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Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain


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Two models of consciousness are contrasted with regard to their treatmentof subjective timing. The standard Cartesian Theater model postulates aplace in the brain where "it all comes together": where the discriminationsin all modalities are somehow put into registration and "presented" forsubjective judgment. In particular, the Cartesian Theater model impliesthat the temporal properties of the content-bearing events occurring withinthis privileged representational medium determine subjective order. Thealternative, Multiple Drafts model holds that whereas the brain eventsthat discriminate various perceptual contents are distributed in both spaceand time in the brain, and whereas the temporal properties of these variousevents are determinate, none of these temporal properties determine subjectiveorder, since there is no single, constitutive "stream of consciousness"but rather a parallel stream of conflicting and continuously revised contents.Four puzzling phenomena that resist explanation by the standard model areanalyzed: two results claimed by Libet, an apparent motion phenomenon involvingcolor change (Kolers and von Grunau), and the "cutaneous rabbit" (Geldardand Sherrick) an illusion of evenly spaced series of "hops" produced bytwo or more widely spaced series of taps delivered to the skin. The unexamined assumptions that have always made the Cartesian Theater model so attractiveare exposed and dismantled. The Multiple Drafts model provides a betteraccount of the puzzling phenomena, avoiding the scientific and metaphysicalextravagances of the Cartesian Theater.
Content may be subject to copyright.
Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992) Time and the Observer. (2)
Reprinted in , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel
Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
When scientific advances contradict "common sense" intuitions, the familiar ideas often linger on, not just
outliving their usefulness but even confusing the scientists whose discoveries ought to have overthrown them. We
shall diagnose a ubiquitous error of thinking that arises from just such a misplaced allegiance to familiar images,
and illustrate it with examples drawn from recent work in psychology and neuroscience. While this is a
"theoretical" paper, it is addressed especially to those who think, mistakenly, that they have no theories and no
need for theories. We shall show how uncontroversial facts about the spatial and temporal properties of
information-bearing events in the brain require us to abandon a family of entrenched intuitions about "the stream
of consciousness" and its relation to events occurring in the brain.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15
Time and the Observer:
the Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain
The Philosopher's Annual
Cognitive Science
Daniel Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne
Two models of consciousness are contrasted with regard to their treatment of subjective timing. The standard
Cartesian Theater model postulates a place in the brain where "it all comes together": where the discriminations in
all modalities are somehow put into registration and "presented" for subjective judgment. In particular, the
Cartesian Theater model implies that the temporal properties of the content-bearing events occurring within this
privileged representational medium determine subjective order. The alternative, Multiple Drafts model holds that
whereas the brain events that discriminate various perceptual contents are distributed in both space and time in the
brain, and whereas the temporal properties of these various events are determinate, none of these temporal
properties determine subjective order, since there is no single, constitutive "stream of consciousness" but rather a
parallel stream of conflicting and continuously revised contents. Four puzzling phenomena that resist explanation
by the standard model are analyzed: two results claimed by Libet, an apparent motion phenomenon involving color
change (Kolers and von Grunau), and the "cutaneous rabbit" (Geldard and Sherrick) an illusion of evenly spaced
series of "hops" produced by two or more widely spaced series of taps delivered to the skin. The unexamined
assumptions that have always made the Cartesian Theater model so attractive are exposed and dismantled. The
Multiple Drafts model provides a better account of the puzzling phenomena, avoiding the scientific and
metaphysical extravagances of the Cartesian Theater.
I'm really not sure if others fail to perceive me or if, one fraction of a second after my face interferes
with their horizon, a millionth of a second after they have cast their gaze on me, they already begin to
wash me from their memory: forgotten before arriving at the scant, sad archangel of a remembrance. -
-Ariel Dorfman, , 1988Mascara
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In Part 1, we introduce two models of consciousness, the standard Cartesian Theater and our alternative, the
Multiple Drafts model, and briefly describe four phenomena of temporal interpretation that raise problems for the
standard model. Two of these, drawn from the research of Libet, have been extensively debated on
methodological grounds, but concealed in the controversy surrounding them are the mistaken assumptions we
intend to expose. In part 2, we diagnose these intuitive but erroneous ideas, and exhibit their power to create
confusion in relatively simple contexts. We demonstrate the superiority of the Multiple Drafts model, by showing
how it avoids the insoluble problems faced by versions of the Cartesian Theater model. In part 3, we show how
covert allegiance to the Cartesian Theater model has misled interpreters of Libet's phenomena, and show how the
Multiple Drafts model avoids these confusions.
1. Two Models of Consciousness
1.1. Cartesian materialism: is there a "central observer" in the brain?
Wherever there is a conscious mind, there is a . A conscious mind is an observer, who takes in the
information that is available at a particular (roughly) continuous sequence of times and places in the universe. A
mind is thus a , a thing it is like something to be (Farrell, 1950, Nagel, 1974). What it is like to
be that thing is partly determined by what is available to be observed or experienced along the trajectory through
space-time of that moving point of view, which for most practical purposes is just that: a . For instance, the
startling dissociation of the sound and appearance of distant fireworks is explained by the different transmission
speeds of sound and light, arriving (at that point) at different times, even though they left the source
point of view
locus of subjectivity
at the observer
But if we ask where precisely in the brain that point of view is located, the simple assumptions that work so well
on larger scales of space and time break down. It is now quite clear that there is no single point in the brain where
all information funnels in, and this fact has some far from obvious consequences.
Light travels much faster than sound, as the fireworks example reminds us, but it takes longer for the brain to
process visual stimuli than to process auditory stimuli. As Pöppel (1985, 1988) has pointed out, thanks to these
counterbalancing differences, the "horizon of simultaneity" is 10 meters: light and sound that leave the same
point about 10 meters from the observer's sense organs produce neural responses that are "centrally available" at
the same time. Can we make this figure more precise? There is a problem. The problem is not just measuring the
distances from the external event to the sense organs, or the transmission speeds in the various media, or allowing
for individual differences. The more fundamental problem is deciding what to count as the "finish line" in the
brain. Pöppel obtained his result by comparing behavioral measures: mean reaction times (button-pushing) to
auditory and visual stimuli. The difference ranges between 30 and 40 msec, the time it takes sound to travel
approximately 10 meters (the time it takes light to travel 10 meters is infinitesimally different from zero). Pöppel
used a peripheral finish line--external behavior--but our natural intuition is that the of the light and
sound happens the time the vibrations strike our sense organs and the time we manage to push the button
to signal that experience. And it happens somewhere , somewhere in the brain on the excited paths
between the sense organ and muscles that move the finger. It seems that if we could say exactly where, we could
infer exactly when the experience happened. And vice versa: if we could say exactly when it happened, we could
infer where in the brain conscious experience was located.
This picture of how conscious experience must sit in the brain is a natural extrapolation of the familiar and
undeniable fact that , we can indeed order events into the categories "not yet
observed" and "already observed" by locating the observer and plotting the motions of the vehicles of information
relative to that point. But when we aspire to extend this method to explain phenomena involving very short time
for macroscopic time intervals
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intervals, we encounter a difficulty: If the "point" of view of the observer is spread over a rather large
volume in the observer's brain, the observer's own subjective sense of sequence and simultaneity be
determined by something other than a unique "order of arrival" since order of arrival is incompletely defined until
we specify the relevant destination. If A beats B to one finish line but B beats A to another, which result fixes
subjective sequence in consciousness? (cf. Minsky, 1985, p.61) Which point or points of "central availability"
would "count" as a determiner of order, and why?
Consider the time course of normal visual information processing. Visual stimuli evoke trains of events in the
cortex that gradually yield content of greater and greater specificity. At different times and different places, various
"decisions" or "judgments" are made: more literally, parts of the brain are caused to go into states that
differentially respond to different features, e.g., first mere onset of stimulus, then shape, later color (in a different
pathway), motion, and eventually object recognition. It is tempting to suppose that there must be some place in the
brain where "it all comes together" in a multi-modal representation or display that is of the content of
conscious experience in at least this sense: the temporal properties of the events that occur in that particular locus of
representation determine the temporal properties--of sequence, simultaneity, and real-time onset, for instance--of
the subjective "stream of consciousness." This is the error of thinking we intend to expose. "Where does it all
come together?" The answer, we propose, is Nowhere. Some of the contentful states distributed around in the
brain soon die out, leaving no traces. Others do leave traces, on subsequent verbal reports of experience and
memory, on "semantic readiness" and other varieties of perceptual set, on emotional state, behavioral proclivities,
and so forth. Some of these effects--for instance, influences on subsequent verbal reports--are at least symptomatic
of consciousness. But there is no one place in the brain through which all these causal trains must pass in order to
deposit their contents "in consciousness".
The brain must be able to "bind" or "correlate" and "compare" various separately discriminated contents, but the
processes that accomplish these unifications are themselves distributed, not gathered at some central decision point,
and as a result, the "point of view of the observer" is spatially smeared. If brains computed at near the speed of
light, as computers do, this spatial smear would be negligible. But given the relatively slow transmission and
computation speeds of neurons, the spatial distribution of processes creates significant temporal smear--ranging, as
we shall see, up to several hundred milliseconds--within which range the normal common sense assumptions about
timing and arrival at the observer need to be replaced. For many tasks, the human capacity to make conscious
discriminations of temporal order drops to chance when the difference in onset is on the order of 50msec
(depending on stimulus conditions), but, as we shall see, this variable threshold is the result of complex
interactions, not a basic limit on the brain's capacity to make the specialized order judgments required in the
interpretation and coordination of perceptual and motor phenomena. We need other principles to explain the ways
in which is composed, especially in cases in which the brain must cope with rapid
sequences occurring at the limits of its powers of temporal resolution. As usual, the performance of the brain when
put under strain provides valuable clues about its general modes of operation.
subjective temporal order
Descartes, early to think seriously about what must happen inside the body of the observer, elaborated an idea that
is superficially so natural and appealing that it has permeated our thinking about consciousness ever since and
permitted us to defer considering the perplexities--until now. Descartes decided that the brain have a center:
the pineal gland, which served as the gateway to the conscious mind. It is the only organ in the brain that is in the
midline, rather than paired, with left and right versions. It looked different, and since its function was then quite
inscrutable (and still is), Descartes posited a role for it: in order for a person to be conscious of something, traffic
from the senses had to arrive at this station, where it thereupon caused a special--indeed magical--transaction to
occur between the person's material brain and immaterial mind. When the conscious mind then decided on a
course of bodily action, it sent a message back "down" to the body via the pineal gland. The pineal gland, then, is
like a theater, within which is displayed information for perusal by the mind.
Descartes' vision of the pineal's role as the turnstile of consciousness (we might call it the Cartesian bottleneck) is
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hopelessly wrong. The problems that face Descartes' interactionistic dualism, with its systematically inexplicable
traffic between the realm of the material and the postulated realm of the immaterial, were already well appreciated
in Descartes' own day, and centuries of reconsideration have only hardened the verdict: the idea of the Ghost in
the Machine, as Ryle (1949) aptly pilloried it, is a non-solution to the problems of mind. But while materialism of
one sort or another is now a received opinion approaching unanimity , even the most sophisticated
materialists today often forget that once Descartes' ghostly is discarded, there is no longer a role for a
centralized gateway, or indeed for any center to the brain. The brain itself is Headquarters, the place
where the ultimate observer is, but it is a mistake to believe that the brain has any deeper headquarters, any inner
sanctum arrival at which is the necessary or sufficient condition for conscious experience.
Endnote 2
res cogitans
Let us call the idea of such a centered locus in the brain , since it is the view one arrives at
when one discards Descartes' dualism but fails to discard the associated imagery of a central (but material) Theater
where "it all comes together". Once made explicit, it is obvious that it is a bad idea, not only because, as a matter
of empirical fact, nothing in the functional neuroanatomy of the brain suggests such a general meeting place, but
also because positing such a center would apparently be the first step in an infinite regress of too-powerful
homunculi. If all the tasks Descartes assigned to the immaterial mind have to be taken over by a
"conscious" system, its own activity will either be systematically mysterious, or decomposed into the activity
of further subsystems that begin to duplicate the tasks of the "non-conscious" parts of the whole brain. Whether or
not anyone explicitly endorses Cartesian materialism, some ubiquitous assumptions of current theorizing
presuppose this dubious view. We will show that the persuasive imagery of the Cartesian Theater, in its
materialistic form, keeps reasserting itself, in diverse guises, and for a variety of ostensibly compelling reasons.
Thinking in its terms is not an innocuous shortcut; it is a bad habit. One of its most seductive implications is the
assumption that a distinction can be drawn between "not yet observed" and "already observed." But, as
we have just argued, this distinction be drawn once we descend to the scale that places us within the
boundaries of the spatio-temporal volume in which the various discriminations are accomplished. Inside this
expanded "point of view" spatial and temporal distinctions lose the meanings they have in broader contexts.
