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Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan
Asian Survey
... Finally, there is a gap in the existing literature. From earlier studies of diplomatic rivalry (Biddick, 1989) to the recent debate over "China as a threat" versus "China as an alternative," narratives often center on China and sideline Taiwan's interaction with Pacific Island countries. Taiwan's role in Oceania is a crucial topic that has been overlooked in previous studies, despite its significant contributions to the development of the region through trade, fisheries and aid. ...
Over the past two decades, China has significantly increased its influence in the Pacific through aids, loans, trades and other forms of economic engagement. This development has drawn much attention from scholars and policymakers, and the notion of “China as an alternative” to traditional powers has gained prominence in the academic and political spheres of the region. In contrast, Taiwan’s involvement has been understudied and sidelined. This chapter critically examines the dominant discourses and explores the implications of diplomatic ties with either Taiwan or China concerning economic development of the island nations in Oceania. We assess economic, aid, and trade data over the past two decades and compare economic performances. Utilizing the Difference-in-Differences method, our research shows that aligning with Taiwan is an economically reasonable choice for small island states that depend heavily on fisheries. On the other hand, larger countries whose revenue relies largely on logging and mining are more susceptible to political pressure and potential sanctions from Beijing. Our study suggests that diversified import and export markets are a crucial prerequisite for Oceanian countries that aim to exercise their sovereignty and resist external pressure from major powers amidst geopolitical rivalry.
... Taiwan's minister of foreign affairs claimed that Kiribati demanded funds in 2019 for commercial airlines which his office rejected shortly before Kiribati broke off relations (bbc, 2019). Small states clearly benefit from what essentially resembles a bidding war (Biddick, 1989;Harris, 2006;Li, 2005;Pheysey, 1999). In addition, when one country breaks relations with Taiwan, allocated money can be used to either bolster support among remaining partners or entice a country to leave China.11 ...
What explains why some countries recognise Taiwan despite attempts by the People’s Republic of China to pressure some to switch recognition? We argue for moving beyond ‘dollar diplomacy’ claims to unpack additional economic influences that might help explain why some states favour Taiwan. Using cross-national evidence from all countries (1950–2016), we find multiple economic factors influencing recognition and conclude that Taiwan’s comparative success in certain regions cannot be explained by broad structural factors.
... Brant (2013) identifies that the Gambia left when Taiwan did not meet 'exorbitant' requests for aid and Vanuatu extorted funds from Beijing when it threatened to switch. Small states clearly benefit from what essentially resembles a bidding war (Biddick, 1989;Harris, 2006;He, 2005;Pheysey, 1999). In addition, when one country breaks relations with Taiwan, previously allocated money can be used to either bolster support among remaining partners or to entice a country to leave China for Taiwan.6 ...
What explains public support for Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition efforts? A sizable literature addresses the role of China and ‘dollar diplomacy’ in influencing countries to recognise Taiwan, yet little research addresses how these factors potentially influence Taiwanese public perceptions of efforts to maintain formal diplomatic recognition. Through four waves of an experimental survey design, we find that Taiwanese are more supportive of efforts when framed in terms of responding to China but support decreases when efforts are framed as potentially leading to increased demands for international aid from diplomatic partners.
... China and Taiwan have used aid donations, although not always directed at natural heritage sources, to Pacific island states for preventing or accepting official recognition of Taiwan as a state and in the United Nations (Shie, 2006). Playing with the politics of island state allegiance goes back to many of the islands' independence during the Cold War when the US and its allies tried to diminish Soviet influence (Biddick, 1989). ...
Due to their size and isolation, and subsequent marginalization and resource limitations, islands frequently face significant development and sustainability challenges; but these same characteristics provide significant advantages too. Natural heritage can support many livelihoods, although care is needed to avoid overexploitation. This paper presents an overview of sustainable livelihoods from natural heritage on islands, indicating the challenges and benefits which emerge. Ethical concerns are described along with the importance of ensuring the diversity and transferability of livelihoods.
