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Abstract
1997 began and ended with the pattern that has become all-too-familiar in the three years of war that have spread across Afghanistan since the rise of the Taliban movement led by provincial Islamic scholars and students in Kandahar in the summer of 1994. On the one hand, there were political negotiations initiated by the UN, regional, and Islamic states. Simultaneously, there were dramatic rounds of bitter fighting as the war spread to the fertile plains of the north, even to the border of Uzbekistan at the river port of Khairaton on the Amu Darya. Although the high tide of the Taliban forces was twice repulsed from the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif (in May and September), the locus of fighting had shifted north of the Hindu Kush divide for the first time, thus intertwining Afghanistan's fate with that of Central Asia. Militarily, a new level of viciousness was revealed in the massacre of 2000 Taliban prisoners at the hands of a northern warlord. Politically, the Taliban gained a small but significant status of international legitimacy through recognition by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. However, relations with Iran deteriorated as the Taliban forced the closure of the Iranian embassy in Kabul. But perhaps the most significant development for the future lay in the advance of the gas and oil pipeline projects to bring the energy resources of Central Asia across Afghanistan to South Asia and the world.
... Therefore, the Taliban were able to gain ground quickly. They conquered Kabul in 1996, pushed farther north in 1997(Magnus 1998), and by 1998 controlled 90% of Afghanistan's territory(Rubin 2000). The other main rebel groups 68 joined their forces under the label United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA), otherwise known as the Northern Alliance. ...
A ground-breaking study on how natural disasters can escalate or defuse wars, insurgencies, and other strife.
Armed conflict and natural disasters have plagued the twenty-first century. Not since the end of World War II has the number of armed conflicts been higher. At the same time, natural disasters have increased in frequency and intensity over the past two decades, their impacts worsened by climate change, urbanization, and persistent social and economic inequalities. Providing the first comprehensive analysis of the interplay between natural disasters and armed conflict, Catastrophes, Confrontations, and Constraints explores the extent to which disasters facilitate the escalation or abatement of armed conflicts—as well as the ways and contexts in which combatants exploit these catastrophes.
Tobias Ide utilizes both qualitative insights and quantitative data to explain the link between disasters and the (de-)escalation of armed conflict and presents over thirty case studies of earthquakes, droughts, floods, and storms in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. He also examines the impact of COVID-19 on armed conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and the Philippines.
... After the announcement of Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan, the group made further territorial gains in 1997; the provinces Takhar, Faryab, Sari Paul, Jawzjan, and Balkh were captured in 1997 (see Map in (Ghufran, 2001). Provinces such as Baghlan, Kapisa, Laghman, Kunar, Nuristan, and Takhar were captured or contested until the United States and its allies overthrew the Taliban in response to the 9/11 attacks (Katzman, 2010;Magnus, 1998;Rashid, 2000). The group implemented Shariyah. ...
This dissertation is comprised of four substantive chapters. The focus of the dissertation researchquestions is within the broader theme of human capital formation in developing countries. The first three chapters have a focus on Pakistan and the last chapter is on Afghanistan. The four chaptersuse various econometric techniques with each chapter examining different aspects of human capital.The first chapter examines ethnic disparities in school enrolment in Pakistan. Using the household survey of the year 2015 (ASER), we find that there exist large gaps in school enrolment between ethnic majority and ethnic minorities. In further analysis, we decompose the factors responsible for these gaps. The results show that school enrolment gaps are mainly attributed to parental education,household financial status, number of children in household and village infrastructure. The second chapter seeks to answer the reasons for the gender gaps in school enrolment using data pertaining to Pakistan by employing Probit, multilevel regression model along with Fairlie decomposition technique. The results show that gender gaps in school enrolment are wider in ethnic Pashtuns, Sindhis, Balochs, and Sirayki children (minorities) as compared to ethnic Punjabi (majority) and Urdu-speaking (minority) children. The third chapter explores whether disability in children is associated with school enrolment and learning outcome gaps. Our results show that disability is related to gaps in educational outcomes. Also, there is a gender dimension. Girls with disabilities are less likely to enrol compared to boys.Moreover, our results show that children identified by their parents as having a severe disability are more likely to enrol in religious schools compared to other regular schools. The fourth chapter investigates the impact of social constraints on educational outcomes and women empowerment in Afghanistan. We employ demographic and health survey conducted in the year 2015 and find that social constraint negatively impact education and women empowerment. The results are consistent with the view that social constraints restrict women mobility
... La guerra del Talibán contra los «señores de la guerra» y antiguos muyahideen continuó en el norte, donde el avance fue devastador e incluso pueblos enteros fueron masacrados ante la más mínima sospecha de colaboracionismo (Magnus 1998). En el resto del país se comenzaron a aplicar antiquísimas prácticas para el castigo a los delincuentes y rebeldes tales como el azote público, la lapidación de mujeres, las ejecuciones sumarias públicas y la amputación de miembros. ...
This article intends to describe the behaviour of weak states within a context of hegemonic expansion, assuming that, from the crisis and fall of the Soviet Union to the beginning of the Irak War, this is the situation that best describes American offensive policies toward power vacuum situations in regions such as the Middle East. Therefore, the reaction of a representative sample of states in that region (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Pakistan) will be analyzed in accordance with policies designed in Washington, trying to describe the most important variables of the interaction as well as restraints imposed to sovereignty of these States and the limits to american expansionism in this region. In order to deal with this matter, a discussion on the different responses given by the international relations theories will be intended. After rescuing theoretical thought on weak states from oblivion, we will try to develop an explanation based on a new model of interaction based on realistic premises.