Cartesian materialism
The crucial features of the Cartesian Theater model can best be seen by contrasting it with the alternative we
propose, the Multiple Drafts model:
All perceptual operations, and indeed all operations of thought and action, are accomplished by multi-track
processes of interpretation and elaboration that occur over hundreds of milliseconds, during which time various
additions, incorporations, emendations, and overwritings of content can occur, in various orders. Feature-
detections or discriminations . That is, once a localized, specialized "observation" has
been made, the information content thus fixed does not have to be sent somewhere else to be discriminated by
some "master" discriminator. In other words, it does not lead to a re- of the already discriminated
feature for the benefit of the audience in the Cartesian Theater. How a localized discrimination contributes to, and
what affect it has on, the prevailing brain state (and thus awareness) can change from moment to moment,
depending on what else is going on in the brain. Drafts of experience can be revised at a great rate, and no one is
more correct than another. Each reflects the situation at the time it is generated (Kinsbourne, in preparation). These
spatially and temporally distributed content-fixations are themselves precisely locatable in both space and time, but
their onsets do mark the onset of awareness of their content. It is always an open question whether any
particular content thus discriminated will eventually appear as an element in conscious experience. These
distributed content-discriminations yield, over the course of time, something a narrative stream or
sequence, subject to continual editing by many processes distributed around in the brain, and continuing
indefinitely into the future (cf. Calvin's (1990) model of consciousness as "scenario-spinning".) This stream of
contents is only rather like a narrative because of its multiplicity; at any point in time there are multiple "drafts" of
narrative fragments at various stages of "editing" in various places in the brain. Probing this stream at different
intervals produces different effects, elicits different narrative accounts from the subject. If one delays the probe too
long (overnight, say) the result is apt to be no narrative left at all--or else a narrative that has been digested or
only have to be made once
rather like
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"rationally reconstructed" to the point that it has minimal integrity. If one probes "too early", one may gather data
on how early a particular discrimination is achieved in the stream, but at the cost of disrupting the normal
progression of the stream. Most importantly, the Multiple Drafts model avoids the tempting mistake of supposing
that there must be a single narrative (the "final" or "published" draft) that is canonical--that represents the
stream of consciousness of the subject, whether or not the experimenter (or even the subject) can gain access to it.
The main points at which this model disagrees with the competing tacit model of the Cartesian Theater, may be
(1) Localized discriminations are precursors of re- of the discriminated content for consideration
by a more central discriminator.
not presentations
(2) The objective temporal properties of discriminatory states may be determined, but they do determine
temporal properties of subjective experience.
(3) The "stream of consciousness" is a single, definitive narrative. It is a parallel stream of conflicting and
continuously revised contents, no one narrative thread of which can be singled out as canonical--as the true
version of conscious experience.
The different implications of these two models will be exhibited by considering several puzzling phenomena that
seem at first to indicate that the mind "plays tricks with time." (Other implications of the Multiple Drafts model are
examined at length in Dennett, forthcoming.)
1.2. Some "temporal anomalies" of consciousness
Under various conditions people report experiences in which the temporal ordering of the elements in their
consciousness, or the temporal relation of those elements to concurrent activity in their brains, seems to be
anomalous or even paradoxical. Some theorists (Eccles, 1977, Libet, 1982, 1985) have argued that these temporal
anomalies are proof of the existence of an immaterial mind that interacts with the brain in physically inexplicable
fashion. Others (Goodman, 1978, Libet, 1985b), while eschewing any commitment to dualism, have offered
interpretations of the phenomena that seem to defy the accepted temporal sequence of cause and effect. Most
recently, another theorist, (Penrose, 1989) has suggested that a materialistic explanation of these phenomena would
require a revolution in fundamental physics. These radical views have been vigorously criticized, but the criticisms
have overlooked the possibility that the appearance of anomaly in these cases is due to conceptual errors that are
so deeply anchored in everyday thinking that even many of the critics have fallen into the same traps. We agree
with Libet and others that these temporal anomalies are significant, but hold a different opinion about what they
We will focus on four examples, summarized below. Two, drawn from the work of Libet, have received the most
attention and provoked the most radical speculation, but because technical criticisms of his experiments and their
interpretation raise doubts about the existence of the phenomena he claims to have discovered, we will begin with
a discussion of two simpler phenomena, whose existence has not been questioned but whose interpretation raises
the same fundamental problems. We will use these simpler cases to illustrate the superiority of the Multiple Drafts
model to the traditional Cartesian Theater model, and then apply the conclusions drawn in the more complicated
setting of the controversies surrounding Libet's work. Our argument will be that even if Libet's phenomena were
not known to exist, theory can readily account for the possibility of phenomena of this pseudo-anomalous sort, and
even predict them.
. (Kolers and von Grünau, 1976; See also Van der Waals and Roelofs, 1930, Kolers, 1972, and the A. Color phi
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discussion in Goodman, 1978) Many experiments have demonstrated the existence of apparent motion, or the phi
phenomenon. If two or more small spots separated by as much as 4 degrees of visual angle are briefly lit in rapid
succession, a single spot will seem to move. This is, of course, the basis of our experience of motion in motion
pictures and television. First studied systematically by Wertheimer (1912; for a historical account, see Kolers,
1972, Sarris, 1989), phi has been subjected to many variations, and one of the most striking is reported in Kolers
and von Grünau, 1976. The philosopher Nelson Goodman had asked Kolers whether the phi phenomenon would
persist if the two illuminated spots were different in color, and if so, what would happen to the color of "the" spot
as "it" moved? Would the illusion of motion disappear, to be replaced by two separately flashing spots? Would
the illusory "moving" spot gradually change from one color to another, tracing a trajectory around the color
wheel? The answer, when Kolers and von Grünau performed the experiments, was striking: the spot seems to
begin moving and then to change color abruptly toward the second location.
Goodman wonders: "how are we able . . .to fill in the spot at the intervening place-times along a path running
from the first to the second flash ? "(1978, p.73) (The same question can of course
be raised about any phi, but the color-switch in mid-passage vividly brings out the problem.) Unless there is
precognition, the illusory content cannot be created until some identification of the second spot occurs in the
brain. But if this identification of the second spot is already "in conscious experience" would it not be too late to
interpose the illusory color-switching-while-moving scene between the conscious experience of spot 1 and the
conscious experience of spot 2? How does the brain accomplish this sleight-of-hand? Van der Waals and Roelofs
(1931) proposed that the intervening motion is produced retrospectively, built only after the second flash occurs,
and "projected backwards in time," (Goodman, 1978, p.74) a form of words reminiscent of Libet's "backwards
referral in time." But what does it mean, that this experienced motion is "projected backwards in time"?
in the middle of its illusory passage
before that second flash occurs
. (Geldard and Sherrick, 1972, see also Geldard 1977, Geldard and Sherrick, 1983,
1986) The subject's arm rests cushioned on a table, and mechanical square-wave tappers are placed at two or three
locations along the arm, up to a foot apart. A series of taps in rhythm are delivered by the tappers, e.g., 5 at the
wrist followed by 2 near the elbow and then 3 more on the upper arm. The taps are delivered with interstimulus
intervals between 50 and 200msec. So a train of taps might last less than a second, or as much as two or three
seconds. The astonishing effect is that the taps seem to the subjects to travel in regular sequence over equidistant
points up the arm--as if a little animal were hopping along the arm. Now that after the 5
taps on the wrist, there were going to be some taps near the elbow? The experienced "departure" of the taps from
the wrist begins with the second tap, yet in catch trials in which the later elbow taps are never delivered, all five
wrist taps are felt at the wrist in the expected manner. The brain obviously cannot "know" about a tap at the elbow
until after it happens. Perhaps, one might speculate, the brain delays the conscious experience until after all the
taps have been "received" and then, somewhere upstream of the seat of consciousness (whatever that is),
the data to fit a theory of motion, and sends the edited version on to consciousness. But would the brain always
delay response to one tap in case more came? If not, how does it "know" when to delay?
B. The cutaneous "rabbit"
how did the brain know
.(Libet, 1965, 1981, 1982, 1985, Libet et al., 1979; see also Popper and Eccles,
1977, Dennett, 1979, Churchland, 1981, 1981b, Honderich, 1984.) Since Penfield and Jasper (1954) it has been
known that direct electrical stimulation of locations on the somatosensory cortex can induce sensations on
corresponding parts of the body. For instance, stimulation of a point on the left somatosensory cortex can produce
the sensation of a brief tingle in the subject's right hand. Libet compared the time course of such cortically induced
tingles to similar sensations produced in the more usual way, by applying a brief electrical pulse to the hand itself.
He argued that while in each case it took considerable time (approximately 500 msec) to achieve "neuronal
adequacy" (the stage at which cortical processes culminate to yield a conscious experience of a tingle), when the
hand itself was stimulated, the experience was "automatically" "referred backwards in time."
C. "Referral backwards in time"
Most strikingly, Libet reported instances in which a subject's left was stimulated his left was
stimulated, which one would tend to think would give rise to two felt tingles: first right hand (cortically induced)
and then left hand. In fact, however, the subjective report was reversed: "first left, then right." Even in cases of
cortex before hand
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simultaneous stimulation, one might have thought, the left-hand tingle would be felt second, due to the additional
distance (close to a meter) nerve impulses from the left hand must travel to the brain.
Libet interprets his results as raising a serious challenge to materialism: ". . . a dissociation between the timings of
the corresponding 'mental' and 'physical' events would seem to raise serious though not insurmountable difficulties
for the . . . theory of psychoneural identity." (1979, p.222.) According to Eccles, this challenge cannot be met:
This antedating procedure does not seem to be explicable by any neurophysiological process. Presumably it is a
strategy that has been learnt by the self-conscious mind . . . the antedating sensory experience is attributable to the
ability of the self-conscious mind to make slight temporal adjustments, i.e., to play tricks with time. (Popper and
Eccles, 1977, p.364.)
. (Libet 1985, 1987, 1989; see also the accompanying
commentaries) In other experiments, Libet asked subjects to make "spontaneous" decisions to flex one hand at the
wrist while noting the position of a revolving spot (the "second hand" on a clock, in effect) at the precise time they
formed the intention. Subjects' reports of these subjective simultaneities were then plotted against the timing of
relevant electrophysiological events in their brains. Libet found evidence that these "conscious decisions" lagged
between 350 and 400msec behind the onset of "readiness potentials" he was able to record from scalp electrodes,
which, he claims, tap the neural events that determine the voluntary actions performed. He concludes that
"cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously" (1985, p.529). That one's consciousness
might lag behind the brain processes that control one's body seems to some an unsettling and even depressing
prospect, ruling out a real (as opposed to illusory) "executive role" for "the conscious self". (See the discussions
by many commentators in BBS, 1985, 1987, 1989, and in Pagels, 1988, p.233ff, and Calvin, 1990, p.80-81. But
see, for a view close to ours, Harnad, 1982)
D. Subjective delay of consciousness of intention
In none of these cases would there be prima facie evidence of any anomaly were we to forgo the opportunity to
record the subjects' of their experiences and subject them to semantic analysis. No sounds appear to
issue from heads before lips move, nor do hands move before the brain events that purportedly cause them, nor do
events occur in the cortex in advance of the stimuli that are held to be their source. Viewed strictly as the internal
and external behavior of a biologically-implemented control system for a body, the events observed and clocked
in the experiments mentioned exhibit no apparent violations of everyday mechanical causation--of the sort to
which Galilean/Newtonian physics provides the standard approximate model. Libet said it first: "It is important to
realize that these subjective referrals and corrections are apparently taking place at the level of the 'sphere';
they are not apparent, as such, in the activities at neural levels." (1982, p.241)
verbal reports
Put more neutrally (pending clarification of what Libet means by the "mental 'sphere'"), only through the subjects'
verbalizations about their subjective experiences do we gain access to a perspective from which the anomalies can
appear. Once their verbalizations (including communicative button-pushes, etc., (Dennett, 1982) are
interpreted as a sequence of speech acts, their yields a time series,
. One can then attempt to put this series into registration with another time series,
. It is the apparent failures of
registration, holding constant the assumption that causes precede their effects, that constitute the supposed
anomalies (cf. Hoy, 1982).
Endnote 3
content the subjective sequence of the stream of
consciousness the objective
sequence of observed events in the environment and in the nervous system
One could, then, "make the problems disappear" by simply refusing to take introspective reports seriously. But
while some hearty behaviorists may comfortably cling to the abstemious principle, "Eschew Content!" (Dennett,
1978), the rest of us prefer to accept the challenge to make sense of what Libet calls "a primary phenomenological
aspect of our human existence in relation to brain function" (1985, p.534).
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In each example an apparent dislocation in time threatens the plausible thesis that our conscious
perceptions are caused by events in our nervous systems, and our conscious acts, in turn, cause events in our
nervous systems that control our bodily acts. To first appearances, the anomalous phenomena show that these two
standard causal links cannot be sustained unless we abandon a foundational--some would say a logically
necessary--principle: . It seems that in one case (subjective delay of awareness of
intention), our conscious intentions to be the causes of their bodily expressions or implementations,
and in the other cases, percepts to have been caused by their stimuli, The vertiginous alternative,
that something in the brain (or "conscious self") can "play tricks with time" by "projecting" mental events
backwards in time, would require us to abandon the foundational principle that causes precede their effects.