Sejak mendapatkan kemerdekaannya, Solomon Islands menjadi partner strategis bagi Taiwan di kawasan Pasifik Selatan. Di tengah keputusan internasional terkait pengakuan kedaulatan Tiongkok atas dasar One China Principle, Solomon Islands bersama beberapa Negara-negara Pasifik Selatan tetap konsisten dalam mendukung ketergantungan Taiwan. Sebagai timbal baliknya, Solomon Islands menjadi negara penerima bantuan pembangunan terbesar dari Taiwan di Kawasan Pasifik Selatan. Akan tetapi pada akhir tahun 2019 secara mengejutkan Pemerintah Solomon Islands menetapkan kebijakan peralihan hubungan diplomatik dari Taiwan ke Tiongkok. Hal ini ditandai dengan kunjungan langsung jajaran pemerintahan Solomon Islands ke Beijing sekaligus menandatangani keikutsertaannya dalam program pembangunan Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) rancangan Tiongkok. Tulisan ini menampilkan bahwasanya keputusan peralihan dukungan Solomon Islands tidak lepas dari dinamika cheque book diplomacy Tiongkok dan Taiwan di Pasifik Selatan. Dalam dua dekade terakhir pengaruh Tiongkok meningkat secara signifikan dilihat dari intensitas bantuan dan lingkup kerjasama lainnya terhadap negara-negara “aliansinya” di kawasan. Sebaliknya intensitas bantuan dan kerjasama yang dilakukan Taiwan di kawasan, khususnya bagi Solomon Islands terbilang konstan dan terbatas.
Penelitian ini meneliti faktor penentu yang terjadi antara Negara Kiribati dengan Negara Taiwan hingga terjadinya pemutusan hubungan diplomatik kedua Negara ini, hubungan diplomatik antara Kiribati dengan Taiwan sudah terjalin sejak lama. Mengingat kedua Negara tidak pernah terjadi kesalahpahaman, penelitian ini menggunakan konsep kepentingan nasional dan konsep kerjasama untuk melihat dinamika yang terjadi Negara Kiribati dengan Negara Taiwan, penulis juga menggunakan deskriptif kualitatif untuk menjabarkan pada penelitian kali ini, hasil dari penelitian ini yaitu hadirnya Negara china di Kiribati dengan bantuan ekonomi yang masif dan juga arah pemerintahan Kiribati yang kini pro China membuat terjadinya pemutusan hubungan diplomatik secara sepihak oleh Negara Kiribati.
Abundant tuna resources have important economic and political significance for Pacific island countries, and obtaining more benefits from tuna resources is the consistent pursuit of Pacific island countries. This article selects Kiribati as an example, mainly for consideration of its national conditions. Kiribati is a maritime country, it’s the world’s largest coral atoll, and it is famous for the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA). Kiribati’s water area is larger than land, its citizens mainly rely on fishing for their livelihoods and commercial activities. Kiribati declared its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in 1978, it currently has 3.55 million square kilometers, which is equivalent to the area of India. Besides, no other resources can make a huge economic contribution to Kiribati. Therefore, obtaining economic and political gains from abundant tuna resources is an urgent need for Kiribati. The EU has a huge tuna consumer market in the world, and there is a huge demand for tuna. The Atlantic fisheries are affected by overfishing, which has led the EU to seek new fisheries around the world. In addition to that, participating in the tuna affairs of Pacific island countries will also have a positive effect on enhancing the EU’s influence in the Pacific island countries. The two sides immediately started cooperation on tuna affairs. This article takes Kiribati’s tuna diplomacy with the European Union as an example and take the fishery partnership agreement signed by the two sides as the starting point to discuss the cooperation between them in tuna fishery and some frictions in the cooperation. In the end of this article, the authors briefly summarize the way Kiribati can further benefit from tuna resources in the future.
Text published in: "Forum Politologiczne", 2010 | 11, pp. 175-313.
This article is an analysis of the development assistance delivered by Peoples Republic of China to the 'Third World'. PRC is one of the major countries in the group of emerging donor nations. The analysis shows the evolution of Chinese development co-operation from it's early beginnings (agreements with Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1950s) until present times. We can talk about 5 generations of PRC's development assistance:
1. aid for so called 'socialistic' or post-revolutionary states,
2. assistance for selected nations close to PRC within the international environment,
3. bilateral development assistance for nations not included above,
4. multilateral development assistance and development co-operation with international organisations,
5. development assistance which is coherent with standards of OECD's Development Assistance Committee.
