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Modern Congressional Election Theory Meets the 1992 House Elections

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Abstract

The events surrounding the 1992 congressional elections—the check-kiting scandal, the last opportunity to convert campaign funds to personal funds, redistricting, and a public allegedly soured on Congress subsequent to pay raises, scandals, and the Thomas-Hill hearings-provided a unique oppor tunity to test the prevailing models of congressional elections. In this research, we analyze the forces that contributed to the coming of 110 new members to the 103rd Congress. Our conclusion is that, while some aspects of the 1992 elections were unusual, the basic statutes of modem congressional election theory still apply if some needed, friendly amendments are added. Candidates continued to behave strategically, for example, but 1992 indicates the importance of developing the concept of strategic behavior for incumbents as well as challengers.

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... These studies perform a total of 58 tests, and have been published from the mid-1990s (i.e. Ahuja et al., 1994;Alford et al., 1994;Jacobson and Dimock, 1994) to very recently (i.e. Hamel and Miller, 2018;Praino and Stockemer, 2018). ...
... The publication time-frame of these studies is similar to the time-frames unveiled in the previous sections, with early studies in the mid-1990s (i.e. Ahuja et al., 1994;Banducci and Karp, 1994;Jacobson and Dimock, 1994), and later studies published very recently (i.e. Larcinese and Sircar, 2017). ...
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As the number of scandals involving politicians in office rises worldwide, the number of studies dedicated to analysing these scandals and their consequences rises as well. In this article, we try to summarise this emerging literature focusing on quantitative studies that use scandal as an independent variable to model its influence on politicians’ electoral results. The analysis finds that scandal-ridden politicians tend to get fewer votes at the ballot box, are more likely to lose elections, and are less likely to win re-election. It also finds that the link between scandal and turnout is unclear; some models indicate that scandals depress turnout, while others report an increase in turnout.
... First, as noted above we can exploit natural variation in the implication of politicians in the scandal while holding relatively constant the timing and nature of the scandal. To our knowledge, this feature of a scandal is shared only by the US House Banking Scandal (Dimock and Jacobsen, 1995;Ahuja et al., 1994;Banducci and Karp, 1994;Clarke et al., 1999). ...
... In the US, studies have found that congressional incumbents charged with corruption have lost, on average, between six and eleven percentage points at the polls (Peters and Welch, 1980;Welch and Hibbing, 1997). Furthermore, the impact of the aforementioned US House Banking Scandal on the vote share of Members of Congress has been studied extensively (Ahuja et al.,1994;Banducci and Karp, 1994;Clarke et al., 1999). Perhaps most notably, Dimock and Jacobsen (1995) found evidence that incumbents were electorally punished for their misbehaviour. ...
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... It is also important to note that many studies of House retirement have focused on, the influence of financial considerations, particularly the opportunity to convert campaign war chests into cash (Ahuja et al. 1994; Clarke et al. 1999; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Jacobson and Dimock 1994; Theriault 1998). These studies consider the high rate of House, retirements in 1992, explained in part by a grandfathering provision that set that year as the last that House members could convert leftover campaign funds to cash. ...
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Existing theories of congressional retirement have developed in the con- text of the House of Representatives'and thus do not consider important differences between the Senate and the House. Our empirical analysis of Senate retirement from 1962 to 2000 demonstrates that retirement deci- sions of Senators are not affected by the same things that affect their House colleagues' decisions; electoral safety and the value of formal insti- tutional positions influence Senators less than House members. Senate retirement decisions are affected by the age of the member and majority- party status. We discuss implications of our results for the,Senate's oper- ation and place in the constitutional system.
... It contributed significantly to exit from the House by all routes: retirement, defeat in the primary election, and defeat in the general election " (621). Other studies reached similar conclusions (Ahuja et al. 1994; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Stewart 1994). Grose and Yoshinaka (2003) discovered that candidates who leave one party for another—Arlen Specter being a recent example—often suffer negative repercussions. ...
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Conventional wisdom is that one of the few things that can counter the incumbency advantage in congressional elections is when an incumbent is embroiled in a scandal. However, there is little research that directly examines the impact of incumbent scandals on the electoral process. This paper intends to provide a basic foundation upon which future research can proceed. I categorize the types of scandals; their effect on campaign expenditures; the quality of challengers they attract; and their effect on the percentage of the vote received by incumbents.
... Similar estimates have been found in prior analyses (Peters and Welch, 1980 ; see also Roberds, 2003 for slightly different estimates but in the same direction). The House bank scandal produced a string of studies that focused on the electoral fallout of the scandal (Ahuja et al., 1994; Banducci and Karp, 1994; Clarke et al., 1999; Dimock and Jacobson, 1995; Jacobson and Dimock, 1994). In their analysis of the House check kiting scandal in 1992, Dimock and Jacobson (1995) find that although most voters expressed outrage over the incident, most incumbents managed to be reelected , albeit with a reduced vote share. ...
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The article analyzes congressional elections research following from the 1978 National Election Study. In a field where basic information was lacking, the study constitutes a major data collection effort. Results should be taken as tentative, with serious work on measurement and conceptualization remaining. Nevertheless, a number of important preliminary findings can be identified. Voters' evaluations of the congressional candidates, House and Senate, have a major influence on the vote, separate from incumbency and party and more important than presidential evaluations or other evaluations. While House incumbents receive the strongest positive support on a number of measures, there is little negative perception of any candidate in congressional contests. Finally, there are major differences found for Senate and House challengers, in voter recognition and information, but no major differences for Senate and House incumbents. House challengers stand apart from all other candidates in their degree of visibility and contact with voters. The article discusses the implications of these findings and indicates priorities for future research.
Congress Reconsidered: Fifth Edition
  • Lawrence C Dodd
  • Bruce I Oppenheimer
Dodd, Lawrence C., and Bruce I. Oppenheimer 1993. Congress Reconsidered: Fifth Edition. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Voters Will Render Judgments on Members' Checking Habits
_. 1992. "Voters Will Render Judgments on Members' Checking Habits." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50 (18 April): 991-93.
Will Flood of Retirements Arrive in 1992?
  • Janet Hook
Hook, Janet. 1991. "Will Flood of Retirements Arrive in 1992?" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 49 (12 January): 72-78.
Record Rate of Retirements Suggests Major Shakeup
  • Jeffrey L Katz
Katz, Jeffrey L. 1992. "Record Rate of Retirements Suggests Major Shakeup." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50 (4 April): 851-55.