The reports by subjects about their different experiences . . . were not theoretical constructs but
empirical observations. . . . The method of introspection may have its limitations, but it can be used
appropriately within the framework of natural science, and it is absolutely essential if one is trying to
get some experimental data on the mind-brain problem. (Libet, 1987, p.785)
prima facie
causes precede their effects
occur too late
occur too early
There is a widespread conviction that no such revolutionary consequence follows from any of these phenomena, a
conviction we share. But some of the influential arguments that have been offered in support of this conviction
persist in a commitment to the erroneous presuppositions that made the phenomena appear anomalous in the first
place. These presuppositions are all the more insidious because although in their overt, blatant forms they are
roundly disowned by one and all, they creep unnoticed back into place, distorting analysis and blinding theory-
builders to other explanations.
2. The Models in Action: Diagnosing the Tempting Errors
2.1. The representation of temporal properties versus the temporal properties of representations
The brain, as the control system responsible for solving a body's real-time problems of interaction with the
environment, is under significant time pressure. It must often arrange to modulate its output in light of its input
within a time window that leaves no slack for delays. In fact, many acts can only be initiated; there is
no time for feedback to adjust the control signals. Other tasks, such as speech perception, would be beyond the
physical limits of the brain's machinery if they did not utilize ingenious anticipatory strategies that feed on
redundancies in the input (Libermann, 1970).
How, then, does the brain keep track of the temporal information it manifestly needs? Consider the following
problem: since the toe-brain distance is much greater than the hip-brain distance, or the shoulder-brain distance or
the forehead-brain distance, stimuli delivered simultaneously at these different sites will arrive at Headquarters in
staggered succession, if travel-speed is constant along all paths. How (one might be tempted to ask) does the brain
"ensure central simultaneity of representation for distally simultaneous stimuli"? This encourages one to
hypothesize some "delay loop" mechanism that could store the early arrivers until they could be put "in synch"
with the latecomers, but this is a mistake. The brain should not solve problem, for an obvious engineering
reason: it squanders precious time by committing the full range of operations to a "worst case" schedule. Why
should important signals from the forehead (for instance) dawdle in the ante-room just because there might
someday be an occasion when concurrent signals from the toes need to be compared to (or "bound to") them?
The brain sometimes uses "buffer memories" to cushion the interface between its internal processes and the
asynchronous outside world (Sperling, 1960, Neisser, 1967, Newell, Rosenbloom and Laird, 1989), but there are
also ways for the brain to utilize the temporal information it needs without the delays required for imposing a
master synchrony. The basic design principle is well illustrated in an example in which a comparable problem is
confronted and (largely) solved, though on a vastly different temporal and spatial scale.
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Consider the communication difficulties faced by the far-flung British Empire before the advent of radio and
telegraph, as illustrated by the Battle of New Orleans. On January 8, 1815, fifteen days after the truce was signed
in Belgium, over a thousand British soldiers were killed in this needless battle. We can use this debacle to see how
the system worked. Suppose on day 1 the treaty is signed in Belgium, with the news sent by land and sea to
America, India, Africa. On day 15 the Battle is fought in New Orleans, and news of the defeat is sent by land and
sea to England, India, etc. On day 20, too late, the news of the treaty (and the order to surrender) arrives in New
Orleans. On day 35, let's suppose, the news of the defeat arrives in Calcutta, but the news of the treaty doesn't
arrive there until day 40 (via a slow overland route). To the Commander in Chief in Calcutta, the battle would
"seem" to have been fought before the treaty was signed--were it not for the practice of dating letters, which
permits him to make the necessary correction.
These communicators solved their problems of communicating information about time by embedding
representations of the relevant time information in the of their signals, so that the arrival time of the signals
themselves was to the information they carried. A date written at the head of a letter (or a dated
postmark on the envelope) gives the recipient information about when it was sent, information that survives any
delay in arrival. This distinction between time represented (by the postmark) and time of representing
(the day the letter arrives) is an instance of a familiar distinction between content and vehicle, and while the details
of this particular solution is not available to the brain's communicators (because they don't "know the date" when
they send their messages), the general principle of the content/vehicle distinction is relevant to information-
processing models of the brain in ways that have not been well appreciated.
strictly irrelevant
Endnote 4
Endnote 5
In general, we must distinguish features of representings from the features of representeds (Neumann, 1990b);
someone can shout "softly, on tiptoe" at the top of his lungs, there are gigantic pictures of microscopic objects, and
oil paintings of artists making charcoal sketches. The top sentence of a written description of a standing man need
not describe his head, nor the bottom sentence his feet. To suppose otherwise is to confusedly superimpose two
different spaces: the representing space and the represented space. The same applies to time. Consider the
"a bright, brief flash of red light." The beginning of is "a bright" and the end of it is "red light". Those
portions of that speech event are not themselves representations of onsets or terminations of a brief red flash (Cf.
Efron, 1967, p.714). No informing event in the nervous system can have zero duration (any more than it can have
zero spatial extent), so it has an onset and termination separated by some amount of time. If it an event
in experience, then the event it represents must itself have non-zero duration, an onset, a middle, and a termination.
But there is no reason to suppose that the beginning of the representing represents the beginning of the
phrase it
Endnote 6
Similarly, the representing by the brain of "A before B" does not have to be accomplished by first:
a representing of A,
followed by:
a representing of B.
"B after A" is an example of a (spoken) vehicle that represents A as being before B, and the brain can avail itself
of the same freedom of temporal placement. What matters for the brain is not necessarily when individual
representing events happen in various parts of the brain (as long as they happen in time to control the things that
need controlling!) but their . That is, what matters is that the brain can proceed to control events
"under the assumption that A happened before B" whether or not the information that A has happened enters the
relevant system of the brain and gets recognized as such before or after the information that B has happened.
(Recall the Commander in Chief in Calcutta: first he is informed of the battle, and then he is informed of the truce,
temporal content
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but since he can extract from this the information that the truce came first, he can act accordingly.) Systems in
various locations in the brain can, in principle, avail themselves of similar information-processing, and that is why
fixing the exact time of onset of some representing element in some place in the brain does not provide a temporal
landmark relative to which other elements can--or must--be the subjective sequence
How are temporal properties really inferred by the brain? Systems of "date stamps" or "postmarks" are not
theoretically impossible (Glynn, 1990), but there is a cheaper, less foolproof but biologically more plausible way:
by what we might call . A useful analogy would be the film studio where the sound track
is "synchronized" with the film. The various segments of audio tape may by themselves have lost all their
temporal markers, so that there is no simple, mechanical way of putting them into apt registration with the images.
But sliding them back and forth relative to the film and looking for convergences, will usually swiftly home in on a
"best fit." The slap of the slateboard at the beginning of each take provides a double saliency, an auditory and a
visual clap, to slide into synchrony, pulling the rest of the tape and the frames into position at the same time. But
there are typically so many points of mutually salient correspondence that this conventional saliency at the
beginning of each take is just a handy redundancy. Getting the registration right depends on the of the film
and the tape, but not on sophisticated analysis of the content. An editor who knew no Japanese would find
synchronizing a Japanese soundtrack to a Japanese film difficult and tedious but not impossible. Moreover, the
temporal order of the stages of the process of putting the pieces into registration is independent of the content of the
product; the editor can organize scene three before organizing scene two, and in principle could even do the entire
job running the segments "in reverse."
content-sensitive settling
Quite "stupid" processes can do similar jiggling and settling in the brain. The computation of depth in random-dot
stereograms (Julesz, 1971) is a spatial problem for which we can readily envisage temporal analogues. If the
system receives stereo pairs of images, the globally optimal registration can be found without first having to
subject each data array to an elaborate process of feature extraction. There are enough lowest-level coincidences of
saliency--the individual dots in a random dot stereogram--to dictate a solution. In principle, then, the brain can
solve some of its problems of temporal inference by such a process, drawing data not from left and right eyes, but
from whatever information-sources are involved in a process requiring temporal judgments. (See Gallistel, 1990,
esp. pp. 539-49, for a discussion of the requirements for "spatiotemporal specification".)
Two important points follow from this. First, such temporal inferences can be drawn (such temporal
discriminations can be made) by comparing the (low-level) of several data arrays, and this real time
process need not occur in the temporal order that its product eventually represents. Second, once such a temporal
inference has been drawn, which may be high-level features have been extracted by other processes, it
does not have to be drawn again! There does not have to be a representation in which the high-level features
are "presented" in a real time sequence for the benefit of a second sequence-judger. In other words, having drawn
inferences from these juxtapositions of temporal information, the brain can go on to represent the results in any
format that fits its needs and resources--not necessarily a format in which "time is used to represent time".
There remains a nagging suspicion that whereas the brain may take advantage of this representational freedom for
other properties, it cannot do so for the property of temporal sequence. Mellor explicitly enunciates this
assumption, deeming it too obvious to need support:
Suppose for example I see one event precede another, . I must first see and then , my seeing of being
somehow recollected in my seeing of . That is, my seeing of affects my seeing of : this is what makes me--
rightly or wrongly--see precede rather than the other way round. But seeing precede means seeing first.
So the causal order of my perceptions of these events, by fixing the temporal order I perceive them to have, fixes
the temporal order of the perceptions themselves. . . . the striking fact . . . should be noticed, namely that
perceptions of temporal order need temporally ordered perceptions.
[our italics]: perceptions of shape and colour, for example, need not themselves be
correspondingly shaped or coloured. (Mellor, 1981, p.8)
e e* e e* e
e* e e*
e e* e e* e
No other property or relation has to be thus
embodied in perceptions of it
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We believe this is false, but there is something right about it. Since the fundamental function of representation in
the brain is to control behavior in real time, the timing of representings is essential to their task, in
two ways. First, the timing may, at the outset of a perceptual process, be . Consider
how to distinguish a spot moving from right to left from a spot moving from left to right on a motion picture
screen. The difference between the two may be the temporal order in which two frames (or more) are
projected. If the brain determines "first A, then B" the spot is seen as moving in one direction; if the brain
determines "first B, then A" the spot is seen as moving in the opposite direction. This discrimination is, then, as a
matter of logic, based on the brain's capacity to make a temporal order judgment of a particular level of resolution.
Motion picture frames are usually exposed at the rate of 24 per second, and so the visual system can resolve order
between stimuli that occur within about 50msec. This means that the actual temporal properties of signals--their
onset times, their velocity in the system, and hence their arrival times--must be accurately controlled until such a
discrimination is made. But once it is made, locally, by some circuit in the visual system (even as peripherally as
the ganglion cells of the rabbit's retina!--Barlow and Levick, 1965), the content "from left to right" can then be
sent, in a temporally sloppy way, anywhere in the brain where this directional information might be put to use. In
this way one can explain the otherwise puzzling fact that at interstimulus intervals at which people are unable to
perform above chance on temporal order judgments, they perform flawlessly on other judgments which logically
call for the same temporal acuity. Thus Efron (1973) showed that subjects could easily distinguish sounds, flashes
and vibrations that differed only in the order in which two component stimuli occurred at a fraction of the
interstimulus interval at which they can explicitly specify their order.
to some degree
what determines the content
A second constraint on timing has already been noted parenthetically above: it does not matter in what order
representations occur so long as they occur in time to contribute to the control of the appropriate behavior. The
function of a representing may depend on meeting a , which is a temporal property of the vehicle doing
the represent . This is particularly evident in such time-pressured environments as the imagined Strategic
Defense Initiative. The problem is not how to make computer systems represent, accurately, missile launches, but
how to represent a missile launch accurately during the brief time while one can still do something about it. A
message that a missile was launched at 6:04:23.678 am EST may accurately represent the time of launch forever,
but its utility may utterly lapse at 6:05am EST. For any task of control, then, there is a
within which the temporal parameters of representings may in principle be moved around ad lib.
temporal control window
The deadlines that limit such windows are not fixed, but rather depend on the task. If, rather than intercepting
missiles, you are writing your memoirs or answering questions at the Watergate hearings (Neisser, 1981), you can
recover the information you need about the sequence of events in your life in order to control your actions in
almost any order, and you can take your time drawing inferences.
These two factors explain what is plausible in Mellor's claim, without supporting the invited conclusion that all
perceptions of temporal order must be accomplished in a single place by a process that observes a
succession of "perceptions" or other representations. Once the perceptual processes an observer have
begun to do their work, providing the necessary discriminations, there is no point in undoing their work in order to
provide a job for a yet more interior observer.
Causes must precede effects. This fundamental principle ensures that temporal control windows are bounded at
both ends: by the earliest time at which information could arrive in the system, and by the latest time at which
information could contribute causally to control of a particular behavior. Moreover, the principle applies to the
multiple distributed processes that achieve such control. Any particular process that requires information from
some source must indeed wait for that information; it can't get there till it gets there. This is what rules out
"magical" or precognitive explanations of the color-switching phi phenomenon, for example. The content
cannot be attributed to any event, conscious or unconscious, until the light from the green spot has reached
the eye and triggered the normal neural activity in the visual system up to the level at which the discrimination of
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green is accomplished. Moreover, all content reported or otherwise expressed in subsequent behavior must have
been "present" (in the relevant place in the brain, but not necessarily in consciousness) in time to have contributed
causally to that behavior. For instance, if a subject in an experiment "dog" in response to a visual stimulus,
we can work backwards from the behavior, which was clearly controlled by a process that had the content
(unless the subject says "dog" to every stimulus, or spends the day saying "dog dog dog . . ." etc.) And since it
takes on the order of 100msec to execute a speech intention of this sort, we can be quite sure that the content
was present in (roughly) the language areas of the brain by 100msec before the utterance. Working from the other
end, we can determine the earliest time the content could have been computed or extracted by the visual
system from the retinal input, and even, perhaps, follow its creation and subsequent trajectory through the visual
system and into the language areas.