All the five generations of development assistance are still being used as instruments of PRC's foreign policy.
The text also shows attitude of People's Republic China towards the idea of Millennium Development Goals. The research has been restricted by PRC´s reluctance to release precise information regarding the scale of its Development assistance.
China’s growing involvement in the South Pacific is part of China’s growing involvement worldwide. Similarly, concerns about China’s growing influence in the South Pacific are part of concerns about the rise of China. The discussion of Chinese involvement in and policy toward the South Pacific should be placed within this bigger picture. An isolated study without understanding China’s grand strategy and overall foreign policy goals can be misguided.
This chapter briefly reviews Chinese involvement in the South Pacific in the past two or three centuries, with an emphasis on the post-Cold War period. It also introduces observers’ main concerns about China’s growing influence in the region.
Over the last thirty-five years, the political map of the Pacific islands region has changed dramatically. During this period, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom relinquished control over almost all of their colonies. The Netherlands came to terms with Indonesia’s acquisition of Irian Jaya, and ceased to take part in Pacific islands affairs. The United States negotiated free association arrangements for some of its Pacific entities, while maintaining its sovereignty over others. France reluctantly accepted the transition of the New Hebrides to independence, but maintained control over three other entities, and from the late-1980s established itself as a significant player in regional affairs.
The diplomatic struggle between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has been a consistent feature of the African landscape since the continent first embarked on the evolution to independence. For Taipei, Africa offers an area of operations for its attempts to break out of the diplomatic isolation forced upon it by Beijing. On its part, the PRC is determined not to allow Taipei international breathing space, for in its view such a raised profile would undermine its own legitimacy as the ruler of the Chinese people, and raise doubts regarding its unofficial claim to be the "leader" of the Third World. Furthermore, African nations have provided a large support constituency for China in its clashes with the West over human rights and democratization. Beijing can ill-afford to dispense with such support at international forums, yet Taipei has refused to submit to Chinese pressure and continues to have a presence in Africa. With this in mind, the diplomatic competition between the PRC and the ROC on the African continent is likely to continue.
This volume examines the prominent role of China in global politics and the relevance of the 'new regionalism' paradigm to China's international outreach. It provides a comprehensive and critical assessment of China's impact on the global politics of regionalization, offers a novel application of analytical models, investigates the aspects of the Chinese practice of regionalization that set it apart, and demonstrates China's transformative potential in international life. Addressing the need to 're-Orient' the research and policy agenda of international relations, this comprehensive study demonstrates both the lack of language to engage with existing norms and standards and the difficulty of applying them to an evaluation of the global politics of China's 'non-Western' international agency.
This book considers the evolving relationship between China and the international system, and the interaction between a China of profound change in its identity, capability, and influence, and an international system that is itself experiencing a process of far-reaching transformation. It develops an analytical framework that allows us to capture, understand and explain a more dynamic pattern of agent-structure interaction in China’s relationship with the international system.
Despite the post-World War II emergence of many small states and growing economic interdependence, small state foreign policy still gets short shrift in international studies. This article seeks to enhance our understanding of the subject by examining the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. At the time of writing, 23 countries in the world have picked Taiwan over China. This is puzzling at first sight, since China is much more powerful than Taiwan, and a vast majority of countries pick China over Taiwan. This article shows that a full understanding must simultaneously take into account the systemic, domestic and individual levels of analysis. This research lends itself to structural realism, which stresses the role of structural factors in foreign policies, especially among small states. On the domestic level of analysis, this study identifies three important factors: ideology, economy and geography. For structural and cultural reasons, major leaders of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies are found to have loomed large in the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.
