilarity and interaction between minority members of a certain income and Whites of all income, thus measuring the extent of overall racial/ethnic segregation by social class. We find that Black residential segregation persists at high levels across all income levels, and that the gap between Blacks and other minority groups actually increases as income rises.
Group-threat theorists suggest that increases in the collective threat posed to dominant ethnic and racial groups increase average levels of prejudice and intensify the relationships between individual characteristics and prejudice. However, group-threat theorists focus attention more on differences in the average levels of prejudice across geographic regions and/or time than on differences in the relationships between individual characteristics and prejudice. The purpose of this article is to explore in greater detail possible differences in these relationships—that is, to identify the conditions that intensify or even dampen the relationships between individual characteristics and prejudice. I use relative group size and economic conditions—as suggested by theories of prejudice—to explain variation in the effects of three social structural variables on prejudice (labor market position, education, and income). I use hierarchical linear modeling to analyze multi-level data from 17 East and West European countries. Results indicate that the effects of labor market position, education, and income differ across countries and that the effects are weaker in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe, largely because of poor economic conditions. There is some support for group-threat theory in that the effect of student status is stronger in countries with larger immigrant populations. However, in opposition to group-threat theory, countries with poor economic conditions have weaker relationships between the social structural variables and prejudice. Thus, results suggest a revision of group-threat theory—indicators of group-threat have different effects on the relationships between individual characteristics and prejudice.
The major objective of the present research is to examine the long-standing theoretical proposition that hostility and discriminatory attitudes toward out-groups are likely to rise with relative size of the out-group population. Using data from The German General Social Survey (ALLBUS, 1996) we provide, for the first time, an examination of the impact of both actual and perceived size of the foreign population on discriminatory attitudes toward foreigners. Specifically, by using a multiple-indicators analytical model, we examine the theoretical proposition that perceived threat posed by an out-group population mediates the relations between size of the out-group and exclusionary attitudes toward the out-group. The analysis does not support the theoretical expectation that actual size of the foreign population in the locale is likely to increase either perception of threat or exclusionary attitudes. Perceived size, however, is found to be associated, as expected, with perceived threat, and perceived threat is found to mediate the relations between perceived size and support for exclusionary practices against foreigners—the higher the perceived size, the more pronounced are both the threat and anti-foreigner attitudes. The findings and their significance are discussed in the light of sociological theories on the relations between minority size and discrimination.
Elevated rates of mortality for African Americans compared to whites, coupled with the persistence of high levels of racial residential segregation, have directed attention to the structural manifestations of racism as potentially important pathogens for health. Using national mortality and census data for 1990 and a measure of black social isolation from whites, we examine the association between residential segregation and mortality in 107 major U.S. cities. Our analyses revealed that black social isolation tended to predict higher rates of mortality for African American males and females, although the strength of the association varied by cause of death. Socioeconomic deprivation explained a modest part of this association for black males but not for black females. Our analyses also found that a positive association between social isolation and mortality was more pronounced, for both blacks and whites, in cities that were also high on the index of dissimilarity. These findings highlight the need for research to identify the specific mechanisms and processes that link residential environments to adverse changes in health status. Peer Reviewed http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45655/1/11206_2004_Article_411172.pdf
In most studies on ethnic attitudes, a rather strong negative relationship has been found between educational attainment and positive ingroup attitudes (or negative outgroup attitudes). However, it is not well known to what extent this educational effect varies across different national contexts. This study investigated the effect of education on different dimensions of nationalism and ethnic exclusionism with the use of 1995 survey data gathered in 22 countries. Notions from socialization theory were used to test whether the educational effect varies according to the length of liberal-democratic tradition and the degree of religious heterogeneity within a country. Results indicate that educational attainment is strongly related to ethnic exclusionism as well as chauvinism, but not to patriotism. Moreover, the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism is smaller in recently established democracies. The hypothesis regarding stronger educational effects in societies with more religious heterogeneity was not supported.
Residential segregation has traditionally been measured by using the index of dissimilarity and, more recently, the P
* exposure index. These indices, however, measure only two of five potential dimensions of segregation and, by themselves, understate the degree of black segregation in U.S. society. Compared with Hispanics, not only are blacks more segregated on any single dimension of residential segregation, they are also likely to be segregated on all five dimensions simultaneously, which never occurs for Hispanics. Moreover, in a significant subset of large urban areas, blacks experience extreme segregation on all dimensions, a pattern we call hypersegregation. This finding is upheld and reinforced by a multivariate analysis. We conclude that blacks occupy a unique and distinctly disadvantaged position in the U.S. urban environment.
Researchers speculate that in addition to poverty, residential patterns may contribute to black/white differences in mortality rates. But few have assessed the relationship. This study reports considerable variation in the black/white ratio of age-specific all-cause mortality rates (ages 15-24 to 65-74 years) from 1982 to 1986 among the 38 U.S. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) with populations greater than one million in 1980. The black/white poverty-rate ratio for each SMSA was a stronger predictor of variation in the black/white mortality ratio for men than for women. For both men and women age 15-44, the level of black/white residential segregation was a significant (positive) predictor of the black/white ratio of the age-standardized death rate. This analysis also identifies SMSAs containing geographic areas with unusually high or low black/white mortality ratios, and indicates the need for more-detailed studies of explanations for such variation.
This study tested the hypothesis that the degree to which local government is metropolitanized is associated with mortality rates for African Americans and with residential segregation, which has itself previously been shown to be positively associated with mortality among African Americans.
One hundred fourteen US standard metropolitan statistical areas were examined. The primary dependent variable was the age-adjusted, race- and sex-specific all-cause mortality rate, averaged for 1990 and 1991. The 2 primary independent variables were residential segregation, as measured by the index of dissimilarity, and metropolitanization of government, as measured by the central city's elasticity score.
Mortality rates for male and female African Americans were lower in metropolitan statistical areas with more metropolitanized local governments and lower levels of residential segregation. Mortality for male and female Whites was not associated in either direction with residential segregation. White male mortality showed no association with level of metropolitanization, but lower White female mortality rates were associated with less metropolitanization.
This study suggests the need for further research into whether policy changes in areas not traditionally thought of as "health policy" areas can improve the health of urban minorities.
We extend research on whites' neighborhood contact with blacks, population composition, and prospects for desegregation by developing a new measure of the floor of racial residential segregation under conditions of low black-white contact. The measure incorporates the way in which multiethnic contexts further constrain levels of black-white segregation. The results show that black-white desegregation is likely when the black population is small, but is unlikely otherwise. Yet, when multiple ethnic groups are sufficiently large, a moderate level of black-white segregation is necessary for whites to maintain low neighborhood contact with blacks, even when the proportion of African Americans is small.
Questions have been raised about whether white flight--one factor contributing to U.S. residential segregation--is driven by racial, race-associated, or neutral ethnocentric concerns. I use closed- and open-ended survey data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality to explore who says they would leave and their reasons for doing so. Thirty-eight percent of white respondents said they would leave one of the integrated neighborhoods, with Detroiters and those endorsing negative racial stereotypes especially likely to do so. When asked why they might leave, whites focused on the negative features of integrated neighborhoods. Expressions of racial prejudice were also common, but neutral ethnocentrism rare. The results of an experiment asking about integration with Asians and Latinos are also discussed.