What would be truly anomalous (indeed a cause for lamentations and the gnashing of teeth) would be if the time
that elapsed between the -stimulus and the "dog"-utterance were less than the time physically required for this
content to be established and moved through the system. But no such anomalies have been uncovered. It is only
when we try to put the sequence of events thus detectable in the objective processing stream into registration with
the subject's subjective sequence that we have any sign of
anomaly at all.
as indicated by what the subject subsequently says
2.2. Orwellian and Stalinesque Revisions: the Illusion of a Distinction
Now let us see how the two different models, the Cartesian Theater and Multiple Drafts, deal with the presumed
anomalies, starting with the simpler and less controversial phenomena. The Cartesian Theater model postulates a
place within the brain where what happens "counts"; that is, it postulates that the features of events occurring
within this functionally definable boundary (whatever it is) are definitive or constitutive features of conscious
experience. (The model applies to all features of subjective experience, but we are concentrating on temporal
features.) This implies that all revisions of content accomplished by the brain can be located relative to this place, a
deeply intuitive--but false--implication that can be illustrated with a thought experiment.
Suppose we tamper with your brain, inserting in your memory a bogus woman wearing a hat where none was
(e.g., at the party on Sunday). If on Monday, when you recall the party, you remember her, and can find no
internal resources for so much as doubting the veracity of your memory, we could all agree that you never
experience her; that is, not at the party on Sunday.
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Of course your subsequent experience of (bogus) recollection can be as vivid as may be, and on Tuesday we can
certainly agree that you have had vivid conscious experiences of there being a a woman in a hat at the party, but
the such experience, we would insist, was on Monday, not Sunday (though it doesn't seem this way to you).first
We lack the power to insert bogus memories by neurosurgery, but sometimes our memories play tricks on us, so
what we cannot yet achieve surgically happens in the brain on its own. Sometimes we seem to remember, even
vividly, experiences that never occurred. We might call such post-experiential contaminations or revisions of
memory , recalling George Orwell's chilling vision of the Ministry of Truth in , which busily
rewrote history and thus denied access to the (real) past to all who followed.
Orwellian 1984
Orwellian revision is one way to fool posterity. Another is to stage show trials, carefully scripted presentations of
false testimony and bogus confessions, complete with simulated evidence. We might call this ploy .
Notice that if we are usually sure which mode of falsification has been attempted on us, the Orwellian or the
Stalinesque, this is just a happy accident. In any disinformation campaign, were we to wonder whether
the accounts in the newspapers were Orwellian accounts of trials that never happened at all, or true accounts of
phony show trials that actually did happen, we might be unable to tell the difference. If the traces--newspapers,
videotapes, personal memoirs, inscriptions on gravestones, living witnesses, etc.--have been either obliterated or
revised, we will have no way of knowing which sort of fabrication happened: a fabrication , culminating in a
staged trial whose accurate history we now have before us, or rather, a summary execution, history-
fabrication covering up the deed: no trial of any sort took place.
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The distinction between reality and (subsequent) appearance, and the distinction between Orwellian and
Stalinesque methods of producing misleading archives, work unproblematically in the everyday world, at
macroscopic time scales. One might well think these distinctions apply unproblematically . That is
the habit of thought that produces the cognitive illusion of Cartesian materialism. We can catch it in the act in a
thought experiment that differs from the first one in nothing but time scale.
all the way in
Suppose a long-haired woman jogs by. About one second this, a subterranean memory of some earlier
woman--a short-haired woman with glasses--contaminates the memory of what you have just seen: when asked a
minute later for details of the woman you just saw, you report, sincerely but erroneously, that she was wearing
glasses. Just as in the previous case, we are inclined to say that your original experience, as opposed to the
memory of it seconds later, was of a woman with glasses. But due to the subsequent memory-contaminations,
it seems to you exactly as if at the first moment you saw her, you were struck by her eyeglasses. An Orwellian,
post-experiential revision has happened: there was a fleeting instant, before the memory contamination took place,
when it seem to you she had glasses. For that brief moment, the of your conscious experience was a
long-haired woman eyeglasses, but this historical fact has become inert; it has left no trace, thanks to the
contamination of memory that came one second after you glimpsed her.
didn't reality
This understanding of what happened is jeopardized, however, by an alternative account. Your subterranean
earlier memories of that short-haired woman with the glasses could just as easily have contaminated your
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experience , in the processing of information that occurs "prior to consciousness" so that you
actually the eyeglasses from the very beginning of your experience.
on the upward path
In that case, your obsessive memory of the woman with glasses would be playing a Stalinesque trick on you,
creating a "show trial" for you to experience, which you then accurately recall at later times, thanks to the record
in your memory. To naive intuition these two cases are as different as can be: told the first way (figure 2) you
suffer no hallucination at the time the woman jogs by, but suffer subsequent memory-hallucinations: you have
false memories of your actual ("real") experience. Told the second way (figure 3) you hallucinate when she runs
by, and then accurately remember that hallucination (which "really did happen in consciousness") thereafter.
Surely these are distinct possibilities, no matter how finely we divide up time?
No. Here the distinction between perceptual revisions and memory revisions that works so crisply at other scales
is not guaranteed application. We have moved into the foggy area in which the subject's point of view is spatially
and temporally smeared, and the question (post-experiential or pre-experiential) need
have no answer. The boundary between perception and memory, like most boundaries between categories, is not
perfectly sharp, as has often been noted.
Orwellian or Stalinesque?
There is a time window that began when the long-haired woman jogged by, exciting your retinas, and ended
when you expressed--to yourself or someone else--your eventual conviction that she was wearing glasses. At
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some time during this interval, the content was spuriously added to the content
. We may assume (and might eventually confirm in detail) that there was a brief time when the
content had already been discriminated in the brain but the content
had been erroneously "bound" to it. Indeed, it would be plausible to suppose that this discrimination of a long-
haired woman was what triggered the memory of the earlier woman with the glasses. What we would not know,
however, is whether this spurious binding was before or after the fact--the presumed fact of "actual conscious
experience". Were you first conscious of a long-haired woman without glasses and then conscious of a long-
haired woman with glasses, a subsequent consciousness which wiped out the memory of the earlier experience, or
was the very first instant of conscious experience already spuriously tinged with eyeglasses? If Cartesian
materialism were true, this question would have to have an answer, even if we--and you--could not determine it
retrospectively by any test. For the content that "crossed the finish first" was either or
. But what happens to this question if Cartesian materialism is false (as just about
everyone agrees)? Can the distinction between pre-experiential and post-experiential content revisions be
wearing glasses long-haired
long-haired woman before wearing glasses
long-haired woman long-
haired woman with glasses
An examination of the color phi phenomenon will show that it cannot. On the first trial (i.e., without
conditioning), subjects seeing the color of the moving spot switch in mid-trajectory from red to green--a
report sharpened by Kolers' ingenious use of a pointer device which subjects retrospectively-but-as-soon-as-
possible "superimposed" on the trajectory of the illusory moving spot: such pointer locations had the content:
"The spot changed color right about ."(Kolers and von Grünau, 1976, p.330.) Recall Goodman's (1978, p.
73) expression of the puzzle: "how are we able . . .to fill in the spot at the intervening place-times along a path
running from the first to the second flash ?"
before that second flash occurs
Consider, first, a Stalinesque mechanism: in the brain's editing room, located before consciousness, there is a
delay, a loop of slack like the "tape delay" used in broadcasts of "live" programs which gives the censors in the
control room a few seconds to bleep out obscenities before broadcasting the signal. first frame
A, of the red spot, arrives, and then, when frame B, of the green spot, arrives, some interstitial frames (C and D)
can be created and then spliced into the film (in the order A,C,D,B) on its way to projection in the theater of
consciousness. By the time the "finished product" arrives at consciousness, it already has its illusory insertion.
In the editing room,
Figure 4.
Alternatively, there is the hypothesis of an Orwellian mechanism: shortly after the awareness of the first spot
the second spot (with no illusion of apparent motion at all), a revisionist historian of sorts, in the brain's memory-
library receiving station, notices that the unvarnished history of this incident doesn't make enough sense, so he
"interprets" the brute events, red-followed-by-green, by making up a narrative about the intervening passage,
complete with midcourse color change, and installs this history, incorporating his glosses, frames C and D (in
figure 4), in the memory library for all future reference. Since he works fast, within a fraction of a second--the
amount of time it takes to frame (but not utter) a verbal report of what you have experienced--the record you rely
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on, stored in the library of memory, is already contaminated. You and that you saw the illusory motion
and color change, but that is really a memory hallucination, not an accurate recollection of your original
say believe
How could we see which of these hypotheses is correct? It might seem that we could rule out the Stalinesque
hypothesis quite simply, because of the delay in consciousness it postulates. In Kolers' and von Grünau's
experiment, there was a 200msec difference in onset between the red and green spot, and since, ,
the cannot be composed by the editing room until after the content has reached the
editing room, consciousness of the initial red spot will have to be delayed by at least that much. (If the editing
room sent the content up to the theater of consciousness immediately, before receiving frame B and then
fabricating frames C and D, the subject would presumably experience a gap in the film, a noticeable delay of
around 200msec between A and C).
ex hypothesi
whole experience green spot
red spot
Suppose we ask subjects to press a button "as soon as you experience a red spot." We would find little or no
difference in response time to a red spot alone versus a red spot followed 200msec later by a green spot (in which
case the subjects report color-switching apparent motion). This could be because there is a delay of at least
200msec in consciousness, but aside from the biological implausibility of such a squandering of time, there is the
evidence from many quarters that responses under conscious control, while slower than such responses as reflex
blinks, occur with close to the minimum latencies that are physically possible; after subtracting the demonstrable
travel times for incoming and outgoing pulse trains, and the response preparation time, there is little time left over
in "central processing" in which to hide a 200msec delay. So the responses had to have been initiated before the
discrimination of the second stimulus, the green spot. This would seem overwhelmingly to favor the Orwellian,
post-experiential mechanism: as soon as the subject of the red spot, he initiates a button-
press. , he becomes conscious of the green spot. both these experiences are
wiped from memory, replaced in memory by the revisionist record of the red spot moving over and then turning
green halfway across. He readily and sincerely (but mistakenly) reports having seen the red spot moving towards
the green spot before changing color.
becomes conscious
While that button press is forming Then
If the subject were to insist that he really was conscious from the very beginning of the red spot moving and
changing color, the Orwellian theorist would firmly explain to him that he is wrong; his memory is playing tricks
on him; the fact that he pressed the button when he did is conclusive evidence that he was conscious of the
(stationary) red spot before the green spot had even occurred. After all, his instructions were to press the
button a red spot. He must have been conscious of the red spot about 200msec before
he could have been conscious of it moving and turning green. If that is not how it seems to him, he is simply
when he was conscious of
The defender of the Stalinesque (pre-experiential) alternative is not defeated by this, however. Actually, he insists,
the subject responded to the red spot he was conscious of it! The directions to the subject (to respond to a
red spot) had somehow trickled down from consciousness into the editing room, which initiated the
button-push before sending the edited version (frames ACDB) up to consciousness for "viewing". The subject's
memory has played no tricks on him; he is reporting exactly what he was conscious of, unless he insists that he
pushed the button after consciously seeing the red spot; his "premature" button-push was unconsciously (or
preconsciously) triggered (cf,. Velmans, 1991).
Where the Stalinesque theory postulates a button-pushing reaction to an conscious detection of a red spot, the
Orwellian theory postulates a experience of a red spot that is immediately obliterated from memory by
its sequel. So here is the rub: we have two different models of what happens in the phi phenomenon: one posits a
Stalinesque "filling in" on the upward, pre-experiential path, and the other posits an Orwellian "memory revision"
on the downward, post-experiential path, and of them are consistent with the subject says or thinks
or remembers. Note that the inability to distinguish these two possibilities does not just apply to the
both whatever
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who might be supposed to lack some private data to which the subject had "privileged access". You, as
a subject in a phi phenomenon experiment, discover anything in the experience from your own first-
person perspective that would favor one theory over the other; the experience would "feel the same" on either
account. (As the interstimulus interval is lengthened, of course, subjects pass from seeing apparent motion to
seeing individual stationary flashes. There is an intermediate range of intervals where the phenomenology is
somewhat "paradoxical": you see the spots as two stationary flashers as one thing moving. This sort of
apparent motion is readily distinguishable from the swifter, smoother sort of apparent motion of cinema, for
instance, but your capacity to make discrimination is not relevant to the dispute between the Orwellian and the
Stalinesque theorist. They agree that you can make this discrimination under the right conditions; what they
disagree about is how to describe the cases of apparent motion that you tell from real motion--the cases in
which you really (mis-) the illusory motion. To put it loosely, in these cases is your memory playing tricks
with you, or are just your eyes playing tricks with you? You can't tell "from the inside".)
could not
We can see the same indistinguishability even more clearly when we see how the two different models handle the
well-studied phenomenon of (for a review, see Breitmeyer, 1984). If a stimulus is flashed briefly on a
screen and then followed, after a brief inter-stimulus-interval, by a second "masking" stimulus, subjects
seeing only the second stimulus. (And if you put yourself in the subject's place you will see for yourself; you will
be prepared to swear that there was only one flash.) The standard description of such phenomena is that the
second stimulus somehow of the first stimulus (in other words, it somehow waylays
the first stimulus on its way to consciousness). But people can nevertheless do much better than chance if required
to guess whether there were two stimuli. This only shows once again that stimuli can have their effects on us
without our being conscious of them. This standard line is, in effect, the Stalinesque model of metacontrast: the
first stimulus never gets to play on the stage of consciousness; it has whatever effects it has entirely unconsciously.