The Pacific Islands region might be regarded as one of the most remote and politically least significant areas in the geopolitical and economic considerations of world giants. However, as the regional order of the Asia-Pacific changes rapidly, China has shown more eagerness to engage the island states. Interestingly, Beijing's former arch-rival Taipei still maintains, arguably, considerable influence over the region. This raises a question that is thought-provoking: why is this status quo tolerated by Beijing? Drawing on empirical sources in relation to communication between Beijing, Taipei and these island states, by focusing on how Beijing handles the South Pacific region in general and the six non-recognizing states in particular, this article attempts to tackle the question by distinguishing the difference in Beijing's mentality today from that of 30 or 40 years ago. It argues that the zero-sum mentality of fighting against Taipei in the region has now been replaced by a positive-sum assumption to engage Taipei, as well as the pan-Chinese community in the world, via the PIS, regardless of whether they establish formal ties with Beijing or not.
The rise of China has led some commentators to claim that Asia will dominate the twenty-first century. In this article the author argues that, to the extent that countries in the region define and understand their politics in Western terms, the rise of Asia will simply continue the influence of modernity that had its origins in the West. In order to demonstrate this case, the author examines the character of political legitimacy in the region, which is founded on the concept of the state, an idea derived from the West. The modern state form has provided considerable advantages to countries in the region, bestowing international legitimacy on those that claim sovereignty, endowing smaller nations with increased political power in international negotiations, and allowing states to use the idea of non-intervention to shield themselves from international scrutiny. But the concept of the state has also defined new territorial boundaries superimposed on pre-existing political, ethnic and traditional sources of power, thereby creating new problems of legitimacy. In confronting and negotiating these challenges, Asian states have resorted to Western concepts of legitimacy, including democracy, nationalism and performance. Thus, an examination of the politics of legitimacy in Asia reveals the extent to which countries in the region are fundamentally shaped in their architecture of governance and their conception of legitimacy by Western ideas. The success of Asia in the twenty-first century will therefore not introduce a new type of ‘Asian’ global politics, or restore a more ancient kind, but simply confirm the dominance of modernity in shaping thought and practice.
Chinese diplomacy, aid, economic interactions and manifestations of soft power have increased the country’s influence in the South Pacific region. By some accounts, China’s influence is already approaching that of traditional stakeholders Australia and New Zealand. In Africa and other regions state-led and private activities in established powers’ perceived spheres of influence has caused concern and inspired particular narratives about China’s motivations. In this article we examine how media discourses in Australia and New Zealand have represented China’s role in the South Pacific. We find that China’s role has been constructed using multiple negative frames, which seek to establish China as unequivocally ‘different’. More than being unencumbered by the constraints of public opinion and a free press, China is portrayed as operating in a different moral universe, in which the cold hearted exploitation of vulnerable island nations (often in cahoots with venal island elites) is entirely normal. The article shows how such constructions reveal some of the complex issues involved in Australia and New Zealand’s relationships both with China and other South Pacific nations.
La creation du Consulat de la Republique populaire de Chine (RPC) en Polynesie francaise s’inscrit dans un contexte d’affirmation de la puissance chinoise dans le Pacifique, sur fond de competition entre la RPC et la Republique de Chine (ROC) a Taiwan. On retrouve donc en Polynesie francaise la question des deux Chine, la RPC tentant de faire reconnaitre ses droits de propriete sur le terrain consulaire occupe par la ROC de 1945 a 1965. Les citoyens francais descendants des Chinois qui ont immigre durant la periode coloniale ont de cette affaire des interpretations diverses, meme si le devenir de l’ancien Consulat n’est apprehende en termes geopolitiques globaux que par une petite minorite d’entre eux. L’analyse menee dans la lignee des developpements recents de l’anthropologie globale s’appuie sur une variation scalaire envisagee sous deux angles : si l’apparition du conflit et les tentatives de resolution dont il fait l’objet se jouent aux echelles locale et globale, la definition de l’echelle pertinente est elle-meme un enjeu du conflit. L’affaire du terrain consulaire est en outre revelatrice de la maniere dont s’opere une conjonction de politiques favorables au maintien des frontieres ethniques, dans un contexte de transition hegemonique
The search for status, or more correctly, the desire to maintain status, lies at the heart of the Republic of China on Taiwan's (ROC) foreign policy. This is particularly so vis-a ¤ -vis its official state-to-state relations. In this regard, the ROC has been constrained by a conscious policy by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to try and marginalize Taiwan on the international stage. Due to objective realities, Taiwan has had to become satisfied with maintaining official state relations with small states only. All, with the exception of the Vatican, are in the developing world, with a number in Africa. This paper examines Taiwanese foreign policy and its diplomatic initiatives, with particular reference to its use of 'dollar diplomacy' in its activities in Africa. The constraints and limitations of such policies are drawn out.