... The report described each year's developments in detail, and provides a good brief history of the conflict Wafadar K. , 1982;Dupree, 1983;Dupree, 1984;Coldren, 1985). (Coldren, 1986;Dunbar, 1987;Dunbar, 1988;Cronin, 1989;Eliot, 1990;Eliot, 1991) (Tarzi, 1992;Tarzi, 1993;Rubin, 1994;Khalilzad, 1995;Khalilzad, 1996;Magnus, 1997) (Magnus, 1998) 20 The ways each subsequent communist leader addressed the obstacles associated with leadership irregularity are summarized in Appendix C. ...
State failure is becoming increasingly prevalent across the globe, creating human suffering, black markets, lost economic opportunities, and safe havens for militant actors. It is imperative that the international community find a way to combat state failure. This study investigates the effects of irregular leadership transitions on state failure recovery. Irregular leadership transitions occur when the executive of a state comes to power through unconstitutional means. Regular leaders are more likely than irregular leaders to have personal experience as a ruler, beneficial domestic and international ties, and familiarity among the population. Irregular transitions may damage bureaucracies, damaging government functionality and halting development projects that had already been underway. Regular leaders benefit from a legacy that was likely able to pass spoils onto an elite group. This elite group is likely to resist relative losses to power more than lower status groups would fight to gain power because of the cognitive principles of risk aversion, and the sensitivity to status inherent to social identity theory. Regular leaders also have traditional legitimacy, while irregular leaders are more likely to have to gain legitimacy. State failure and failure recovery are overdetermined, so it is impossible to be able to confidently determine the direction of causal flow. Every determinant of failure is related to every other, and it is difficult to separate their effects. The role of leadership regularity is therefore investigated as a proxy that can predict variation on the rate of failure recovery. The quantitative analysis consisted of multi and bivariate regressions investigating the effects of leadership regularity on failure duration, as well as the relative explanatory power held by several factors associated with leadership regularity. Robustness checks were performed using Bayesian statistics, and survival analyses. Irregular leadership transitions were found to predict a roughly five year increase in state failure duration. The Afghan Civil War was used as an illustrative case, describing the ways in which Daoud, Taraki, Amin, Karmal, Massoud, Hekmatyar, and Mullah Omar all overcame, or failed to overcome, different obstacles associated with their irregularity and how these obstacles affected their relative levels of success attempting to extend governance.
In this volume the authors frame the conflicted relationship between Iran and the United States as a low intensity conflict and explore how diplomatic, military, and economic weapons are employed to bolster each nation's strategic and tactical advantage. It is a unique and major contribution to the scholarly and policy debate on American foreign and economic policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran. © Joseph J. St. Marie and Shahdad Naghshpour 2011. All rights reserved.
Political stability has been a central theme of policy for all governments and political systems in the history of modern Afghanistan. Since its inception in the mid-nineteenth century, the country experimented with a diverse succession of political systems and state ideologies matched by few other countries' political histories. In the span of less than nine decades since independence in 1919, the Afghan state was substantially restructured at least a dozen times. This volume looks at Afghanistan's historic relations with Central and South Asia, ethno-nationalism and development, Soviet occupation and transformation of relations with Pakistan, stability of the Islamic State and regional cooperation. It examines how Afghanistan's different political systems reformed and readjusted policies to make them more conducive to political stability. Yet political stability, at best, has remained a dream unrealized in Afghanistan.
El presente trabajo intenta describir el comportamiento de los Estados débiles frente a un contexto de expansión hegemónica, partiendo de la base de que el período comprendido entre el desmembramiento de la Unión Soviética y la invasión de Irak durante el año 2003 fue un momento de vacío de poder y expansión norteamericana hacia distintas regiones del globo, especialmente el Medio Oriente. Se analiza la reacción de un grupo de Estados del mundo islámico (Afganistán, Irak, Irán, Libia y Paquistán) a las políticas gestadas desde Washington para la región, intentando deducir un patrón que describa parsimoniosamente las variables principales de dicha interacción, cuáles fueron las fronteras impuestas a la soberanía de esos Estados y cuáles los límites que pudieron imponer al expansionismo norteamericano en su región. Para ello, se intentará comparar las respuestas que las distintas escuelas de pensamiento de la teoría de las relaciones internacionales darían a Estudios Internacionales 166 (2010) · Universidad de Chile nuestro interrogante. Luego de rescatar del olvido académico los escritos teóricos dedicados al análisis de los Estados débiles, se desarrollará con mayor detenimiento el planteo de la escuela realista, introduciendo un modelo de interacción basado en sus axiomas fundamentales. This article intends to describe the behaviour of weak states within a context of hegemonic expansion, assuming that, from the crisis and fall of the Soviet Union to the beginning of the Irak War, this is the situation that best describes American offensive policies toward power vacuum situations in regions such as the Middle East. Therefore, the reaction of a representative sample of states in that region (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Pakistan) will be analyzed in accordance with policies designed in Washington, trying to describe the most important variables of the interaction as well as restraints imposed to sovereignty of these states and the limits to American expansionism in this region. In order to deal with this matter, a discussion on the different responses given by the international relations theories will be intended. After rescuing theoretical thought on weak states from oblivion, we will try to develop an explanation based on a new model of interaction based on realistic premises.
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