But we have just uncovered a second, Orwellian model of metacontrast: subjects are indeed conscious of the first
stimulus (which would "explain" their capacity to guess correctly) but their memory of this conscious experience
is almost entirely obliterated by the second stimulus (which is why they deny having seen it, in spite of their tell-
tale better-than-chance guesses).
prevents conscious experience
Endnote 7
Both the Orwellian and the Stalinesque version of the Cartesian Theater model can deftly account for the data-
-not just the data we already have, but the data we can imagine getting in the future. They both account for the
verbal reports: one theory says they are innocently mistaken while the other says they are accurate reports of
experienced "mistakes". (A similar verdict is suggested in the commentaries of Holender, 1986; see especially
Dixon, 1986, Erdelyi, 1986, Marcel, 1986, Merikle and Cheesman, 1986.) They agree about just where in the
brain the mistaken content enters the causal pathways; they just disagree about whether that location is pre-
experiential or post-experiential. They both account for the non-verbal effects: one says they are the result of
unconsciously discriminated contents while the other says they are the result of consciously discriminated but
forgotten contents. They agree about just where and how in the brain these discriminations occur; they just
disagree about whether to interpret those processes as happening inside or outside the charmed circle of
consciousness. Finally, they both account for the subjective data--whatever is obtainable "from the first-person-
perspective"--because they agree about how it ought to "feel" to subjects: subjects should be unable to tell the
difference between misbegotten experiences and immediately misremembered experiences. So, in spite of first
appearances, there is really only a verbal difference between the two theories (cf. Reingold and Merikle, 1990).
They tell exactly the same story except for where they place a mythical Great Divide, a point in time (and hence a
place in space) whose location is nothing that subjects can help them locate, and whose location is
also neutral with regard to all other features of their theories. This is a difference that makes no difference.
Consider a contemporary analogy. With the advent of word-processing and desktop publishing and electronic
mail, we are losing the previously quite hard-edged distinction between pre-publication editing, and post-
publication correction of "errata". With multiple drafts in electronic circulation, and with the author readily making
revisions in response to comments received by electronic mail, calling one of the drafts the canonical text--the text
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of "record", the one to cite in one's own publications--becomes a somewhat arbitrary matter. Often most of the
intended readers, the readers whose reading of the text matters, read only an early draft; the "published" version is
archival and inert. If it is important effects we are looking for, then, most if not all the important effects of writing
a text are now spread out over many drafts, not postponed until after publication. It used to be otherwise; virtually
all of a text's important effects happened appearance in a book or journal and its making such an
appearance. All the facts are in, and now that the various candidates for the "gate" of publication can be seen no
longer to be functionally important, if we feel we need the distinction at all, we will have to decide arbitrarily what
is to count as publishing a text. There is no natural summit or turning point in the path from draft to archive.
after because of
Similarly--and this is the fundamental implication of the Multiple Drafts model--if one wants to settle on some
moment of processing in the brain as the moment of consciousness, this has to be arbitrary. One can always "draw
a line" in the stream of processing in the brain, but there are no functional differences that could motivate
declaring all prior stages and revisions unconscious or preconscious adjustments, and all subsequent emendations
to the content (as revealed by recollection) to be post-experiential memory-contamination. The distinction lapses at
close quarters.
Another implication of the Multiple Drafts model, in contrast to the Cartesian Theater, is that there is no need--or
room--for the sort of "filling in" suggested by frames C and D of figure 4. Discussing Kolers' experiment,
Goodman notes that it
"seems to leave us a choice between a retrospective construction theory and a belief in clairvoyance" (1978, p.83)
What then is "retrospective construction"?
Whether perception of the first flash is thought to be [our italics], I call this
the retrospective construction theory--the theory that the construction perceived as occurring between the two
flashes is accomplished not earlier than the second.
delayed or preserved or remembered
It seems at first that Goodman does not choose between a Stalinesque theory (perception of the first flash is
delayed) and an Orwellian theory (the perception of the first flash is preserved or remembered), but his Orwellian
revisionist does not merely adjust judgments; he material to the gaps:constructs fill in
each of the intervening places along a path between the two flashes is filled in . . . with one of the flashed colors
rather than with successive intermediate colors. (p.85)
What Goodman overlooks is the possibility that the brain doesn't actually have to go to the trouble of "filling in"
anything with "construction", for no one is looking. As the Multiple Drafts model makes explicit, once a
discrimination has been made once, it does not have to be made again; the brain just adjusts to the conclusion that
is drawn, making the new interpretation of the information available for the modulation of subsequent behavior.
Recall the Commander in Chief in Calcutta; he just had to that the truce came before the battle; he didn't
also have to mount some sort of pageant of "historical reconstruction" to watch, in which he receives the letters in
the "proper" order.
Similarly, when Goodman (1978) proposes that "the intervening motion is produced retrospectively, built only
after the second flash occurs and projected backwards in time," this suggests ominously that a final film is made
and then run through a magical projector whose beam somehow travels backwards in time onto the mind's screen.
Whether or not this is just what Van der Waals and Roelofs (1930) had in mind when they proposed "retrospective
construction," it is presumably what led Kolers (1972, p.184) to reject their hypothesis, insisting that all
construction is carried out in "real time." Why, though, should the brain bother to "produce" the "intervening
motion"? Why not just conclude that there was intervening motion, and encode that "retrospective" content into
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the processing stream? This would suffice for it to seem to the subject that intervening motion had been
Our Multiple Drafts model agrees with Goodman that retrospectively the brain creates the content (the judgment)
that there was intervening motion, and this content is then available to govern activity and leave its mark on
memory. But our model claims that the brain does not bother "constructing" any representations that go to the
trouble of "filling in" the blanks. That would be a waste of time and (shall we say?) . The judgment
is , so the brain can get on with other tasks!
already in Endnote 8
Goodman's "projection backwards in time," like Libet's "backwards referral in time," is an equivocal phrase. It
might mean something modest and defensible: a is included in the content. On this
reading it could be a claim like "This novel takes us back to ancient Rome . . ," which almost no one would
interpret in a metaphysically extravagant way, as claiming that the novel was some sort of time travel machine.
This is the reading that is consistent with Goodman's other views, but Kolers apparently took it to mean something
metaphysically radical: that there was some actual projection of one thing at one time to another time. As we shall
see, the same equivocation bedevils Libet's interpretation of his phenomena.
reference to some past time
The model of the Cartesian Theater creates artifactual puzzle questions that cannot be answered, whereas for our
model these questions cannot meaningfully arise. This can be seen by applying both models to other experiments
that probe the limits of the distinction between perception and memory. A normally sufficient, but not necessary,
condition for having experienced something is subsequent verbal report, and this is the anchoring case around
which all the puzzle cases revolve. Suppose that although one's brain has registered--that is, responded to--(some
aspects of) an event, something intervenes between that internal response and a subsequent occasion for verbal
report. If there was no time or opportunity for an initial overt response of any sort, and if the intervening events
prevent later overt responses (verbal or otherwise) from incorporating reference to some aspect(s) of the first event,
this creates a puzzle question: were they never consciously perceived, or have they been rapidly forgotten?
Consider the familiar span of apprehension. Multiple letters are simultaneously briefly exposed. Some are
identified. The rest were certainly seen. The subject insists they were there, knows their number, and has the
impression that they were clear-cut and distinct. Yet he cannot identify them. Has he failed "really" to perceive
them, or has he rapidly "forgotten" them? Or consider an acoustic memory span test, administered at a rapid rate,
e.g., 4 items a second, such that the subject perforce cannot respond till the acoustic event is over. He identifies
some, not others. Yet, subjectively he heard all of them clearly and equally well. Did he not genuinely perceive, or
did he forget, the rest?
And if, under still more constricted circumstances such as metacontrast, the subject even lacks all conviction that
the unrecallable items , should we take this judgment as conclusive grounds for saying he did not
experience them, even if they prove to have left other contentful traces on his subsequent behavior? If there is a
Cartesian Theater, these questions demand answers, since what gets into the Theater, and when, is supposedly
determinate, even if the boundaries appear fuzzy due to human limitations of perception and memory.
were there
Our Multiple Drafts model suggests a different perspective on these phenomena. When a lot happens in a short
time, the brain may make simplifying assumptions (For a supporting view, see Marcel, 1983). In metacontrast, the
first stimulus may be a disc and the second stimulus a ring that fits closely outside the space where the disc was
displayed. The outer contour of a disc rapidly turns into the inner contour of a ring. The brain, initially informed
just that something happened (something with a circular contour in a particular place), swiftly receives
confirmation that there was indeed a ring, with an inner and outer contour. Without further supporting evidence
that there was a disc, the brain arrives at the conservative conclusion that there was only a ring. Should we insist
that the disc was experienced because the disc would have been reported? Our model
of how the phenomenon is caused shows that there is no motivated way of settling such border disputes:
if the ring hadn't intervened
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information about the disc was briefly in a functional position to contribute to a later report, but this state lapsed;
there is no reason to insist that this state was inside the charmed circle of consciousness until it got overwritten, or
contrarily, to insist that it never quite achieved this state. Nothing discernible to "inside" or "outside" observers
could distinguish these possibilities.
In color phi, the processes that calculate that the second spot is green and that there is motion proceed roughly
simultaneously (in different parts of the brain), and eventually contribute to the process that concludes that the red
spot moved over and abruptly turned green on the way. That conclusion is achieved swiftly enough, in the
standard case, to overwhelm or replace any competing contents before they can contribute to the framing of a
report. So the subject says--and believes--just what Kolers and von Grünau report,
. Was the subject conscious a fraction of a second earlier of the stationary red spot? Ask him.
If the interstimulus interval is made somewhat longer, there will come a point where the subject report an
experience of first a stationary red spot, then a green spot, and then a sense that the red
spot ("must have") moved over and changed color. This experience has--as the subject will tell you--a quite
different phenomenology. Apparent motion is experienced under such conditions, but it is obviously different
from ordinary motion, and from swifter varieties of apparent motion. In what way is it different? In this way: the
subject notices the difference! In this case it does seem to him as if he only later "realized" that there had been
motion. But in cases in which this retrospective element is lacking it is still the case that the discrimination of
motion-with-color-change is achieved after the colors and locations of the spots were discriminated--and there is
no later process of "filling in" required.
and that is what the subject
was conscious of also
noticeably retrospective
In the cutaneous "rabbit," the shift in space (along the arm) is recorded over time by the brain. The number of taps
is also recorded. Although in physical reality the taps were clustered at particular locations, the simplifying
assumption is that they were distributed regularly across the space-time extent of the experience. The brain relaxes
into this parsimonious though mistaken interpretation the taps are registered, of course, and this has the effect
of wiping out earlier (partial) interpretations of the taps, but some side effects of those interpretations (e.g., the
interpretation that there were five taps, that there were more than two taps, etc.) may live on.
Although different attributes are indeed extracted by different neural facilities at different rates (e.g., location
versus shape versus color), and although if asked to respond to the presence of each one in isolation, we would do
so with different latencies, we perceive events, not a successively analyzed trickle of perceptual elements or
attributes. As Efron remarks:
There are no grounds for an a priori assumption that the specificity of our awareness of an object of perception, or
an aspect of that object, gradually increases or grows following the moment of its onset from the least specific
experience to some maximally specific experience. . . . We do not, when first observing an object with central
vision, fleetingly experience the object as it would appear with the most peripheral vision, then as it would appear
with less peripheral vision . . . .Similarly, when we shift our attention from one object of awareness to another,
there is no experience of 'growing' specificity of the new object of awareness--we just perceive the new
object.(1967, p.721)
Is there an "optimal time of probing"? On the plausible assumption that after a while such narratives degrade
rather steadily through both fading of details and self-serving embellishment (what I ought to have said at the party
tends to turn into what I did say at the party), one can justify probing "as soon as possible" after the stimulus
sequence of interest. At the same time, one wants to avoid interfering with the phenomenon by a premature probe.
Since perception turns imperceptibly into memory, and "immediate" interpretation turns imperceptibly into rational
reconstruction, there is no single, all-contexts summit upon which to direct one's probes. Any probe may elicit a
narrative (or narrative fragment), and any such elicited narrative determines a "time line," a subjective sequence of
events from the point of view of an observer. This time line may then be compared with other time lines, in
particular with the objective sequence of events occurring in the brain of that observer. For the reasons discussed,
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these two time lines may not superimpose themselves in orthogonal registration. There may be order differences
that induce kinks.
Figure 5.