China's influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly. Some analysts are concerned that China is on its way to replacing the West as the dominant power and China's rise in the region poses a major threat to the West. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. The move can be strategic mainly in the sense that it has strong implications for China's reunification strategy and it serves China's long-term development strategy. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China's national security is limited at present and will remain so in the foreseeable future. China also lacks the military capability to challenge the US-led West in the region in the years to come. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its ‘no-strings-attached’ aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. China has serious image problems in the region and these problems are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China thus has neither the hard power nor the soft power to become a genuine hegemon in the region.
As China rises, it has become increasingly aggressive in applying its soft power in the Pacific. What does China's arrival mean for the emerging regional order in the Pacific? What is it up to in the strategic backwater of the Pacific, which has traditionally been regarded as an 'American lake' and Australia's 'special patch'? Setting my analysis in the broad context of China's new global diplomacy, I argue that the pattern of China's assertive behaviour in the Pacific is no different from its approach to other regions in the global South. I further argue that with only limited strategic, diplomatic and economic investment in the Pacific, China has become a regional power by default. The arrival of China, therefore, is unlikely to provoke any new round of great power competition. Rather, it offers opportunities for the world's second most formidable development challenge.
This article considers the background to, and implications of, the increased diplomatic, economic and strategic interest China is showing in the Pacific Island region. While in recent times this has been linked to political instability in the islands, Chinese contact with the region dates back to the colonial era. In the post-World War Two period Taiwan has competed with China for influence and recognition. The reasons why five island states (Nauru, Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and Palau) recognise Taiwan are explored. The conclusion reflects on the implications of strains in US-China relations, as well as indications that the region is undergoing a geopolitical transition from American to Asian influence.
This paper focuses on Taiwan's aid to the Marshall Islands. Three types of Taiwanese aid are discussed: as part of the Marshall Islands trust fund, as part of the Marshall Islands governmental budget, and the Taiwan Technical Mission. While Taiwan's aid plays a role in upgrading agricultural and rural development, it is also embroiled in controversies such as mixed local empowerment and constraints by the Cold War legacy.
This paper explores the impact of the 1991 Mt Pinatubo eruption on the US-Republic of the Philippines military relations through the lens of disaster diplomacy. Disaster diplomacy focuses on how and why disaster-related activities (e.g. mitigation, prevention and response) do and do not yield diplomatic gains, looking mainly at disaster-related activities affecting diplomacy rather than the reverse. Disaster diplomacy 'pathways', identified in previous studies, help to explain how the Filipino and US governments approached the negotiations for renewing the lease of the US military facilities in the Philippines in the context of two bases being damaged by a volcanic eruption. The paper further addresses six underpinning questions of disaster diplomacy for this case study. These questions assist in answering this paper's central research question: how much did the 1991 eruption of Mt Pinatubo influence US-Philippines military cooperation due to the concurrent diplomatic talks between the two governments regarding the lease renewal for the US bases in the Philippines? The answer is that disaster-related activities due to the Mt Pinatubo eruption had a short-term impact on US-Philippines diplomacy. This impact was seen in the context of significant connections already existing, through the long-standing US-Philippines military links. Over the long-term, non-disaster factors had a more significant impact on US-Philippines military diplomacy than Mt Pinatubo, adding to the list of case studies for which disaster diplomacy's impact was limited.