There is nothing metaphysically extravagant or challenging about this failure of registration (Snyder, 1988). It is
no more mysterious or contra-causal than the realization that the individual scenes in movies are often shot out of
sequence, or that when you read the sentence "Bill arrived at the party after Sally, but Jane came earlier than either
of them." you learn of Bill's arrival before you learn of Jane's earlier arrival. The space and time of the
representing is one frame of reference; the space and time of what the representing represents is another. But this
metaphysically innocuous fact does nevertheless ground a fundamental metaphysical category: when a portion of
the world comes in this way to compose a skein of narratives, that portion of the world is an observer. That is
what it is for there to be an observer in the world, a something it is like something to be.
3. The Libet Controversies Re-examined
3.1. Libet's experiments allegedly showing "backwards referral"
Libet's experiments with direct cortical stimulation have provoked a great deal of discussion and speculation, in
spite of the fact that they involved very few subjects, were inadequately controlled, and have not been replicated
(Churchland, 1981, 1981b). No doubt they have attracted this unusual attention, in spite of their serious technical
flaws, because, according to Libet, they demonstrate "two remarkable temporal factors":
(1) , initiated by a sensory stimulus,
for eliciting any resulting conscious sensory experience.
There is a substantial delay before cerebral activities achieve "neuronal
(2) After neuronal adequacy is achieved, the of the experience
, utilizing a "timing signal" in the form of the initial response of cerebral cortex to the sensory
stimulus. (1981, p182)
subjective timing is (automatically) referred
backwards in time
The "timing signal" is the primary evoked potential in the cortex 10 to 20msec after peripheral stimulation. Libet
suggests that the backwards referral is always "to" the timing signal.
Libet's model is Stalinesque: various editing processes occur prior to the moment of "neuronal adequacy", at
which time a finished film is projected. How is it projected? Here Libet's account vacillates between an extreme
view and a moderate view (cf. Honderich, 1985):
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(a) it is projected backwards in time to some Cartesian theater where it actually runs in
synch with the primary evoked potentials. (The primary evoked potentials, as "timing signals", serve rather like
the slateboard used in film-making, showing the projector exactly how far back in time to project the experience.)
backwards projection:
(b) it is projected in ordinary time, but it carries something like a postmark, reminding the
viewer that these events must be understood to have occurred somewhat earlier. (In this case the primary evoked
potentials serve simply as dates, which might be on the Cartesian screen by a title "On the eve of the
Battle of Waterloo" or "New York City, summer, 1942")
backwards referral:
Libet's own term is "referral" and he defends it by reminding us of the "long recognized and accepted"
phenomenon of spatial referral, which might suggest the moderate reading. But since he also insists that this
backwards referral is "remarkable" and a challenge to the theory of "psychoneural identity," he invites the extreme
interpretation. And this interpretation is further supported by a passage at the close of Libet 1981:Endnote 9
there is experimental evidence for the view that the subjective or mental "sphere" could indeed "fill in" spatial and
temporal gaps. How else, for example, could one view the already mentioned enormous discrepancy
between a subjective visual image and the configuration of neuronal activities that gives rise to the
experience of the image? (p.196.)
that is known
to exist
Endnote 10
Let us consider the details. "Neuronal adequacy," which Libet estimates to require up to 500msec of cortical
activity, is determined by seeing how late, following initial stimulation, a direct cortical stimulation can interfere
with the consciousness subsequently reported. Beyond that critical interval, a direct cortical stimulus would be
reported by the subject to be a experience. (Having arrived too late for incorporation by the editing
room into the "final print" of the first stimulus experience, it would appear in the next installment.) Libet's data
suggest a tremendously variable editing window: "The conditioning cortical stimulus could be started more than
500msec following the skin pulse and still modify the skin sensation, although in most cases retroactive effects
were not observed with S-C intervals greater than 200msec." (1981, p.185.) Libet is careful to define neuronal
adequacy in terms of effect on subsequent unhurried verbal report: "the subject was asked to report, within a few
seconds after the delivery of each pair of . . .stimuli" (1979, p.195), and he insists that "The timing of a subjective
experience must be distinguished from that of a behavioral response (such as in reaction time), which might be
made before conscious awareness develops . . ." (1979, p.193)
This proviso permits him to defend a rival interpretation of Churchland's data. Churchland (1981) attempted to
discredit Libet's claim about the long rise time to "neuronal adequacy" for consciousness, by asking subjects in an
experiment to say "go" as soon as they were conscious of a skin stimulus like those used by Libet. She reported a
mean response time over 9 subjects of 358msec, which, she argued, showed that the subjects must have achieved
neuronal adequacy by the 200msec mark at the latest (allowing time for the production of a verbal response).
Libet's reply is Stalinesque: a verbal reaction can be unconsciously initiated. "There is nothing magical or uniquely
informative when the motor response is a vocalization of the word 'go' instead of the more usual one of a finger
tapping a button . . . The ability to detect a stimulus and to react to it purposefully, or be psychologically
influenced by it, without any reportable conscious awareness of the stimulus, is widely accepted." (1981, p.187-8)
And to the objection, "But what did Churchland's subjects think they were doing, if not saying, as requested, just
when they were conscious of the stimulus?" Libet could give the standard Stalinesque reply: they did indeed
eventually become conscious of the stimulus, but by then, their verbal report had already been initiated. Endnote 11
For this reason Libet rejects reaction time studies such as Churchland's as having "an uncertain validity as a
primary criterion of a subjective experience," (1981, p.188). He favors letting the subject take his time: "The
report is made unhurriedly within a few seconds after each trial, allowing the subject to introspectively examine
his evidence." (p.188) How, then, can he deal with the rival prospect that this leisurely pace gives the Orwellian
revisionist in the brain plenty of time to replace the memories of consciousness with memories?veridical false
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Reporting after the trial of course requires that processes of short-term memory and recallability be operative, but
this presents no difficulty for subjects with no significant defects in these abilities. (p.188)
This begs the question against the Orwellian, who is prepared to explain a variety of effects as
the result of mis-remembering or hallucinatory recall, in which a prior, real event in consciousness is
obliterated and replaced by subsequent memories. (For related discussions, see Allport, 1988, p.171-76; Bisiach,
1988, pp.110-12.) Has Libet let the stew cook too long, or has Churchland sampled it too soon? If Libet wants to
claim a status for his choice of probe time, he must be prepared to combat the counterarguments.
Libet comes close to pleading : "Admittedly, a report of relative timing order cannot, in itself,
provide an indicator of the 'absolute' time (clock-time) of the experience: as suggested, there is no known method
to achieve such an indicator." (1981, p.188), echoing his earlier remark that there seemed to be "no method by
which one could determine the absolute timing of a subjective experience." 1979, p.193. What Libet misses,
however, is the possibility that this is because there is no such moment of absolute time. (Cf. Harnad, unpublished,
and 1987)
nolo contendere
Churchland too falls prey to the failure to distinguish time represented from time of representing, in her criticisms
(1981, 1981b):
The two hypotheses differ essentially on just when the respective sensations [our italics]. (1981, p177)were felt
Even if it be supposed that the sensations arising from the simultaneous skin and LM [medial lemniscus]
sensations are [our italics], the delay in neuronal adequacy for skin stimuli may well
be an artifact of the setup. (1981b, p494)
felt at exactly the same time
Suppose that all such artifacts were eliminated, and the sensations are "felt at exactly the same time". Will this
mean that there is a time such that stimulus 1 is felt at and stimulus 2 is felt at (the anti-materialist prospect) or
only that stimulus 1 and stimulus 2 are felt as (experienced as) simultaneous? Churchland doesn't discourage the
inference that Libet's findings, if vindicated, would wreak havoc (as he claims) on materialism. Elsewhere,
however, she correctly notes that "intriguing as temporal illusions are, there is no reason to suppose there is
something preternatural about them, and certainly there is nothing which distinguishes them from spatial illusions
or motion illusions as uniquely bearing the benchmark of a non-physical origin." (1981, p178) This could only be
the case if temporal illusions were phenomena in which ; if the take
place at the "wrong" times, something more revolutionary is afoot.
t t t
time was misrepresented misrepresentings
Where does this leave Libet's experiments with cortical stimulation? As an interesting but inconclusive attempt to
establish something about . Primary evoked potentials may somehow
serve as specific reference-points for neural representations of time, although Libet has not shown this, as
Churchland's technical criticisms make clear. Alternatively, the brain keeps its representations of time more labile.
We don't represent seen objects as existing on the retina, but rather at various distances in the external world; why
should the brain not also represent events as happening it makes the most "ecological" sense for them to
happen? When we are engaged in some act of manual dexterity, "fingertip time" should be the standard; when we
are conducting an orchestra, "ear time" might capture the registration. "Primary cortical time" might be the default
standard (rather like Greenwich Mean Time for the British Empire), a matter, however, for further research.
how the brain represents temporal order
The issue has been obscured by the fact that both proponent and critic have failed to distinguish consistently
between time of representing and time represented. They talk past each other, with Libet adopting a Stalinesque
position and Churchland making the Orwellian countermoves, both apparently in agreement that there is a fact of
the matter about exactly when (in "absolute" time as Libet would put it) a conscious experience happens. Endnote
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3.2. Libet's claims about the "subjective delay" of consciousness of intention
The concept of the absolute timing of an experience is exploited in Libet's later experiments with "conscious
intentions," in which he seeks to determine their absolute timing experimentally by letting the subjects, who alone
have direct access (somehow) to their experiences, do . He asked subjects to look at a clock (a spot of
light circling on an oscilloscope) they experience consciously intending, and to make a judgment about the
position on the clock of the spot at the onset of intention, a judgment they can later, at their leisure, .
Libet is clearer than most of his critics about the importance of keeping content and vehicle distinguished: "One
should not confuse is reported by the subject with he may become introspectively aware of what he is
reporting." (Libet 85, p.559) He recognizes (p.560), moreover, that a judgment of simultaneity need not itself be
simultaneously arrived at or rendered; it might mature over a long period of time (consider, for instance, the
minutes it may take the stewards at the race track to develop and then examine the photo-finish picture on which
they eventually base their judgment of the winner or a dead heat).
what when
Libet gathered data on two time series:
the objective series, which includes the timing of the external clock and the salient neural events: the readiness
potentials (RPs) and the electromyograms (EMGs).
the subjective series (as later reported), which consists of mental imagery, memories of any pre-planning, and
crucially of a single benchmark datum for each trial: a simultaneity judgment of the form:
my conscious intention
(W) began simultaneously with the clock spot in position P
Libet seems to have wanted to approximate the elusive discussed by the existentialists (e.g., Gide,
1948, Sartre, 1943), the purely motiveless--and hence in some special sense "free"--choice, and as several
commentators have pointed out (Breitmeyer 1985, Bridgeman 1985, Danto 1985, Jung 1985, Latto 1985) such
highly unusual actions (which might be called acts of deliberate pseudo-randomness) are hardly paradigms of
"normal voluntary acts" (Libet 1987, p.784). But has he in any event isolated a variety of conscious experiences,
however characterized, that can be given absolute timing by such an experimental design?
acte gratuit
He claims that when conscious intentions to act (at least of his special sort) are put into registration with the brain
events that actually initiate the acts, there is an offset: consciousness of intention lags 300-500msec behind the
relevant brain events. This does look ominous to anyone committed to the principle that "our conscious
decisions" our bodily motions. It looks as if are located in Cartesian theaters where we are shown, with
a half-second tape delay, the decision-making that is going on (somewhere aren't). We are not
quite "out of the loop" (as they say in the White House), but since our access to information is thus delayed, the
most we can do is intervene with last-moment "vetoes" or "triggers." One who accepts this picture might put it
this way:
control we
real elsewhere we
Downstream from (unconscious) command headquarters, I take no real initiative, am never in on the birth of a
project, but do exercise a modicum of executive modulation of the formulated policies streaming through my
This picture is compelling but incoherent. For one thing, such a "veto" would itself have to be a "conscious
decision", it seems, and hence ought to require its own 300-500msec cerebral preparation--unless one is assuming
outright Cartesian dualism. (See MacKay, 1985, who makes a related point). Setting that problem aside, Libet's
model, as before, is Stalinesque, and the obvious Orwellian alternative is raised by Jasper (1985), who notes that
both epileptic automatisms and behaviors occurring under the effect of such drugs as scopolamine show that
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"brain mechanisms underlying awareness may occur without those which make possible the recall of this
awareness in memory afterward." Libet concedes that this "does present a problem, but was not experimentally
testable." (p.560)Endnote 13
Given this concession, is the task of fixing the absolute -timing of consciousness ill-conceived? Neither
Libet nor his critics draw that conclusion. Libet, having carefully distinguished content from vehicle-- is
represented from it is represented--nonetheless tries to draw inferences from premises about what is
represented to conclusions about the absolute timing of the representing in consciousness (Cf. Salter, 1989).
Wasserman (1985) sees the problem: "The time when the external objective spot occupies a given clock position
can be determined easily, but this is not the desired result." But he then goes on to fall in the Cartesian trap: "What
is needed is the time of occurrence of the internal brain-mind representation of the spot."