Taiwan's effort to carry on diplomatic relations in the face of hostility from China has collided with Australia's reform agenda for the Pacific Islands. This issue is particularly acute in Solomon Islands, which has longstanding ties with Taiwan and a close association with Australia. In the lead-up to the April 2006 elections in Solomon Islands, a local politician accused Taiwan of funding candidates. The same politician later stated that popular anger towards Taiwan sparked the post-election riot that devastated Honiara's Chinatown. Although neither of these accusations was supported with evidence, they prompted Australia to publicly criticize Taiwan's involvement in Solomon Islands. This article argues Australia's reaction was due to existing Australia-Taiwan tension over the South Pacific, and because Australian policymakers found Taiwan a more palatable focus than acknowledging the ambitious reach of Australia's reform efforts. Australia's rhetoric drew a negative reaction from Taiwan, which believed Canberra was seeking a scapegoat to deflect from its inability to anticipate or control the riot. The incident also contributed to the Taiwan government's perception of Australia as increasingly pro-China. Despite subsequent efforts from Taiwan and Solomon Islands to improve accountability for Taiwan's aid, the differing interests of Australia and Taiwan continued to be an issue as funding from Taiwan became more important to Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sogavare during his dispute with Australia. This article examines the interaction between Australia and Taiwan over Solomon Islands, and considers its significance to wider Australia-Taiwan involvement in the South Pacific.
China and Taiwan have become important actors in South Pacific affairs due to their diplomatic rivalry. Securing the diplomatic recognition of the Pacific Islands countries is expensive for China and Taiwan. There are limits to what the rivals are willing to spend, and they attempt to reduce costs. This dynamic shapes how Taiwan and China engage Pacific Islands politicians. It also motivates their high level official visits to the region, and how they engage South Pacific regional organizations. Despite criticisms that China–Taiwan rivalry corrupts and destabilizes the South Pacific, the issue of whether China and Taiwan's diplomatic rivalry has been beneficial or detrimental to the region remains contentious. China and Taiwan appear to have recently called a truce in their decades-old rivalry. This tacit agreement is still tentative, and the involvement of China and Taiwan in the region has yet to change significantly. However, Taiwan has reportedly begun to reduce funding, and is likely to reform its aid delivery in order to satisfy demands from the South Pacific region's dominant power, Australia, and to improve its image as a humanitarian aid donor. China is also likely to reduce funding while the truce holds. However, China considers its ties with South Pacific governments more important than responding to Australian pressure, and is unlikely to reform its South Pacific aid programmes as a result of the diplomatic truce.
The competition on foreign aid, as a means for securing foreign policy and other benefits by the donor, can lead to diplomatic rivalry. This article utilizes a game theoretic model to analyze the existing rivalry for foreign aid and international status between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Similar to the role of political contributions in the public choice theory, foreign aid is taken a means of international lobbying, to realize the donor's objective. Research results, based on the policy effect consideration, indicates that the equilibrium aid policy, which is endogenously determined, renders an inability on the part of the donors, which affects the recipient's optimal foreign policy. How does a donor obtain favorable outcomes when such rivalry exists? Strengthening diplomatic endeavors to realize the access effect has been proved an effective method. Analytical results have shown that this method not only complements aid rivalry but also increases the welfare of the donor. Copyright 2001 Western Economic Association International.
Contemporary Samoan society is a reflection of a number of different cultures and influences. As a result of several attempts at colonisation by the British, German and New Zealand Administrations the cultural landscape of Samoa has been influenced by many different groups and peoples. As a result of integration and assimilation into the Samoan way of life the Chinese have been accepted into Samoan society and have contributed to the development of Samoan culture and identity. This thesis explores the history of the Chinese in Samoa as a method of uncovering the true extent of the influence played by the Chinese, both as a people and as a nation, in the make-up of Samoan society. It uncovers the roles and impacts of the Chinese in the island nation from the first Chinese arrivals in the late 19th century, through various political administrations and into the present day. The thesis will illustrate the importance of the Chinese in Samoa and how they have contributed to, and helped to shape, the Samoan people, politics, culture, identity and economy. This thesis explains the importance of the Chinese in Samoa by examining important events in Samoan history in the past 150 years. Such events include the forbidding of Chinese settlement in Samoa through the Malietoa Laupepa Law of 1880, the establishment of the Chinese indentured scheme, and the ‘new wave’ of Chinese aid being poured into the Pacific, including Samoa, in recent times.