" time of occurrence" of the internal representation? Occurrence where? There is essentially continuous
representation of the spot (representing it to be in various different positions) in various different parts of the brain,
starting at the retina and moving up through the visual system. The brightness of the spot is represented in some
places and times, its location in others, and its motion in still others. As the external spot moves, all these
representations change, in an asynchronous and spatially distributed way. Where does "it all come together at an
instant in consciousness"? Nowhere. Wasserman correctly points out that the task of determining where the spot
was at some time in the subjective sequence is itself a voluntary task, and initiating it presumably takes some time.
This is difficult not only because it is in competition with other concurrent projects (as stressed by Stamm, p.554),
but also because it is unnatural--a conscious judgment of temporality of a sort that does not normally play a role in
behavior control, and hence has no natural meaning in the sequence. The process of interpretation that eventually
fixes the judgment of subjective simultaneity is itself an artifact of the experimental situation, and ,
therefore telling us nothing of interest about the actual timing of normal representation vehicles anywhere in the
changes the task
Stamm likens the situation to Heisenbergian uncertainty: "self-monitoring of an internal process interferes with
that process, so that its precise measurement is impossible." (p.554)
This observation betrays a commitment to the mistaken idea that an absolute time of intersection, "precise
measurement" of which, alas, is impossible for Heisenbergian reasons (see also Harnad, 1989). This could only
make sense on the assumption that there is a particular privileged place where the intersection matters.
there is
The all too natural vision that we must discard is the following: somewhere deep in the brain an act-initiation
begins; it starts out as an unconscious intention, and slowly makes its way to the theater, picking up clarity and
power as it goes, and then, at an instant, , it bursts on stage, where a parade of visual spot-representations are
marching past, having made their way slowly from the retina, getting clothed with brightness and location as they
moved. The audience or is given the task of saying which spot-representation was "on stage" exactly when the
conscious intention made its bow. Once identified, this spot's time of departure from the retina can be calculated, as
well as the distance to the theater and the transmission velocity. In that way we can determine the exact moment at
which the conscious intention occurred in the Cartesian theater.
Some have thought that although vision is incoherent, that does not require one to give up the idea of absolute
timing of experiences. There is an alternative family of models for the onset of consciousness that avoid the
preposterousness of the Cartesian centered brain. Couldn't consciousness be a matter not of arrival at a point but
rather a matter of a representation exceeding some threshold of activation over the whole cortex or large parts
thereof? On this model, an element of content becomes conscious at some time , not by entering some
functionally defined and anatomically located system, but by changing state right where it is: by acquiring some
property or by having the intensity of one of its properties boosted above some criterial level.
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The idea that content becomes conscious not by entering a subsystem, but by the brain's undergoing a state
change of one sort or another has much to recommend it (see, e.g., Kinsbourne, 1988, Neumann, 1990, Crick and
Koch, 1990). Moreover, the simultaneities and sequences of such mode-shifts can presumably be measured by
outside observers, providing, in principle, a unique and determinate sequence of contents attaining the special
mode. But this is still the Cartesian theater if it is claimed that the real ("absolute") timing of such mode-shifts is
definitive of subjective sequence. The imagery is different, but the implications are the same. Conferring the
special property that makes for consciousness at an instant is only half the problem; discriminating that the
property has been conferred at that time is the other, and although scientific observers with their instruments may
be able to do this with microsecond accuracy, how is the brain to do this? We human beings do make judgments
of simultaneity and sequence of elements of our own experience, some of which we express, so at some point or
points in our brains the corner must be turned from the actual timing of representations to the representation of
timing. This is a process that takes effort in one way or another (Gallistel, 1990), and wherever and whenever
these discriminations are made, thereafter the temporal properties of the representations embodying those
judgments are not constitutive of their content.
Suppose that a succession of widely spread activation states, with different contents, sweeps over the cortex. The
actual, objectively measured simultaneities and sequences on this broad field are of no functional relevance
. What would make sequence the stream of
consciousness if the brain could not discern the sequence? What matters, once again, is not the temporal properties
of the representings, but the temporal properties , something determined by how they are "taken" by
subsequent processes in the brain.
they can also be accurately detected by mechanisms in the brain this
3.3. Grey Walter's experiment: a better demonstration of the central contention of the Multiple Drafts model
It was noted above that Libet's experiment created an artificial and difficult judgment task, which robbed the
results of the hoped-for significance. This can be brought out more clearly by comparing it to a similar experiment
by Grey Walter (1963), with patients in whose motor cortex he had implanted electrodes. He wanted to test the
hypothesis that certain bursts of recorded activity were the initiators of intentional actions. So he arranged for each
patient to look at slides from a carousel projector. The patient could advance the carousel at will, by pressing the
button on the controller. (Note the similarity to Libet's experiment: this was a "free" decision, timed only by an
endogenous rise in boredom, or curiosity about the next slide, or distraction, or whatever.) Unbeknownst to the
patient, however, the controller button was a dummy, not attached to the slide projector at all. What actually
advanced the slides was the amplified signal from the electrode implanted in the patient's motor cortex.
One might suppose that the patients would notice nothing out of the ordinary, but in fact they were startled by the
effect, because it seemed to them as if the slide projector was anticipating their decisions. They reported that just
as they were "about to" push the button, but before they had actually decided to do so, the projector would
advance the slide--and they would find themselves pressing the button with the worry that it was going to advance
the slide twice! The effect was strong, according to Grey Walter's account, but apparently he never performed the
dictated follow-up experiment: introducing a variable delay element to see how large a delay had to be
incorporated into the triggering in order to eliminate the "precognitive carousel" effect.
An important difference between Grey Walter's and Libet's design is that the judgment of temporal order that
leads to surprise in Grey Walter's experiment is part of a normal task of behavior monitoring. In this regard it is like
the temporal order judgments by which our brains distinguish moving left-to-right from moving right-to-left, rather
than "deliberate, conscious" order judgments. The brain in this case has set itself to "expect" visual feedback on
the successful execution of its project of advancing the carousel, and the feedback arrives earlier than expected,
triggering an alarm. This could show us something important about the actual timing of content vehicles and their
attendant processes in the brain, but it would not, contrary to first appearances, show us something about the
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"absolute timing of the conscious decision to change the slide."
Suppose, for instance, that an extension of Grey Walter's experiment showed that a delay as long as 300msec (as
implied by Libet) had to be incorporated into the implementation of the act in order to eliminate the subjective
sense of precognitive slide-switching. What such a delay would in fact show would be that expectations set up by
a decision to change the slide are tuned to expect visual feedback 300msec later, and to report back with alarm
under other conditions. The fact that the alarm eventually gets interpreted in the subjective sequence as a
perception of misordered events (change before button push) shows nothing about in real time the
consciousness of the decision to press the button first occurred. The sense the subjects reported of not quite having
had time to "veto" the initiated button push when they "saw the slide was already changing" is a natural
interpretation for the brain to settle on (eventually) of the various contents made available at various times for
incorporation into the narrative. Was this sense already there at the first moment of consciousness of intention (in
which case the effect requires a long delay to "show time" and is Stalinesque) or was it a retrospective
reinterpretation of an otherwise confusing (in which case it is Orwellian)? This question should no
longer seem to demand an answer.
fait accompli
The Multiple Drafts model has many other implications for scientific theories of consciousness (Dennett, 1991),
but our main conclusion in this paper is restricted to temporal properties of experience: the representation of
sequence in the stream of consciousness is a product of the brain's interpretive processes, not a direct reflection of
the sequence of events making up those processes. Indeed, as Ray Jackendoff has pointed out to us, what we are
arguing for in this essay is a straightforward extension to experience of time of the common wisdom about
experience of space; the representation of space in the brain does not always use space-in-the-brain to represent
space, and the representation of time in the brain does not always use time-in-the-brain. It may be objected that the
arguments presented here are powerless to overturn the still obvious truth that our experiences of events occur in
the very same order as we experience them to occur. If someone thinks the thought "One, two, three, four, five,"
his thinking "one" occurs before his thinking "two" and so forth. The example does illustrate a thesis that is true in
general, and does indeed seem unexceptioned so long as we restrict our attention to psychological phenomena of
"ordinary," macroscopic duration. But the experiments we selected for discussion are concerned with events that
were constricted by unusually narrow time-frames of a few hundred milliseconds. At this scale, we have argued,
the standard presumption breaks down.
It might be supposed, then, that we are dealing only with special cases. These limiting cases may interestingly
reveal how the brain deals with informational overload, but, one might suggest, they are unrepresentative of the
brain's more usual manner of functioning. The contrary is the case, however, as might be anticipated, in view of
the brain's well-known propensity for applying a limited number of basic manners of proceeding across a wide
range of situations. The processes of editorial revision that are dramatically revealed in the time-pressured cases
continue indefinitely as the brain responds to the continued demands of cognition and control. For instance, as time
passes after an event has occurred, that event may be recalled to episodic memory, but to an ever more limited
extent. After some days, an occurrence that may have unrolled over minutes or more is remembered within as
restricted a time frame as those we have been discussing. Such memories present not as randomly blurry or
depleted versions, but as internally coherent simplified renderings of what are taken to be the most important
elements. Temporal succession is typically an early victim of this reorganization of the event, sacrificed in favor of
(apparently) more useful information (as instanced in the phi phenomenon).
We perceive--and remember--perceptual events, not a successively analyzed trickle of perceptual elements or
attributes locked into succession as if pinned into place on a continuous film. Different attributes of events are
indeed extracted by different neural facilities at different rates, (e.g. location versus shape versus color) and
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people, if asked to respond to the presence of each one in isolation, would do so with different latencies,
depending on which it was, and on other well-explored factors. The relative timing of inputs plays a necessary
role in determining the information or content in experience, but it is not obligatorily tied to any stage or point of
time during central processing. How soon we can respond to one in isolation, and how soon to the other, does not
exactly indicate what will be the temporal relationship of the two in percepts that incorporate them both.
There is nothing theoretically amiss with the goal of acquiring precise timing information on the mental operations
or informational transactions in the brain (Wasserman and Kong, 1979). It is indeed crucial to developing a good
theory of the brain's control functions to learn exactly when and where various informational streams converge,
when "inferences" and "matches" and "bindings" occur. But these temporal and spatial details do not tell us
directly about the contents of consciousness. The temporal sequence is, within the limits of
whatever temporal control window bounds our investigation, purely a matter of the content represented, not the
timing of the representing.
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1. The original draft of this essay was written while the authors were supported by the Rockefeller Foundation as
Scholars in Residence at the Bellagio Study Center, Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, April, 1990. We are grateful
to Kathleen Akins, Peter Bieri, Edoardo Bisiach, William Calvin, Patricia Churchland, Robert Efron, Stephan
Harnad, Douglas Hofstadter, Tony Marcel, Odmar Neumann, Jay Rosenberg, and David Rosenthal for comments
on subsequent drafts.
2. A philosophical exception is Vendler (1972, 1984) who attempts to salvage Cartesian dualism. A scientific
exception is Eccles (E.g., Popper and Eccles, 1977).
3. What about the prospect of a solitary Robinson-Crusoe scientist who performs all these experiments wordlessly
on himself? Would the anomalies be apparent to this lone observer? What about reconstructing these experiments
with non-language-using animals? Would we be inclined to interpret the results in the same way? Would we be
justified? These are good questions, but their answers are complicated, and we must reserve them for another
4. Such a "postmark" can in principle be added to a vehicle of content at any stage of its journey; if all materials
arriving at a particular location come from the same place, by the same route at the same speed, their "departure
time" from the original destination can be retroactively stamped on them, by simply subtracting a constant from
their arrival time at the way station. This is an engineering possibility that is probably used by the brain for making
certain automatic adjustments for standard travel times.
5. "The essence of much of the research that has been carried out in the field of sensory coding can be distilled
into a single, especially important idea--any candidate code can represent any perceptual dimension; there is no
need for an isomorphic relation between the neural and psychophysical data. Space can represent time, time can
represent space, place can represent quality, and certainly, nonlinear neural functions can represent linear or
nonlinear psychophysical functions equally well." (Uttal, 1979) This is a widely acknowledged idea, but, as we
will show, some theorists (mis-)understand it by tacitly reintroducing the unnecessary "isomorphism" in a dimly
imagined subsequent translation or "projection" in consciousness.
6. Cf. Pylyshyn, 1979: "No one . . . is disposed to speak of such physical properties of a mental event as
its color, size, mass and so on . . .though we speak of them as (or having the experiential content
of) such properties. For instance, no one would not properly say of a thought (or image) that it was large or red,
but only that it was a thought something large or red (or that it was an image something large or red) . . . It
ought to strike one as curious, therefore, that we speak so freely of the of a mental event."
do representing
about of
7. P. S. Churchland (1981, p172) notes a difference between "masking in the usual sense" and "blanking in short
term memory," which perhaps is an allusion to these two possibilities, but does not consider how one might
distinguish between them.
8. Consider the region of cortex, MT, which responds to motion (and apparent motion). Suppose then that some
activity in MT the brain's concluding that there was intervening motion. There is no further question, on the
Multiple Drafts model, of whether this is a pre-experiential or post-experiential conclusion. It would be a mistake
to ask, in other words, whether this activity in MT was a "reaction to a conscious experience" (by the Orwellian
historian) as opposed to a "decision to represent motion" (by the Stalinesque editor).
9. See also his dismissal of MacKay's suggestion of a more moderate reading (1981, p.195, 1985b, p.568).
10. Libet's final summation in 1981, on the other hand, was inconclusive: "My own view . . .has been that the
temporal discrepancy creates relative difficulties for identity theory, but that these are not insurmountable." (p.196)
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Presumably they would be undeniably insurmountable on the backwards interpretation, and Libet later
(1985b, p.569) describes these difficulties in a way that seems to require the milder reading: "Although the delay-
and-antedating hypothesis does not separate the actual time of the experience from its time of neuronal production,
it does eliminate the necessity for simultaneity between the of the experience and the actual
clock-time of the experience." Perhaps Eccles' enthusiastic support for a radical, dualistic interpretation of the
findings has misdirected the attention of Libet (and his critics) from the mild thesis he sometimes defends.
subjective timing
11. In an earlier paper, Libet conceded the possibility of Orwellian processes and supposed there might be a
significant difference between unconscious mental events and conscious-but-ephemeral mental events: "There
may well be an immediate but ephemeral kind of experience of awareness which is not retained for recall at
conscious levels of experience. If such experiences exist, however, their content would have direct significance
only in later unconscious mental processes, although, like other unconscious experiences, they might play an
indirect role in later conscious ones." (1965, p.78)
12. Harnad (1989) sees an insoluble problem of measurement, but denies our contention that there is no fact of the
matter: "introspection can only tells us when an event to occur, or which of two events to occur
first. There is no independent way of confirming that the real timing was indeed as it seemed. Incommensurability
is a methodological problem, not a metaphysical one." So Harnad asserts what we deny: that among the real
timings of events in the brain is a "real timing" of events .
seemed seemed
in consciousness
13. In a later response to a similar suggestion of Hoffman and Kravitz (1987) Libet asks the rhetorical question
"Are we to accept the primary evidence of the subjects' introspective report (as I do), or are we going to insist that
the subject had a conscious experience which he himself does not report and would even deny having had?"
(1987,p.784) This is another expression of Libet's a priori preference for a Stalinesque position.
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... At any single moment of an observer's time, the activity of one's brain reflects a mixture of past content (memories), immediate perceptions, and future expectations (foresight); this is indeed a modern re-formulation of Saint-Augustin's insightful definition. To navigate the past, present and future in such manner, cognitive neuroscientists say that the brain maps and represents time (10,15,16): what exactly does a cognitive (neuro)scientist intend to say by this? ...
... As is the case in physics, events cannot be dissociated from their spatiotemporal coordinates except when recoded in abstract format (i.e. when neural systems transduce the temporal properties of stimuli or events into a neural code). Hence, the difficulty resides in separating the representing from the represented (15,60), the signifier from the signified. ...
... Although simplifying assumptions on the difficulty of defining events (93)(94)(95), of defining the nature of non-isomorphism between mental and physical time (15) and the issue serial order in the brain and mind (17,18) are made for experimental feasibility, an important factor for explaining temporal cognition should be incorporated in empirical work. I believe a crucial case should be made for the generic human ability to endogenously re-order events at will, whether they may or may not have been experienced in real-life. ...
Full-text available
You and I, feeling and thinking matter, age as time elapses and thus conceive time as an irreversible arrow. We also speak of time that passes and that lasts, of time that marks the beat, and reminisce the past and plan the future times. Humans equip themselves with a linear arrow of time (sometimes circular) on which they chronologically arrange events, facts of their personal life, or those of History; events, which they causally (re)arrange from the past to anticipate the future. The intelligible and consciously available temporal phenomenology we, humans, experience is a hallmark of exquisite evolutionary processes, seemingly remote from the time that physics describe. Yet the psychological reality that makes up our intangible awareness of what we call “time” is inseparable from the functioning of the most complex physical systems known in the universe: our brains. Can we infer from the dynamic properties of brain activity our experience of time? Is the timing of consciousness emerging from our brain also the consciousness of time we claim to have? Herein, I will discuss the viewpoint that (psychological) time results from a neural code and that time perception cannot be reduced to “serial nows” – if only from the external observer’s viewpoint. Operationalizing “time” in cognitive neuroscience is a necessary heuristics to posit clear computational goals, algorithmic rules and possible implementations of mental clocks in thinking matter.
... In his interpretation, he replaced a thousand-yearold duality of body-soul with the new version of duality of mind-body. He even characterize the self further, in Cartesian theater where "I" is an entity in our mind that is the viewer of subjective experiences (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992). John Locke was the first to promote the idea of consciousness as the most important aspect of self, giving rise to self-identity and self-awareness that are the cornerstone of modern science of mind (Gordon-Roth J, 2020). ...
The notion of free will seems so intuitive to us that it would be hard, even impossible, to imagine that we live in a world without ever exerting any willpower. This view of reality is not only hindrance to inspiration, it poses a serious threat to our moral and social responsibilities. Nonetheless, many scientific and philosophical schools of thought such as determinism purport free will as a mere illusion. As an attempt to rescue free will put forward by libertarianism, compatibilism or physical indeterminism that either exempts our mind from the universal rules of cause and effect by offering our minds a metaphysical status or substitute free will with random will rooted in the laws of quantum mechanics. This manuscript offers an alternative perspective under a new paradigm of consciousness called physical libertarianism that explicates true free will through the unwavering laws of cause and effect. Based on this paradigm, consciousness is the result of interaction of awareness and decision-making process. By applying awareness to the process of decision-making awareness-based choice selection or true free will is conceived. In return, by assigning the power of decision making to the process of awareness discretionary selection of information for attention or intentional attention is emerged. Through integration of these two mental functions, an independent entity called “I” is formed that differentiates natural intelligence from artificial intelligence. While determinism can aptly describe the world of inanimate objects and artificial intelligence, because of “I,” determinism has no jurisdiction over the realm of natural intelligence.
... 3 illusory impression of movement when seeing two brief stimuli presented successively at two distinct locations (e.g., Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992;Dainton, 2008;Grush, 2006;Hoerl, 2012). Though it bears some similarities with apparent motion, we shall see that the sense of impending collision raises its own set of questions. ...
... Prior to Cartesian renaissance, "I" was understood as a metaphysical or religious description of soul or psyche, whereby Berkeley claimed that our spirit is constantly observing us (Downing, 2020). Later, "I" started to be viewed as an entity that is interchangeable with mind, but also as an observer in the Cartesian theatre (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992). ...
Consciousness is usually perceived as a state of being aware of one’s environment as well as self. Despite its omnipresence in our life, understanding this concept is challenging. This has given rise to several theories attempting to explain the nature of consciousness, as well as hard and soft problems of consciousness. In fact, the boundaries of consciousness defined by these theories are a topic of continued discussion, particularly in light of the recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI). Some of these theories consider consciousness as a simple integration of information while others purport the need for an agency in the process of integration for an entity to be considered conscious. Some theories consider consciousness as a graded entity and some equate consciousness with content of awareness. In this work, major theories of consciousness are reviewed and compared, focusing on awareness, attention, and sense of self. These findings are interpreted in relation to AI in order to ascertain what makes AI distinct from natural intelligence.
... Jaeggi (2013, 27 ff.) refers to Foucault in this context, but the idea is widespread across and beyond philosophical debates; see, for instance,Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992) andMcConnel (2011). ...
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Alienation has been recently revived as a central theme in critical theory. Current debates, however, tend to focus on normative rather than on explanatory issues. In this paper, I confront the latter and advance an account of alienation that bears on the mechanisms that bring it about in order to locate alienation as a distinctive social and psychological fact. In particular, I argue that alienation can be explained as a disruption induced by social factors in the sense of mental ownership that comes with the first personal awareness of being a subject of attitudes, emotions, and actions, and outline how social factors can play a structuring causal role in the process that brings it about. In the first section, I introduce the theme and explain why it is important to focus on the mechanisms that underlie alienation. In the second section, I maintain that understanding how alienation works is crucial to make sense of false consciousness. In the third section, I consider the relevance of mental ownership to explaining alienation and discuss existing evidence about whether and how it can fail. In the final section, I argue that disturbances in the simulation routines that support social cognition might underpin alienation, and outline how social factors might play a structuring causal role in this connection.
The way we view the reality of nature, including ourselves, depend on consciousness.It also defines the identity of the person, since we know people in terms of their experiences. In general, consciousness defines human existence in this universe. Furthermore, consciousness is associated with the most debated problems in physics such as the notion of observation, observer,in the measurement problem. However,its nature, occurrence mechanism in the brain and the definite universal locality of the consciousness are not clearly known. Due to this consciousness is considered asan essential unresolved scientific problem of the current era.Here, we review the physical processes which are associated in tackling these challenges. Firstly, we discuss the association of consciousness with transmission of signals in the brain, chain of events, quantum phenomena process and integrated information. We also highlight the roles of structure of matter,field, and the concept of universality towards understanding consciousness. Finally, we propose further studies for achieving better understanding of consciousness.
Several authors have proposed that perceptual information carries labels that identify temporal features, including time of occurrence, ordinal temporal relations, and brief durations. These labels serve to locate and organise perceptual objects, features, and events in time. In some proposals time marking has local, specific functions such as synchronisation of different features in perceptual processing. In other proposals time marking has general significance and is responsible for rendering perceptual experience temporally coherent, just as various forms of spatial information render the visual environment spatially coherent. These proposals, which all concern time marking on the millisecond time scale, are reviewed. It is concluded that time marking is vital to the construction of a multisensory perceptual world in which things are orderly with respect to both space and time, but that much more research is needed to ascertain its functions in perception and its neurophysiological foundations.
In the previous issue, Budson, Richman, and Kensinger (2022) put forth the intriguing proposal that consciousness may have evolved from the episodic memory system. In addition to providing a possible evolutionary trajectory for consciousness, I believe that viewing consciousness as an extension of memory in this way is particularly useful for understanding some of the puzzling temporal complexities that are inherent to consciousness. For example, due to neural transmission delays, our conscious experience must necessarily lag the outside world, which creates a paradox for both conscious perception (Do we see the past, rather than the present?) and action (How can we make rapid decisions if it takes so long to become conscious of something?). These paradoxes can be elegantly solved by treating consciousness as a memory system. Finally, the proposal put forth by Budson and colleagues (2022) aligns with the emerging perspective that consciousness, like memory, represents a narrative time line of events rather than any single instant. However, I believe that this conceptualization can be further extended to include not only the past, but also the future. In this way, consciousness can be provocatively viewed as the remembered past, present, and future.
For many decades, the proponents of `artificial intelligence' have maintained that computers will soon be able to do everything that a human can do. In his bestselling work of popular science, Sir Roger Penrose takes us on a fascinating tour through the basic principles of physics, cosmology, mathematics, and philosophy to show that human thinking can never be emulated by a machine. Oxford Landmark Science books are 'must-read' classics of modern science writing which have crystallized big ideas, and shaped the way we think.
Everybody knows that one will suddenly fall into misjudgment in sequential item recognition, when the sequence such as music or speech comes at a too rapid rate. The author named the threshold of such rate the "critical rate for identification(C. R. I. ). , and studied several factors which affect the critical rate, by means of Warren-type experiments. The results show that kind of sound, number of classifying categories, silent interval between items, and similarity between sequential items each affect the C. R. I. . On the basis of the results, the relations between auditory fusion and auditory stream segregation and the C. R. I. are discussed, and auditory information processing rates are estimated from these C. R. I data.
A great deal of the success of science has rested on its specific methods. One of which has been to start with the study of simple phenomena such as that of falling bodies, or to decompose systems into parts with well-defined properties simpler than those of the total system. In our time there is a growing awareness that in many cases of great practical or scientific interest, such as economics or the hu­ man brain, we have to deal with truly complex systems which cannot be decomposed into their parts without losing crucial properties of the total system. In addi­ tion, complex systems have many facets and can be looked at from many points of view. Whenever a complicated problem arises, some scientists or other people are ready to invent lots of beautiful words, or to quote Goethe "denn immer wo Begriffe feh­ len, dort stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein" ("whenever concepts are lack­ king, a word appears at the right time"). Quite often such a procedure gives not only the layman but also scientists working in fields different from that of the in­ ventor of these new words the impression that this problem has been solved, and I am occasionally shocked to see how influential this kind of "linguistics" has become.
The problem of the relation between our bodies and our minds, and espe­ cially of the link between brain structures and processes on the one hand and mental dispositions and events on the other is an exceedingly difficult one. Without pretending to be able to foresee future developments, both authors of this book think it improbable that the problem will ever be solved, in the sense that we shall really understand this relation. We think that no more can be expected than to make a little progress here or there. We have written this book in the hope that we have been able to do so. We are conscious of the fact that what we have done is very conjectur­ al and very modest. We are aware of our fallibility; yet we believe in the intrinsic value of every human effort to deepen our understanding of our­ selves and of the world we live in. We believe in humanism: in human rationality, in human science, and in other human achievements, however fallible they are. We are unimpressed by the recurrent intellectual fashions that belittle science and the other great human achievements. An additional motive for writing this book is that we both feel that the debunking of man has gone far enough - even too far. It is said that we had to learn from Copernicus and Darwin that man's place in the universe is not so exalted or so exclusive as man once thought. That may well be.