The Contemporary Pacific 12.2 (2000) 465-479
Since the world began shifting its diplomatic recognition and economic ties away from the Republic of China (Taiwan), and toward the People's Republic of China in the 1970s, the Taiwan government has solicited political and economic support from smaller nations. As of early 2000, Taiwan had formal relations with some twenty-nine countries, and most of these ties were cemented with economic or other significant aid.
In seeking to broaden its international influence, Taiwan's foreign policy has focused on both the large, developed nations that have probably irrevocably switched recognition to China, and to less developed, often smaller states. These smaller countries can offer full diplomatic ties, as well as occasional voting support on important issues in international forums such as the United Nations. With Taiwan's legitimacy as an independent entity constantly challenged by China, every foreign diplomatic relation is counted as a significant achievement. In addition to these political motivations, these countries are potentially lucrative foreign investment targets. Taiwan's foreign aid is often the key to winning a new embassy.
In earlier research, Gerald Chan examined Taiwan's politically motivated "southward policy" of courting mainly larger countries in Southeast Asia, and Chen Hurng-yu looked at Taiwan's economic and investment ties to several of Asia's developing nations (Chan 1996; Chen 1994). Most of the target nations, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, generally benefitted from the inflow of foreign capital, though it constituted a relatively small part of their overall economies. Even with no diplomatic relations in this part of the world, Taiwan gains some implicit political clout and moral support from its economic ties with the countries of Southeast Asia.
Taiwan's more successful diplomatic efforts have come in the least developed parts of the world. Ian Taylor has focused on its competition for recognition in African nations, where "dollar diplomacy" has won it recognition by eight states (1998). Karl Fields has taken a wider view of this economic statesmanship and explored the investment policies of Taiwan's ruling Nationalist Kuomintang party in several parts of the world (1998). However, few of these or other works focus on the use of Taiwan's aid or investment in the small, developing states.
The results of Taiwan's investment expansion in developing nations have several implications for ties with other regions of the world, including Pacific Island states. First, the movement allows it to diversify its economic relations away from a growing number of investment projects in neighboring China, which could be tempted to use the resulting leverage for economic or political manipulation. As noted, Taiwan also stands to improve ties with the target nations, even if diplomatic relations remain informal. However, many developing countries have poor infrastructure, and find absorbing funds difficult. On balance, the political pay-off to Taiwan may outweigh any real economic gain for its investors, or even for some of the recipient countries.
This essay extends the examination of Taiwan's efforts to develop economic and political ties with developing states, and focuses on the recently independent nation of Palau. Palau has strengthened its economic and political relations with Taiwan significantly since 1994, when it shed its status as a United Nations trust territory administered by the United States. Finally, in late December 1999, Palau extended official diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. Here I examine strategies the Taiwanese government and quasi-private industry have used to solidify ties with Palau, and the effects these actions have had on Palau's economic, as well as social and political, development.
I begin with a brief look at Taiwan's relations with other Pacific Island states, and touch on the ways it has fostered bonds with the small nations. I then turn to the recent history of Taiwan's move into Palau, and the effects its strategy has had there. In examining Taiwan's efforts, I consider both beneficial and detrimental effects of its investment in Palau. I conclude with an assessment of current Taiwan-Palau economic ties, and include lessons for Taiwan, Palau, and other potential clients of Taiwan's recent foreign-economic-policy drive among the smaller developing nations of the...
The PRC and Taiwan are competing to gain diplomatic recognition from Pacific Islands states, a number of which recognise Taiwan and serve as a barrier to its international isolation. Since much of Oceania is in Australia's sphere of influence, this struggle has often involved Canberra. This paper focuses on the intensifying conflict–with conclusions about the local political economic situations of the countries in Oceania that are most likely to switch recognition, the dilemmas that the issue poses for Australia and its alliance with the US, and the game theory of these auctions of diplomatic recognition. The rental of recognition is analysed as a “sovereignty business” in which some Pacific Islands states engage—similar to the offshore financial centres which are prevalent in the region. Yes Yes
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